STAT CON

STATUTE CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE

NUNEZ VS GSIS
FACTS
Petitioner Leonilo obtained three loans from GSIS Family Bank
All the three loans were secured by a mortgage of certain parcel/properties of land
While the 3 loans were maturing, he obtained a fourth loan
On the maturity of the three loans, he executed a promissory note
More than 19 years after the promissory note, the bank undertook to extrajudicially
foreclose the properties mortgaged
CONTENTION OF BANK:
That Leonilo violated the terms and conditions of the loans when he failed to pay his
principal obligations and interest
On petition, 2 of the 6 lands was extrajudicially closed
Leonilo filed a complaint against GSIS
CONTENTION OF LEONILO:
That he did not secure a fourth loan
That the three loans already matured, hence, it no longer had any right as prescription set in
RTC for Leonilo , died and substituted by his heirs (cause of action already prescribed);
denied Banks Motion for Recon and Notice of Appeal
CA for Bank; denied Leonilos Motion for Recon
RULING:
Distinction of Rule 45 and Rule 65 of RoC
-That errors of jurisdiction are best reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65;
-That error of judgment can only be corrected by appeal in a petition for review under Rule
45.
Despite the distinct, the Court may treat certiorari filed under Rule 45 if the same is filed w/in
reglementary period for filing a petition for review
The petition was filed under Rule 45 and 65
When the bank then filed its Motion for Reconsideration on the last of the 15-day period for
taking an appeal and it was subsequently denied, the bank had only one (1) day from
December 9, 2002 when it received a copy of the order denying the motion or until
December 10, 2002 within which to perfect its appeal
It filed the Notice of Appeal, however, on December 11, 2002, hence, out of time, and the
decision of the trial court had become final and executory. =ISTCHE

While Rules may be relaxed when the party invoking liberality adequately explains his failure
to abide therewith, the bank failed to do so.
The explanations 49 proffered by the bank behind its failure to incorporate a notice of
hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration are unsatisfactory
As to the claim that the government would suffer loss of substantial amount if not allowed to
recover the proceeds of the loans, this Court finds that any loss was caused by respondent's
own doing or undoing.
In fine, the failure to timely perfect an appeal cannot simply be dismissed as a mere
technicality, for it is jurisdictional
Jurisdictional issue aside, upon the ground of prescription, the bank's case would just the
same fail. An action to foreclose a real estate mortgage prescribes in ten years
A review of the records of the case shows that, as correctly claimed by petitioners, no letter
of demand, court action, or foreclosure proceeding was undertaken prior to December 11,
1997 and September 1, 1999.
STAT CON PART
Clutching at straws, the bank argues that the applicable provision is Article 1141, 56 not
Article 1142 57 of the Civil Code.
Article 1141 of the Civil Code speaks of real actions over immovables or rights. Article 1142 of
the Civil Code speaks of a mortgage action which prescribes in ten years. The strategic
location of Article 1142 immediately right after Article 1141 of the same Code, which speaks
of real actions, indicates that it is an exception to the rule in the previous article.
the petition is GRANTED.
PNB VS CRUZ
FACTS
AMEX laid off 70% of its employees because of business reverses
The retained 30% continued to work but were not paid and continued until AMEX ceased
operations and entered into an agreement with TM San Andres (latter would be leasing the
equipment and machineries of AMEX)
The unpaid employees filed with Labor Arbiter and found their claim valid and meritorious
AMEX and its president did not appeal but PNB did as mortgage-creditor
CONTENTION of PNB
That the workers' lien covers unpaid wages only and not the termination or severance pay
which the workers likewise claimed they were entitled to
NLRC affirmed the appealed decision
RULING
The petition is devoid of merit
PNB daw did not question the validity of the workers claim for unpaid wages
In the petition, PNB asks w/n the workers lien take precedence

COURT: cannot allow petitioner to alter its stance; the petitioner failed to question the same
on appeal. Hence, it is now barred from claiming that the workers' lien applies only to the
products of their labor and not to other properties of the employer which are encumbered
by mortgage contracts or otherwise

CONTENTION OF PET:
Sec 15 RA 409 has been repealed by RA 5185
RULING OF COURT:

STAT CON HERE

In Herman vs. Radio Corporation of the Philippines, 7 this Court declared that whenever two
statutes of different dates and of contrary tenor are of equal theoretical application to a
particular case, the statute of later date must prevail being a later expression of legislative
will. Applying the aforecited case in the instant petition, the Civil Code provisions cited by the
petitioner must yield to Article 110 of the Labor Code
Nevertheless, under Article 110 of the Labor Code as amended, the unpaid wages and other
monetary claims of workers should be paid in full before the claims of the Government and
other creditors. Thus not even tax claims could have preference over the workers' claim
Consistent with the ruling of this Court in Volkschel Labor Union vs. Bureau of Labor
Relations, 11 this court adopts the doctrine that "(i)n the implementation and interpretation
of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations, the workingman's
welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration."12 Bearing this in mind, this
Court must reiterate the dictum laid down in A.C . Ransom that the conflict between Article
110 of the Labor Code and Article 2241 to 2245 of the Civil Code must be resolved in favor of
the former. A contrary ruling would defeat the purpose for which Article 110 was intended;
that is, for the protection of the working class, pursuant to the never-ending quest for social
justice

RA 409 is a special law; RA 5185 and BB 337 is a general law

RULE OF STAT CON: that a special law prevails over a general law regardless of their dates
of passage and the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general
ANOTHER RULE: every effort must be exerted to avoid a conflict between statutes. If
reasonable construction is possible, the laws must be reconciled in that manner
In the light of all the foregoing, we do not find any grave abuse of discretion committed by
the respondent Commission.
the petition is DISMISSED.
NPC VS HON PRESIDING JUDGE
FACTS

the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit

Province of Misamis Oriental filed a complaint with RTC Cagayan against NAPOCOR for
[collection of real property tax and special education fund tax covering from 1978-1984]
Pet NAPOCOR filed Motion to Dismiss: that court had no jurisdiction; cited PD 242 that
disputes bet govt agencies is settled by SEC of JUSTICE
Court denied the Motion to Dismiss; denied the second Motion to Dismiss

LOPEZ VS CSC

NAPOCOR relied on PD 242 that cases settled by the SEC of JUSTICE

FACTS
Vice Mayor of MNL and Presiding Officer of City Council submitted to CSC the appointments
of 19 officers and employees in the Exec Staff of the Office of Presiding Officer (pursuant to
Sec 15 RA 409)
City Budget Officer sought recommendation from Personnel Bureau whether the newly
appointed employees be paid [on the basis of appointments by Vice Mayor]
Personnel Bureau said that City Mayor is proper appointing officer and the opinion was
transmitted to CSC
CSC opined that it is City Council is vested with the power

RESPONDENT MUNICPAL CORPORATIONS relied on PD 464: that collection of tax may be

enforced by civil action in any COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION

ISSUE: whether or not Section 15, supra, of the Charter of the City of Manila has been
repealed

Where SL is inconsistent with GL, a partial repeal of

GL will be implied to the extent of the repugnancy grafted upon the GL
SL is EX to GL
In the case, conflict bet. PD 242 and 464, in favor of 464 because it is later enactment

No appeal from decision of CSC parties aggrieved proceed to Court on certiorari under Rule
65 w/in 30 days from receipt

RULING:
Use STAT CON:
PD 242 is general law
PD 464 is special law
Between GL and SL, the SL prevails

the petition is DISMISSED.

CSC judgment are unappealable and subject only to certiorari
Still accept the petition because of important public interest (since it was filed w/in 30 days)

GORDON VS JUDGE VERIDIANO

FACTS
There are two drug stores owned by PR, covered by mayors permit and license to operate by
FDA
FDA conducted a test buy at one of the drug stores and was sold of a certain drug w/o
doctors prescription
A report was submitted to petitioner mayor and he revoke the Mayors Permit Vice Mayor
caused the posting for the permanent closure [since Mayor went to Singapore]
FDA Administrator directed the closure of the drug store and payment of fine in violation of
RA 3720 + stern warning. Later, FDA lifted the closure order
PR wrote to Pet Mayor to reconsider the revoked Mayors Permit
After the reply, PR filed with RTC a mandamus and damages against Pet and Vice-M
PR requested from FDA to exchange the location of the drug stores and was granted.
But upon knowing this, Pet disapproved the transfers and suspended the Mayors Permit
PR filed supplemental complaint; Respondent judge directed to maintain status quo
Pet wrote FDA requesting reconsideration and resumption of the operation of the drug store
but denied by FDA; motion for recon likewise denied
RULING
Compare the power and function of FDA and Mayor
==FDA==
Board of Pharmaceutical Examiners was tasked originally to inspect drug via ACT 2762
FDA vested will all drug inspection function under RA 3720
DOH issued AO No. 60 for effective exercise of function; laid down requirement for
application to be filled with FDA for authorization to operate or establish drug establishment
PD 280 promulgated because of rampant drug addiction; TO GIVE MORE TEETH TO THE
POWERS OF FDA
==MAYOR==
Traces his authority to the charter of Olongapo City, R.A. No. 4645 under Section 10
STAT CON PRINCIPLE
Conflicting statutes should be reconciled instead of declaring one invalid; harmonize them
Authorization to operate issued by FDA is a precedent to the grant of mayors permit
Despite the FDA permit, compliance must still be ascertained by the mayor if the LOCAL
REQUIREMENTS were observed, otherwise, in the exercise of his own authority, he may
refuse to give the permit
The power to approve license extends also to the power to revoke it
Thus, FDA grants the license, so FDA may revoke the license for violation Same is applied to
Olongapo
Mayor may not revoke permit on the ground that the compliance was found satisfactorily by
FDA Same also with FDA: may not revoke license on the ground laid by mayor

Thus, in the case, drug store was ordered by FDA for violation of its own condition, THUS THE
MAYOR HAD NO AUTHORITY TO interpose his own findings on the matter and substitute
them
Violation is national in scope, so under the FDA
Factual finding of administrative authorities are accorded with respect Even courts respect
them So petitioner must accept the decisions
HOWEVER, the SUSPENSION IS BASED ON THE TRANSFER OF THE SITE OF THE DRUG STORE
APPROVED BY DFA W/O PERMISSION FROM PET
Court believes final decision is with MAYOR since it is related to LOCATION
FDA have no right to disapprove only if it would impair the health or interest of the
customer
Our holding is that the petitioner acted invalidly in revoking Mayor's Permit No. 1954 after
the FDA had authorized the resumption of operations of the San Sebastian Drug Store
following the enforcement of the penalties imposed upon it. However, it was competent for
the petitioner to suspend Mayor's Permit No. 1955 for the transfer of the Olongapo City Drug
Store in violation of the permit .
Pet was only promoting campaign against drug addiction he acted with good faith though
he may have overreacted
PP VS JUDGE PALMA
FACTS
Respondent Morada, 17 y/o was charged with vagrancy
Respondent judge dismissed the case that court cannot take further cognizance of the case
w/o prejudice to refiling in the Juvenile court
Prosecution + Cam Sur Juvenile court judge believe that jurisdiction remain with regular court
Thus petition
RULING
Court sustains the petition
RA 6591 created the Cam Sur Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and provided a limited
jurisdiction over criminal cases where the accused is UNDER 16 YEARS OLD at the TIME OF
FILING THE CASE
PD 603 was issued and defined YOUTHFUL OFFENDER as OVER 9 but under 21 and DID NOT
TRANSFER JURISDICTION OVER CC WHERE ACCUSED IS UNDER 16
PD 603 is a general law
RA 6591 is a special law
A GL cannot repeal a SL by implication it must be expressed and specific

AGAIN, the definition of YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS DID NOT WITHDRAW THE REGULAR COURT
THEIR JURISDICTION TO TRY CASES WHERE ACCUSED ARE 16 but below 21 and TRANSFER it
to JUVENILE COURT (where it is limited only to under 16)
IF IT WERE THE INTENT AND PURPOSE OF PD, it would have expressly provided for repeal
ISSUANCE OF PD 798 strengthen the prosecutions stand that REG COURT over 16, under
21; JUV COURT under 16
Though SG acknowledge RJs intent, IT WAS CLEAR IN THE LAW THAT JUV COURTS ARE
LIMITED TO UNDER 16 it cannot be expanded by judicial fiat
The Code establishes the criteria and guidelines under which all youthful offenders under 21
years are to be tried and attended to, regardless of whether the cases be filed with the
Juvenile Courts for those under 16 years or with the regular courts for the older ones
Thus, the dismissal orders of respondent judge dated March 6, 1976 and April 1, 1976 are set
aside

RULING/STAT CON:
CA correctly applied CC
Sec 4, RA 409 is not SL but General Law because it regulates the liability of City of MNL
Art 2189 is SL because it is particular prescription making
In other word, Sec 4 RA 209 refers to liability arising from negligence in general while ART
2189 refers to liability due to defective stress in particular
Thus, present petition is based on alleged defective of condition of road as was in ART 2189
FIRST ISSUE: City admitted that such streets were under its control and supervision
Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and
supervision
Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under the control or
supervision of the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection
with the maintenance of said road, which were decided by the Court of Appeals in the
affirmative, is one of fact, and the findings of said Court, thereon are not subject to our
review.

CITY OF MANILA VS TEOTICO

ARCENAS VS CITY OF SAN CARLOS
FACTS
Teotico was a practicing public accountant, a business, a professor. One night, he fell inside
an UNVCOVERED and UNLIGHTED CATCHBASIN or MANHOLE

FACTS
Arenas was a judge of San Carlos City. He instituted a petition for mandamus against City of
San Carlos. He alleged that SC City is a 3rd class city;

Due to this fall, he sustained injuries and he was brought to hospital

He filed with CFI a complaint for damages against MNL because the incident: (CONTENTION)
-Prevented him from working for 20 days
-Lost daily income
-Subjected to humiliation and ridicule
-Fear and anxiety for the welfare of his minor children
MNL (CONTENTION)
-That missing iron cover of catchbasin was reported missing and was replaced the next day
-That no report that the catchbasin was not covered
-That it was always policy to repair such
-That it was immediately attended to
CFI sustained the defendants and dismissed the complaint
CA decision was affirmed EXCEPT in so far as MNL is concerned; was sentenced to pay
ISSUE: w the case is governed by Sec 4, RA 409 or Article 2189 of CC
CONTENTION of MNL:
RA 2189 should prevail over RA 409 because:
-Latter is special law (exclusive for City of MNL) while former is general law (applicable to
entire PH)

CONTENTION:
THAT under RA 5967 provides that the basic salary of 2nd and 3rd class cities shall be 18k per
annum
THAT he was receiving monthly salary of 1k: 350 of natl govt wile 650 by the city govt and
that it was short of 500
THAT he was entitled to salary differential of 9,500k
THAT he requested to enact the budget but refused
THAT it is the duty of respondents to enact the budget
CONTENTION (Respondent)
Admitted and denied the allegations:
THAT city judge shall at least be 100 pesos less than that of city mayor.
CFI dismissed the petition
CONTENTION #2 (Petitioner)
THAT if the last proviso of Sec 7, RA 5967 would be interpreted as the controlling measure for
fixing the salary of the city judges, THEN THE PRINCIPAL SEC 7 of FIXING THE SALARY OF CITY
JUDGE HIGHER THAN CITY MAYOR WOULD BE USELESS
THAT since it is the intention to increase the salary of city judge, THE LAST PROVISO SHOULD
GIVE WAY TO THE PRECEDING PROVISIONS

RULING
City Mayor 13,200
Ciy Judge 12,000
Exactly 100 more than the salary of the city judge

LTC prescribes publication after the approval of ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees, or
other charges

STAT CON
Based on the deliberation of Senate, the intention of Congress in enacting Republic Act No.
5967 was that the salary of a city judge should not be higher than the salary of the city mayor

Blackstone definition of GL and SL - universal rule affecting the entire community and
special law as one relating to particular persons or things of a class

The saving clause "Provided, however qualifies the earlier provision which fixes the salary
of city judges for second and third class cities at P18,000.00 per annum

RCC is a special act (applied only to MNL) whereas LTC is a general law (applied to all LGU)

Moreover, SL is considered as EX to GL
BUT THE RULE IS NOT APPLICABLE IF SL = GL and GL = SL or particular
In the case, it is

The primary purpose of a proviso is to limit the general language of a statute. When there is
irreconcilable repugnancy between the proviso and the body of the statute the former is
given precedence over the latter on the ground that it is the latest expression of the intent of
the legislature

RCC speaks of ordinance in general

LTC speaks of ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges in particular

DECISION: dismisssed

2 PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTING
The principle cannot be applied since the CONTROVERSY IS A PURE QUESTION OF LAW

Thus, LTC CONTROLS a Gprovision must give way to Pprovision

BAGATSING VS RAMIREZ
FACTS
Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 7522 which is regulating the operation of
public markets and prescribing fees for rentals of stalls
Respondent Manila Market Vendors Inc., (MMVI) commenced civil case seeking the
declaration of nullity of the said ordinance
CONTENTION OF MMVI:
THAT publication requirement was not complied
THAT market committee was not given participation
THAT anti graft and corrupt practices act was violated
THAT ordinance violate PD 7

3 Minor details but still.. important wa ko ka g

4 non participation of Market Committee does not affect the ordinance
The function of committee is purely recommendatory its recommendation is without
effect MC serve as legislative aide
5 Ordinance not made for corporation but for raising revenues of city.
The right to tax depends upon the ultimate use and purpose NOT ON THE CHARACTER OR
THE PERSON
DECISION: ordinance is held valid
MAGTAJAS VS PRYCE

First, respondent judge denied the plea for FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES

FACTS
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro; leased a portion of building
belonging to Pryce Properties Corp (PR), renovated and equipped it and prepared its
inauguration during Christmas season

Later, respondent judge declared the nullity of the ordinance for NON COMPLIANCE OF
PUBLICATION REQUIREMENT

It was met with opposition from different backgrounds: civil orgs, religious sects, women,
youth. Demonstrations led by mayor

Motion for recon was denied; Hence present petition

SP of CDO enacted Ordinance 3353 (Ord 1) and adopted another Ordinance 3375-93 (Ord 2)

RULING
1 CONFLICT between Revised City Charter (RCC) and Local Tax Code (LTC) on the manner of
publication

Pryce assailed the ordinances before CA [with PAGCOR as intervenor]

CA declared the ordinance invalid and issued writ to prohibit the enforcement;
reconsideration was denied

RCC require publication before the enactment of th ordinance and after the approval

CONTENTION OF PETITIONERS
THAT gambling is not allowed by GL and by the Consti

THAT legislative power conferred upon LGU may be exercised over all kinds of gambling; thus
govt of CDO has the authority to prohibit them w/in its territory
THAT when the Code authorize the LGU to prevent and suppress gambling, it meant ALL
FORMS OF GAMBLING w/o distinction: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos.
Otherwise, it would have expressly excluded from the scope of their power casinos and other
forms of gambling authorized by special law, as it could have easily done. The fact that it did
not do so simply means that the local government units are permitted to prohibit all kinds of
gambling within their territories, including the operation of casinos
THAT if there is doubt on LGC, it must be in favor of LGC
THAT gambling is harmful; impugn the wisdom of PD 1869 in creating PAGCOR and authorize
the operation of casino

ADDITIONAL: two kinds of gambling: ILLEGAL AND AUTHORIZED BY LAW

Basically, morality of gambling is not justiciable. Thus Court cannot question the wisdom,
morality or practicability of statutes it is left with the legislative and executive
department

Petition is DENIED

More details on the paragraph:

Gambling is not illegal per se
Nothing in the Consti that proscribe or penalize gambling
Left to Congress whether to allow it without limitation or prohibit some forms

LIM VS CA

ISSUE: main issue is whether the ordinances are valid

RULING
Test for validity of an ordinance
Under Sec 458 of LGC, govt units are authorized to prevent or suppress gambling. But this
provision excludes games of chance w/c are NOT PROHIBITED BUT ARE PERMITTED BY LAW
Under the rule of NOSCITUR A SOCIIS, a word or phrase should be interpreted in relation to,
or given the same meaning of, words with which it is associated.
Accordingly, we conclude that since the word "gambling" is associated with "and other
prohibited games of chance," the word should be read as referring to only illegal gambling
which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed.

COURT FINDS THAT the ordinances violated PD 1869

Ordinance should not contravene a statute. Municipal Govt are only agents of Natt Govt.
The delegate cannot be superior to the principal
CONCLUSION/DECISION:
PAGCOR has the power to centralize and regulate all games of chance w/in the PH.. PD 1869
remains unimpaired and not modified by LGC
Casino gambling is authorized by PD 1869. It cannot be amended or nullified by an ordinance
Despite the good intention and motives, the ordinances are contrary to PD 1869

JUDGE LEYNES VS COA

FACTS
PR entered into contract of lease with Pet for 3 years
After the term expired, PR refused to vacate
Pet filed with City Court MNL an ejectment suit
The case was terminated by a judicially approved compromise agreement
The lease continued and on Apr 1985, pet advised PR that he would no longer renew the
contract
However, on Aug 1985, PR informed pet of his intention to renew contract
But pet advised PR that he did not agree with the renewal
Because PR refused to vacate, pet filed another ejectment suit with Met Trial Court
LOWER COURT - dismissed the complain that: lease contract has not expired and that
compromise agreement constitutes res judicata
RTC - Pet appealed to RTC but RTC affirmed lower court

PET only read par F of the repealing clause upon reading the entire clause, PD 1689 is not
one of them [repealed]
IMPLIED REPEAL
No proof that PD 1869 was impliedly repealed
PAGCOR is mentioned as source of founding of two RAs. This show that PAGCOR was not
repealed by LGC but improved to be responsive to the fiscal problems of the government
STAT CON?
Reconcile and harmonize statute if there is conflict
Proper action on the conflict of PD and Code is NOT TO UPHOLD ONE AND ANNUL THE
OTHER but to give EFFECT TO BOTH BY HARMONIZING THEM
So: LGU may and must prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling w/in their territories
EXCEPT only those allowed by statutes like PD 1869

CA affirmed the RTC; motion for recon denied

WA NAHUMAN
DAR VS SUTTON
FACTS
This is about a land in Masbate
Respondent made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholding to PET DAR to avail of
certain incentives under the law [pursuant to the existing agrarian reform law at that time]
A new agrarian law took effect and included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock
(CARL)

A case decided by SC ruled that that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not
included in the definition of agricultural land. SC declared as unconstitutional some
provisions of CARL
In view of the case, respondents filed with PET DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer inspected the land and found that it was SOLELY for cattleraising and recommended to DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of CARL
Respondents reiterated the withdrawal but PET ignored their request
DAR issued AO 9 series of 1993 that only portions of private agricultural lands shall be
excluded from CARL
Respondents wrote DAR Sec and advised him to consider their withdrawal under the Luz
Farms Doctrine
DAR partially granted the application from CARL. Pet exempted certain hectares of
respondents land while the other were ordered to be segregated and placed under
compulsory acquisition
Respondent moved for recon; filed a notice of appeal to Office of President; Office of the
Pres affirmed the Order of petitioner DAR but the issues of the constitutionality of the AO is
left for the courts to determine
CA favored the respondents
ISSUE: constitutionality of DAR AO 9
CONTENTION OF DAR
THAT AO 9 is to limit the area of livestock farm
THAT AO 9 seeks to remedy reports that some landowners convert their agri farms to
livestock farms to evade coverage in the CARL
Admin rules and reg are subject to judicial review because they partake the force and effect
of law
For admin rules and reg to be valid, must be issued by authority of a law AND MUST NOT
CONTRAVENE THE CONSTI
RULING
THE AO CONTRAVENE THE CONSTI
AO regulate livestock farm by including them in the agrarian reform
It is clear in the Consti that it excluded ALL LANDS EXCLUSIVELY DEVOTED TO LIVESTOCK
PET DAR clearly exceeded its power in issuing the AO
PET DAR argues that AO is to address the reports that landowners convert their agri lands to
livestock farms BUT THE SCENARIO IS NOT APPLICABE TO THE CASE
The family acquired the land as early as 1948; been in the business for a long period; NO
EVIDENCE THAT RESPONDENT CONVERTED THEIR BUSINESS OF BREEDING CATTLE AFTER THE
ENACTMENT OF CARL

STAT CON: Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the reenactment
of a statute by Congress without substantial change is an implied legislative approval and
adoption of the previous law
Basically, the 1988 CARL was amended by RA 7881 to amend certain provisions Specifically
the definition of the terms agricultural activity and commercial farming Congress sought
to align the provisions of the agrarian law with that of the intent of the Consti
DECISION: dismissed
The AO was unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of the agrarian reform beyond the
scope of the Consti