GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T.

GONZALES,
respondents. 219 SCRA 115
FACTS: Private respondent Marilou Gonzales filed a complaint for damages against Gasheem Shookat, an Iranian
Citizen, of breach of promise to marry. She said that both of them agreed to marry after the end of the school
semester and the petitioner asked the approval of her parents. She stated that the petitioner forced to live with him in
his apartments. Respondent was a virgin before she was forced to live with the Iranian (petitioner). A week before
she filed her complaint, petitioner maltreated, assaulted and asked not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is
already married to someone living in Bacolod City.
On the petitioners counterclaim, he said that he never proposed marriage with the private respondent; he
neither forced her to live with him and he did not maltreat her but only told her to stop from coming into his apartment
because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport. He insisted that he must be
awarded for damages for he suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation due to the complaint of the private
respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is to be held liable for damages for breach of promise to marry.
HELD: A breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. This court held that where a mans promise
to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that
promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to
Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of fraud and deceit and the willful injury to her honor
and reputation which followed thereafter. Such act done by the petitioner is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy.
Petitioner even committed deplorable acts in disregard of the laws of the country. The court ordered that the
petition be denied with costs against the petitioner.

Abbas vs. Abbas 219 SCRA 115 Civil Law Torts and Damages Breach of promise to Marry Article 21 of the
Civil Code
In August 1986, while working as a waitress in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, Marilou Gonzales, then 21 years old, met
Gashem Shookat Baksh, a 29 year old exchange student from Iran who was studying medicine in Dagupan. The two
got really close and intimate. On Marilous account, she said that Gashem later offered to marry her at the end of the
semester. Marilou then introduced Gashem to her parents where they expressed their intention to get married.
Marilous parents then started inviting sponsors and relatives to the
wedding
. They even started looking for animals to slaughter for the occasion.
Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his apartment where they had sexual intercourse. But in no time,
their relationship went sour as Gashem began maltreating Marilou. Gashem eventually revoked his promise of
marrying Marilou and he told her that he is already married to someone in Bacolod City. So Marilou went home and
later sued Gashem for damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded her P20k in moral damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed marriage to Marilou and that he cannot be adjudged to have
violated Filipino customs and traditions since he, being an Iranian, was not familiar with Filipino customs and
traditions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.

HELD: Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of Marilou not really because of his breach of promise to
marry her but based on Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. In this case, it is the deceit and fraud employed by
Gashem that constitutes a violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code. His promise of marrying Marilou was a deceitful
scheme to lure her into sexual congress. As found by the trial court, Marilou was not a woman of loose morals. She
was a virgin before she met Gashem. She would not have surrendered herself to Gashem had Gashem not promised
to marry her. Gashems blatant disregard of Filipino traditions on marriage and on the reputation of Filipinas is
contrary to morals, good customs, and public policy. As a foreigner who is enjoying the hospitality of our country and
even taking advantage of the opportunity to study here he is expected to respect our traditions. Any act contrary will
render him liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code.
The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 was meant to expand the concepts of torts and quasi delict. It is
meant to cover situations such as this case where the breach complained of is not strictly covered by existing laws. It
was meant as a legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books such as the absence of a law penalizing a the breach of
promise to marry.
The Supreme Court however agreed with legal luminaries that if the promise to marry was made and there was
carnal knowledge because of it, then moral damages may be recovered (presence of moral or criminal seduction),
Except if there was mutual lust; or if expenses were made because of the promise (expenses for the wedding), then
actual damages may be recovered.

In January 1993, Syed Azhar Abbas was invited to the house of Felicitas Goo, mother of Gloria Goo. He said he was
asked to participate in a ceremony which was meant to welcome him to the Philippines (Abbas is a Pakistani). He
said he did not know that the ceremony was actually his marriage with Gloria Goo.
Later, Gloria filed a bigamy case against Abbas. Abbas allegedly married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura.
To avoid the bigamy case, Abbas filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo.
To prove the validity of their marriage, Gloria presented a marriage contract signed by Abbas as well as the
solemnizing officer who celebrated their marriage. The marriage contract contained the alleged marriage license
issued to Abbas.
Abbas presented a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar which states that the marriage license, based on
its number, indicated in the marriage contract was never issued to Abbas but to someone else.
The RTC ruled in favor of Abbas. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC on the ground that there was no
diligence to search for the real source of the marriage license issued to Abbas (for it could be that the marriage
license was issued in another municipality).
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Abbas and Goo is void ab initio.
HELD: Yes. Their marriage lacked one of the essential requisites of marriage which is the issuance of a valid
marriage license.
The Court of Appeals is wrong in reversing the RTC. The Local Civil registrars certification enjoyed probative value
as her duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. There is a presumption of
regularity of official acts in favor of the local civil registrar. Gloria was not able to overcome this presumption hence it
stands to favor Abbas.

The fact that Abbas did sign the marriage contract does not make it conclusive that there was in fact a valid marriage
license issued to him nor does it cure the fact that no marriage license was issued to Abbas. Article 4 of the Family
Code is clear when it says, The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio. Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the
beginning.

Republic of the Philippines Vs. Liberty D. AlbiosCASE FACTS:

On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios weremarried in the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate o f M a r r i a g e w i t h R e g i s t e r N o . 2 0 0 4 1 5 8 8 . 3 . O n D e c e m b e r 6 , 2 0 0 6 , A l b i o s f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Fringer in the RTC. She reveals that they never lived
as h u s b a n d a n d w i f e b e c a u s e t h e y n e v e r h a d t h e i n t e n t i o n o f e n t e r i n g i n t o a
m a r r i e d s t a t e o r complying with the essential marital obligations. They were even
immediately separated after their marriage. She claims their marriage was one made in jest and,
therefore, null and void ab initio.
ISSUE:
W hether or not a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration
is also legally void and inexistent.
DECISION:
The court declared that the marriage between Fringer and Albios valid and
subsisting. Albios claims that the marriage was made
i n j e s t h o w e v e r a m a r r i a g e i n j e s t i s defined as a pretended marriage, legal in form but
entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a
clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. The parties involved in this case were
fully aware of their intentions to marry in order for Albios to acquire an American citizenship.
Although the ideal cause of marriage is that of love, other reasons like that of convenience is
not prohibited as a reason for marriage. As long as all the essential and formal requisites
prescribed by law are present,it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law; it shall
be declared valid. Although fraud is a ground for declaring a marriage void, this situation is not one
of the reasons allowed listed under Article 46 of the Family Code. The court refuses to allow the
individuals to use marriage for their fraudulent schemes for their convenience and also allow them to get
out of it easily due to the inconvenient situation.
APPLICABLE LAW AND RATIONALE:
Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the Family Code may constitute fraud,
namely, (1) non-disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment
by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and
(
4) c o n c e a l m e n t o f d r u g a d d i c t i o n , a l c o h o l i s m , o r h o m o s e x u a l i t y . N o o t h e r m i s r e p r e s e n
tation or d e c e i t s h a l l c o n s t i t u t e f r a u d a s a g r o u n d f o r
a n a c t i o n t o a n n u l a m a r r i a g e . E n t e r i n g i n t o a marriage for the sole purpose of
e v a d i n g i m m i g r a t i o n l a w s d o e s n o t q u a l i f y u n d e r a n y o f t h e listed
circumstances. Article 4 7 (3 ), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. (In the pres
ent case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter the fraudulent
marriage)

Republic vs. Dayot

GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008

FACTS:
Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a marriage license,
they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose
contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both employees of the
National
Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against Jose and an
administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on
July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his marriage with
Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn affidavit
in lieu of the marriage license requirement.
HELD:
CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they
executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only in June
1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings of facts of
the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a marriage.
Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas
cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage
license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to
be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. Hence, Jose and Felisas marriage is void ab initio. The
court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does
not prescribe and may be raised any time.

Dayot vs. Dayot

Article 39 Prescription
Jose was introduced to Felisa in 1986. He later came to live as a boarder in Felisas house, the latter being his
landlady. Later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, so she could claim a package sent to
her by her brother from Saudi. At the PCH, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded
pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be
released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get
both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of
paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had
contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of
Felisas house. When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with
Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, she said she does not know of such. Felisa denied Joses allegations and

defended the validity of their marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife
absent the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with him on
account of their age difference. In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was
subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993,
Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with
the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and
Coordinating Board. The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and
meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year without emolument. The RTC ruled against
Jose claiming that his story is impossible and that his action of fraud has already prescribed. It cited Article 87 of the
New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured party
within four years after the discovery of the fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action to file an action to nullify a marriage due to fraud is subject to prescription.
HELD: The OSG avers that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage
license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses subsequent
marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of
nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.This is erroneous.An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. Jose and
Felisas marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is
void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.