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Essay question: Are Robert Thompsons principles of counterinsurgency

unique to the Malayan Emergency OR are they universally enduring maxims independent of time, place and situation?
The British declared the emergency state in Malaya in 1948 in response to the
Malayan Communist Party (CPM)s intentions for an armed struggle. The Party,
formed in 1930, had been the most prominent actor against the Japanese occupation
from 1941 until 1945 (Hack, 2012, p.2). In the after-math of the Second World War,
the party underwent a re-orientation period which culminated with the adoption of a
united front strategy at a national level. Facing an increasingly worsening situation
at home and instigated by international communist arrangements, the Party decided to
take up arms. The counter-insurgency lasted until 1960 when the British achieved an
indisputable victory. A cornerstone event in the history of Malaysia, the Malayan
Emergence stands out as the epitome of successful counter-insurgency operations
(Hack, 2012). For this reason numerous scholars have rigorously studied the Malayan
Emergence in an attempt to forge a universal scheme of counter-insurgency (COIN).
However linear the measures against the insurgents might have been, many critics
pointed out the tremendous advantages that the British enjoyed in Malay.
In comparison to South Vietnam, Malay consisted of a smaller and much better
administered territory, and the country was a lot more prosperous (Thompson, 1966,
p. 19). Additionally, in comparison to the Philippines where the communist recruits
could hardly be narrowed down to a particular community, in Malay they came
almost entirely from the Chinese sections of the population (Laqueur, 1998, p. 288).
Unlike South Vietnam, the Malayan communists did not enjoy much, if any,
international support from fellow comrades and the countrys indigenous governing
apparatus had been consistently groomed by the British long before the insurgency
had started (Thompson, 1966, p. 19). Nevertheless, the bottom line is that the
geographic, political and economic factors in Malay were much more advantageous
for fighting an insurgency as compared to other places.
From this perspective, Sir Robert Thompsons Five Principles of Counterinsurgency become difficult to digest, let alone be employed as a universal COIN
scheme. 1101However, they were never fully applied in other COIN operations. A
closer look at most counter-insurgencies operations carried around the world reveals

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a fundamental conceptual misreading of insurgency. Understanding that insurgencies

are credibility wars by their ontological nature will lead scholars and policymakers
to pinpoint essential and universal analytical tools useful in counter-insurgency (Ong,
2007, p.3). As such, exploring the substratum of Thompsons COIN principles will
highlight that insurgency as a concept comprises of sine qua non characteristics
which do defy circumstantiality when being countered.
Sir Thompsons COIN principles are widely quoted as the most comprehensive
COIN guidelines coined in the aftermath of the Malayan Emergence. The five
principles are:
First principle: The government must have a clear political aim: to establish
and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically and
economically stable and viable.
Second principle: The government must function in accordance with the law;
Third principle: The government must have an overall plan.
Fourth principle: The government must give priority to defeating the political
subversion, not the guerillas.
Fifth principle: In the guerilla phase of an insurgency, a government must
secure its base areas first (Thompson, 1966, pp. 50-57).
At first glance it is impossible to overlook the ambiguity and analytical flexibility of
his principles - Whose government? What does it imply to be a politically and
economically viable country? What should the overall plan address? Nevertheless, it
is precisely such ambiguity which allows for the accommodation of circumstances.
Sir Thompson explains that an insurgent movement is a war for the people and that
the main purpose of a counter-insurgency campaign is the instillment of confidence
(Thompson, 1966, pp. 51, 58). Complementary to military action against the
insurgents, the government should take specific actions for ensuring that the
remaining population which is mainly neutral will not subvert to the insurgent group.
Instilling confidence in the people by carrying consistent operations and actions
creates credibility which translates into legitimacy. Better illustrated in the words of
Kumar Ramakrishna, the Malay Emergence was essentially won by the governments
use of effective propaganda consisting of actions and words which engendered the
confidence of a targeted audience - the rural Chinese population (2002, p. 205).

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Bearing this in mind, Sir Thompson explains that an efficient government

apparatus is imperative in crafting short and long term plans which account for the
security and welfare of its population (Thompson, 1966, p. 51). Moreover, by
performing according to the law - attention, he does not mention according to which
law!- the government reinforces its own legitimacy, creates a virtual space which
excludes insurgent and builds up credibility (Thompson, 1966, pp. 53-54). While
fighting the insurgents, efficiently catering for the population and gaining confidence
requires a civil-military partnership, a strong government and adequate propaganda
(Thompson, 1966, p. 55). It is difficult to prove the universality of Sir Thompsons
principles, especially because they have only been consistently applied during the
Malayan Emergency. By means of induction, I suggest that his principles might
represent a viable path towards crafting a universal approach to COIN. I will firstly
discuss the need of complementarity between military and political action and then
address the importance of efficient government apparatus. Lastly, I will underline the
importance of propaganda by words, which should be consistent with deeds, in order
to wage a psychological war against the insurgents. My argument will mostly be
shaped by the counter-insurgency operations in Malaya, South Vietnam and post2001 Afghanistan.
During the Malayan Emergence one General mentioned that the only role of a
divisional commander should be to go round seeing that the troops have got their
beer! (Thompson, 1966, p. 61). Such limited role on an army in counterinsurgencies appears in contradiction to what the US army has been doing in places
such as South Vietnam or Afghanistan. The analysis of military culture sheds light on
why armies act differently in similar circumstances. Ong Wei Chong rightfully
argues that while the British COIN rests on a highly integrated minimal force ()
that neither alienates a target population nor undermines its legitimacy and
credibility, the American Army has institutionalised preference for big wars
(2007, pp. 5,7). Past experiences, such as the Boer War, the Irish Troubles and the
Amristar massacre in 1919, demonstrated the Britons that unrestrained use of force
leads to alienation of the indigenous population, political illegitimacy at home and,
ultimately, to defeat (Mockaitis, 1990). On the contrary, the US Armys main
experiences were considered the World Wars.
More specifically, the British Army conceived of airpower as a means of
intimidation and, as in the case of Malaya, a means of tactical deployment of troops,
air supply, voice flights, and reconnaissance missions (Mockaitis, 1990, p. 215). On

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the contrary, the US Army considered it its greatest technological advantage against
the insurgents (Laqueur, 1998, p. 275). Such unrestrained use of force characterised
by outrageous airpower shooting and heavy attacks on the hamlets severely damaged
their credibility with the rural population (Ong, 2007, p. 16). Moreover, in the case of
Afghanistan, heavy airstrikes and substantial US support to war lords did managed to
topple the Taliban regime, but did not extinguish the insurgency. The Taliban crossed
the border into Pakistan and so southern Afghanistan returned to a civil war-like state
in which tribes fought for power (International Crisis Group, 2011, p.5). In the words
of John Nagl, their differing organisational cultures lies behind the fact that the
British army was a learning institution and the American army was not (2005, p.
xiv).
Population security is indeed one of the most important aspects of COIN, but it
is definitely not synonymous with fighting the insurgents. In fact, the roles of the
police and the intelligence are highly relevant for waging successful counterinsurgencies (Thompson, 1966, pp. ,88). The police ensures the applicability of law
and security, thus reinforcing the confidence of people. Since major operations are
rarely useful for defeating insurgents, good intelligence leads to minor operations
which slowly add up. These two aspects of counter-insurgencies help prevent
political subversion and instil credibility among the population. Only a high degree of
cooperation between the military and the political organisations can lead to a
competent balance of forces.
In the case of Malaya, the two roles of the army were to support the
government in its process to regain control of the population and to attack the areas
infiltrated by the insurgents(Thompson, 1966, p. 105). But in neither of the USs
counter-insurgency operations did the army emulate the Britons and stick to such
basic procedures. Ultimately, the inability of the army to restrain from interfering in
the political realm leads to loss of credibility and, essentially, loss of political
legitimacy. Although the US army has obviously learnt from past experiences the
limits of military intervention, the role of the army as providers of social welfare in
Afghanistan is equally detrimental to consistent counter-insurgent efforts. Marine
soldiers in Afghanistan build schools, establish health clinics, create the local
government centre, train and reform the police, assist people in conflict resolutions
and cultivate gender equality (Eikenberry, 2013). Apart from the high cost apparently it takes $1 million per year per soldiers deployed in Afghanistan, the
greatest disadvantage of such an expansive role of the military is that it hinders the

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development of a credible, efficient and legitimate government (Eikenberry, 2013). In

fact, a study in Afghanistan shows that the greatest support for the insurgency
consists in the population mostly deceived and disenchanted by the heavy reliance of
the Afghan government on the US army and the lack of indigenous governance and
security (International Crisis Group, 2011, p.10).
On the contrary, during the Malayan Emergence, the British army provided a
security umbrella for the civil administration and it oversaw the integration of the
local civil, military and political efforts into winning the hearts and minds of the
population(Ong, 2007, pp. 19, 20). In fighting an insurgency, the result will be
favourable only if the military effort is coupled with a consistent political effort to
address the main causes of unrest. By default, a consistent political effort can only be
sustained by an effective and viable indigenous government which oversees a strong
administrative structure and the fruitful collaboration of agencies.
Assuming the majority of the population remains neutral to either the
government or the insurgents, the main aim of the government should be winning
their hearts and minds (Thompson, 1966, p.63). In this sense, political stability and
determination to win are paramount to gain the confidence of strategic populations.
There is no coincidence that during the Malayan Emergency the most strategic period
of the counter-insurgency coincided with General Templers emphasis on efficient
executive power and on governmental incentives to appease the rural Chinese (Smith,
2001). Templers Citizenship Bill, which conferred Malayan citizenship to an
estimated 1,157,000 Chinese, the introduction of elections, construction of jungle
forts and provision of welfare service to Malayas aboriginal, Orang Asli, are the
most illustrative examples of the strong executive power in Malaya (Smith, 2001, pp.
67, 69, 70). It can indeed be argued that Malaya enjoyed an a priori much more
developed governmental structure. Even so, during their counter-insurgency
operations the Americans have never put consistent effort into developing efficient
and accountable governments.
In South Vietnam, the Diem government and administration were rather
corrupt, land reform failing and he never attempted to win the hearts and minds of his
population by creating a common sense of identity (Laqueur, 1998, p. 270). In terms
of appeasing the peasantry, he never reached the countryside and, in fact, corruption
alienated the peasants (Ramakrishna, 2002, p. 208). What further decreased the
governments legitimacy was the abrogation of the Constitution after the fall of Diem

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(Thompson, 1966, p. 66). Considering that the Constitution is the ultimate source of
authority and the foundation of human rights within a state, its abrogation meant the
elimination of both aspects mentioned above. As such, distrust replaced legitimacy
and the lack of state authority created a power vacuum which would slowly be filled
through the astute propaganda of VietCong.

A very relevant example which demonstrates the detrimental effect of

inefficient organisation and administration is the situation of the strategic hamlets in
Vietnam. In Malaya the isolation of the population was successfully achieved through
the creation of resettlements which were properly guarded and administered
(Thompson, 1966, p. 122). On the contrary, in Vietnam the advanced intrusion of the
insurgents demanded much higher levels of organisation and efficiency. The
inappropriate administration of the hamlets which sought to impose political elites
caused high waves of distrust among the population. The Ngo regime was repeatedly
accused of dictatorship and tyranny, and so it failed to adequately managed the one
sphere which might have saved South Vietnam (Thompson, 1966, p. 126).
Moreover, the high amount of financial aid the US had provided provided inflicted
upon Diem a sense of financial independence which distanced him from the
population. As such, there was no need for him to seek the popular support and try
gain the confidence of people (Kahin and Lewis, 1967). A similar scenario also
occurred in Afghanistan.
The Afghans have lost credibility in both the Karzai government and the US.
Firstly, the government has demonstrated its inability to efficiently deal with criminal
organisations, corrupt police officers and state officials, lack of basic healthcare,
unemployment, inviable justice system etc. The population has lost any sense of
credibility in the government and this is the more obvious as people seek the support
of the Taliban for such basic services. For instance, tribal leaders demand their help
to fight patrons in the Kabul government and Afghans seem to increasingly rely on
the Talibans harsh justice system (Eikenberry, 2013)(International Crisis Group,
2011, p.10). Secondly, blindly backing Karzais government and the refusal to attack
the Taliban in Pakistan and along the Durand line made people adamantly distrustful
of the US (Eikenberry, 2013). The rampant abuses of force carried by the US - such
as sustained bombardment of Afghan countryside, raids which violate Afghan homes,
unjustified detentions of Afghan nationals and outrageous civilian death tolls coupled with Karzais impotence to protect the population led the people into a state

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of anarchy Eikenberry, 2013). There is no wonder that the Talibans propaganda is

strategically built on the countrys ills (International Crisis Group, 2011, p.10).
During the Malayan Emergence, the psychological aspect of the counterinsurgency emergences as a sine qua non for victory. In addition to the governments
effective use of functional propaganda in appeasing the rural Chinese, Kumar
Ramakrishna points out the role of propaganda in generating mental pressures on the
public and the terrorists (2002, p. 3). Briggss and Templers efficient employment
of propaganda and psychological warfare has often been quoted as one of the pillars
of their victory. In short, their psychological warfare strategy rested on a civil
approach, rejected hatred in relation to surrendered individuals, was thoroughly based
on the truth, prevented the guerilla from seizing initiative and was sensitive to the
local culture (Ong, 2007, p. 30). A strong civil-military cooperation commanded the
army a strategic role in the psychological warfare which mainly involved leaflet
dissemination and voice aircrafts. An efficient executive power carried the merger
between the old Department of Information and the Emergency Information Services
into the Information Services Department and (Smith, 2001). The key lied in the facts
that this propaganda by words was fully consistent with deeds. The surrender policy
promised fair treatments to all the MCP defectors and the increase in rewards
sounded extremely attractive in particular to peasants (Ramakrishna, 2002).
While propaganda and psychological warfare were effectively employed by the
government during the Malayan Emergency, in the case of South Vietnam and
Afghanistan the situation was the total opposite. Not only was the government
discrediting this aspect of counter-insurgency, but is was the insurgents themselves
who successfully adopted this strategy. In contrast to Malaya, in South Vietnam the
airforce was used for disseminating bomb shells as opposed to leaflets. However,
when they did distribute leaflets, they were highly inappropriate due to the inability
of the US to adequately understand the local culture. Leaflets which depicted scarcely
dressed women were distributed with the purpose of encouraging the VietCong men
to return home (Ong, 2007, p. 32). Needless to mention, this diminished all chances
the US had at gaining the confidence of the locals. In fact, it has been documented
that propaganda has been much more efficiently implemented by the VietCong. Their
cadres displayed the image of the poor and dedicated fighter, and at times silenced
their ideological overtones in favour of more comprehensive patriotic ones (Laqueur,
1998, p.273). Facing a highly aggressive foreign power and an inefficient

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government, the population of South Vietnam felt insecure and lacked any credibility
towards any official authority structures.
The situation in Afghanistan resembles South Vietnam at its best and is in
complete opposition to Malaya. As previously mentioned, the Afghan governments
inability to cater for its people has severely affected the populations levels of
confidence. When deeds fail to meet the expectations, words can rarely help regain
credibility. For instance, the government broke its promises of amnesty and failed to
ensure the security of defected insurgents. Unlike the surrender policy successfully
implemented during the Malayan Emergency, in Afghanistan the government would
engage in false agreements in order to arrest, torture or murder ex-Taliban members.
Also, the governments crafts amnesty deals which include property and land
ownership only to later back down due to bureaucratic or tribal misunderstandings
(International Crisis Group, 2011, p. 11). It is obvious that members of the Taliban
who are disenchanted with the group lack any real incentive of returning into the
community. Risking deceit, severe punishment or even death, they lose all credibility
in the government and refocus on the Taliban.
Similarly to the VietCong, the Taliban take advantage of the deplorable
situation of the government and craft a propaganda which emphasises their
inevitability and invincibility (International Crisis Group, 2008, p. 33). The
psychological element of the insurgency is splendidly illustrated in a statement the
Taliban issued in response to the USs deployment of additional 3000 soldiers in
2008: We will never forgive those people who brought the Americans to our
territory and those who entered Kabul supported by American warplanes, because the
nation will never forgive them: they have sold their Afghan identity and freedom
(International Crisis Group, 2008, p. 22). Such powerful rhetorics point out the
necessity of fighting insurgencies with words. Because, essentially, insurgencies are
credibility wars (Ong, 2007, p. 3).
Paraphrasing Sir Thompsons principles and understanding the
foundation of which they rest become paramount when discussing their universality.
It would be inappropriate to claim they are universally applicable, but there are
several conceptual aspects of counter-insurgencies which seem general due to the
ontological nature of insurgencies. When fighting insurgents, the most important
thing is to avoid the political subversion of the neutral majority of the population.
This happens by gaining their confidence and not by using unrestrained force. The

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limited role of the military must be complemented with a greater role played by
efficient governments. By securing the population and catering their short term and
long term needs, the populations confidence in the government will increase to the
detriment of the insurgents. Also relevant, the government must show determination
to win and must use a vivid rhetoric which would gain the credibility of the people.
Using the right words could help instil confidence in the people and psychological
warfare against the insurgents is very important. The government will gain credibility
by staying truthful and being indiscriminate. Such general guidelines help
accommodate the varying circumstances. Nevertheless, by means of conceptual
identification, insurgencies are different but the same everywhere.
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