Man and World 21:327-346 (1988)

9 Kluwer Academic Publishers

Gadamer and philosophical ethics

MICHAEL KELLY
Baruch College, City University of New York

Philosophical ethics, understood as a theory of ethical reflection,

has been under the shadow of skepticism throughout much of
the twentieth century. This has been true in the Anglo-American
tradition because of emotivism, and in the Continental tradition
because of existentialism? The emotivists charge that ethical
theory can never attain the objectivity that is required for a
valid scientific theory; whereas the existentialists claim that any
ethical theory is too formal or abstract, and thus inherently
impractical. A belief shared by these two traditions is that, because ethical theory is either impossible or impractical, philosophical ethics itself is impossible.
Since the 1960s, however, there has been a revival of interest
in ethics, both within the philosophical community and in the
public at large. Although the reasons for this revival are varied,
they are, in general, external to philosophy proper. That is, one
of the reasons is not that philosophers have reached a consensus
about how to establish an objective and practical ethical theory.
This is evident from the fact that their interest in ethics is often
accompanied by a skepticism similar to that which marked emotivism and existentialism. ~ The result is that philosophical ethics
still seems impossible today.
What causes this skepticism about philosophical ethics? The
answer is, I think, that philosophers have been uncertain about
what ethical theory is and what it can be expected to achieve.
Since the principal way in which philosophy can contribute to
ethics is by developing an ethical theory that explains the structure of ethical reflection and its relation to ethical practice, the
consequence of this uncertainty is that philosophers have con-

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tributed little to ethics. Moreover, many have convinced themselves that, in principle, they cannot contribute.
Hans-Georg Gadamer is more encouraging about the possibility
of philosophical ethics. For this and several other reasons, ] shall
discuss the relevance of his philosophical hermeneutics to the
overcoming of ethical skepticism. First of all, he provides a very
insightful, if succinct, account of why philosophical ethics proves
so difficult. 3 A second reason is that he proposes a model of
ethical theory, based on a partial synthesis of Aristotelian and
Kantian ethics, which will help to restore our confidence in philosophical ethics. After explaining this synthesis, I shall return
to the issue of skepticism in the third section. My overall purpose
here is to describe, develop, and defend Gadamer's contribution to
philosophical ethics.

Why, according to Gadamer, is philosophical ethics so vulnerable

to skepticism? The problem is that, while it is theoretical, ethical
reflection cannot reject the demand that it also be of practical
relevance;4 it must be theoretical and practical at the same time.
Even Kant, by reputation the archformalist, accepts this demand
- even pure reason must be practical. Many ethical theorists
since Kant have struggled with this issue. It was prominent in
Hegel's critique of Kant and later in Kierkegaard's critique of
Hegel. Against the priority given to the categorical imperative in
Kant's ethics, Hegel emphasized the concrete, if universal, forms
of ethical life (the family, civil society, and state) within which
ethical laws are determined. Against Hegel, Kierkegaard introduced the notion of choice, the concrete m o m e n t when an ethical decision has to be made. At such a moment, both general laws
tested by the categorical imperative and the universal forms of
ethical life are too abstract; for there is a single individual making
a choice that is marked by both its transitory nature and the absoluteness of its resolve: "ethical choice is not a matter of theoretical knowledge, but rather of the clarity, sharpness, and affliction of conscience."s
The basic problem in both critiques, which continues to echo

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in more recent discussions about ethical theory, is the generality
of ethical reflection: "In so far as ethics is understood as a knowledge of the general, it is involved in the ethical questionableness
that is connected with the concept o f general laws. ''~ How can a
general ethical theory do justice to the concrete, practical situations of ethical life, that is, the context o f deliberation and action?
It seems either that a general theory cannot have any practical
efficacy at all, or that, in order to satisfy the criteria of objectivity
and impartiality which characterize such a theory, we have to abstract so much from what defines us as concrete individuals that
we suffer from what has recently been referred to as "moral alienation, ''~ that is, we have to alienate ourselves from ourselves and
from other humans qua individuals in order to have an ethical
theory. In the first case, the practical value and usefulness of ethical theory is very dubious, while in the second case the price we
have to pay for theory is simply too high. On the other hand, if
we abandon ethical theory because of the problems stemming
from its generality, we thereby faIt into decisionism, the position
t h a t our ethical choices are made according to the demands o f
the m o m e n t , which may or m a y not be rational, may or may not
be consistent, m a y or may not be moral.
Gadamer argues that there are two possible ways to resolve
these problems: one is Aristotle's link between phronesis and
ethos, and the other is Kant's formalism combined with his
notion of the "natural dialectic" in ethical reflection. 8 The two
ways are not intended as separate paths, however. Gadamer suggests that a partial synthesis of these two ethical theories may
resolve the problem of philosophical ethics; for Aristotle and
Kant both attempted to establish a clear conceptual relationship
between ethical theory and practice so that philosophical ethics
can avoid irrelevance, skepticism, and decisionism.
The suggestion o f such a synthesis, however, is initially as paradoxical as the issue it is supposed to resolve is problematic. For
Aristotle's ethics is based on the notion o f phronesis, a practical
reason that is conditioned by its ethos - the customs, habits,
laws, etcetera, o f the political life by which it is formed and in
which it operates. Kant's ethics, on the other hand, is based on
an idea o f pure practical reason, which is a priori and thus unconditioned by empirical factors (e.g., desires, interests, etc.).

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How can these two ethical theories be combined when they are
based on what seem to be two opposing notions of practical
reason? How can the conditionedness and unconditionedness o f
practical reason be reconciled? On the answer to this question
depends the possibility o f philosophical ethics.
Gadamer argues that the conflict between conditionedness
and unconditionedness is not so m u c h a conflict between two conceptions o f practical reason as one within practical reason itself.
The autonomy o f ethical reason certainly has the character o f
intelligible self-determination. But that does not exclude the
empirical conditionedness o f all human actions and decisions ....
The recognition o f human conditionedness is compatible with
the sublime unconditionedness o f ethical law. 9
The conflict is between the laws that practical reason gives to
itself and the context o f ethical deliberation and action with
which these laws begin and to which they must then be applied.
The laws are unconditioned in so far as they are expressions of
practical reason's self-determination, but deliberation and action
are conditioned by the restraints on this self-determination which
are embodied in practical reason's ethos.
This account o f a conflict within practical reason may, at first,
seem more compatible with Aristotle's ethics than with Kant's.
But the "independent of experience" w h i c h is the meaning of
"pure" in Kant's idea o f pure practical reason applies as m u c h
to ethical laws as to practical reason itself. 1~ These laws are unconditioned, in effect, if they have a universal form, and their
form is universal if they pass the test o f the categorical imperative. Although these laws and the categorical imperative must be
derived from reason, this reason cannot and need not be completely a priori. According to Kant himself, it is not possible for
human practical reason to be completely pure, nor is it possible
to prove that pure reason can be practicalJ ~ I f this is true, then
there is no way that practical reason's laws can be based solely
(in Kant's terms, directly and sufficiently) on a priori reason.
Furthermore, even if practical reason's universal laws were based
on pure reason alone, they would be rather useless, because they
would lack content. In so far as practical reason's laws must have

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content (which can be derived only from what K a n t calls empirical reason) and must be applied to moral deliberation and action
(both of which are conditioned), they cannot be completely
pure. 12 Moreover, we do not need a completely pure practical
reason. Kant's goal in the second Critique -ethical laws with
universal forms - can be attained by empirical practical reason,
that is, by phronesis. There is no reason why a conditioned practical reason cannot articulate and defend laws that have a universal
form; for the conditionedness of practical reason affects only the
content and practical application of its laws. To take an example
from the legal sphere, it is possible to formulate a legal principle
- "equality before the law" - whose form is universal in the sense
that its scope (i.e., its intended application) is universal, but which
is not based on pure reason and which is not necessarily carried
out in practice. Ethical laws have a similar status. They can be
universal in form, but less than universal in content or actual application. As such, they are not products of pure reason alone,
but, at best, of a practical reason whose pure and empirical moments are inseparable. 13 Kant's goal in the second Critique is "to
prevent the empirically conditioned reason from presuming to be
the only ground of determination of the will" (KpV, p. 16 [PAE,
V:16]). To reach this goal, he did not need to prove that pure
reason alone is capable of determining the will.
Thus, the attributes "conditioned" and "unconditioned" do
not conflict, because they do not apply to the same thing (practical reason) in the same respect. Rather, the attribute "conditioned" applies to the situatedness of ethical deliberation and
action; and the attribute "unconditioned" to the laws established
by practical reason. In the end, therefore, the conflict is really
within practical reason and, more specifically, between its unconditioned laws and the application of these same laws to conditioned deliberation and action. TM
Gadamer's proposed synthesis of Aristotelian and Kantian
ethics may still seem rather one-sided, favoring Aristotle over
Kant, phronesis over pure practical reason. But the synthesis
remains compatible with Kant's philosophy. For example, the
problem of application just discussed is reminiscent of Kant's
theoretical problem in the first Critique, where he had discovered
the a priori laws of the understanding and was faced with the

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question of whether they could be applied to experience. A related, but more practical problem arises in the second antinomy
of the same Critique. as How can human actions be free if they
take place in the empirical world of nature, and if this world is
causally governed (determined) by the laws of nature? Kant's
proposed solution to this antinomy between freedom and nature
is well known: the n o u m e n o n / p h e n o m e n o n distinction. Action
is understood in two senses: noumenally in terms of the law of
freedom, and phenomenally in terms of the laws of nature. This
dualism reflects the two sides of philosophical ethics which we
have been discussing here; it reflects the theoretical and practical
dimensions of ethics: the noumenal unconditionedness of ethical
laws and the phenomenal conditionedness of ethical deliberation
and action.
But this dualism, which is very characteristic of Kant's philosophy as a whole, is merely an expression of the conflict between
freedom and nature or between conditionedness and unconditionedness; it does not resolve the conflict. This point will become
clear, I think, if we examine a related conflict (in the Groundwork) which Kant calls the "natural dialectic" in practical reason:
Man feels within himself a powerful counterweight to all the
commands of duty, which are presented to him by reason as
being so pre-eminently worthy of respect; this counterweight
consists of his needs and inclinations, whose total satisfaction
is summed up under the name of happiness. Now reason irremissibly commands its precepts, without thereby promising
the inclinations anything; hence it disregards and neglects these
impetuous and at the same time so seemingly plausible claims
( w h i c h d o not allow themselves to be suppressed by any command). Hence arises a natural dialectic, i.e., a propensity to
quibble with these strict laws of duty, to cast doubt upon their
validity, or at least upon their purity and strictness, and to
make them, where possible, more compatible with our wishes
and inclinations. Thereby are such laws corrupted in their very
foundations and their whole dignity is destroyed - something
which even ordinary practical reason cannot in the end call
good. 16

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The natural dialectic is within practical reason: between practical
reason's recognition of its moral duties and laws, and the pressure
from its various desires, needs, and interests for it to refuse the
call of these recognized duties and laws. Gadamer refers to this as
the "dialectic of exception": 17 practical reason acknowledges its
duties and even the laws that represent them, but it tries, at the
same time, to construe its own situation as an exception that is
exempted from the otherwise universal scope of these duties and
laws. This is the familiar phenomenon of making one's situation
seem exceptional so that the law does not apply to it. According
to Kant, the presence of such a dialectic in ordinary rational
knowledge of morality requires the transition to the philosophical
knowledge of morality (and, ultimately, to the metaphysics of
morals and the Critique Of Practical Reason). is Moreover, one of
the main reasons why Kant insisted on the notion of the unconditioned moral law is to offset this natural dialectic. Because the
dialectic seems to be caused, in part, by empirical desires, interests, etcetera, the only way i t could be avoided entirely, Kant
suggests, is if ethical reflection were free of all empirical conditionedness. But Kant does not argue that this dialectic could ever
be completely eliminated. 19 The ideas of good will, duty, universal law, etcetera, were introduced to represent and strengthen one
half of the dialectic. So long as we remain human, our ethical
reflection and moral freedom are limited by the other half of this
same dialectic. As Gadamer expresses it, although the idea of the
purity of practical reason represents "the unconditionedness of
our duty against the plea of our desires," it does not "determine
the whole of our ethical being. ''2~
The presence and persistence of this natural dialectic as a
structural feature of ethical reflection establishes a clearer link
between Aristotelian and Kantian ethics; for the "natural dialectic" is similar to the dialectic between phronesis and ethos. In
both cases, the dialectic manifests itself within practical reason
as a dialectic between our ordinary moral consciousness (our recognition of our moral duties, laws, rights, etc.) which is based on
our ethos (our traditions, habits, institutions, etc.) but which also
is not completely or only moral in character, and our philosophical-practical reason which tries to offset the empirical forces that
lead this moral consciousness astray and which criticizes the im-

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moral aspects of this consciousness and its ethos.
The dialectic is thus what Gadamer earlier referred to as a mixture of the "substance of ethical life" and the "watchful conscience." Aristotle represents the substance of ethical life:
The proper content of Aristotelian ethics is not the great key
concepts of a heroic-image ethics and its "table of values":
but rather it is, the inconspicuousness and infallibility of concrete ethical consciousness, which finds its expression in insignificant and all-encompassing concepts such as: what is
proper, decent, good and right) 1
He shows us that "the necessary limitation [of conditionedness]
that underlies our insight into what is ethically right or just
does not necessarily lead us to a corrupt mixture of motives"; 22
the dichotomy between completely pure and completely corrupt
(corrupt because empirical) practical reason is too extreme and
untenable? ~ And Kant represents the watchful conscience which
cautions us about the limits of these "insignificant and all-encompassing concepts," because they are often powerless against the
counterweight of natural, nonmoral inclinations that lead us
toward evil. 24 Thus, .while Kant makes us aware of the limitations of an empirically conditioned practical reason, Aristotle
demonstrates h o w we can best develop and utilize this, our only
type of practical reason, whose purity is relative to its conditionedness. This synthesis of Aristotelian and Kantian ethics,
characterized by the dialectic between phronesis and ethos, unconditionedness and conditionedness, and duty and inclination,
is, according to Gadamer, what determines the possibility of philosophical ethics.

U
In a recent book and several reviews, Gadamer discusses the same
synthesis of Aristotelian and Kantian ethics and clarifies some of
the claims made a b o v e ? S O n these occasions, the synthesis is
made through his interpretation of Plato's ethics. First, Gadamer
argues for a certain continuity betweenPlato and Aristotle on the

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level of ethical theory; then, he draws a comparison between
Plato's and Kant's ethics; and, finally, although not in such a syllogistic fashion, he re-examines the relationship between Aristotelian and Kantian ethical theories.
The link between Plato's and Aristotle's ethics is established
through two claims. The first claim is that they had a common
enemy - the sophistic conception of moral knowledge as something that could be taught as if it were a techne. From Plato's
early dialogues through his insistence in the Protagoras and elsewhere that virtue cannot be taught even though it is knowledge,
his ethics is consistent, in part, with Aristotle's later distinction
between phronesis and techne; for both philosophers argue that
ethical knowledge cannot be taught. Gadarner elaborates on this
c o m m o n enemy:
Statements like "virtue is knowledge" do not come out of the
blue, rather, their sense is determined in part by what they
answer or respond to. Socrates is responding to the confusion
in the moral tradition, a tradition for which Sophism promises
the new foundation of a bogus techne, a new "knowledge."
Plato and Aristotle seem to have been in complete agreement
in their c o m m o n efforts to fend off this sophistic technical
conception of [moral] knowledge. 26
The sophistic conception of virtue is perhaps best represented
by Thrasymachus's idea of justice (in the Republic) as the interest of the stronger; for it is an idea based on certain politicallegal conventions of the time, and it is nondiscursive in the sense
that it forecloses further discussion of justice, that is, it transforms
the discussion of the moral idea of justice into a political power
struggle between those who hold power (and define justice) and
those who are powerless (and compelled to abide by the reigning
definition of justice). In opposition to this conception of justice,
Plato and Aristotle were equally concerned to establish an ethical
account of the idea of justice. Plato's claim that virtue is knowledge is his way of moving the discussion of justice to a moral,
discursive level on which rational accountability is given priority
over the appeal to power. Aristotle criticizes this equation; but
his criticism is more of a modification (virtue involves knowledge)

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than a total rejection of it. The shared demand for rational accountability is, according to Gadamer, what unifies Plato and
Aristotle and separates t h e m from the Sophists who, in rejecting the very notion of moral discourse, abandoned the search
for accountability and relegated justice and other moral concepts to the nihilistic struggle for power.
Gadamer's second claim about a commonality between Plato
and Aristotle concerns the idea of the good. The suggestion of a
c o m m o n idea in this instance seems unlikely at first because of
Aristotle's well known critique of Plato's idea of the good. 27
But, Gadamer argues, Aristotle criticizes primarily the theoretical
and metaphysical aspects of this idea; and, even when he does
that, it is not clear whether he intends to reject or modify them.
In any case, what is more important here is Aristotle's comments
on the relevance of the idea of the good to ethics. In this respect,
a major point of his critique is not to reject the idea of the good
in itself, but to claim that it is not relevant in the practical, moral
sphere, and thus to distinguish it from the idea of the human
good. 28 According to Gadamer, it is this point which led Aristotle
to introduce the notion of practical reason: practical reason is
to the idea of the human good what theoretical reason is to the
idea of the g o o d in itself. Once again, Aristotle tempers Plato's
position. 29
There is substantive, textual evidence within Plato's and Aristotle's writings for Gadamer's claim about a Platonic-Aristotelian
effect concerning the idea of the good. First of all, the distinction between the good and the human good is present, albeit in
nascent form, in the Republic: it takes concrete form in the distinction between something (e.g., justice) which is good in itself
and something (e.g., happiness) which is good for its consequences
for humans (357a-358a). Moreover, the Philebus is an explicit
and profound dialogue about the distinction between the good
and the human good. And, finally, the controversy within Aristotle's Ethics about whether happiness is the end of contemplation or action reflects his recognition of the roles of both the good
(qua object of contemplation) and the human good in human
ethical life.
The second link that Gadamer describes in his recent book and
essays is between Plato and Kant and is based on the similarities

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between the beginning of Republic, Book II, and the transition
from Section I to Section II of the Groundwork. The fundamental
similarity is between Plato's goal of finding the idea of justice in
itself and Kant's rigorism in seeking an a priori basis for the common rational knowledge of morality. The two philosophers were
combating the lure of sophistic and eudaemonistic ethical beliefs,
respectively, which were at the center of the then traditional
moralities. They were both trying to provide ethical reflection
with an autonomous basis from which it could secure itself against
the seductions of power and pleasure. The rigorism of their ethical
theories can be understood only against the background of the
sophistic and eudaemonistic moralities which they were attempting to overcome with the help of philosophy:
[Plato's]severance of the noetic from the sensory, of true insight from mere points of view - this chorismos, in other words
- is the truth of moral consciousness as such .... it is no coincidence that this insight of Plato's was dignified anew when the
concern was to give morality a transcendental foundation.
Kant's rigor is exceeded only by the rigor with which Plato,
in the dialogue of the true state, compels his Socrates to separate the true essence of morality from what is held to be socially acceptable (Republic, Book 2). 30
Thus, the common ground between Plato and Kant is that both
defended the autonomy of ethical reflection vis-d-vis traditional,
"socially acceptable" morality.
Just as Plato's rigorism was tempered earlier by Aristotle,
Kant's rigorism can now be tempered in a similar fashion and
again by Aristotle. We thus return to the original synthesis which
is based on the "natural dialectic" in practical reason. Gadamer
discusses this dialectic again, but now in relation to the links between Plato, Aristotle, and Kant.
The clearest exposition of this theme [of the relation between
theory and practice in ethics], which Aristotle was the first to
take up, seems to me to be Kant's Foundations o f a Metaphysics o f Morals. There, at the conclusion of the first section of
the so-called "laying of the groundwork," Kant treats the

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transition from common reasonable moral knowledge to philosophical knowledge. He starts with the convincing thesis
that in human nature there is a proclivity at work: human beflags tend to resort to a kind of dialectic in order to evade what
their consciousness of duty, for instance, makes morally evident
to them. Kant calls this a tendency to quibble, and it not only
makes the transition to the philosophy of morals necessary, but
essentially always makes that transition by itself. It is obvious
that Kant adheres to the basic tenet of Platonic-Aristotelian
philosophy in his moral philosophy, insofar as he divorces the
practical, moral imperative from the technical imperative of
cleverness. 31
Aristotle and Kant introduced ethical theory to offset the tendencies of traditional morality. To accomplish this task, they had to
distinguish practical reason from technical knowledge and thus to
insist on the autonomy of ethical reflection. In Kant, this distinction takes t h e form of the differences between ordinary and
philosophical rational knowledge of morality, between moral
imperatives and rules of skill, and between categorical and hypothetical imperatives; whereas in Aristotle it concerns the differences between phronesis and techne, as well as between phronesis and episteme. The autonomy of ethical reflection is thus estabfished in contrast to both traditional morality and to other forms
of knowledge.
The more concrete level of the link between Aristotle and
Kant is that both of them began their ethical theories with a
critique of specific traditional ethical beliefs, for instance, about
justice, duty, the good life. They did not just criticize the foundations of these beliefs. The exact content of the beliefs they criticized is, of course, quite varied because of the historical differences between ancient Greece and Enlightenment Germany.'
But the more important point, according to Gadamer, is that the
recognition of these shared beliefs is a first step in the formation
of ethical reflection. 32 Beginning with such beliefs, the task of
philosophical ethics is to clarify and criticize the principles and
ends of ethical practices. As Kant emphasized, his role as moral
philosopher was not to introduce new ethical principles, but to
provide a procedure for evaluating the principles already being

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followed in order to help them to withstand the "natural dialectic" in practical reason which, as we have seen, might lead us to
violate these same principles.
[Ordinary human reason] tries to obtain information and clear
instruction regarding the source o f its own principle and the
correct determination o f this principle in its opposition to
maxims based on need and inclination, so that reason may
escape from the perplexity of opposite claims and may avoid
the risk o f losing all genuine moral principles through the ambiguity into which it easily falls. 33
And, as we have also seen, were it not for this natural dialectic,
philosophical ethics would hardly be necessary.
It is important, according to Gadamer, to emphasize that this
conceptual clarification and critique of ethical principles is not a
search for their transcendental or ahistorical foundation (Begriindung) in pure reason; it is, rather, a process o f correcting (Berichtigung) them in the context and because o f the natural dialectic
in practical reason. "Philosophy can only bring to consciousness
the norm character which is appropriate for ethical norms. ''a4
That is, it can neither create these norms or principles, nor provide them with a foundation. It can only analyze and improve on
the ethical principles already embedded in ethical practices. Recognition o f this as the task o f philosophical ethics is, according to
Gadamer, what unites Plato, Aristotle, and Kant.

III
What is the relevance of Gadamer's proposed synthesis of Aristotelian and Kantian ethical theories for contemporary philosophical
ethics? How does this synthesis help to resolve ethical skepticism?
The answers to these two questions are virtually the same because,
by showing how ethical skepticism can be resolved, I will also be
showing how Gadamer's proposal is relevant.
The principal cause o f ethical skepticism is the failure o f philosophical ethics to be theoretical and practical at the same time.
Two possible consequences o f this failure are (1) decisionism or

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the reduction of ethics to traditional morality when it is not
theoretical and critical enough; or (2) an ethical theory that
is either impractical because it is too theoretical, or alienating
because it is too general. This failure and its consequences
are related to the following dichotomy which has been prominent in the modern history of moral philosophy: either practical reason must be completely pure or it is completely irrational, uncritical, or even immoral. Gadamer argues that this
is a false dichotomy; for an irreconcilable opposition between
pure and empirical practical reason is both untenable and unnecessary. I t is untenable, because the natural dialectic in moral
consciousness cannot be avoided by favoring just one side of the
dialectic. An overemphasis on any one side gives rise to ethical
skepticism: if ethical theory is reduced to its empirical side, then
it becomes irrational, uncritical, and immoral; if it is reduced to
its pure side, then it becomes impractical and alienating. This
opposition is unnecessary, because practical reason can indeed
be rational, critical, and moral despite t h e presence of the natural
dialectic, that is, without being completely pure. It is therefore
imperative to find a way of balancing the two sides o f this dichotomy. By emphasizing the natural dialectic within practical reason,
Gadamer's proposed synthesis achieves this balance.
The two consequences of ethical skepticism tied to the false
dichotomy which Gadamer criticizes are also related to the traditional criticisms of Aristotelian and Kantian ethics. Aristotle
is criticized for making practical reason too dependent on heteronomous or metaphysical conditions, and thus too uncritical;
whereas Kant is criticized for making ethical theory too formalistic, a n d thus impractical or alienating. Gadamerargues, however,
that these criticisms are based on interpretations of Aristotle's and
Kant's ethical theories which ignore their historical contexts (influenced by the sophistic notion of virtue as techne, eudaemonistic ethics, etc.), and thus they overlook the problems (e.g., the natural dialectic in moral consciousness, the relationship between philosophical ethics and traditional morality, the theoretical and practical moments of philosophical ethics, etc.) which those ethical theories
were introduced to resolve. He suggests instead that, if we interpret their ethical theories in terms of these problems, then it is
possible to synthesize Aristotle's and Kant's theories into a single,
coherent conception of philosophical ethics. With such a syn-

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thesis, we will then be able to resolve ethical skepticism, because
the synthesis is based on the claim that philosophical ethics must
and can be theoretical and practical at the same time. That is,
since the synthesis eliminates the principal cause of ethical skepticism, it eliminates the skepticism itself.
What does it mean, however, for philosophical ethics to be
theoretical and practical at the same time? To answer this question, it is necessary first to draw a distinction between practical
reason and philosophical ethics. On the level o f practical reason,
theory symbolizes the a u t o n o m y o f ethical reflection which
Kant defends, while practice represents the ethos as described
by Aristotle. Practical reason arises from and is exercised in its
given ethos, but it still has a relative degree o f a u t o n o m y by virtue
o f the fact that reason itself is part of this ethos, that is, because
(and so long as) critical rationality (i.e., philosophy) is a living part
of this ethos. Since Kant, this "fact" has been passed down to
us as part of the legacy o f the Enlightenment; it is one way o f understanding what he refers to as the "fact o f reason" - critical
rationality and freedom are what make morality possible. Thus,
although the idea o f ethos is, in general, clearly a restriction on
freedom, it does not eliminate it; ethos also contains the possibility of freedom and it remains that against which freedom is
measured. Just as we cannot ignore either side of the natural dialectic in moral consciousness, we cannot escape our ethos or our
freedom. The theoretical and practical moments of practical reason are shaped and, in turn, unified by these relationships.
There are also theoretical a n d practical m o m e n t s o f philosophical ethics: the practical effect o f philosophical ethics
is an ethical theory. This effect is indirect in the sense that
the theory is about practical reason; as such, it does not directly determine ethical life the way practical reason can. Yet
this theory may, in turn, determine how we exercise our practical reason and thereby indirectly affect how we lead our
ethical life. Although these direct theoretical and indirect practical effects do not necessarily follow fl'om philosophical ethics, they will follow if it is convincing, if it can persuade us
that the conception o f ethical reflection which it advances is
morally and rationally desirable, theoretically coherent, and practically feasible. And, if it is persuasive, then ethical theory and

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practice are unified on the level of philosophical ethics as well,
and ethical skepticism is thereby eliminated.
Finally, what about the problem of the generality of ethical
theory? How can Gadamer's synthesis of Aristotelian and Kantian
ethics eliminate the threat of moral alienation? The synthesis,
once realized, virtually dissolves this threat too, for the notion of
ethos encompasse s the concrete individuality from which we are
alienated when ethical theory is too general. Objectivity, one of
the alleged causes of moral alienation, has to be established within an ethos; it is thus subject to the conditions of this ethos,
among which is concrete individuality. That is, if the synthesis
truly realizes a balance between ethical theory and practice,
then the theory will not be too general in the way that causes
moral alienation. A goal of the synthesis, and a test of its effectiveness, is thus whether it actually achieves this balance.
Thus, Gadamer's proposed synthesis of Aristotelian and Kantian
ethics is able to resolve ethical skepticism by addressing the problems which cause it. For this reason alone, since skepticism is one
of the main problems facing philosophical ethics today, this synthesis is relevant to contemporary philosophical ethics.

IV
In the beginning of After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre describes
contemporary ethical theory as an incoherent potpourri of concepts taken from essentially incompatible theories in the history
of moral philosophy? 4 The concepts are allegedly incompatible
because of the historical contexts in which they were first articulated; the contexts include presuppositions which are historically
specific and which render the concepts and theories they generate
incommensurate with concepts and theories having different presuppositions. Gadamer is, of course, well aware of the historical
conditionedness of ethical concepts; but he also believes that the
historicity of philosophical reflection is what makes it possible
to find a certain degree of continuity between historically distinct
moral philosophies. The purpose of emphasizing this continuity
is to understand what philosophical ethics is, in general, and thus
to strengthen it in the present. The continuity is not merely

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given, however; it has to be created and sustained. Yet it is n o t an
arbitrary construction based on the perspective o f the historical
present. It is, rather, the result o f the persistance o f certain questions that moral philosophers have shared t h r o u g h o u t history,
for example, the ones addressed here concerning the relationship
between ethical t h e o r y and practice and the shadow o f ethical
skepticism. The history o f moral philosophy is the history o f the
efforts, failures included, to achieve some cont i nui t y by answering
these and o ther related questions. Gadamer's c o n t r i b u t i o n to this
co n tin u ity , which ! have been able only to sketch here, is his
argument that philosophical ethics is indeed possible despite the
recognition o f the conditionedness o f ethical reflection. His provocative synthesis o f Aristotelian and Kantian ethical theories provides hope and concrete direction for philosophical ethics in a
world a d m i t t e d l y characterized more by skepticism, relativism,
and nihilism than by any shared ethical t h e o r y or practice.

NOTES
1. For the classic statement of emotivism, see C.L. Stevenson, Ethics and
Language (New Haven: Yale, 1945). J.P. Sartre is perhaps the clearest
representative of existentialist ethics; see "Existentialism is a Humanism," in Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, ed. Walter Kaufmann
(Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1956); and Being and Nothingness, trans.
Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956). Of course,
not all ethical theorists in this century are committed to either emotivism
or existentialism; my claim here is only that these two philosophical
positions have been extremely influential.
2. There are, of course, ethical theorists today who are not skeptical about
philosophical ethics; but I think contemporary moral philosophy is
predominantly skeptical. See, as prime examples of this skepticism,
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University Press,
1981); and Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1985). Furthermore, many philosophers
who have recently become interested in ethics have been more concerned
with practical, policy issues rather than with ethical theory per se.
3. "[lber die MSglichkeit einer philosophischen Ethik," in Kleine Schriften I (Tiibingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1976) [hereafter KS], pp. 179-91.
4. Ibid., pp. 180-81.
5. Ibid., p. 181.
6. I am using Hegel and Kierkegaard as examples of two main types of criti-

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7.

8.

9.
10.

11.

12.

cisms of ethical theory which are prevalent in the history of modern

ethical theory; these types are essentially the same ones introduced
above and discussed further below.
On the notion of "moral alienation," see Bernard Williams, "Persons,
Character and Morality," in Moral Luck (New York: Cambridge, 1981),
pp. 1 - 1 9 ; and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, op.cit.; and see also
Adrian Piper, "Moral Theory and Moral Alienation," Journal of Philosophy LXXXIV 2 (February 1987): 1 0 2 - 1 8 .
KS, pp. 181, 191. See also Gadamer, Platos dialektische Ethik (Hamburg:
Meiner, 1931) [herafter PdE], p. 5; and Die Iclee des Guten zwischen
Plato und Aristotles (Heidelberg: Winter, 1978) (The Idea o f the Good in
Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy, trans. P. Christopher Smith [New Haven: Yale, 1986] ) [hereafter I G P A I .
KS, p. 184.
In the second Critique, Kant does not discuss the problem of whether
reason can be pure; he claims that this problem was resolved in the first
Critique. The issue in the second Critique is whether pure reason can
be practical. This problem is approached by asking whether there are
any pure moral laws. Cf. Kant's Crit~'itue of Practical Reason, trans.
Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-MerriU, 1956) [hereafter
KpV], pp. 1 5 - 1 6 - the volume and page numbers of the Prussian
Academy Edition [PAE] of Kant's works are also provided here: PAE,
V:16.
According to Kant, the p r o o f that pure reason can be practical is autonomy - the principle of morality by which mason determines the will to
action - because a u t o n o m y would be impossible without pure reason
(cf. KpV, p. 43 [PAE, V : 4 1 - 4 2 ] ). At the same time, Kant admits that
there is no deduction to prove the objective reality of autonomy (cf.
KpV, pp. 48, 97 [PAE, V:47, 9 3 - 9 4 ] ) . Hence, there is no p r o o f for
the p r o o f that pure reason can be practical. Concerning the point that
the human will cannot be completely pure, it is enough to remember
that, according to Kant himself, we need imperatives because our will is
finite, i.e., not always pure like the divine will.
In his critique of Kant's ethics, Hegel focuses on the problem of the
content of universal laws. He argues that (1) pure reason cannot be a
law-giver, because a law must have content and pure reason is merely
formal; (2) pure reason is merely a law-tester whose task is to decide
which maxims meet the requirements of the categorical imperative;
(3) when pure reason acts as a law-tester, however, it must presuppose
maxims along with all their contingency, determinacy, etc.; and (4)
as a result of these presuppositions, pure reason is unstable as a law-tester
and, more importantly, it is no longer pure. Practical reason cannot have
content and still be pure; and, if it remains pure, it has no content. Cf.
The Phenomenotogy o f Mind, trarls. J,B. Baille (New York: Harper &
Row, 1967), pp. 4 3 9 - 5 3 ; Natural Law: The Scientific Ways of Treating

Natural Law, Its Place in Moral Philosophy, and Its Relation to the

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Positive Sciences, trans. T.M. Knox (Philadelphia, PA: University of

Pennsylvania Press, 1975), pp. 75ff.; and The Philosophy of Right,
trans. T.M. Knox (New York: Oxford, 1967), Parts I I - I I I .
13. Throughout this essay, Kant represents the pure side and Aristotle the
empirical side of practical reason. Thus, the term 'practical reason' in
the present context is not strictly Kantian or Aristotelian. The distinction between the~e two sides of practical reason is mirrored within Kant
in the distinction between WilIe and Willkiir; although I cannot elaborate
on this point now, I would interpret Kant's distinction in light of the
mediation between Aristotle and Kant.
14. This application is performed or executed by ethical judgment, the
mediator between ethical laws and ethical deliberation and action, between unconditionedness and conditionedness. The recognition of the
important role of moral judgment is, I think, one of the main reasons
for the recent revival of Aristotelian ethics.
15. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1929), A444/B472ff.
16. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. James W. Ellington
[hereafter GMM], in Kant's Ethical Philosophy (Indianapolis, IN:
Hackett, 1983), pp. 1 6 - 1 7 [PAE, I V : 4 0 4 - 0 5 ] .
17. KS, p. 182.
18. GMM, p. 17 (PAE, IV:405).
19. The "natural dialectic" in practical reason first introduced in the Groundwork is between duty and inclination. But, because Kant understands
duty in terms of the concept of the moral law and reduces all inclinations to the pursuit of happiness, this is essentially the same dialectic
between virtue and happiness discussed in the second Critique as the
antinomy of pure practical reason. Kant attempts to resolve this dialectic, not by eliminating one side of it, nor simply by claiming that
the two sides are analytically identical, but by arguing that virtue is
an a priori condition for happiness, that it has both moral and logical
priority over happiness. Just as freedom and nature are compatible in
the first Critique, virtue and happiness can be unified in the second
Critique in the form of the "highest good." The moral law remains the
determining ground of the pure will, but the "highest good" is its object.
But Kant's "resolution" does n o t eliminate the natural dialectic in practical reason, it only establishes a hierarchy among its two sides (cf. KpV,
pp. 1 1 1 - 2 4 [PAE, V: 1 0 6 - 1 9 ] ).
20. KS, p. 188.
21. Ibid., p. 187.
22. Ibid., p. 190.
23. Cf. GMM, pp. 2 - 3 (PAE, I V : 3 8 9 - 9 0 ) ; and Metaphysics of Morals, Part
II, in Kant's Ethical Philosophy, op.cit., p. 14 (PAE, VI:215). Thus,
as I argued implicitly above (pp. 3 3 2 - 3 3 4 ) , the presence of the natu-

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reason, something which he was reluctant to accept.
24. Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Theodore M. Greene
and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper, 1960), Book One, pp. 15-49.
25. Cf. IGPA; "Werner Marx: Gibt es anf Erden ein Mass?", Philosophische
Rundschau XXXI 3/4 (1984): 161-77 [hereafter "Review I " ] ; and
"Heidegger und das Problem der Ethik," Philosophisehe Rundschau
XXXII. 1/2 (1985): 1 - 2 6 [hereafter "Review II"].
26. IGPA, p. 61, and chs. 2 - 2 .
27. Metaphysics 9 9 0 a 3 3 - 9 9 3 a l l , and Nieomachean Ethics [hereafter NE]
1 0 9 6 a l l - 1 0 9 7 a 3 0 , trans. W.D. Ross, in The Basic Works of Aristotle,
ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941).
28. NE 1096b30-34.
29. According to Gadamer, this was the task and style of Aristotle's dialectic. On Gadamer's understanding of dialectic in ancient Greek philosophy, see "Hegel and the Dialectic of the Ancient Philosophers," in Hegel's Dialectic, trans. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale, 1976).
30. IGPA, p. 19.
31. Ibid., pp. 170-71.
32. Aristotle does this in the first book of NE in relation to the question of
what is the good for man and Kant does it in the beginning of GMM in
relation to the common understanding of duty and other basic moral
notions. Of course, Kant proceeds in a different manner in the second
Critique; but, even there, he says he must presuppose GMM "in so far
as that work gives a preliminary acquaintance with the principle of duty
and justifies a definite formula of it" (KpV, p. 8 [PAE, V:8] ).
33. GMM, p. 17 (PAE, IV-405); and KpV, p. 8 (PAE, V:8).
34. "Review II," p. 12.
34. After Virtue, op.cit., pp. 1 - 5 .