BuildingPerformance in the

Taiwan Earthquake
A Review of
Nantou
County
by Peter Yin
March 2000
City of Los Angeles
Department of Public Works
Bureauof Engineering
City of Los Angeles
Mayor Richard Riordan
Boardof Public Works
Ellen Stein, President
Valerie Shaw, Vice-President
Maribel Marin
Tod Burnett
Woody Fleming
Bureauof Engineering
Vitaly B. Troyan, City Engineer
Acknowledgments
The author wishes to express his appreciation to the City of Los Angeles
Board of Public Works and the Bureau of Engineering for their support of
the relief mission to the Taiwan Earthquake. He is also grateful to the
Taipei Economical and Cultural Offices in Los Angeles for their coordina-
tion of all arrangements for the trip.
Particular acknowledgment is due to fellow relief team members: Mr.
Henry Huang of the Los Angeles County Public Works Department; Mr.
Albert Chen of Black & Veatch; and Mr. Albert Tsai of W. E. Moscicki and
Associates, and to Dr. Jing-Wen Jaw of the City of Los Angeles Bureau of
Engineering for their review and critique of this paper.
Thanks also go to Winifred Harano and the Administrative Services
Division of the Bureau of Engineering for assistance in the editing, layout
and production of this report.
1
BuildingPerformance in
the Taiwan Earthquake
A reviewof NantouCounty
by Peter Yin, PE, SE
Preface
The devastating earthquake that struck cen-
tral Taiwan on September 21, 1999, was the
largest in recent Taiwan history. Measured at
7.6 on Richter Scale, it killed more than 2,300
people, destroyed 10,000 buildings, seriously
damaged many streets, bridges, public facili-
ties, power distributions, and industrial op-
erations. The initial estimate of reconstruction
cost was well beyond one hundred billion U.S.
dollars.
In responding to the disaster, structural
engineers in Southern California formed a re-
lief team to assist the Taiwanese people. With
the emphasis on the experience in reinforced
concrete structures and high-rise building de-
sign background, a group of eight structural
professionals from public agencies and the pri-
vate sector across the Southland, were chosen.
I was one of the members. The team was given
one of the most challenging tasks: Assigned
to Nantou County, the epicenter to evaluate
mid-rise/high-rise buildings, examine gov-
ernmental buildings, schools, hospitals, librar-
ies, and review low-rise residential buildings.
From October 6 to October 10, 1999, we vis-
ited six hard-hit cities or townships, reviewed
and inspected more than one hundred build-
ings. We eyewitnessed the ground rupture, the
wiping out of entire blocks, and the destruc-
tion of all kinds of structures, large and small,
public and privately-owned. We also saw
many buildings with minor or no damage, in
the same neighborhoods as those that failed.
The difference in these buildings may have
been just due to engineering, but the results
between those that succeeded and those that
failed was life or death.
This report, reflecting my personal obser-
vation and opinion, is focused on buildings
in Nantou County. No detailed geotechnical
data or seismology theory will be discussed
here, except for a few instances where it is
closely associated with the building case stud-
ies included in this report. By reviewing these
cases and discussing their successes and fail-
ures, it is hoped that we
would have a better idea on
what worked and what did
not in the Taiwan earthquake.
And we all know that what
happened in Taiwan yester-
day, might happen to Califor-
nia tomorrow.
Buildings in Taiwan
Taiwan is an island country
situated in a humid subtropi-
cal region approximately
8,000 miles west of Los Ange-
les. It is one fourteenth the
size of California but has a
population of 22 million, or
about two thirds of Califor-
nia. Almost two thirds of the
2
island are mountainous area or hillside, thus
land is extremely valuable. Because of the eco-
nomic benefits, an Open Space policy was
initiated by the government which allowed
building owners to build more square foot-
age vertically as long as the space on the street
level was open to the public. This, however,
created a weak-story for a vast majority of
buildings. Further, because of the humid en-
vironment and cost considerations, excepting
high-rise buildings in major cities, almost all
buildings are made of rigid concrete frames
with non-reinforced brick in-fills. These in-fills
played a crucial role in the Taiwan earthquake.
They might have either saved lives or de-
stroyed the building, depending on how they
were used.
Buildingdesign andconstruction in Taiwan
Taiwans building code closely resembles the
UBC and ACI practiced in the United States.
(See Figure A). In fact, many of the university
professors, engineers, architects, and govern-
mental officials studied and even worked in
the U.S. before they went back to Taiwan.
During our visit to Taiwan, our team had op-
portunities to talk to professionals in Nantou
County and the City of Taipei. With the quali-
fication of our team having two members who
were in fact chairs of subcommittees of the
Structural Engineers Association of Southern
California, we were impressed with the
knowledge and ability of the professionals we
met. It is obvious that there are many quali-
fied professional engineers and geologists in
Taiwan, practicing a code similar to the build-
ing code in the United States.
However, in Nantou County the architect
is in charge of the structural design for any
building whose height is less than 35 meters.
He/she employs the engineers and geologists
to perform structural calculations or soil re-
ports, sometimes under cutthroat type bid-
ding wars. The structural engineer and the soil
engineer have no authority in building design
and construction in these cases. (In most met-
ropolitan areas in Taiwan any building taller
than 35 meters, or seven-stories, are mandated
to be designed by structural engineers and
reviewed by a structural review committee
formed of local professionals.)
The architect would incorporate the
sketches and details from the engineers to his/
her plan, and apply for building permits from
the government.
Figure A (Data source: UCSD Ji-Ji, Taiwan Earthquake of September 21, 1999.)
Recommended design base shear by building code.
3
After the permit was obtained, the
owner/developer took over and hired a con-
tractor. The developer and the contractor both
should have licensed engineers to interpret the
plan and execute the project by regulation. The
owner normally hired his architect as
representative.
The local enforcement agency
would inspect the construction at few
key stages, though in most cases, it
was never as thorough, nor with the
follow-through as practiced in the
United States. Construction quality
control has been largely the responsi-
bility of the architect, who might or
might not receive cooperation from
the contractor.
Another common practice was
the use of subcontracts. Taiwan is no
exception in this regard. After the con-
tract was awarded, the general con-
tractor would sub the project out to
several low bid subcontractors, whose
performance would really determine
the quality of the construction. In such
cases, if a stringent inspection system
was not implemented or enforced by
the government, the quality of the con-
struction most likely would be in seri-
ous jeopardy.
Figure C
The Earthquake
Taiwan is situated in a subduction zone be-
tween the Philippine Sea Plate and the Eur-
asian Plates. (See Figure B) The East Coast ex-
perienced most of the serious ground motion
Figure B (Data Source: Cen-
tral Weather Bureau,
R.O.C.)
4
in the past, while the Nantou County at the
central part of Taiwan, was considered a mod-
erate seismic zone. The strong ground motion
that ruptured at Hsuangtung Fault and the
Chelungpu Fault, (See Figure C) had the ini-
tial rumble measure 7.6 on the Richter Scale,
followed by three aftershocks bigger than the
Northridge Earthquake (6.8) in the first 48
hours, and 9,000 aftershocks in the next two
weeks. In the cities we visited, many of the
areas experienced Peak Ground Acceleration
of 0.5g in the horizontal direction, and a 0.3g
in the vertical direction with the duration ex-
ceeding 30 seconds, according to data from
the Central Weather Bureau of Taiwan.
The relief team visited three cities:
Nantou, Puli, Tsao-Tun, and three townships:
Ming-Jen, Chung-Liao and Ji-Ji. The last one
was the quakes epicenter.
Howthe buildings were evaluated
This report discusses the performances of
buildings in Nantou County in 8 categories:
1. 3 to 4 story non-ductile, concrete frame
buildings.
2. Low-rise commercial buildings.
3. High rise buildings
4. School buildings
5. Municipal Buildings
6. Hospitals
7. Libraries
8. Convalescent Homes
Since there are so many buildings, only a few
examples will be given of each. Each instance
will refer to the five principles in the build-
ings seismic design: building configuration;
structural redundancy; structural continuity,
ductile detailing and construction quality.
5
Features:
1. Wide open store front at street level.
2. Brick in fill between units.
3. Reinforced concrete frame and pour-in-
place slab.
4. Insufficient column size, low brick wall
added to the beam at building front.
5. Beam reinforcement extends to the face of
building for future add-on neighboring
building.
6. Illegal addition to the top.
7. Concrete stairway in the middle of floor
plan.
8. Brick in-fill wall at the rear of building.
Outcomes:
1. Creates weak story/soft story on the first
floor.
2. Very strong resistance to earthquake forces
in the longitudinal direction.
3. Load paths from floors to frames have no
problem.
4. Brick wall above beam creates strong-
beam/weak-column system; column will
fail by shear or flexural forces.
5. Insufficient lap length and concrete cold
joint on concrete beam bad for load paths.
Re-bar splice at joint against ductile detail-
ing. Buildings banged to each other due to
these weak links; impact was greater when
adjacent buildings were of different
heights.
6. Further burdens the structural system
which was not built seismically sufficient
to start with.
7. Acting as K-truss to resist transverse (seis-
mic) forces.
8. Acting as shear wall may have saved many
buildings from collapse.
BuildingCase Studies
Section 1
Three to four story, non-ductile, concrete framed
buildings.
These types of buildings are commonly built for residential/commercial use and are most
popular in Taiwan. Usually a family occupies the upper floors of the unit with a high percent-
age using the ground level for commercial purposes. The following were observed:
6
1-2. and 1-3 (Puli)
Weak story/soft story
and lack of ductile de-
tailing made these col-
umns vulnerable,
which in turn could
cause building col-
lapse.
1-1 (Puli) Beam reinforcements extended for future neighboring building. Noted col-
umn width (parallel to the street) reduced to the minimum to increase the store open
space.
Typical 3-4 Story Concrete
Buildings.
7
1-5 (Puli) Though not by design,
the brick wall at rear was the ac-
tual lateral support to the build-
ing. See typical floor plan.
1-4 (Puli) Stairway at
middle floor plan pro-
vides lateral support to
the building. See typical
floor plan
3-4 Story Building Typical Floor Plan
8
1-6 and 1-7 (Puli) Ductile detailing was absent.
9
1-8 above (Chung-Liao, 10km from epicenter) All buildings on the block lost their first floor. On
average, every family lost a member.
1-9 (Chung-
Liao) Despite
the loss of the
first floor, this
was the only
building on the
block still
standing.
10
1-10 above (Nantou) Five-story build-
ing showed column flexural failure. Note
masonry wall added to top of girder.
1-11 right (Nantou) Stirrup space too
large, electrical conduit reduced the col-
umn effective area.
1-12 below (Nantou) Shear failure at
column and wall in this five-story build-
ing.
11
1-13 (Nantou) No
seismic detailing.
1-14 right (Chung-Liao)
Column flexural failure in
this three-story building.
12
1-15 Three-story apartment at Ji-Ji, the epicenter.
1-16 Detail of flexural failure at column. No ductile detailing, weak-story.
13
Section 2
Low-Rise Commercial Buildings
Due to Taiwans open space policy and for commercial reasons, most buildings have wide-
open space on the street level. This, along with in-fill-brick walls added to the floor beam and
lack of ductile detailing, caused numerous commercial buildings to collapse when their first
floor failed. Unlike residential buildings, which have stairways and brick walls (in the rear)
as redundancies, commercial buildings were mostly supported by columns.
2-1 and 2-2 (Puli) Eight-
story twin buildings lost first
floor. Note that the columns
had no seismic detailings.
14
2-3 and 2-4 (Puli) Detail of the twin buildings showed
lack of seismic ties. Many required detailings were miss-
ing in the columns. Concrete quality was questionable.
15
2-5 Commercial buildings at Puli. Like many others, these two buildings lost their first floor due to
weak story/soft story.
2-6 Market at Puli. The buried first floor was normally jammed with people during business hours.
Luckily, the quake occured at 1:47 am.
16
2-7 (Puli) Another example of the devastating effect of the strong beam-
weak column frame system.
2-8 This street in Puli is a perfect example of structural continuity problems. All buildings in this
block lost the first floor due to weak story. Meanwhile, the shorter building (built at a different time) hit
the adjacent taller building when movement occurred in a different direction. The deformation of the
taller building demonstrates this. (Also see Section 1, Feature 5 for comments.)
17
2-10 and 2-11 Column shear failure in this building. The
building did not collapse due to the large amount of struc-
tural redundancies.
2-9 Seven-story commer-
cial/residential building.
See details below.
18
Section 3
High-Rise Buildings
Most of these buildings were built over the past 5 to 10 years. Reinforced special moment
resisting frame system was supposed to be used. However, no ductile detailing was found in
many columns abutting the street. The unfavorable locations on the floor plan and poor de-
tailing made these columns vulnerable. Lack of quality control also contributed to many col-
umn failures
3-1 and 3-2 Twelve-story com-
mercial building in Nantou.
Due to wide use of brick in-fill
walls throughout every floor,
this building only suffered
damage to columns on the first
floor, street front.
19
3-3 and 3-4 (Nantou) Col-
umns showed crowded rein-
forcements. Utility and
drainage conduit took away
further space. There were no
seismic ties, and improper
lap splices. Also, concrete
quality was questionable.
20
3-5, 3-6 and 3-7 (Nantou) Similar problems occurred in this building as those in 3-1 and 3-2. Col-
umns showed poor construction as well.
21
3-8 at right (Puli) Sixteen-story Kuo-Pao
Plaza
3-9 Largest drift occurred at the east
corner. Southeast column damages
should not be surprising. Note that stir-
rups were missing. (See Typical Floor
Plan)
3-12 Column at middle of south wing
was damaged due to bad detailing.
Shear failure occurred above the short
brick wall.
22
3-10 Wall elements suffered most
damage in the north wing where
the floor plan bent. Note that the
shear wall on the first floor was
severely damaged and removed.
In the photo a worker is starting
to rebuild the wall. (See Typical
Floor Plan.)
3-11 Though the concrete
peeled off, this link beam in the
north wing was considered to
be successful.
23
Typical Floor Plan
Indicates beam column rigid frame system with brick-in-fill at all places. C shape configu-
ration and bend at plan layout caused plan irregularity. The areas that suffered damage
were predictable.
24
Section 4
School Buildings
Tsau-Tun Trade School
The school construction has several features:
a. Non-ductile concrete frame throughout.
b. Brick in-fill wall at transverse direction full weight.
c. Short brick wall above girders at longitudinal direction.
d. Column weak axis bends along longitudinal direction. Building has no shear wall in this
direction.
4-1 Three-story moment frame system. All columns became short column due to the built-up of
short brick walls on girder. Structural system had no chance to deform and to absorb energy before the
sudden shear failure at columns. These short brick wall was never considered in the design analysis.
25
4-2 A close up of the first
column of building on
previous page.
4-4 A combination of shear and compression failure on columns.
4-3 Show failure at d from joint face.
26
4-5 The result of a weak story.
4-6 Note the short wall above girder, second-floor made column flexural failure inevitable.
27
4-7 Shear failure at short column.
4-8 Deformed columns.
Ductile detailing would
have mitigated the damage.
28
Section 5
Municipal Buildings
Almost all governmental buildings were non-ductile concrete moment frames with brick in-
fill walls. Poor construction quality and short column were common problems at these
buildings.
5-1 Puli City Hall. This three-story reinforced concrete building pancaked. The high brick in-fill wall
made the column very short. Columns were sheared off before any frame deformation could start.
5-2 Tsau-Tun City Hall had a better fate. Structural redundancy and flexibility made the difference.
29
5-3 Longer columns
between floor (deformed
before shear failure) and
redundancy was ob-
served at this building.
(Tsau-Tun City Hall)
5-4 Brick in-fills
were the first
defense of this
building. (Tsau-
Tun City Hall)
5-5 Ground
rupture in front
of Tsau-Tun City
Hall. An even
larger rupture
tilted the building
in the back of this
picture.
30
5-6 and 5-7 Puli Police Headquarters had the same column shear failures as City Hall.
31
6-1 A vertical irregularity
(Two-story high lobby at en-
trance) caused all shear walls
at the first and second floors
to crack. No diagonal rein-
forcement was provided at
shear wall between windows.
6-2 Columns at lobby
area were sheared off. No
seismic details were pro-
vided.
Section 6
Hospitals
Puli Veterans Hospital
This building, completed within 10 years, was not a success. It was constructed as a dual
system, but neither the shear wall nor the frame has a ductile detailing. The shear wall was
lightly reinforced with only one curtain rebar and no boundary member. This building did
not collapse due to the large amount of structural redundancy.
32
6-3 Building side view. Veneers were peeled off after concrete wall cracked.
6-4 There is no boundary member noted at the inner side of shear wall. Light reinforcement has
only one curtain re-bar.
33
6-5 The interior shear wall has no required seismic detailing.
6-6 Columns (no ductile detailing) damaged after shear wall failed.
34
Section 7
Libraries
NantouCounty Library
This eight-story reinforced concrete special moment resisting frame building was still wait-
ing for final inspection and approval when the earthquake struck. All interior and exterior
walls were non-structural and were not designed for seismic resistance. Plan irregularity in-
dicated that torsion would govern (see page 37). Despite walls cracked at south and east
sides, this project was considered a success. Quality of construction was good.
7-1 Cracks are evident in south elevation of the Library wall.
35
7-2 and 7-3 Damaged walls were not designed as
lateral force resisting elements.
36
7-4 A look at the same damaged
wall from the inside. Note that the
columns next to the wall panels
have no damage.
7-5 Northeast corner of building.
The only other place that exhib-
ited significant damage (non-
structural).
37
7-6 Even though the ceil-
ing fell apart, no cracks
at the column or beam
were observed.
Plan
This special moment resisting frame building has plan irregularity. Centroid of rigidity is at
northwest portion on the plan, thus the south and east exterior walls suffered the most dam-
age.
38
Section 8
Convalescent Homes
J eri Retirement Center - A successful example
Jeri Retirement Center, in Nantou City, has three large non-ductile reinforced concrete frame
buildings with brick in-fills. It suffered no damage in this earthquake. The construction qual-
ity was good (the owner was familiar with construction practice), the building had regular
configuration, and brick walls provided extra redundancy.
Plan
Typical floor plan
The brick in-fills shown on the plan
were constructed from ground to
roof. Regular configuration and ex-
cellent wall layout made the build-
ing resistent to damage.
39
8-2 and 8-3 Elevation views of the other two buildings.
40
Observations and
Conclusions:
During our teams stay in Nantou, only a lim-
ited number of buildings could be observed.
However, based upon the magnitude of the
devastation and how wide spread the dam-
aged area was, it was clear that the Taiwan
earthquake was much stronger than the
Northridge quake.
The following was observed:
1. Near the fault line rupture, ground motion
could vary significantly within a very short
distance. If a building performed well, it
does not necessarily mean that building
was designed and built better than those
that collapsed at nearby sites.
2. Despite the magnitude of the seismic force,
well-designed shear wall and special mo-
ment frame system proved to be most ef-
fective. Except for those near the fault line,
no single structures designed and built per
building code was found to have collapsed
in Nantou County.
3. Partial height wall/brick in-fill signifi-
cantly changed building behavior. One of
the most damaging factors in this quake
was the failure of short columns created
by these low walls. The building failed in-
stantly due to a frame system that had no
chance to deform and absorb the energy.
4. Full height non-reinforced brick in-fills, de-
spite its low engineering value, clearly
prevented many buildings from collapse
and thus saved lives. The importance of
redundancy in building design can not be
overemphasized.
5. Ductile detailing is essential for rigid frame
buildings in seismic design. Many build-
ing would have survived had the code re-
quirements been followed. The low-rise
residential/commercial concrete buildings
not built according to code suffered the
most casualties.
6. Lack of structural continuity also caused
many building failures of 3 to 4-story struc-
tures, especially where the buildings were
of different heights. The impact of build-
ing collisions was tremendous, as illus-
trated in Section 2 of this report.
7. Liquefaction caused foundation settlement
in a significant number of buildings. Many
buildings were built around fault lines and
the failure of these structures was inevi-
table. Geotechnical data and strict regula-
tion regarding these issues should be es-
tablished and strictly enforced.
8. The authority and responsibility of struc-
tural and geotechnical engineers should be
established. Recognition of the importance
of these disciplines is essential to public
safety, as demonstrated in this earthquake.
9. Ignorance in design practice and poor
quality in construction was observed.
Implementation of a plan review, permit
processing and inspection system, similar
to the one in the City of Los Angeles is rec-
ommended.