In Raul Lambino, et. al. vs. Comelec G.R. No.

174153, October 25, 2006

the issue on initiative to propose amendments to the 1987 Constitution was
again at issue. FACTS: Raul Lambino and Enrico Aumentado with other
groups, gathered signatures for an initiative to propose amendments to the
1987 Constitution. In August 2006, the Lambino group filed a petition
asking the Comelec to conduct a plebiscite for the ratification of the
amendments proposed in their initiative petition, in accordance with Section
5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of RA 6735.
The petitioners claim that their initiative petition was supported by the
signatures of 6M+ individuals, constituting at least 12% of all registered
voters, with each legislative district represented by at least 3% of the
registered voters. They further claimed that the provincial and city Comelec
officials had already verified the 6.3M signatures. However, the Comelec
denied the petition on the ground that there is no valid enabling law
governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution, relying on Santiago
vs. Comelec (336 SCRA 843 1997) which declared RA 6735 inadequate to
implement the initiative clause on proposal to amend the Constitution. The
advocates of the proposed amendments then filed with the SC a petition for
certiorari and mandamus (under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court) to set aside
the Comelec Resolution dismissing the petition and to order the Comelec to
give due course to their petition.
ISSUES:

(1) Whether the initiative petition of the Lambino group

complied with the provisions of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution.
(2) Whether the Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago vs.
Comelec declaring RA 6735 incomplete and inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the
initiative clause to amend the Constitution.

HELD: (1) the initiative petition failed to comply with the requirements of
the Constitution. For the petition to be valid, two essential requisites must
be complied with, namely: (a) the people must author, and thus sign, the
entire proposal; no agent or representative can sign on their behalf; and (b)
as an initiative upon a petition, the proposed amendments must be embodied
in the petition itself.

The rationale for the second requisite is that the signature requirement
would be rendered meaningless if the person affixing his signature has not
first seen and understood what it is that he is signing. Further, and more
importantly, loose interpretation of the subscription requirement can pose a
significant potential for fraud. On-compliance with the above mentioned
requirements is fatal to the initiative petition. For sure, the great majority of
the 6.3M people who signed the signature sheets did not see the full text of
the proposed changes before signing, as the proposed amendments were not
stated in the signature sheets. They were not apprised of the nature and
effect of the proposed amendments, among which are substantial changes as
follows:
1) the term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus
member of the Parliament may be re-elected indefinitely;
2) The Interim Parliament whose membership comprised of present
members of Congress can decide when to call the parliamentary
elections. Thus, leaving them the absolute discretion to determine
their term limits.
3) That within 45 days from the ratification of proposed changes, the
interim Parliament may further propose revision or amendments to
the Constitution.
Furthermore, a peoples initiative to change the Constitution applies
only to an amendment to the Constitution and not revision. Article XVII of
the Constitution speaks of three modes of proposing amendments to the
Constitution:
a.
by direct congressional action (3/4 vote of all its members)
b.
through a constitutional convention, and
c.
through a peoples initiative. The first and second modes, as
provided in Section 1 of Article XVII, apply to both
amendment and revision, but the 3rd mode applies only to
amendments. The distinction between the first two modes and
the third was intentional as shown by the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission where it was said: the committee
members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to
amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the
revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the
operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment
or Revision xxx.

There can be no dispute that a peoples initiative can only propose

amendments to the Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives
to amendments. There can be no deviation from the constitutionally
prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A popular clamor, even one
backed by 6.3M signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific
modes prescribed in the Constitution itself. The Lambinos groups
proposed changes constituted not just an amendment but a revision, because
of the change in the form of government from Presidential to Parliamentary,
and the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN REVISION AND AMENDMENT. Revision
broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like
altering the principle of separation of power or the system of checks and
balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety
of the Constitution.
On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces,
deletes, without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally
affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally
affects only the specific provision being amended.
On the second pivotal issue of revisiting the ruling of the Court in
Santiago vs. Comelec, an affirmation or reversal of the same will not change
the outcome of the case. The Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving
the constitutionality of a statue if the case before the Court can resolve on
some grounds. Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-settled
doctrine that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of the statute if
the case can be resolved on some other grounds.
NOTE: In the resolution on the motion for reconsideration, however, the
Court noted that a majority of the justices voted to declare RA 6735
sufficient law for a peoples initiative on the Constitution, effectively
abandoning Santiago v. Comelec.)
Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, Antonio Gonzales and Orlando
Balbon, Jr. 622 SCRA 744 (July 2010). In considering the residency issue,
the dwelling where a person permanently intends to return to and to remain
his or her capacity or inclination to decorate the place, or the lack of it, IS
IMMATERIAL. Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it determined
the fitness of a dwelling as a persons residence based solely on very

personal and subjective assessment standards when the law is replete

with standards that can be used. Comelec used wrong considerations in
arriving at the conclusion that Mitras residence is not the residence
contemplated by law.
In this case, following the conversion of Puerto Princesa (Mitras
domicile of origin) from a component city to a highly urbanized city whose
residents can no longer vote for provincial officials, Mitra abandoned his
domicile in Puerto Princesa and acquired a new one in Aborlan which is
within the LGU where he intended to run. Mitra bought the old Maligaya
Feedmill and used the second floor as his residence.
Assitio vs. Aguirre 619 SCRA 518 Residence as used in the law
prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, is
DOCTRINALLY SETTLED to mean domicile, importing not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention inferable from a persons
acts, utterances and activities. Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully
effect a transfer, one must demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or change of
domicile; (2) bonafide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond to said purpose
Panlaqui v. Comelec 613 SCRA 573 Voters inclusion/exclusion
proceedings essentially involve the issue of whether a voter shall be included
in or excluded from the list of voters based on the qualifications required by
law and the facts presented to show possession of these qualifications. As
distinguished from the procedure in certificate of candidacies (petition to
deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy) on the other hand, the
denial/cancellation proceedings involve the issue of whether there is a false
representation of a material fact (Sec. 78).
Panlaqui vs. Comelec 613 SCRA 573 - It is not within the province of
the RTC in a voters inclusion/exclusion proceedings to take cognizance
of and determine the presence of a false representation of a material
fact. It has no jurisdiction to try the issues of whether the misrepresentation
relates to material fact and whether there was an intension to deceive the
electorate in terms of ones qualifications for public office. The finding
that Velasco was not qualified to vote due to lack of residency
requirement does not translate into a finding of a deliberate attempt to

mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render him

ineligible.
Canicosa v. Comelec 282 SCRA 512 (1997). The question of inclusion or
exclusion from the list of voters involves the right to vote which is not
within the power and authority of the Comelec to rule upon. The
determination of whether one has the right to vote is a justiciable issue
properly cognizable by our regular courts.
Macalintal v. Comelec 405 SCRA 614 (2003) The execution of the
affidavit itself is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit
required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant
or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines,
but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in
fact abandoned his domicile of origin. The affidavit is required of
immigrants and permanent residents abroad because by their status in
the host countries, they are presumed to have relinquished their intent
to return to this country; thus, without the affidavit, the presumption of
abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain.
Right of Suffrage of Duals (Overseas Absentee Voters) under
RA 9189. - Loida Nicolas-Lewis, et. al. vs. Comelec G.R. No. 162759,
August 6, 2006. - Petitioners are dual citizens having retained or reacquired
Philippine Citizenship under RA 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003. As such, they sought registration and
certification as overseas absentee voters under RA 9189 or the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003, in order to vote in the May 2004 elections.
However, the Philippine embassy in the US advised them that per Comelec
letter dated September 23, 2003, they have yet no residence requirement as
prescribed by the Constitution. Petitioners sought a clarification from the
Comelec which thereafter, expressed the opinion that dual citizens
under RA 9225 cannot exercise the right of suffrage under the Overseas
Absentee Voting Law because said law was not enacted for them, hence,
they are considered regular voters who have to meet requirements of
residency, among others.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhile
retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 may
vote as absentee voter under RA 9189.

HELD: Section 1 of Article V of the Philippine Constitution prescribed

residency requirement as a general eligibility factor for the right to vote.
On the other hand, Section 2 thereof, authorizes congress to devise a system
wherein an absentee may vote, implying that a non-resident may, as an
exception to the residency prescription in the preceding section, be allowed
to vote.
There is no provision in the dual citizenship law (RA 9225), requiring
duals to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines
first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, RA 9225,
in implicit acknowledgement that duals are most likely non-residents,
grants under Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as granted to an
absentee voter under RA 9189 which aims to enfranchise as much as
possible all overseas Filipinos, who, save for the residency requirement
exacted of an ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote as ruled in
Makalintal vs. Comelec 405 SCRA 614
Cordora v. Commission on Elections 580 SCRA 12 (2009) Cordora
concluded that Tambunting failed to meet the residency requirement because
of Tambuntings naturalization as an American. Cordoras reasoning fails
because Tambunting is not a naturalized American. Residency, for the
purpose of elections laws, includes the twin elements of the fact of residing
in a fixed place and the intention to return there permanently, and is not
dependent upon citizenship.
Liberal Party vs. Commission on Elections 620 SCRA 393 (May 6,
2010), the SC distinguished REGISTRATION and ACCREDITATION
of a political party. The root of this petition before the SC is the Nationalista
Party-Nationalista Party Coalition (NP-NPC) petition before the COMELEC
for registration as a coalition and accreditation as the dominant minority
party. While the Comelec En Banc claimed jurisdiction over the registration
of coalitions and has in fact decreed NP-NPCs registration, the Comelec
however did NOT rule on the accreditation aspect. The registration of a
coalition and the accreditation of a dominant minority party are two
separate matters that are substantively distinct from each other.
Section 2(5), Article IX-C and Rule 32 of the CRP regulate the
registration of political parties, organizations or coalition of
political parties. Accreditation as a dominant party is governed by

Comelec Resolution No. 8752, Section 1 of which states that the

petition for accreditation shall be filed with the Clerk of the
Commission who shall docket it as an SPP (DM) case. This was the
manner the NP-NPC was docketed.
Registration of political parties is a special proceeding assigned to
a Division for handling under the CRP. No similar clear cut rules is
available to a petition for accreditation as a dominant party.
Registration must first take place before a request for accreditation
can be made. Accreditation is the next natural step to follow after
registration.
Hence, when the Comelec En Banc, resolved the registration of the NPNPC the case is terminated and ripe for review by the SC via a Petition for
Certiorari. The issue with respect to accreditation is a separate issue which
is treated in a separate proceedings. As ruled, a Motion for Reconsideration
of a Resolution of the Comelec En Banc is a prohibited pleading (Sec. 1(d)
Rule 13). The remedy available to a party is a petition for certiorari with the
SC pursuant to Article IX-A, Sec. 7 and Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Atienza, Jr. et. Al. vs Comelec 612 SCRA 761 Authority of Comelec
over intra- party disputes is limited. The Comelec may intervene in disputes
internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its constitutional
functions. The validity or invalidity of Atienza et. Al.s expulsion was
purely a membership issue that had to be settled within the party. It is an
internal matter over which Comelec has no jurisdiction.
Damasen vs. Tumamao 613 SCRA 49 (2010) the discretion of accepting
members to a political party is a right and a privilege, a purely internal
matter, which the Court cannot meddle in. The reason behind the right given
to a political party to nominate a replacement where a permanent vacancy
occurs in the Sanggunian is to maintain the party representation as willed by
the people in the election (Sec. 45 (b) of RA 7160 Rule on Succession and as
held in Navarro v. CA 672 SCRA 355 (2010). Damasen was not a bonafide
member. Tumamao was husband of the VM who died).
Lokin, Jr. vs. Commission on elections 621 SCRA 385 (June 22, 2010),
the SC ruled that Comelec cannot issue rules and regulations that provide a
ground for the substitution of a party-list nominee NOT written in R.A.7941.
Sec. 8 provides Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each
registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the Comelec

not later than 45 days before the election a list of names, not less than
five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it
obtains the required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who
have given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall
not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his
bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. NO change
of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after
the same shall have been submitted to the Comelec except in cases (1)
where the nominee dies, or (2) withdraws in writing his nomination, (3)
becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee
shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the
HR who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered
resigned.
CIBAC (Citizens Battle Against Corruption) thru its President Emmanuel
Villanueva manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2007
synchronized national and local elections and submitted their list of 5
nominees (Villanueva, Lokin (herein petitioner), Cruz-Gonzales, Tugna and
Galang). The list was later published in the newspapers of general
circulation.
Before the elections, Villanueva filed a certificate of
nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees whereby it
withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted
Borje. The amended list included Villanueva, Cruz-Gonzales and Borje.
Subsequently, Villanueva transmitted to Comelec the signed petitions of
more than 81% if the CIBAC members in order to confirm the withdrawal of
the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang.
Based on the Party-List Canvas Report, it showed that CIBAC was entitled
to a second seat, hence, the counsel of CIBAC filed with the Comelec sitting
as National Board of Canvassers, a request to proclaim Lokin as the 2 nd
nominee which was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales. Since
Comelec failed to act on the filing of the certificate of nomination,
substitution and amendment of the list of nominees and the petitions of the
more than 81% of CIBAC members, Villanueva filed a petition to confirm
the said certificate with the Comelec which was docketed as E.M. No. 07054. In the meantime, Comelec as NBC partially proclaimed several party
lists as having won which included Cibac.

The Secretary General of CIBAC informed the Secretary General of the HR

to formally swear Lokin into office but which was denied in view of the
pendency of E.M. No. 07-054 which approved the withdrawal of the
nominations of Lokin et. al. and the substitution of Borje. Cruz-Gonzales
was proclaimed as the official second nominee.
Lokin brought before the SC via Mandamus to compel respondent Comelec
to proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC. Also, in another
petition, Lokin assailed Sec. 13 of Resolution No. 7804 (Rules and
Regulations Governing the filing of Manifestation of Intent to Participate
and submission of Names of Nominees under the Party-List) and its
resolution in E.M. No. 07-054.
The Comelec asserts that a petition for certiorari is an inappropriate recourse
in law due to the proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales as representative and her
assumption of that office; that Lokins proper recourse was an electoral
protest filed in the HRET, therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction over the
matter being raised by Lokin. CIBAC posits that Lokin is guilty of forum
shopping for filing a petition for mandamus and a petition for certiorari,
considering that both petitions ultimately seek to have him proclaimed as the
second nominee of CIBAC.
ISSUES: a) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy.
The Court has jurisdiction. The controversy involving Lokin is neither an
EP nor an action for QW, for it concerns a very peculiar situation in which
Lokin is seeking to be seated as second nominee of CIBAC. Although an EP
may properly be available to one part-list organization seeking to unseat
another party-list organization to determine which between the defeated and
the winning party-list organizations actually obtained the majority of the
legal votes, Lokins case is not one in which a nominee of a particular partylist organization thereby wants to unseat another nominee of the same party
list. Neither does an action for QW lie, considering that the case does not
involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the RP, or some
other case of disqualification.
Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the
Comelec to seek the review of its resolution in accordance with Section 7 of
Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and
assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales. The constitutional mandate is now
implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, which provides for

the review of the judgments, final orders or resolution of the Comelec and
the Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a
petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in the SC within
the limited period of 30 days. The Court has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over Lokins certiorari and for mandamus.
(b) Both actions, certiorari and mandamus did not violate the rule against
forum shopping even if the actions involved the same parties, because they
were based on different causes of action and the reliefs they sought were
different.
Comelec gravely abused its discretion in promulgating Section 13 of
Res. No. 7804 as it expanded the exceptions under Sec. 8 of RA 7941
Section 8 enumerates only 3 instances in which the party-list
organization can substitute another person in place of the nominee. The
enumeration is exclusive.
Abayhon vs. HRET et. al 612 SCRA 375/Palparan Jr. vs. HRET et. al.
These two cases were consolidated and jointly resolved as it both concerns
the authority of the HRET to pass upon the eligibilities of the nominees of
the party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of Congress.
Abayhon is the 1st nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list that won a seat in
the HR during the 2007 elections. Palparan on the other hand was the 1 st
nominee of Bantay party-list. A petition for QW was filed with HRET
against the party-list groups and its nominee claiming that it was not eligible
for a party-list since it did not represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. Abayhon is the spouse of an incumbent
congressional district representative and likewise does not belong to the UR
and marginalized. Petitioners also claim that Abayhon lost her bid as partylist rep called An Waray in the immediately preceding elections of May 10,
2004. Palparan also was alleged to have committed various human rights
violations against the marginalized sectors (Bantay represents the victims of
communist rebels, CAFGU, security guards and former rebels.)
Abayhon and Palparan postures that the Comelec already confirmed the
status of the party list as a national multi-sectoral party-list organization, that
HRET had no jurisdiction over the petitioner for QW since the petitioners
collaterally attacked the registration of the party-list organization, a matter
that fell within the jurisdiction of the Comelec. That it was the party-list that

was taking a seat in the HR and not them, being only its nominees. All
questions involving their eligibility as nominee, were internal concerns of
the organization. The HRET dismissed the petition against party-list but
upheld its jurisdiction over nominees who both filed an MR which was
denied. Hence, this special civil action for certiorari alleging that the HRET
gravely abused its discretion.
The Court made reference to Sec. 5(1) of Article VI (which identifies who
the members of that House are. The HR shall be composed of not more
than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ration, and those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
Clearly the members of the HR are 2 kinds members who shall be
elected from legislative districts and those who shall be elected through a
party-list system. From the point of view of the Constitution, it is the
party-list rep who are elected into office, NOT their parties or
organizations. These representatives are elected, however, through that
peculiar party-list system that the Constitution authorized and that Congress
by law established where the voters cast their votes for the organizations or
parties to which such party-list reps belong.
Once elected, both the district reps and the party-list reps are treated in like
manners. They have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and emoluments.
They can participate in the making of laws that will directly benefit their
legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to the same term
limitations of 3 years for a max of 3 consecutive terms. The party list
system act itself recognizes party list nominees as members of the HR (Sec.
2, RA 7941 Declaration of Policy The State shall promote proportional
representation in the election of reps in the HR through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the
marginalized and UR sectors x x x x to become members of the HR .
The Court held that initially, the authority to determine the qualifications of
a party-list nominee belongs to the organization and to choose five from
among the aspiring nominees to comply with the law. But where an

allegation is made that the party or organization had chosen and allowed a
disqualified nominee to become its party-list rep in the lower house and
enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position, the resolution of the
dispute is taken out of its hand. Hence, pursuant to Section 17 of Article VI,
the HRET being the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other
things, the qualifications of the members of the HR, the HRET has
jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. The HRET was
correct in dismissing the QW and retaining authority to rule on the
qualifications.
Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v. Comelec 619 SCRA
585 (DELISTING) The Comelec may motu propio OR upon verified
complaint of any interested party, remove, or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition IF It: (a) fails to participate in the last 2
preceding elections; OR (b) fails to obtain at least 2% of the votes casts
under the party-list system in the 2 preceding elections for the
constituency in which it was registered (Section 6 RA 7941). The word
OR is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of
one thing from the other things enumerated. A party list group or
organization that failed to garner 2% in a prior election and immediately
thereafter did not participate in the preceding election is something that is
not covered by Section 6(8) of RA 7941. From this perspective, it may ben
an unintended gap in the law and as such is a matter for Congress to address.
This case abandoned the Minero vs. Comelec G.R. No. 177548 May 10,
2007.
Amores vs. HRET et. al 622 SCRA 593 (2010) Amores via a petition for
QW with the HRET questioned the legality of the assumption of office of
Emmanuel Joel Villanueva as rep of CIBAC. It was alleged among other
things, that Villanueva assumed office without a formal proclamation by the
Comelec, disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC since at
the time of the filing of his certificates of nomination and acceptance, he was
already 31 years old or beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of
RA 7941 and that his change of affiliation from CIBACs youth sector to its
overseas Filipino workers and their families sector was not effected at least 6
months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections so as to be qualified to represent
the new sector under Section 15 of RA 7941.

The HRET dismissed the petition as it found the petition to be filed beyond
the 10 days reglementary period, that the age qualification for youth sectoral
nominees under Section 9 of RA 7941 applied only to those nominated as
such during the first 3 congressional terms after the ratification of the
Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered
exclusively as representing the youth sector, which CIBAC, a multi sectoral
organization, is not. As regards the shift of affiliation, it was held that
Section 15 did not apply as there was no resultant change in party list
affiliation.
ISSUES: (1) whether the petition for QW was dismissible for having been
filed unseasonably; and (2) whether Section 9 and 15 of RA 7941 apply to
Villanueva. As to the first issue, the SC found grave abuse of discretion on
the part of HRET. The Court overlooked the technicality of timeliness and
rules on the merits since the challenge goes into Villanuevas qualifications,
it may be filed at anytime during his term. Also date of proclamation was
not clear. As to the second and more substantial issue, the Court made
reference to Section 9 of RA 7941 which provides that in case of a
nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be 25 but not more than 30
years of age on the day of the election. The youth sectoral rep who
attains the age of 30 during his term shall be allowed to continue in
office until the expiration of his term.
The Court did not find any textual support on the interpretation of HRET
that Section 9 applied only to those nominated during the first 3
congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution or until 1998. A
cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free
from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or
interpretation. Only room for application. The distinction is nowhere found
in the law. When the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish.
Respecting Section 15 of RA 7941, the Court likewise found no textual
support for HRETs ratiocination that the provision did not apply to
Villanuevas shift of affiliation from CIBACs youth sector to its overseas
Filipino workers and their families sector as there was no resultant change in
party list affiliation. Section 15 reads Change of Affiliation: Effect
Any elected party list rep who changes his political party or sectoral
affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat; Provided, That
if he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within 6 months

before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list

rep under his new party or organization.
The wordings of Section 15 is clear as it covers changes in both political
party and sectoral affiliation and which may occur within the same party
since multi-sectoral party-list org are qualified to participate in the
Philippine party-list system. A nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation
within the same party will only be eligible for nomination under the new
sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected at least 6 months before
the elections. Sec. 9 and 15 apply to Villanueva.
As regards the contention that Villanueva is the 1 st nominee of CIBAC,
whose victory was later upheld, is NO moment. A party-list orgs ranking of
its nominees is a mere indication of preference , their qualifications
according to law are a different matter.
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Comelec 618 SCRA 32 Ladlad is an
organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals or transgendered individuals. They applied for
registration with Comelec in 2006 and its accreditation was denied on the
ground that the org had no substantial membership. Ladlad in 2009 again
filed a petition for registration which was dismissed by Comelec on moral
grounds.
The SC ruled that moral disapproval is not a sufficient governmental interest
to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation to the party list
system. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically
enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. The SC found that Ladlad
has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for
accreditation.
Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 vs. G.R. No. 177271, May 4, 2007,
523 SCRA 1 - Petitioners reacting on an emerging public perception that the
individuals behind the party-list groups do not, as they should, actually
represent the poor and marginalized sectors. Petitioners, wrote a letter to the
Comelec requesting that the complete list of the nominees of all parties who
have been accredited pursuant to Comelec Resolution No. 7804 prescribing
rules and regulations to govern the filing of manifestation of intent to
participate and submission of names of nominees under the party-list system

of representation in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections be

published. The Comelec vehemently did not accede to the request of the
petitioners, it based its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of
subject party-list groups on Section 7 of RA 7941 (more specifically the last
sentence which states: the names of the party-list nominees shall not be
shown on the certified list..
The Comelec believe that the party list elections must not be
personality oriented. Abalos said under RA 7941, the people are to vote for
sectoral parties, organizations, or coalitions not for their nominees.
ISSUE: whether or not the disclosure of the names of the nominees are
covered by the Right of Public to information.
HELD: The Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the
names of the nominees of the party list groups. No national security or like
concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the
party-list groups in question. The last sentence of Section 7 is limited in
scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which
the same provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election
day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute nothing in RA
7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through
mediums other than the Certified list the names of the party-list nominees.
The Comelec obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the
provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007
elections. The need for voters to be informed about matters that have a
bearing on their choice. The ideal cannot be achieved in a system of blind
voting, as veritably advocated in the assailed resolution of the Comelec.
Banat et. al. vs. Comelec G.R. 178271/12972 2009 which abandoned the
matter of computation held in the Veterans Party case intention was to fill
the 20% and party list were ranked according to the votes cast for party-list
and even those who did not reach the 2% were given seats in the second
round of the ranking. Those who garnered 2% automatically takes a seat in
the first round.
Panlaqui v. Comelec 613 SCRA 573 Voters inclusion/exclusion
proceedings essentially involve the issue of whether a petition shall be
included in or excluded from the list of voters based on the qualifications
required by law and the facts presented to show possession of these

qualifications. On the other hand, the COC denial/cancellation proceedings

involve the issue of whether there is a false representation of a material fact.
The false representation must necessarily pertain not to a mere innocuous
mistake but to a material fact or those that refer to a candidates qualification
for elective office.
Loong c. Comelec 216 SCRA 760 (1992) If a person qualified to file a
petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the petition within the
15-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for whatever reasons,
the election laws do not leave him completely helpless as he has another
chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for
QW within 10 days from the proclamation of the results of the election.
NOTE: In Fermin v. Comelec G.R. No. 179695 and G.R. No. 182369,
December 18, 2008, the SC clarified that Section 5 (Procedure in cases of
Nuisance candidates) and Section 7 (Petition to Deny Due Course To or
Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy under RA 6646, did not in any way
amend the period for filing Section 78 petitions. While Section 7 of the
said law makes reference to Section 5 on the procedure in the conduct of
cases for the denial of due course to the COCs of nuisance candidates (then
chief Justice Davide in his dissenting opinion in Aquino v. Comelec, G.R.
No. 120265, September 18, 1995 248 SCRA 400, explains that the
procedure hereinabove provided mentioned in Section 7 cannot be construed
to refer to Section 6 which does not provide for a procedure but to the
effects of disqualification cases, (but) can only refer to the procedure
provided in Section 5 of the said Act on nuisance candidates, the same
cannot be taken to mean that the 25-day period for filing Section 78
petitions is changed to 5 days counted from the last day for the filing of
COCs.
The clear language of Section 78 cannot be amended or modified b y
a mere reference in a subsequent statute to the use of a procedure
specifically intended for another type of action. Cardinal is the rule in
statutory construction that repeals by implication are disfavored and will not
be so declared by the Court unless the intent of the legislators is manifest.
Noteworthy in Loong v. Comelec 216 SCRA 760 (1992), which upheld
the 25-day period for filing Section 78 petitions, was decided long after
the enactment of RA 6646. Hence, Section 23, Section 2 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure is contrary to the unequivocal mandate of the law.
Following the ruling in Fermin, the Court declared that as the law stands,

the petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC may be filed at

anytime not later than 25-days from the time of the filing of the COC.
In Salcedo v. Comelec 312 SCRA 447, it was ruled that a candidate who
used her husbands name even through their marriage was declared void was
not guilty of misrepresentation concerning a material fact. In order to justify
the cancellation, it is essential that the false representation pertains to
material matter affecting substantive rights of a candidate the right to run
for elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. The material
misrepresentation must refer to the qualifications for the office, such as
residence, citizenship, age. In addition to the requirement of materiality, the
false representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible.
In Justimbaste v. Comelec 572 SCRA 736 (2008) Material
misrepresentation as a ground to deny due course or cancel a certificate of
candidacy refers to the falsity of a statement required to be entered therein as
enumerated in Section 74 of the OEC. Concurrent with materiality is a
deliberate intention to deceive the electorate as to one qualification making
reference to Salcedo II that in order to justify the cancellation of the COC
under Section 78, it is essential that the false representation mentioned
therein pertained to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this
provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate the right to run
for the elective post for which he filed the COC. There is also no showing
that there was an intent to deceive the electorate as to the identity of the
private respondent, nor that by using his Filipino name the voting public was
thereby deceived.
In Lluz v. Comelec G.R. No. 172840 June 7, 2007 SC ruled that first, a
misrepresentation in a COC is material when it refers to a qualification for
elective office and affects the candidates eligibility; second, when a
candidate commits a material misrepresentation & third, a misrepresentation
of a non-material fact, or non-material misrepresentation, is not a ground to
deny due course to or cancel a COC under Sec. 78. In other words, for a
candidates certificate of candidacy to be denied due course or canceled by
the Comelec, the fact misrepresented must pertain to a qualification for the
office sought by the candidate. Punong barangay said that he was a CPA
when in fact he is not).

Aldovino Jr., vs. Comelec 609 SCRA 234 (2009) Article X, Section 8
both by structure and substance fixes an elective officials term of office
and limits his stay in office to 3 consecutive terms as an inflexible rule that
is stressed, no less, by citing voluntary renunciation as an example of a
circumvention. The provision should be read in the context of interruption
of term, NOT in the context of interrupting the full continuity of the
exercise of the power of the elective position. The voluntary renunciation
it speaks of refers only to the elective officials involuntary relinquishment
of office and loss of title to this office. It does not speak of the temporary
cessation of the exercise of power or authority that may occur for
various reasons, with preventive suspension being only one of them.
Quoting Latasa the law contemplates a rest period during which the
local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power
or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a
particular government unit.
Penera v. Comelec 599 SCRA 609. The issue on premature campaigning was raised
as an issue in this case. Antecedent facts briefly show that Penera and Andanar were
mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica in the last May 14, 2007 elections. Andanar
filed before the Office of the Regional Election Director, Caraga Region, Region
XIII, a petition for disqualification against Penera for unlawfully engaging in
election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the commencement of
the campaign period.
The Petition alleged that on 29 March 2007, a day before the start of the
authorized campaign period on 30 March 2007, Penera and her partymates went
around the different barangays in Sta. Monica, announcing their candidacies and
requesting the people to vote for them on the day of the elections. Penera alleged
that the charge was not true although having admitted that a motorcade did take
place which was simply in accordance with the usual practice in nearby cities and
provinces, where the filing of COC was preceded by a motorcade, which dispersed
soon after the completion of such filing. Penera in her defense cited Barroso v.
Ampig (385 Phil 2237; 328 SCRA 530) wherein the Court supposedly ruled that a
motorcade held by candidates during the filing of their COCs was not a form of
political campaigning. Pending the disqualification case, Penera was proclaimed as
winner and assumed office on July 2, 2002.
Comelec ruled on 24 July 2007 that Penera engaged in premature campaigning in
violation of Section 80 and disqualified Penera from continuing as a mayoralty
candidate. The SC ruled no abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec and held
that the conduct of a motorcade is a form of election campaign or partisan political
activity which fall squarely under the ambit of Section 79 of the OEC.

Penera moved for reconsideration arguing that she was not yet a candidate at
the time of the supposed premature campaigning, since under Section 15 of RA 8436
(the law authorizing the Comelec to use an automated election system for the
process of voting, counting of votes, and canvasing/consolidating the results of the
national and local elections), as amended by RA 9369, is not officially a candidate
until the start of the campaign period.
In granting Peneras MR, the SC En Banc held that Penera did not engage in
premature campaigning and should thus, not be disqualified as a mayoralty
candidate. The Court said(a)
The Courts 11 September 2009 Decision (or the assailed Decision)
considered a person who files a certificate of candidacy already a candidate even
before the start of the campaign period. This is contrary to the clear intent and
letter of Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended, which stated that a person who files his
certificate of candidacy will only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign
period, and unlawful acts or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only
upon the start of such campaign period. In applying the said law
(1)

The effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful

as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start
of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.

(2)

Accordingly, a candidate is liable for an election offense only

for acts done during the campaign period, not before. In other words,
election offenses can be committed by a candidate only upon the start
of the campaign period. Before the start of the campaign period, such
election offenses cannot be committed.

Since the law is clear, the Court has no recourse but to apply it. The forum
for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not the
Court but the Legislature.
(b)
Contrary to the assailed Decision, Section 15, of RA 8436, as
amended, does not provide that partisan political acts done by a candidate before
the campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the
campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan political acts done by a
candidate before the campaign period are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful
upon the start of the campaign period. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the
Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of expression and
speech, would be void for vagueness.


That Section 15 of RA 8436 does not expressly state that campaigning
before the start of the campaign period is lawful, as the assailed decision asserted, is
no moment. It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly
declared unlawful by law. The mere fact that the law does not declare an act
unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress
to declare in Section 15 of RA 8436 that partisan political activities before the start
of the campaign period is lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state that any
unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the
start of the campaign period. The only inescapable and logical result is that the
same acts, if done before the start of the campaign period, are lawful.
(d)
The Courts 11 September 2009 Decision also reversed Lanot v.
Comelec (G>R> No. 164858, 16 November 2006). Lanot was decided on the ground
that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the
campaign period. This ground was based on the deliberations of the legislators who
explained that the early deadline for filing COC under RA 8436 was set only to
afford time to prepare the machine readable ballots, and they intended to preserve
the existing election period, such that one who files his COC to meet the early
deadline will still not be considered as a candidate.
When Congress amended RA 8436, Congress decided to expressly
incorporate the Lanot doctrine into law, thus, the provision in Section 15, of RA
8436 that a period who files his certificate of candidacy shall be considered a
candidate only at the start of the campaign period Congress wahted to insure that
no person filing a certificate of candidacy under the early deadline required by the
automated election system would be disqualified or penalized for any partisan
political act done before the start of the campaign period. This provision cannot be
annulled by the Court except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality. The
assailed Decision, however, did not claim that his provision is unconstitutional. In
fact, the assailed Decision considered the entire Section 15 good law. Thus, the
Decision was self-contradictory reversing Lanot but maintaining the
constitutionality of the said provision.
In Lanot vs. Comelec 507 SCRA 114, the Court ruled that there are two aspects of
a disqualification case:
1) Electoral aspect determines whether the offender should be disqualified from
being a candidate or from holding office. Proceedings are summary in
character and require only clear preponderance of evidence. An erring
candidate may be disqualified even without prior determination of probable
cause in a PI. The electoral aspect may proceed independently of the
criminal aspect and vice-versa.

2) Criminal aspect determines whether there is probable cause to charge a

candidate for an election offense. If there is probable cause, the Comelec
through its Law Department, files the criminal information before the
proper court. Proceedings before the proper court demand a full-blown
hearing and require proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict. A criminal
conviction shall result in the disqualification of the offender, which may even
include disqualification from holding a future public office.

Typoco vs. Comelec 614 SCRA 391 In Garay v. Comelec 261 SCRA 222
(1996) the Court held that (a) certificate of votes does not constitute
sufficient evidence of the true and genuine results of the election; only
election returns are, pursuant to Sections 231, 233-236 and 238 of BP881.
Again in De Guzman v. Comelec 426 SCRA 698 (2004) the Court stated
that, in an election contest where the correctness of the number of votes is
involved, the best and most conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves;
where the ballots can nor be produced or are not available, the election
returns would be the best evidence.
Doromal vs. Biron/Comelec 613 SCRA 160 (2010) the certificate of
votes, which contains the number of votes obtained by each candidate, is
issued by the BEI upon the request of the duly accredited watcher pursuant
to Section 16 of RA 6646. Relative to its evidentiary value, Section 17 of
RA 6646 provides that Sections 235 and 236 of BP 881 notwithstanding, the
Certificate of Votes shall be admissible in evidence to prove tampering,
alteration, falsification or any anomaly committed in the preparation of the
election returns concerned, when duly authenticated by at least two
members of the BEI who issued the certificate. Failure to present the CV
shall however not bar the presentation of other evidence to impugn the
authenticity of the ER. It cannot be a valid basis of canvass.
Purpose of requiring authentication of at least 2 members of the BOC to
safeguard the integrity of the certificate from the time it is issued by the BEI
to the watcher after the counting of votes at the precinct level up to the time
that it is presented to the board of canvassers to proved tampering.
Calo v. Comelec 610 SCRA 342/Pecson v. Comelec 575 SCRA 634
decisions of the courts in election protest cases, resulting as they do from a
judicial evaluation of the ballots and a full blown adversarial proceedings.
Should at least be given similar worth and recognition as decisions of the
board of canvassers. This is especially true when attended by other equally

weighty circumstances of the case, such as the shortness of the term of the
contested elective office, of the case.
Mananzala vs. Comelec and Julie Monton 523 SCRA 31. - Decisions,
final orders or rulings of the Commission on Election contests involving
elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory and not
appealable; All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by
the Commission en banc.
A decision of the RTC was raised on appeal which was heard by the 2 nd
division which reversed the decision of the RTC. In his MR petitioner
argues that the MR filed with the former 2nd division has thrown the
whole case wide open for review as in a trial de novo in a criminal case
yet Comelec en banc failed to conduct a thorough review of the contested
ballots. Election cases cannot be treated in a similar manner as criminal
cases where, upon appeal from a conviction by the trial court, the whole case
is thrown open for review and the appellate court can resolve issues which
are not even set forth in the pleadings.
Pacanan, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 597 SCRA 189
Aguilar v. Comelec 591 SCRA 491 - Petitioner Pacanan, Jr. and private
respondent Langi Sr., were candidates for mayor in the municipality of
Motiong, Samar during the May 14, 2007 elections. Petitioner was
proclaimed having garnered a total of 3,069 votes against private
respondents 3,066 votes.
On May 25, 2007, private respondent filed an election protest with the
RTC which rendered a Decision on January 7, 2008 RTC declaring private
respondent as winner with a plurality of 6 votes. 3 days after or on January
10, 2008 petitioner filed a notice of appeal and paid 3K appeal fee before the
RTC and also appealed the RTC decision to the Comelec. Out of the 3K
appeal fee required under Sec. 3, Rule 40 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure, petitioner only paid 1K plus 200 to cover the legal
research/bailiff fees. On March 17, 2008 Comelec 1st division issued on
Order dismissing the appeal on the ground that petitioner failed to pay the
correct appeal fee within the 5-days reglementary period which is a ground
for the dismissal of the appeal under Section 9(a), Rule 22 of the CRP. On
March 28, 2008 petitioner filed a MR with the Comelec En Banc which
denied the resolution declaring that the appeal was not perfected on time for

non-payment of the complete amount of appeal and for late payment as well,
hence, did not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal.
Before the SC is a petition for Certiorari raising that 1) Comelec
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in holding that the correct appeal fee was not paid on time; 2) In
failing to consider, that assuming that the correct appeal fee was not paid on
time, the alleged non-payment is not in anyway attributable to petitioner; 3)
that assuming the correct appeal fee was not paid on time, there are highly
justifiable and compelling reasons to resolve the subject case on the merit in
the interest of justice and public interest.
The SC noted that two (2) different tribunals earlier require the
payment of two different appeal fees for the perfection of the appeals of
election cases.
Sec. 3, Rule 22 of the CRP ( Appeals form decisions of Courts in
election Protest Cases), mandates that the notice of appeal must be filed
with 5-days after the promulgation of the decision. On the other hand,
Section 3 & 4 Rule 40 of the CRP amended the amount of the appeal fees
to 3.2K which should be paid with the cash division of the Comelec.
On the other hand, Section 8 & 9, Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07-4-15 SC
(Rules of procedure in Election Contests before the Court Involving
Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials effective May 15, 2007) also
provide the procedure of instituting an appeal and the required appeal fees to
be paid for the appeal to be given due course.
This requirement in the payment of appeal fees had caused much
confusion, which the Comelec addressed through the issuance of Comelec
Res. No. 8486 on July 15, 2008. The salient feature of the said resolution
provide that the appeal to the Comelec of the trial courts decision in
election contests involving municipal and barangay officials is perfected
upon the filing of the notice of appeal and payment of the 1K appeal fee
to the court that rendered the decision within the 5-day reglementary
period. The non-payment or the insufficient payment of the addition appeal
fee of 3.2K to the Comelec Cash Division in accordance with Rule 40,
Section 3 of the CRP, as amended, does not affect the perfection of the
appeal and does not result in outright or ipso facto dismissal of the
appeal.

Comelec 1st division gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order
dismissing the appeal taking notice that the notice of appeal and the 1K
appeal fee were, respectively filed and paid with the MTC on April 21, 2008
which date the appeal was perfected. Comelec Res. 8486 clarifying the rule
on the payment of appeal fees was issued only on July 15, 2008, or almost 3months after the appeal was perfected. Yet on July 31, 2008 or barely two
weeks after the issuance of Comelec Res. 8486, the Comelec 1 st division
dismissed the appeal for non-payment of the 3.2K appeal fee.
Considering that petitioner filed his appeal months before the
clarificatory resolution on appeal fees, the appeal should not be unjustly
prejudiced by Comelec Res. No. 8486. Fairness and prudence dictate the
1st division should have first directed petitioner to pay the additional appeal
fee in accordance with the clarificatory resolution. Instead it hastily
dismissed the appeal on the strength of the clarificatory resolution which had
taken effect only a few days earlier. (This unseemly haste is an invitation to
outrage.) Court further stressed the liberal construction policy.
Saludaga vs. Comelec 617 SCRA 601 The discretion to allow execution
pending reconsideration belongs to the division that rendered the assailed
decision, order or resolution, or the Comelec en banc, as the case may be
not to the presiding Commissioner. A writ of execution pending resolution
of the MR of a decision of the division is not granted as a matter of right
such that its issuance becomes a ministerial duty that may be dispensed even
just by the Presiding Commission.
Calo v. Comelec 610 SCRA 342 The relevant rule provides that a motion
for execution pending appeal filed by the prevailing party shall contain a 3day notice to the adverse party and execution pending appeal shall not issue
without prior notice and hearing. The purpose of these requirements is to
avoid surprises that may sprung upon the adverse party who must be given
time to study and meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution by
the court. Where a party had the opportunity to be heard, then the purpose
has been served and the requirement substantially complied with. In this
case, even the Comelec admitted that respondent was heard and afforded his
day in court; hence, it should not have annulled the RTC special order on
said ground.

San Miguel vs. Comelec 609 SCRA 424 The law provides that the court
may issue execution pending appeal. Evident from the usage of the word
may, the language of the subject provision denotes that it is merely
directory, not mandatory, for the trial court to issue the special order before
the expiration of the period to appeal. The trial court may still thereafter
resolve a motion for execution pending appeal, provided: (i) the motion is
filed within the 5-day reglementary period; and (ii) the special order is
issued prior to the transmittal of the records of the Comelec.