Ultimate result was strategy of mutual assured destruction. Deterrence theory assumes
that the parties to a conflict are fundamentally rational. A paradox arises because actually
carrying out a strategy of mutual assured destruction (MAD) seems fundamentally
irrational. Also: as military technology became more complex the uncertainties
surrounding its usage rose rapidly. This had the effect of making rational calculation ever
harder. Some analysts such as Jervis questions deterrences central premise by asserting
that decision-makers were not necessarily rational. Also questioned was the assumption
that both sides saw the game exactly the same way.
Procedural rationality (normal rationality) versus instrumental rationality (abnormal
but internally self-consistent rationality (Hitler, Bin-Laden) compared and contrasted.
(Discuss.)
Deterrence versus compellance (define).
Controllability of nuclear (e.g. prospects for a limited nuclear war not spinning out of
control). (Discuss.)
Nuclear deterrence did not eliminate the need for a conventional defense as well.
General deterrence versus imminent deterrence (Morgan). (Discuss & define). Huth &
Russet used Morgans definition of imminent deterrence (one side is at least
seriously considering an attack, while the other is mounting a threat of retaliation in order
to prevent it.) They identified 54 such cases occurring between 1900 and 1980. In 31
(57%) of the cases, deterrence was found to have succeeded. Other researchers cast
doubts on these findings however.
Disarmament , arms control, and deterrence (Discuss.)
Post-Cold War deterrence (Discus.)
Terrorism (Discuss at length.) Per Betts now less danger of complete annihilation but
more danger of mass destruction. Threats arise from:
1) Non-state affiliated (independent) groups
2) Rouge state sponsored groups.
Nuclear weapons are seen as being likely to form central core of deterrence well into the
21st century. Effects of new technologies? (Discuss.)