Darfur a Case Study in National Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect

By Richard L. Dixon
When one thinks of Darfur the following observations comes to mind, a decades old raging civil
war, human trafficking, Islamic militancy, genocide, Arab militia, and oil. The United States
approach to the crisis in Darfur differs in objectivity, methodology, and level of importance
compared to its continued focus on Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf. Ever since the fiasco
in Somalia in the mid 1990’s, the United States has diminished its role in East Africa to the likes
of the United Nations, African Union, and France. Yet the crisis in Darfur is far from over and
threatens to explode into a failed state mode as has been the case with Somalia. The whole East
African region is facing an era of uncertain stability. The tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea
threatens to explode into another damaging war, Kenya is desperately trying to keep ethnic
tensions from the last presidential election from boiling over, Chad is fighting rebels who operate
from within Libya, and Somalia’s internationally recognized weak government is powerless to
stop both the Warlords and Al Qaeda within the country who operate with impunity. To state that
the whole East Africa region is a basket case is an understatement. Darfur is just another
defective egg in that basket within the region. “The widespread depiction of eastern Africa as a
region under severe siege captures the enormous security challenges it poses for the international
community. Historically, the human crises spawned in the region have exacted a heavy burden
on international resources, a burden that continues in Darfur, southern Sudan, and Somalia.”1

The lack of a comprehensive U.S. policy to help mitigate the crisis within Darfur and the Sudan
has left a vacuum for other international players among these the African Union, ICC
(International Criminal Court), the United Nations peacekeeping efforts, and China which has
focused on building a new silk road into the Mineral rich area.

“China’s Africa policy can best be understood from its unique political and economic
perspectives. Although China reaps considerable economic gains from Africa, it would be
simplistic to regard those economic benefits as the sole driver of China’s policy agenda toward
Africa. Media outlets and Western scholars often suggest that China’s relationship with Africa is
built on its dependency on and demand for energy resources, markets, and investment
opportunities for its booming industries and job seeking workers. China has often been criticized
for taking advantage of the vulnerability of African economies and the desperation of its people
and leaders for increased foreign investment to spur development and growth.”2

What is at stake, is the sovereignty of Sudan and how best to deal with current president Umar
Hassan Ahmad al Basjar and his indictment of initiating war crimes and genocide against the
population in the South: protecting non-combatants from the Arab Militia, strengthening the
African Union peacekeeping force, dismantling the apparatus that enslaves thousands of women
and children, and reducing the number of refugees from both Somalia and Sudan who overflow
into neighboring.
Sudan is a country contrast in religions, traditions, and customs. Islam is the official religion of
Sudan yet both Christianity and other indigineous beliefs comprise over 25% of the population in
the Southern part which encompasses the Darfur province. Sudan like Iraq and Afghanistan is
composed of various tribal groups, races, and languages. 578 Tribes form the foundation of the
country which speak 145 separate dialects even though Arabic is the official language. The
majority racial group in are blacks who represent 52% of the population followed by Arabs who
make up 35% and Beja form 5%. Currently it is the Arabs who are in power and have engaged in
civil war with a growing rebellion of various ad hoc groups of blacks and fundamentalist Islamic
groups who seek a foothold in the region. “Even before the bombing of the American
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, radical Islamism was already
causing strains among the secular regimes in the region, building both on economic
decline in these economies and the perceived marginalization of Islamic groups in
Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania.”3

It was common knowledge that Osama Bin Laden sought sanctuary in Sudan prior to 911 in
utilize the country as a base of operations for his Global Al Qaeda terrorist operations. He was
subsequently kicked out because of the nature of his radical Islamic philosophy which threatened
to upset the status quo in the Sudan. It was doing this period that the Sudanese government
offered to apprehend Bin Laden and turn him over to the U.S. authorities because of his
involvement in the U.S. embassy bombing in Kenya. However, then President Bill Clinton failed
to accept this offer and let Bin Laden slip away and eventually settled in Afghanistan. “As an
American Muslim and a political supporter of Clinton, I feel now, as I argued with Clinton and
Berger then, that their counter-terrorism policies fueled the rise of Bin Laden from an ordinary
man to a Hydra-like monster.

Realizing the growing problem with Bin Laden, Bashir sent key intelligence officials to the U.S.
in February 1996. The Sudanese offered to arrest Bin Laden and extradite him to Saudi Arabia
or, barring that, to "baby-sit" him--monitoring all his activities and associates. But Saudi officials
didn't want their home-grown terrorist back where he might plot to overthrow them.

In May 1996, the Sudanese capitulated to U.S. pressure and asked Bin Laden to leave, despite
their feeling that he could be monitored better in Sudan than elsewhere. Bin Laden left for
Afghanistan, taking with him Ayman Zawahiri, considered by the U.S. to be the chief planner of
the Sept. 11 attacks.”3

Sensing a lost of control of Sudan; Basjar deputized numerous elements of the Arab Militia as an
unofficial wing of the Sudanese Army in order to counteract the growing rebellion. Even though
Sudan was oil and mineral rich, it had a legacy of corruption, high illiteracy rates, disease,
poverty, and a growing desertification of its agricultural lands. These conditions exacerbated the
tensions among the various tribal, ethnic, racial, and religious lines within the country. A full
scale civil war ensured. It was the Arab Militia that engaged in acts of barbarism such as force
enslavement of young women and children, rape, maiming and destroying whole villages.
3
Khadiagala, Gilbert, M., 9
3
Ijaz, Monsoor. “Clinton Let Bin Laden Slip Away and Metastasize”, Los Angeles Times,
December 5, 2001, http:///www.infowars.com/saved
%20pages/Prior_Knowledge/Clinton_let_bin_laden.htm (accessed October 16, 2009.
“A recently released report by a consortium of NGOs found that government-supported militia,
like the Janjaweed and the Popular Defense Forces, together with elements of the SAF, have
systematically abducted civilians for the purposes of sexual slavery and forced labor as part of
the Darfur conflict. This practice was far more common, however, at the beginning of the
conflict in 2003 than during the reporting period, when the conflict in Darfur had largely
subsided. Some were released after days or weeks of captivity, while others escaped after a
number of are from non-Arabic speaking ethnic groups like the Fur, Massalit, and Zaghawa.
Abducted women and girls are subjected to rape, forced marriage, and sexual slavery, as well as
forced domestic and agricultural labor. Abducted men and boys are subjected to forced labor in
agriculture, herding, portering goods, and domestic servitude.”4

The Arab Militia also participated in acts of genocide against the black population in the South
which lead to a mass exodus of refugees to the no-man’s land in Kenya or neighboring Ethiopia
(such as the Lost Boys). Basjar as president of Sudan had common knowledge that such
atrocities were being carried out by the Arab Militia (and in some cases with the blessings of the
Sudanese Government) but failed to take action to put a stop to these human rights abuses. These
massive human rights abuses in the beginning escaped the condemnation of the International
Community. In fact, there were those who denied that innocent people were being enslaved,
killed, or raped. It wasn’t until 2003 that the United Nations under the leadership of Kofi Annan
made the situation in Darfur an international priority. The United Nations in conjunction with the
African Union dispatched peacekeeping troops within the Darfur region to protect the non-
combatants from the onslaught of the Arab Militia, provide sector security, and to stabilize the
country so that it would not go the way of neighboring Somalia as a failed state steeped in
anarchy.

The effectiveness of the African Peacekeepers from the AU of ending the killing, raping,
enslaving, and maiming of unarmed civilians in the Darfur region has been marginal.
The peacekeeping mission has been rift for failure for a number of reasons:

1. The soldiers are poorly trained, poor, and uneducated

2. They lack the discipline to be an effective deterrent to the Arab militia and suffer high
casualty rates of any peacekeeping mission organized by the UN.

3. They do not possess the latest military hardware and weaponry and are often outgunned.

4. The peacekeepers themselves have also participated in random acts of violence and
savagery against the civilian population. “These agreements normally provide that the
troop-contributing states will exercise criminal jurisdiction over the troops that they
contribute. This means that peacekeepers who commit crimes while on duty in another
country are liable to prosecution for those crimes in terms of the (military) criminal law
of their own state. The problem, of course, is that different states may have different
views on which, if any, crimes committed by their troops they wish to prosecute.

4
United States Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2009, p 265-266.
 Individual states may not be either willing or able to prosecute serious crimes committed
by their troops while performing peacekeeping duties.”5

The legal framework for the introduction of peacekeeping troops in Darfur was a brokered peace
deal in 2006 between the warring rebel and Arab Militia factions. The intent of the document
was to stabilize the area and protect the civilians. However, the terms of the treaty have not been
kept in full faith by all parties involved and the world has continued to witness the ongoing mass
exodus of refugees as well as a mounting death toll. “In April 2004 the African Union (AU)
sponsored peace talks between the GOS, the JEM, and SLA in which the parties agreed to a
Humanitarian Ceasefire agreement. The ceasefire was not respected and violence continued in
Darfur despite monitoring and peacekeeping efforts by the African Union Mission in Sudan
(AMIS) throughout 2004 and 2005. In May 2006, a peace agreement was signed by the GOS and
the Minni Minawi faction of the SLA. To support the Darfur Peace Agreement the UN Security
Council authorized a joint African Union/United Nations (UNAMID) Hybrid force to take over
for AMIS by the end of 2007. UNAMID is supposed to have 26,000 troops and at full strength
which would make it the largest UN peacekeeping mission in history. As of March 31st, 2008,
there were only 9,213 uniformed personnel in the field due to obstacles created by the Khartoum
government, including its refusal to accept non-African contingents. There also was no peace to
keep, as rebel and government forces continued to battle each other.”6

Through all the diplomatic maneuvering to protect the civilians in Southern Sudan, President
Basjar remained uncooperative, indifferent, and some cases a willing participant in the acts of
Genocide against his own people. Therefore the international community had a predicament in
protecting the civilians while at the same time respecting the notion of sovereignty in regards to
Sudan. There was clear cut evidence that President Basjar was responsible for war crimes and the
world community had to readily response. “That the human rights violations in Darfur meet the
legal threshold of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity and, therefore, justifies
forcible humanitarian intervention by any grouping of states whether in or outside the context of
the UN or the AU. While intervention may be legitimate outside the UN or AU framework, it
would be in the interest of the stability of the global and regional peace and security system
painstakingly assembled over the last six decades that preference be given to forcible
intervention within the institutional framework of the UN and AU. In order to demonstrate that
forcible humanitarian intervention remains a serious policy option, the study shows that the other
possible options of intervention are not appropriate in the particular circumstances of Darfur.”7

In the situation with President Basjar, the United Nations and the International Criminal Court
were able to circumvent the sovereignty issue by exerting military humanitarian intervention
under the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine. “Although there have been other attempts to
5
Du Plessis, Max, Stephen Pete. Who guards the Guards? The International Criminal Court
and Serious Crimes Committed by Peacekeepers in Africa, ISS Monograph Series #121
(February 2006), 3.
6
InterAction. “Sudan & Chad, a Guide to Humanitarian and Development Efforts of
Interaction member Agencies in Sudan and Chad,” (June 2008), 7.
7
Kindiki, Kithure. “Intervention to Protect Civilians in Darfus”, Legal Dilemmas and Policy
Imperatives, Is Monograph Series, #131 (May 2007), 2.
redefine the concept of sovereignty and the place of forcible intervention in a country where
gross and systematic human rights violations are taking place, it is the 2001 Responsibility to
Protect Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS,
2001) that broke new normative ground on this matter. The report proposed a
reconceptualization of sovereignty – as responsibility rather than only a right. According to the
report, sovereign states have the primary responsibility to protect their people from avoidable
catastrophe, but when they are unable or unwilling to do so, that responsibility must be borne by
the wider community of states.”8

It was this legal framework which gave the ICC the greenlight to indict President Omar Hassan
Ahmad al-Bashir on charges of war crimes and genocide and the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest. President Bashir has the distinction of being the first sitting head of state to be indicted by
the ICC. “Today, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a warrant
for the arrest of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, President of Sudan, for war crimes and crimes
against humanity. He is suspected of being criminally responsible, as an indirect (co-)perpetrator,
for intentionally directing attacks against an important part of the civilian population of Darfur,
Sudan, murdering, exterminating, raping, torturing and forcibly transferring large numbers of
civilians, and pillaging their property. This is the first warrant of arrest ever issued for a sitting
Head of State by the ICC.”9

Even though the United States was not one of the original 121 countries that ratified the treaty
establishing the ICC in Geneva, it still has a vested interest in helping to bring peace to Sudan by
working through the UN and AU by offering developmental aid, military hardware, and
backroom diplomacy. The United States cannot interject itself directly into the Darfur crisis as it
did unsuccessfully in Somalia. To do so would invite a major backlash from the warring parties
in the region and portray to the Muslim world that the U.S. indeed is carrying out a protracted
war against Islam.

“American counterterrorism initiatives in Africa since 9/11 have been based

on a policy of “aggregation,” in which localized and disparate insurgencies
have been amalgamated into a frightening, but artificially monolithic whole.
Misdirected analyses regarding Africa’s sizable Muslim population, its
overwhelming poverty, and its numerous ungoverned spaces and
failed states further contribute to a distorted picture of the terrorist threat
emanating from the continent. The result has been a series of high-profile,
marginally valuable kinetic strikes on suspected terrorists; affiliation with
proxy forces inimical to stated U.S. policy goals; and the corrosion of African
support for many truly valuable and well-intentioned U.S. endeavors.”10

8
Ibid, 5.
9
International Criminal Court. “ICC issues a warrant of arrest for Omar Al Bashir, President of
Sudan”, Press Release, March 3, 2009 (accessed October 17, 2009)
10
Berschinski, Robert G. “ Africom Dilemma: The Global War on Terrorism, Capacity Building,
Humanitarianism, and the future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa”, Strategic Studies
Institute, November 2007, vi.
In redefining its role in regards not only to Sudan but the whole East African region, the United
States can project an image of a stable international actor who brings much valuable resources
and expertise to a war-torn area of Africa.

References

1. Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Eastern Africa: Security and the Legacy of Fragility,” Africa
Program Working Paper Series, International Peace Institute (October 2008), 9.
 2. Hany Besadu, “The Implications of China’s Ascendancy for Africa,” Working Paper #40,
The Center for International Governance (October 2008), 3.

3. Gilbert M. Khadiagala, 9.

4. Monsoor Ijaz, “Clinton Let Bin Laden Slip Away and Metastasize,” Los Angeles Times,
December 5, 2001, http://www.infowars.com/saved
%20pages/Prior_Knowledge/Clinton_let_bin_laden.htm (accessed October 16, 2009).

5. United States Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2009, 265-266.

6. Max Du Plessis and Stephen Pete, “Who Guards the Guards? The International Criminal
Court and Serious Crimes Committed by Peacekeepers in Africa,” ISS Monograph Series
#121 (February 2006), 3.

7. InterAction, “Sudan & Chad, a Guide to Humanitarian and Development Efforts of

Interaction Member Agencies in Sudan and Chad,”( June 2008), 7

8. Kithure Kindiki, “Intervention to Protect Civilians in Darfur, Legal Dilemmas and Policy
Imperatives, ISS Monograph Series, #131 (May 2007), 2.

9. Ibid, 5.

International Criminal Court, ”ICC issues a warrant of arrest for Omar Al Bashir, President of
Sudan,” Press Release, March 3, 2009 http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/0EF62173-
05ED-403A-80C8-F15EE1D25BB3.htm (accessed October 17, 2009).
Robert G. Berschinski, “Africom Dilemma: The Global War on Terrorism, Capacity Building,
Humanitarianism, and the Future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa,” Strategic Studies
Institute (November 2007), vi.