Crisostomo vs CA

Whether or not a travel agency is required to observe the standard of care required with that of a
common carrier.
Doctrine: Travel agency is not a common carrier. It is not an entity engaged in the business of
transporting either passengers or goods and is therefore, neither a private nor a common carrier. Its
covenant with its customers is simply to make travel arrangements in their behalf. Its services as a travel
agency include procuring tickets and facilitating travel permits or visas as well as booking customers for
tours. It is in this sense that the contract between the parties in this case was an ordinary one for
services and not one of carriage. It can only be considered as an agent of an airline. It is only required to
observe standard of care required of that of a good father of a family under Article 1173 of the Civil
Code.

Osmena vs Rama
Whether or not a condition dependent upon the exclusive will of the debtor is valid.
Doctrine: A condition, facultative as to the debtor, is obnoxious to the first sentence contained in article
1115 and renders the whole obligation void. If that statement found in the debtors acknowledgment of
the indebtedness should be regarded as a condition, it was a condition which depended upon her
exclusive will, and is therefore, void. (Art. 1115, Civil Code.) The acknowledgment, therefore, was an
absolute acknowledgment of the obligation and was sufficient to prevent the statute of limitation from
barring the action upon the original contract.

Papa vs AU Valencia, et. al.

Whether or not payment of a check shall only produce the effect of payment if it has been cashed.
Doctrine: While it is true that the delivery of a check produces the effect of payment only when it is
cashed, pursuant to Art. 1249 of the Civil Code, the rule is otherwise if the debtor is prejudiced by the
creditor's unreasonable delay in presentment. The acceptance of a check implies an undertaking of due
diligence in presenting it for payment, and if he from whom it is received sustains loss by want of such
diligence, it will be held to operate as actual payment of the debt or obligation for which it was
given. The payee of a check would be a creditor under this provision and if its no-payment is caused by
his negligence, payment will be deemed effected and the obligation for which the check was given as
conditional payment will be discharged. Granting that petitioner had never encashed the check, his
failure to do so for more than ten (10) years undoubtedly resulted in the impairment of the check
through his unreasonable and unexplained delay.

Gabriel vs Monte de Piedad y Caja de Aharros and the CA

Whether or not the provisions of a chattel mortgage contract which the petitioner executed to secure
the payment of his obligation are contrary to law, morals and public policy which would render the
contract ineffective.
Doctrine: A contract is to be judge by its character, and courts will look to the substances and not to the
mere form of the transaction. The freedom of contract is both a constitutional and statutory right and to
uphold this right, courts should move with all the necessary caution and prudence in holding contracts
void. In the absence of express legislation or constitutional prohibition, a court, in order to declare a
contract void as against public policy, must find that the contract as to the consideration or thing to be
done, has a tendency to injure the public, is against the public good, or contravenes some established
interests of society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals, or tends clearly to undermine
the security of individual rights, whether of personal liability or of private property. Examining the
contract at bar, we are of the opinion that it does not in any way militate against the public good.
Neither does it contravene the policy of the law nor the established interests of society.

Liguez vs Court of Appeals

Whether or not liberality of the donor can be a valid consideration of a contract.
Doctrine: Liberality of the donor can only be deemed the causa of contracts referred to in Article 1274
of the Civil Code of 1889 if such contracts are of pure beneficence, that is to say, contracts designed
solely and exclusively to procure the welfare of the beneficiary, without any intent of producing any
satisfaction for the donor; contracts, in other words, in which the idea of self-interest is totally absent on
the part of the transferor. For this very reason, the same Article 1274 provides that in remuneratory
contracts, the consideration is the service or benefit for which the remuneration is given; causa is not
liberality in these cases because the contract or conveyance is not made out of pure beneficence, but
"solvendi animo."
The late Salvador P. Lopez was not moved exclusively by the desire to benefit appellant Conchita
Liguez, but also to secure her cohabiting with him, so that he could gratify his sexual impulses. This is
clear from the confession of Lopez to the witnesses Rodriguez and Ragay, that he was in love with
appellant, but her parents would not agree unless he donated the land in question to her. Actually,
therefore, the donation was but one part of an onerous transaction (at least with appellant's parents)
that must be viewed in its totality. Thus considered, the conveyance was clearly predicated upon an
illicit causa.