World War I, it was feared in Japan that, after the end of the war, which was
a battle between white races, those white races would unite to confront the
yellow races.
In December 1918 (7th Year of Taish) in Yokohama, one day before the
departure of the Japanese delegation to the Paris Conference, members
received an official directive from the government that included the following
instructions on the issue of the League of Nations:
Because racial discrimination among nations has not been eliminated
yet, the League of Nations could bring grave disadvantages to Japan.
If the League is going to be established, however, Japan cannot
remain an outsider, which would make Japan isolated. Thus, in order
to eliminate disadvantages for Japan that could derive from racial
discrimination, the delegation is instructed to argue as much as
possible for an appropriate guarantee against these disadvantages.
This shows that the Japanese government was truly worried that the white
races, which occupied the overwhelming majority at the League of Nations,
would act with high-handedness, adopting all kinds of pro-white rules as
they wished. As it happened, however, Japan was appointed a member of the
Leagues Council and it never became the victim of any racial discrimination
in the operation of the League. In retrospect, Japan was a little bit paranoid,
overanxious about future racial problems.
What Japan took up as a specific issue during the Paris Peace Conference
was the principle of abolition of racial discrimination within each country.
Because of Britains global hegemony since the 17th century, the majority
of the underdeveloped fertile land in the world at that time had been
monopolized by the Anglo-Saxon countries. While it was the racial
discrimination against the Japanese immigrants in the United States that
agonized Japan the most in those days, Japanese immigrants were de facto
shut out from such fertile lands as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and
South Africa from the beginning. It was the intention of the Japanese
delegation to create a stir on this issue.
What the Japanese side proposed was that, because member countries of
the League of Nations would be treated equally, racial discrimination against
as promptly and as much as possible. Britain also did not find it possible to
oppose initially, but asked for time to ponder on the proposal. As the
objections by members of the British Empire became known, however,
Britain itself became increasingly unsupportive.
In contrast, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand were adamantly
against the Japanese argument. Prime Minister William Hughes of
Australia, in particular, went so far as to leave the negotiation table,
claiming the proposal was utterly unacceptable to the public in his country.
Hughes attitude was so eccentric that Prime Minister Louis Botha of South
Africa confided to Makino, Strictly between you and me, I cannot help but
call him a madman. Hughes consistently remained a man of clear-cut views
and, in the later debate on whether the Anglo-Japanese Alliance should be
continued, he strongly argued for its continuation against others who argued
for its abolition, including Canada.
Meanwhile, Japan tried to make compromises in Paris, and, in the end, it
conceded to drop the principle of the abolition of racial discrimination from
the main text of the Covenant of the League of Nations and insert it in the
preamble instead. This made the principle an unbinding proclamation of the
Covenant. Nevertheless, Japan failed to obtain agreement from participating
countries before going into a vote. As it turned out, eleven out of sixteen
participating countries voted for the Japanese proposal, while five rejected it,
including Britain and the United States. Britain found it had no other choice
than to represent the intention of members of the British Empire. Although
the U.S. government had been sympathetic with the Japanese proposal, it
had to vote against it, in order to prevent Australia from leaving the League,
which would make the U.S. government a target of harsh criticism and
attacks from its Western states. Thus, the vote left a bitter aftertaste for
many of the participants. U.S. President Wilson, who presided over the
conference, declared that the proposal have been rejected because it failed to
win unanimous support. Makino protestedto no availsaying there were
other cases that proposals had been adopted by a majority vote. On April 11,
Makino delivered a speech in order to leave Japans position in the official
record.
The Japanese public naturally became highly indignant.
Local newspapers in France were generally sympathetic to Japan. La
When Yuan Shikai proclaimed his reign as Emperor of the Chinese Empire
on January 1, 1916, influential leaders and groups in various locations
around China rose in revolt. This was the Third Revolution (,
Constitutional Protection Movement), which forced Yuan to abandon
monarchism on March 22. Yuan died, disheartened, on June 5, 1916.
Although Li Yuanhong succeeded Yuans presidency, the real power of the
regime was soon overtaken by Premier Duan Qirui. Being a competent man,
Duan managed to remain an influential figure in the Beiyang Government
until the Northern Expedition by Chiang Kai-shek in 1926, withstanding
numerous civil wars and power struggles.
Meanwhile, Sun Yat-sen established a military government in
Guangdong in 1917, followed by Zhang Zuolins seizure of Manchuria in 1918,
both of which posed threats to the Beiyang Government. In 1921, the
Communist Party of China was organized in Shanghai in 1921.
Nishihara Loans
Meanwhile, Japans policies also underwent changes.
Although the government of Prime Minister kuma Shigenobu had
announced its support of Yuan Shikais monarchism around the time of the
Twenty-One Demands, it changed its attitude as Yuans Chinese Empire
became unpopular both within and outside China. In the end, the kuma
government joined the Western powers in recommending the abolition of
monarchism. As China began to show signs of disintegration during the
turmoil following the Third Revolution, the kuma government decided to
secretly support nongovernmental anti-Yuan movements promoted by
so-called tairiku-rnin (Japanese adventurers and political activists in
China).
Because Li adopted a policy of north-south reconciliation after Yuans
death, the Japanese idea to take advantage of Chinas disintegration became
unviable, forcing Japan to change its policy toward the support of Li and
Duan. More specifically, the Japanese government tried to bring the Duan
regime under its control by means of economic assistance. The so-called
Nishihara Loans played the central role in this.
Although Nishihara Kamez was a private citizen who had been closely
associated with Terauchi Masatake since the latter was Governor-General of
counter the Monroe Doctrine of the United States, and insisted that it was
high time to invest Japans surplus capital into China, seeing as Japan at
that time had accumulated a huge amount of foreign reserves due to the war
boom. It was the combination of Gots big talk, Terauchis soldier-like
simple-mindedness, and general distrust of the foreign ministry since its
mishandling of joining World War I and issuing the Twenty-One Demands
that led to the decision to entrust a private citizen with the entire loan
negotiation with China. The decision became easy prey for leading figures of
the Duan government with a quick eye for gain. If one had to look for any
positive outcome of the Nishihara Loans for Japan, one could only argue that,
during the period, the Duan government remained very cooperative with
Japan and agreed to sign the Sino-Japanese Military Treaty at the time of
the Siberian Intervention.
To say a word for the honor of Duan, he did not accept the Japanese offer
only for monetary gain.
When asked in a TV program about the Chinese dignitaries he had
associated with, Yoshida Shigeru singled out Duan and praised him, saying,
He was a magnificent man who talked about nothing but his country.
Yoshida added that Duans true ambition was for China to recover eastern
Siberia in collaboration with Japan.
It so happened that, at that time, the United States was devoid of any legal
argument for denouncing Japans loans to China.
At a time when no European countries could afford to pay attention to the
Far East due to the war in Europe, it was only the United States that had
both suspicions concerning Japans advance to the Far East and the power to
stop it. As described in previous chapters, the United States attempted in
vain to form a four-country consortium with Britain, France, and Germany,
excluding Japan and Russia, to provide loans to Qing. Given the realities in
the Far East, participation by Japan and Russia was found essential, upon
which the United States withdrew from the consortium on the grounds that
the conditions for the loans interfered in Qings sovereignty. Although the
consortium survived the withdrawal of the United States and, subsequently,
Germany, all the membersJapan, Russia, Britain, and Francewere
participants in World War I. They could not afford to raise opposition to
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11
consider that the current U.S. attitude toward China derives from the
personal sentiment of the current Secretary of State and you should
not take it seriously.
It was a blessing to have an ally, particularly when it was such an influential
ally as Britain.
The Lansing-Ishii Agreement was an exceptional document in the history
of U.S.-Japan relations in the sense that it made the United States endorse
Japans special position in China. Had it been negotiated solely bilaterally
between the two parties, Japan would never have obtained such an outcome.
This was only possible because, in the first place, Japan was fighting a
war on the same side as the United States and because, secondly, the
negotiation was aided by Britains strong influence and its skilled diplomacy.
It would not be an overstatement to say that the greatest loss for Japan from
the abolishment of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in later years was Britains
diplomatic influence, particularly concerning the United States.
On September 5, when Ishii visited the British ambassador this time, the
latter said to Ishii:
Although the United States also unofficially recognizes Japans special
position in China, it seems hesitant to acknowledge it publicly.
Because the U.S. government has never asked foreign governments to
acknowledge its Monroe Doctrine, it would not give its endorsement
even if Japan asks for it concerning China. Just like the United States,
which appears to be content with the Monroe Doctrine without asking
for foreign governments endorsement, perhaps it may be unnecessary
for Japan to ask for U.S. endorsement in writing concerning its
position in China.
Thus, the British ambassador even gave Ishii a hint about how Japan could
backstep in order to prevent the failure to reach an agreement from
developing into friction with the United States.
Additionally, the British ambassador had been instructed by the home
government to hand a document outlining how Japan had contributed to the
Entente Powers since the beginning of World War I to the U.S. secretary of
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state.
The British ambassadors advice notwithstanding, Japan succeeded in
making the U.S. government recognize Japans special position in China.
For one thing, the Japanese government had earlier obtained the pledge
of the U.S. government concerning Japans special interest in Manchuria.
When the then Ambassador to the Republic of China Paul Reinsch tried
various plots to make inroads into Japans concession in Manchuria,
Japanese ambassador to the United States Sat Aimaro asked Secretary
Lansing for clarification in January 1917. Lansing assured Sat that the U.S.
government had never issued such an instruction because it had recognized
Japans special interest in Manchuria. Although Washington had never made
a formal announcement on this issue, he said, it had de facto recognized
Japans interest and, thus, Washington had no intention to infringe on it.
In addition, the British ambassador to the United States acted as a
skillful intermediary, leaving both Japan and the United States wide room
for compromise. This benefitted Japan during the bilateral negotiations.
The Lansing-Ishii Agreement was concluded on November 2, 1917,
through an exchange of notes. The deal was struck by Lansing first sending a
formal letter to Ishii. In his reply, Ishii directly quoted Lansings letter, thus
signaling his agreement.
Background of the Agreement
If scrutinized closely, the Lansing-Ishii Agreement was an enumeration of
mutually contradictory principles, which later became controversial.
First, the agreement stated that, in recognition of a general principle that
special relations emerge between adjacent countries, the United States
recognized Japans special interest in China, particularly where the
territories of the two countries were adjacent to each other.
Yet the agreement also declared that China was perfectly entitled to
territorial sovereignty and that neither the United States nor Japan had any
intention to obstruct Chinas independence or its territorial integrity.
Pointing to the open-door principle and the principle of equal opportunity
vis--vis China, the agreement stated that it trusted the Japanese
governments guarantee that Japan would not take any action that would be
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unbeneficial to other countries trade with China, even in the region where
Japan had special interests.
Although no significant gap in interpretation had existed between the
two countries at the time of the conclusion of the agreement, differences
emerged as time went on.
At the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in August 1919, Lansing
announced that the special interests referred to in the agreement did not
include political special interest. In contrast, Ishii in his memoir Gaik
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15
initially take the stance of accepting the Chinese argument. France also
takes the position that Japan might have to return Qingdao to China,
depending on the condition.
As the conference faced rough going as expected, Balfour got together
with Japanese chief delegates Makino Nobuaki and Chinda Sutemi for a
consultation that lasted for an hour. The British Foreign Ministrys director
for Far Eastern affairs McCree also joined the discussion.
The Japanese government was prepared to return territories to China,
but it wished to retain such economic interests as the railroad and mines as
well as some settlements within China. In order to clear other countries
suspicions that Japan was greedily seeking for something more, Balfour
asked for clarification from the Japanese side on each and every specific
issue that had been raised concerning Japans intention. Some of the points
were mere propagandas used by the Chinese side, but even McCree had been
tricked.
After the consultation, Balfour instructed McCree to summarize the
one-hour discussion in a memorandum, which, after modifications and
corrections by the Japanese side, was handed to leaders of the British,
French, and U.S. governments by Balfour at a debriefing of the meeting.
Although Wilson continued to oppose some parts of the memorandum,
Balfour, again, attempted to mediate by submitting a compromise proposal.
In this way, agreement was finally reached among Japan, Britain, and the
United States.
Around the same time, the Italian delegation boycotted the Peace Conference
over the issue of a claim to Fiume and returned home. The United States, out
of fear that the League of Nations would abort if Japan, too, withdrew from
the conference, compromised over Japans arguments. The Japanese
delegation, as a matter of fact, had been instructed by the home office in
Tokyo not to sign the Covenant of the League of Nations if Japans request
regarding the Shandong Peninsula was rejected. In other words, the United
States sacrificed its principle in order to salvage the League of Nations.
A similar process was repeated toward the end of World War II. It is
believed that the Soviet Union had been prepared to be accommodative in
terms of the demarcation of occupied territory in East Europe, assuming
Britain and the United States would find it uncomfortable for the Soviet
16
Union to advance into the west beyond the pre-war German-Soviet border.
As soon as the Soviet Union learned about the Four Policemen
arrangementthat is, the Soviet Unions participation in the United
Nationsthat the United States had really been after, the Soviet Union
stopped referring to taking an accommodative stance and, instead,
concentrated on expanding its occupied territory.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, too, sacrificed the actual American benefits in
international politics in order to realize an idealistic institutionthe United
Nations. This was a manifestation of American idealism.
In contrast to Franklin Roosevelt, who persisted with dealing with the
aftermath of World War II through the United Nations ignoring Winston
Churchill, who insisted on relying on power politics, Woodrow Wilson
salvaged the League of Nations by accepting British mediation during the
Paris Peace Conference. Wilsons decision might have reflected the reality of
the time when Britains power was still too great to ignore. It was truly
thanks to Britains support that Japan was able to pursue its double-edged
diplomacy of implementing imperialistic policies and participating in the
League of Nations.
It was indeed heaven-given for a country like Japan, which was unfamiliar
with international diplomacy due to its historical and geographical tradition
of isolation, to have a friend like Britain.
When we recall that, in later years, Japan had to deal with the
Manchurian Incident without the benefit of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and
that Japan still could have had a chance to settle the issue with a mutual
compromise had it accepted the Lytton Report, drafted by a British diplomat,
we can easily imagine how important Britain was to Japan.
The Chinese delegation announced that it would sign the peace treaty
with Germany except for the clause on the Shandong Peninsula. But for a
country to sign this kind of treaty and remain unrestricted by some of its
clauses was against the international law practice and unacceptable to the
participants of the Paris Conference, including chairperson Georges
Clemenceau. The Chinese delegation consequently abstained from the treaty
signing ceremony on June 28, 1919. In fact, a storm of protest was blowing in
China that would not allow its delegation to participate in the ceremony.
On May 4, hearing that an agreement had been reached among Japan,
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Britain, and the United States on April 30, some 3,000 Chinese students got
together in a protest meeting at Tiananmen Square and rushed to the
Japanese legation. Their rally was blocked, and students raided the
residents of pro-Japanese dignitaries instead. The protest movement spread
to all over the country in no time and a nationwide strike was launched in
June. Although the Beijing government had initially attempted to restrict
students, it instead released detained students and purged pro-Japanese
dignitaries as the protest movement became widespread. This was the May
Fourth Movement that marked the beginning of a new era of anti-Japanese
sentiments among the Chinese.
Two New Trends in the 20th Century
Chiang Kai-shek concisely summarized the history around that time as
follows in his book Chinas Destiny:
The Japanese imperialists, first, imposed the Twenty-One Demands
on China, taking advantage of Yuan Shikais monarchical ambition;
next succeeded in providing political loans to accommodate the
militaristic policy of the Beiyang Army regime; then concluded the
Sino-Japan Military Treaty that allowed Japan to advance its troops
to Manchuria; willfully conquered Qingdao; and finally demanded the
concessions in the railroad and mines that Germany had had on the
Shandong Peninsula. This was a national humiliation that shattered
our peoples hope and insulted our self-confidence. It resulted in
inducing a strong desire for a revolution among the Chinese people.
The May Fourth Movement was nothing but the most vivid expression
of this desire.
If one reviews those five years of Sino-Japanese relations from the
perspective of a Chinese nationalistic revolutionary, this would exactly be
the way the incident occurred as Chiang Kai-shek described above. In
contrast to the historical views of Yuan Shikai and Duan Qirui, who had to
be actually engaged in dealing with Japan, Chiang represented the southern
revolutionaries, who had a conflict of interest with the Beiyang regime. As
the Chinese Nationalist Party became the mainstream of the Chinese
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