Manchester Development Corporation vs.

Court of Appeals
149 SCRA 562
Principles:
1. Case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee
regardless of actual date of filing in Court.
2. Basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of
damages in the original complaint and not in the amended
complaint.
3. All complaints, petition, answers and other similar pleadings
should specify the amount of damages prayed for not only in the
body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and that the
damages should be considered in the assessment of the filing
fees.
Gancayco, J.:
Facts:
The case is an action for torts and damages and specific
performance with prayer for temporary restraining order, etc. The
prayer is for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction during the pendency of the action against the defendants'
announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs
for the property in question, to attach such property of defendants
that maybe sufficient to satisfy any judgment that maybe rendered,
and after hearing, to order defendants to execute a contract of
purchase and sale of the subject property and annul defendants'
illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff, ordering defendants jointly
and severally to pay plaintiff actual, compensatory and exemplary
damages as well as 25% of said amounts as maybe proved during
the trial as attorney's fees and declaring the tender of payment of
the purchase price of plaintiff valid and producing the effect of
payment and to make the injunction permanent. The amount of
damages sought is not specified in the prayer although the body of
the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78 Million as
damages
suffered
by
plaintiff.
Meanwhile plaintiff through another counsel with leave of
court filed an amended complaint on September 12, 1985 for the
inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable Corporation as co-plaintiff and by
emanating any mention of the amount of damages in the body of
the complaint. The prayer in the original complaint was maintained.
After the Court issued an order on October 15, 1985 ordering the reassessment of the docket fee, on November 12, 1985 the trial court
directed plaintiffs to rectify the amended complaint by stating the

amounts which they are asking for. It was only then that plaintiffs
specified the amount of damages in the body of the complaint in the
reduced amount of P10,000,000.00. Still no amounts of damages
were specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.
Issue:
Whether or not the basis of assessment of the docket fees
should be the amount of damages in the amended complaint.
Ruling:
The motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit.
The docket fee paid upon filing of complaint in the amount
only of P410.00 by considering the action to be merely one for
specific performance where the amount involved is not capable of
pecuniary estimation is obviously erroneous. Although the total
amount of damages sought is not stated in the prayer of the
complaint yet it is spelled out in the body of the complaint totalling
in the amount of P78,750,000.00 which should be the basis of
assessment
of
the
filing
fee.
On the other hand, in the Magaspi case, the trial court
ordered the plaintiffs to pay the amount of P3,104.00 as filing fee
covering the damages alleged in the original complaint as it did not
consider the damages to be merely an or incidental to the action for
recovery of ownership and possession of real property. An amended
complaint was filed by plaintiff with leave of court to include the
government of the Republic as defendant and reducing the amount
of damages, and attorney's fees prayed for to P100,000.00. Said
amended complaint was also admitted. The action was considered
not only one for recovery of ownership but also for damages, so that
the filing fee for the damages should be the basis of assessment.
Although the payment of the docketing fee of P60.00 was found to
be insufficient, nevertheless, it was held that since the payment was
the result of an "honest difference of opinion as to the correct
amount to be paid as docket fee" the court "had acquired
jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings thereafter had were
proper and regular." Hence, as the amended complaint superseded
the original complaint, the allegations of damages in the amended
complaint should be the basis of the computation of the filing fee.
In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was
possible as the allegations of the complaint, the designation and the
prayer show clearly that it is an action for damages and specific

performance. The docketing fee should be assessed by considering

the amount of damages as alleged in the original complaint.
As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that
a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee
regardless of the actual date of filing in court. Thus, in the present
case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the
payment of only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the amendment
of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For a legal
purpose there is no such original complaint that was duly filed which
could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended
complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the
trial court are null and void.
The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case
that the basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount
of damages sought in the original complaint and not in the amended
complaint.
The Court cannot close this case without making the
observation that it frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the
original complaint in this case of omitting any specification of the
amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78
million is alleged in the body of the complaint. This is clearly
intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the
correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the
assessment
of
the
filing
fee.
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints,
petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the
amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be
considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any
pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib
accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the
record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the
complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the
Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the
amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi
case in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is
overturned and reversed.

Reyes vs. Court of Appeals

38 SCRA 138
Principle:
In trial de Novo on Appeal, the Court of First Instance will not
affirm, reverse or modify the judgment appealed from the inferior
courts.
Reyes, J.B. L. J.:
Facts:
Plaintiffs-appellants are lesses of defendant's premises
located at Nos. 686, 688 and 690 Rizal Avenue, Manila, where they
also conduct their respective businesses. The lease was oral and on
a month-to-month basis. Plaintiffs have been occupying the
premises for a period from 10 to 15 years as of the filing of the
complaint. On May 8, 1962, defendant started sending out to each
of said plaintiffs notices to vacate the premises to give way for the
demolition of the old building occupied by them and eventual
construction of a new one. The notices were received by plaintiffs on
their respective dates, namely May 8, 1962, September 21, 1962,
October 10, 1962 and January 15, 1963. Each of the said notices
gave plaintiffs a period of time within which to move out. The last
notice gave said plaintiffs 24 hours within which to vacate the
premises.
On
started the
building and
back portion

January 16, 1963, as previously scheduled; defendant

demolition of the roofing and upper sidings of the
also the fencing thereof, although the demolition of the
actually started on January 7, 1963.

On January 17, 1963, plaintiffs filed a complaint for forcible

entry with the City Court against defendant, praying among others,
for a writ of preliminary injunction (which was granted) and
damages. The defendant counterclaimed for ejectment and
damages for alleged loss of the use and occupation of his premises
in the form of (a) fixed losses in the amount of P177,869.06; (b)
monthly losses in the amount of P27,295.00 from January 15, 1963;
and (c) P1,000.00 daily losses, also from January 15, 1963, until
possession is restored.
On February 23, 1963, the City Court rendered its decision in
favor of plaintiffs, later amended on May 24, 1963 because of the
intervening Compromise Agreement between plaintiff Go Ban and
defendant.
Defendant appealed the aforesaid decision to the Court of

First Instance. In a decision dated January 11, 1965, later amended

on February 11, 1965, the said Court dismissed the complaint and
all claims and counterclaims, among others.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals which, in turn,
rendered its decision on November 21, 1967, affirming the decision
of the Court of First Instance, with the sole modification that
plaintiffs should also pay to defendant Kalaw the sum of P50,000.00
as temperate damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance erred in not
granting plaintiff-appellant's motion for the execution of the
mandatory injunctive relief granted in the City Court decision.
Ruling:
The decision appealed from is modified by deleting therefrom
the award of temperate damages, but sentencing plaintiffappellants to pay respondent Teodoro Kalaw Jr., P2,500.00,
attorney's fees without prejudice to said respondent's right to file a
separate suit with the competent court for the recovery of the other
damages claimed by him in the inferior courts.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that, in trial de novo on
appeal, the Court of First Instance will not affirm, reverse, or modify
the judgment appealed from inferior courts, for the simple reason
that there is no judgment to affirm or modify, because all the
proceedings had in the Municipal Court, including the judgment, do
not in contemplation of law exist, having been vacated upon
perfection of the appeal, and the only instance when said judgment
appealed from is revived is when the appeal is withdrawn or
dismissed. For under Section 9, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, a
"perfected appeal" from the city court to the court of first instance
"shall operate to vacate the judgment" of the city court, and "the
action when duly docketed in the court of first instance shall stand
for trial de novo upon its merits, in accordance with the regular
procedure in that court, as though the same had never been tried
before and was originally there commenced." Since all the
proceedings in the city court including the judgment become, as it
were, inexistent in case of appeal of the Court of First Instance, and
since trial de novo must be held in the latter court, the execution of
the aforesaid decision of the City Court (requiring the lessor to
restore the roofing and remove the fence and/or pay P25.00
compensatory damages daily to each of the plaintiffs-appellants

until the premises are restored to their former condition) was not yet
proper and warranted.
Moreover, if the case to be tried de novo, there is always the
possibility that the trial court may make different findings that will
support a judgment contrary to that of the inferior court. As such,
the right of the parties are changed. If the inferior courts decision
were to be executed after appeal therefrom, the Court of First
Instance would have to undo what it had previously ordered to be
done; hence, justice would hardly be served if it were mandatory for
the Court of First Instance to order the execution of the City Court's
decision. As it turned out, the original judgment was superseded by
that of the Court of First Instance in this case. The City Court's
decision upon the rendition of the Court of First Instance judgment
becomes a thing of the past, without life, purpose or effect. It is the
decision of the Court of First Instance that prevails. Finally the city
court decision having been superseded, the issue raised now has
become moot and academic and, therefore cannot be properly
raised.

Commercial Union Assurance Company Limited vs. Lepanto

Consolidated Mining Company
86 SCRA 79
Principle:
1. Ex-parte motion for extension of time to file record on appeal
not considered a litigated or contentious motion and may be
acted upon even without proof of service on adverse party.
2. Record on appeal considered seasonably filed where ex-parte
motion for extension of time to file record on appeal was filed
within the original period prescribed by the Rules.
Guerrero, J.:
Facts:
On June 28, 1974, plaintiff-appellant filed its notice of appeal and
appeal bond. On the same day, it filed a motion for extension of 30
days counted from July 7, 1974 within which to submit its record on
appeal. The lower court granted appellant 30 days extension of time
within which to file its record on appeal. Thereafter, defendants filed
its opposition to motion for extension of time to file Record on
Appeal on the ground that plaintiff's motion for extension of time did
not comply with Section 5, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. As it turned
out however the opposition was denied by the lower court.
A motion for reconsideration and a motion to dismiss appeal
were filed by the defendants alleging, among other things, that the
lower court committed error when it granted plaintiff's motion for
extension of time to submit record on appeal because said motion
failed to comply with the requirements as required by sections 4, 5
and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. The lower court, denied
defendant's motion for reconsideration and thereupon approved
plaintiff's
appeal.
Defendants-appellees
Commercial
Union
Assurance Co. Ltd. filed before the Supreme Court a petition for
certiorari and mandamus against the trial judge, the Court of
Appeals and Lepanto, with a prayer for a temporary restraining
order against the Court of Appeals to cease and desist from taking
any action on the appeal interposed by plaintiff. The Supreme Court
dismissed
the
said
petition.

Petitioners Commercial Union Assurance Co., did not file any

motion for reconsideration, hence the aforesaid minute resolution
became final. Thereafter, in the appeal of Lepanto, Commercial
Union Assurance Company Ltd. filed with the Court of Appeals a
motion to dismiss Lepanto's appeal arguing that a) Lepanto's motion
for extension of time to submit record on appeal was a mere scrap
of paper for non-compliance with Rule 15, Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rules
of Court and the trial court had no jurisdiction to act on, much less
grant, the motion; and b) Since the record on appeal was filed
during the extension period which had been unauthorizedly granted,
the appeal was not seasonably perfected and the trial court's order
dismissing the complaint became final and unappealable.
Lepanto opposed the motion to dismiss its appeal, alleging that;
a) Commercial Union Assurance Company Ltd.'s Motion to dismiss
was barred by the prior final decision of the Supreme Court; and b)
The motion for extension of time to submit record on appeal was
within the trial court's discretion to grant. The Court of Appeals
sustained Commercial Union Assurance Company's arguments and
dismissed
the
appeal.
Lepanto filed a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals
promulgated a resolution which found Lepanto's second ground as
meritorious. Commercial Union Assurance Company Ltd. moved for
reconsideration. This motion for reconsideration was denied "for lack
of merit" by the Court of Appeals. Hence, Commercial Union
Assurance Company Ltd. filed this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the record on appeal filed by the private
respondent was within the period prescribed by the Rules of Court.
Ruling:
The petition was denied.
Yes. The record on appeal filed by the private respondent was
within the period prescribed by the Rules of Court.
The ex parte motion of private respondent for extension of time
to file the record on appeal does not appear to be a litigated or a
contentious motion. There is no claim that the motion was intended
to delay the appeal; on the contrary, it appears to be grounded on a

reason which is not only reasonable and fair, the same being "due to
demands on the professional time of the (undersigned) counsel" but
also was satisfactory to the trial court that the said motion did not
affect the substantive rights of the adverse party and, therefore, the
Court may act on the same even without proof of service thereof on
the
adverse
party.
Accordingly, the Court agree with the contention of the
private respondent and the ruling of the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution dated Nov. 25, 1975 which sustained the view that the
record on appeal filed by the private respondent within the period
prayed for in its motion ex parte for extension of time to file the
record on appeal, was submitted within the reglementary period and
that the trial court has the power and authority to act on the same
in accordance with the law, provided the ex parte motion was filed
within
the
original
period
prescribed
by
the
Rules.

Honorable Armando Cledera vs. Honorable Ulpiano

Sarmiento
39 SCRA 552
Principle:
Defective motion that does not comply with Sections 4, 5 and 6
of Rule 15 is a mere scrap of paper and does not toll the running of
period for appeal.
Makasiar, J.
Facts:
The private respondents herein were employees of the provincial
government of Camarines Sur and paid under the plantilla of
personnel of the road and bridge fund budget. The provincial board
of the province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 176, series
of 1968, which approved the road and bridge fund budget of the
province for the fiscal year 1968-1969 and abolished the positions of
herein private residents, who as a consequence filed Civil Cases.
After the pre-trial, the parties agreed that Civil Cases Nos. 6591
and 6763 be decided jointly "on the strength of the stipulation of
facts entered into by the parties and the evidence already presented
in Civil Case No. 6591"; and the parties were given five (5) days
from July 14, 1969 or until July 19, 1969 to submit their respective
memoranda, after which the two cases would be deemed submitted
for decision. Private respondents filed a motion to re-open the cases
and to allow them to present additional evidence. Respondent Judge
denied the said motion of herein private respondents. Private
respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. Respondent Judge
issued an order requiring petitioners to submit within five (5) days
from receipt their opposition to private respondents' motion for
reconsideration. Respondent Judge set aside its order, re-opened the
two cases and allowed respondents to present additional evidence.
Respondent Judge rendered a decision in both Civil Cases Nos. 6591
and 6763 in favor of private respondents declaring as null and void.
Petitioners, filed a motion for reconsideration.
On June 16, 1970, private respondents filed a motion for
execution on the ground that the decision had already become final
since no appeal therefrom had been interposed and perfected by
herein petitioners within thirty (30) days from their receipt on May
12, 1970 of the aforesaid decision. In paragraph 3 of said motion for
execution, private respondents expressly admitted that petitioners
filed their motion for reconsideration, claiming however that the

same motion was "fatally defective, pro forma, and should not be
considered ... because it failed to comply with the mandatory and
elementary provisions of Sec. 2 of Rule 37 in relation to Secs. 4, 5,
and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court; consequently, the filing of
such motion for reconsideration ... did not and should not toll the
running of the period for appeal." Petitioners filed their opposition to
the motion for execution on the ground that they had complied with
Sec. 2 of Rule 37 in connection with Secs. 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of
the Revised Rules of Court. Respondent Judge denied petitioners'
motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner's motion was properly filed in
accordance with Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling:
The petition was dismissed.
No. Petitioner's motion was not properly filed in accordance with
Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Rules of Court.
Defective motion that does not comply with Sections 4, 5 and 6
of Rule 15 is a mere scrap of paper and does not toll the running of
period for appeal. Where a decision was rendered against
petitioners who filed a motion for reconsideration thereof with a
Notice of Hearing a) directed to the Clerk of Court , not to the
parties; and b) merely stating the same be submitted " for
resolution of the Hon. Court upon receipt hereof," copy of which
motion was duly furnished to and received by respondents' counsel:
said motion is fatally defective and did not toll the running of the
period to appeal, for it failed to indicate the place, time and date of
hearing of the motion as required by Section 2, Rule 37, in relation
to Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15.