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JOURNAL OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS, VOLUME 27, ISSUE 2, OCTOBER 2014

33

Detection of electromagnetic jamming signals
interfering with a railway track-to-train radio
communication
S.Mili, D.Sodoyer, V.Deniau and M.Heddebaut.
AbstractGlobal System for Mobile communications-Railways (GSM-R) is now widely used for train-to-track radio
communication. As for any radio communication system, non-intentional and intentional ElectroMagnetic Interference (EMI) can
affect this track-to-train radio link. This paper studies the impact of low-power electromagnetic jammers on this communication.
Firstly, experiments performed on a dedicated test bench are presented to evaluate the impact of selected jamming signals on a
GSM-R radio communication. In certain jamming conditions, loss of connection can result. Then, a method to detect these
jamming signals is presented. We considered and modelled a simplified GSM-R communication chain using a GMSK
modulation. This was used to evaluate the impact of the jammer on the IQ constellation representation. As for the experimental
part, the same interfering signals are applied. We then use the Error Vector Magnitude parameter to detect the presence of
these jamming signals. Depending on the parameters of the modulation chain, we adapt our processing to detect the
disturbance. A good detection of the jammed signal is obtained by analysing the EVM parameter while trying to detect these
signals in an AWGN channel.
Index Terms Detection, Error Vector Magnitude (EVM), GMSK, GSM-R, Intentional Electromagnetic interference (IEMI), IQ
constellation, jammer, radio communication, railway.

!

1 INTRODUCTION
his paper studies the impact of low-power
electromagnetic jammers on a railway track-to-train
radio communication and a method associated to
detect the presence of these jamming signals at the
receiver.
Appeared in the mid-1970s, track-to-train radio
communication was initially based on analogue radio,
and was used to equip some railway networks [1]. The
operation began with the use of hand-held transceivers
and was deployed initially for communication in depots.
It subsequently evolved to an exchange of information
between agents operating in the locomotives with
regulation centres. Some years later, the evolution of the
system shows the first deployment of dedicated track-to-
train radio communication systems. The deployment of
these systems enables the centralized control of trains and
also highly increases safety [2]. At the end of the 1990s,
following a strong recommendation from the European
Commission, the International Union of Railways (UIC)
decided to implement a Pan-European digital radio
system for railway communication. Indeed, since trains
cross borders, the development of a unique European
radio for railways was required. The system aims to
gradually replace the different analogue networks of
track-to-train radio operated in Europe. It was decided to
use a variant of the GSM 900 system dedicated to rail [2].
The system was called Global System for Mobile
Communications for Railways or GSM-R. Common
European GSM-R frequencies were allocated to GSM-R,
between 876 MHz and 880 MHz for the downlink and,
between 921 MHz and 925 MHz for the uplink. GSM-R
allows voice communications and data transmission
along an increasing amount of European railway
corridors [3]. It also provides voice and data
communication for railway signalling and manages the
railway emergency calls to establish specific priority
communications during emergency operations [2].
Currently, 32 rail operators from 24 European countries
have agreed to deploy GSM-R networks [2]. By the end of
2016, 56 countries in five continents should have
operational GSM-R networks. GSM-R, supporting the
digital radio system Euroradio, is also used as radio
bearer for the control applications of the trains in Europe
named European Train Control System (ETCS) [4]. The
mandatory high level of safety needed by railway
transport imposes strong requirements on a whole
railway system. Therefore, a very reliable track-to-train
communication link is necessary. Thus, it becomes
important to carefully evaluate this radio communication
system, considering all the elements that could impact its
reliability. In this work, we concentrate on the evaluation

S. MILI. Univ. Lille Nord de France, IFSTTAR, French institute of science
and technology for transport, development and networks. 20 rue Elise Re-
clus 59650 Villeneuve dAscq, France.
D. SODOYER. Univ. Lille Nord de France, IFSTTAR, French institute of
science and technology for transport, development and networks. 20 rue
Elise Reclus 59650 Villeneuve dAscq, France.
V. DENIAU. Univ. Lille Nord de France, IFSTTAR, French institute of
science and technology for transport, development and networks. 20 rue
Elise Reclus 59650 Villeneuve dAscq, France.
M. HEDDEBAUT. Univ. Lille Nord de France, IFSTTAR, French insti-
tute of science and technology for transport, development and networks. 20
rue Elise Reclus 59650 Villeneuve dAscq, France.


T
34



of the immunity of the GSM-R communication system
against low-power electromagnetic jamming signals.
There exist several electronic devices that can affect train-
to-track communication reliability. Among them, GSM
radio jammers [5] are illegal devices in many countries
that can however be found in some places. They usually
cover several radiofrequency bands, sometimes including
the GSM-R frequencies. These jammers generate a
significant radio frequency power that can affect locally
the communication. Among the different existing types of
jammer, a widely available category is technically based
on devices, using a sine wave signal, fast sweeping a
large frequency band. They deliver a significant output
power to an internal or external antenna, typically in the
order of 1 W for hand-held equipment.
GSM-R has its own cellular network installed along the
track, designed to provide a minimum level of received
power > 95 dBm at the receiving antenna, anywhere
along the track. This is a mandatory requirement imposed
by the EIRENE specifications [6]. During the movement
of the train, according to its proximity to the nearest Base
Transceiver Station (BTS), the downlink signal received
by the train or the uplink signal received by the BTS
varies between -95 and -20 dBm [6]. Considering the
output power delivered by the jamming devices (1 W or
+30 dBm), interferences are likely to occur in certain
conditions.
Moreover, if the track-to-train communication link is
interrupted for several seconds, then the train can stop
because it does not receive any updated control
information from the ground control centre [7]. Therefore,
a jammer could have a serious impact on train operation
[8].
This paper is organized in the following way. To propose
an approach of the problem, the second section provides
results of preliminary experimentations performed to
evaluate the impact of a jamming signal on a GSM-R
communication. The third section presents the communi-
cation chain that we have modelled in order to simulate
the presence of a jamming signal on the communication.
The fourth section introduces the error vector magnitude
method (EVM) applied to evaluate the impact of an inter-
fering signal. The following section describes the jam-
ming signal detection process using the EVM. Consider-
ing libraries of non-jammed and jammed signals, the sixth
section presents the detection process and the associated
jamming detection results. Finally, conclusions and direc-
tions for future work are provided
2 PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
To evaluate the effectiveness of a jammer, a dedicated
wired test bench is set up. It is presented in fig. 1. A GSM-
R communication is established in laboratory using a base
transceiver station (BTS) emulator noted CMU and a
GSM-R train mobile equipment. The GSM-R frequency is
set to 924.8 MHz and will be used for the whole study.
Using combiners, a supplementary radio signal is injected
in the radiofrequency link generating different jamming
waveforms, at different power levels. In this study, two
jamming signals will be used, a pure sine wave centered
in the pass-band of the receiver and, a FM-modulated,
constant envelope signal, occupying most of a GSM-R
channel. A spectrum analyser is used to visualize these
waveform frequency occupancies [9].
Using this test bench, the jamming effectiveness on the
radio communication can be estimated in terms of bit
error rate, noted BER. Table 1 presents some results
obtained with the set-up.

In the first column, a constant -38 dBm GSM-R level is
delivered to the input of the mobile GSM-R receiver. This
represents a significant level of operation as compared to
the -95 dBm minimum level requested by the EIRENE
specifications. The second column indicates the variable
jamming power injected at the input of the GSM-R mobile
receiver. This jamming signal is centred in the GSM-R
communication channel used. The third column shows
the resulting measured BER in the case of the pure sine
wave jammer. The last column indicates the results
obtained with an FM-modulated jamming signal. We
obtain the following conclusions: when the received
GSM-R power is of the same order of magnitude as the
power received from the jammer then, the
communication is perturbed or interrupted. A 6 dB
difference (or more) between the two power levels greatly
reduces the impact of the jammer. A pure sine wave
centred on the GSM-R channel has less impact than a
wider bandwidth FM-modulated jamming signal.
Since these preliminary experimental measurements have
experimentally demonstrated the jamming effect on a
TABLE 1
IMPACT OF A JAMMING SIGNAL ON THE GSM-R RADIO COMMUNI-
CATION.
Power of
GSM-R signal
(dBm)
Power of the
jamming signal
(dBm)
BER for a Pure
sine wave
jamming signal
BER for a FM mod
75 kHz dev.
jamming signal
-38 -36
Loss of the
communication
Impossible connexion
-38 -38 5.6 Impossible connexion
-38 -40 2.1 14.7
-38 -42 0.8 7.8
-38 -44 0.2 2.7
-38 -48 0.06 0.2
-38 -50 0.02 0.04

Fig. 1. Test bench for the evaluation of jamming effectiveness
35



GSM-R communication, our next objective is to determine
how this perturbation affects the receiver and, if it is pos-
sible to detect the presence of such an interfering signal
by processing the signals in the receiving chain. We start
this study by modelling the relevant parts of a GSM-R
communication chain.
3 GSM-R COMMUNICATION CHAIN
GSM-R uses a Gaussian Minimum Shift Keying (GMSK)
modulation scheme [10]. Therefore, we have modelled a
GMSK transmission chain using the normalized band-
width time product (BT
b
) of 0.3, where T
b
is the time dura-
tion of bit. This modulation has a continuous phase [11].
Starting from these parameters, we created a communica-
tion chain represented in fig. 2. In this study, we consider
a communication channel composed of Additive White
Gaussian Noise (AWGN) only. At the emission, we use a
frame length of 156 bits, corresponding to a GSM-R burst;
these bits are modulated and transmitted through the
AWGN channel. On the receiving side, the signal is de-
modulated using a Viterbi algorithm, noted VA. The de-
sired signal is then recovered using a quadratic demodu-
lator.
The transmitted signal s(t) is written using (1):

[ ] ) ( ) ! 2 sin( ) ( ) ! 2 cos( ) (
2
) ( t g t f t s b t f t C a
T
E
t s
c n c n
b
+ + = (1)

Where g(t) simulates the AWGN channel, E is the
associated bit energy, f
c
is the frequency. C(t) and S(t) are
expressed in (2) :

!
!
"
!
!
#
$
=
=
b
b
T
t
t S
T
t
t C
2
!
sin ) (
2
!
cos ) (
(2)
representing respectively the effective I and Q signals
in which the binary in-phase and quadrature sequence
signals are respectively given by a
n
and b
n
in (3):
!
"
#
= =
= =
1 sin
1 cos
n n n
n n
x b
x a
$
(3)
x
n
is a phase constant used during the data transition
points from t=nT
b
and t=(n+1)T
b
, to keep the phase
continuous and where !
n
is the initial bit information for
the n
en
sample.
A simplified representation of the GMSK signal at the
emission is also given by (4):

[ ] ) ( ) ( ) 2 cos( ) ( ) 2 sin( ) ( t g t q t f t i t f t s
c c
+ + = ! ! (4)
) ( ) ( ) ( t g t y t s + = (5)
The demodulation chain is completed with the Viterbi
algorithm detailed in the following fig. 3:

where I(t) and Q(t) represent the in-phase and the
quadrature signal given by (6) and (7):
) ( ) ! 2 cos( t s t f I
c
= (4)
) ( ) ! 2 sin( t s t f Q
c
= (5)
Using this model, without any filtering, we obtain the IQ
constellation represented in fig. 4(a). Through a low-pass
filter, we obtain the less noisy constellation represented in
fig. 4(b). Different sampling rates are considered.
Usually, a low sampling rate is used by the terminals to
demodulate the signals. To apply our selected jammer
detection method, we consider a higher sampling rate, up
to 100 samples per symbol. Considering these representa-
tions, we decided to evaluate the impact of an interfering
signal on the quadratic representation by analysing the
error vector magnitude (EVM). We shall now introduce
the proposed detection method and evaluate its ability to
detect a jamming signal.

Fig. 2. Simulated communication chain.

Fig. 3. Demodulation chain.

(a)

(b)
Fig. 4. IQ constellation a: without filtering, b: with filtering.
36



4 IMPACT OF AN INTERFERING SIGNAL USING THE
ERROR VECTOR MAGNITUDE METHOD
The EVM parameter is commonly used in modern com-
munication systems to assess the modulation quality [12].
EVM is calculated by comparing two signals, a reference
signal and a variation of this reference signal caused by
interferences or distortions. So, the error vector magni-
tude is the vectorial difference between the reference sig-
nal and the distortion of this signal [13]. The principle of
the EVM method represents the difference in position
between the quadratic representation in normal operation
and in the presence of interference [12]. This is illustrated
in fig. 5.

EVM can be calculated considering (8):
!
"
!
#
$
+ =
+ =
% & =
2 2
2 2
s
s i
y
y i
i i
Q I s
Q I y
s y EVM (8)
Where y
i
and s
i
refer to normal measured data and per-
turbed measured data on the IQ constellation diagram. To
quantify the effect of the EVM, we use the average root
mean-square error vector magnitude (EVM
rms
). Sequences
of 156 bits are considered, corresponding to burst lengths.
As indicated in (9), the EVM
rms
represents the average
error vector to the ideal symbol.
!
!
"
=
n
i
n
i i
rms
y
s y
EVM
2
2
(9)
We successively calculate the EVM
rms
, and the degrada-
tion of the quality of the communication by varying, in a
first step, the signal to noise (AWGN) ratio (SNR) in the
absence of jamming signals and, in a second step, the sig-
nal to jammer power ratio noted SJR, at a constant SNR
value.

) ( ) ( ) (
2 , 1
t G t s t s
p T =
+ = (10)

!
!
"
#
$
$
%
&
=
g
y
P
P
SNR
10
log 10 (11)
!
!
"
#
$
$
%
&
=
p
G
y
P
P
SJR
10
log 10 (12)
As in the experimental part presented in section 2, we
consider two different types of jamming signals. The first
one is a pure sine wave, noted G
1
(t) injected at the center
of the receiver bandwidth. The second jamming signal is
a frequency modulated (FM) signal occupying most of the
200 kHz communication channel, noted G
2
(t).

Table 2 presents the results of this computation. To obtain
these results, we calculate the EVM and BER average over
1,000 repetitions for each configuration. In the AWGN
line, we start by evaluating the effect of the AWGN
channel alone, while increasing the SNR. A 10 dB SNR
leads to a BER of 1.32% and an EVM of 0.3035. Let us
recall that a limit BER value of 1.13 % corresponds to the
reference value employed by railway operators to assess
the quality of the reception signal [14]. A BER lower than
1.13 % is considered satisfactory for railway operation.

We now impose a constant SNR value of 10.2 dB,
corresponding to a BER of 1.20 %, slightly below the
value needed for satisfactory railway operation and we
introduce the G
1
(t) and G
2
(t) jamming signals. In this new
scenario, we compute the SJR by considering the useful
signal power, including the selected AWGN power to
jamming power ratio. Results are obtained by varying the
power level of the injected disturbing signal. Using a very
high signal plus noise to jammer ratio of 60 dB, we
logically obtain the same BER and EVM values as for the
selected SNR

value of 10.2 dB. Since we do not introduce
any protection or correction mechanism in our receiver
model, lower jammer power values can impact the
receiving quality, as compared to the experimental values
presented in section 2. We focus this table 2 presentation
on the 20 to 22.5 dB range of SJR values.















Fig. 5. IQ constellation for EVM calculation.

TABLE 2
EVM AND BER VARIATIONS DEPENDING ON, A: THE AMPLITUDE
RATIO AWGN CHANNEL, B: THE AMPLITUDE RATIO OF G
1
(T) SINE
WAVE, G
2
(T) FM-MODULATED SINE WAVE.
SNR (dB) EVM BER (%)
AWGN
No jamming



10
10.2
10.4
10.6
10.8
0.3035
0.2970
0.2906
0.2843
0.2780
1.32
1.20
1.07
0.91
0.72


(a)
37



Fig. 6(a) and 6(b) respectively present the resulting BER
and EVM usual graphical representations. They show the
joint evolution of BER and EVM according to the SNR.
We note that the variations of these two parameters as a
function of the SNR is not similar. Indeed, we denote an
EVM monotonic variation, which is different from that of
the progressive BER. So, for a given SNR these variation
ranges are very distinct.

Fig. 7 compares the effect of the G
1
(t) and G
2
(t)
jamming signals on the BER and EVM. In both BER and
EVM representations, we verify the previous
experimental result indicating a stronger interference
provided by the FM modulated signal.
For a specific SJR value we can see that the EVM and BER
are different. This illustrates the difference between the
evaluation of the modulation method alone, and the
evaluation of the full transmission quality.
In fig. 7(a), the BER remains reasonable when the
variation of the SJR is between 60 and 20 dB. From this
value we see a high variation of the BER to achieve its
saturation for a SJR of 15 dB.
Fig. 7(b), shows changes of EVM when it has the same
SJR variation as in fig. 7(a). In fact, at equivalent SJR,
variations for both types of interference are quite similar
until SJR of 25 dB. However, for higher values a
significant increase in EVM can be seen, and remains
higher for the second type of interference.
From these curves we can choose a given SJR seting the
value of EVM which later permits us to identify and
assess the quality of communication.
5 JAMMING SIGNAL DETECTION METHOD
Thereafter, we will use the EVM parameters for the
jamming detection processing. We start this process by
determining the useful representation (I(t), Q(t)) which
permits us to represent the system in two different
situations: the first situation called normal corresponds

SJR (dB) EVM BER (%)
Jammer G1(t)



SNR = 10.2dB
6

20
20.5
21
21.5
22
22.5

60
0.3922

0.3074
0.3066
0.3058
0.3051
0.3043
0.3039

0.297
49.02

14.23
12.75
11.11
9.946
8.903
8.038

1.21
Jammer G2(t)



SNR = 10.2dB

6

20
20.5
21
21.5
22
22.5

60
0.5463

0.3076
0.307
0.306
0.3053
0.3048
0.3046

0.2970
47.89

11.94
10.53
9.283
8.525
7.503
6.83

1.27


(b)


(a)

(b)
Fig. 6. SNR variation for AWGN channel and evolution of: a: BER b:
EVM.

2014 JOT
www.journaloftelecommunications.co.uk


(a)

(b)
Fig. 7. SJR variations for G
1
(t) and G
2
(t) channels and evolution of
case a: BER, case b: EVM.

38



to the absence of jamming signal and, the second
situation called jammed is in presence of a jamming
signal. We use the already presented demodulation chain
to implement the detection processing and the EVM
method is applied. As stated in section 3, in order to
obtain accurate EVM values, we apply a high sampling
rate and a 100/T
b
rate is used for all the following results.
5.1 Normal situation
The model of a normal situation is based on the
specification of the GMSK modulation of the reference
data. We consider the characteristics of the signals and
their mathematical specifications to build the model. The
normal situation is carried out considering the GMSK
demodulation principles based on the I and Q
information, as explained in this section. The block signal
detection processing is implemented on the
demodulation chain, as presented in fig. 8.

In each branch, the signals of the communication chain
are in the form:
)) ( cos( t A I ! = (13)
)) ( sin( t A Q ! = (14)
where
!
"
#
+ < < $
+ < < $
1 ) cos( 1
1 ) sin( 1
a
a
(15)
This implies that the vector for each sample of the
normal representation follows (16):

1 ) ( cos ) ( sin 1
2 2
+ < + < ! a a (16)
Firstly, we consider a high 60 dB SNR, without a jamming
signal. For each sample of the transmitting data, the rep-
resentation perfectly matches a disk representing the IQ
data as presented in fig. 9, where fig. 9(a) represents the
IQ representation, fig. 9(b) represents the envelope esti-
mation and fig. 9(c) represents the estimated envelope. In
this case, our model follows the rule provided in (16)
where each data sample matches a specific location inside
the maximum envelope circle representation.
Secondly, we consider a lower SNR condition. We impose
a SNR value corresponding to the minimum satisfactory
railway communication, i.e. 10.2 dB (see table 2). In this
case, the area does not fit with the fig. 9 envelope and a
new maximum radius must be defined, using (17).
) ( ) (
2 2
t Q t I TT + = (17)

Where TT represents the circle radius of the real noisy
signal.

To determine this radius, we consider (18). For each of the
four quadrants of the unit circle, we determine the maxi-
mum radius of the area; the maximum of these four radi-
uses is then selected to represent the optimum area that
allows it to wrap all the data, and became the reference of
the normal situation.
) , , , max(
) max( : 0 ) , (
) max( : ) 0 , 0 (
) max( : ) 0 , 0 (
) max( : 0 ) , (
4 3 2 1
4
3
2
1
R R R R R
TT R Q I
TT R Q I
TT R Q I
TT R Q I
ay
= !
"
"
#
"
"
$
%
= <
= > <
= < >
= >
(18)
Therefore, the new envelope model follows the equation
of the circle given by:
[ ] [ ] { }
2
2 2
: , , ,
ay
R Q I Q I =! + + " # $ + " # $ % % % % (19)
where
awgn
b = ! ,
awgn
b is the effect of the AWGN channel.
We now use the EVM method presented in section 4 to
measure the distortion associated to this SNR condition.
This method permits us to define an EVM value
representative of the model of functioning corresponding
to this normal situation. Normally this value of EVM
will be bounded by the maximum circle given by (18).
we calculate the EVM for this data :
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
) ( ) (
awgn
b s y s y i i
Q Q I I s y EVM ! = " " " = " = (20)
From this assumption, and as we can see in fig. 10, we
conclude that EVM! corresponds to the standard devia-
tion of the noise from the channel, and from this conclu-
sion we will adapt our detection process.

Fig. 8. Signal detection processing.


Fig. 9. High SNR (60 dB) maximum envelope circle determination: a:
IQ representation, b: envelope estimation, c: estimated envelope.

39




5.2 Jammed situation
In this section, we finally consider the addition of a
jamming signal using a 20 dB SJR value, while
maintaining the SNR value at 10.2 dB. As can be seen in
fig. 11, this added jamming signal, without phase
reference to our communication signal, deforms our IQ
constellation in a different way. We use the EVM method
presented in section 4 to measure this distortion.


Then, the respective EVM values will be used to delimi-
tate the model of functioning corresponding to a normal
situation and the model of functioning corresponding to a
jammed situation. This requires a model which is now
described.
5.3 Detection of jamming situations (EVM method)
To create the model described in fig. 12, we start by
defining a data base corresponding to a learning phase.
Using the learning data base, we determine the
maximum contour of the IQ constellation over a given
time duration (R
ay
, EVM
threshold
).
{ } EVM EVM
threshold
max = (21)
[ ] [ ] { }
threshold
EVM EVM Q I < ! + " # ! + " # : , , , $ $ $ $ (22)
Having a known geometrical shape (GMSK: quadratic
modulation) the envelope represents our normal
situation model and contains all the data points [15].
Subsequently, the detection identifies the position of the
sample at a given time and checks if it belongs or not to
the space representing the model. This means that we
determine if the calculated EVM is higher or lower than
the EVM
threshold
, i.e. the threshold selected for a given BER.
The normal situation is represented by the maximum
envelope of the constellation representing a circle, which
depends on the parameters used during the tests. In this
case, we consider the model of the EM environment as a
bounded circle from -! to +!. Any deformation indicates
the presence of a jamming signal.
5.4 Degradation signals
To be able to test the validity of our method, we consid-
ered the signals previously evaluated in section 2, i.e. the
pure sine wave and the FM-modulated signals respective-
ly noted G
1
(t) and G
2
(t). The experimental results pro-
posed in Table 2 allow us to get prior information on the
value of BER versus SNR (the variation of maximum am-
plitude).
To start this analysis, we present the IQ constellations
obtained in the presence of EM disturbances. Fig. 13(a)
represents the constellation obtained applying only
AWGN with an SNR of 10.2 dB. Fig. 13(b) and 13(c) re-
spectively represent the constellation using the same SNR
and in the presence of G
1
(t) and G
2
(t) jamming signals. We
consider a high SJR of 20 dB. The EVM method is applied
to these data obtained without filtering.

Fig. 10. Low SNR maximum envelope circle determination with
filtering.


Fig. 11. Low SNR (10.2 dB) envelope circle determination in presence
of a jamming signal (SJR = 20 dB) with filtering.


Fig. 11. Flowchart of construction of the model and EVM detection
method.


Fig. 11. IQ constellations for a: AWGN channel, b: AWGN + G
1
(t),
c: AWGN + G
2
(t) without filtering.

40



We now need a detection process to identify these
different situations using the selected EVM method.
6 Detection tests
6.1 Creating the data base
The global data base contains three sections C1, C2 and
C3 respectively corresponding to the normal mode, the
jammed mode in presence of the pure sine wave (C2), and
jammed mode in presence of the FM-modulated signal
(C3).
The initial model is built by learning C1 quadratic data;
during a normal functioning N = 1,000 IQ data are
recorded using a 10.2 dB SNR, resulting in a BER of
1.20%. Each record corresponds to the IQ observation of
one GSM-R burst. This means that each IQ sample
contained in the burst has N observations. This first data
base represents the N bursts IQ representations.
Then, we create a data base for the jamming signals. For
each of these signals, we record the IQ data for N
1
= 2,000
bursts (2,000 observations for each samples) C2, C3 for
each disturbance, considering SJR values ranging
between 6 dB and 60 dB. All the data tests are considered.
6.2 Performing the learning phase
The learning phase consists in estimating the parameter
EVM of the IQ data defined by (17) for normal data, using
a database C1 and the selection of the EVM
threshold
.
We estimate the magnitude vector error for each sample
for the N observations, and for all the observations we
select the maximum one (EVM
threshold
). Adding to the unit
circle this value represents the radius of the circle
containing the information. This generates a maximum
envelope including all the data samples and determining
an area from which we identify the nature of the signal
(normal and jammed signal).
6.3 Developing the EM jamming detection
Considering the detection process and the flow chart
principle presented in fig. 12, we tested the capability of
our model to detect the jamming signals. The observation
data tests are evaluated to estimate in which mode of
functioning we are. The N
1
observations for the data base
C2 and C3 are tested and, for each of the data bases, we
note the percentage of good detection and non-
recognition of the jammer. We further assess the jamming
detection efficiency of our model by the rate of bad
detection. These results are presented in table 3.
We conclude that we obtain a satisfactory jamming
detection for the two jammed scenarios, as compared to a
pure AWGN situation. However, we obtain a satisfactory
but non-perfect detection. The successful rate obtained
with this disturbance is not maximal because we used the
very wide 6 to 60 dB range of SJR. When the jamming
signal is very low, then the impact on the communication
becomes marginal and the resulting BER will not be
degraded. In these cases, the jamming does not impact
the communication and we can consider it as acceptable.
It is important to note that, most of the time the SNR is
lower than the SJR. Therefore, our system is able to detect
the jammers, even if their signals are embedded in the
channel noise.
Using the results of IQ assessments mentioned on the
quadratic evaluation, we can establish a link between the
amplitude of the disturbance (SJR), the maximum
envelope of the signal (EVM
threshold
) and the deterioration
level of the communication. In order to optimize our
detection system, we focus our interest to detect only
those harmful jamming signals that effectively deteriorate
the quality of the transmission. This is illustrated in
fig. 14.

Learning the constellation deformations in each case of
jamming has allowed us to identify a threshold at which
disturbances were significant and should be detected. As
we can see in fig. 14, we can define three different areas
for these situations, normal mode, acceptable jamming
conditions mode and unacceptable jammed mode.
Using the results of section 3, we establish a link between
the deterioration of the communication (BER) and the SJR
between the useful and the jammed signals. Using these
results, we choose a BER corresponding to the limit of
acceptable jamming conditions and we link it to the SJR
for each mode of jamming, to determine the new
threshold for EVM that represents the limit contour of the
model.
In this study, we set the SJR at 28 dB resulting in a BER of
5% and we consider these values to build the new model
and so the new EVM
threshold
. We apply the same formula as
mentioned before to determine the new normal mode
with new envelope and, considering this new area, we
reiterate the evaluation.
Now, our tests take into consideration the new contour
optimized for this upgraded normal situation. This
normal situation does not represent an unjammed mode
but an acceptable jammed mode selected for a specific
BER
threshold
. In this case, table 4 represents the evaluation of
the detection of the harmful situation. These new
TABLE 3
GOOD AND BAD DETECTION LEVELS IN % FOR G
1
(T) AND G
2
(T)
JAMMING SIGNALS.
Mode Detection good Detection bad
G1(t) 93.26% 6.74%
G2(t) 92.51% 7.49%



Fig. 14. IQ constellation and representation of good and harmful
shapes.
41



conditions deliver improved results of good detection.

In table 3 and in table 4, the pure sine wave jamming
signal is a bit better detected than the FM-modulated
signal because the FM modulation is not spectrally very
different from the GMSK modulation used by the GSM-R
protocol.
7 CONCLUSION
Global System for Mobile communications-Railways is
widely used for train-to-track radio communication. As
for any radio communication system, non-intentional and
intentional ElectroMagnetic Interference can affect this
track-to-train radio link. This work has studied the impact
of low-power electromagnetic jammers on this
communication. Experimentally, we have obtained that,
when the received GSM-R power is of the same order of
magnitude as the power received from the jammer, then
the communication is perturbed or interrupted.
Furthermore, a pure sine wave centred on the GSM-R
channel has less impact than a wider bandwidth FM-
modulated jamming signal. Then, we have considered
and modelled a GSM-R communication chain using a
GMSK modulation. We used one of the peculiarities of
the modulation to detect the jamming signals considering
the deformation of the IQ constellation. The Error Vector
Magnitude method was used to distinguish between
normal conditions and jammed conditions. We have
found that a good detection of the selected jamming
signals is obtained while trying to identify the presence of
jamming signals in an AWGN channel. Our evaluation
studies have allowed us to make a ranking of damage
into acceptable condition, i.e. not-useful to be detected,
and necessary-to-detect condition. Although the method
cannot provide information on the jammer characteristics,
we have verified that it allows a quick and effective way
to detect jamming conditions. Further work is now in
progress considering more complex propagation channels
than the pure AWGN results presented in this article.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The research leading to these results has received funding
from the European Communitys Framework Program
FP7/2007-2013 under grant agreement number 285136.
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Souheir Mili was born in Constantine, Algeria 1987. She received
M.Sc. degree in electronics engineering on 2009 from the University
of Constantine and the Magister degree in control systems on 2012
from the University Jijel, Algeria. In 2011 she received the master
degrees from the university of Lille, France. Since october 2011, she
is working toward a Ph.D.degree at the french institute of science
TABLE 4
GOOD AND BAD DETECTION LEVEL IN % FOR PERTURBATIONS
G
1
(T) SINUS WAVE, G
2
(T) FM MODULATED SINUS WAVE FOR
BER
THRESHOLD
.
Mode Detection good Detection bad
G1(t) 98% 2%
G2(t) 97% 3%


42



and technologie for transport development and networks(IFSTTAR).
She is working on Electromagnetic compatibility, signal processing
and railway comminications.

David Sodoyer was born in Soissons, France, in 1976. He received
the M.S. And Ph.D. degrees in signal processing from the INPG
(Institut National Polytechnique de Grenoble), France, in 2001 and
2004, respectively. Between 2004 and 2010 he worked with several
laboratories (INPG, CNRS, INT, INRETS) on signal statistical pro-
cessing applied to signal localization and separation. In 2010, he
joined the IFSTTAR-LEOST as a full-time Researcher. He is current-
ly focused on Latent Variable Analysis, sources separation and de-
tections events in signal processing.

Virginie Deniau was born in France on May 6, 1974. She received
the M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in electronics from the University of Lille
in 2000 and 2003, respectively.
Since 2003, she has been a Researcher in electromagnetic compati-
bility (EMC) for the French Institute of Science and Technology for
Transport, Development, and Networks (IFSTTAR), Universite Lille
Nord de France, Villeneuve dAscq, France. Her research interests
include EMC test facilities, the test methodologies, and the charac-
terisation of EM environments in the transportation domain. She
notably worked on the mode stirred reverberation chambers and on
the three-dimensional TEM cells. Currently, her research interests
include the susceptibility of digital communication systems face to
electromagnetic environments typically of the transports means.


Marc Heddebaut was born in Somain, France, in 1955. He received
the M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in electronics from the University of Lille
France in 1980 and 1983, respectively. He joined the French Nation-
al Institute for Transportation and Safety Research (INRETS now
IFSTTAR) in 1983 and became a senior researcher in 1988. Since
1979, he has been working in the field of land mobile communication
and electromagnetic compatibility. His primary interests include tele-
communication systems dedicated to land transport, EMC, mobile
localization and command control of automated vehicles.