Asimetra e irrelevancia en la propuesta de Hempel

The second reason, (B), for holding that Hempel's conditions could not be sufficient for singular
explanation has to do with 'explanatory' symmetries. Hempel's account of singular explanation in terms
of derivability from true, empirical premisses permits intuitively objectionable cases in which (part of)
the explanans can be explained by the explanandum, as well as explain it. How can we amend the
account, so that such symmetries of 'explanation' will not arise?
Both James Woodward and Peter Achinstein have argued (or implied) that the explanation relation is
not an asymmetric relation, as is usually supposed, and that there are or can be bona fide cases of
acceptable symmetrical explanation, explanatory mutual dependence between two singular facts.
However, both would of course concede that there are some cases in which symmetrical explanation
must be ruled out (i.e. in the case of causal explanation). The explanation relation, even if not
asymmetric, is surely not symmetric. If not asymmetric, it must be non-symmetric. This is enough for my
argument here. All the examples I shall consider in this part of the chapter are cases in which
symmetrical explanations are intuitively unacceptable; I do not need to retain the stronger claim that
the explanation relation itself is asymmetric.
There are a number of these symmetry counterexamples which challenge Hempels account of singular
explanation, many of which derive from Sylvain Bromberger and Michael Scriven. For consider
Bromberger's flagpole example: the shadow is so long because the pole has this height, and not
conversely. At first sight, no contextual factor could reverse this asymmetry, because the pole's height is
a property it has in and by itself, and its shadow is a very accidental feature. The general principle linking
the two is that its shadow is a function f(x, t) of its height x and the time t (the latter determining the
sun's elevation). But imagine the pole is the pointer on a giant sundial. Then the values of f have desired
properties for each time t, and we appeal to these to explain why it is (had to be) such a tall pole.We
have already touched on some of these examples in the discussion of Hempel. There are two kinds of
cases that generate these unacceptable symmetries. First, there are equations which show that the
numerical value assumed by some property of a system at time t is a function of the values assumed by
the other properties of the system at time t or an earlier time, t (Ohms law, Hookes law, the BoyleCharles laws for ideal gases, the length and the period of the pendulum).
Second, there are laws with biconditionals, which can include cases both of laws of coexistence and of
laws of succession. A barometer falls iff [if and only if] a storm is approaching; the light received from
the galaxies exhibits a shift towards the red end of the spectrum iff the galaxies are receding from us;
and (Aristotle's case) a planet twinkles iff it is not near.
To this, we can add Salmon's confused rooster who explains the rising of the sun on the grounds of his
regular crowing.10 These equations or biconditionals will allow the derivation of the height of the
flagpole from the length of the shadow and the length of the shadow from the height of the flagpole;
the length of the pendulum from its period and its period from its length; the approaching storm from
the fall in the barometer as well as the fall of the barometer from the approaching storm; the receding
of the galaxies from the red shift as well as the red shift from the recession of the galaxies, the rising of
the sun from the crowing of the cock as well as the crowing of the cock from the rising of the sun.
But, in each of these pairs, the first derivation would be nonexplanatory; the second, explanatory.
Equations and biconditionals permit symmetric derivations; but since at least these examples do not

provide symmetric explanations, there must be more to singular explanation than what Hempel's theory
thus far allows. Hempel, as we saw, 'dealt' with this by suggesting that there may not really be true
biconditionals in such cases (he supposed, it will be recalled, that there might be cases of Koplik spots
without measles). But what we have to establish is how, given that there may really be true
biconditionals or equations of this kind which allow derivations 'in both directions', we are able to
distinguish the explanations from the derivations which fail to explain (Ruben, pags. 725-726).
Some familiar difficulties beset the covering law model. The asymmetry problem arises because some
scientific laws have the logical form of equivalences. Such laws can be used "in either direction." Thus a
law asserting that the satisfaction of a condition C1 is equivalent to the satisfaction of a condition C2 can
be used in two different kinds of argument. From a premise asserting that an object meets C1 , we can
use the law to infer that it meets C2; conversely, from a premise asserting that an object meets C2, we
can use the law to infer that it meets C 1 . The asymmetry problem is generated by noting that in many
such cases one of these derivations can be used in giving explanations while the other cannot.
Consider a hoary example, (For further examples, see Bromberger 1966.) We can explain why a simple
pendulum has the period it does by deriving a specification of the period from a specification of the
length and the law which relates length and period. But we cannot explain the length of the pendulum
by deriving a specification of the length from a specification of the period and the same law. What
accounts for our different assessment of these two arguments? Why does it seem that one is
explanatory while the other "gets things backwards"? The covering law model fails to distinguish the
two, and thus fails to provide answers (Kitcher, p. 339).
Explanatory Asymmetries. There are many cases in which a derivation of an explanandum E from a law
L and initial conditions I seems explanatory but a backward derivation of I from E and the same law
L does not seem explanatory, even though the latter, like the former, appears to meet the criteria for
successful DN explanation. For example, one can derive the length s of the shadow cast by a flagpole
from the height h of the pole and the angle of the sun above the horizon and laws about the
rectilinear propagation of light. This derivation meets the DN criteria and seems explanatory. On the
other hand, a derivation (2.5.1) of h from s and and the same laws also meets the DN criteria but
does not seem explanatory. Examples like this suggest that at least some explanations possess
directional or asymmetric features to which the DN model is insensitive.

Explanatory Irrelevancies. A derivation can satisfy the DN criteria and yet be a defective explanation
because it contains irrelevancies besides those associated with the directional features of explanation.
Consider an example due to Wesley Salmon (Salmon, 1971, p.34):
(2.5.2) (L) All males who take birth control pills regularly fail to get pregnant
(K) John Jones is a male who has been taking birth control pills regularly
(E) John Jones fails to get pregnant

It is arguable that (L) meets the criteria for lawfulness imposed by Hempel and many other writers. (If
one wants to deny that L is a law one needs some principled, generally accepted basis for this judgment

and, as explained above, it is unclear what this basis is.) Moreover, (2.5.2) is certainly a sound deductive
argument in which L occurs as an essential premise. Nonetheless, most people judge that (L) and (K)
are no explanation of E . There are many other similar illustrations. For example (Kyburg 1965), it is
presumably a law (or at least an exceptionless, counterfactual supporting generalization) that all
samples of table salt that have been hexed by being touched with the wand of a witch dissolve when
placed in water. One may use this generalization as a premise in a DN derivation which has as its
conclusion that some particular hexed sample of salt has dissolved in water. But again the hexing is
irrelevant to the dissolving and such a derivation is no explanation.

One obvious diagnosis of the difficulties posed by examples like (2.5.1) and (2.5.2) focuses on the role of
causation in explanation. According to this analysis, to explain an outcome we must cite its causes and
(2.5.1) and (2.5.2) fail to do this. As Salmon (1989, p.47) puts it, a flagpole of a certain height causes a
shadow of a given length and thereby explains the length of the shadow. By contrast, the shadow
does not cause the flagpole and consequently cannot explain its height. Similarly, taking birth control
pills does not cause Jones' failure to get pregnant and this is why (2.5.2) fails to be an acceptable
explanation. On this analysis, what (2.5.1) and (2.5. 2) show is that a derivation can satisfy the DN
criteria and yet fail to identify the causes of an explanandumwhen this happens the derivation will fail
to be explanatory.

As explained above, advocates of the DN model would not regard this diagnosis as very illuminating,
unless accompanied by some account of causation that does not simply take this notion as primitive.
(Salmon in fact provides such an account, which we will consider in Section 4.) We should note,
however, that an apparent lesson of (2.5.1) and (2.5.2) is that the regularity account of causation
favored by DN theorists is at best incomplete: the occurrence of c , e and the existence of some
regularity or law linking them (or x 's having property P and x 's having property Q and some law linking
these) is not a sufficient condition for the truth of the claim that c caused e or x 's having P is causally
or explanatorily relevant to x 's having Q. More generally, if the counterexamples (2.5.1) and (2.5.2) are
accepted, it follows that the DN model fails to state sufficient conditions for explanation. Explaining an
outcome isn't just a matter of showing that it is nomically expectable.

There are two possible reactions one might have to this observation. One is that the idea that
explanation is a matter of nomic expectability is correct as far as it goes, but that something more is
required as well. According to this assessment, the DN/IS model does state a necessary condition for
successful explanation and, moreover, a condition that is a non-redundant part of a set of conditions
that are jointly sufficient for explanation. However, some other, independent feature, X (which will
account for the directional features of explanation and insure the kind of explanatory relevance that is
apparently missing in the birth control example) must be added to the DN model to achieve a successful
account of explanation. The idea is thus that Nomic Expectability + X= Explanation. Something like this
idea is endorsed, by the unificationist models of explanation developed by Friedman (1974) and Kitcher
(1989), which are discussed in Section 5 below (scientific explanation Stanford).

A second, more radical possible conclusion is that the DN account of the goal or rationale of explanation
is mistaken in some much more fundamental way and that the DN model does not even state necessary
conditions for successful explanation. As noted above, unless the hidden structure argument is
accepted, this conclusion is strongly suggested by examples like (2.4.1) (The impact of my knee caused
the tipping over of the inkwell) which appear to involve explanation without the explicit citing of a law
or a deductive structure. To assess whether the DN/IS model provides necessary conditions for
explanation, we thus must consider the hidden structure strategy in more detail.

1 Sodium normally combines with bromine in a ratio of one-to-one

2 Everything that normally combines with bromine in a ratio of one-to-one normally combines with
chlorine in a ratio one-to-one
Sodium normally combines with chlorine in a ratio of one-to-one
1 Jones ate at least a pound of arsenic at time t
2 (x) (x eats at least 1 lb arsenic at t x dies within 24 hours after t)
Jones dies within 24 hours of t
1 Every man who regularly takes birth control pills avoids pregnancy
2 John Jones has taken his wifes birth control pills regularly
John Jones avoided becoming pregnant in the past year