Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 117485-86 April 22, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MELCHOR ESTOMACA y GARQUE, accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J .:p
With our recent adjudgment in People vs. Alicando
1
as a backdrop, even an initial perusal of the
records of these cases now before us on appeal and/or automatic review gives a sense of paramnesia or,
in the French term more often used, deja vu. One cannot escape the illusion of remembering events
when experienced for the first time, or of something overly or unpleasantly familiar in the present
appellate review.
Indeed, the courtroom dramatis personae in the cases at bar are the same as in Alicando, that is,
the presiding judge,
2
the government counsel de oficio,
3
and the substitute counsel de parte.
4
The
cases likewise involve the heinous crime of rape and were repressed by the sentence of death. The crux
of the controversy in both is identically the validity vel non of the arraignment conducted by the same trial
court which followed closely equivalent procedures in conducting the questioned proceedings. Hence, as
will hereafter be demonstrated, the observations of this Court will also inevitably converge and move
along the same channels of thought.
On May 24, 1994, consequent to five separate complaints, Criminal Cases Nos. 43567, 43568,
43569, 43570 and 43571 were filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Iloilo City charging herein
appellant, an illiterate laborer, with rape committed on five separate occasions against his
own daughter, complainant Estelita Estomaca.
The trial court detailed its findings and the prosecution's contentions on the multiple incestuous
rapes, as follows:
Melita is the eldest daughter of the accused, the second husband of Melita's mother.
Melita has a full-blood younger brother around twelve (12) years old. She has two (2)
half-blood sisters (from) the first marriage of her mother who are residing in Manila.
Melita claims that she was first raped in July 1993, at their residence at Barangay
Tiolas, San Joaquin, Iloilo. This is now the subject of Criminal Case No. 43567. The
offense was repeated by her father before Christmas of December, 1993 (Criminal
Case No. 43568); January 1994 (Criminal Case No. 43569); February 1994 (Criminal
Case No. 43570); and on March 6, 1994 (Criminal Case No. 43571).
5

There is some inconsistency in the statements on record as to what actually took place on June 14,
1994 during the arraignment of appellant, assisted by his government counsel de oficio, Atty.
Rogelio Antiquiera. The decision of the court below, dated July 15, 1994, declares that he entered a
plea of guilty to Criminal Cases Nos. 43568 and 43571, and a plea of not guilty to Criminal Cases
Nos. 43567, 43569 and 43570.
6
Obviously engendered by the insufficiency of the proceedings
conducted and the imprecision of the notes taken at this stage, this matter will be further discussed
hereafter.
The two criminal complaints, both subscribed by the offended party on April 29, 1994 and which are
the subject of the joint judgment of the lower court challenged in this appellate review, respectively
allege:
Criminal Case No. 43568
That sometime in the month of December, 1993, in the Municipality of San Joaquin,
Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, taking advantage of his superior strength, abuse of
confidence and trust, he being the father of the undersigned, with deliberate intent
and by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned who, at that time, (was)
15 years of age.
7

Criminal Case No. 43571
That on or about March 6, 1994, in the Municipality of San Joaquin, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being the father of the undersigned complainant, with deliberate intent and
by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse (with) the undersigned, who, at that time, (was)
15 years of age.
8

Proceeding upon the capital nature of the offenses involved, the trial court, after appellant ostensibly
waived the presentation of evidence for his defense, required the prosecution to adduce evidence
purportedly to establish appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, on June 29, 1994, the
complainant herself, Melita Estomaca, appeared in court and testified that she was raped by her
father once in December, 1993 and, again, on March 6, 1994. Both incidents, according to her, took
place inside their residence at Sitio
Tan-agan, Barangay Tiolas in San Joaquin, Iloilo at nighttime and that, on those two occasions, she
tried to resist her father's assaults to no avail. After the last rape, she gathered enough courage to
flee from their home, and thereafter she reported the incidents to her mother who was then living
separately from them. Apparently, appellant was later apprehended and has since been under
detention.
9

On the authority of Republic Act No. 7659 which took effect on December 31, 1993, the lower court
imposed upon appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the sexual assault supposedly
perpetrated in December, 1993, and the supreme penalty of death with respect to the rape allegedly
committed on March 6, 1994. In each of the said cases, he was further ordered to indemnify the
offended party in the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
10

What disconcerts this Court, however, is the alarming consistency of non-compliance by the court a
quo of the procedural rules to be observed for the validity of the arraignment of an accused. Indeed,
the importance of this particular stage of a criminal proceeding, especially when capital offenses are
involved, cannot be over-emphasized. Hence, we pause at this juncture to once again briefly
expound on this vital procedural aspect which the trial court, once in Alicando and again in the case
at bar, appears to have treated with cavalier disregard or frustrating misapprehension.
1. In People vs. A. Albert,
11
we traced the developmental antecedents which culminated and found
expression in reglementary form in Section 3, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
governing a plea of guilty to a capital offense. We there pointed out that the rationale behind the rule is
that courts must proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its severest form death
for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable and experience has shown that
innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty.
12

We stressed the need to avoid improvident pleas of guilt since the accused may thereby forfeit his
life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning, significance and consequences of his
plea.
13
We lamented the confused application adopted or the apathetic indifference in the application of
said rule considering the paramount importance of a valid arraignment, it being the stage where the
issues are joined in the criminal action and without which the proceedings cannot advance further or, if
held, will otherwise be void. We then enjoined the trial courts to review and reflect upon the jurisprudential
and statutory rules which evolved over time in response to the injustice created by improvident pleas
acknowledging guilt, at times belatedly discovered under the judicial rug, if at all.
With exacting certitude, Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment should be made in
open court by the judge himself or by the clerk of court furnishing the accused a copy of the
complaint or information with the list of witnesses stated therein, then reading the same in the
language or dialect that is known to him, and asking him what his plea is to the charge. The
requirement that the reading be made in a language or dialect that the accused understands and
knows is a mandatory requirement, just as the whole of said Section 1 should be strictly followed by
trial courts. This the law affords the accused by way of implementation of the all-important
constitutional mandate regarding the right of an accused to be informed of the precise nature of the
accusation leveled at him and is, therefore, really an avenue for him to be able to hoist the
necessary defense in rebuttal thereof.
14
It is an integral aspect of the due process clause under the
Constitution.
2. For a more graphic illustration, and thereby a clearer appreciation of what actually transpired in
the so-called arraignment of appellant in the court below, we quote at length the pertinent transcripts
of the stenographic notes taken at that stage, with emphases on significant portions:
Pros. Nelson Geduspan : For the prosecution.
Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera : For the accused. Ready for arraignment.
Court : The offended party is the daughter.
Interpreter : (Reading the information/complaint to the accused in
Ilonggo/local dialect).
For Crim. Case No. 43567,
the accused, pleads Guilty.
For Crim. Case No. 43568,
the accused, pleads Guilty.
For Crim. Case No. 43569,
the accused, pleads Guilty.
For Crim. Case No. 43570,
the accused, pleads Guilty.
For Crim. Case No. 43571,
the accused, pleads Guilty.
Court : What is your educational attainment?
Witness : I was not able to finish Grade I.
Court : The court would like to explain to you in your plea of Guilty. If
you plead Guilty to these five (5) offenses, definitely, you will have
five (5) sentences.
Accused : Yes, your honor.
Court : Under the New Law the least most probably would be life
sentence.
Accused : Yes, your honor.
Court : How old are you now?
Accused : Forty two.
Court : Because of this fact you have no chance to get back to the
new society and your rights will be affected.
Accused : I know. That's what they told to me.
Court : Despite of (sic) this fact you still insist on your plea of guilty in
these five cases?
Interpreter : According to him, he performed only two (2) acts.
Court : When (were) these two acts performed?
Accused : December 1993 and March 1994.
Court : The other cases charged against you (are) not true?
Accused : It is not true maybe it was committed by her boyfriend then
it was charged against me.
Court : In so far as. . . What is not included in the plea therefore, is
the month of July 1993, January 1994 and the month of February
1994. You did not commit these? Why is it that when you were asked
you entered a plea of guilty?
Accused : Because I committed two acts only.
Court : Why is it that when you were asked you entered a plea of
guilty?
Accused : Because what I recall is that I just committed two acts of
rape.
Court : Not Guilty in the three (3) charges and Guilty in two (2)
charges. Does counsel and accused agree to pre-trial conference?
Atty. Antiquiera : We dispense (with) the pre-trial conference.
Court : For the two charges (to) which he pleads guilty, the court will
receive evidence in order to impose the proper penalty and on the
other charges, the court will receive evidence for the
prosecution.
15
(Emphasis and corrections in parentheses ours.)
xxx xxx xxx
At the subsequent hearing, just like what happened in Alicando, the presiding judge went through
the same formality of having appellant stand again before him, and this is what transpired:
Court : Before the court allows the prosecution to present evidence,
accused, please come here again.
(At this juncture, the accused came near to the court)
Court : The court informs you as accused that you are charged (with)
the crime of rape; under the new law which if you plead guilty, you will
be sentence(d) to death penalty, did you understand that?
A : Yes, Your Honor.
Q : Despite this warning for the second time by the court to you, do
you still insist (o)n your plea of guilty?
A : Yes, Your Honor.
Q : Is this plea your voluntary will without force or intimidation from
anyone else to include the complaining witness or the family?
A : No, Your Honor.
Q : So, therefore, the court will allow you to present evidence if you
wis(h) to because you insist (o)n your plea of guilty. Do you intend to
present evidence.
A : No, I will not present evidence.
Court : Okey, because of this the court will receive evidence of the
prosecution.
In another case, the last time when arraigned, you admitted that
sometime in December, 1993, you likewise raped your daughter, do
you still confirm and affirm this?
A : Yes, Your Honor.
Q : In this case, because this was committed (i)n December 1993, the
penalty here isreclusion perpetua. After learning this as informed to
you by the court, do still insist on your plea of guilty?
A : Yes, I will admit. I did it.
Q : Do you admit this voluntarily without force, intimidation or physical
injuries or mauling on you by anyone whomsoever?
A : No, Sir.
Q : In connection with this, therefore, definitely you will be convicted
in both cases?
A : Yes, your honor.
Q : What is your educational attainment?
A : Grade I.
Q : Being Grade I, the court emphasized that you are swayed by your
own fashion because of your low education?
A : I am not.
Q : In other words, you still insist on your plea of guilty?
A : Yes, sir.
Court : Okey, proceed with the presentation of prosecution evidence.
Q : In this Criminal Case No. 43568, do you intend to present
evidence?
A : No, Your Honor.
Court : Okey, proceed.
16

xxx xxx xxx
3. At threshold, what strikes this Court as peculiar is that the arraignment appears to have consisted
merely of the bare reading of the five complaints, synthetically and cryptically reported in the
transcript, thus: "(Reading the information/complaint to the accused in Ilonggo/local dialect)." Since
what was supposed to have been read was stated in the singular, but there were five criminal
complaints against appellant, this Court is then left to speculate on whether all five criminal
complaints were actually read, translated or explained to appellant on a level within his
comprehension, considering his limited education.
Again, on the presumption of correctness, since this Court has no other bearings to steer by, it may
be assumed that all five complaints were read since the clerk is supposed to have thereafter
announced in cadence and in the consecutive order of cases that appellant pleaded guilty to all the
charges. What, however, punctures this possible bubble of regularity is that appellant subsequently
declared, and the clerk consequently contradicted her previous recital, that he was not pleading
guilty to three of the complaints. This is hardly a respectable and credible performance in the
solemnity of a court trial of five capital offenses.
We cannot, therefore, be persuaded that on this very basic procedure alone, involving just the
mechanical process of arraignment outlined in Section 1, there was the necessary degree of
compliance by the court below. Other considerations reveal how flawed the supposed arraignment
actually was. For instance, there is no showing whether or not appellant or his counsel de oficio was
furnished a copy of each complaint with the list of witnesses against him, in order that the latter may
duly prepare and comply with his responsibilities. Of more troublous concern is the fact that
appellant was not specifically warned that on his plea of guilty, he would definitely and in any event
be given the death penalty under the "New Law," as the trial court calls Republic Act No. 7659. He
was also not categorically advised that his plea of guilty would not under any circumstance
affect or reduce the death sentenceas he may have believed or may have been erroneously
advised.
Such an erroneous notion on the part of appellant which may have impelled him to plead guilty is not
improbable or conjectural, especially when we consider his mental state and the environmental
situation. This is precisely whatPeople vs. Dayot
1
7 cautioned against, thus:
A "searching inquiry," under the Rules, means more than informing cursorily the
accused that he faces a jail term (because the accused is aware of that) but so also,
the exact length of imprisonment under the law and the certainty that he will serve
time at the national penitentiary or a penal colony. Not infrequently indeed, an
accused pleads guilty in the hope, as we said, of a lenient treatment, or upon a
bad advice or promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should
he admit guilt or express "remorse." It is the duty of the judge to see to it that
he does not labor under these mistaken impressions, . . . . (Emphasis supplied).
Likewise of very serious importance and consequence is the fact that the complaints were
supposedly read to appellant in "Ilonggo/local dialect." Parenthetically, there was no statement of
record that appellant fully understood that medium of expression. This assumes added significance
since Ilonggo, or properly called Hiligaynon, is a regional language,
18
spoken in a major part of Iloilo
province, Negros Occidental and, with variations, in Capiz. Within a province or major geographical area
using a basic regional language, there may be other local dialects spoken in certain parts thereof. If said
indication in the aforequoted portion of the transcript intended to convey that Ilonggo is merely a local
dialect and was also the idiom referred to, the same is egregious error; it would be different if "local
dialect" was used to denote an alternative and different medium but, inexplicably, without identifying what
it was.
The significance of this distinction is found right in the provisions of Section 1(a) of Rule 116 which,
cognizant of the aforestated linguistic variations, deliberately required that the complaint or
information be read to the accused in thelanguage or the dialect known to him, to ensure his
comprehension of the charges. The Court takes judicial notice, because it
is either of public knowledge or readily capable of unquestionable demonstration,
19
that in the central
and northwestern part of Iloilo province and all the way up to and throughout Antique, including
necessarily San Joaquin where the offenses were committed and of which appellant and his family are
natives, the local dialect is known as "kinaray-a."
Barring previous exposure to or as a consequence of extended social or commercial intercourse,
"kinaray-a" is not readily understandable to nor spoken by those born to the Hiligaynon regional
language or who have lived in the areas under its sway for an appreciable period of time. The
converse is true for those whose native tongue is the dialect of "kinaray-a," since they are generally
not well-versed in Ilonggo, or Hiligaynon. Since all the complaints are not only in English but in
technical legal language, we are again at sea as to whether and how the indictments were translated
to Ilonggo and/or to "kinaray-a," or that the appellant was truly and honestly made aware of the
charges and, especially, the consequences of his guilty plea thereto. The records are silent and do
not reveal anything on this point, nor how the dialogue between the presiding judge and appellant
was translated. Yet a man's life is at stake while this Court wrestles with that dilemma created by an
omission of official duty.
4. The foregoing discussion brings us to the strict injunction that the trial court must fully
discharge its duty to conduct the requisite searching inquiry in such a way as would
indubitably show that appellant had made not only a clear, definite and unconditional plea,
but that he did so with a well-informed understanding and full realization of the
consequences thereof. To ask an accused about his educational attainment and then warn him
that he might have admitted the crime because of his poor intelligence is certainly not the logical
approach in assaying the sufficiency of his plea of guilty.
In the same manner, a mere warning to him that he could possibly face extreme retribution in the
form of death or face a life sentence in jail is not even enough.
20
The trial judge should ascertain and
be totally convinced that, for all intents and purposes, the plea recorded has all the earmarks of a valid
and acceptable confession upon which an eventual judgment of conviction can stand.
21
Although there is
no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge may go about the matter of a proper "searching
inquiry," it would be well for the court, for instance, to require the accused to fully narrate the incident that
spawned the charges against him, or by making him reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the
crime, or by causing him to furnish and explain to the court missing details of significance.
22

The trial court should also be convinced that the accused has not been coerced or placed under a
state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent or avenging
quarters and this it can do, such as by ascertaining from the accused himself the manner in which he
was subsequently brought into the custody of the law; or whether he had the assistance of
competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and, ascertaining from him
the conditions under which he was detained and interrogated during the aforestated investigations.
Likewise, a series of questions directed at defense counsel as to whether or not said counsel had
conferred with, and completely explained to the accused the meaning of a plea and its
consequences, would be a well-taken step along those lines.
23

Questions of these nature are undoubtedly crucial and no truer is this than in the case of appellant
for, again, the original records and rollo of this case now under review are completely bereft of any
document or record concerning his apprehension, detention and prior investigation, whether
custodial or preliminary. The foregoing circumstances must be taken in addition to the appropriate
forewarnings of the consequences of a plea of guilty, as well as the questions by the court regarding
the age, educational attainment and socio-economic status of the accused which may reveal
contributory insights for a proper verdict in the case.
And, on this latter aspect, we are inclined to quote from Alicando since, as stated in limine the
defective arraignment in the cases now before us is virtually a reprise of what the same trial court
with its presiding judge did or did not do in that previous case:
Section 3 of Rule 116 which the trial court violated is not a new rule for it merely
incorporated the decision of this Court in People vs. Apduhan Jr. and reiterated in an
unbroken line of cases. The bottom line of the rule is that a plea of guilt must be
based on a free and informed judgment. Thus, the searching inquiry of the trial
court must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea; and (2) the full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The questions of the trial court
failed to show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the appellant nor did the
questions demonstrate appellant's full comprehension of the consequences of the
plea. The records do not reveal any information about thepersonality profile of the
appellant which can serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and
informed plea of guilt. The age, socio-economic status, and educational background
of the appellant were not plumbed by the trial court. . . . . (Citations omitted).
It will be readily observed, if one would analyze appellant's responses during his irregular
arraignment, that his low intelligence quotient and lack of education combined to deprive him of fully
understanding what obviously appeared to him as mysterious rituals and unfamiliar jargons. This
was also what happened, and what we duly noted, inPeople vs. Albert, supra.
In the transcripts of said proceeding which are earlier quoted extensively, there are italicized portions
showing not only the grossly inadequate or ambiguous, if not indifferent, questions of the lower court
but also the erratic answers of appellant which are neither responsive nor rational.. There is no need
to belabor them here since they speak for themselves, but we are not impressed by the formulary
questions posed by the lower court while going through the motions of interviewing appellant. The
Court would want to stress here, therefore, that the judicial conscience cannot accept as valid a plea
of guilty to a charge with a mandatory death penalty when entered by an accused with a befuddled
state of mind at an arraignment with reversible lapses in law.
5. Adverting once again to Alicando, we reiterated therein that pursuant to Binabay vs. People, et
al.,
24
no valid judgment can be rendered upon an invalid arraignment. Since in Alicando the arraignment
of appellant therein was void, the judgment of conviction rendered against him was likewise void, hence
in fairness to him and in justice to the offended party that case was remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings. The case at bar being on all fours with the aforementioned cases on the particular
determinant issue, we have perforce to yield to the same doctrine and disposition.
Let it be clearly understood, however, especially by the censorious: This Court will not hesitate to
impose the capital punishment when all the requisites therefor have been met in accordance with the
law of the land. It cannot, therefore, hold a life forfeit, no matter how despicable the offender, when
effective protection for his basic rights was denied because of poverty or ignorance. Nor will the
Court render a death sentence just to make a meretricious obeisance to the vengeful call for blood.
Judicious verdicts evolve from the privacy of reasoned reflection in chambers and not from the
publicity of emotional acclaim on the podium.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo in Criminal Cases Nos. 43568 and 43571 convicting
accused-appellant Melchor Estomaca y Garque of two crimes of rape is hereby SET ASIDE. Said
cases are REMANDED to the trial court for further and appropriate proceedings, with instructions
that the same be given appropriate priority and the proceedings therein be conducted with deliberate
dispatch and circumspection.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 140863 August 22, 2000
SOLAR TEAM ENTERTAINMENT, INC. and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROLANDO HOW, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch
257 of Paraaque and MA. FE F. BARREIRO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GONZAGA-REYES, J .:
The question raised in this instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is whether or not the trial
court can indefinitely suspend the arraignment of the accused until the petition for review with the
Secretary of Justice (SOJ) has been resolved.
The facts of this case are not disputed.
On May 28, 1999, the City Prosecutor of Paraaque filed an Information
1
for estafa against Ma.
Fe Barreiro (private respondent) based on the complaint
2
filed by Solar Team Entertainment,
Inc. (petitioner). The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-536 entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Ma. Fe F. Barreiro" before the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 257,
presided by public respondent Judge Rolando G. How.
Before the scheduled arraignment of private respondent on August 5, 1999 could take place,
respondent court issued an Order
3
dated June 29, 1999, resetting the arraignment of private
respondent on September 2, 1999 on the ground that private respondent had "filed an appeal with
the Department of Justice (DOJ)".
4
Private respondent manifested in the same Order that she would
submit a certification from the DOJ granting due course to her appeal on or before the second
scheduled arraignment.
5
On September 24, 1999, respondent court issued an Order
6
denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration of the order that previously reset the arraignment of private
respondent. Said order further rescheduled the arraignment of private respondent to November 18,
1999.
On November 10, 1999, private respondent filed another "Motion to Defer Arraignment".
7
On
November 15, 1999, before the scheduled date of the arraignment of private respondent and
before the date set for the hearing of private respondents "Motion to Defer Arraignment",
respondent court issued an Order
8
further deferring the arraignment of private respondent
"until such time that the appeal with the said office (SOJ) is resolved".
9
Petitioners motion
for reconsideration of the order was denied by respondent court on November 22, 1999.
10

Petitioner bewails the fact that six months have elapsed since private respondent appeared or
submitted herself to the jurisdiction of respondent court and up to now she still has to be
arraigned.
11
Respondent court allegedly violated due process when it issued the assailed order
before petitioner received a copy of the "Motion to Defer Arraignment" of private respondent and
before the hearing for the same motion could be conducted.
12
Petitioner points out that despite the
order of respondent court dated September 26, 1999 which stated that the arraignment of private
respondent on November 18, 1999 is "intransferable", respondent court, in utter disregard of its own
order, issued the now assailed order indefinitely suspending the arraignment of private respondent.
13

Petitioner is convinced that the twin orders further delaying the arraignment of private respondent
and denying the motion for reconsideration of petitioner violate Section 7, of the Speedy Trial Act of
1998 (RA 8493) and Section 12, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Petitioner further submits that this instant petition raises "a pure question of law of first
impression"
14
since "it involves the application and interpretation of a law of very recent vintage,
namely Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as the Speedy Trial Act of 1998".
15
Petitioner
mainly relies on Section 7 of said law that states that:
"Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and Between Arraignment and
Trial. The arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
information, or from the date the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which
the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. xxx"
By issuing the assailed order, respondent court allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack/excess of jurisdiction.
16
Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus to nullify
and set aside the order of respondent court dated November 15, 1999.
Petitioner limits the issues to the following:
I.
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ARRAIGN THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT DESPITE THE LAPSE OF THE TIME LIMIT OF THIRTY (30) DAYS
MANDATORILY IMPOSED BY SECTION 7, OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8493, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS "THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1998"; AND
II.
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DEFYING SECTION 12, RULE 116, OF THE REVISED
RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
17

The instant petition is devoid of merit.
The power of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates even after the
information has already been filed in court is well settled. In Marcelo vs. Court of
Appeals,
18
reiterated in Roberts vs. Court of Appeals,
19
we clarified that nothing in Crespo vs.
Mogul
20
forecloses the power or authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his
subordinates in criminal cases despite an information already having been filed in court.
21

The nature of the Justice Secretarys power of control over prosecutors was explained in Ledesma
vs. Court of Appeals
22
in this wise:
"Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the secretary of justice who, under
the Revised Administrative Code,
23
exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said
prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings.
Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Section[s] 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of the Code
gives the secretary of justice supervision and control over the Office of the Chief Prosecutor and the
Provincial and City Prosecution Offices. The scope of his power of supervision and control is
delineated in Section 38, paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV of the Code:
(1) Supervision and Control. Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly
whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the
performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and
decisions of subordinate officials or units; x x x x.
Supplementing the aforequoted provisions are Section 3 of R.A. 3783 and Section 37 of Act 4007,
which read:
Section 3. x x x x
The Chief State Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief State Prosecutors, the Senior State Prosecutors,
and the State Prosecutors shall x x x perform such other duties as may be assigned to them by the
Secretary of Justice in the interest of public service.
x x x x x x x x x
Section 37. The provisions of the existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, whenever a specific
power, authority, duty, function, or activity is entrusted to a chief of bureau, office, division or service,
the same shall be understood as also conferred upon the proper Department Head who shall have
authority to act directly in pursuance thereof, or to review, modify, or revoke any decision or action of
said chief of bureau, office, division or service."
Supervision and control of a department head over his subordinates have been defined in
administrative law as follows:
In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see
that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may
take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform such duties. Control, on the
other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that
of the latter.
Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors
finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which holds that mistakes,
abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by an
administrative agency should be corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by
courts. As a rule, only after administrative remedies are exhausted may judicial recourse be
allowed."
24

Procedurally speaking, after the filing of the information, the court is in complete control of
the case and any disposition therein is subject to its sound discretion.
25
The decision to
suspend arraignment to await the resolution of an appeal with the Secretary of Justice is an
exercise of such discretion. Consistent with our ruling in Marcelo,
26
we have since then held in a
number of cases that a court can defer to the authority of the prosecution arm to resolve, once and
for all, the issue of whether or not sufficient ground existed to file the information.
27
This is in line with
our general pronouncement in Crespo
28
that courts cannot interfere with the prosecutors discretion
over criminal prosecution.
29
Thus, public respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion when
it suspended the arraignment of private respondent to await the resolution of her petition for review
with the Secretary of Justice.
In several cases, we have emphatically cautioned judges to refrain from arraigning the accused
precipitately to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
30
In Dimatulac vs. Villon,
31
the judge in that case hastily
arraigned the accused despite the pending appeal of the accused with the DOJ and notwithstanding
the existence of circumstances indicating the probability of miscarriage of justice. Said judge was
reminded that he should have heeded our statement in Marcelo
32
"that prudence, if not wisdom, or at
least respect for the authority of the prosecution agency, dictated that he (respondent judge therein)
should have waited for the resolution of the appeal then pending with the DOJ."
33

It bears stressing that the court is however not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of
Justice since the court is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case, and
may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
34
Reliance alone
on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice would be an abdication of the trial courts duty and
jurisdiction to determine prima facie case.
35

Petitioner insists that in view of the passage of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, the review authority of
the Secretary of Justice after an information has been already filed in court may possibly transgress
the right of a party to a speedy disposition of his case, in light of the mandatory tenor of the Speedy
Trial Act of 1998 requiring that the accused must be arraigned within thirty (30) days from the filing of
an information against him. Petitioner then impresses upon this Court that there is a need to
reconcile the review authority of the Secretary of Justice and the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, and
submits that "the Secretary of Justice must review the appeal and rule thereon within a period of
thirty (30) days from the date the information was filed or from the date the accused appeared in
court (surrendered or arrested)"
36
if only to give meaning to the Speedy Trial Act.
We are not persuaded. The authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his
subordinates even after an information has already been filed in court does not present an
irreconcilable conflict with the thirty-day period prescribed by Section 7 of the Speedy Trial Act.
Contrary to the urgings of petitioner, Section 7 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 prescribing the
thirty-day period for the arraignment of the accused is not absolute. In fact, Section 10 of the
same law enumerates periods of delay that shall be excluded in computing the time within
which trial must commence. The pertinent portion thereof provides that:
"SEC. 10. Exclusions. - The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within
which trial must commence:
x x x
"(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any justice or judge motu propio or
on motion of the accused or his/her counsel or at the request of the public prosecutor, if the justice
or judge granted such continuance on the basis of his/her findings that the ends of justice served by
taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. No
such period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court in accordance with this
subparagraph shall be excludable under this section unless the court sets forth, in the record of the
case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting
of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the accused in a speedy trial."
Accordingly, the view espoused by petitioner that the thirty-day period prescribed by Section 7 of the
Speedy Trial Act must be strictly observed so as not to violate its right to a speedy trial finds no
support in the law itself. The exceptions provided in the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 reflect the
fundamentally recognized principle that the concept of "speedy trial" is "a relative term and must
necessarily be a flexible concept."
37
In fact, in implementing the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, this Court
issued SC Circular No. 38-98, Section 2 of which provides that:
"Section 2. Time Limit for Arraignment and Pre-trial. The arraignment, and the pre-trial if the
accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the
court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The period of the pendency of a motion to
quash, or for a bill of particulars, or other causes justifying suspension of arraignment shall be
excluded." (Emphasis ours)
As stated earlier, prudence and wisdom dictate that the court should hold in abeyance the
proceedings while the Secretary of Justice resolves the petition for review questioning the resolution
of the prosecutor. The delay in such a case is justified because the determination of whether the
delay is unreasonable, thus amounting to a transgression of the right to a speedy trial, cannot be
simply reduced to a mathematical process. Hence, the length of delay is not the lone criterion to be
considered, several factors must be taken into account in determining whether or not the
constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated. The factors to consider and balance are the
duration of the delay, reason thereof, assertion of the right or failure to assert it and the prejudice
caused by such delay.
38

The importance of the review authority of the Secretary of Justice cannot be overemphasized; as
earlier pointed out, it is based on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies that holds
that "mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by
an administrative agency should be corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by
courts."
39

We are not unmindful of the principle that while the right to a speedy trial secures rights to
the defendant, it does not preclude the rights of public justice.
40
However, in this case,
petitioner as private complainant in the criminal case, cannot deprive private respondent,
accused therein, of her right to avail of a remedy afforded to an accused in a criminal case.
The immediate arraignment of private respondent would have then proscribed her right as
accused to appeal the resolution of the prosecutor to the Secretary of Justice since Section 4
of DOJ Order No. 223 of June 30, 1993 forestalls an appeal to the Secretary of Justice if the
accused/appellant has already been arraigned.
41
Hence, in this case, the order suspending the
arraignment of private respondent merely allowed private respondent to exhaust the administrative
remedies available to her as accused in the criminal case before the court could proceed to a full-
blown trial. Conversely, in case the resolution is for the dismissal of the information, the offended
party in the criminal case, herein petitioner, can appeal the adverse resolution to the Secretary of
Justice.
42
In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court aptly pointed out that:
"the trial court in a criminal case which takes cognizance of an accuseds motion for review of the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor or for reinvestigation and defers the arraignment until
resolution of the said motion must act on the resolution reversing the investigating prosecutors
finding or on a motion to dismiss based thereon only upon proof that such resolution is already
final in that no appeal was taken therefrom to the Department of J ustice."
43
(Emphasis ours)
The fact that public respondent issued the assailed order suspending the arraignment of private
respondent before the "Motion to Defer Arraignment" of private respondent could be heard is not
tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. It was well within the power of public respondent to grant
the continuance since Section 10 (f) of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 clearly confers this authority.
Public respondent substantially complied with the requirement of Section 10 (f) of the Speedy Trial
Act when it stated its reasons for the deferment and eventual suspension of the arraignment of
private respondent in its orders dated September 24, 1999
44
and November 22, 1999
45
. In said
orders, public respondent reasoned that the suspension of the arraignment of private respondent
was to give the opportunity to the accused to exhaust the procedural remedies available,
46
to allow
the Secretary of Justice to review the resolution of the City Prosecutor
47
so as not to deprive the
former of his power to review the action of the latter by a precipitate trial of the case,
48
and based on
the discretionary power of the trial judge to grant or deny the motion to suspend the arraignment of
the accused pending determination of her petition for review at the Department of Justice.
49
Despite
the absence of a law or regulation prescribing the period within which the Secretary of Justice must
dispose of an appeal, the presumption still holds true that in the regular performance of his functions,
the Secretary of Justice will decide the appeal in the soonest possible time. Recently, the
Department of Justice issued Memorandum Order No. 12 dated July 3, 2000 mandating that the
period for the disposition of appeals/petitions for review shall be 75 days.
50
In view of this
memorandum, the indefinite suspension of proceedings in the trial court because of a pending
petition for review with the Secretary of Justice is now unlikely to happen.
Section 16 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court does entitle the offended party to intervene in the
criminal case if he has not waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute it
separately from the criminal action. However, the prosecution of the criminal case through the
private prosecutor is still under the direction and control of the public prosecutor
51
and such
intervention must be with the permission of the public prosecutor.
52
In this case, based on the power
of control and supervision of the Secretary of Justice over public prosecutors, the pendency of the
appeal of private respondent with the Secretary of Justice should have impelled the public
prosecutor to move for the suspension of the arraignment of private respondent. Considering that
private respondent had already informed the court of her appeal with the Secretary of Justice and
had moved for the suspension of her arraignment, the public prosecutor should have desisted from
opposing the abeyance of further proceedings.
Lastly, petitioners argument that the suspension of the arraignment in this case was in violation of
Section 12, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is likewise not tenable. Section
12, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that:
"Section 12. Suspension of Arraignment. The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time
thereof:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively
renders him unable to fully understand the case against him and to plead intelligently thereto.
In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement
for such purpose.
(b) The court finds the existence of a valid prejudicial question."
There is nothing in the above-quoted provision that expressly or impliedly mandates that the
suspension of arraignment shall be limited to the cases enumerated therein. Moreover,
jurisprudence has clearly established that the suspension of arraignment is not strictly
limited to the two situations contemplated in said provision.
53
In fine, no grave abuse of
discretion attended the issuance of the assailed order suspending the arraignment of private
respondent until her petition for review with the Secretary of Justice is resolved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 163972-77 March 28, 2008
JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J .:
Joselito Raniero J. Daan (petitioner), one of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 24167-24170,
24195-24196,
1
questions the denial by the Sandiganbayan of his plea bargaining proposal.
The antecedents facts are laid down by Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated March 25, 2004, as
follows:
Said accused,
2
together with accused Benedicto E. Kuizon, were charged before this Court
for three counts of malversation of public funds involving the sums of P3,293.00, P1,869.00,
and P13,528.00, respectively, which they purportedly tried to conceal by falsifying the time
book and payrolls for given period making it appear that some laborers worked on the
construction of the new municipal hall building of Bato, Leyte and collected their respective
salaries thereon when, in truth and in fact, they did not. Thus, in addition to the charge for
malversation, the accused were also indicted before this Court for three counts of falsification of
public document by a public officer or employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of "not guilty" and substitute the
same with a plea of "guilty", provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and
voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal is not
acceptable, said accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of "not guilty" to the crime of
falsification of public document by a public officer or employee with a plea of "guilty", but to the
lesser crime of falsification of a public document by a private individual. On the other hand, in the
malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of "not guilty" thereto with a plea of
"guilty", but to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts.
Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found as acceptable the proposal of
the accused to plead "guilty" to the lesser crime of falsification of public document by a private
individual. The prosecution explained:
"With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it appears that the act of the accused in
pleading guilty for a lesser offense of falsification by a private individual defined and penalized under
Article 172 of the Revised Penal code will strengthen our cases against the principal accused,
Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to be the master mind of these criminal acts."
Insofar as the malversation cases are concerned, the prosecution was likewise amenable to the offer
of said accused to plead "guilty" to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render
accounts because:
"x x x JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the total amount of P18,860.00 as per
official receipt issued by the provincial government of Leyte dated February 26, 2002. In short, the
damage caused to the government has already been restituted x x x.
3

The Sandiganbayan, in the herein assailed Resolution,
4
dated March 25, 2004, denied
petitioners Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by the prosecution,
on the main ground that no cogent reason was presented to justify its approval.
5

The Sandiganbayan likewise denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated
May 31, 2004.
This compelled petitioner to file the present case for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/ or writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his plea
bargaining offer on the following grounds: first, petitioner is not an accountable officer and he merely
affixed his signature on the payrolls on a "routinary basis," negating any criminal intent; and that the
amount involved is only P18,860.00, which he already restituted.
6

The petition is meritorious.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution
work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually
involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the
counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver
charge.
7

Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
to wit:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser
offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the
accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not
guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (sec. 4, cir. 38-98)
Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1 and 2,
Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the pre-
trial conference,
8
viz:
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. In all criminal cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within
thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a
shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial
conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful
defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of
the case.
SEC. 2. Pre-trial agreement. All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial
conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they
cannot be used against the accused. The agreements covering the matters referred to in section 1 of
this Rule shall be approved by the court. (Emphasis supplied)
But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has finished
presenting its evidence and rested its case. Thus, the Court has held that it is immaterial that
plea bargaining was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was made only after the
prosecution already presented several witnesses.
9

Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea
bargaining may be made,i.e., that it should be with the consent of the offended party and the
prosecutor,
10
and that the plea of guilt should be to a lesser offense which is necessarily
included in the offense charged. The rules however use word may in the second sentence of
Section 2, denoting an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the
accused to make such plea.
11
Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for
a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of
bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused.
12

In People of the Philippines v. Villarama,
13
the Court ruled that the acceptance of an offer to plead
guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is
addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court,
14
viz:
x x x In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor
with a yardstick within which their discretion may be properly exercised. Thus, in People v.
Kayanan (L-39355, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437, 450), We held that the rules allow such a plea only
when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. In
his concurring opinion in People v. Parohinog (G.R. No. L-47462, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 373,
377), then Justice Antonio Barredo explained clearly and tersely the rationale or the law:
x x x (A)fter the prosecution had already rested, the only basis on which the fiscal and the court
could rightfully act in allowing the appellant to change his former plea of not guilty to murder to guilty
to the lesser crime of homicide could be nothing more nothing less than the evidence already in the
record. The reason for this being that Section 4 of Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule 116) under which a
plea for a lesser offense is allowed was not and could not have been intended as a procedure for
compromise, much less bargaining.
15
(Emphasis supplied)
However, Villarama involved plea bargaining after the prosecution had already rested its case.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as in the present case, the trial court's exercise
of its discretion should neither be arbitrary nor should it amount to a capricious and whimsical
exercise of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and it must be so patent or
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law.
16

In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea offer on the ground that petitioner
and the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposal would redound to the benefit of the
public. The Sandiganbayanbelieves that approving the proposal would "only serve to trivialize the
seriousness of the charges against them and send the wrong signal to potential grafters in public
office that the penalties they are likely to face would be lighter than what their criminal acts would
have merited or that the economic benefits they are likely to derive from their criminal activities far
outweigh the risks they face in committing them; thus, setting to naught the deterrent value of the
laws intended to curb graft and corruption in government."
17
1avvphi 1
Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting petitioner's plea offer.
However, subsequent events and higher interests of justice and fair play dictate that petitioner's plea
offer should be accepted. The present case calls for the judicious exercise of this Court's equity
jurisdiction -
Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice where courts
of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special
circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter, the
intent and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by
different courts.
18

and of its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts,
19
in order to afford
equal justice to petitioner.
In People of the Philippines v. Estrada,
20
the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution dated March 14,
2007, approved the Plea Bargaining Agreement entered into by the prosecution and one of the
accused, Charlie "Atong" Ang. The agreement provided that the accused undertakes to assist in the
prosecution of the case and promises to return the amount of P25,000,000.00. In approving the Plea
Bargaining Agreement, the Sandiganbayan took into consideration the timeliness of the plea
bargaining and whether the agreement complied with the requirements of Section 2, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court. The Sandigabayan noted that the accused had already withdrawn his earlier plea of
"not guilty"; and that the prosecution consented to the plea of guilt to a lesser offense; and the lesser
offense, which is Corruption of Public Officials in relation to Indirect Bribery, is necessarily included
in the offense charged, which is Plunder.
21

The Court sees no reason why the standards applied by the Sandiganbayan to Estrada
should not be applied to the present case. Records show that there was a favorable
recommendation by the Office of the Special Prosecutor to approve petitioner's motion to
plea bargain. Thus, in its Memorandum dated August 16, 2002, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
rationalized:
In the cases at bar, there is no dispute that JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the
total amount ofP18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the provincial government of Leyte dated
February 26, 2002. In short, the damage caused to the government has already been restituted by
the accused.
There is also no dispute that accused DAAN voluntarily surrendered in the instant cases.
Moreover, the accused is also willing to plead guilty to a lesser offense which to our mind,
merits consideration.
With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it appears that the act of the accused in
pleading guilty for a lesser offense of falsification by private individual defined and penalized under
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code will strengthen our cases against the principal accused, the
Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to be the master mind of these criminal acts. After
all, the movants herein JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN was merely designated as draftsman detailed
as foreman/timekeeper of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte.
22

Moreover, the lesser offenses of Falsification by Private Individuals and Failure to Render Account
by an Accountable Officer are necessarily included in the crimes of Falsification of Public Documents
and Malversation of Public Funds, respectively, with which petitioner was originally charged.
Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, for the crime of Falsification of Public
Documents through an untruthful narration of facts to be established, the following elements must
concur: (a) the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the
offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the
offender are absolutely false; and (d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with
the wrongful intent of injuring a third person.
23

On the other hand, Falsification by Private Individuals penalized under Article 172, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code has the following elements: (a) the offender is a private individual or a
public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position; (b) the offender
committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code;
and (c) the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document.
24

As regards the crime of Malversation of Public Funds defined and penalized under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, with which petitioner was also charged, the elements are as follows: (a) the
offender is a public officer; (b) he has custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties
of his office; (c) the funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is
accountable; and (d) he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through
abandonment or negligence permitted, the taking by another person of such funds or
property.
25
Article 217 also provides that the failure of the public officer to have duly forthcoming
such public funds or property, upon demand by a duly authorized officer, "shall be prima
facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use." In this regard, it has
been ruled that once such presumption is rebutted, then it is completely destroyed; in fact, the
presumption is never deemed to have existed at all.
26

Meanwhile, under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code, Failure to Render Account by an
Accountable Officer, the lesser offense which petitioner seeks to plead guilty of, the following
elements must concur: (a) the offender is a public officer; (b) the offender must be an accountable
officer for public funds or property; (c) the offender is required by law or regulation to render
accounts to the COA or to a provincial auditor; and (d) the offender fails to render an account for a
period of two months after such accounts should be rendered.
27

Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court states when an offense includes or is included in the other,
to wit:
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of
those constituting the latter.
An offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former as alleged in the complaint or information constitute the latter. And
vice versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
28

In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed against petitioner are sufficient to hold petitioner
liable for the lesser offenses. Thus, in the charge for Falsification of Public Documents, petitioner
may plead guilty to the lesser offense of Falsification by Private Individuals inasmuch as it does not
appear that petitioner took advantage of his official position in allegedly falsifying the timebook and
payroll of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte. In the same vein, with regard to the crime of Malversation
of Public Funds, while the Informations contain allegations which make out a case for Malversation
against petitioner, nevertheless, absent the element of conversion, theoretically, petitioner may still
be held liable for Failure to Render Account by an Accountable Officer if it is shown that the failure to
render account was in violation of a law or regulation that requires him to render such an accounting
within the prescribed period.
Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this case likewise
constitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to such lesser offenses.
Finally, as propounded by petitioner, indeed, he is not an accountable officer in that the nature of his
duty as foreman/timekeeper does not permit or require possession or custody of local government
funds,
29
not to mention that petitioner has already restituted the amount of P18,860.00 involved in
this case. Unlike Estrada which involves a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death,
30
and a
whopping P25,000,000.00 taken from the public coffers, this case tremendously pales in
comparison.
Under the peculiar circumstances of the present case, where gross inequity will result in a
discriminatory dispensation of justice, the Court will not hesitate to intervene in order to equalize the
imbalance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 25, 2004 and May 31, 2004
are SETASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is hereby ORDERED to grant petitioner's Motion to Plea
Bargain. Let records of this case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings in
accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.