G.R. No.

L-37364 May 9, 1975

BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
MILITARY COMMISSION 2, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, and
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT, and
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, * respondents.
Facts: In September 1972, after the declaration of Martial Law, Ninoy was arrested and was placed
under custody. He was brought to Fort Bonifacio. He filed for the issuance of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus which was denied by the SC. Aquino then questioned the validity of such denial and the
declaration of martial law; at the same time he questioned the authority of the military court [No. 2]
created [pursuant to GO 2-A] to try him and his other companions. He was being charged for illegal
possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives. He was also being charged for violation of the
Anti-Subversion Act and for murder. All were filed before the military court. Aquino argued that the
military court had no jurisdiction because civilian courts were still operational and that, being a
civilian, his trial by a military commission deprives him of his right to due process.
When the proceedings before the MilitaryCommission opened, petitioner questioned thefairness of the
trial and announced that he did not wish to participate in the proceedings even as he discharged both
his defense counsel of choice and his military defense counsel. For the petitioner's assurance, a
Special Committee was created to reinvestigate the charges against
petitioner. Petitioner filed supplemental petition questioning the legality of the creation of the Special
Committee. On March 24, 1975, petitioner filed an "Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order Against Military Commission No. 2"; praying that said Commission be prohibited
from proceeding with the perpetuation of testimony under its Order dated March 10, 1975, the same
being illegal, until further orders from the Supreme Court
Issue: Whether or not Aquino was afforded due process in a military court.
Held: YES. According to Schwartz, The immunity of civilians from military jurisdiction must,
however, give way in areas governed by martial law. When it is absolutely imperative for public
safety, legal processes can be superseded and military tribunals authorized to exercise the jurisdiction
normally vested in court.
Neither are We impressed with petitioners argument that only thru a judicial proceeding before the
regular courts can his right to due process be preserved. The guarantee of due process is not a
guarantee of any particular form of tribunal in criminal cases. A military tribunal of
competent jurisdiction, accusation in due form, notice and opportunity to defend and trial
before an impartial tribunal, adequately meet the due process requirement. Due process of
law does not necessarily means a judicial proceeding in the regular courts. The guarantee
of due process, viewed in its procedural aspect, requires no particular form of procedure. It
implies due notice to the individual of the proceedings, an opportunity to defend
himself and the problem of the propriety of the deprivations, under the circumstances presented,
must be resolved in a manner consistent with essential fairness. It means essentially a fair and
impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of defense.
Here, the procedure before the Military Commission, as prescribed in Presidential Decree No. 39 which
is was promulgated on November 7,1972, providing for the "Rules Governing the Creation,
Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure and Other Matters Relevant to Military Tribunals, assures
observance of the fundamental requisites of procedural due process, due notice, an essentially fair
and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of the defense Section 11 of the
Manual for Courts-Martial specifically provides that the rules of evidence generally recognized in the
trial of criminal cases in the courts of the Philippines shall be applied by courts-martial. This is
applicable to trials in the military commission. There is, therefore, no justification for petitioners
contention that such military tribunals are concerned primarily with the conviction of an accused and
that proceedings therein involve the complete destruction and abolition of petitioners constitutional
rights. This is not, however, to preclude the President from considering the advisability of the transfer
of these cases to the civil courts, as he has previously announced.

G.R. No. L-36188-37586 February 29, 1980

ROQUE GUMAUA, petitioner,
vs
MAJOR GENERAL ROMEO ESPINO, in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 2, respondent.
Facts: In 1972, a Chinaman was kidnapped by allegedly the group of a certain Sgt. Cordova. During the
investigation, Sgt. Cordova and Mr. Co told the investigators that the victim was in a house in a barrio in San
Clements, Tarlac The accused, accompanied by the NBI agents, pointed to the house where the victim was being
kept. Said house was owned by herein petitioner, Roque Gumaua, who used to be a co-soldier of Sgt. Aguinaldo
Cordova in Camp Olivas. Upon entering the house, the NBI agents found the victim inside a big cage in the ground
floor of the house. Guarding him was accused Rodrigo Halasan, a long-time friend of petitioner Gumaua. After
surveillance, Gumauas house was raided and he was arrested. Since martial law was being imposed at that time,
Gumaua was held under the custody and trial of the military court [No. 2]. Gumaua then petitioned for prohibition
and mandamus with restraining order and preliminary injunction against Major General Romeo Espino as Chief of
Staff of the AFP and Military Commission No. 2, challenging the validity of the creation and jurisdiction over him as a
civilian of respondent Military Commission No. 2. He filed for habeas corpus and averred that (a) military tribunals
cannot try civilians if civil courts are open; (b) the President cannot deprive the civil courts of their jurisdiction to try
criminal cases involving civilians; (c) as a civilian, he is entitled even during Martial Law to his constitutional right to
counsel during the preliminary investigation, to be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts only upon his arrest or
voluntary submission; and (d) General Order No. 12-A defining the jurisdiction of the military commissions has not
been validated by the New Constitution which has not been ratified by a plebiscite, as the referendum hold pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 86 was not sufficiently complied with the amending process prescribed by the 1935
Constitution, which process is binding on the people
ISSUE: Whether or not Gumaua can be validly tried before the military court.
HELD: The SC first and foremost affirmed that the declaration of martial law is valid. The 1973 Constitution has
been validly ratified by the sovereign people and is now in full force and effect. Proclamation No. 1081 placing the
entire country under martial law is valid. That the proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privileges
of the writ of habeas corpus. That the President of the Philippines, as Commander-in-Chief and as enforcer or
administrator of martial law, . . . can promulgate proclamations, orders and decrees during the period of martial law
essential to the security and preservation of the Republic, to the defense of the political and social liberties of the
people, and to the institution of reforms to prevent the resurgence of rebellion or insurrection or secession or the
threat thereof as well as to meet the impact of a worldwide recession, inflation or economic crisis which presently
threatens all nations including highly developed countries . . . . That the President of the Philippines, as legislator
during the period of martial law, can legally create military commissions or courts martial to try, not only members of
the armed forces, but also civilian offenders, for specified offenses including kidnapping.
And finally, there is likewise ample proof that Sgt. Aguinaldo Cordova and Sgt. Barbelonio Casipi, co-accused of
petitioners in the kidnapping charge, belonged to the armed forces at the time of the commission of the crime, in
much the same way that the evidence demonstrates that petitioner Gumaua himself is a retired PC noncommissioned officer. Consequently, the trial of petitioners Gumaua and Halasan before the respondent Military
Commission No. 2, along with the two other accused who were members of the Armed Forces is valid under General
Orders Nos. 8.