Abalos vs CA

(case #4)

Delfin Abalos was charged and convicted of murdering Liberato Damias.
Veronica Bulatao, the girlfriend of the victim, witnessed the killing. She
testified that Abalos shot the victim in her house at a close range.

Delfin denied the contention, saying that he was at the tobacco fields,
working with his father, which was corroborated by Delfins father and
two other persons.

Abalos argues that there is not evidence to convict him because the
paraffin test conducted on him yielded negative for powder burns on his
hand, hence confirming that he never fired the shot that killed the victim.
Issue:

1. Whether or not the innocence of the defendant can be proved by
the negative result of the paraffin test.
2. Whether or not the defendant has a solid alibi.
Held:

1. The court ruled in the negative. Anent the paraffin test, it is true
that it produced a negative result but such fact does not ipso
facto merit Delfin's acquittal. This Court acknowledges that the
absence of powder burns in a suspect's hand is not conclusive
proof that he has not fired a gun. In fact, the traces of nitrates
can easily be removed by the simple act of washing one's hand.

2. For alibi to prosper, petitioner must not only prove that he was
not at the crime scene but that it was also physically impossible
for him to have been present there at the time the offense was
committed. He miserably failed to satisfy the second requisite.
Delfin himself testified that the distance between the tobacco
fields to Veronica's house was only around 400 meters and it only
took eight (8) minutes to traverse such path. Evidently, it was not
impossible for Delfin to be present at the locus criminis.

3. Borje vs Sandiganbayan
(case #11)

Borje, a provincial plant officer of the bureau of plant industry in La
Union, was accused of the crime of falsification of public document.
Herein complainant Ducusin alleged that the petitioner took advantage
of his position in falsifying the time book and payroll of his office for the
periods January to March 1977, daily time record of Ducusin by making it
appear that Ducusin participated in the same and affixed his signatures,
when in fact he did not sign the documents, in order to receive P225
which was supposed to have been received by Ducusin.

To prove that Borje committed the crime, the prosecutor presented
several documents such as: the time book and payro;; of the accuseds
office for the period of January to March 1977; the daily time record for
the same period of Rodrigo Ducusin and the certification that Ducusin
was detailed to the program.

On appeal, Borje argued that proof beyond reasonable doubt was not
established since; a. the originals of the alleged falsified documents were
not presented in court hence, the corpus delicti was not established as
held in US vs Gregorio and; b. there is no iota of evidence that the
petitioner falsified the complainants signature on the alleged falsified
documents.

ISSUE:

1. WON Ducusins testimony with regard to his non-participation in
the program is admissible
2. WON the presentation of the photocopies of the falsified
documents is enough to prove the crime of falsification of public
documents

HELD:

1. No. The alleged verbal order is doubtful for under normal and
usual official procedure, a written special order issued by a
government office is cancelled, amended or modified only by
another written special order, not only for purposes of record on
file but also to prevent conflict and confusion in government
operations. Moreover, under the best evidence rule, Section 2,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the supposed verbal order cannot
prevail over the written Special Order No. 172 which lists Ducusin
in the payroll for the program.

2. No. In U.S. vs Gregorio, it was held that:
In a criminal case for the falsification of a document, it is
indispensable that the judges and the courts have before
them the document alleged to have been simulated,
counterfeited or falsified, in order that they may find,
pursuant to the evidence produced at the trial, whether
or not the crime of falsification was actually committed;
in the absence of the original document, it is improper to
conclude, with only a copy of the said original in view,
that there has been a falsification of a document which
was neither found nor exhibited, because, in such a case,
even the existence of such original document may be
doubted.

The SB is incorrect to dismiss the ruling in the Gregorio
case. Firstly the Gregorio ruling makes no distinction for
the doctrine itself applies in criminal proceedings for the
falsification of a document, whether simulated,
counterfeited, or falsified. Secondly, the Gregorio
doctrine is still tenable notwithstanding modern copying
devices for a falsified document, passed off as an original
can also be duplicated by xeroxing and thereafter,
certified as true copy of the original. And thirdly,
considering that in the case at bar, the xeroxing was
done or caused to be done by complainant Ducusin after
taking out the original documents without the official
authority and permission of the Disbursing Officer and
Cashier, Remedios Lorenzo, who was then out on rural
service and thereafter the originals were lost, misplaced
and are now missing, the failure to present the originals
is suspicious for complainant had ulterior and ill motives
in accusing the petitioner Borje.


Lechugas vs CA
(case #18)

Petitioner filed an unlawful entry case against private respondent the
Lozas. Victoria Lechugas allegedly bought the subject properties from
Leonicia Lasangue, as evidenced by a public Deed of Absolute Sale,
which is duly registered with the Registered of Deeds. Another case was
filed for recovery and possession of the same property and both cases
was tried jointly. Private respondent contended that their father, Hugo
Loza, bought the same land in question from Victorina Limor, and
another adjoining land from one Emeterio Lasangue. The remaining
portion of the lot bought from Limor was allegedly the one bought by
Lechugas. Lasangue corroborated this in her testimony, who although
illiterate, was able to specifically point out the land sold to Lechugas,
which is contrary to the deed of sale between Lasangue and Lechugas.

ISSUE:

WON parole evidence be admitted to determine the land bought by
Lechugas.

HELD:

YES. The parol evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be
invoked by either party to the litigation against the other, where at least
one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the
written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the
instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation
established.

The petitioner's reliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. The rule
is not applicable where the controversy is between one of the parties to
the document and third persons. The deed of sale was executed by
Leoncia Lasangue in favor of Victoria Lechugas. The dispute over what
was actually sold is between petitioner and the private respondents. In
the case at bar, through the testimony of Leoncia Lasangue, it was
shown that what she really intended to sell and to be the subject of
Exhibit A was Lot No. 5522 but not being able to read and write and fully
relying on the good faith of her first cousin, the petitioner, she just placed
her thumbmark on a piece of paper which petitioner told her was the
document evidencing the sale of land. The deed of sale described the
disputed lot instead.

17. PARADISE SAUNA V. NG
Facts:
The case arose from the Petitioners act of terminating the
Respondents appointment as manager-administrator of his
alleged failure to comply with the terms and conditions of his
appointment.
Respondent Ng filed a case for specific performance and
damages with prayer for a preliminary injuction. Later on, he
amended his complaint to one for breach of contract with
damages.
LC rendered judgment in favour of Ng
IAC affirmed TC, Hence this petition
Issues:
How contract between Petitioner and Respondent is a lease or
management contract.
Held:
Subject contract is a lease contract and NOT a management
contract.
When a pleading is amended, the original one is deemed
abandoned. Hence, amended pleading replaces the original
which no longer forms part of the record and the trial of the case
is the basis of the amended pleading.
In this case, parol evidence was introduced to prove that the
contract in question was not a management contract as it
appears on its face but a base contract.
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of
an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between
the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add
to the terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his
pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their
successors in interest after the execution of the written
agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills. (7a)
In the instant case, failure of a contrast to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties is raised. The fact that allegations of
respondent Ng with respect to his rights as lesser of the petitioner corp
were made on the basis of Exhibit A in the amended complaint meets
the procedural requirements that paid failure be put in issue by the
pleadings.

10. HEIRS OF LOURDES SABANPAN V. COMORPOSA

Facts:
This case arose from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed in
MTC by Petitioner against Respondent involving possession of a
parcel of land.
Respondent argued that they have acquired just and valid
ownership of the premises and that the Regional Director of
DENR has already upheld their possession over the land in
question, when it ruled the rightful claimants and per possessors.
CA Ruled that although not yet final, the order issues by the
Regional Director of DENR remained in full force and effect;
unless declared null and void. The certification issued by the
DENRs community environment and natural resources officer
was proof that when the cadastral survey was conducted, the
land was still alienable and was not yet allocated to any person.
Issues:
1.) WON the DENR Officers certification which only means the
facsimile of the alleged signature of a certain Jose F Tagerda are
admissible as evidence.
2.) WON the affidavits are admissible as evidence.
Held:
1.) Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered
orginals and are at best exact copies. As such, they are NOT
admissible as evidence, as there is no way of determining
whether they are genuine or authentic.
Neither the ROP nor jurisprudence would sanction the
admission of evidence that has not been formally offered during
trial. But this evidentiary rule is applicable to only ordinary trials,
not to cases covered by the rules on summary procedure cases
in which no full blown trial is held.
2.) The admissibility of evidence should be distinguished
from its probative value. Just because a piece of evidence is
admitted does not ipso facto mean that it conclusively proves the
fact in dispute.

3. PEOPLE V. NARVASA
Facts:
Accused-appellants were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of illegal possession of FIREARMS in its aggravated
form and was sentenced to RP
SPO3 Primo Camba & PO2 Simeon Navora, while on patrol
received a report that the gang of the appellants were carrying
various firearms.
The 2 policemen decided to investigate before they could search
the house of Navasa, they were met by a valley of gunfire.
Unfortunately SPO3 Camba was hit and he eventually died.
Shortly afterwards the accused appellants were apprehended.
Issues:
In the absence of the firearms themselves, may illegal possession
of firearms be proven by Parol evidence.
Held:
The existence of firearms can be established by testimony even
without the presentation of the said firearm.
In the case of People v. Orchuela, the court held that the
existence of the firearm can be established by testimony, even
without the presentation of the said firearm. In the said case,
appellant Orchuela was convicted of qualified illegal possession
of firearms despite the fact that the firearms used were not
presented as evidence.
The existence of weapon was deemed amply established by the
testimony of the witness that Orchuela was in possession of it
and had used it to kill the victim.
The witness is NOT expected to remember an occurrence with
perfect recollection of the minute details.
5. Abella vs. CA
Facts:
On May 26, 1987, petitioner Abella, as lessor, and private
respondent Colarina, as lessee, signed a contract of lease of
apportion of building in Nag City, from July 1, 1987 until July 1,
1991 for 4 years, with a monthly rental of 3,000. Upon signing of
the contract, Colorina paid an amount of 40,000 to Abella which
the latter acknowledge by issuing the corresponding receipt.
Colorina paid the monthly rental but discontinued payment from
November 1987 to April 1988.
Thereafter, Abella took possession of the premises; hence, in
1988 Colorina filed an action for enforcement of contract of
lease with preliminary mandatory injunction and damages
against Abella. RTC, favours Abella but on Appeal CA reversed
the decision stating that Colorina did not violate the contract for
it is stated in the receipt received by Abella that THE SUM OF
40,000 AS ADVANCE DEPOSIT, TO ANSWER FOR ANY RENTAL
WHICH MR. CONDRADO COLORINA MAY FAIL TO PAY
DURING THE TERM OF THE LEASE AS PER CONTARCT.
Hence, this petition.
Isuue: whether or not, the receipt is considered documentary
evidence.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that, the receipt expresses truly the
parties intent on the purpose of said payment as against the oral
testimony of the petitioner that said amount is but only a good
money. Without any doubt, oral testimony as to ascertain fact
depending as it does exclusively on human memory is not as
reliable as written or documentary evidence. I would sooner
trust the smallest ship of paper for truth said Judge Limpkin of
Georgia. Than the strongest and most retentive memory ever
bestowed on mortal man.
Thus, uphold the findings of the CA.

12. CITI Bank N.A. Mastercrd vs. Teodoro
Facts:
Efren Teodoro was one such cardholder of the petitioner.
Respondent, Teodoro, made various purchase through his credit
card. Thereafter petitioner claims that of January 1995, the
obligations of the respondent stood at 191,693.25 pesos. Several
times it demanded payment from him, but he refused to pay,
claiming that the amount demanded did not correspond to his
actual obligations.
During the trial, petitioner represented several sales
invoice or charge slips, which added up to only 24,388.36 pesos.
Although mere photocopies of the originals, the invoices were
marked in evidence as exhibits F to F-4 because all these copies
appeared to bear the signature of respondent, the trial court
deemed, them sufficient proof of his purchases with the use of
the credit card. Petitioner claimed that respondents obligation
to ballooned to 191,693.25 as shown by statement of accounts.
MTC and RTC ruled in favour of the petitioner. CA reversed.
Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that
petitioner failed to prove the due execution and the cause of the
unavailability and non-production of the charge slips marked in
evidence as exhibits F to F-4.
Held: NO
The original copies of the sales invoices are the best evidence to
prove the alleged obligation. Photocopies thereof are mere
secondary evidence. As such, they are inadmissible because
petitioner, as the offeror, failed to prove any of the exceptions
provided under Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as well
as the conditions of their admissibility. Because of the
inadmissibility of the photocopies in the absence of the originals,
respondents obligation was not established.
Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. When the
original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or
existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on
his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated.
Applying the above Rule to the present case, before a party is
allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of
the original sales invoices, the offeror must prove the following:
(1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and
destruction of the original or the reason for its nonproduction in
court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith
to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed.[14]
The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution,
loss, and contents. At the sound discretion of the court, this
order may be changed if necessary.
In the present case, the existence of the original sales invoices
was established by the photocopies and the testimony of
Hernandez. Petitioner, however, failed to prove that the
originals had been lost or could not be produced in court after
reasonable diligence and good faith in searching for them.

19. Pilipinas Bank vs. CA
Facts:
Petitioner obtained from Private respondent Meridian assurance
Corp. a Money Security and Payroll Comprehensive Policy
(Insurance Policy). While the policy was in full force and effect,
petitioners armoured vehicle was robbed while on it way to
deliver the payroll withdrawal of it client.
Petitioner filed a formal notice of claim under its insurance
policy. However, private respondent averred that the insurance
does not cover the deliveries of the withdrawals to petitioner
client.
During trial, petitioner presented Mr. Tubianosa to testify on the
existence and due execution of the insurance policy.
After almost a year, petitioner filed a motion to recall witness,
praying that it be allowed Tubianosa to testify on the
negotiations, pertaining to the terms and conditions of the policy
before its issuance to determine the intention of the parties
regarding the said terms and conditions.
Private respondent objected thereto, on the ground that the
same would violate the parol evidence rule.
The RTC denied the motion to recall, thereafter affirmed by the
CA.
Issue: WON the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC.
Held: NO.
Petitioners Complaint merely alleged that under the provisions
of the Policy, it was entitled to recover from private respondent
the amount it lost during the heist. It did not allege therein that
the Policys terms were ambiguous or failed to express the true
agreement between itself and private respondent. Such being
the case, petitioner has no right to insist that it be allowed to
present Tubianosas testimony to shed light on the alleged true
agreement of the parties, notwithstanding its statement in its
Pre Trial Brief that it was presenting said witness for that
purpose.
Section 9, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly
requires that for parol evidence to be admissible to vary the
terms of the written agreement, the mistake or imperfection
thereof or its failure to express the true agreement of the parties
should be put in issue by the pleadings.
As correctly noted by the appellate court, petitioner failed to
raise the issue of an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection
in the terms of the Policy, or of the failure of said contract to
express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto in
its Complaint. There was therefore no error on the part of the
appellate court when it affirmed the RTCs Order disallowing the
recall of Tubianosa to the witness stand, for such disallowance is
in accord with the rule that when the terms of an agreement
have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all
the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties
and their successors in interest, no evidence of such other
terms other than the contents of the written agreement.

PEOPLE OF THE Philippines vs. Hon. Judge Sixto Domondon

Facts: The three respondents, Filomena Gabriel, Jose Arenas and
Estela Nicanor were accused of violating the Anti Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. The charges arose in connection with the
alleged leakage of test questions in the Teachers Selective
Examination. Originally, there was a fourth information filed with
the same court against another defendant, Jessie Siapno, but
upon the Peoples motion, on the ground that the said defendant
would be utilized as a state witness, the trial court ordered her
discharge as defendant and dismissed the case against her.
Extrajudicial confession has been signed by Jessie Siapno which
was allowed by court. That when Jessie asked by the Prosecutor
to identify her signature, the defense objects on the ground that
the answer to the question would tend to incriminate the
witness. The defense counsel also objected when she asked by
the prosecutor to describe the test booklet on the ground that
the best evidence was the booklet itself.

Issue: Whether or not the extrajudicial admission Of Jessie
Siapno is admissible

Ruling: Yes, the extrajudicial confession of discharged defendant
Siapno is admissible. Although as a general rule an extrajudicial
confession is evidence only against the person making it, the
same may be taken into consideration as a circumstance in
assessing and passing upon the weight and credibility of the
accomplice as well as those of the opposing parties. The two
defendants also executed extrajudicial confession which the
court found identical with that of Jessie on material points.
Unless, therefore, it is shown that there was collusion in making
the confession, they are admissible as circumstantial evidence
against the persons implicated to show the probability of their
criminal participation.

SISON VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts: Eleven accused were indicted for the crime of murder
against Salcedo arising from the mauling incident occurred
during the Marcos Regime at Luneta Park. All these accused
were allegedly kicked, boxed and mauled Salcedo to death.
Photographs were taken of the victim as he was being mauled
and chased by his assailants at the Luneta. During the trial, the
prosecution presented photographs allegedly depicting the
incident. The defense counsel objects on the ground that the one
who took the picture was not presented to identify them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the photographs taken is admissible

Ruling: Yes, the photographer, however, is not the only witness
who can identify the pictures he has taken. The correctness of
the photographs as a faithful representation of the object
portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of
the person who made it or by other competent witness after
which the court can admit subject to impeachment as to its
accuracy. Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the
photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify
to its exactions and accuracy.

1. TIJING vs CA (354 SCRA 17)
FACTS:
Petitioners, Tijing are husband and wife. They have six children.
The youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was born on April 27,
1989. Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of
private respondent Angelita Diamante, then a resident of Tondo,
Manila. In August 1989, Bienvenida went to the house of Angelita
Diamante for an urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her
way to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she
returned. She also left her four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr.,
under the care of Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of
the child while Bienvenida was doing laundry.
When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and
Edgardo, Jr., were gone. Four years later or in October 1993,
Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez,
allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita, and whose
remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan. Bienvenida lost
no time in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw
her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after four years.
Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus
with the trial court in order to recover their son. As the case
ensued, To substantiate their petition, petitioners presented two
witnesses, namely, Lourdes Vasquez and Benjamin Lopez. The
second witness, Benjamin Lopez, declared that his brother, the
late Tomas Lopez, could not have possibly fathered John Thomas
Lopez as the latter was sterile.
For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of
the child. She asserts that at age 42, she gave birth to John
Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife Zosima
Panganiban in Singalong, Manila. She added, though, that she
has two other children with her real husband, Angel Sanchez.
She said the birth of John Thomas was registered by her
common-law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the local civil registrar
of Manila on August 4, 1989.
On March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded that since Angelita
and her common-law husband could not have children, the
alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility. The trial
court also held that the minor and Bienvenida showed strong
facial similarity. Accordingly, it ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and
John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person who is the
natural child of petitioners. The Court of Appeals reversed the
decision on the ground that evidence adduced was insufficient,
hence, this case.
ISSUE: WON the finding of the trial court as to the facial
similarity of the petitioners and John Thomas Lopez, their
alleged son is tenable?
HELD:
Yes. The Court noted the pieces of evidence adduced: first
Angelita could no longer bear children due to her ligation, second
her common-law husbands sterility, third the falsity of John
Thomas birth certificate and fourth the similarity/ resemblance
between the minor and his alleged parent is competent and
material evidence to establish parentage.
A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional
methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways
available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in
using DNA test for identification and parentage testing.
The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person
has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from
the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and
child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a
novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still
open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes,
courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA
evidence.


8. Roble vs Arbasa
FACTS:
On January 2, 1976, spouses Dominador Arbasa and Adelaida
Roble (hereinafter referred to as respondents) purchased from
Fidela Roble an unregistered parcel of land located at Poblacion,
Isabel, Leyte. As reflected on the deed of sale, the property had a
total land area of two hundred forty (240) square meters. Due to
their diligent efforts in reclaiming a portion of the sea, using
stones, sand and gravel, the original size of two hundred forty
(240) square meters increased to eight hundred eighty four (884)
square meters.
Since 1976 and until the present, respondents have been in
actual, open, peaceful and continuous possession of the entire
parcel of land in the concept of owners and had it declared for
taxation purposes in the name of respondent Adelaida Arbasa.
Included in the sale were the improvements found on the land,
consisting mainly of the house of Fidela.
Adelaida tolerated her sister Fidelas continued stay at the house.
Latter and her husband thereon died. Petitioners Roble claimed
ownership of the house and the southern portion of the land with
an area of 644 square meters.
Arbasa then filed an action for quieting of title with damages. At
the pre-trial conference held on July 4, 1990, the parties defined
the issue to be: whether the deed of sale executed on January 2,
1975 by Fidela Roble in favor of respondents conveyed the entire
eight hundred eighty four (884) square meters parcel of land,
including the house of Fidela, or it covered only two hundred
forty (240) square meters located at the northern portion of the
property.
RTC ruled that the deed of absolute sale executed by Fidela
Roble covered only a total area of two hundred forty (240) square
meters in favor of respondents and not the entire eight hundred
eighty four (884) square meters claimed by respondents. On
appeal, CA observed that from the wording of the deed of sale,
Fidela Roble sold to respondents the whole parcel of
residential land bounded on the south by the seashore. . The
Court of Appeals opined that this technical description, as
contained in the deed of sale, lent credence to the claim of
respondents that they were responsible for reclaiming the 644
square meters claimed by petitioners. CA ruled in favor of the
Arabsa. Hence this case.
ISSUE: WON Fidela sold the whole of the parcel of land to
Arbasa?
HELD: Yes. The Court finds no ambiguity in the terms and
stipulations of the deed of sale. Contracts are the laws between
the contracting parties. It shall be fulfilled according to the literal
sense of their stipulations. If their terms are clear and leave no
room for doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the
contracts are obligatory no matter what their forms may be,
whenever the essential requisites for their validity are present.
Sale, by its very nature, is a consensual contract because it is
perfected by mere consent. The essential elements of a contract
of sale are the following: (a) consent or meeting of the minds,
that is consent to transfer ownership in exchange for the price;
(b) determinate subject matter; and (c) price certain in money or
its equivalent. All these elements are present in the instant case.
Moreover,. parol evidence rule forbids any addition to or
contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by testimony
or other evidence purporting to show that, at or before the
execution of the parties written agreement, other or different
terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of
the written contract. When an agreement has been reduced to
writing, the parties can not be permitted to adduce evidence to
provide alleged practices, which all purposes would alter the
terms of written agreement. Whatever is not found in the writing
is understood to have been waived and abandoned.
The rule is not without exceptions, however, as it is likewise
provided that a party to an action may present evidence to
modify, explain, or add to the terms of the written agreement if
he puts in issue in his pleadings: (a) an intrinsic ambiguity,
mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) the failure
of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto; (c) the validity of the written
agreement; or (d) the existence of other terms agreed to by the
parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the
written agreement.
None of the aforecited exceptions finds application to the instant
case. Nor did respondents raise this issue at the proceedings
before the trial court.


15.PEOPLE VS. TANDOY
FACTS:
Mario Tandoy was accused feloniously sold eight (8) pieces of
dried marijuana flowering tops, two(2) pieces of dried marijuana
flowering tops and crushed dried marijuana flowering tops,
which areprohibited drug, for and in consideration of P20.00.

The accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors
in this appeal:

The Court a quo erred in admitting in evidence against the
accused Exh. "E-2-A" which is merely axerox copy of the P10.00
bill allegedly used as buy-bust money.

The evidence of the prosecution may be summarized as follows:

One of them was the accused-appellant, who said without
preamble: "Pare, gusto mo bangumiskor?" Singayan said yes.
The exchange was made then and theretwo rolls/pieces
ofmarijuana for one P10.00 and two P5.00 bills marked ANU
(meaning Anti-Narcotics Unit).

The team then moved in and arrested Tandoy.The accused-
appellant invokes the best evidence rule and questions the
admission by the trial court of the xerox copy only of the marked
P10.00 bill.


The Solicitor General, in his Comment, correctly refuted that
contention thus:

a. This assigned error centers on the trial court's admission
of the P10.00 bill marked money which, according to the
appellant, is excluded under the best evidence rule for being a
mere xerox copy.
b. Apparently, appellant erroneously thinks that said
marked money is an ordinary document falling under Sec. 2, Rule
130 of the Revised Rules of Court which excludes the introduction
of secondary evidence except in the five (5) instances mentioned
therein.

The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the
document are the subject of inquiry.

Issue:
Whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists,
or in the circumstances relevant to orsurrounding its execution,
the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is
admissible.

Held:
1. Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the
prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing its existence
and not its contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a Xerox
copy thereof, is therefore admissible without the need of
accounting for the original. Moreover, the presentation at the
trial of the "buy-bust money" was not indispensable to the
conviction of the accused-appellant because the sale of the
marijuana had been adequately proved by the testimony of the
police officers. So long as the marijuana actually sold by the
accused-appellant had been submitted as an exhibit, the failure
to produce the marked money itself would not constitute a fatal
omission. We are convinced from the evidence on record that the
prosecution has overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused-appellant with proof beyond
reasonable doubt of his guilt.He must therefore suffer the
penalty prescribed by law for those who would visit the scourge
of drug addiction upon our people.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged
decision AFFIRMED in toto, with costsagainst the accused-
appellant.
:

Transpacific Industrial Supplies Inc v CA and Associated Bank
235 SCRA 494

FACTS: Petitioner Transpacific Industrial Inc applied for and was
granted loans by respondent Associated Bank. The loans were
evidenced and secured by four promissory notes, a real estate
mortgage and a chattel mortgage. Subsequently, Associated
Bank returned the duplicate original copies of the promissory
notes to Trans-Pacific with the word PAID stamped thereon.
Despite such return, Associated demanded from Transpacific the
payment of the amount of P 492,100 representing the accrued
interest on one of the promissory notes and stated that the
promissory notes were erroneously released. At first,
TransPacific expressed its willingness to pay the amount
demanded but change its mind and initiated an action instead
before the RTC for specific performance and damages against
the respondent bank and prayed for the obligation to the bank to
be declared fully paid. The RTC ruled in favor of TransPacific
where it held that Transpacific has fully discharged its obligation
by virtue of its possession of the documents evidencing
indebtedness, applying thereon the legal presumption provided
by Art. 1271 of the Civil Code, to wit;
Art. 1271. The delivery of a private document evidencing a credit,
made voluntarily by the creditor to the debtor, implies the
renunciation of the action which the former had against the
latter.
Associated Bank then appealed to the respondent court, CA, who
reversed the decision of the RTC and held that the documents
found in possession of TransPacific are mere duplicate and
cannot be the basis of petitioners claim that its obligation has
been fully paid. CA contends that since the promissory notes
submitted by the petitioner were duplicates and not the
originals, the delivery thereof by respondent bank to the
petitioner does not merit the application of Art. 1271. Art. 1271
must be construed to mean the original copy of the document
evidencing the credit.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in its decision to disregard the promissory
notes as evidence of payment by Transpacific on the ground that
such were just mere duplicates and not the originals.
RATIONALE: The Supreme Court held that the pronouncement
of the CA regarding the documents is groundless. Its undisputed
that the documents presented were duplicate originals and
therefore admissible as evidence. The SC cited its ruling in
People v. Tan where it held:
When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets
of writing paper so that the writing of a contract upon the
outside sheet, including the signature of the party to be charged
thereby, produces a facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such
signature being thus reproduced by the same stroke of pen which
made the surface or exposed impression, all of the sheets so
written on are regarded as duplicate originals and either of them
may be introduced in evidence as such without accounting for
the nonproduction of the others.
Pursuant to Sec 2[b], Rule 130; A duplicate copy of the original
may be admitted in evidence when the original is in the
possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered,
and the latter fails to produce if after reasonable notice, as in the
case of respondent bank.
The SC also held that the presumption created by Art. 1271 of the
CC is not conclusive but merely prima facie. If theres no evidence
to the contrary the presumption stands. On the other hand, the
presumption loses its legal efficacy in the face of proof or
evidence to the contrary. In the case at bar, the SC found
sufficient justification to overthrow the presumption of payment
made by the delivery of the documents evidencing petitioners
indebtedness. The rationale for allowing presumption of
renunciation in the delivery of a private instrument is that, unlike
that of a public instrument, there could be just one copy of
evidence of the credit. Where several originals are made out of a
private document, the intendment of the law would thus be to
refer to the delivery only of the original original rather than to the
original duplicate of which the debtor would normally retain a
copy.

People v. Ulzoron
286 SCRA 641
FACTS: Accused-Appelant Samuel Ulzoron was charged of rape
with the use of a deadly weapon by complaining witness, Emily
Gabo, when he allegedly, armed with a 2 foot long bolo and with
the use of physical force, forcibly and against the will of the
latter, engaged in sexual intercourse with Gabo. Ulzoron was
adjudged guilty and subsequently sentenced by the trial court
with the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appelant argued in his
defense that the undisputed facts and circumstance made it
more likely that him and Emily was involved in an adulterous
relationship for there was nothing to support the victims claim of
struggle since the examining physician could not conclude that
there was physical force inflicted due to the lack of any physical
injury on Emily. He also called the attention of the court on the
circumstance that the judge who wrote the decision did not
personally tried the case and thus lacked the opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the parties and their witnesses.
ISSUES:
1. WON Ulzorons claim of innocence due to the lack of
physical injury on the victim of the alleged rape is correct.
2. WON Ulzoron raising the sweetheart defense in his
appeal may be given credence by the court.
3. WON the circumstance that the judge who wrote the
decision was not the one who personally tried the case
prejudiced the accused.
RATIONALE:
1. On the matter of Ulzorons defense of the lack of
physical injury on Emily, the Supreme Court held that its not
necessary for the commission of rape that thered be marks of
physical violence on the victims body. In the particular case at
bar, the absence of bodily harm on Emily can be adequately
explained by the testimony given by the latter during the cross-
examination proceedings when asked to describe the manner
they traversed the 40 meters distance to the scene of the crime.

2. With regards to the claim of adulterous relationship with
the victim, the Court did not agree with the Office of the Solicitor
General that the sweetheart defense being raised as a defense
for the first time in Ulzorons appeal should be disallowed to
conform with the established jurisprudence. The SC held that
Ulzoron could only be emphasizing the point that the facts and
circumstances established could lead to a conclusion of the
existence of adulterous relationship between him and Emily and
not of rape. Simply put, the appellant could only be using the
sweetheart theory not necessarily as a defense but as a focal
point in disputing the appreciation by the trial court of the
evidence of the prosecution. Thus, the defense may not be
totally disregarded.

3. On the issue that the judge who wrote the decision had
not heard the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the SC
held that such circumstance does not taint or disturb the decision
of the judge since after all, the judge had the records of the case
before him including the transcript of the stenographic notes.
The validity of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact
that its writer only took over from a colleague who had earlier
presided at the trial, unless there is a clear showing of grave
abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts. The records
adequately support the factual findings of the trial court and its
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. Furthermore, the
SC stated that the circumstance of force and intimidation
attending the case at bar were manifested clearly not only on the
victims testimony but also on the physical evidence presented
during the trial consisting of her torn dress and underwear as well
as the medico-legal support. Such pieces of evidence are more
eloquent than a hundred witnesses.

Thus, the SC affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Inciong Jr. v. CA
257 SCRA 578

FACTS: Petitioner Baldomer Inciong Jr. co-signed a promissory
note in the amount of P50, 000 with Rene Naybe and Gregorio
Pantanosas holding themselves jointly and severally liable to
private respondent Philippine Bank of the Communications.
Upon the expiration of the term specified for payment in the
promissory note without the promisors paying for the obligation,
PNB filed a complaint for collection of sum against the three
obligors. The lower court dismissed the case against Pantanosas
while Naybe had already gone to Saudi Arabia at the time the
summons were served thus, leaving Inciong to be the only one
duly served with the summons and the action to prosper against.
Inciong, in his defense, alleged that at that time the 5 copies of a
blank promissory note where brought to him by his friend at his
office, he affixed his signature thereto but in one copy he
indicated that he binds himself only for the amount of P5,000. He
further claims that his consent to the promissory note was
vitiated by fraud. The RTC ruled against him and such decision
was later on affirmed by the respondent court, CA. In his petition
for review on certiorari on the decision of the CA, one of his
assertions is that since the promissory note is not a public deed
with the formalities prescribed by law, but a mere commercial
paper which does not bear the signature of attesting witnesses,
parol evidence may overcome the contents of the promissory
note.
ISSUE: WON
HELD: The Supreme Court found no merit in Inciongs assertion.
The first paragraph of the parol evidence rule states:
"When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing,
it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there
can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement."
Its clear from the wording of the rule that it does not specify that
the written agreement be a public document. What is required is
that the agreement be in writing as the rule was in fact founded
on long experience that written evidence is much more certain
and accurate than that which rests in fleeting memory only and
that it would be unsafe when parties have expressed the terms of
their contract in writing to admit weaker evidence to control and
vary the stronger and to show that the parties intended a
different contract from that expressed in writing signed by them.
Thus, the SC held that for the parol evidence rule to apply, a
written contract need not be in any particular form, or be signed
by both parties. As a GENERAL RULE; Bills, notes and other
instruments of a similar nature are not subject to be varied or
contradicted by parol or extrinsic evidence.
Thus, Inciongs petition was denied and the SC affirmed the
findings of the CA.


Case no. 14
MAGDAYAO v. PEOPLE

An Information was filed charging petitioner with violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 of drawing a check with insufficient funds to Ricky
Olvis in the amount of P600,000.00. When arraigned, the
petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. At trial for the
presentation to adduce its evidence, the petitioner was absent.
On motion of the prosecution, the court allowed it to adduce
evidence. The prosecution presented the private complainant,
Ricky Olvis, who testified on direct examination that, the
petitioner drew and issued to him the check of P600,000.00
which was dishonored for the reason "Drawn Against Insufficient
Funds". Olvis also testified that, the petitioner pleaded for time
to pay the amount thereof, but reneged on his promise. Olvis
then filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22. The petitioner again offered to repay Olvis.
Taking pity on the petitioner, he agreed. He then returned the
original copy of the check to the petitioner, but the latter again
failed to make good on his promise and failed to pay the
P600,000.00. The prosecution wanted Olvis to identify the
petitioner as the drawer of the check, but because of the latters
absence, the direct examination on the witness could not be
terminated. The prosecution moved that such direct examination
of Olvis be continued on another date, and that the petitioner be
ordered to appear before the court so that he could be identified
as the drawer of the subject check. The trial court granted the
motion. After several postponements at the instance of the
petitioner, he failed to appear before the court for continuation
of trial. The trial court rendered judgment convicting the
petitioner of the crime charged.
ISSUE:
WON THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT RENDERED THE
DECISION WITH ALLEGED FINDINGS OF FACTS NOT
SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.
HELD: DENIED
1.As long as the original evidence can be had, the court should
not receive in evidence that which is substitutionary in nature,
such as photocopies, in the absence of any clear showing that the
original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced
in court
2. To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the
original of a writing is in the custody or control of the adverse
party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that the adverse party must
be given reasonable notice, that he fails or refuses to produce the
same in court and that the offeror offers satisfactory proof of its
existence.
3. The offeror must prove that he has done all in his power to
secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said party to
produce the document. When such party has the original of the
writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it or refuses to
produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted.

Case no. 7
CALLANTA V. NLRC

Petitioner was appointed as sub-agent by respondent company
under supervision of Edgar Rodriguez with specific assignment at
Iligan City and Lanao Province. He was promoted to the position
of national promoter salesman of respondent company for Iligan
City, Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur. However, a "spot audit"
was conducted and he was found to have a tentative shortage in
amount of P49,005.59. He rendered his resignation effective on
the same date. Thereafter, he wrote a letter complaining about
his false resignation and demanding for the refund of the amount
of P76,465.81 as well as reinstatement to his former position.
Respondent company ignored above demands. Petitioner filed a
complaint against, respondent company before the NLRC for
illegal dismissal, unpaid commission and receivable and/or claims
due, non-payment of vacation leaves, holiday pays, 13th month
pay, COLA and other company benefits and damages. The Labor
Arbiter rendered a decision declaring termination of petitioner's
services illegal. Respondent company appealed. Respondent
NLRC issued an order requiring private respondent company to
post a cash or surety bond in the amount equal to the monetary
award in the Labor Arbiter's judgment and also ordered
immediate reinstatement of petitioner to his former position.
Two months from the date of the Order, private respondent filed
the required bond but did not reinstate petitioner. Meanwhile,
petitioner filed with respondent NLRC a Motion for Writ of
Execution pending appeal which was not acted upon up to the
time where public respondent NRLC decided the appeal which
set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the
complaint of petitioner for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
WON THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
ALLEGED RESIGNATION LETTER COMPLAINANT WAS VALID
AND EFFECTIVE CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE LABOR
ARBITER THAT THE SAME WAS FORCED UPON
COMPLAINANT.
HELD: DISMISSED
1.A highly educated employee cannot be rattled by results of a
spot audit to the extent of resigning in a state of confusion.
- On top of the absence of evidence adduced by petitioner to the
contrary, the Court also finds it unbelievable that petitioner was
rattled and confused into signing the resignation letter on
account of a mere spot audit report
- A man of high educational attainment and qualification is
expected to know the import of everything he executes, whether
written or oral
- Petitioner cannot now be allowed of any evidence to the
contrary, the Court believes was tendered voluntarily by him
2. Unsigned summation of accounts not admissible as evidence
- For its claims for refund, petitioner presented written
summation of accounts reflecting the amounts allegedly owned
by responded company to him. But it is not dated nor signed,
thus, inadmissible and uncertain as to its origin and authenticity