Anda di halaman 1dari 9

SECURITY PLAN

FOR

VALVE CHANGEOUT OF 6X 300# AT EBUBU MANIFOLD

BY

ANASAMI CONSTRUCTION NIG. LTD

SEPTEMBER 2014

Page 1 of 9

1. INTRODUCTION
SPDC drives to make our facilities safe for operation. This has led to a plan to replace passing valves in SPDC land
manifolds . Anasami Construction Nig. Ltd has been instructed to repalce a valve at Ebubu manifold during this shutdown
date planned for September 2014.
OUTLINE OF TASK/SCOPE OF WORKS
The scope of work for this Project shall include the following:

Pre-mob Inspection/certification of personnel


Collection of SPDC issued valve
Secure FTO with the Host Communities.
Mobilisation and demobilisation of equipment and personnel to site
Removal of passing valve and installation of new valve at Ebubu mf.
Application of paint
Re-instatement of site/demobilisation
Close-out Documentation:- The Contractor shall submit a close-out report of the project inclusive of still
pictures of site works to SPDC for archiving.

JOB LOCATION/COMMUNITY: Ebubu


a.

ACCOMODATION: SPDC and Contractor personnel shall go to site from Shell I.A except otherwise
stated
No. of personnel: SPDC 8; Contractor 15
b. The purpose of this plan is to ensure the Security of staff both during moves to and from the worksite and
during the task, in line with SPDC convoy movement Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and best
practice to reduce risks to As Low As Reasonably Possible (ALARP).
c. Programme and duration of Works: TWO MONTHS, commencing 09/09/14

The crew shall be going to site daily from Shell I.A with a dedicated JTF cover throughout the life of the project.
c. THREAT ASSESSMENT:
Threat Summary Table for Area:
Threat Source/Rating

Low

Medium

High

Violent Crime

H7

Organised Crime

H7

Militant Activism

Extreme

L3

Civil Unrest

M4

Armed Conflict

M5

Theft of Information

L2

Terrorism

L3

SIS COMMENT: In line with published facility and infrastructure threat rating for the week
d. SECURITY OPERATING LEVELS:
The Security plan is based on escalating Security Operating Levels (SOLs) with increased mitigations at each
level, SOLs are as follows:
Green Base line Security Performance Criteria met
Amber Increased Security measures against Generic threats
Red Elevated Security measures against specific Threats
Black Reaction to an attack or Intelligence of an imminent attack
(Further details from Group Security Standards and Security Manuals)
a. CURRENT SOL As at <03/09/14> is

Amber

Page 2 of 9

b. MITIGATIONS
Legend:
P = Probability
I = Impact
L=Low
U=Unlikely
ASA - Area Security Advisor
CRO-Community Relations Officer
Team
CH Contract Holder

ARL = Assessed Risk Level


E=Extreme
H=High
M=Medium
CSM-Security Manager
HSO- Head Security Operations
DSS-District Security Supervisor
ESR-External Security Relations
ERT-Emergency Response Team
KMT-Kidnap Management
CSR Contract Site Rep
SSR SPDC Site Rep

PROBABILITY AS DICTATED BY THREAT ASSESSMENT


SN

SECURITY
THREATS

CONTROLS/MITIGATING MEASURES

Violent
Crime
(Armed
Robbery,
Kidnapping,
Carjacking,
workplace
violence etc)

H7

Organised
Crime
(Asset
Theft,
Fraud,
Bunkering)

H7

Militant
Activism
(IED
attacks,
SAF Attacks

L3

Use of SIS intelligence


Use of 2 teams of armed GSF personnel
for security escort/cover throughout
the duration of project
Implementation of effective Journey
management
Security briefings for all staff briefed
on Threats and Security Reaction
Guidelines regularly
First Aid training for staff
Kidnap Management Team(KMT)
available
Use of SIS intelligence
Use of 2 teams of armed GSF personnel
for security escort/cover throughout
the duration of project
Effective Access Control for all staff
and contractors
Loss Prevention searches of outgoing
personnel and vehicles
Use of Property Removal passes (gate
pass)
Use of SIS intelligence
Use of 2 teams of armed GSF personnel
for security escort/cover throughout
the duration of project
Regular updates for GSF on emerging
threats, tactics and procedures(TTPs)
used by adversaries
Withdrawing from, or reducing
operations during high-risk periods
Staff Security Awareness alerts and
briefs.
Daily POB monitoring and record
keeping by CSR.
Evacuation plan in place

Page 3 of 9

SOL

ACTION
PARTY

ARL WITH
COUNTERMEASURES
IMPLEMENTED

ASA
ASA/CH/CSR

CH/CSR
PSS/CSR

M4

CH
CH

CSR/SSR
CSR/SSR

CH

M4

CH
ASA

ASA/CH/CSR

ASA

CH/ASA

ASA/CH
HSO/ASA

L1

Obtain & confirm workable MoU &


LTO/FTO

CH

Use of SIS intelligence

ASA

Good Community relations practices and


strategy.

CH

Civil/
Community
Unrest
(Work site
invasion,
Blockades,
Strikes etc)

Armed
Conflict
(Inter/Intra
tribal/cult
fighting, JTF
Operations)

Theft of
Information
(Industrial
Espionage,
Theft of
propriety
information
for Financial
gain)

Terrorism

M4

M5

CH/CRO
L2

Evacuating staff and none essential


personnel during crisis periods.

CH

Employ local labour where applicable.

CH

Prompt payment of wages/salaries of


community labourers

CH

Use of 2 teams of armed GSF personnel


for security escort/cover throughout
the duration of project

Use of 2 teams of armed GSF personnel


for security escort/cover throughout
the duration of project
Use of SIS intelligence
Journey Management

CH
L3

Obtain & confirm workable MoU &


LTO/FTO

ASA

Clear Desk/Vehicle Policy

CH

Securing of Sensitive information

CH

L2

Continuous liaison with Government,


Host Communities and Security
agencies

CH

Awareness Briefings and training

L1

ASA/CH
CR/CH

L3

SIS monitoring

Use of SIS intelligence


Use of 2 teams of armed GSF personnel
for security escort/cover throughout
the duration of project

ASA

Page 4 of 9

L1

e. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
Vehicle Requirement
Ser
Use
#

Type of vehicle

Quantity/SOL

01

Work Equipment

Self Loader

Movement of materials to site

02

Escort

Hilux

For security escort/cover

03

Passenger

Bus/Hilux

04

Other

1/1

Security Manpower Requirement Summary


Ser
Type
Quantity at SOL
#
1
SPY Police
8
2
Armed Officers/MOPOL
3
4
5
6

Movement of work crew to/fro site

Remarks

To provide security escort/cover for personnel,


materials, and equipment

SPY Drivers
JTF
SSS
Other

Communications
Ser #
Type of communications
available
1
On Site landline
2
On Site POC
3
GSM network
4
VHF comms with Control Room
f.

Remarks

Yes

No

Remarks
n
t
GSM shall be used as means of communication

REACTION TO INCIDENTS/CONTINGENCY PLANS:


Priority in all incidents is to the safety of staff
o Route to venue/worksite blocked Use alternate route/return to base location
o Attack/Incident on route to/from venue Return to Base Location/Summon Security/GSF Assistance
o Attack on venue Lock Down work site, move staff to safe location, summon Security/GSF assistance
o Kidnapping of Staff Account for remaining staff, Inform Security Representative, Initiate Kidnap
Management Team
o Lost Comms Use Alternate communications(GSM/VHF/messenger etc)
ALL Security related incidents are to be reported to SPDC Security Representative (ASA)

g. CONTACT DETAILS
Position

Name

Telephone

Manager, Security OPS


Land East
ASA, Pipeline

Mitchell Joshua O

08070339383

Akamdiocha Onwuliri

08070323548

Contract Holder

Saniyo Eworitse

08070341759

Contractor Rep

Esan Yinka

08033296373

SPDC Site Rep.

Inalegwu Agbambo

08036410696

Security Control Room

080702 22929

SPDC Medical

080702 39133

SPDC Fire Service

080702 39144

SPDC Oil Response

080702 39177

Page 5 of 9

Email

Remarks

h. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS:

i.

Contractor shall be responsible for security of personnel, materials, and equipment throughout
the duration of the project
As may be advised by GSA, use of 2 teams of armed GSF personnel to provide security
escort/cover for work crew throughout the duration of project
CSR to liaise with PSS and latch onto GSF deployments at Ebubu for additional security support
if required
Contractor shall be responsible for the engagement of locals to secure equipment and materials
at close of work each day throughout the duration of project. Locals must daily liaise with GSA at
Ebubu for support if required.
CH shall be responsible for ensuring compliance with PSP and where review/extension is
necessary, CH should apply at least one week before the expiration of PSP.
FTO must be obtained before mobilisation to site.
This PSP is subject to immediate review as security threat and SOL changes.
A copy of this PSP must be given to the PSS/DSS on site before the commencement of the
project
Also, take note of Attachments 1, 2 & 3 and comply accordingly.
Contract holder to ensure that GSAs deployed by the contractor to the work site comply
with the VPSHR
APPROVALS

_______________________
Esan Yinka
Contractor Representative

_______________________________
Saniyo Eworitse
Contract Holder

___________________________
Akamdiocha Onwuliri
Area Security Adviser

_______________________________
Mitchell Joshua O
Manager, Security Operations, Land East

Page 6 of 9

Attachment 1
CHANGE IN SOL FOR OBIGBO AND AFAM/OKOLOMA LOCATIONS: REVISED SECURITY
MEASURES EFFECTIVE 8TH AUGUST 2011
Vince/Andrew/Isaac,
The Security Operating Level (SOL) for Imo River, Afam/Okoloma, and Obigbo in the Land-1 Asset team was raised from Amber to
Red on 4th December 2010 and has remained so for over 7 months now. The reasons for raising the SOL were published as stated
below:
Threat Assessment summary
The JTF operations in Abia State (which is still in progress) has destroyed most of the kidnap camps in the vicinity
leading to fractionalization of the criminal groups. Most of these splitter groups are now on the move and carry
out criminal activities without established operational bases.
The threat level in the areas North-East PHC is classified as HIGH. This threat level is predicted to persist till the
end of the year because of the yuletide.
The most vulnerable aspect of our business is personnel-in-transit since the locations/facilities are fully protected
with JTF deployments.
Operational Mitigation measures
In the light of the foregoing the Security Operating Level (SOL) for Imo River, Obigbo and Afam/Okoloma are hereby raised fro m
current AMBER to RED effective 04/12/10.
The threat level for the area has improved with the killing of the key militant by GSA in January 2011. Moreover, the government has
established an Army Brigade by Asa (just adjacent the Imo River field along the express road). Since this deployment, kidnapping
and other criminal activities within this area have been reduced to the barest minimum. In fact, no kidnap case has been reported
along this axis by our intelligence group in the past 4 months. The current threat assessment for Obigbo and Afam/Okoloma does
not indicate any special threat to the area than general criminality that is common everywhere in the Niger Delta. However, major
concerns still exist in respect of Imo River and therefore the SOL for the location will remain at RED.
In the light of the above the SOL for Obigbo & Afam/Okoloma has been lowered from RED to AMBER effective Monday 8th
August 2011. Consequently, the following operational mitigation measures will apply as from 8th August 2011:
1. A JTF patrol team of 10 with 2 vehicles has been established to patrol the route from Obigbo junction to Afam
from 6am to 6pm. The team will be provided with gsm to have communication with SCC at IA.
2. Logistics Department is to carry out a re-assessment of the alternative route in view of the deplorable condition of
the currently approved route through Obigbo town. The current security arrangement is considered adequate to
support any of the two routes.
3. The POBs at these facilities can now return to full capacity.
4. The duties of the Risk Management Team (RMT) may need to be reviewed. EPLT approval is no longer required
security-wise but may still be necessary for Imo River and other Out-of-GPHC locations for business-criticality
reasons. For all trips out-of-GPHC locations (requiring RMT approval) the escort composition will be 4 armed
personnel + 1 driver (minimum).
5. Daily convoy movement of personnel (expatriates & Nigerians) to these locations by road can now resume
fully. Those moving by convoy (3 vehicles max.) will require JTF escort with 2 vehicles (lead and chase). Those
moving in a single stand-alone vehicle will require only 1 MOPOL escort vehicle (chase). Nigerians living close to
these locations are free to drive to work if they so desire.
6. The same guidelines apply for Agbada location except that all escorts will be by MOPOL because it is within
GPHC.
7. Car parking arrangement at these facilities must henceforth be strictly monitored and controlled along with the
access control processes of the facilities.
8. Intra-field movement (i.e. movements to well heads and other sites outside FLB/FS) escorts henceforth shall be
authorized by the District Security Supervisors (DSS) on site.

Solomon Asen
Head, Security Operations Eastern Delta

Page 7 of 9

Attachment 2
5.4 Security Resources
Security Operating Level: BLACK

Force
Sy Personnel
JTF
SPY
MOPOL
Navy
SSS
Community
Guards
Community
Surveillance

Vehicles

Porta-kabin

House- boat

Gunboat

Other(State)

Vehicles
2 Hilux

Porta-kabin

House- boat

Gunboat

Other(State)

Security Operating Level: RED

Force
Sy Personnel
JTF
12
SPY
MOPOL
Navy
SSS
Community
Guards
Community
Surveillance

Security Operating Level: AMBER

Force
Sy Personnel
JTF
SPY
MOPOL
8
Navy
SSS
Community
Guards
Community
Surveillance

Vehicles

Porta-kabin

House- boat

Gunboat

Porta-kabin

House- boat

Gunboat

Other(State)

2 Hilux

Security Operating Level: GREEN

Force
Sy Personnel
JTF
SPY
MOPOL
Navy
SSS
Community
Guards
Community
Surveillance

Vehicles

Page 8 of 9

Other(State)

Attachment 3
4.1

Guidelines on
Human Rights

the

Voluntary

Principles

on

Security

and

The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPSHR) provide


practical guidance to companies, on how to maintain the safety and
security of their operations, with respect for the human rights and
fundamental freedoms of people in surrounding communities.
The implementation of the Voluntary Principles is a cooperation
effort,
which should
involve
all
three
participating
pillars
(government, companies, and NGOs)
The Voluntary Principles covers three (3) key areas:
Risk Assessment
Interaction between Companies and Government Security
Interaction between Companies and Private Security
Companies are obliged to:
check available human rights records of the security forces with
which they work
ensure that the type and number of forces deployed are competent,
appropriate and proportionate
record, report and investigate any credible allegations of human
rights abuses
Where force is used, it should be properly investigated and
reported.
Security Forces are obliged to:
Attempt to use non-violent means to resolve issues before using
force and firearms
Issue a warning and give sufficient time for suspects to heed that
warning before resorting to the use of firearms
Provide medical aid for injured persons where force is used

Page 9 of 9