DISTINCTION BETWEEN BIGAMOUS VOID AND BIGAMOUS VOIDABLE MARRIAGE

REPUBLIC V. NOLASCO
220 S 20

FACTS:

Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman. He met Janet Parker, a British, in
bar in England. After that, Janet started living with Nolasco in his
ship for six months. It lasted until the contract of Nolasco expired
then he brought her to his hometown in Antique. They got
married in January 1982. Due to another contract, Nolasco left
the province. In 1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother
informing him that his son had been born but 15 days after, Janet
left. Nolasco went home and cut short his contract to find
Janets whereabouts. He did so by securing another seamans
contract going to London. He wrote several letters to the bar
where they first met but it was all returned. Gregorio
petitioned in 1988 for a declaration of presumptive death of
Janet.

ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his
wife, Janet, is already dead?

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that Nolascos efforts to locate
Janet were not persistent to show that he has a well-founded
belief that his wife was already dead because instead of
seeking assistance of local authorities and the British
Embassy, he even secured another contract. More so, while he
was in London, he did not even try to solicit help of the authorities
to find his wife.


Republic v Bermudez-Lorino
G.R. No. 160258

Facts
Respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino and her husband were
married on June 12, 1987.s
Before they got married, Gloria was unaware of her
husbands irresponsible attitude and violent character. She
decided it would be safer to leave him behind. In order to
support her children, she was compelled to work abroad.
From the time of her physical separation from her husband
in 1991, Gloria has not heard of him at all. She had absolutely
no communications with him, or with any of his relatives.
On August 14, 2000, nine years after she left her husband,
Gloria filed a verified petition with the Regional Trial Court
under the rules on Summary Judicial Proceedings in the
Family Law provided for in the Family Code. She alleged that
after nine years, there was absolutely no news about her
husband, Francisco Lorino, and she believes that he is
already dead and is now seeking through a petition for the
Court to declare that her husband is judicially presumed
dead for the purpose of remarriage. Petition was published
in a newspaper of general circulation.
RTC rendered a decision rendering Francisco Lorino
presumptively dead. Judgment immediately final and
executory.
Despite judgment being final and executory, OSG filed an
appeal. RTC elevated the records to the CA. In its decision,
the CA, treating the case as an ordinary appealed case denied
the Republics appeal. Without filing a motion for
reconsideration, the Republic filed a petition for review on
certiorari under rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue
Whether or not the CA duly acquired jurisdiction over the appeal
on a final and executory judgment of the RTC.

Ruling
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is
no reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal,
precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express
provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are immediately
final and executory.

It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due
course to the Republics appeal and order the transmittal of the
entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals. An appellate
court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which,
by express provision of law, is immediately final and
executory. As in the case of Veloria vs. Comelec the right to
appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is
merely a statutory privilege.

Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all
judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in Family
Law are immediately final and executory, the right to appeal
was not granted to any of the parties therein. The Republic of
the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of
presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no
right to appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001.

It was therefore erroneous for the CA to dismiss it for lack of
merit and should have dismissed the appeal outright for lack of
jurisdiction over the case because decision sought to be appealed
is immediately final and executory.

Petition of Republic is denied.


REPUBLIC V. IYOY
GR NO 152577

Facts:
On 25 March 1997, Respondent Crasus Iyoy filed a complaint
in the RTC for the nullity of marriage with his wife Fely, on
the ground that after the celebration of their marriage, he
found his wife hot-tempered, nagger and extravagant.
Then in 1984, Fely left the PH for the US leaving all their five
children to Crasus. After a year, she sent a letter to
respondent re seeking divorce but the latter disregarded the
request.
In 1985, respondent learned that Fely got married to an
American.
In 1987, Fely went back to the PH with her new husband;
respondent did not bother to talk to her because hes afraid
that he might not bear the pain and sadness.
At the time the complaint was filed, it has been 13years
since Fely left and abandoned respondent and there was
no more possibility of reconciliation between them.
Respondent alleged that Fely has psychological incapacity to
perform marital obligations set forth in the FC.
In 1997, Fely refuted all the allegation about her, instead,
argued that her hot temperance was due to her
husbands drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere
effort to find employment, hence, the reason why she
left the country was for financial reasons.
She further invokes that although she left, she continued to
give support to her children. She also explained that after the
divorce, she was naturalized as an American Citizen, hence,
DISTINCTION BETWEEN BIGAMOUS VOID AND BIGAMOUS VOIDABLE MARRIAGE
her status re marriage is governed by her present
nationality.
On 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment
declaring the marriage of respondent and Fely null and
void ab initio due to Felys psychological incapacity to
comply with her marital duties such as striving for unity,
observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support.
Crasus also adequately established that the defendant
practically abandoned him; and that his wife committed
bigamous marriage.
Petitioner Republic assailed the RTCs decision saying that it
was contrary to law and evidence, hence, filed an appeal to
the CA but the appellate court affirmed the earlier decision
of the RTC citing article 26 of the FC saying that to
condemn plaintiff to remain shackle in a marriage that in
truth and in fact does not exist and to remain married to a
spouse who is incapacitated to discharge essential marital
covenants is verily to condemn him to a perpetual
disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent.
With such, Petitioner Republic seek an appeal in the SC on
the ground that abandonment by and sexual infidelity of
respondents wife do not per se constitute psychological
incapacity.

RULING:
What constitute a psychological incapacity?
Citing Santos v CA, the Court stated that psychological
incapacity refers to no less than a mental incapacity that
causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage.

The only evidence presented by Crasus was his testimony which
is put in question for being self-serving. The evidence is not
enough to convince the Court that Fely had such grave mental
illness that prevented her from assuming the essential
obligations of marriage.

The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that
hurt and embarrassed respondent and the rest of the family.
Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of
respondent; her marriage to an Am citizen; and even her
flaunting of her American family may be indeed manifestations of
her alleged incapacity, nonetheless, the root cause for such was
not identified. If the root cause f the incapacity was not identified,
then, it cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological