G.R. No.

87676 December 20, 1989

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL PARKS DEVELOPMENT
COMMITTEE,petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE NATIONAL PARKS DEVELOPMENT SUPERVISORY ASSOCIATION
& THEIR MEMBERS, respondents.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch III, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner's complaint in Civil Case
No. 88- 44048 praying for a declaration of illegality of the strike of the private respondents and to restrain the same. The
Court of Appeals denied the petitioner's petition for certiorari, hence, this petition for review.
The key issue in this case is whether the petitioner, National Parks Development Committee (NPDC), is a government
agency, or a private corporation, for on this issue depends the right of its employees to strike.
This issue came about because although the NPDC was originally created in 1963 under Executive Order No. 30, as the
Executive Committee for the development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks, and later renamed as
the National Parks Development Committee under Executive Order No. 68, on September 21, 1967, it was registered in
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a non-stock and non-profit corporation, known as "The National Parks
Development Committee, Inc."
However, in August, 1987, the NPDC was ordered by the SEC to show cause why its Certificate of Registration should
not be suspended for: (a) failure to submit the General Information Sheet from 1981 to 1987; (b) failure to submit its
Financial Statements from 1981 to 1986; (c) failure to register its Corporate Books; and (d) failure to operate for a
continuous period of at least five (5) years since September 27, 1967.
On August 18, 1987, the NPDC Chairman, Amado Lansang, Jr., informed SEC that his Office had no objection to the
suspension, cancellation, or revocation of the Certificate of Registration of NPDC.
By virtue of Executive Order No. 120 dated January 30, 1989, the NPDC was attached to the Ministry (later Department)
of Tourism and provided with a separate budget subject to audit by the Commission on Audit.
On September 10, 1987, the Civil Service Commission notified NPDC that pursuant to Executive Order No. 120, all
appointments and other personnel actions shall be submitted through the Commission.
Meanwhile, the Rizal Park Supervisory Employees Association, consisting of employees holding supervisory positions in
the different areas of the parks, was organized and it affiliated with the Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services
(TUPAS) under Certificate No. 1206.
On June 15, 1987, two collective bargaining agreements were entered into between NPDC and NPDCEA (TUPAS local
Chapter No. 967) and NPDC and NPDCSA (TUPAS Chapter No. 1206), for a period of two years or until June 30, 1989.
On March 20, 1988, these unions staged a stake at the Rizal Park, Fort Santiago, Paco Park, and Pook ni Mariang
Makiling at Los Banos, Laguna, alleging unfair labor practices by NPDC.
On March 21, 1988, NPDC filed in the Regional Trial Court in Manila, Branch III, a complaint against the union to
declare the strike illegal and to restrain it on the ground that the strikers, being government employees, have no right to
strike although they may form a union.
On March 24, 1988, the lower court dismissed the complaint and lifted the restraining order for lack of jurisdiction. It held
that the case "properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor," because "there exists an employer-
employee relationship" between NPDC and the strikers, and "that the acts complained of in the complaint, and which
plaintiff seeks to enjoin in this action, fall under paragraph 5 of Article 217 of the Labor Code, ..., in relation to Art. 265
of the same Code, hence, jurisdiction over said acts does not belong to this Court but to the Labor Arbiters of the
Department of Labor." (p. 142, Rollo.).
Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 14204). On March 31, 1989, the Court of appeals
affirmed the order of the trial court, hence, this petition for review. The petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred:
1) in not holding that the NPDC employees are covered by the Civil Service Law; and
2) in ruling that petitioner's labor dispute with its employees is cognizable by the Department of Labor.
We have considered the petition filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of NPDC and the comments thereto and are
persuaded that it is meritorious.
In Jesus P. Perlas, Jr. vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 84637-39, August 2, 1989, we ruled that the NPDC is an
agency of the government, not a government-owned or controlled corporation, hence, the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction
over its acting director who committed estafa. We held thus:
The National Parks Development Committee was created originally as an Executive Committee on January 14,1963, for
the development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks (Executive Order No. 30). It was later
designated as the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9,
1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia were designated Chairman and Vice- Chairman respectively (E.O.
No. 3). Despite an attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of Forest Development, Department of Natural Resources, on
December 1, 1975 (Letter of Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November 27, 1975), the
NPDC has remained under the Office of the President (E.O. No. 709, dated July 27, 1981).
Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC as a regular government agency under the Office of
the President and allotments for its maintenance and operating expenses were issued direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A Perlas,
Item No. 2, 3). (Italics ours.)
Since NPDC is a government agency, its employees are covered by civil service rules and regulations (Sec. 2, Article IX,
1987 Constitution). Its employees are civil service employees (Sec. 14, Executive Order No. 180).
While NPDC employees are allowed under the 1987 Constitution to organize and join unions of their choice, there is as
yet no law permitting them to strike. In case of a labor dispute between the employees and the government, Section 15 of
Executive Order No. 180 dated June 1, 1987 provides that the Public Sector Labor- Management Council, not the
Department of Labor and Employment, shall hear the dispute. Clearly, the Court of Appeals and the lower court erred in
holding that the labor dispute between the NPDC and the members of the NPDSA is cognizable by the Department of
Labor and Employment.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14204 is
hereby set aside. The private respondents' complaint should be filed in the Public Sector Labor-Management Council as
provided in Section 15 of Executive Order No. 180. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.



People v. Panis, 142 SCRA 66
FACTS:
On January 9, 1981, four information were filed in the in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Zambales and Olongapo City
allegingthat herein private respondent Serapio Abug, "without first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a
holder of authority tooperate a fee-charging employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally
operate a private fee chargingemployment agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and promising employment in
Saudi Arabia" to four separate individuals.Abug filed a motion to quash contending that he cannot be charged for illegal
recruitment because according to him, Article 13(b) of the Labor Code says there would be illegal recruitment only
"whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offeredany employment for a fee.Denied at first, the
motion to quash was reconsidered and granted by the Trial Court in its Orders dated June 24, 1981, andSeptember 17,
1981. In the instant case, the view of the private respondents is that to constitute recruitment and placement, all theacts
mentioned in this article should involve dealings with two or more persons as an indispensable requirement. On the other
hand,the petitioner argues that the requirement of two or more persons is imposed only where the recruitment and
placement consists of an offer or promise of employment to such persons and always in consideration of a fee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 13(b) of the Labor Code provides for the innocence or guilt of the private respondent of the crime
of illegalrecruitment
COURT RULING:
The Supreme Court reversed the CFIs Orders and reinstated all four information filed against private respondent.The
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code was merely intended to create a presumption, and not to impose a condition on the basic
rulenor to provide an exception thereto.The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act
of recruitment and placement of workers. Any of the actsmentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b) win constitute
recruitment and placement even if only one prospective worker is involved.The proviso merely lays down a rule of
evidence that where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employmentto two or more prospective
workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement.
The words "shall be deemed" create the said presumption.











G.R. Nos. L-58674-77 July 11, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. DOMINGO PANIS, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zambales & Olongapo City, Branch III and
SERAPIO ABUG, respondents.

CRUZ, J:
The basic issue in this case is the correct interpretation of Article 13(b) of P.D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code,
reading as follows:
(b) Recruitment and placement' refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for
profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or
more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging
that Serapio Abug, private respondent herein, "without first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of
authority to operate a fee-charging employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a
private fee charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and promising employment in Saudi
Arabia" to four separate individuals named therein, in violation of Article 16 in relation to Article 39 of the Labor Code. 1
Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not charge an offense because he was accused of
illegally recruiting only one person in each of the four informations. Under the proviso in Article 13(b), he claimed, there
would be illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment
for a fee. " 2
Denied at first, the motion was reconsidered and finally granted in the Orders of the trial court dated June 24 and
September 17, 1981. The prosecution is now before us on certiorari. 3
The posture of the petitioner is that the private respondent is being prosecuted under Article 39 in relation to Article 16 of
the Labor Code; hence, Article 13(b) is not applicable. However, as the first two cited articles penalize acts of recruitment
and placement without proper authority, which is the charge embodied in the informations, application of the definition of
recruitment and placement in Article 13(b) is unavoidable.
The view of the private respondents is that to constitute recruitment and placement, all the acts mentioned in this article
should involve dealings with two or mre persons as an indispensable requirement. On the other hand, the petitioner
argues that the requirement of two or more persons is imposed only where the recruitment and placement consists of an
offer or promise of employment to such persons and always in consideration of a fee. The other acts mentioned in the
body of the article may involve even only one person and are not necessarily for profit.
Neither interpretation is acceptable. We fail to see why the proviso should speak only of an offer or promise of
employment if the purpose was to apply the requirement of two or more persons to all the acts mentioned in the basic rule.
For its part, the petitioner does not explain why dealings with two or more persons are needed where the recruitment and
placement consists of an offer or promise of employment but not when it is done through "canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers.
As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto
but merely to create a presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and
placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise
of employment is made in the course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
(of) workers. "
The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and placement of workers. Any of
the acts mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b) win constitute recruitment and placement even if only one prospective
worker is involved. The proviso merely lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected in consideration of a
promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be
deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement. The words "shall be deemed" create that presumption.
This is not unlike the presumption in article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, for example, regarding the failure of a public
officer to produce upon lawful demand funds or property entrusted to his custody. Such failure shall beprima
facie evidence that he has put them to personal use; in other words, he shall be deemed to have malversed such funds or
property. In the instant case, the word "shall be deemed" should by the same token be given the force of a disputable
presumption or of prima facie evidence of engaging in recruitment and placement. (Klepp vs. Odin Tp., McHenry County
40 ND N.W. 313, 314.)
It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of the questioned provision for lack of records of debates and
deliberations that would otherwise have been available if the Labor Code had been enacted as a statute rather than a
presidential decree. The trouble with presidential decrees is that they could be, and sometimes were, issued without
previous public discussion or consultation, the promulgator heeding only his own counsel or those of his close advisers in
their lofty pinnacle of power. The not infrequent results are rejection, intentional or not, of the interest of the greater
number and, as in the instant case, certain esoteric provisions that one cannot read against the background facts usually
reported in the legislative journals.
At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign against illegal recruitment and
placement, which has victimized many Filipino workers seeking a better life in a foreign land, and investing hard- earned
savings or even borrowed funds in pursuit of their dream, only to be awakened to the reality of a cynical deception at the
hands of theirown countrymen.
WHEREFORE, the Orders of June 24, 1981, and September 17, 1981, are set aside and the four informations against the
private respondent reinstated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.










G.R. No. 84082 March 13, 1991
HELLENIC PHILIPPINE SHIPPING, INC., petitioner,
vs.
EPIFANIO C. SIETE and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), respondents.

CRUZ, J.:p
Challenged in this petition is the decision of the respondent NLRC holding Hellenic Philippine Shipping Company liable
for the illegal dismissal of Capt. Epifanio Siete, herein private respondent, and awarding him salaries and other benefits
corresponding to the unexpired portion of his employment contract. Enforcement of this decision has meanwhile been
held in abeyance pursuant to our temporary restraining order dated August 3, 1988.
Siete was employed on May 22, 1985, as Master of M/V Houda G by Sultan Shipping Co., Ltd., through its crewing
agent, herein petitioner. He boarded the vessel on May 24, 1985, at Cyprus. From there, it sailed on June 1, 1985, to El
Ferrol, Spain, where it loaded cargo that it subsequently discharged at Tripoli, Lebanon, from June 25-29, 1985. It then
proceeded back to Cyprus, arriving there on June 30, 1985.
On July 8, 1985, Capt. Wilfredo Lim boarded the vessel and advised Siete that he had instructions from the owners to take
over its command. These instructions were confirmed by a telex sent by Sultan Shipping to Siete on July 10, 1985.
Neither Lim nor the telex indicated the reason for his relief. The private respondent claims this information was also
withheld from him by the petitioner upon his repatriation to Manila.
On July 12, 1985, Siete filed a complaint against the petitioner for illegal dismissal and non-payment of his salary and
other benefits under their employment contract. On September 6, 1985, the petitioner alleged in its answer that the
complainant had been dismissed because of his failure to complete with the instruction of Sultan Shipping to erase the
timber load line on the vessel and for his negligence in the discharge of the cargo at Tripoli that endangered the vessel and
stevedores. Siete denied these averments in his reply dated September 23, 1985, and reiterated that he had not earlier been
informed of the cause of his dismissal and repatriation, either in Cyprus or later in Manila.
After considering the position papers and documentary evidence of the parties, Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) dismissed the complaint, holding that there was valid cause for
Siete's removal. 2 The decision placed much value on the various communications presented by the petitioner to show that
Siete was indeed guilty of the charges that justified his separation.
On January 4, 1988, the private respondent appealed to the NLRC, contending that the records presented by the petitioner
were prepared long after his dismissal and were especially suspect because they came from persons in the employ of
Sultan Shipping. He insisted that he was dismissed without even being informed of the charges against him or given an
opportunity to refute them. He added that, even assuming he was negligent in the unloading of the cargo at Tripoli, this
shortcoming did not warrant such a severe penalty as his dismissal.
In its decision dated June 27, 1988, 3 the public respondent reversed the POEA Administrator, holding that the dismissal
violated due process and that the documents submitted by the petitioner were hearsay, self-serving, and not verified.
Accordingly, it disposed as follows:
A new decision is entered finding the dismissal of complainant as illegal. Respondent is hereby ordered to pay to the
complainant his salaries, wages and other benefits corresponding to the unexpired portion of his employment contract
with Sultan Shipping Company, Ltd., dated May 22, 1985.
The petitioner now faults this decision as having been reached with grave abuse of discretion. It contends that the private
respondent had been instructed to erase the timber load line on the vessel; that he had indeed been negligent in supervising
the unloading of the cargo at Tripoli, resulting in the replacement of certain damaged equipment; and that he had not been
denied due process, considering the summary nature of the proceedings that had to be taken in view of the nature of his
position. Moreover, assuming the awards were justified, there was a mistake in their computation because the amount of
$400.90 previously collected by Siete had not been deducted.
Certiorari is denied.
The findings of fact of public respondent are conclusive on this Court, there being no showing that they were reached
arbitrarily. Substantial evidence has established that the private respondent was indeed not notified of the charges against
him and that no investigation was conducted to justify his dismissal. Moreover, the petitioner has failed to prove that Siete
had been instructed to erase the timber load lines and that he had been negligent in the cargo unloading at Tripoli.
The Court notes that the reports submitted by the petitioner to prove its charges were all prepared after the fact of Siete's
dismissal and were signed by its own employees. 4 Their motives are necessarily suspect. The mere fact that they have
made such reports does not itself prove the charges, which were investigated ex parte, if at all. It is not denied that Siete
was not informed of the charges beforehand or that he was given an opportunity to refute them. Even after his arrival in
Manila, he was kept in the dark about the reason for his dismissal. The excuse of the petitioner that it itself did not know
why he was dismissed, being only a crewing agent of Sultan Shipping, deserves no comment.
The Labor Code provides as follows:
Sec. 1. Security of tenure and due process. No worker shall be dismissed except for a just or authorized cause provided
by law and after due process.
Sec. 2. Notice of dismissal. Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the
particular acts or omission constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work, the notice shall be
served at the worker's last known address.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. The worker may answer the allegations stated against him in the notice of dismissal within
a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and
to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.
Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. The employer shall immediately notify a worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him
stating clearly the reasons therefor.
The petitioner argues that whatever defects might have tainted the private respondent's dismissal were subsequently cured
when the charges against him were specified and sufficiently discussed in the position papers submitted by the parties to
the POEA. That argument is unacceptable. The issue before the POEA was in fact the lack of due process in Siete's
dismissal. The law requires that the investigation be conducted before the dismissal, not after. That omission cannot be
corrected by the investigation later conducted by the POEA. As the Solicitor General correctly maintained, the due
process requirement in the dismissal process is different from the due process requirement in the POEA proceeding. Both
requirements must be separately observed.
While it is true that in Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC 5 and Rubberworld (Phils.) v. NLRC 6 the lack of due process before the
dismissal of the employee was deemed corrected by the subsequent administrative proceedings where the dismissed
employee was given a chance to be heard, those cases involved dismissals that were later proved to be for a valid cause.
The doctrine in those cases is not applicable to the case at bar because our findings here is that the dismissal was not
justified.
The argument that the afore-quoted provisions are not applicable to the private respondent because he was a managerial
employee must also be rejected. It is not correct to say that managerial employees may be arbitrarily dismissed, at any
time and without cause as established in an appropriate investigation. Managerial employees, no less than rank-and-file
laborers, are entitled to due process. Loss of confidence, which is the usual ground for the removal of the managerial
employee, must be established like any other lawful cause. 7 Even if it be assumed that Siete was a managerial employee
an issue which, incidentally, was not earlier raised or resolved the petitioner has not satisfactorily proved the reason
for its supposed loss of confidence in him.
It is not true that the vessel would be left unattended if the captain were to be placed under investigation because he would
not have a ready replacement. The petitioner forgets that under Article 627 of the Code of Commerce:
Art. 627. The sailing mate, as the second chief of the vessel and unless the ship agent does not order otherwise, shall take
the place of the captain in case of absence, sickness or death and shall then assume all Ins powers, obligations and
liabilities.
let alone the fact that in the particular case of Siete, there was actually a ready replacement for him. This was Capt. Lim
who, on instruction of Sultan Shipping, boarded the vessel on July 8, 1985, purposely to take over its command from
Capt. Siete.
The Court reiterates the ruling that private employment agencies are jointly and severally liable with the foreign-based
employer for any violation of the recruitment agreement or the contract of employment. 8 As a requirement for the
issuance to it of a license to operate a private recruiting agency, a verified undertaking was made by the petitioner that it
would "assume joint and solidary liability with the employer for all claims and liabilities which (might) arise in
connection with the implementation of the contract of employment." It cannot now contend that as a mere crewing agent it
cannot be made to answer for the liabilities of Sultan Shipping.
The reason for the above-mentioned requirement is obvious. Were the rule otherwise, employees with legitimate demands
against the employer would be helpless to enforce them because the latter has no office or properties in this jurisdiction.
Violation of the employment contract would remain unredressed. It was precisely to correct this difficulty that the
recruiting agent is now required, as a condition for the issuance to it of a license to operate, to assure the employee that he
has remedies available in this country even if the culpable employer is beyond the reach of our courts.
It need only be noted that there was a slight error in the computation of the award due the private respondent which he
himself acknowledges. This was the failure to deduct from his total award the amount of $400.90 he admitted having
earlier collected in Cyprus. As corrected, the computation of the total award should be as follows:
Monthly Basic Pay US$1,200.00
Monthly Allowance 500.00

Total Monthly Compensation US$1,700.00
One-Year Salary & Allowance
(US$1,700.00 x 12) US$20,400.00
Plus: One-Month Leave Pay 1,700.00

US$22,100.00
Less: Cash Advances:
Manila US$600.00
Spain 64.70
Lebanon 500.00

1,164.70
Slapchest 28.36
Bal. of ship
cash fund 400.90
Total Deductions 1,593.96
Total Amount Due US$20,506.04

We are not persuaded that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the findings of the POEA
sustaining the petitioner and dismissing the private respondent's complaint. On the contrary, we agree that the private
respondent was illegally dismissed because, first, he was not accorded a fair investigation as required by law, and second,
because the grounds invoked for his separation have not been proved by the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision as above modified is AFFIRMED and the petition DISMISSED, with costs
against the petitioner. The temporary restraining order dated August 3,1988, is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.



















G.R. No. 167614 March 24, 2009
ANTONIO M. SERRANO, Petitioner,
vs.
Gallant MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., INC., Respondents.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
For decades, the toil of solitary migrants has helped lift entire families and communities out of poverty. Their earnings
have built houses, provided health care, equipped schools and planted the seeds of businesses. They have woven together
the world by transmitting ideas and knowledge from country to country. They have provided the dynamic human link
between cultures, societies and economies. Yet, only recently have we begun to understand not only how much
international migration impacts development, but how smart public policies can magnify this effect.
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon
Global Forum on Migration and Development
Brussels, July 10, 20071
For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8042,2 to wit:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as
defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of
twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
does not magnify the contributions of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) to national development, but exacerbates the
hardships borne by them by unduly limiting their entitlement in case of illegal dismissal to their lump-sum salary either
for the unexpired portion of their employment contract "or for three months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less" (subject clause). Petitioner claims that the last clause violates the OFWs' constitutional rights in that it
impairs the terms of their contract, deprives them of equal protection and denies them due process.
By way of Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner assails the December 8, 2004
Decision3 and April 1, 2005 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which applied the subject clause, entreating this
Court to declare the subject clause unconstitutional.
Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-approved Contract of Employment with the following terms and
conditions:
Duration of contract 12 months
Position Chief Officer
Basic monthly salary US$1,400.00
Hours of work 48.0 hours per week
Overtime US$700.00 per month
Vacation leave with pay 7.00 days per month5
On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for
the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of
respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.6
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer.7 Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as
Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998.8
Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the
time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an
unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint9 against respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment
of his money claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73, broken down as follows:
May
27/31,
1998 (5
days)
incl.
Leave
pay
US$ 413.90
June
01/30,
1998
2,590.00
July
01/31,
1998
2,590.00
August
01/31,
1998
2,590.00
Sept.
01/30,
1998
2,590.00
Oct.
01/31,
1998
2,590.00
Nov.
01/30,
1998
2,590.00
Dec.
01/31,
1998
2,590.00
Jan.
01/31,
1999
2,590.00
Feb.
01/28,
1999
2,590.00
Mar.
1/19,
1999
(19
days)
incl.
leave
pay
1,640.00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
25,382.23
Amount
adjusted
to chief
mate's
salary

(March
19/31,
1998 to
April
1/30,
1998) +
1,060.5010
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL
CLAIM
US$ 26,442.7311
as well as moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999, declaring the dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary
benefits, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the dismissal of the complainant
(petitioner) by the respondents in the above-entitled case was illegal and the respondents are hereby ordered to pay the
complainant [petitioner], jointly and severally, in Philippine Currency, based on the rate of exchange prevailing at the
time of payment, the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY U.S. DOLLARS (US $8,770.00),
representing the complainants salary for three (3) months of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of
employment.1avvphi1
The respondents are likewise ordered to pay the complainant [petitioner], jointly and severally, in Philippine Currency,
based on the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of payment, the amount of FORTY FIVE U.S. DOLLARS (US$
45.00),12 representing the complainants claim for a salary differential. In addition, the respondents are hereby ordered to
pay the complainant, jointly and severally, in Philippine Currency, at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of payment,
the complainants (petitioner's) claim for attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total amount awarded to
the aforesaid employee under this Decision.
The claims of the complainant for moral and exemplary damages are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
All other claims are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.13 (Emphasis supplied)
In awarding petitioner a lump-sum salary of US$8,770.00, the LA based his computation on the salary period of three
months only -- rather than the entire unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of petitioner's employment contract -
applying the subject clause. However, the LA applied the salary rate of US$2,590.00, consisting of petitioner's "[b]asic
salary, US$1,400.00/month + US$700.00/month, fixed overtime pay, + US$490.00/month, vacation leave pay =
US$2,590.00/compensation per month."14
Respondents appealed15 to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to question the finding of the LA that
petitioner was illegally dismissed.
Petitioner also appealed16 to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the Court
in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission17 that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are
entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts.18
In a Decision dated June 15, 2000, the NLRC modified the LA Decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 15 July 1999 is MODIFIED. Respondents are hereby ordered to pay complainant,
jointly and severally, in Philippine currency, at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment the following:
1. Three (3) months salary
$1,400 x 3 US$4,200.00
2. Salary differential 45.00
US$4,245.00

3. 10% Attorneys fees 424.50
TOTAL US$4,669.50
The other findings are affirmed.
SO ORDERED.19
The NLRC corrected the LA's computation of the lump-sum salary awarded to petitioner by reducing the applicable salary
rate from US$2,590.00 to US$1,400.00 because R.A. No. 8042 "does not provide for the award of overtime pay, which
should be proven to have been actually performed, and for vacation leave pay."20
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of the subject
clause.21 The NLRC denied the motion.22
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari23 with the CA, reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject
clause.24 After initially dismissing the petition on a technicality, the CA eventually gave due course to it, as directed by
this Court in its Resolution dated August 7, 2003 which granted the petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 151833,
filed by petitioner.
In a Decision dated December 8, 2004, the CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate;
however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.25
His Motion for Reconsideration26 having been denied by the CA,27 petitioner brings his cause to this Court on the
following grounds:
I
The Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have decided the case in a way not in accord with applicable decision of the
Supreme Court involving similar issue of granting unto the migrant worker back wages equal to the unexpired portion of
his contract of employment instead of limiting it to three (3) months
II
In the alternative that the Court of Appeals and the Labor Tribunals were merely applying their interpretation of Section
10 of Republic Act No. 8042, it is submitted that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in law when it failed to discharge its
judicial duty to decide questions of substance not theretofore determined by the Honorable Supreme Court, particularly,
the constitutional issues raised by the petitioner on the constitutionality of said law, which unreasonably, unfairly and
arbitrarily limits payment of the award for back wages of overseas workers to three (3) months.
III
Even without considering the constitutional limitations [of] Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the Court of Appeals
gravely erred in law in excluding from petitioners award the overtime pay and vacation pay provided in his contract since
under the contract they form part of his salary.28
On February 26, 2008, petitioner wrote the Court to withdraw his petition as he is already old and sickly, and he intends to
make use of the monetary award for his medical treatment and medication.29 Required to comment, counsel for petitioner
filed a motion, urging the court to allow partial execution of the undisputed monetary award and, at the same time,
praying that the constitutional question be resolved.30
Considering that the parties have filed their respective memoranda, the Court now takes up the full merit of the petition
mindful of the extreme importance of the constitutional question raised therein.
On the first and second issues
The unanimous finding of the LA, NLRC and CA that the dismissal of petitioner was illegal is not disputed. Likewise not
disputed is the salary differential of US$45.00 awarded to petitioner in all three fora. What remains disputed is only the
computation of the lump-sum salary to be awarded to petitioner by reason of his illegal dismissal.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner at the monthly rate of
US$1,400.00 covering the period of three months out of the unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of his
employment contract or a total of US$4,200.00.
Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in addition to the US$4,200.00 awarded by
the NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a total of US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the
entire nine months and 23 days left of his employment contract, computed at the monthly rate of US$2,590.00.31
The Arguments of Petitioner
Petitioner contends that the subject clause is unconstitutional because it unduly impairs the freedom of OFWs to negotiate
for and stipulate in their overseas employment contracts a determinate employment period and a fixed salary
package.32 It also impinges on the equal protection clause, for it treats OFWs differently from local Filipino workers
(local workers) by putting a cap on the amount of lump-sum salary to which OFWs are entitled in case of illegal
dismissal, while setting no limit to the same monetary award for local workers when their dismissal is declared illegal;
that the disparate treatment is not reasonable as there is no substantial distinction between the two groups;33 and that it
defeats Section 18,34 Article II of the Constitution which guarantees the protection of the rights and welfare of all Filipino
workers, whether deployed locally or overseas.35
Moreover, petitioner argues that the decisions of the CA and the labor tribunals are not in line with existing jurisprudence
on the issue of money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs. Though there are conflicting rulings on this, petitioner urges
the Court to sort them out for the guidance of affected OFWs.36
Petitioner further underscores that the insertion of the subject clause into R.A. No. 8042 serves no other purpose but to
benefit local placement agencies. He marks the statement made by the Solicitor General in his Memorandum, viz.:
Often, placement agencies, their liability being solidary, shoulder the payment of money claims in the event that
jurisdiction over the foreign employer is not acquired by the court or if the foreign employer reneges on its obligation.
Hence, placement agencies that are in good faith and which fulfill their obligations are unnecessarily penalized for the acts
of the foreign employer. To protect them and to promote their continued helpful contribution in deploying Filipino
migrant workers, liability for money claims was reduced under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. 37(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner argues that in mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, the subject clause sacrifices the well-being
of OFWs. Not only that, the provision makes foreign employers better off than local employers because in cases involving
the illegal dismissal of employees, foreign employers are liable for salaries covering a maximum of only three months of
the unexpired employment contract while local employers are liable for the full lump-sum salaries of their employees. As
petitioner puts it:
In terms of practical application, the local employers are not limited to the amount of backwages they have to give their
employees they have illegally dismissed, following well-entrenched and unequivocal jurisprudence on the matter. On the
other hand, foreign employers will only be limited to giving the illegally dismissed migrant workers the maximum of
three (3) months unpaid salaries notwithstanding the unexpired term of the contract that can be more than three (3)
months.38
Lastly, petitioner claims that the subject clause violates the due process clause, for it deprives him of the salaries and other
emoluments he is entitled to under his fixed-period employment contract.39
The Arguments of Respondents
In their Comment and Memorandum, respondents contend that the constitutional issue should not be entertained, for this
was belatedly interposed by petitioner in his appeal before the CA, and not at the earliest opportunity, which was when he
filed an appeal before the NLRC.40
The Arguments of the Solicitor General
The Solicitor General (OSG)41 points out that as R.A. No. 8042 took effect on July 15, 1995, its provisions could not
have impaired petitioner's 1998 employment contract. Rather, R.A. No. 8042 having preceded petitioner's contract, the
provisions thereof are deemed part of the minimum terms of petitioner's employment, especially on the matter of money
claims, as this was not stipulated upon by the parties.42
Moreover, the OSG emphasizes that OFWs and local workers differ in terms of the nature of their employment, such that
their rights to monetary benefits must necessarily be treated differently. The OSG enumerates the essential elements that
distinguish OFWs from local workers: first, while local workers perform their jobs within Philippine territory, OFWs
perform their jobs for foreign employers, over whom it is difficult for our courts to acquire jurisdiction, or against whom
it is almost impossible to enforce judgment; and second, as held in Coyoca v. National Labor Relations
Commission43 and Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission,44 OFWs are contractual employees who can never
acquire regular employment status, unlike local workers who are or can become regular employees. Hence, the OSG
posits that there are rights and privileges exclusive to local workers, but not available to OFWs; that these peculiarities
make for a reasonable and valid basis for the differentiated treatment under the subject clause of the money claims of
OFWs who are illegally dismissed. Thus, the provision does not violate the equal protection clause nor Section 18, Article
II of the Constitution.45
Lastly, the OSG defends the rationale behind the subject clause as a police power measure adopted to mitigate the solidary
liability of placement agencies for this "redounds to the benefit of the migrant workers whose welfare the government
seeks to promote. The survival of legitimate placement agencies helps [assure] the government that migrant workers are
properly deployed and are employed under decent and humane conditions."46
The Court's Ruling
The Court sustains petitioner on the first and second issues.
When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review of the acts of its co-equals, such as the Congress, it
does so only when these conditions obtain: (1) that there is an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights
susceptible of judicial determination;47 (2) that the constitutional question is raised by a proper party48 and at the earliest
opportunity;49 and (3) that the constitutional question is the very lis mota of the case,50otherwise the Court will dismiss
the case or decide the same on some other ground.51
Without a doubt, there exists in this case an actual controversy directly involving petitioner who is personally aggrieved
that the labor tribunals and the CA computed his monetary award based on the salary period of three months only as
provided under the subject clause.
The constitutional challenge is also timely. It should be borne in mind that the requirement that a constitutional issue be
raised at the earliest opportunity entails the interposition of the issue in the pleadings before acompetent court, such that, if
the issue is not raised in the pleadings before that competent court, it cannot be considered at the trial and, if not
considered in the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.52 Records disclose that the issue on the constitutionality of the
subject clause was first raised, not in petitioner's appeal with the NLRC, but in his Motion for Partial Reconsideration with
said labor tribunal,53 and reiterated in his Petition forCertiorari before the CA.54 Nonetheless, the issue is deemed
seasonably raised because it is not the NLRC but the CA which has the competence to resolve the constitutional issue.
The NLRC is a labor tribunal that merely performs a quasi-judicial function its function in the present case is limited to
determining questions of fact to which the legislative policy of R.A. No. 8042 is to be applied and to resolving such
questions in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself;55 thus, its foremost function is to administer and
enforce R.A. No. 8042, and not to inquire into the validity of its provisions. The CA, on the other hand, is vested with the
power of judicial review or the power to declare unconstitutional a law or a provision thereof, such as the subject
clause.56Petitioner's interposition of the constitutional issue before the CA was undoubtedly seasonable. The CA was
therefore remiss in failing to take up the issue in its decision.
The third condition that the constitutional issue be critical to the resolution of the case likewise obtains because the
monetary claim of petitioner to his lump-sum salary for the entire unexpired portion of his 12-month employment
contract, and not just for a period of three months, strikes at the very core of the subject clause.
Thus, the stage is all set for the determination of the constitutionality of the subject clause.
Does the subject clause violate Section 10,
Article III of the Constitution on non-impairment
of contracts?
The answer is in the negative.
Petitioner's claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the stipulations in his contract on the term of his
employment and the fixed salary package he will receive57 is not tenable.
Section 10, Article III of the Constitution provides:
No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have only a prospective operation,58and
cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected;59 however, as to laws already in existence, their provisions are read into
contracts and deemed a part thereof.60 Thus, the non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II is limited in
application to laws about to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing acts or contracts by enlarging,
abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties thereto.
As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995 preceded the execution of the employment
contract between petitioner and respondents in 1998. Hence, it cannot be argued that R.A. No. 8042, particularly the
subject clause, impaired the employment contract of the parties. Rather, when the parties executed their 1998 employment
contract, they were deemed to have incorporated into it all the provisions of R.A. No. 8042.
But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground
that it impinges on the impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to
regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in
view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may be employed.61 Police power
legislations adopted by the State to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare
of the people are generally applicable not only to future contracts but even to those already in existence, for all private
contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to promote public welfare.62
Does the subject clause violate Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18,
Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor
as a protected sector?
The answer is in the affirmative.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the law.
Section 18,63 Article II and Section 3,64 Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without distinction as to
place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to economic security and
parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations
should be borne by them in equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared
the burden imposed on, others in like circumstances.65
Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to incorporate, when it sees fit, a system of
classification into its legislation; however, to be valid, the classification must comply with these requirements: 1) it is
based on substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes of the law; 3) it is not limited to existing conditions
only; and 4) it applies equally to all members of the class.66
There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a classification embodied in a law: a)
the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related
to serving a legitimate state interest;67 b) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show that
the challenged classification serves an important state interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to
serving that interest;68 and c) strict judicial scrutiny69 in which a legislative classification which impermissibly interferes
with the exercise of a fundamental right70 or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class71 is presumed
unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve
a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.72
Under American jurisprudence, strict judicial scrutiny is triggered by suspect classifications73 based on race74 or
gender75 but not when the classification is drawn along income categories.76
It is different in the Philippine setting. In Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employee Association, Inc. v.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,77 the constitutionality of a provision in the charter of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP),
a government financial institution (GFI), was challenged for maintaining its rank-and-file employees under the Salary
Standardization Law (SSL), even when the rank-and-file employees of other GFIs had been exempted from the SSL by
their respective charters. Finding that the disputed provision contained a suspect classification based on salary grade, the
Court deliberately employed the standard of strict judicial scrutiny in its review of the constitutionality of said provision.
More significantly, it was in this case that the Court revealed the broad outlines of its judicial philosophy, to wit:
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies should be accorded recognition
and respect by the courts of justice except when they run afoul of the Constitution. The deference stops where the
classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution. When
these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a
stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not suffice.
Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded special protection by the Constitution requires a stricter judicial
scrutiny finds no support in American or English jurisprudence. Nevertheless, these foreign decisions and authorities are
not per se controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they are persuasive and have been used to support many of our
decisions. We should not place undue and fawning reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable mental crutches
without which we cannot come to our own decisions through the employment of our own endowments. We live in a
different ambience and must decide our own problems in the light of our own interests and needs, and of our qualities and
even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our own concept of law and justice. Our laws must be construed in
accordance with the intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the language of each law and
the context of other local legislation related thereto. More importantly, they must be construed to serve our own public
interest which is the be-all and the end-all of all our laws. And it need not be stressed that our public interest is distinct
and different from others.
x x x x
Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for the use of equal protection as a tool of effective judicial
intervention.
Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution. The Preamble proclaims "equality"
as an ideal precisely in protest against crushing inequities in Philippine society. The command to promote social justice in
Article II, Section 10, in "all phases of national development," further explicitated in Article XIII, are clear commands to
the State to take affirmative action in the direction of greater equality. x x x [T]here is thus in the Philippine Constitution
no lack of doctrinal support for a more vigorous state effort towards achieving a reasonable measure of equality.
Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to marginalized groups of
society, including labor. Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of
the working class on the humane justification that those with less privilege in life should have more in law. And the
obligation to afford protection to labor is incumbent not only on the legislative and executive branches but also on the
judiciary to translate this pledge into a living reality. Social justice calls for the humanization of laws and the equalization
of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated.
x x x x
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality, recognizing
the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the
"rational basis" test, and the legislative discretion would be given deferential treatment.
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice against
persons favored by the Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered
down view would call for the abdication of this Courts solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution
and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the
government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the character or nature
of the actor.
x x x x
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-employee status. It is akin to a
distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from
the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher compensation packages that are competitive with the industry,
while the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite
disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank
- possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career advancement - are given higher compensation
packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people whose
status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who
have the real economic and financial need for the adjustment . This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to free
the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the
quality of life for all." Any act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by
this Court before it can pass muster. (Emphasis supplied)
Imbued with the same sense of "obligation to afford protection to labor," the Court in the present case also employs the
standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceives in the subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer
examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two
levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs with employment contracts ofone year or
more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment;
OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year or more
As pointed out by petitioner,78 it was in Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission79 (Second Division, 1999) that the Court laid down the following rules on the application of the periods
prescribed under Section 10(5) of R.A. No. 804, to wit:
A plain reading of Sec. 10 clearly reveals that the choice of which amount to award an illegally dismissed overseas
contract worker, i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or three (3) months salary
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less, comes into play only when the employment contract concerned
has a term of at least one (1) year or more. This is evident from the words "for every year of the unexpired term" which
follows the words "salaries x x x for three months."To follow petitioners thinking that private respondent is entitled to
three (3) months salary only simply because it is the lesser amount is to completely disregard and overlook some words
used in the statute while giving effect to some. This is contrary to the well-established rule in legal hermeneutics that in
interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part or word thereof be given effect since the law-making body is
presumed to know the meaning of the words employed in the statue and to have used them advisedly. Ut res magis valeat
quam pereat.80 (Emphasis supplied)
In Marsaman, the OFW involved was illegally dismissed two months into his 10-month contract, but was awarded his
salaries for the remaining 8 months and 6 days of his contract.
Prior to Marsaman, however, there were two cases in which the Court made conflicting rulings on Section 10(5). One
was Asian Center for Career and Employment System and Services v. National Labor Relations Commission(Second
Division, October 1998),81 which involved an OFW who was awarded a two-year employment contract,but was
dismissed after working for one year and two months. The LA declared his dismissal illegal and awarded him
SR13,600.00 as lump-sum salary covering eight months, the unexpired portion of his contract. On appeal, the Court
reduced the award to SR3,600.00 equivalent to his three months salary, this being the lesser value, to wit:
Under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, a worker dismissed from overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause
is entitled to his salary for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less.
In the case at bar, the unexpired portion of private respondents employment contract is eight (8) months. Private
respondent should therefore be paid his basic salary corresponding to three (3) months or a total of SR3,600.82
Another was Triple-Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission (Third Division, December
1998),83 which involved an OFW (therein respondent Erlinda Osdana) who was originally granted a 12-month contract,
which was deemed renewed for another 12 months. After serving for one year and seven-and-a-half months, respondent
Osdana was illegally dismissed, and the Court awarded her salaries for the entire unexpired portion of four and one-half
months of her contract.
The Marsaman interpretation of Section 10(5) has since been adopted in the following cases:
Case Title Contract
Period
Period of
Service
Unexpired Period Period Applied in
the Computation of
the Monetary
Award
Skippers v.
Maguad84
6 months 2 months 4 months 4 months
Bahia Shipping
v. Reynaldo
Chua 85
9 months 8 months 4 months 4 months
Centennial
Transmarine v.
dela Cruz l86
9 months 4 months 5 months 5 months
Talidano v.
Falcon87
12 months 3 months 9 months 3 months
Univan v. CA88 12 months 3 months 9 months 3 months
Oriental v.
CA89
12 months more than 2
months
10 months 3 months
PCL v.
NLRC90
12 months more than 2
months
more or less 9
months
3 months
Olarte v.
Nayona91
12 months 21 days 11 months and 9
days
3 months
JSS v.Ferrer92 12 months 16 days 11 months and 24
days
3 months
Pentagon v.
Adelantar93
12 months 9 months and
7 days
2 months and 23
days
2 months and 23
days
Phil. Employ v.
Paramio, et
al.94
12 months 10 months 2 months Unexpired portion
Flourish
Maritime v.
Almanzor 95
2 years 26 days 23 months and 4
days
6 months or 3
months for each
year of contract
Athenna
Manpower v.
Villanos 96
1 year, 10
months and
28 days
1 month 1 year, 9 months
and 28 days
6 months or 3
months for each
year of contract

As the foregoing matrix readily shows, the subject clause classifies OFWs into two categories. The first category includes
OFWs with fixed-period employment contracts of less than one year; in case of illegal dismissal, they are entitled to their
salaries for the entire unexpired portion of their contract. The second category consists of OFWs with fixed-period
employment contracts of one year or more; in case of illegal dismissal, they are entitled to monetary award equivalent to
only 3 months of the unexpired portion of their contracts.
The disparity in the treatment of these two groups cannot be discounted. In Skippers, the respondent OFW worked for
only 2 months out of his 6-month contract, but was awarded his salaries for the remaining 4 months. In contrast, the
respondent OFWs in Oriental and PCL who had also worked for about 2 months out of their 12-month contracts were
awarded their salaries for only 3 months of the unexpired portion of their contracts. Even the OFWs involved
in Talidano and Univan who had worked for a longer period of 3 months out of their 12-month contracts before being
illegally dismissed were awarded their salaries for only 3 months.
To illustrate the disparity even more vividly, the Court assumes a hypothetical OFW-A with an employment contract of
10 months at a monthly salary rate of US$1,000.00 and a hypothetical OFW-B with an employment contract of 15 months
with the same monthly salary rate of US$1,000.00. Both commenced work on the same day and under the same employer,
and were illegally dismissed after one month of work. Under the subject clause, OFW-A will be entitled to US$9,000.00,
equivalent to his salaries for the remaining 9 months of his contract, whereas OFW-B will be entitled to only
US$3,000.00, equivalent to his salaries for 3 months of the unexpired portion of his contract, instead of US$14,000.00 for
the unexpired portion of 14 months of his contract, as the US$3,000.00 is the lesser amount.
The disparity becomes more aggravating when the Court takes into account jurisprudence that, prior to the effectivity of
R.A. No. 8042 on July 14, 1995,97 illegally dismissed OFWs, no matter how long the period of their employment
contracts, were entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. The matrix below speaks for
itself:
Case Title Contract
Period
Period of
Service
Unexpired
Period
Period Applied in the
Computation of the
Monetary Award
ATCI v. CA, et
al.98
2 years 2 months 22 months 22 months
Phil. Integrated
v. NLRC99
2 years 7 days 23 months and
23 days
23 months and 23 days
JGB v. NLC100 2 years 9 months 15 months 15 months
Agoy v.
NLRC101
2 years 2 months 22 months 22 months
EDI v. NLRC,
et al.102
2 years 5 months 19 months 19 months
Barros v.
NLRC, et al.103
12 months 4 months 8 months 8 months
Philippine
Transmarine v.
Carilla104
12 months 6 months and
22 days
5 months and
18 days
5 months and 18 days
It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract periods or the unexpired portions thereof, were
treated alike in terms of the computation of their monetary benefits in case of illegal dismissal. Their claims were
subjected to a uniform rule of computation: their basic salaries multiplied by the entire unexpired portion of their
employment contracts.
The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a differentiated rule of computation of the money claims
of illegally dismissed OFWs based on their employment periods, in the process singling out one category whose contracts
have an unexpired portion of one year or more and subjecting them to the peculiar disadvantage of having their monetary
awards limited to their salaries for 3 months or for the unexpired portion thereof, whichever is less, but all the while
sparing the other category from such prejudice, simply because the latter's unexpired contracts fall short of one year.
Among OFWs With Employment Contracts of More Than One Year
Upon closer examination of the terminology employed in the subject clause, the Court now has misgivings on the
accuracy of the Marsaman interpretation.
The Court notes that the subject clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less"
contains the qualifying phrases "every year" and "unexpired term." By its ordinary meaning, the word "term" means a
limited or definite extent of time.105 Corollarily, that "every year" is but part of an "unexpired term" is significant in
many ways: first, the unexpired term must be at least one year, for if it were any shorter, there would be no occasion for
such unexpired term to be measured by every year; and second, the original term must be more than one year, for
otherwise, whatever would be the unexpired term thereof will not reach even a year. Consequently, the more decisive
factor in the determination of when the subject clause "for three (3) months forevery year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less" shall apply is not the length of the original contract period as held in Marsaman,106 but the length
of the unexpired portion of the contract period -- the subject clause applies in cases when the unexpired portion of the
contract period is at least one year, which arithmetically requires that the original contract period be more than one year.
Viewed in that light, the subject clause creates a sub-layer of discrimination among OFWs whose contract periods are for
more than one year: those who are illegally dismissed with less than one year left in their contracts shall be entitled to
their salaries for the entire unexpired portion thereof, while those who are illegally dismissed with one year or more
remaining in their contracts shall be covered by the subject clause, and their monetary benefits limited to their salaries for
three months only.
To concretely illustrate the application of the foregoing interpretation of the subject clause, the Court assumes
hypothetical OFW-C and OFW-D, who each have a 24-month contract at a salary rate of US$1,000.00 per month. OFW-
C is illegally dismissed on the 12th month, and OFW-D, on the 13th month. Considering that there is at least 12 months
remaining in the contract period of OFW-C, the subject clause applies to the computation of the latter's monetary benefits.
Thus, OFW-C will be entitled, not to US$12,000,00 or the latter's total salaries for the 12 months unexpired portion of the
contract, but to the lesser amount of US$3,000.00 or the latter's salaries for 3 months out of the 12-month unexpired term
of the contract. On the other hand, OFW-D is spared from the effects of the subject clause, for there are only 11 months
left in the latter's contract period. Thus, OFW-D will be entitled to US$11,000.00, which is equivalent to his/her total
salaries for the entire 11-month unexpired portion.
OFWs vis--vis Local Workers
With Fixed-Period Employment
As discussed earlier, prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the monetary awards of illegally
dismissed OFWs was in place. This uniform system was applicable even to local workers with fixed-term
employment.107
The earliest rule prescribing a uniform system of computation was actually Article 299 of the Code of Commerce
(1888),108 to wit:
Article 299. If the contracts between the merchants and their shop clerks and employees should have been made of a fixed
period, none of the contracting parties, without the consent of the other, may withdraw from the fulfillment of said
contract until the termination of the period agreed upon.
Persons violating this clause shall be subject to indemnify the loss and damage suffered, with the exception of the
provisions contained in the following articles.
In Reyes v. The Compaia Maritima,109 the Court applied the foregoing provision to determine the liability of a shipping
company for the illegal discharge of its managers prior to the expiration of their fixed-term employment. The Court
therein held the shipping company liable for the salaries of its managers for the remainder of their fixed-term
employment.
There is a more specific rule as far as seafarers are concerned: Article 605 of the Code of Commerce which provides:
Article 605. If the contracts of the captain and members of the crew with the agent should be for a definite period or
voyage, they cannot be discharged until the fulfillment of their contracts, except for reasons of insubordination in serious
matters, robbery, theft, habitual drunkenness, and damage caused to the vessel or to its cargo by malice or manifest or
proven negligence.
Article 605 was applied to Madrigal Shipping Company, Inc. v. Ogilvie,110 in
which the Court held the shipping company liable for the salaries and subsistence allowance of its illegally dismissed
employees for the entire unexpired portion of their employment contracts.
While Article 605 has remained good law up to the present,111 Article 299 of the Code of Commerce was replaced by
Art. 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889, to wit:
Article 1586. Field hands, mechanics, artisans, and other laborers hired for a certain time and for a certain work cannot
leave or be dismissed without sufficient cause, before the fulfillment of the contract. (Emphasis supplied.)
Citing Manresa, the Court in Lemoine v. Alkan112 read the disjunctive "or" in Article 1586 as a conjunctive "and" so as
to apply the provision to local workers who are employed for a time certain although for no particular skill. This
interpretation of Article 1586 was reiterated in Garcia Palomar v. Hotel de France Company.113 And in both Lemoine
and Palomar, the Court adopted the general principle that in actions for wrongful discharge founded on Article 1586, local
workers are entitled to recover damages to the extent of the amount stipulated to be paid to them by the terms of their
contract. On the computation of the amount of such damages, the Court in Aldaz v. Gay114 held:
The doctrine is well-established in American jurisprudence, and nothing has been brought to our attention to the contrary
under Spanish jurisprudence, that when an employee is wrongfully discharged it is his duty to seek other employment of
the same kind in the same community, for the purpose of reducing the damages resulting from such wrongful discharge.
However, while this is the general rule, the burden of showing that he failed to make an effort to secure other employment
of a like nature, and that other employment of a like nature was obtainable, is upon the defendant. When an employee is
wrongfully discharged under a contract of employment his prima facie damage is the amount which he would be entitled
to had he continued in such employment until the termination of the period. (Howard vs. Daly, 61 N. Y., 362; Allen vs.
Whitlark, 99 Mich., 492; Farrell vs. School District No. 2, 98 Mich., 43.)115 (Emphasis supplied)
On August 30, 1950, the New Civil Code took effect with new provisions on fixed-term employment: Section 2
(Obligations with a Period), Chapter 3, Title I, and Sections 2 (Contract of Labor) and 3 (Contract for a Piece of Work),
Chapter 3, Title VIII, Book IV.116 Much like Article 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889, the new provisions of the Civil
Code do not expressly provide for the remedies available to a fixed-term worker who is illegally discharged. However, it
is noted that in Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., Inc. v. Rich,117 the Court carried over the principles on the payment of
damages underlying Article 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889 and applied the same to a case involving the illegal discharge
of a local worker whose fixed-period employment contract was entered into in 1952, when the new Civil Code was
already in effect.118
More significantly, the same principles were applied to cases involving overseas Filipino workers whose fixed-term
employment contracts were illegally terminated, such as in First Asian Trans & Shipping Agency, Inc. v.
Ople,119involving seafarers who were illegally discharged. In Teknika Skills and Trade Services, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission,120 an OFW who was illegally dismissed prior to the expiration of her fixed-period employment
contract as a baby sitter, was awarded salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of her contract. The Court arrived at
the same ruling in Anderson v. National Labor Relations Commission,121 which involved a foreman hired in 1988 in
Saudi Arabia for a fixed term of two years, but who was illegally dismissed after only nine months on the job -- the Court
awarded him salaries corresponding to 15 months, the unexpired portion of his contract. In Asia World Recruitment, Inc.
v. National Labor Relations Commission,122 a Filipino working as a security officer in 1989 in Angola was awarded his
salaries for the remaining period of his 12-month contract after he was wrongfully discharged. Finally, in Vinta Maritime
Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,123 an OFW whose 12-month contract was illegally cut short in the
second month was declared entitled to his salaries for the remaining 10 months of his contract.
In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who were illegally discharged were
treated alike in terms of the computation of their money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire
unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject
clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment contract have since
been differently treated in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on
local workers with fixed-term employment.
The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation of the monetary
benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an
unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with
fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar
disadvantage.
There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by the Constitution, the Court now subjects
the classification to a strict judicial scrutiny, and determines whether it serves a compelling state interest through the least
restrictive means.
What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and
calibrated by history.124 It is akin to the paramount interest of the state125 for which some individual liberties must give
way, such as the public interest in safeguarding health or maintaining medical standards,126 or in maintaining access to
information on matters of public concern.127
In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no compelling state interest that the subject clause may
possibly serve.
The OSG defends the subject clause as a police power measure "designed to protect the employment of Filipino seafarers
overseas x x x. By limiting the liability to three months [sic], Filipino seafarers have better chance of getting hired by
foreign employers." The limitation also protects the interest of local placement agencies, which otherwise may be made to
shoulder millions of pesos in "termination pay."128
The OSG explained further:
Often, placement agencies, their liability being solidary, shoulder the payment of money claims in the event that
jurisdiction over the foreign employer is not acquired by the court or if the foreign employer reneges on its obligation.
Hence, placement agencies that are in good faith and which fulfill their obligations are unnecessarily penalized for the acts
of the foreign employer. To protect them and to promote their continued helpful contribution in deploying Filipino
migrant workers, liability for money are reduced under Section 10 of RA 8042.
This measure redounds to the benefit of the migrant workers whose welfare the government seeks to promote. The
survival of legitimate placement agencies helps [assure] the government that migrant workers are properly deployed and
are employed under decent and humane conditions.129 (Emphasis supplied)
However, nowhere in the Comment or Memorandum does the OSG cite the source of its perception of the state interest
sought to be served by the subject clause.
The OSG locates the purpose of R.A. No. 8042 in the speech of Rep. Bonifacio Gallego in sponsorship of House Bill No.
14314 (HB 14314), from which the law originated;130 but the speech makes no reference to the underlying reason for the
adoption of the subject clause. That is only natural for none of the 29 provisions in HB 14314 resembles the subject
clause.
On the other hand, Senate Bill No. 2077 (SB 2077) contains a provision on money claims, to wit:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90)
calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of
the complaint, the claim arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving
Filipino workers for overseas employment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
The liability of the principal and the recruitment/placement agency or any and all claims under this Section shall be joint
and several.
Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on any money claims exclusive of damages under this
Section shall not be less than fifty percent (50%) of such money claims: Provided, That any installment payments, if
applicable, to satisfy any such compromise or voluntary settlement shall not be more than two (2) months. Any
compromise/voluntary agreement in violation of this paragraph shall be null and void.
Non-compliance with the mandatory period for resolutions of cases provided under this Section shall subject the
responsible officials to any or all of the following penalties:
(1) The salary of any such official who fails to render his decision or resolution within the prescribed period shall be, or
caused to be, withheld until the said official complies therewith;
(2) Suspension for not more than ninety (90) days; or
(3) Dismissal from the service with disqualification to hold any appointive public office for five (5) years.
Provided, however, That the penalties herein provided shall be without prejudice to any liability which any such official
may have incurred under other existing laws or rules and regulations as a consequence of violating the provisions of this
paragraph.
But significantly, Section 10 of SB 2077 does not provide for any rule on the computation of money claims.
A rule on the computation of money claims containing the subject clause was inserted and eventually adopted as the 5th
paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. The Court examined the rationale of the subject clause in the transcripts of the
"Bicameral Conference Committee (Conference Committee) Meetings on the Magna Carta on OCWs (Disagreeing
Provisions of Senate Bill No. 2077 and House Bill No. 14314)." However, the Court finds no discernible state interest, let
alone a compelling one, that is sought to be protected or advanced by the adoption of the subject clause.
In fine, the Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving the existence of a compelling state interest that
would justify the perpetuation of the discrimination against OFWs under the subject clause.
Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject clause is to protect the employment of OFWs by
mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, such callous and cavalier rationale will have to be rejected. There
can never be a justification for any form of government action that alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes the
same burden on another sector, especially when the favored sector is composed of private businesses such as placement
agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed of OFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution commands.
The idea that private business interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling state interest is odious.
Moreover, even if the purpose of the subject clause is to lessen the solidary liability of placement agencies vis-a-vis their
foreign principals, there are mechanisms already in place that can be employed to achieve that purpose without infringing
on the constitutional rights of OFWs.
The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-Based Overseas Workers, dated
February 4, 2002, imposes administrative disciplinary measures on erring foreign employers who default on their
contractual obligations to migrant workers and/or their Philippine agents. These disciplinary measures range from
temporary disqualification to preventive suspension. The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and
Employment of Seafarers, dated May 23, 2003, contains similar administrative disciplinary measures against erring
foreign employers.
Resort to these administrative measures is undoubtedly the less restrictive means of aiding local placement agencies in
enforcing the solidary liability of their foreign principals.
Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and
other OFWs to equal protection.1avvphi1
Further, there would be certain misgivings if one is to approach the declaration of the unconstitutionality of the subject
clause from the lone perspective that the clause directly violates state policy on labor under Section 3,131Article XIII of
the Constitution.
While all the provisions of the 1987 Constitution are presumed self-executing,132 there are some which this Court has
declared not judicially enforceable, Article XIII being one,133 particularly Section 3 thereof, the nature of which, this
Court, in Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission,134 has described to be not self-actuating:
Thus, the constitutional mandates of protection to labor and security of tenure may be deemed as self-executing in the
sense that these are automatically acknowledged and observed without need for any enabling legislation. However, to
declare that the constitutional provisions are enough to guarantee the full exercise of the rights embodied therein, and the
realization of ideals therein expressed, would be impractical, if not unrealistic. The espousal of such view presents the
dangerous tendency of being overbroad and exaggerated. The guarantees of "full protection to labor" and "security of
tenure", when examined in isolation, are facially unqualified, and the broadest interpretation possible suggests a blanket
shield in favor of labor against any form of removal regardless of circumstance. This interpretation implies an
unimpeachable right to continued employment-a utopian notion, doubtless-but still hardly within the contemplation of the
framers. Subsequent legislation is still needed to define the parameters of these guaranteed rights to ensure the protection
and promotion, not only the rights of the labor sector, but of the employers' as well. Without specific and pertinent
legislation, judicial bodies will be at a loss, formulating their own conclusion to approximate at least the aims of the
Constitution.
Ultimately, therefore, Section 3 of Article XIII cannot, on its own, be a source of a positive enforceable rightto stave off
the dismissal of an employee for just cause owing to the failure to serve proper notice or hearing. As manifested by
several framers of the 1987 Constitution, the provisions on social justice require legislative enactments for their
enforceability.135 (Emphasis added)
Thus, Section 3, Article XIII cannot be treated as a principal source of direct enforceable rights, for the violation of which
the questioned clause may be declared unconstitutional. It may unwittingly risk opening the floodgates of litigation to
every worker or union over every conceivable violation of so broad a concept as social justice for labor.
It must be stressed that Section 3, Article XIII does not directly bestow on the working class any actual enforceable right,
but merely clothes it with the status of a sector for whom the Constitution urges protection through executive or legislative
action and judicial recognition. Its utility is best limited to being an impetus not just for the executive and legislative
departments, but for the judiciary as well, to protect the welfare of the working class. And it was in fact consistent with
that constitutional agenda that the Court in Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employee Association, Inc. v.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, penned by then Associate Justice now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, formulated the judicial
precept that when the challenge to a statute is premised on the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the
Constitution with special protection -- such as the working class or a section thereof -- the Court may recognize the
existence of a suspect classification and subject the same to strict judicial scrutiny.
The view that the concepts of suspect classification and strict judicial scrutiny formulated in Central Bank Employee
Association exaggerate the significance of Section 3, Article XIII is a groundless apprehension. Central Bank applied
Article XIII in conjunction with the equal protection clause. Article XIII, by itself, without the application of the equal
protection clause, has no life or force of its own as elucidated in Agabon.
Along the same line of reasoning, the Court further holds that the subject clause violates petitioner's right to substantive
due process, for it deprives him of property, consisting of monetary benefits, without any existing valid governmental
purpose.136
The argument of the Solicitor General, that the actual purpose of the subject clause of limiting the entitlement of OFWs to
their three-month salary in case of illegal dismissal, is to give them a better chance of getting hired by foreign employers.
This is plain speculation. As earlier discussed, there is nothing in the text of the law or the records of the deliberations
leading to its enactment or the pleadings of respondent that would indicate that there is an existing governmental purpose
for the subject clause, or even just a pretext of one.
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that precise reason that the
clause violates not just petitioner's right to equal protection, but also her right to substantive due process under Section
1,137 Article III of the Constitution.
The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine
months and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No.
8042.
On the Third Issue
Petitioner contends that his overtime and leave pay should form part of the salary basis in the computation of his monetary
award, because these are fixed benefits that have been stipulated into his contract.
Petitioner is mistaken.
The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave pay. For seafarers like petitioner, DOLE
Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is
understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses; whereas overtime pay is compensation
for all work "performed" in excess of the regular eight hours, and holiday pay is compensation for any work "performed"
on designated rest days and holidays.
By the foregoing definition alone, there is no basis for the automatic inclusion of overtime and holiday pay in the
computation of petitioner's monetary award, unless there is evidence that he performed work during those periods. As the
Court held in Centennial Transmarine, Inc. v. Dela Cruz,138
However, the payment of overtime pay and leave pay should be disallowed in light of our ruling in Cagampan v. National
Labor Relations Commission, to wit:
The rendition of overtime work and the submission of sufficient proof that said was actually performed are conditions to
be satisfied before a seaman could be entitled to overtime pay which should be computed on the basis of 30% of the basic
monthly salary. In short, the contract provision guarantees the right to overtime pay but the entitlement to such benefit
must first be established.
In the same vein, the claim for the day's leave pay for the unexpired portion of the contract is unwarranted since the same
is given during the actual service of the seamen.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The subject clause "or for three months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less" in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042
is DECLAREDUNCONSTITUTIONAL; and the December 8, 2004 Decision and April 1, 2005 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals are MODIFIED to the effect that petitioner is AWARDED his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his
employment contract consisting of nine months and 23 days computed at the rate of US$1,400.00 per month.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.





















G.R. No. 148893 July 12, 2006
SKIPPERS UNITED PACIFIC, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, GERVACIO ROSAROSO, and COURT OF
APPEALS,respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Respondent Gervacio Rosaroso* was signed up as a Third Engineer with Nicolakis Shipping, S.A., a foreign firm, through
its recruitment and manning agency, herein petitioner Skippers United Pacific, Inc. The term of the contract was for one
year, starting July 10, 1997 to July 8, 1998, and with a salary of US$800.00 and other benefits. Barely a month after
boarding the vessel M/V Naval Gent on July 15, 1997, respondent was ordered to disembark in Varna, Bulgaria, on
August 7, 1997, and repatriated to the Philippines. Immediately after arriving in the Philippines, respondent filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal and monetary claims on August 18, 1997.1
In a Decision dated August 11, 1998, the Labor Arbiter found that respondent was illegally dismissed:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, judgment is rendered finding the dismissal of complainant illegal. An order
is issued directing the respondents to pay complainant the amount of US$2,400.00 or its Philippine peso equivalent
of P100,000.00 as separation pay plus the amount of US$186.69 representing complainants unpaid salary for seven (7)
days or in the Philippine peso equivalent of P7,840.98 or the total amount of P108,640.98. On top of said amount,
attorneys fees of P5,000.00 is also awarded.
SO ORDERED.2
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the Labor Arbiters Decision and dismissed
petitioners appeal per its Decision dated February 26, 1999.3 Petitioner sought reconsideration thereof but its motion was
denied by the NLRC in its Resolution dated May 27, 1999.4
Thus, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53490.
On May 7, 2001, the CA5 dismissed the petition and affirmed in toto the NLRC Decision dated February 26,
1999.6 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated July 3, 2001.7
Hence, the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the following assignment of errors:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER ILLEGALLY DISMISSED THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN AWARDING PRIVATE RESPONDENT
BACKWAGES EQUIVALENT TO HIS THREE (3) MONTHS SALARY.8
Petitioners main contention is that the CA, the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter erred in not giving "full evidentiary value" to
the telexed Chief Engineers Report dated September 10, 1997, which specified the causes of respondents dismissal,
quoted as follows:
TO: SKIPPERS MNL
CC: SKIPPERS PIRAEUS
FM: MV NAVAL GENT
DT: SEPT. 10, 1997
DURING SHIP REPAIR AT PERAMA DD. 18/07-31/07/97 OUR ATTENDING SUPT. ENGINEERS CONSTANTLY
OBSERVING ALL PERSONNELS ABILITY AND ATTITUDE WITH REGARDS TO OUR TECHNICAL
CAPABILITY AND BEHAVIOURS WITH EMPHASY [SIC] ON DISCIPLINE. IT IS ONLY UNFORTUNATE THAT
THEY NOTICED 3/E G. ROSAROSO AS BEING SLACK AND NOT CARING OF HIS JOB AND DUTIES BEING
HIRED AS THIRD ENGR OFFICER, TO THE FULLEST BEYOND THEIR EXPECTATION. AFTER TOO MUCH
OF CONSIDERATION AND DELIBERATION HAVING HIM CONSTANTLY ADVISED BY 2/E F. DIAMOS
ASKING FOR HIS COOPERATION TO WORK AND HELP IN THE ONGOING ENORMOUS REPAIRS. BUT
FAILED TO HEED AND REFUSED TO BE MOTIVATED. WE HAVE SEEKED [SIC] ADVISE FROM YOUR
OFFICE VIA PHONE, SKIPPERS PIRAEUS THRU CAPT. KAMPANIS AND THE PORT CAPT OF NICOLAKIS
SHIPPING CAPT. PAPASTILIANOS, OF WHAT TO BE DONE. THE OWNERS RECOMMENDATION WAS TO
REPLACED [SIC] HIM ON THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
1) LACK OF DISCIPLINE HE RESENTED DISCIPLINE. HE IS SEEN BY SUPT. ENGRS. ON SEVERAL
OCCASION DURING WORKING HOURS STAYING ON PORTSIDE DECK SMOKING AND HAVING SNACKS.
MANY TIMES HE IS INSIDE THE GALLEY CHATTING WITH CHIEF COOK DURING WORKING HOURS AND
HAVING SNACKS. HE TENDS TO BE FREQUENTLY LATE FOR DUTY/WORK AND IS GENERALLY
UNRELIABLE.
2) IRRESPONSIBLE - HE HAS NOT SHOWN A HIGH SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY AS 3/ENGR. HE IS
CAREFREE IN DISCHARGING HIS DUTIES IN MAINTAINING THE ASSIGNED MACHINERIES, SUCH AS
BOILER, DIESEL GENERATORS, STARTING AIR COMPRESSORS AND VARIOUS PUMPS. HE CANNOT BE
TRUSTED TO DO HIS JOB UNLESS SUPERVISED PERPETUALLY.
3) LACK OF DILIGENCE - HE REQUIRES CONSTANT PUSHING AND HAS TO BE WATCHED MOST OF THE
TIME. LACK OF INITIATIVE REGARDLESS OF CONSTANT MOTIVATION.
SGD. JEROME A. RETARDO
CHIEF ENGR9
According to petitioner, the foregoing Report established that respondent was dismissed for just cause. The CA, the
NLRC, and the Labor Arbiter, however, refused to give credence to the Report. They are one in ruling that the Report
cannot be given any probative value as it is uncorroborated by other evidence and that it is merely hearsay, having come
from a source, the Chief Engineer, who did not have any personal knowledge of the events reported therein.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that the charges against respondent are bare allegations, unsupported by corroborating evidence.
The Labor Arbiter stated that if respondent indeed committed the alleged infractions, then these should have, at the very
least, been entered into the seamans book, or that a copy of the vessels logbook presented to prove the same.10 The
Labor Arbiters findings were sustained by the NLRC.11
The CA upheld these findings, succinctly stating as follows:
Verily, the report of Chief Engineer Retardo is utterly bereft of probative value. It is not verified by an oath and, therefore,
lacks any guarantee of trustworthiness. It is furthermore and this is crucial not sourced from the personal knowledge of
Chief Engineer Retardo. It is rather based on the perception of "ATTENDING SUPT. ENGINEERS CONSTANTLY
OBSERVING ALL PERSONNELS ABILITY AND ATTITUDE WITH REGARDS TO OUR TECHNICAL
CAPABILITY AND BEHAVIOURS WITH EMPHASY (sic) ON DISCIPLINE" who "NOTICED 3/E ROSAROSO AS
BEING SLACK AND NOT CARING OF HIS JOB AND DUTIES X X X ." Accordingly, the report is plain hearsay. It is
not backed up by the affidavit of any of the "Supt." Engineers who purportedly had first-hand knowledge of private
respondents supposed "lack of discipline," "irresponsibility" and "lack of diligence" which caused him to lose his job. x x
x 12
The Court finds no reason to reverse the foregoing findings.
To begin with, the question of whether respondent was dismissed for just cause is a question of fact which is beyond the
province of a petition for review on certiorari. It is fundamental that the scope of the Supreme Courts judicial review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is confined only to errors of law. It does not extend to questions of fact. More so in
labor cases where the doctrine applies with greater force.13
The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have already determined the factual issues, and these were affirmed by the CA. Thus,
they are accorded not only great respect but also finality,14 and are deemed binding upon this Court so long as they are
supported by substantial evidence.15 A heavy burden rests upon petitioner to convince the Court that it should take
exception from such a settled rule.16
More importantly, the finding that respondent was illegally dismissed is supported, not only by the evidence on record,
but by jurisprudence as well.
The rule in labor cases is that the employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal was for a just cause; failure to
show this would necessarily mean that the dismissal was unjustified and, therefore, illegal.17 The two-fold requirements
for a valid dismissal are as follows: (1) dismissal must be for a cause provided for in the Labor Code, which is
substantive; and (2) the observance of notice and hearing prior to the employees dismissal, which is procedural.18
The only evidence relied upon by petitioner in justifying respondents dismissal is the Chief Engineers Report dated
September 10, 1997. The question that arises, therefore, is whether the Report constitutes substantial evidence proving
that respondents dismissal was for cause.
Substantial evidence is defined as that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion.19 As all three tribunals found, the Report cannot be given any weight or credibility because it is
uncorroborated, based purely on hearsay, and obviously merely an afterthought. While rules of evidence are not strictly
observed in proceedings before administrative bodies,20 petitioner should have offered additional proof to corroborate the
statements described therein. Thus, in Ranises v. National Labor Relations Commission,21 involving a seafarer who was
repatriated to the Philippines for allegedly committing illegal acts amounting to a breach of trust, as based on a telex
dispatch by the Master of the M/V Southern Laurel, the Court rejected the weight given by the NLRC on the telex, to wit:
Unfortunately, the veracity of the allegations contained in the aforecited telex was never proven by respondent employer.
Neither was it shown that respondent employer exerted any effort to even verify the truthfulness of Capt. Sonodas report
and establish petitioners culpability for his alleged illegal acts. Worse, no other evidence was submitted to corroborate
the charges against petitioner.
Similarly in this case, petitioner should have presented other evidence to corroborate its claim that respondents acts or
omissions aboard the vessel M/V Naval Gent warrant his immediate repatriation. Moreover, the fact that the Report was
accomplished on September 10, 1999, or more than a month after respondent was repatriated, makes it all the more
suspect, and was obviously made to make it appear that there were valid reasons for respondents dismissal.
Another analogous case worth citing is Pacific Maritime Services, Inc. v. Ranay.22 This case involved two seafarers
repatriated to the Philippines for committing acts on board the vessel M/V Star Princess, which acts amounted to serious
misconduct, insubordination, non-observance of proper hours of work and damage to the laundry of the vessels crew and
passengers. In support of its claim that the respondents were validly dismissed, the petitioners presented its lone evidence,
a telefax transmission purportedly executed and signed by a certain Armando Villegas, detailing the incidents which
prompted the termination of private respondents services. The Court, however, ruled that the telefax transmission is not
sufficient evidence, viz.:
Petitioners reliance on the telefax transmission signed by Armando Villegas is woefully inadequate in meeting the
required quantum of proof which is substantial evidence. For one thing, the same is uncorroborated. Although substantial
evidence is not a function of quantity but rather of quality, the peculiar environmental circumstances of the instant case
demand that something more should have been proffered. According to the account of Villegas, it appears that the
incidents he was referring to transpired with the knowledge of some crew members. The alleged assault by Gerardo Ranay
on Villegas, for instance, was supposedly witnessed by at least four other crew members. Surprisingly, none of them was
called upon to testify, either in person or through sworn statements. Worse, Villegas himself who omitted some vital
details in his report, such as the time and date of the incidents referred to, was not even presented as witness so that
private respondents and the POEA hearing officer could have been given an opportunity to cross-examine and propound
clarificatory questions regarding matters averred by him in the telefax transmission. Moreover, although signed, the same
was not under oath and, therefore, of dubious veracity and reliability although admissible. Likewise, the motive is suspect
and the account of the incidents dangerously susceptible to bias since it came from a person with whom private
respondents were at odds. All told, petitioners failed to make up for the weakness of the evidence upon which they
confidently anchored the merits of their case.
Likewise, the belated submission of the report by Villegas, long after the incidents referred to had taken place and after
the complaint had been lodged by private respondents, weighs heavily against its credibility. Petitioners did not show any
convincing reason why said report was only accomplished on September 22, 1989. They merely argued that as in criminal
cases, the witness is usually reluctant to report an incident. At any rate, with present technology, a ship out at sea is not so
isolated that its captain cannot instantly communicate with its office. It would appear that the report, filed several months
later, is but an afterthought.
Therefore, the CA was correct in affirming the findings and conclusions of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.
Petitioner maintains that it complied with the requisites of procedural due process. According to petitioner, respondent
was constantly reprimanded and rebuked for his acts. Petitioner also contends that the ships Master is allowed to dismiss
an erring seafarer without hearing under Section 17, paragraph D of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) Standard Employment Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going
Vessels. Paragraph D, Section 17, however, is not applicable in respondents case.
Section 17 sets forth the disciplinary procedures against erring seafarers, to wit:
Section 17. DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES
The Master shall comply with the following disciplinary procedures against an erring seafarer:
A. The Master shall furnish the seafarer with a written notice containing the following:
1. Grounds for the charges as listed in Section 31 of this Contract.
2. Date, time and place for a formal investigation of the charges against the seafarer concerned.
B. The Master or his authorized representative shall conduct the investigation or hearing, giving the seafarer the
opportunity to explain or defend himself against the charges. An entry on the investigation shall be entered into the ships
logbook.
C. If, after the investigation or hearing, the Master is convinced that imposition of a penalty is justified, the Master shall
issue a written notice of penalty and the reasons for it to the seafarer, with copies furnished to the Philippine agent.
D. Dismissal for just cause may be effected by the Master without furnishing the seafarer with a notice of dismissal if
doing so will prejudice the safety of the crew or the vessel. This information shall be entered in the ships logbook. The
Master shall send a complete report to the manning agency substantiated by witnesses, testimonies and any other
documents in support thereof.
The foregoing provision was explained in Skippers Pacific, Inc. v. Mira,23 as follows:
Note that under Section 17 of what is termed the Standard Format, the "two - notice rule" is indicated. An erring seaman is
given a written notice of the charge against him and is afforded an opportunity to explain or defend himself. Should
sanctions be imposed, then a written notice of penalty and the reasons for it shall be furnished the erring seafarer. It is
only in the exceptional case of clear and existing danger to the safety of the crew or vessel that the required notices are
dispensed with; but just the same, a complete report should be sent to the manning agency, supported by substantial
evidence of the findings. (Emphasis supplied)
There is nothing on record that shows that furnishing respondent with a notice of dismissal will pose a clear and present
danger to the vessel and its crew. And even if the Master was justified in dispensing with the required notice, still, it was
essential that a complete report, substantiated by witnesses, testimonies and any other documents in support thereof, was
sent to the manning agency. The record of this case is bereft of any such report and supporting documents. Instead,
respondent was verbally ordered to disembark the vessel and repatriated to the Philippines without being told of the
reasons why.24 Clearly, respondent was not accorded due process.
Finally, petitioner laments the award of backwages equivalent to three months salary in favor of respondent. Petitioner
argues that there is no basis for such award. The Court is not persuaded.
A seafarer is not a regular employee as defined in Article 280 of the Labor Code. Hence, he is not entitled to full
backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement as provided in Article 279 of the Labor Code.25 Seafarers are
contractual employees whose rights and obligations are governed primarily by the POEA Standard Employment Contract
for Filipino Seamen, the Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment, and, more importantly, by Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8042, or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.26While the POEA Standard
Employment Contract for Filipino Seamen and the Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment do not
provide for the award of separation or termination pay,27 Section 10 of R.A. 8042 provides for the award of money
claims in cases of illegal dismissals, thus:
Section 10. Money Claims. x x x
x x x
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the
worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum,
plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less.
x x x
The award of salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less, is not an award of backwages or separation pay, but a form of indemnity for the worker
who was illegally dismissed. The Labor Arbiter may have mislabeled it as separation pay, nonetheless, the award was
made in conformity with law.
However, in the interest of substantial justice and to avoid further litigation on the matter,28 it must be stressed that the
peso amounts equivalent to the dollar awards of the Labor Arbiter can not be enforced for being contrary to law. The peso
equivalent of the monetary award should be computed at the peso to dollar exchange rate prevailing at the time of
payment,29 as provided in Republic Act No. 8183, entitled "An Act Repealing Republic Act Numbered Five Hundred
Twenty-Nine, As Amended, Entitled An Act to Assure the Uniform Value of Philippine Coin and Currency," which
provides:
SECTION 1. All monetary obligations shall be settled in the Philippine currency which is legal tender in the Philippines.
However, the parties may agree that the obligation or transaction shall be settled in any other currency at the time of
payment.
Except for the foregoing clarification, the Court finds no cogent reason to grant this petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 7, 2001 and Resolution dated July 3, 2001 rendered by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53490 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the monetary awards of
US$2,400.00 and US$186.69 made by the Labor Arbiter in its Decision dated August 11, 1998, should be payable in its
equivalent in Philippine currency computed at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment.
Let the heirs of deceased respondent represented by his surviving wife, Carmen M. Rosaroso, residing at Hills View,
Mohon II, Tisa, Cebu City, who are hereby deemed substituted as respondents, be sent a copy of herein Decision.
SO ORDERED.



















People v gasacao
Gr. No. 168445

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is an appeal from the May 18, 2005 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00800 dismissing the
appeal of appellant, Florencio O. Gasacao and affirming the March 5, 2001 Joint Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 218, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Large Scale Illegal
Recruitment in Crim. Case No. Q-00-94240 and acquitting him of the charge in Crim. Case No. Q-00-94241.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Appellant was the Crewing Manager of Great Eastern Shipping Agency Inc., a licensed local manning agency, while his
nephew and co-accused, Jose Gasacao, was the President. As the crewing manager, appellants duties included receiving
job applications, interviewing the applicants and informing them of the agencys requirement of payment of performance
or cash bond prior to deployment.
On August 4, 2000, appellant and Jose Gasacao were charged with Large Scale Illegal Recruitment defined under Section
6, paragraphs (a), (l) and (m) of Republic Act (RA) No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,
and penalized under Section 7 (b) of the same law, before the RTC of Quezon City.

The informations read:
In Criminal Case No. Q-00-94240
That sometime in the months of May to December, 1999 or thereabout, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally recruit, enlist and promise overseas employment to
the private complainants, namely, Lindy M. Villamor, Dennis Cabangahan, Erencio C. Alaba, Victorino U. Caderao,
Rommel B. Patolen, Joseph A. Demetria and Louie A. Arca, as overseas seamen/seafarers, the said accused thereby
charging, exacting and collecting from the said private complainants cash bonds and/or performance bonds in amounts
ranging from P10,000.00 to P20,000.00 without any authority to do so and despite the fact that the same is prohibited by
the POEA Rules and Regulations, which amount is greater than that specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed
by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, and despite the payment of the said fees, the said accused failed to actually
deploy the private complainants without valid reasons as determined by the Department of Labor and Employment and
despite the failure of deployment, the said accused failed to reimburse the expenses incurred by the said private
complainants in connection with their documentation and processing for the purpose of their supposed deployment.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
In Criminal Case No. Q-00-94241
That sometime in the months of September to November 1999 or thereabout, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally recruit, enlist and promise overseas
employment to the private complainants, namely, Melvin I. Yadao, Frederick Calambro and Andy Bandiola, as overseas
seamen/seafarers, the said accused thereby charging, exacting and collecting from the said private complainants cash
bonds and/or performance bonds in amounts ranging from P10,000.00 to P20,000.00 without any authority to do so and
despite the fact that the same is prohibited by the POEA Rules and Regulations, which amount is greater that that
specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary Labor and Employment, and despite the payment
of said fees, the said accused failed to actually deploy the private complainants without valid reasons as determined by the
Department of Labor and Employment and despite the failure of deployment, the said accused failed to reimburse the
expenses incurred by the said private complainants in connection with their documentation and processing for the purpose
of their supposed deployment.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Only the appellant was arrested while Jose Gasacao remained at large. When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to
the offense charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. On March 5, 2001, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 218,
rendered its Joint Decision convicting appellant of Large Scale Illegal Recruitment in Crim. Case No. Q-00-94240 and
acquitting him of the charge in Crim. Case No. Q-00-94241. The dispositive portion of the joint decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Crim. Case No. Q-00-94240, the prosecution having established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, the Court finds Florencio O. Gasacao GUILTY of Large Scale Illegal Recruitment punishable under Section 7, (b)
of R.A. 8042. He is sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00. He shall also indemnify Dennis C.
Cabangahan in the amount of P8,750.00; Lindy M. Villamor for P20,000.00; Victorino U. Caderao for P20,000.00;
Rommel B. Patolen for P20,000.00; and Erencio C. Alaba for P20,000.00. Complainants Louie A. Arca and Joseph A.
Demetria did not testify.

2. In Crim. Case No. Q-00-94241, complainants Melvin I. Yadao, Frederick Calambro and Andy Bandiola did not
testify. Moreover, the Court believes all these complainants should have been grouped in just one (1) information. Hence,
for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the Court finds Florencio O.
Gasacao NOT GUILTY of the offense charged.

SO ORDERED.[5]

Conformably with our pronouncement in People v. Mateo,[6] which modified pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court
insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as in this case, as well as this Courts Resolution dated September 19,
1995, we resolved on February 2, 2005 to transfer the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and
disposition.[7]

On May 18, 2005, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The appealed Joint
Decision dated March 5, 2001 of the trial court in Criminal Case No. Q-00-94240 is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

With costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.[8]

Hence, this appeal.

The core issue for resolution is whether error attended the trial courts findings, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that
appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of large scale illegal recruitment.

RA No. 8042 defines illegal recruitment as follows:

II. ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT

Sec. 6. DEFINITIONS. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor
Code of the Philippines: Provided, that such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts,
whether committed by any persons, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority.

(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than the specified in the schedule of allowable fees
prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to make a worker pay any amount greater than that actually
received by him as a loan or advance;

....

(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the Department of Labor and Employment; and

(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the workers in connection with his documentation and processing for
purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the worker's fault. Illegal
recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered as offense involving economic sabotage.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or
confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group.


A license is a document issued by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) authorizing a person or entity to
operate a private employment agency, while an authority is a document issued by the DOLE authorizing a person or
association to engage in recruitment and placement activities as a private recruitment entity. However, it appears that
even licensees or holders of authority can be held liable for illegal recruitment should they commit any of the above-
enumerated acts.

Thus, it is inconsequential that appellant committed large scale illegal recruitment while Great Eastern Shipping Agency,
Inc. was holding a valid authority. We thus find that the court below committed no reversible error in not appreciating
that the manning agency was a holder of a valid authority when appellant recruited the private complainants.

There is no merit in appellants contention that he could not be held liable for illegal recruitment since he was a mere
employee of the manning agency, pursuant to Section 6 of RA No. 8042 which provides:

The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical
persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their business shall be liable.

Contrary to appellants claim, he is not a mere employee of the manning agency but the crewing manager. As such, he
receives job applications, interviews applicants and informs them of the agencys requirement of payment of performance
or cash bond prior to the applicants deployment. As the crewing manager, he was at the forefront of the companys
recruitment activities.

Private complainant Lindy Villamor testified that it was appellant who informed him that if he will give a cash bond of
P20,000.00, he will be included in the first batch of applicants to be deployed. Notwithstanding the payment of the cash
bond as evidenced by a receipt dated December 15, 1999 and issued by the appellant, Villamor was not deployed
overseas. He further testified that when he found out that appellant was no longer connected with Great Eastern Shipping
Agency Inc., he confronted Jose Gasacao and showed to him a photocopy of the receipt. Jose Gasacao gave him the
address of the appellant but he failed to recover the amount from the latter.

Another private complainant, Erencio C. Alaba testified that he applied as a seaman with Great Eastern Shipping Agency
Inc. in May 1999 and submitted all the requirements to appellant. The latter told Alaba that after payment of a cash bond,
he will be deployed within three months. On June 3, 1999, Alaba gave P10,000.00 to the appellant as evidenced by a cash
voucher which was approved and signed by the appellant in the presence of Alaba.

Afterwards, appellant asked Alaba to have his medical examination. He was also informed that those who had completed
paying the P20,000.00 cash bond will have priority in deployment. Thus, Alaba gave another P10,000.00 to appellant on
August 2, 1999 and was again informed that he will be deployed in a dredging or supply boat within three months from
August 1999. Despite appellants representations, Alaba was never deployed and was also unable to recover the amount of
the cash bond that he paid.

Private complainant Dennis Cabangahan testified that he applied as a seaman with Great Eastern Shipping Agency Inc. on
July 27, 1999 and paid the cash bond of P19,000.00 as evidenced by a receipt issued by appellant. The latter informed
him that he will be deployed abroad within three months. As what had happened to the other complainants, Cabangahan
was never deployed overseas nor did he recover his money.

Victoriano Cadirao[9] also testified that on August 1, 1999, he applied with the manning agency for the position of mess
man. He submitted his application to appellant who told him to come back when he has the money to cover the cash bond
of P20,000.00. Appellant told him that the payment of the cash bond is optional, but that his deployment will be fast-
tracked if he pays the cash bond. On August 10, 1999, he gave P20,000.00 to appellant who issued a receipt. When the
promised employment failed to materialize, the appellant told Cadirao to wait for another dredging vessel. In December
1999, he found out that appellant was no longer connected with Great Eastern Shipping Agency Inc. so he went to his
residence and demanded the return of his money. Appellant however refused to return the amount of the cash bond.

On the other hand, Rommel B. Patolen testified that he applied with Great Eastern Shipping Agency Inc. as an ordinary
seaman in May 1999. After complying with the requirements, appellant told him to report to the agency thrice a
week. From May to December 1999, Patolen reported to the agency as instructed. On December 11, 1999, he gave
P20,000.00 to appellant who acknowledged its receipt. Patolen further testified that he paid the cash bond because
appellant told him that his prospective employer will arrive in December 1999 from Saudi Arabia with a vessel to
accommodate him. He was further advised that he could leave within three months if he paid the cash bond. However,
Patolen was never deployed and when he found out that appellant was no longer connected with Great Eastern Shipping
Agency Inc., he went to the house of the latter and informed him that he was withdrawing his application. Appellant
asked him to wait for his new agency, Ocean Grandeur, which has no license yet.

The foregoing testimonies of the private complainants clearly established that appellant is not a mere employee of Great
Eastern Shipping Agency Inc. As the crewing manager, it was appellant who made representations with the private
complainants that he can secure overseas employment for them upon payment of the cash bond.

It is well settled that to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that appellant gave complainants the distinct
impression that he had the power or ability to send complainants abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to
part with their money in order to be employed.[10] Appellants act of promising the private complainants that they will
be deployed abroad within three months after they have paid the cash bond clearly shows that he is engaged in illegal
recruitment.

The trial courts appreciation of the complainants testimonies deserves the highest respect since it was in a better position
to asses their credibility.

Even assuming that appellant was a mere employee, such fact is not a shield against his conviction for large scale illegal
recruitment. In the case of People v. Cabais,[11] we have held that an employee of a company or corporation engaged in
illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and
consciously participated in the recruitment process. We further stated that:

In this case, evidence showed that accused-appellant was the one who informed complainant of job prospects in Korea
and the requirements for deployment. She also received money from them as placement fees. All of the complainants
testified that they personally met the accused-appellant and transacted with her regarding the overseas job placement
offers. Complainants parted with their money, evidenced by receipts signed by accused Cabais and accused Forneas.
Thus, accused-appellant actively participated in the recruitment of the complainants.[12]

Clearly, the acts of appellant vis--vis the private complainants, either as the crewing manager of Great Eastern Shipping
Agency Inc. or as a mere employee of the same, constitute acts of large scale illegal recruitment which should not be
countenanced.

We find no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of large
scale illegal recruitment. It was established that he promised overseas employment to five applicants, herein private
complainants. He interviewed and required them to complete and submit documents purportedly needed for their
employment. Although he informed them that it is optional, he collected cash bonds and promised their deployment
notwithstanding the proscription against its collection under Section 60 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations
Implementing R.A. No. 8042[13] which state that:


SEC. 60. Prohibition on Bonds and Deposits. In no case shall an employment agency require any bond or cash deposit
from the worker to guarantee performance under the contract or his/her repatriation.

We find as flimsy and self serving appellants assertion that he was unaware of the prohibition against the collection of
bonds or cash deposits from applicants. It is an established dictum that ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith.[14] The defense of good faith is neither available.

It is also undisputed that appellant failed to deploy the private complainants without any valid reason, this notwithstanding
his promise to them that those who can pay the cash bond will be deployed within three months from payment of the
same. Such failure to deploy constitutes a violation of Section 6 (l) of RA No. 8042. Worse, when it became clear that
appellant cannot deploy the private complainants without their fault, he failed to return the amount of the cash bond paid
by them.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three or more persons individually or as a
group. In this case, five complainants testified against appellants acts of illegal recruitment, thereby rendering his acts
tantamount to economic sabotage. Under Section 7 (b) of RA No. 8042, the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not
less than P500,000.00 nor more than P1,000.000.00 shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage.

Verily, the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable of large scale illegal
recruitment.
WHEREFORE, the May 18, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00800 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
















G.R. No. 125044 July 13, 1998
IMELDA DARVIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. 15624 dated January 31,
1996, 1 which affirmed in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite, convicting accused-
appellant, Imelda Darvin for simple illegal recruitment under Article 38 and Article 39, in relation to Article 13 (b) and
(c), of the Labor Code as amended.
Accused-appellant was charged under the following information:
That on our about the 13th day of April 1992, in the Municipality of Bacoor, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, through fraudulent representation to one Macaria
Toledo to the effect that she has the authority to recruit workers and employees for abroad and can facilitate the necessary
papers in connection thereof, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, hire, recruit and promise a job
abroad to one Macaria Toledo, without first securing the necessary license and permit from the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration to do so, thereby causing damage and prejudice to the aforesaid Macaria Toledo.
Contrary to law. 2
The evidence for the prosecution, based on the testimony of private respondent, Macaria Toledo, shows that sometime in
March, 1992, she met accused-appellant Darvin in the latter's residence at Dimasalang, Imus, Cavite, through the
introduction of their common friends, Florencio Jake Rivera and Leonila Rivera. In said meeting, accused-appellant
allegedly convinced Toledo that by giving her P150,000.00, the latter can immediately leave for the United States without
any appearance before the U.S. embassy. 3 Thus, on April 13, 1992, Toledo gave Darvin the amount of P150,000.00, as
evidenced by a receipt stating that the "amount of P150,000.00 was for U.S. Visa and Air fare." 4After receiving the
money, Darvin assured Toledo that she can leave within one week. However, when after a week, there was no word from
Darvin, Toledo went to her residence to inquire about any development, but could not find Darvin. Thereafter, on May 7,
1992, Toledo filed a complaint with the Bacoor Police Station against Imelda Darvin. Upon further investigation, a
certification was issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) stating that Imelda Darvin is
neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. 5 Accused-appellant was then charged for
estafa and illegal recruitment by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite.
Accused-appellant, on the other hand, testified that she used to be connected with Dale Travel Agency and that in 1992, or
thereabouts, she was assisting individuals in securing passports, visa, and airline tickets. She came to know Toledo
through Florencio Jake Rivera, Jr. and Leonila Rivera, alleging that Toledo sought her help to secure a passport, US visa
and airline tickets to the States. She claims that she did not promise any employment in the U.S. to Toledo. She, however,
admits receiving the amount of P150,000.00 from the latter on April 13, 1992 but contends that it was used for necessary
expenses of an intended trip to the United States of Toledo and her friend, Florencio Rivera 6 as follows. P45,000.00 for
plane fare for one person; P1,500.00 for passport, documentation and other incidental expenses for each person;
P20,000.00 for visa application cost for each person; and P17,000.00 for services.7 After receiving the money, she
allegedly told Toledo that the papers will be released within 45 days. She likewise testified that she was able to secure
Toledo's passport on April 20, 1992 and even set up a date for an interview with the US embassy. Accused alleged that
she was not engaged in illegal recruitment but merely acted as a travel agent in assisting individuals to secure passports
and visa.
In its judgment rendered on June 17, 1993, the Bacoor, Cavite RTC found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of simple
illegal recruitment but acquitted her of the crime of estafa. The dispositive portion of the judgment reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Imelda Darvin is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Simple Illegal Recruitment for having committed the prohibited practice as defined by paragraph (b) of Article 34 and
punished by paragraph (c) of Article 39 of the Labor Code, as amended by PD 2018.
Accused Imelda Darvin is hereby ordered to suffer the prison term of Four (4) years, as minimum, to Eight (8) years, as
maximum; and to pay the fine of P25,000.00.
Regarding her civil liability, she is hereby ordered to reimburse the private complainant the sum of P150,000.00 and
attorney's fees of P10,000.00.
She is hereby acquitted of the crime of Estafa.
SO ORDERED. 8
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto, hence this petition.
Before this Court, accused-appellant assails the decision of the trial and appellate courts in convicting her of the crime of
simple illegal recruitment. She contends that based on the evidence presented by the prosecution, her guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
We find the appeal impressed with merit.
Art. 13 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides the definition of recruitment and placement as:
. . .; b) any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment locally or abroad, whether for profit or
not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
On the other hand, Article 38 of the Labor Code provides:
a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be
undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this
Code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article.
xxx xxx xxx
Applied to the present case, to uphold the conviction of accused-appellant, two elements need to be shown: (1) the person
charged with the crime must have undertaken recruitment activities; and (2) the said person does not have a license or
authority to do so. 9
In this case, private respondent, Macaria Toledo alleged that she was offered a job in the United States as nursing
aide 10 by accused-appellant. In her direct examination, she testified as follows:
Atty. Alejandro:
Q : How did you come to know the accused?
Witness : I was introduced by my two friends. One of whom is my best friend. That according to them, this accused has
connections and authorizations, that she can make people leave for abroad, sir.
Court : What connections?
Witness : That she has connections with the Embassy and with people whom she can approach regarding work abroad,
your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
Q : When you came to meet for the first time in Imus, Cavite, what transpired in that meeting of yours?
A : When I came to her house, the accused convinced me that by means of P150,000.00, I will be able to leave
immediately without any appearance to any embassy, non-appearance, Sir.
Q : When you mentioned non-appearance, as told to you by the accused, precisely, what do you mean by that?
A : I was told by the accused that non-appearance, means without working personally for my papers and through her
efforts considering that she is capacitated as according to her I will be able to leave the country, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Alejandro : What transpired after the accused told you all these things that you will be able to secure all the
documents without appearing to anybody or to any embassy and that you will be able to work abroad?
Witness : She told me to get ready with my P150,000.00, that is if I want to leave immediately, Sir.
Atty. Alejandro : When you mentioned kaagad, how many days or week?
Witness : She said that if I will able to part with my P150,000.00. I will be able to leave in just one week time, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx 11
The prosecution, as evidence, presented the certification issued by the POEA that accused-appellant Imelda Darvin is not
licensed to recruit workers abroad.
It is not disputed that accused-appellant does not have a license or authority to engage in recruitment activities. The
pivotal issue to be determined, therefore, is whether the accused-appellant indeed engaged in recruitment activities, as
defined under the Labor Code. Applying the rule laid down in the case of People v. Goce, 12 to prove that accused-
appellant was engaged in recruitment activities as to commit the crime of illegal recruitment, it must be shown that the
accused appellant gave private respondent the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send the private
respondent abroad for work such that the latter was convinced to part with her money in order to be so employed.
In this case, we find no sufficient evidence to prove that accused-ppellant offered a job to private respondent. It is not
clear that accused gave the impression that she was capable of providing the private respondent work abroad. What is
established, however, is that the private respondent gave accused-appellant P150,000.00. The claim of the accused that the
P150,000.00 was for payment of private respondent's air fare and US visa and other expenses cannot be ignored because
the receipt for the P150,000.00, which was presented by both parties during the trial of the case, stated that it was "for Air
Fare and Visa to USA." 13 Had the amount been for something else in addition to air fare and visa expenses, such as work
placement abroad, the receipt should have so stated.
By themselves, procuring a passport, airline tickets and foreign visa for another individual, without more, can hardly
qualify as recruitment activities. Aside from the testimony of private respondent, there is nothing to show that accused-
appellant engaged in recruitment activities. We also note that the prosecution did not present the testimonies of witnesses
who could have corroborated the charge of illegal recruitment, such as Florencio Rivera, and Leonila Rivera, when it had
the opportunity to do so. As it stands, the claim of private respondent that accused-appellant promised her employment
abroad is uncorroborated. All these, taken collectively, cast reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused.
This Court can hardly rely on the bare allegations of private respondent that she was offered by accused-appellant
employment abroad, nor on mere presumptions and conjectures, to convict the latter. No sufficient evidence was shown to
sustain the conviction, as the burden of proof lies with the prosecution to establish that accused-appellant indeed engaged
in recruitment activities, thus committing the crime of illegal recruitment.
In criminal cases, the burden is on the prosecution to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, the essential elements of the
offense with which the accused is charged; and if the proof fails to establish any of the essential elements necessary to
constitute a crime, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of
proof as, excluding the possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of
proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. 14
At best, the evidence proffered by the prosecution only goes so far as to create a suspicion that accused-appellant probably
perpetrated the crime charged. But suspicion alone is insufficient, the required quantum of evidence being proof beyond
reasonable doubt. When the People's evidence fail to indubitably prove the accused' s authorship of the crime of which he
stands accused, then it is the Court's duty, and the accused's right, to proclaim his innocence. Acquittal, therefore, is in
order. 15
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15624
dated January 31, 1996, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Imelda Darvin is hereby ACQUITTED on
ground of reasonable doubt. Accordingly, let the accused be immediately released from her place of confinement unless
there is reason to detain her further for any other legal or valid cause. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
\















G.R. No. 132029 July 30, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
MARIO ALZONA, appellant.


D E C I S I O N


AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated July 28, 1997 rendered in CA-G.R. CR No. 17228, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the joint decision of the trial court finding appellant MARIO ALZONA guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of illegal recruitment in large scale and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P100,000.00 (Criminal Case No. 92-113702) and estafa (Criminal Case Nos. 92-113706 to 92-113709) is AFFIRMED
with modification in the sense that the penalty which should be imposed upon herein appellant in Criminal Case No. 92-
113709 is the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 9 years of prision
mayor, as maximum.
Pursuant to Section 13(2), Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, let this case be certified and
the entire records thereof be elevated to the Supreme Court for review.
Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
On December 4, 1996, an Information for Large Scale Illegal Recruitment against appellant Mario Alzona, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 92-113702 and seven Informations for Estafa against appellant and his wife, Miranda Alzona,
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 92-113703 to 92-113709, were filed before Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila (RTC for brevity). All eight cases were consolidated and jointly tried by the RTC. However, due to the failure of
private complainants to testify and present their evidence, Criminal Cases Nos. 92-113703 to 92-113705 were dismissed
but only as against appellant Mario Alzona.
In Criminal Case No. 92-113702, the Information charges appellant as follows:
That in (sic) or about and during the period comprised between August 2, 1991 and March 30, 1992, inclusive, in the City
of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, representing himself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino
workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully, and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise
employment/job placement abroad to the following persons, namely: LYDIA C. RAMOS, MELINDA P. GONZALES,
MARCELA R. MERCADO, FERNANDO P. DELA CRUZ, LEONARDO C. MERCURIO, MARIO REGINO P.
DECENA and JAMES M. MAZON, without first having secured the required license or authority from the Department of
Labor.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 92-113706 to 92-113709, the Informations allege that appellant, conspiring and confederating
with his wife, Miranda Alzona, defrauded private complainants Fernando Dela Cruz, James Mazon, Leonardo Mercurio
and Mario Regino Decena, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representation that they had the power and
capacity to recruit and employ the private complainants and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given
the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in
inducing said private complainants to give and deliver, as in fact private complainants delivered sums of money to
appellant and his wife, the latter well knowing that their representations were false and fraudulent and were made solely to
obtain sums of money from private complainants, which money, once in their possession, they misappropriated,
misapplied and converted to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the private complainants.
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the foregoing charges. Trial ensued. Accused Miranda Alzona remains
at-large.
The facts of the case, as established by the prosecution, are as follows.
Private complainant Mario Regino Decena came to know of appellant because a friend of his, Goring Rodil, was able to
work abroad through the facilitation of appellant. Decena met appellant at the latters house at 1532 Hizon St., Sta. Cruz,
Manila, where appellant asked him to prepare P38,000.00, inclusive of the P1,000.00 for the passport, so he can leave
within one month. Said amount was supposed to pay for his fare going to Korea where appellant said he would be
employed as a factory worker with a monthly salary of $450.00. Both appellant and Miranda convinced him to apply for
work abroad. He then paid the P1,000.00 for the passport and on February 10, 1992, he paid another P33,000.00, received
by appellant himself. The latter refused to give him a receipt for the amounts he paid. Despite having paid the total
of P34,000.00, appellant failed to send him to work in Korea and also failed to return his money.2
Another private complainant, Leonardo Mercurio, also went to appellants house in Sta. Cruz, Manila and applied to
appellant and his wife for work abroad. Mercurio and his brother-in-law, Fernando Dela Cruz, were accompanied by
Decena who had also applied to the spouses Alzona for overseas work. Mercurio talked mainly to appellants wife,
Miranda, in the presence of appellant. She asked him to pay P1,000.00 for the passport. Appellant was seated around the
same table where he and Miranda were talking. Appellant and Miranda asked Mercurio and his brother-in-law to
pay P20,000.00 each on March 30, 1992. Thus, on March 30, 1992, Mercurio delivered to appellant the amount
of P20,000.00 and despite his request for a receipt, appellant refused to issue one. The total fees being asked for by
appellant was P38,000.00. After receiving the P20,000.00, appellant reminded Mercurio to pay the balance so he can
depart within a week for Korea where appellant promised him employment as a factory worker with a monthly salary of at
least $450.00. Appellant instructed Mercurio to buy an attach case and a coat and tie. Mercurio was not able to depart by
the first week of April as promised by appellant but he continued to follow-up his application. Sometime in July of 1992,
Mercurio became impatient and demanded from appellant for the return of his money. On August 21, 1992, Mercurio
filed a complaint with the police against appellant.3
Private complainant Fernando Dela Cruz corroborated the testimony of Mercurio on all material points. On some of the
occasions that he and Mercurio followed-up their applications, Dela Cruz talked to appellant himself who would always
tell him to prepare because they will soon be leaving for Korea. The last time they went to appellants house, the
Barangay Captain of the place informed them that appellant had already been apprehended.4
Private complainant James Mazon had a similar experience with appellant and Miranda. After having heard that appellant
and Miranda were accepting applicants for employment abroad, Mazon went to appellants residence during the first week
of January, 1992. Appellant and Miranda promised that he would be deployed to Korea where he will be employed as a
factory worker. He was told to pay the placement fee of P38,000.00 inclusive of charges for the passport. Appellant told
Mazon that he was in-charge of booking and procuring tickets, while Miranda was the one who made arrangements with
regard to the application for a job abroad. On January 10, 1992, he gaveP15,000.00 to appellant who did not issue a
receipt. Upon receiving such partial payment, appellant promised him that he would be deployed within one to two
months. He was never deployed to Korea and he heard from the other private complainants who were also from Mulanay,
Quezon, that appellant was already in jail.5
Risa Balverde, a Licensure Officer III of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) testified that
appellant was neither licensed nor authorized by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment.6
For his defense, appellant merely denied that he ever met, talked to or received money from the aforementioned four
private complainants; nor had he been involved in illegal recruitment. He presented the alibi that he, being a jeepney
driver, was out of their house everyday from 7 o clock in the morning to around 9 oclock in the evening, so private
complainants could not have talked to him at his house at 1532 Hizon St., Sta. Cruz, Manila. He, however, admitted that
in 1989, he found out that his wife was engaged in recruiting workers for abroad. In fact, his wife had been going back
and forth to Korea around six times a year since 1990, to accompany people. He stopped being a jeepney driver on July
15, 1992, because so many people were going to their house.7
Appellants daughter, Marites Alzona, corroborated her fathers testimony that he is a jeepney driver and is out of their
house everyday from 6 oclock in the morning to 10 oclock in the evening, and therefore, private complainants could not
have met her father. She admitted that she had seen private complainants talking to her mother at their house beginning
August 1991 but she was unaware as to what their purpose was for coming to their house. She would see them at their
house around four times a month, but the last time she saw them was in July 1992. Her mother left for Korea on July 15,
1992 and thereafter, every time private complainants would come looking for her mother, she would be the one to talk to
them. When she told them that her mother had left for Korea, private complainants became angry. On August 5, 1992, she
and her father were arrested at their house.8
Appellants sister, Esther Panday, testified that she owns the jeepney being driven by appellant everyday, twelve hours a
day. Such being the case, she believed appellant could not have engaged in any other sideline such as recruiting workers
for abroad.9
After both parties had rested their case, the trial court rendered judgment,10 the dispositive portion of which read as
follows:
WHEREFORE, this court finds the accused Mario Alzona GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in
large scale in Criminal Case No. 92-113702 and of four (4) separate crimes of estafa in Criminal Cases Nos. 92-113706,
92-113707, 92-113708 and 92-113709 and, as a consequence thereof, sentences him as follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 92-113702, to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00; and
(2) In Criminal Cases Nos. 92-113706, 92-113707, 92-113708 and 92-113709, to suffer in each case the indeterminate
penalty of one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional minimum as minimum to five (5) months and eleven
(11) days of prision correccional maximum as maximum.
Further, the accused shall indemnify the private complainants Fernando dela Cruz, James Mazon, Leonardo Mercurio and
Mario Regino P. Decena the respective sums of P21,000.00, P15,000.00, P21,000.00, and P34,000.00, with interest
thereon at the legal rate from judicial demand until fully paid.
Costs against the accused in all the above-mentioned cases.
Anent Criminal Cases No. 92-113703, 92-113704 and 92-113705, the same are hereby ordered dismissed as against
accused Mario Alzona for lack of evidence.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.11
Appellant appealed the criminal cases to the Court of Appeals with the following Assignment of Errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT ILLEGALLY RECRUITED THE
COMPLAINANTS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF 4 COUNTS OF ESTAFA
DESPITE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE THAT HE CONSPIRED WITH HIS WIFE IN DEFRAUDING
THE COMPLAINANTS.
Appellant points out that the testimonies of Mercurio, Dela Cruz and Mazon showed that it was actually only Miranda
who transacted with private complainants. Therefore, argues appellant, there was no sufficient evidence to prove that
appellant was acting in confederation with his wife. Furthermore, appellant claims that private complainants merely
implicated him because they could no longer find Miranda who was the one who recruited private complainants for
overseas employment.
On July 28, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision, the decretal portion of which has been quoted earlier.
First, we tackle the charge of Illegal Recruitment against appellant. Pertinent provisions of the Labor Code state thus:
Article 13. Definitions. -
. . .
(b) Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
. . .
Article 38. Illegal Recruitment. - (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under
Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and
punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The Department of Labor or any law enforcement officer may initiate
complaints under this Article.
(b) Illegal Recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving
economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof
Illegal Recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring
and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined
under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal Recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or
more persons individually or as a group, . . .
Article 39. Penalties. (a) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)
shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein; . . .
Pursuant to the foregoing, the prosecution must prove the following elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large
scale, to wit:
(1) the person undertakes any recruitment activity defined under Article 13, paragraph (b), or any prohibited practice
enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) said person does not have a license or authority to engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) the act is committed against three or more persons, individually or as a
group.12
The testimonies of prosecution witnesses, namely: private complainants Decena, Mercurio, Dela Cruz, and Mazon and
Licensure Officer III Balverde, of the POEA, prove that appellant and his wife Miranda promised overseas employment to
private complainants upon payment of placement fees, without the necessary license therefor. Appellant maintains that he
could not have transacted with private complainants as he was out of their house as a jeepney driver from 6 oclock in the
morning to 9 oclock in the evening, seven days a week. With these conflicting versions of the parties, it is quite clear that
the resolution of this case revolves around the credibility of witnesses.
We are constrained to scrutinize the entire records of the case and determine whether the prosecution evidence has proven
the existence of all the elements of the crimes of Illegal Recruitment and Estafa.
It is important to keep in mind the oft-repeated rule that:
. . . where the issue is on credibility, the findings of the trial court will generally not be disturbed. The trial court has the
advantage of hearing the witnesses and observing their conduct during the trial, circumstances that carry great weight in
appreciating credibility. The trial court is thus in a better position to settle such an issue.13
We have carefully reviewed the records of the case and find no cogent reason to overturn the factual findings of the trial
court, especially its evaluation of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, thus: "the testimonies of private
complainants . . . given in clear, logical and straightforward manner, mentioning details of the incidents that could not
have been merely concocted, reflecting spontaneity and sincerity in the narration of events, are indicative of the truth of
what actually happened."14
The testimonies of the four private complainants, viewed in their totality, have indeed established that appellant and
Miranda cooperated with each other in convincing private complainants to pay them a placement fee ofP38,000.00 for
employment as factory workers in Korea, despite the absence of the required license therefor. The alleged segmented
portions of the testimonies of Mercurio, Dela Cruz, and Mazon, quoted by appellant in his appellants brief, that
supposedly would show that only his wife Miranda was involved in illegal recruitment, were obviously taken out of
context. A scrutiny of the entirety of all four private complainants testimonies would show that sometimes, it would be
appellant who would transact business with private complainants and at other times, it would be appellants wife Miranda.
Most damning for appellant, however, is the fact that all the private complainants categorically stated that it was appellant
who received sums of money from them and refused to issue a receipt. Such fact shows that he actively engaged in the
recruitment of three or more workers for employment abroad despite the lack of the necessary license from the POEA,
which act constitutes the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale.
Next, we come to the charges of four separate counts of estafa against appellant. Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the
Revised Penal Code provides thus:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall
be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of
the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000.00; but the
total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
. . . . . . . . .
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
. . .
Verily, the very same evidence proving appellants commission of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale also
established that appellant and Miranda acted with unity of purpose in defrauding private complainants by misrepresenting
that they (appellant and Miranda) had the power, influence, agency and business to obtain overseas employment for
private complainants upon payment of a placement fee, which complainants did pay and deliver to appellant. Thus,
private complainants suffered damages to the extent of the various sums of money they delivered to appellant,
i.e., P34,000.00 from Decena, P21,000.00 each from Mercurio and Dela Cruz, andP15,000.00 from Mazon. The
prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of the four counts of estafa.
The Court of Appeals was correct in modifying the penalty imposed on appellant with regard to Criminal Case No. 92-
113709, competently explaining thus:
We note, however, that the trial court imposed the wrong penalty in Criminal Case No 92-113709 . . . involving the
amount of P34,000.00. Pursuant to Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, if the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00,
the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in the minimum period shall be imposed in its
maximum period (6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years) adding one year for each additional P10,000.00; but the total
penalty shall not exceed 20 years.
The amount defrauded, as stated above, is P34,000.00. Hence, the penalty should be imposed in the maximum period (6
years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years) plus one year, there being only oneP10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty should be taken from the aforementioned maximum period, while
the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional in its minimum
and medium period which has a duration of 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. Accordingly, the correct penalty
should be 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 9 years of prision mayor as maximum.
An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review.15 The typographical error in the dispositive portion of the
decision rendered by the RTC regarding the penalty to be imposed on appellant in Criminal Cases Nos. 92-113706 to 92-
113708 should be corrected from "one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional minimum as minimum to five
(5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum as maximum" to "one (1) year and eight (8) months of
prision correccional as minimum to five (5) years and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as maximum."
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 28, 1997 in CA-G.R. CR No. 17228 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION only as to Criminal Cases Nos. 92-113706 to 92-113708 where appellant is hereby sentenced in each
case, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional as minimum to five
(5) years and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as maximum.
SO ORDERED.






G.R. No. 101361 November 8, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARY ROSE ONDO @ BABY and SIMEON ORTEGA, accused. MARY ROSE ONDO @ BABY, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Eriberto S. Guerrero, Jr. for accused-appellant.

QUIASON, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No-89-3949,
convicting Mary Rose Ondo @ Baby of illegal recruitment.
Appellant and Simeon Ortega were charged with violation of Article 38 of the Labor Code, committed as follows:
That on or about and sometime from the month of December 1988 to August 1989, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, by falsely representing themselves to have the power and capacity to contract,
enlist and transport workers for employment abroad, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and felonously recruit
Erlinda Cortez, Fidela Engada, Myra Siguenza, Dulce Garcia and Emilinda Padua and charged them placement fees and
processing fees and promising said persons non-existing jobs abroad, thus participating to the recruitment, placement of
deployment of said worders under false pretenses. (Rollo, p. 22).
The court a quo accepted, as established by the evidence on record, the version of the prosecution, which was summarized
in the brief of the Solicitor General, as follows:
On January 9, 1989, Perfecta Calderon, the sister and cousin of private complainants Frederico Calderon and Erlinda
Cortez, respectively, received a call from her sister Angelita Calderon who was in Italy. Angelita instructed her to wait for
the call of appellant regarding the recruitment of her brother Frederico and cousin Erlinda Cortez for jobs in Italy. A few
days thereafter, she received a call from appellant who asked for the passports, pictures and birth certificates of Frederico
and Erlinda so that appellant could process the requisite documentations for their departure to Italy. Likewise, appellant
also demanded the amount of 5,000 US Dollars (sic) as payment for the plane tickets of both applicants (tsn., pp. 3-4, may
10, 1990).
On January 15, 1989, appellant called her up telling her to bring the documents (passports, pictures and Birth Certificates)
to appellant's residence at 1754 Lacaba Compound, Tramo Street, Pasay City, which she did.
At the residence of appellant, Perfecta handed over the documents and the 5,000 US Dollars (sic) to Simeon Ortega who
signed a receipt (Exhs. "J" and "J-1") to evidence payment. Ortega then handed the money to appellant. Before leaving
appellant's residence, Perfecta inquired for the date of departure of her brother and cousin, but was told by appellant to
wait for her call (tsn., pp. 5-8, may 10, 1989). The call, however, never came, so she demanded for the return of the
money and the documents. Only the documents were returned (tsn., p. 9, May 10, 1990).
Her brother and cousin though were able to leave for and are already working in Italy through the assistance of another
travel agency (tsn., ibid.)
Sometime in December 1988, private complainant Fidela Engada was introduced by her brother Wilfredo to appellant
through a letter. Wilfredo Engada instructed her auntie Lucy Engada by phone to bring complainant to appellant for the
latter to process her papers for abroad.
On December 28, 1988, private complainant and Lucy Engada went to appellant's residence in 1754 Lacaba Compound,
Tramo Street, Pasay City, where she was introduced to appellant. Private complainant manifested he desire to go abroad
through the help of appellant per her brother's recommendation. Appellant then intimated to her that the amount
P65,000.00 was needed to defray for all the expenses. Outright, she handed a down payment of P30,000.00 which was
duly receipted ([Exhs. "A" to "A-1"] tsn., pp. 5-8, May 2, 1990). Appellant asked for her passport for processing and told
her to get in touch with appellant to ascertain the date of her departure.
After numerous follow-ups, private complainant was informed by appellant of her departure on August 18, 1989 and
appellant demanded another amount of 200 US Dollars (sic) for the purchase of her plane ticket for Italy. This event was
duly acknowledged by appellant (Exhs. "B" to "B-1", tsn., pp. 10-11, May 2, 1990).
On August 18, 1989, however, private complainant was not able to depart for Italy. She then tried to see appellant at her
residence but to no avail; appellant could no longer be located. For four more times she went to appellant's place but with
the same result. In her last attempt though, private complainant met the other victims of appellant and it was then that they
decided to file their complaints with the Pasay City Prosecutor's Office against appellant through a "Magkasanib na
Pahayag" ([Exh. "C"], tsn., pp. 12-14, May 2, 1990).
Private complainant, Dulce Garcia was introduced to appellant through a letter from appellant's friend, Lilia Gonzales. On
the last week of April 1989, appellant called her about 11:00 o'clock (sic) in the evening and introduced herself as
a balikbayan from Italy and a recruiter who could deploy workers for abroad. Private complainant, desirous of trying her
luck abroad, asked what the requirements were. Appellant told her that the amount of P65,000.00 was needed to pay for
the package-deal-arrangement in processing her travel documents i.e. passports, plan ticket and placement fees (tsn., pp.
14-15, May 10, 1990).
Three days after, appellant called her up again and told her to prepare the necessary requirements and to go to her
(appellant's) address at 1754-A Lacaba Compound, Tramo Street, Pasay City with the P65,000.00. While at the appellant's
residence, she was told that she could depart on the first week of June 1989. On May 10, 1989, appellant called her up
anew and told her to her (appellant) again at her said residence and bring with her the necessary documents and the
P65,000.00.
In the afternoon of the next day (May 11, 1989), private complainant went to appellant's residence where she handed the
documents and the amount of P53,000.00 in the presence of Emmanuel Balboa, appellant's boyfriend. Appellant issued a
receipt in acknowledgment therefor (Exhs. "K" to "K-1"), with the entry appearing thereat "received the amount of Fifty-
three Thousand Pesos Payment for plane ticket in going to Italy" (Exh. "K-2"). Appellant then told her to wait for another
call yet. Five days after, appellant called her up and told her to bring along her Birth Certificate and ID pictures so that she
could accompany her to the Passport Division of the department of Foreign Affairs at the Film center. Private complainant
was further told that her personal appearance at the Passport Division was important. (tsn., pp. 16-19, May 10, 1990).
At the Passport Division, private complainant was interviewed, after which appellant told her to give the balance of the
P65,000.00 In the morning of May 22, 1989, she went to appellant's residence and paid the amount of P11,500.00, which
payment was duly receipted (Exhs. "L" to "L-2") with the entry: "received from Dulce Garcia, P11,510.00 payment for
travel abroad." Appellant then showed private complainant her passport which was never handed over to her up to now.
She was assured though that her departure would be on June 6, 1989 (tsn., pp. 20-21, May 10, 1990). June 6, 1989 came
but private complainant was not able to depart because a day before (June 5, 1989), appellant called her up and told her
that she (appellant) was hospitalized. Her departure was, however, rescheduled for August 8, 1989. On this said scheduled
date (August 8, 1989), she was not able to leave because appellant told her that nobody would fetch her at the airport in
Italy. Thus the departure was again reset for any other day of August. The month of August 1989 passed, but she was not
able to leave. So she demanded for the return of the entire amount of P64,510.00 but appellant failed to return the money.
She, together with the other "victims" of appellant, decided to file complaints against the latter with the Pasay Fiscal's
Office in a "Sinumpaan Salaysay" (Exhs. "M" to "M-2", tsn., pp. 21-23, May 10, 1990)" (Rollo, pp. 72-79).
After convicting appellant of illegal recruitment, the court a quo sentenced her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P100,000.00 in accordance with Article 39 of the Labor Code (Decision, p. 19; Rollo, p. 40).
In her appeal, appellant questions the findings of the trial court that she had committed acts constituting a violation of
Article 38 of the Labor Code (Appellant's Brief, pp. 6-7; Rollo, p. 57).
The evidence on record shows that the complainants positively identified appellant as the one who recruited them for jobs
in Italy as domestic helpers and who demanded P65,000.00 from each of them as payment for the facilitation of their
travel documents. It was appellant's promise to complainants of job opportunities abroad that lured them to part with their
money.
In the absence of any proof that the decision of the trial court was based on conjectures or surmises, the same must be
upheld on appeal. The trial court is in a better position to observe and evaluate the demeanor of the witnesses (People v.
Pido, 200 SCRA 45 [1991]).
Devoid of merit is the defense of the appellant that the Felixim Travel Agency was the one which recruited the
complainants. No proof whatsoever was adduced to show that the officers or employees of said agency had personally
transacted with private complainants in connection with their overseas employment. The complainants themselves had
testified that the Felixim Travel Agency had nothing to do with their transaction with appellant.
We agree with the findings of the court a quo that appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment.
Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides that:
Illegal Recruitment. (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of
this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under
Article 39 of this Code.
Article 13 (b) of the Labor, Code, defines recruitment and placement as "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment locally or abroad, whether for profit or not.
As can be gleaned from the aforementioned provisions, illegal recruitment has two essential elements, to wit: (1) the
accused must be engaged in the recruitment and placement of workers, whether locally or overseas and; (2) the accused
has not complied with such guidelines, rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
particularly with respect to the securing of license or authority to recruit and deploy workers either locally or overseas.
These essential elements are present in the case at bench. Appellant promised overseas employment to the complainants
for a fee, which the latter paid. In fact, appellant admitted that the money she received from the complainants was in
connection with the processing of their visas, passports and plane tickets. She also admitted that she failed to make good
her promise to send them abroad (TSN, October 5, 1990, p. 6).
Appellant is neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment as testified by Virginia Santiago
of the Inspection Division of the Licensing Board of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
Appellant insists that being a minor, she should be placed under custody of the barangay official of Sambol, Lemery,
Batangas as provided for by Article 191 of P.D. No. 603.
Article 191 of P.D. 603 provides:
Care of Youthful Offender Held for Examination or Trial. A youthful offender held for physical and mental
examination or trial or pending appeal, if unable to furnish bail, shall be from the time of his arrest be committed to the
care of the Department of Social Services and Development or the local rehabilitation center or a detention home in the
province or city which shall be responsible for his appearance in court whenever required: Provided, That in the absence
of any such center or agency within a reasonable distance from the venue of the trial, the provincial, city or municipal jail
shall provide quarters for youthful offenders separate from other detainees. The court may, in its discretion, upon
recommendation of the Department of Social Services and Development or other agency or agencies authorized by the
court, release a youthful offender on recognizance, to the custody of his parents or other suitable person who shall be
responsible for his appearance whenever required. However, in case of those whose cases fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Military Tribunals, they may be committed at any military detention or rehabilitation center. (Emphasis
supplied)
This issue is mooted in view of the fact that the trial of the appellant was terminated while her appeal was resolved with
this decision. As can be inferred from its wordings, the provision is operative only during the trial or pending the appeal of
the minor-accused.
Nevertheless, the law uses the word "may," which denotes that it is directory in nature and implies discretion on the part
of the trial court to place the minor under the custody of his or her parents or any suitable person.
Appellant further invokes the provisions of Article192, which she alleges the court a quo failed to apply to her benefit.
Under said Article, the trial court shall suspend the sentencing and commitment of youthful offenders and instead commit
them to the custody of the Department of Social Services and Development or to any training institution until they shall
have reached 21 years of age.
Again, appellant's contention cannot be sustained.
Said Article provides that it ". . . . shall not apply to a youthful offender who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence
under its provisions or to one who is convicted of an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment." (Emphasis
supplied).
Appellant was convicted by the court a quo of illegal recruitment and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment. Clearly, her case. falls under the exception provided for by the Child and Youth Welfare Code.
Under Section 39 of the Labor Code, as amended, the penalty of life imprisonment is correctly imposed where illegal
recruitment is committed in "large scale," which means that it is committed against three or more persons (People v.
Duque, 212 SCRA 607 [1992]). In this case,appellant victimized Erlinda Cortez, Fidela Engada, Myra Siguenza, Dulce
Garcia and Emilinda Padua.
We noted that appellant was only 16 years of age at the time she committed the offense (TSN, October 5, 1990, p. 2). If
she prosecuted under, the Revised Penal Code, appellant is entitled to a reduction of the penalty imposed by law by one
degree because of the attendance of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority (Article 68, Revised Penal Code).
But the benign provisions of the Revised Penal Code are not applicable to offenders prosecuted and punished under
special laws. Likewise, appellant is not entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which requires the
sentencing court to fix a minimum term within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, because the
penalty imposed on her is "life imprisonment" (Act 4103 as amended by Act 4225, Sec. 2).
Under the circumstances, we can only recommend that executive clemency be extended to her (People v. Beralde, 139
SCRA 426 [1985]; People v. Lagasca, 148 SCRA 264 [1987]; People v. Mangusan, 189 SCRA 624 [1990]).
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto but in view of the minority of appellant at the time she
committed the offense, we recommend to the Secretary of Justice that a case study of appellant be undertaken to
determine whether she is deserving of executive clemency. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

People v Nogra
Gr. No. 170834
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated August 31, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
C.R. No. 00244 affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Naga City in Criminal Case No.
98-7182, convicting Antonio Nogra (appellant) of large scale illegal recruitment under Section 6(m) in relation to Section
7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 (R.A. No. 8042),[2] otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act
of 1995.[3]
The inculpatory portion of the Information charging one Lorna G. Orciga and appellant with large scale illegal
recruitment reads as follows:

That sometime during the period of March 1997 to November, 1997 in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the General Manager and Operations Manager of
LORAN INTERNATIONAL OVERSEAS RECRUITMENT CO., LTD., with office at Concepcion Grande, Naga City,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each other, representing themselves to have the capacity to
contract, enlist, hire and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement to the herein complaining witnesses RENATO
ALDEN, OLIVER SARMIENTO, FE ZABALLA, TEOFILA LUALHATI, PILIPINA MENDOZA and KERWIN
DONACAO, but failed to actually deploy them without valid reason, as well as to reimburse their documentation,
placement and processing expenses for purposes of deployment despite their repeated demands for the return of the same,
to their damage and prejudice in the amounts as may be proven in court.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

Only appellant was brought to the jurisdiction of the trial court since Lorna G. Orciga was then and still is at
large. Arraigned with the assistance of counsel, appellant entered a plea of NOT GUILTY to the crime
charged. Thereafter, trial of the case ensued.

Of the six complainants, the prosecution was able to present five of them, namely: Renato Alden,
Fe Zaballa, Teofila Lualhati, Filipina Mendoza and Kerwin Donacao. Anaielyn Sarmiento, wife of complainant
Oliver Sarmiento, also testified for the prosecution.

The facts, as established by the prosecution, are aptly summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as
follows:

Appellant held office at Loran International Overseas Recruitment Co., (Loran)
in Concepcion Grande, Naga City (p. 4, TSN, October 19, 1998). A nameplate on his table prominently displayed his
name and position as operations manager (p. 11, TSN, November 17, 1998; p. 4, TSN, January 12, 1999; p. 21, TSN,
November 19, 1998). The license of Loran also indicated appellant as the operations manager (p. 5, TSN, February 10,
1999). The POEA files also reflect his position as operations manager of Loran (Exhibit L to L-4, pp. 5-9, TSN,
November 19, 1998).

Sometime in December 1996, Renato Alden went to Loran to apply for a job as hotel worker for Saipan. He was
interviewed by appellant, who required Alden to submit an NBI clearance and medical certificate and to pay the
placement fee. Alden paid the amount of P31,000.00. The additional amount of P4,000.00 was to be paid prior to his
departure to Saipan (pp. 5-6, TSN, November 17, 1998). Appellant promised Alden that he would leave within a period
of three to four months. After one year of waiting Alden was not able to leave. Alden filed a complaint with the NBI
when he was not able to recover the amount and could no longer talk with appellant (p. 6, TSN, November 17, 1998).

On April 18, 1997, Teofila Lualhati applied for employment as hotel worker for Saipan with Loran (pp. 1-3, 10,
TSN, November 19, 1998). Appellant required her to submit an NBI clearance and medical certificate and to pay the
processing fee in the amount of P35,000.00 so she could leave immediately. She paid the amount of P35,000.00 to
Loran's secretary in the presence of appellant. She was promised that within 120 days or 4 months she would be able to
leave (pp. 11-13, TSN, November 19, 1998). Despite repeated follow-ups, Lualhati was unable to work in Saipan. She
demanded the refund of the processing fee. When the amount was not returned to her, she filed a complaint with the NBI
(pp. 14-15, TSN, November 19, 1998).

Sometime in April 1998, Filipina Mendoza went to Loran to apply for employment as hotel worker (p. 4, TSN,
July 12, 1999). She paid the amount of P35,000.00 as placement fee. When she was not able to work abroad, she went to
Loran and sought the return of P35,000.00 from appellant (p. 7, TSN, January 21, 1999).

Sometime in October 1997, Kerwin Donacao went to Loran to apply for employment as purchaser in Saipan (p. 4,
TSN, February 10, 1999). He was required to submit NBI clearance, police clearance, previous employment certificate
and his passport. He paid the placement fee of P35,000.00 (pp.4-5, TSN, February 10, 1999). After paying the amount,
he was told to wait for two to three months. When he was not able to leave for Saipan, he demanded the return of the
placement fee, which was not refunded (pp. 6-7, TSN, February 10, 1999).

During the first week of November 1997, Annelyn Sarmiento and her husband, Oliver Sarmiento, applied for
overseas employment. For the application of Oliver Sarmiento, they submitted his medical certificate and certification of
previous employment. They were also made to pay the amount of P27,000.00 as processing fee. Oliver Sarmiento was
promised that within 1 month, he would be able to leave. Initially, Oliver Sarmiento was told that allegedly his visa was
yet to be obtained. When he was not able to leave and what he paid was not refunded, he filed a complaint with the NBI
(pp. 4-6, TSN, April 23, 1999).

Sometime in May 1997, Fe Zaballa applied for overseas employment in Saipan with Loran (p. 4, TSN, May 21,
1999). She was required to submit her medical certificate, original copy of her birth certificate, NBI clearance and police
clearance. She was also required to pay the amount of P35,000.00 as placement fee. When she could not be deployed,
she sought to recover the amount she paid, which was not returned (pp. 7-8, TSN, May 2, 1999).[5]

On the other hand, appellant presented the following evidence:

The defense presented [appellant] Antonio Nogra and the agency's secretary and cashier, Maritess Mesina.

From their testimonies it was established that LORAN INTERNATIONAL OVERSEAS RECRUITMENT CO.,
LTD., (LORAN, for brevity) was owned by accused Lorna Orciga and Japanese national Kataru Tanaka (TSN, September
30, 2000, p. 7). Sometime in July 1994, [appellant] Antonio Nogra read from outside the agency's main office
at Libertad, Mandaluyong City that it was in need of a liaison officer. He applied for the position. The part-owner and
co-accused, Lorna Orciga, hired him instead as Operations Manager as the agency was then still in the process of
completing the list of personnel to be submitted to the POEA. (TSN, January 31, 2001, p. 5).

[Appellant] Nogra started working with LORAN in October 1994. In 1995, he was transferred to Naga City when
the agency opened a branch office thereat. Although he was designated as the Operations Manager,
[appellant] Nogra was a mere employee of the agency. He was receiving a monthly salary of P5,000.00 and
additional P2,000.00 monthly meal allowance. He was in-charge of the advertisement of the company. He also drove for
the company. He fetched from the airport the agency's visitors and guests and drove them to hotels and other
places. (TSN, May 3, 2000, pp. 2-9).

Although part-owner Lorna Orciga was stationed in Manila, she, however, actually remained in control of the
branch office in Naga City. She conducted the final interview of the applicants and transacted with the foreign
employers. She also controlled the financial matters and assessment fees of the agency in Naga City (TSN, September 20,
2000, pp. 8-9). The placement and processing fees collected by the agency in Naga City were all deposited in the bank
account of Lorna Orciga and not a single centavo went to the benefit of [appellant] Nogra (TSN, January 10, 2000, pp. 14-
22).[6]

On March 26, 2003, the RTC rendered Judgment[7] finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ANTONIO NOGRA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Illegal Recruitment Committed in Large Scale defined under Sections 6(m) and 7(b) of RA 8042, otherwise known as The
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 and, accordingly, hereby imposes upon him the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).

SO ORDERED.[8]

On April 10, 2003, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.[9] The RTC ordered the transmittal of the entire records of
the case to this Court.

Conformably to the ruling in People v. Mateo,[10] the case was referred to the CA for intermediate review.[11]

On August 31, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision[12] affirming the decision of the RTC. The CA held that being an
employee is not a valid defense since employees who have knowledge and active participation in the recruitment activities
may be criminally liable for illegal recruitment activities, based upon this Court's ruling in People
v.Chowdury[13] and People v. Corpuz;[14] that appellant had knowledge of and active participation in the recruitment
activities since all the prosecution witnesses pinpointed appellant as the one whom they initially approached regarding
their plans of working overseas and he was the one who told them about the fees they had to pay, as well as the papers
that they had to submit; that the mere fact that appellant was not issued special authority to recruit does not exculpate him
from any liability but rather strongly suggests his guilt; that appellant's invocation of non-flight cannot be weighed in his
favor since there is no established rule that non-flight is, in every instance, an indication of innocence.
A Notice of Appeal[15] having been timely filed by appellant, the CA forwarded the records of the case to this
Court for further review.

In his Brief, appellant assigns as errors the following:

I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS A MERE EMPLOYEE
OF THE RECRUITMENT AGENCY DESPITE HIS DESIGNATION AS ITS OPERATIONS MANAGER.

II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE OFFENSE-CHARGED
DESPITE THE FACT THAT UNDER THE LAW, HE WAS NOT CRIMINALY LIABLE FOR HIS AGENCY'S
TRANSACTIONS.[16]

Appellant argues that the agency was under the management and control of Orciga, and that he was a mere
employee; that he could not be held personally liable for illegal recruitment in the absence of any showing that he was
validly issued special authority to recruit workers, which was approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA); that his non-flight is indicative of his innocence.

Appellee, through the OSG, counters that appellant is not a mere clerk or secretary of Loran, but its Operations
Manager who directly participated in the recruitment scheme by promising private complainants work abroad, but failed
to deploy them and refused to reimburse the applicants' placement fees when demanded.

The appeal fails. The CA did not commit any error in affirming the decision of the RTC.

R.A. No. 8042 broadened the concept of illegal recruitment under the
Labor Code[17] and provided stiffer penalties, especially those that constitute economic sabotage, i.e., Illegal Recruitment
in Large Scale and Illegal Recruitment Committed by a Syndicate.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 defined when recruitment is illegal:

SEC. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor
Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a
fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts,
whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:

x x x x

(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the Department of Labor and Employment; and

(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the workers in connection with his documentation and processing for
purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the worker's
fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered as offense involving
economic sabotage.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or
confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group.

The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices, and accessories. In case
of juridical persons, the officers having control, management ordirection of their business shall be liable. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

In the present case, evidence for the prosecution showed that Loran
International Overseas Recruitment Co., Ltd. is a duly licensed recruitment agency with authority to establish a branch
office. However, under R.A. No. 8042, even a licensee or holder of authority can be held liable for illegal recruitment,
should he commit or omit to do any of the acts enumerated in Section 6.

Appellant was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale under Section 6 (l) and (m) of R.A. No. 8042. Section
6 (l) refers to the failure to actually deploy without valid reason, as determined by the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE). Section 6 (m) involves the failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection
with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases in which the deployment does not actually
take place without the workers fault.

A thorough scrutiny of the prosecution's evidence reveals that it failed to prove appellant's liability under Section 6
(l) of R.A. No. 8042. The law requires not only that the failure to deploy be without valid reason as determined by the
Department of Labor and Employment. The law envisions that there be independent evidence from the DOLE to
establish the reason for non-deployment, such as the absence of a proper job order. No document from the DOLE was
presented in the present case to establish the reason for the accused's failure to actually deploy private
complainants. Thus, appellant cannot be held liable under Section 6 (l) of R.A. No. 8042.

As to Section 6 (m) of R.A. No. 8042, the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that private
complainants made payments to Loran, and appellant failed to reimburse the amounts paid by private complainants when
they were not deployed. The prosecution presented the receipts issued by Loran to private complainants evidencing
payment of placement fees ranging from P27,000.00 to P35,000.00.
Appellant does not dispute that private complainants were not deployed for overseas work, and that the placement
fees they paid were not returned to them despite demand. However, he seeks to exculpate himself on the ground that he is
a mere employee of Loran.

The Court is unswayed by appellant's contention.

The penultimate paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 explicitly states that those criminally liable are the
principals, accomplices, and accessories. In case
of juridicalpersons, the officers having control, management or direction of their business shall be liable. Contrary to
appellant's claim, the testimonies of the complaining witnesses and the documentary evidence for the prosecution clearly
established that he was not a mere employee of Loran, but its Operations Manager. The license of Loran, the files of the
POEA and the nameplate prominently displayed on his office desk reflected his position as Operations Manager. As such,
he received private complainants' job applications; and interviewed and informed them of the agencys requirements prior
to their deployment, such as NBI clearance, police clearance, medical certificate, previous employment certificate and the
payment of placement fee. He was also responsible for the radio advertisements and leaflets, which enticed complaining
witnesses to apply for employment with the agency. Clearly, as Operations Manager, he was in the forefront of the
recruitment activities.

The defense of being a mere employee is not a shield against his conviction for large scale illegal recruitment. In People
v. Gasacao[18] and People v. Sagayaga,[19] the Court reiterated the ruling in People v. Cabais,[20] People
v. Chowdury[21] and People v. Corpuz[22] that an employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment
may be held liable as principal by direct participation, together with its employer, if it is shown that he actively and
consciously participated in the recruitment process.

In the present case, it was clearly established that appellant dealt directly with the private complainants. He interviewed
and informed them of the documentary requirements and placement fee. He promised deployment within a three or four
month-period upon payment of the fee, but failed to deploy them and to reimburse, upon demand, the placement fees paid.

The Court is not persuaded by appellant's argument that his non-flight is indicative of his innocence. Unlike the flight of
an accused, which is competent evidence against him tending to establish his guilt, non-flight is simply inaction, which
may be due to several factors. It may not be construed as an indication of innocence.[23]

Of marked relevance is the absence of any showing that the private complainants had any ill motive against appellant
other than to bring him to the bar of justice to answer for the crime of illegal recruitment. Besides, for strangers to
conspire and accuse another stranger of a most serious crime just to mollify their hurt feelings would certainly be against
human nature and experience.[24] Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution
were actuated by improper motive, their positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand under the solemnity of
an oath deserve full faith and credence.[25]

It is a settled rule that factual findings of the trial courts, including their assessment of the witnesses credibility, are
entitled to great weight and respect by the Supreme Court, particularly when the CA affirmed such findings.[26] After all,
the trial court is in the best position to determine the value and weight of the testimonies of witnesses.[27] The absence of
any showing that the trial court plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the
result of the case, or that its assessment was arbitrary, impels the Court to defer to the trial courts determination
according credibility to the prosecution evidence.

Under the last paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042, illegal recruitment shall be considered an offense involving
economic sabotage if committed in large scale, viz, committed against three or more persons individually or as a
group. In the present case, five complainants testified against appellants acts of illegal recruitment, thereby rendering his
acts tantamount to economic sabotage. Under Section 7 (b) of R.A. No. 8042, the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine
of not less than P500,000.00 nor more thanP1,000.000.00 shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic
sabotage.

Thus, the RTC and the CA correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of large scale illegal recruitment.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated August 31, 2995 of the Court of Appeals affirming
the conviction of appellant Antonio Nogra for large scale illegal recruitment under Sections 6 (m) and 7 (b) of Republic
Act No. 8042 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 91552-55 March 10, 1994
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO MANUNGAS, JR. y GO @ "PERCY", accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Rolando Gamalinda for accused-appellant.

NOCON, J.:
This is an appeal by accused-appellant Fernando Manungas, Jr. alias "Percy" from the decision 1 dated October 31, 1989
of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasisnan, Branch 38 in Criminal Cases Nos. L-3993, L-3994,
L-3996 and L-4000 finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of ESTAFA and ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT, the dispositive portion of which reads:
In the light of what has been stated and discussed above, the court finds and holds the accused Fernando Manungas y Go
alias "Percy" guilty beyond peradventure of doubt of the crimes filed against him and conformable thereto, hereby
pronounces judgment as follows:
In Criminal Case No. L-3993, the court declares accused, Fernando Manungas y Go alias "Percy" guilty of estafa for the
sum of P16,800.00 as alleged in the information filed against him and there being no aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in his favor, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the
prison term from two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten years (10) days as minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months
and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as maximum and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
The court further orders the accused to reimburse the offended party, Wilfrey Mabalot, the sum of sixteen thousand eight
hundred (P16,800.00) pesos which is the amount of money paid and delivered to him by said complaining witness without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
In Criminal Case No. L-3994, the court likewise declares the accused, Fernando Manungas y Go alias "Percy" guilty of
estafa for the sum of P17,550.00 as charged in the information. And there being no aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance present, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in his favor, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate prison term from two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days as minimum to five (5) years, five
(5) months and (11) days ofprision correccional as maximum and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
The court further directs the accused to reimburse the offended party, Danilo Ramirez the sum of seventeen thousand five
hundred fifty (P17,550.00) pesos which the accused took from the complaint without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
In Criminal Case No. L-3996, the court also declares the accused, Fernando Manungas y Go alias "Percy" guilty of estafa
for eighteen thousand six hundred (P18,600.00) pesos as charged in the information filed against him. There being no
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance present, and applying the Indeterminate Law in his favor, said accused is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term from two (2) years, eleven months (11) months and ten (10) days
asminimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as maximumand to pay the
costs of the proceedings.
The court also directs the accused to reimburse the offended party the sum of eighteen thousand six hundred (P18,600.00)
pesos which is the amount paid and delivered by the offended party to him without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
In Criminal Case No. L-4000, the court likewise holds the accused, Fernando Manungas y Go alias "Precy" guilty of the
crime of Illegal Recruitment on Large Scale as charged in the information filed against him, defined and penalized under
the provisions of Article 39, par. (a) of Presidential Decree No. 2018 amending Articles 38 and 39 of P.D. No. 442,
otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, and conformable thereto, hereby sentences the said accused to
suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment and to pay a fine of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) pesos without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency pursuant to law.
The accused shall serve the penalties herein imposed against him successively or one after the other according to their
severity. 2
Based on the evidence adduced before the trial court, the facts of the case are as follows:
Sometime in April of 1987, accused-appellant Fernando Manungas, Jr. went to Barangay Legaspi, Tayug, Pangasinan
where he stayed in the house of Arturo and Lilia de Vera to recruit workers for employment abroad. During his stay,
accused-appellant was able to convince complainants Wilfrey Mabalot, Danilo Ramirez, Leonardo Estanoco and Crisanto
Collado to apply as janitors in Saudi Arabia. He told them to bring all the necessary documents for the processing of their
applications to his office in Manila.
On April 29, 1987, complainants went to accused-appellant's office located at Room 611, L and S Bldg., 1414 Roxas
Blvd., Ermita, Manila and paid accused-appellant P250.00 each for their medical examination. Thereafter, accused-
appellant required the complainants to pay, on various occasions, placement fees and other expenses incurred in the
processing of their papers and issued corresponding receipts for said amounts. The total amount paid by the complainants
to accused-appellant are the following: Wilfrey Mabalot P16,800.00; Danilo Ramirez P17,550.00, Leonardo
Estanoco 18,600.00, and Crisanto Collado 13,300.00
When complainants failed to leave for Saudi Arabia, they requested Luis "Jing" Ramirez, to verify with the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) whether accused-appellant was licensed to recruit workers for abroad.
They subsequently learned that he was not as shown by the Certification issued by the POEA.3
Thereafter, complaints filed against accused-appellant complaints for Estafa defined under par. 2(a), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code and Illegal Recruitment on a Large Scale. In due course, informations fro three (3) counts of Estafa
(Criminal Cases Nos. L-3993, L-3994 and L-3996) and Illegal Recruitment on a Large Scale (Criminal Case No. L-4000)
were filed against accused-appellant before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan.
On the other hand, accused-appellant maintained that he was the operations manager of the ZG Recruitment and
Placement Agency, a duly licensed recruitment agency. Sometime in April 1987, he went to Barangay Legaspi, Tayug,
Pangasinan and recruited complainants to work in Saudi Arabia as janitors. Unfortunately, the job order for the janitorial
services was awarded to Express Placement Agency instead of ZG Recruitment and Placement agency. Thereafter,
accused-appellant transferred complainants' application for overseas employment to Nora Cunanan of Express Placement
Agency. Accused-appellant also turned over the fees paid by the complainants to Nora Cunanan as evidenced by the
receipts 4 issued by the latter. When Nora Cunanan absconded with the money of the complainants, accused-appellant
filed an estafa case against Nora Cunanan after securing a Special Power of Attorney from the complainants to prosecute
and collect their money. However, he was not able to attend the hearing as he was arrested in connection with the these
cases.
Accused-appellant maintains that he did not make false representations to the complainants when he requited the latter for
employment abroad as he had told complainants that he is only an employee of a licensed recruitment agency in Manila.
He further claims that he was not motivated by any deceitful intentions and had not caused any damage to the
complainants because the amounts of money given to him by the latter were actually spent for their medical tests and
other documents necessary for their overseas employment.
Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines "Recruitment and Placement" as:
Any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That
any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
In the instant case, accused-appellant told complainants to submit to him their pictures, birth certificates, NBI clearances
and the necessary documents for the processing of their employment in Saudi Arabia. Thereafter, accused-appellant
collected from each of the complainants payment for the their respective passport, training fee, placement fee, medical
tests and other sundry expenses which unquestionably constitutes acts of recruitment within the meaning of the law.
Besides, there is illegal recruitment when one gives the impression of his ability to send a worker abroad 5 and there is
evidence that accused-appellant had represented to the complainants that he could send them abroad as janitors in Saudi
Arabia. And because of his representation, complainants gave their hard-earned money to accused-appellant in
consideration of the same representation. As pointed out by the Solicitor General in his brief:
It may be that at the time appellant recruited private complainants, he was then the operations manager of the ZGR
Placement Agency, a duly licensed recruitment agency. But, as amply established by the evidence, the recruitment of
private complainants was appellant's own personal undertaking. He did not do it for the agency. This is clearly shown by
the sequence of events that led to the consum[m]ation of the transaction in question. Thus: it was appellant who talked
private complainants into applying for employment abroad; when private complainants signified their interest, he alone
was the one who informed them of the documents that they have to secure; he too was the one who demanded and
received from them the fees for medical examination, passport, authentication, training, placement and psycho and AIDS
test; also, he was the one who assured them of employment abroad and of the return of their money in the event of their
non-deployment; moreover, it was he who undertook to inform private complainants of their departure.
But that is not all. When private complainants failed to receive notice of their departure as promised them by appellant,
they had somebody verify with the POEA if appellant was a licensed recruiter. This circumstance shows all the more that
indeed appellant represented himself to be the recruiter, otherwise it would have been the status of the agency with which
he allegedly worked for, that private complainants would have requested to be verified. 6
As to accused-appellant's claim that he did not misappropriate the money given to him by the complainants as he had
turned over the latters' placement fees to Nora Cunanan, who subsequently absconded with the complainant's money, the
trial court correctly held that:
The version of the defense has the nature of a cock and bull story which is difficult and hard to accept. It is something that
is fantastic and ridiculous. It is within the realm of fiction and patently a mere fabrication to exculpate the accused from
the consequences of his nefarious and deceitful activities. If it is really true that the complainants were transferred and
accommodated by the agency of Nora Cunanan, why did not the accused and Mrs. Lydia Zamora who appear to be both
intelligent take the necessary prudence and caution of putting the supposed agreement to transfer in writing considering
the amounts of funds involved in the alleged transfer. Logic and common sense dictate that under such a situation, the
accused and Mrs. Zamora take ordinary care of their concerns. To impress the court that there was really a transfer made,
the accused claimed that there was a estafa case filed against Mrs. Cunanan before the City Fiscal's Office in Manila. It is
however surprising why Atty. Jose Torrefranca who was engaged by the accused to file the estafa case did not present any
letter-complaint or any charged sheet filed against Mrs. Cunanan. He did not even mention the Fiscal who investigated the
case. More intriguing is the fact that counsel does not know what happened to the alleged case of estafa after he filed the
same. Likewise, when Mrs. Lydia Zamora declared, she claimed that the case filed against Nora Cunanan was before the
Regional Trial Court and not in the City Fiscal's Office.
Defense also made capital of the special power of atty. executed by the complainants (exhibit 4) and their letters sent to
the accused (exhibits 5, 6, 7 and 8) to convince the court that the real culprit in the whole mess in Nora Cunanan. The
complainants made convincing explanation why they signed the special power of attorney. Wilfrey Mabalot declared that
when the accused asked him to sign the document, he was told that its purpose is to facilitate their departure and when he
signed the letter exhibit "6" he was just told to sign by the accused and because the latter was in [a] hurry, he signed
without knowing its contents. He likewise explained that being a mere high school graduate he was not able to understand
the imports of its contents. Danilo Ramirez explained that when he signed the special power of attorney, he did not read
the contents because the accused was in [a] hurry in returning to Manila and that he sent the three letters to the accused
while he was confined in jail because Manungas asked him to help him (accused) recover the money given to Mrs.
Cunanan. Leonardo Estanoco declared, that he signed exhibit "4" because the accused told him that the document will be
used to facilitate the processing of their papers. He did not understand its contents because he only understands little
English. 7
Thus accused-appellant is guilty of the crimes of Estafa and Illegal Recruitment. Under Article 38 of the Labor Code, as
amended, the crime of illegal recruitment is qualified when the same is committed against three (3) or more persons.
A person who violates any of the provisions under Article 13(b) and Article 34 of the Labor Code can be charged and
convicted separately of illegal recruitment and estafa [Revised Penal Code, Article 315, 2(a)] because illegal recruitment
is a malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for a conviction while estafa is a malum
in se where criminal intent of the accused is necessary for a conviction.
WHEREFORE, finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crimes of estafa and illegal recruitment in a large scale,
decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

















G.R. No. 91552-55 March 10, 1994

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO MANUNGAS, JR. y GO @ "PERCY", accused-appellant.

Facts of the case:

In 1987, accused-appellant Fernando Manungas, Jr. recruited Wilfrey Mabalot, Danilo Ramirez, Leonardo Estanoco and
Crisanto Collado to work as janitors in Saudi-Arabia. In connection with this, Fernando required the applicants the
several amounts for medical, placement and other fees. The applicants failed to be deployed to Saudi however, and
upon verification with POEA, they found out that Fernando was not a licensed recruiter. Complainants filed complaints
of Estafa and Illegal Recruitment on a Large Scale against Fernando. Fernando maintained that he was not illegally
recruiting because he was connected with a duly licensed recruitment agency, and that only because the job openings
was subsequently awarded to another recruitment agency that the applicants he recruited were not able to leave for
Saudi.

Issue:

Whether or not Fernando was guilty of Illegal Recruitment on a Large Scale, given the circumstances.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that Fernando, despite of his being connected with a licensed recruitment agency, was still
guilty of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code, because he performed the acts of recruitment as defined in Article 13
of the Labor Code, by himself. He was the one who recruited the applicants, and he was the one who required of them
the fees he collected himself. Illegal recruitment was also qualified because he recruited more than three persons.