060719gh Address Part 1 v7

Part 1 Page 1
ADDRESS TO THE COURT

County Court of Victoria, Case numbers T01567737 & Q10897630
Your Honour,
Headings (below) are only to give some indications to assist to locate an issue but
are not to be taken to limit matters stated below it neither that other matters stated elsewhere are
not relevant.
HEARING DIFFICULTIES
From onset I have to set out that I have for decades now suffered a hearing loss
which is more then 25% to each ear and for this I use hearing aids but those appear to generally
play up during Court hearings. Without proper functioning hearing aids I lack to hear certain
sounds and as such may misunderstand/misconceive what is being stated/asked by others.
What is an ADDRESS TO THE COURT?
The ADDRESS TO THE COURT is a document that enables the unrepresented Defendant or for
that matter any defendant or litigant to place before the Court in writing what he/she desires to
State, including legal arguments, so that the Court can withdraw into chambers and can at its own
leisure consider matters without having any problems as to pronunciations or misstatements or
other language problems causing frustration to those involved in the proceedings.
The ADDRESS TO THE COURT has been used in all levels of State and Federal Courts,
including the High Court of Australia, involving civil and criminal cases since 1985.
TRANSCRIPT & DENIAL OF REASON OF JUDGMENTS
During the criminal trial proceedings before Ross J in the County Court of Victoria, in September
2004 the Defendant Mr Abbott was unrepresented and the Court arranged for daily transcripts to
be provided to Mr. Abbott, at no cost to him. I seek likewise that I am provided with transcript of
the proceedings without cost to me.
During the proceedings before the Magistrates Court of Victoria at Heidelberg on 16 and 17
November 2005 I did also request transcripts to be provided and this was refused as the magistrate
made clear that I could purchase a copy of the audio tape and listen to it.
Having immediately ordered the audio tapes, and paid for them then, at the conclusion of the trial
I was later advised that all audio recording in this case on 16 November 2005 had been without
result. I was advised that the 17 November 2005 recording was successful. However, despite
being advised that audio tape would take about a week, it took about 3 weeks and then to discover
that there appears to have been tampering with the tape causing part to be inaudible or not at all
on the tape.
Considering that I had complained in writing that the orders had been issued showing that I had
failed to vote on 1/1/2005, being New Years day when no election was held, I view that the
suspected tampering of the tape was to make it in audible what was stated by the magistrate in
regard of this. I take this as a very serious matter, as not only was I refused a written Reason of
Judgment in regard to each and every order made, which now I was clearly denied, but the
magistrate never handed down a Reason of Judgment as to why I was convicted and the audio
tape is inconclusive. In my view, this was a grave injustice.
" The most odious of all oppressions are those which mask as justice."
:U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, Krulewitch v United States.
Luke 11:21.
Page 1 ADDRESS TO THE COURT including SUBMISSIONS By the Defendant, Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka.
For 19-7-2006 County Court of Victoria proceedings Case numbers T01567737 & Q10897630
Part 1 Page 2
"When the strong man fully armed guardeth his own court, his goods are in peace."
R v. Lusink and another; Ex Parte Shaw (1980) 6 FLR 235 and 236
“However in some cases the words or conduct of a judge may be such as to lead the parties reasonably to think
that the judge has prejudged an important question in the case, and then prohibition may issue. Of course, the
court which is asked to grant prohibition will not lightly conclude that the judge may reasonably be suspected of
bias in this sense; it must be "firmly established" that such a suspicion may reasonably be engendered in the
minds of the parties or the public, as was made clear by the court in R v Commonwealth Conciliation and
Arbitration Commission; Ex Parte Angliss Group (1969) 122 CLR 546 at 553-4, in the passage cited in R v
Watson; Ex Parte Armstrong (132 CLR at 262).”
“The critical question, however, is not whether a judge believes he or she has prejudged a question, but whether
that is what a party or the public might reasonably suspect has occurred (see per Lord Denning MR in
Metropolitan Properties Co. (FGC Ltd v Lannon (1969) 1 QB 577 at 599, a judgement cited with approval
by this court in R v Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; Ex Parte Angliss Group
(1969) 122 CLR 546 at 553; In some circumstances repeated denials of prejudging might well convey the
impression of "protesting to much"...
Where the magistrate refused to hand down a reason of judgment, and so in writing also,
despite specifically requested by the Defendant, then this may indicate the magistrate was bias,
along with his comments that he was not going to consider “citizenship” issue as part of grounds
of the OBJECTION TO LEGAL JURISDICTION, even so this was also critical to any
decision to INVOKE LEGAL JURISDICTION or not.
This Court may hear matters DE NOVO but ought to be careful not to make the same or similar
errors and rob the Defendant of a FAIR and PROPER trial.
UNREPRESENTED DEFENDANT A SELF EDUCATED “CONSTITUTIONALIST”
The matter before this court is a very complex and serious matter, as the end result could be a
criminal conviction. The unrepresented Defendant native language is Dutch and the Defendant
has not had any formal education in the English language and neither in legal studies. Hence, the
Defendant in that way is disadvantaged to some degree while on the other hand this was to his
benefit in that as a self trained “constitutionalist” he has been able to understand constitutional
provisions without being, so to say, brainwashed by legal fictions and other incorrect perceptions
that exist.
Andrei Sakharov, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/andrei_sakharov_quote_30a9)

Freedom of thought is the only guarantee against an infection of people by mass myths,
which, in the hands of treacherous hypocrites and demagogues, can be transformed into
bloody dictatorships.
Alexander Hamilton, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/alexander_hamilton_quote_71c2)

No legislative act contrary to the Constitution can be valid. To deny this would be to affirm
that the deputy (agent) is greater than his principal; that the servant is above the master; that
the representatives of the people are superior to the people; that men, acting by virtue of
powers may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid. It is not to
be supposed that the Constitution could intend to enable the representatives of the people to
substitute their will to that of their constituents. A Constitution is, in fact, and must be
regarded by judges as fundamental law. If there should happen to be a irreconcilable
variance between the two, the Constitution is to be preferred to the statute.
Fredrich August von Hayek, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quotes_by/fredrich+august+von+hayek )

The greatest danger to liberty today comes from the men who are most needed and most
powerful in modern government, namely, the efficient expert administrators exclusively
concerned with what they regard as the public good.
Robert Lindner, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/robert_lindner_quote_a79f)

Part 1 Page 3
Authority has every reason to fear the skeptic, for authority can rarely survive in the face of
doubt.
Friedrich Nietzsche, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/friedrich_nietzsche_quote_3039)

Distrust everyone in whom the impulse to punish is powerful.
George Orwell, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/george_orwell_quote_304c )

At any given moment there is an orthodoxy, a body of ideas which it is assumed all right-
thinking people will accept without question. It is not exactly forbidden to state this or that
or the other, but it is “not done”… Anyone who challenges the prevailing orthodoxy finds
himself silenced with surprising effectiveness. A genuinely unfashionable opinion is almost
never given a fair hearing, either in the popular press or in the highbrow periodicals.
Lysander Spooner, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/lysander_spooner_quote_654e)

And the so-called sovereigns, in these different governments, are simply the heads, or
chiefs, of different bands of robbers and murderers.
Lysander Spooner, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote_blog/Lysander.Spooner.Quote.DEEB )

Our constitutions purport to be established by 'the people,' and, in theory, 'all the people'
consent to such government as the constitutions authorize. But this consent of 'the people'
exists only in theory. It has no existence in fact. Government is in reality established by the
few; and these few assume the consent of all the rest, without any such consent being
actually given.
Voltaire, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/voltaire_quote_312a )

...So long as the people do not care to exercise their freedom, those who wish to tyrannize
will do so; for tyrants are active and ardent, and will devote themselves in the name of any
number of gods, religious and otherwise, to put shackles upon sleeping men.
Ludwig von Mises, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/ludwig_von_mises_quote_bca5)

This, then, is freedom in the external life of man -- that he is independent of the arbitrary
power of his fellows.
Daniel Webster, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/daniel_webster_quote_3141)
The contest, for ages, has been to rescue Liberty from the grasp of executive power.
Edward Zehr, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/edward_zehr_quote_7281)
I wouldn't call it fascism exactly, but a political system nominally controlled by an
irresponsible, dumbed down electorate who are manipulated by dishonest, cynical,
controlled mass media that dispense the propaganda of a corrupt political establishment can
hardly be described as democracy either.
Ronald Reagan, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/ronald_reagan_quote_73aa)
Freedom is the recognition that no single person, no single authority or government has a
monopoly on the truth, but that every individual life is infinitely precious, that every one of
us put in this world has been put there for a reason and has something to offer. It´s so hard
for government planners, no matter how sophisticated, to ever substitute for millions of
individuals working night and day to make their dreams come true. The fact is,
bureaucracies are a problem around the world.
Immanuel Kant, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/immanuel_kant_quote_a319)

Freedom is independence of the compulsory will of another, and in so far as it tends to exist
with the freedom of all according to a universal law, it is the one sole original inborn right
belonging to every man in virtue of his humanity.

Part 1 Page 4
ADMISSION VERSUS CONFESSION
&
INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE
The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions may rely upon documents or other material it
obtained over the years as evidence, such as perhaps statements made under force of criminal
sanction, where by hindsight no such legal force was permissible. For example, many a person
register with the Australian electoral commission for voting, because they are advised that if they
fail to do so then they can face criminal sanction. The truth is that the Commonwealth of Australia
specifically was denied any right for “compulsory registration and voting” (15-4-1897) and that it
was up to the “desire” of a person to exercise his franchise to vote or not.
It is only by virtue of his citizenship of a state or of a territory

that he has any political rights in the Commonwealth.
The Framers of the Constitution made clear that Section 41 of the Constitution provided a right to
vote, as there was no need to qualify if one was an adult of the age of 21 to vote in federal
elections if one had franchise with a State.
Still, people are subjected to register with the Australian Electoral Commission under
unconstitutional threat of force (criminal sanctions) and for this any enrolment card must be
deemed to be inadmissible as evidence in those circumstances.
Likewise, any correspondence obtained by the Australian Electoral Commission under a

unconstitutional threat of force, such as a fine, also must be ruled inadmissible for the
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions to be used as evidence, as it was coerced under
deplorable circumstances.
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 21 November 1991, LOCAL GOVERNMENT (ELECTIONS)

BILL, Second reading, Page 1513,
QUOTE
Hon. C. J. HOGG (Minister for Ethnic, Municipal and Community Affairs) -- I
move:
ENROLMENT
ENROLMENT AND CONDUCT OF ELECTIONS
New enrolment provisions are inserted in the Act to provide for a council voter roll to
be drawn in the first instance only from the relevant portion of the State electoral roll.
Any other persons who wish to be included will be required to apply. This inessence
means everyone will apply for enrolment either to the Federal Electoral Commission,
in which case they are included on the Legislative Assembly roll, or direct to the
council. The responsibility will be on those who are not on the State electoral roll and
who seek to vote to apply for enrolment. Voting will be compulsory for all voters on
the roll; therefore provision is made for voters other than those on the Legislative
Assembly roll to be able to apply to be removed from the roll. The amendments will
ensure an up-to-date roll and help to eliminate duplicate enrolment.

Part 1 Page 5
END QUOTE
The problem with this is that constitutionally one can only enrol with a State and then
AUTOMATICALLY qualify as an adult to vote for Federal elections, hence there is no such
thing as to enrol with the Federal Electoral Commission and any legislation enacted by the State
to allow for this is and remains unconstitutional and so ULTRA VIRES.
The Defendant, to his knowledge never registered with the State Electoral Commission as an
elector! Therefore any purported enrolment with the Federal Electoral Commissioner was under
duress and remains unconstitutional.
The Victorian Justice Handbook 1962 page 83:
ADMISSION AND CONFESSIONS.

Admissions.
“In civil cases, statements made by the party to the proceedings or by his authorized agents
are admissible against, but not in favour of, such party, to prove the facts stated.”
Confessions.
Confessions may be received in criminal matters. No confession which is tendered in

evidence shall be rejected on the grounds that a promise or threat has been held out to the
person confessing unless the judge or presiding officer is of opinion that the inducement was
really calculated to cause an untrue admission of guilt to be made – Evidence Act 1958,
section 149
There are two kinds of admissions – admissions in writing and verbal admissions.
In order to allow a written admission to be produced as an exhibit or allowed in, there must
be some adoption of the paper itself. That adoption may be in many ways – by the signing of
the document, by placing a mark on the document or by reading of the document.
If a confession is taken down in writing and signed by the defendant, or its truth
acknowledged by parol, or if it be written by him, then it is put in as an ordinary document
and read to the court. But if the confession is taken down by a person who was present when
the confession was made and is not signed or acknowledged by the defendant the document
is not itself evidence, but may be used by the person who made it to refresh his memory. If
a confession (which is in existence) contains admissible evidence, parol evidence cannot be
given of it: R. v. Kerr (No. 1) (1951). VLR., 212
Comparison between Admissions and Confessions.
ADMISSIONS. CONFESSIONS.
1. Civil proceedings. 1. Criminal proceedings.
2. Need not be voluntary. 2. Must be voluntary.
3. May be made by agent, 3. Usually made only by

counsel or solicitor. Prisoner himself.
For far too long the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions and so also the Australian
Electoral Commission has used its might and so taxpayers funds to bulldoze any defendant as well
Part 1 Page 6
as the Courts as to that it can do what it does, and it is well overdue that this is stopped and we
finally have that JUSTICE PREVAILS and the lawyers who have been involved in this kind of
conduct themselves face the reality of criminal charges for this unconstitutional/illegal conduct as
to protect the people against this kind of brutal force.
“DESIRE” to vote cannot be compulsory to vote!
&
Section 245 CEA was and remains ULTRA VIRES at least since 4-12-2002 and for this
also the 2004 FAILING TO VOTE charge has no legal foundation
The Defendant has in fact refused to vote in recent State elections and no prosecutions for this
followed, where the Defendant advised to have objections to vote in State elections! As a matter
of fact the State Attorney-General himself advised that there is no State citizenship!
Without State citizenship there can be no Australian citizenship (Commonwealth citizenship) as
both includes franchise. It is because of Federation that the then Colonies transferred certain
legislative powers from the Colonies (now States) to the Commonwealth of Australia that by this
obviously the right of a State citizen to vote who shall be their legislators was partly transferred
also to the Commonwealth of Australia by this, hence, no state citizen could therefore be denied
franchise in the Federal arena where such person had obtained State franchise, as Section 41 of
the Constitution protected that right.
At time of Federation and indeed at the time of the Commonwealth of Australia enacting
legislation as to voting, there was no general obligation for anyone to vote. The Commonwealth
of Australia began to make voting compulsory in 1911, this, even so it was not compulsory in the
States. By this, the Commonwealth of Australia unconstitutionally infringed upon the freedoms
of the electors. In the error that it could do so (legislate for compulsory voting) failing to be aware
that it was bound by the liberties existing at the time the Constitution was created, and that it
could not diminish or reduce any rights and freedoms, regardless that any State may have done so
since for its own State elections. Subsequently States commenced to legislate also to make voting
compulsory.
The following quotation of a document published by the Australian Electoral Commission under
the heading, “Compulsory Voting in Australia” by Tim Evans, Director Elections Systems &
Policy, Australian Electoral Commission, 16 January 2006;
• In 1915, consideration was given to introducing compulsory voting for a

proposed referendum. As the referendum was never held the idea wasn’t
pursued.
As such, while initially there was an issue to have this approved by way of Section 128 of the
Constitution referendum, this was never proceeded with.
Hence, it cannot be argued that this compulsory voting was approved by the electors!
While compulsory voting was introduced in 1915 in Queensland, and in the Commonwealth of
Australia federal political environment by way of a Bill in 1924, it nevertheless could not
circumvent the fact that it was not constitutionally permissible.
• The impact was immediate, with turnout at the 1925 election rising to over
91%.
• Victoria introduced compulsory voting in 1926, NSW and Tasmania in 1928,
WA in 1936 and SA in 1942.
• When enrolment and voting at federal elections was introduced for Australian
Aborigines in 1949 it was voluntary, and continued to be so until 1984 when
Part 1 Page 7
enrolment and voting became compulsory for all eligible electors.
As the Commonwealth of Australia only could legislate for the whole of the Commonwealth (as
the Framers of the Constitution made very clear during the Debates) and in 1949 the 1967
referendum had not been held, then clearly there was a conflict in that the Commonwealth of
Australia somehow did not make it compulsory for Aboriginals to vote, yet did so (albeit
wrongly) for others.
Indeed, it still does not have it compulsory for those in the Antarctic. As such, it appears the
Federal Parliament legislate upon its wimps rather then to consider what is constitutionally
permissible and appropriate.
In view that the Defendant had from onset opposed the Magistrates Court of Victoria to invoke
legal (federal) jurisdiction and in fact the magistrate on 4-12-2002 made orders to have those
constitutional issues to be addressed then the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions
clearly had an OBLIGATION to place before the magistrate on 16 and 17 November 2005 the set
out of matters and why the Magistrate then could invoke jurisdiction. This it never did.
Voting as a Civic Duty

• Proponents of compulsory voting argue that voting is a civic duty comparable
to other duties citizens perform, such as taxation, compulsory education and
jury duty.
• Opponents argue that it is an infringement of liberty to force people to vote,
and that the ill informed and those with little interest in politics are forced to
the polls.
• One argument against compulsory voting is that voting can be an onerous
imposition on some citizens. Against this it has been stated by Mr
Christopher Bayliss, in a submission to JSCEM, that:
”All our voting system requires is for a voter to attend a polling booth and
mark some papers as they wish, approximately once every three years. This
does not seem to be an insurmountable burden to be part of a democracy”.
• Another argument is that both the United Nations Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights refer to people’s rights to “freely chosen representatives”. It is
then claimed that a “right” is something that a person posses and chooses to
use, not something produced on demand.
• Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, however, states that
“rights and freedoms” are subject to “duties to the community”, including the
“just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a
democratic society”.
• The Public Interest Advocacy Centre has stated, in a submission to JSCEM,
that:
”There are many things that people do not wish to do and which they would
not do if they were able to exercise “individual freedoms”, but which
parliament has legislated to require. The role of parliament in a parliamentary
democracy includes passing laws to ensure the effectiveness of that
democratic system”.
• For opponents of compulsory voting, the question is about the nature and
extent of the obligations that it is acceptable for the parliament to impose.
13
The writer of this article (published by the Australian electoral commission) clearly never
considered the fact that constitutionally the political liberty could not be compromised, unless a
Section 128 referendum was successful to give such powers to do otherwise.
Part 1 Page 8
It is not an argument if the parliament can or cannot legislate to force people to do something that
they may not desire to do but rather is the parliament has in the first place the constitutional
legislative powers to do so!
If there is no such constitutional powers then it is immaterial what the Parliament may desire
unless it first obtains such additional power by way of a Section 128 of the Constitution
referendum
For example, the Commonwealth of Australia may very well desire to legislate to have all driver
licences being the same throughout the Commonwealth of Australia and to ensure that any
conviction in anyone State or Territory is applied against any driver regardless where this driver
resides, but, regardless how sensible this might sound, in the end the Commonwealth of Australia
lacks any constitutional powers to legislate for this and therefore it is not relevant if the Federal
parliament desires to provide certain legislation but the first, so to say, port of call is if there is any
constitutional powers to legislate.
The Commonwealth of Australia legislative powers in regard of elections is bound by what is

embedded in the Constitution and this includes “if they desire to exercise their franchise” and
therefore it is not what anyone may deem should be done rather if there is constitutional powers
for it. Nothing is stopping the Commonwealth of Australia to pursue a Section 128 of the
Constitution referendum to make voting compulsory, but unless and until it achieves an approval
as such of the people compulsory voting legislation is and remains ULTRA VIRES.
On 24-3-1897 it was stated; “if they desire to exercise their franchise” and on 15-4-1897 Mr
Gordon proposed to make registration and voting compulsory but this had been rejected and Mr
Gordon then withdrew his submission. Hence voting cannot be made compulsory either. The
word “desire” clearly leaves it up to the choice of the elector to vote or not to vote!
Hansard 24-3-1897 Constitution Convention Debates
Sir GEORGE TURNER: It would never do to allow in this Federal Parliament that those representatives
who are elected upon the most liberal franchise possible should be outvoted by those who would be elected by
a very limited franchise indeed. As this may fairly be regarded as the National House, representing the people
of the various States as a nation, we ought to have uniformity in the franchise. We must leave it to the Federal
Parliament to say what the franchise should be. At the same time, as some colonies have given the right of
voting to those who have not that right in other colonies, it would be unfair and inequitable to take from any
who have the right, and therefore whatever uniformity is determined upon we shall have to allow the
innovation that no person, man or woman, who has the right to vote shall be deprived of exercising that
right, even so far as the elections to the Federal Parliament are concerned. I would go the length of saying
that everyone who has the right in the various colonies, if they desire to exercise their franchise, should have
the opportunity of doing so.
Again
At the same time, as some colonies have given the right of voting to those who have not that
right in other colonies, it would be unfair and inequitable to take from any who have the
right, and therefore whatever uniformity is determined upon we shall have to allow the
innovation that no person, man or woman, who has the right to vote shall be deprived
of exercising that right, even so far as the elections to the Federal Parliament are
concerned.
And
I would go the length of saying that everyone who has the right in the various colonies, if
they desire to exercise their franchise, should have the opportunity of doing so.

Part 1 Page 9
“Desire” stands for “an expressed wish”, “option”, “choice”, “request”, etc, not being
compulsory!
Because the Commonwealth of Australia could only legislate in regard of qualifications and other
rights not to minimize but to increase the rights of any person, then clearly any legislation that is
to remove such rights or to force a person to vote against his “desire” must be deemed
unconstitutional, and so ULTRA VIRES. Hence, the Court could not invoke any jurisdiction for
this either, as to deal with any charges of FAILING TO VOTE.
It should be considered also that the State of Victoria recognize the application of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and as any federal franchise is based upon
State franchise then for this also this is applicable.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Article 1
(For general comments on its implementation see

http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/CCPR+General+comment+12.En?OpenDocument)
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
PART II
Article 2
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the
present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional
processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as
may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are
violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by
any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and
to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when
granted.
Article 3
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/CCPR.C.21.Rev.1.Add.10,+CCPR+Gen)

Part 1 Page 10
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to
the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present Covenant.
Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in
article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by

universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the
free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.
No judgment of any court ever appears to have addressed the numerous constitutional issues
raided by the defendant, and any judgment of the High Court of Australia never either addressed
the scope of issues as the defendant has raised.
The desire by the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions to at all cost score a conviction
regardless of how inappropriately this might be I view never should be a justification for this
Court to appropriately adjudicate matters for so far it can invoke legal jurisdiction, if at all.
In criminal cases, such as for example murder, no Court of law would convict an accused merely
because another person faced with a same charged was previously convicted. Each and every case
must be considered upon its own merits, and if the Commonwealth Director of Public
Prosecutions cannot even overcome the issue of jurisdiction then there clearly never was/is a case
to answer.
As is quoted below
Mr. GORDON.-
Once a law is passed anybody can say that it is being improperly administered, and it
leaves open the whole judicial power once the question of ultra vires is raised.
It therefore cannot be held that while the Magistrates Court of Victoria on 4-12-2002 adjourned
proceedings so constitutional issues could be dealt with by the High Court of Australia to
determine if the legislation objected against upon constitutional grounds could be declared
INTRA VIRES somehow the very legislation being now ULTRA VIRES still continues to
operate against anyone else as if it is INTRA VIRES.
What appears to be is that the Australian Electoral Commission and the Commonwealth Director
of Public Prosecutions have totally disregarded the rule of law and abused and misused the legal
processes to score convictions and otherwise fine people which never was legally justified
because once the Magistrate on 4 December 2002 accepted the submission of the Commonwealth
Director of Public Prosecutions that there were indeed constitutional issues to be adjudicated upon
then the legislative provisions subject to the objections were clearly ULTRA VIRES and could
not be relied upon against any other person either until and unless the High Court of Australia had
declared the legislative provisions subject to constitutional objections to be INTRA VIRES. This
never occurred.
As the Framers of the Constitution made clear that if the legislative provision (it is not law once it
is ULTRA VIRES) remained ULTRA VIRES because the High Court of Australia declines to
declare it INTRA VIRES then at most a Referendum could provide the kind of legislative powers
required to enact such legislation but not retrospective. As such, only legislation passed after such
Part 1 Page 11
amendment to the Constitution was provided for by a Section 128 of the Constitution referendum
could be applied but not made retrospective either.
While people often are convicted by retrospective legislation this clearly is contrary to the
intentions of the Framers of the Constitution, who did not want people acting within the law be
made by hindsight criminals. As after all then no one could rely upon what might be the law.
Mr. SYMON.-It is not a law which is ultra vires.
And
Mr. SYMON.-Do you think acquiescence would make a law if the law passed by the
Commonwealth Parliament was ultra vires?
Mr. GORDON.-It would until the law was impugned. If the state did not impugn that law
it would remain in force. It is a law, and it could be allowed to be valid by the force of
acquiescence.
And
Mr. SYMON.-It is not a law if it is ultra vires.
Mr. GORDON.-It would be law by acquiescence. It would remain a law until it was
attacked.
And
Mr. HIGGINS.-But suppose they go beyond their power?
Mr. GORDON.-It is still the expression of Parliament. Directly a Ministry seeks to

enforce improperly any law the citizen has his right.
And
Mr. GORDON.-
And
Mr. HOLDER.-I will answer that interjection, which certainly has great weight.
Mr. OCONNOR.-Will the honorable member answer this question: Supposing a law is
affirmed by this process, and afterwards another law involving the same question is
proposed, is that also made good, or must there be a referendum for that?
Mr. HOLDER.-I have two interjections to answer. I will deal first with that of the
Attorney-General of Victoria. In reply to his statement that this makes the law altogether
retrospective, I simply say that the proposal is to make the law retrospective in this sense:
That during the interval throughout which it was, according to the judgment of the court,
ultra vires, the decision of the people afterwards could make it intra vires.
Mr. ISAACS.-That might make persons criminals who were not otherwise criminals. It
might not have been an offence to do a certain thing if the High Court declared the law to be

Part 1 Page 12
ultra vires, but if that law was made intra vires from an antecedent date, all the persons who
did that thing might be subject to punishment.
Mr. HOLDER.-I have great respect for the eminent legal authority of the Attorney-
General of Victoria, and he may help me to overcome that difficulty, and attain the
advantage I seek to attain. Mr. O'Connor asks me, if this were adopted, and under a certain
referendum a certain Bill was declared to be intra vires, whether that position would cover
any similar Bill adopted afterwards? My answer to that is this. I wish it [start page 1720]
should do so, that the enlargement of the Constitution should be not merely for the inclusion
of the particular measure which had been passed, but for the inclusion of the particular
matter concerning which otherwise that Bill had been, but for the referendum, ultra vires. I
do not profess to be a draftsman, and I gather that the Drafting Committee have been kind
enough to undertake-especially for lay members-to put into proper phraseology any
resolutions which the Convention has by a majority declared to embody principles which
they wish to have included in the Bill. So I am content, if the Convention adopts my
proposition as being an indication of its will, to leave the wording of the clause as it shall
appear finally entirely in the hands of the Drafting Committee, and shall be very glad of any
help they can give to suggest a method of covering what the honorable member has
suggested, so that my intentions my be fully met. do feel that in any question where the
point of the law ultra vires is raised, not the High Court but the people ought to be the final
appeal-that if I or any one else is on the other side of this controversy concerning a measure,
and I take the ground that it is ultra vires or that it is not, the final appeal concerning what
the Federal Parliament may do ought not to rest with the High Court, which can simply
determine it on the dry question of law, but ought to rest with those people who, themselves,
have the right to say whether or not the Constitution shall be enlarged to take in the
particular question at issue. I do not hesitate to affirm that, if we can place this final appeal
in the hands of the people instead of keeping it in the hands of the High Court, we will have
done very much indeed to popularize this measure, not only in South Australia, but in other
colonies. For I do assure honorable members that the presence of so large a number of
lawyers as there are in this Convention has helped to give colour to the suggestion, which is
very widely prevalent, that this Constitution is being made for the lawyers and for the
courts.
Mr. SYMON.-Nonsense!
Mr. GLYNN.-That is pandering to the popular cry.
Mr. BARTON.-I think my honorable friend ought to do his best to dispel any such base
slander as that.
Mr. HOLDER.-I can assure my honorable friend that I will do my best to dispel any such
base slander as that. I am not stating a matter in which I express my own thought or my own
feeling, but I repeat that in what I said just now I am expressing the thought and the feeling
of a great many persons outside the Convention who are not so well informed as we are. If
we can remove a misapprehension, if we can cure a ground of distrust, by making the
people themselves the final arbiters in their own cause, we shall surely be doing well, and
by doing that we will not be endorsing, but will be going the very best way possible to
refuse an indorsement to that opinion which was dissented from just now.
Sir EDWARD BRADDON.-Why not make them the first arbiters, too?
Mr. SYMON.-Why not make them the High Court at once?

Part 1 Page 13
Mr. HOLDER.-I have already shown that the adoption of my clause would save a large
amount of time. It is quite impossible that the people can sit as Judges, because the function
of Judges is one thing, and the function of electors of the Commonwealth is quite another
thing. I am not confounding these two. The people are absolutely incompetent to judge
whether a certain law is or is not ultra vires, and I would not dream of committing that
charge to the people, for there are no persons less fit than the general electors-taken all
together on a referendum-of any country to decide whether this or that is true law.
Mr. ISAACS.-You say the people accept the position in law; but they are asked whether
they will change the Constitution.
[start page 1721]
Mr. HOLDER.-That is exactly it. I would never dream of asking the people to reverse a
legal decision arrived at by the High Court. I have been specially careful in the form of the
amendment to avoid any such thing. I do not dream that the High Court will on one day say
that a certain Bill is ultra vires, and that the people shall the day after, or some months after,
say the court was wrong. That is not what I suggest. I suggest that the people should accept
the decision of the High Court that the law was ultra vires, but should say it ought not to be
ultra vires-that the Constitution should be enlarged so that such a decision could not be
given again. I do not wish to leave it to the people to say that the decision was wrong, but to
leave them to say that the Constitution should be so enlarged so as to-make such a decision
impossible in the future. That is a different thing from making the people Judges or giving
them a judicial position. I really feel very hopeless as a layman addressing the Convention
on a very technical legal point like this. I quite anticipate-and though this is not a wise thing
to say, I do not mind saying it-I quite anticipate defeat before I sit down. At the same time, I
shall not cease to regret defeat if it comes, nor shall I cease to believe that this way out, or
some other which the Drafting Committee could easily suggest, ought to be adopted, so as
to avoid the possibility of anybody outside saying, with any appearance of truth, that this is
a lawyer-written Constitution.
Where then Section 245 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 has been ULTRA VIRES, at
least since challenged by the Defendant, albeit it is ULTRA VIRES from when it was originally
enacted as any legislation that is ULTRA VIRES because of being beyond constitutional powers
is then ULTRA VIRES from when it was enacted, then the fact that nevertheless the Australian
Electoral Commission fined tens of thousands of electors itself ought to be a major scandal and
indeed requires a ROYAL COMMISSION. Further the fact that despite this the Commonwealth
Director of Public Prosecutions continued to pursue enforcement of Section 245 of the
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 and in deed as is currently before the Court charged the
Defendant with FAILING TO VOTE in the 2004 purported federal election, and even scored a
conviction on 17 November 2005 also underlines that the Commonwealth Director of Public
Prosecutions is using taxpayers funds to employ lawyers to illegally litigate charges for which in
the circumstances there was no legal justification. The onus was upon the Commonwealth
Director of Public Prosecutions to pursue that the High Court of Australia may declare the
legislative provisions INTRA VIRES before any further charges could be pursued, such as in
regard of the 2004 purported Federal election.
The issue is that at least from 4-12-2002 (albeit it was earlier because of the objections made by
the Defendant) Section 245 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 was ULTRA VIRES and
for this any further litigation or other fines by the Commonwealth Electoral Commission and/or
the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions in regard of the same purported 2001 Federal
election and/or the subsequent purported 2004 Federal election and/or any by election could not
be legally sustained where Section 245 ever since remained ULTRA VIRES.
Part 1 Page 14
Any legislative provisions that becomes ULTRA VIRES is so not just in regard of the
person/Defendant who makes the objection but it becomes ULTRA VIRES to the whole of the
Commonwealth of Australia. To every person who otherwise might be subject to this legislative
provisions. It would be utter and sheer nonsense if any legislative provisions could be declared
ULTRA VIRES for one Defendant but not for other Defendant. Commonwealth of Australia
legislative provisions must apply to all and any person without discrimination and so it is either
ULTRA VIRES to all people or INTRA VIRES to all people. It would be abhorrent to
contemplate that every person has to obtain in their own right a legal decision as then the High
Court of Australia could be forced to decide tens of thousands of cases governing the same legal
provision. clearly, this is not what is possible. The 1999 HCA 27 Wakim case is a clear example,
where the High Court of Australia declared that the so called Cross Vesting Act indeed was
ULTRA VIRES, and this applied to anyone not just to Wakim!
The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions pursues the courts to convict Defendants
time and again, and obtained this to be done concealing from the Court that Section 245
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 in fact was ULTRA VIRES and had not been declared by the
High Court of Australia to be INTRA VIRES.
Foster (1950) S.R. (N.S.W.) 149, at p151 (Lord Denning, speaking on the role of an
advocate)
"As an advocate he is a minister of Justice equally with a judge, A Barrister cannot
pick or choose his clients...He must accept the brief and do all he honourably can on
behalf of his client. I say 'All he honourably can' because his duty is not only to his
client. He has a duty to the court which is paramount. It is a mistake to suppose that he
is a mouthpiece of his client to say what he wants: or his tool to do what he directs. He
is none of those things. He owes his allegiance to a higher cause. It is the cause of
truth and Justice. He must not consciously misstate the facts. He must not
knowingly conceal the truth. He must not unjustly make a charge of fraud, that is,
without evidence to support it. He must produce all relevant authorities, even those
that are against him. He must see that his client discloses, if ordered, all relevant
documents, even those that are fatal to his case. He must disregard the specific
instructions of his client, if they conflict with his duty to the court."
Yet, despite Orders by the magistrate ( ON 4-8-2005) to provide to the Defendant all relevant
material as Section 388 of the CEA1918 was not held applicable, the Commonwealth Director of
Public Prosecutions failed to do so on and after 17 November 2005.
The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions concealed from the Court on 16 and 17
November 2005 that Section 245 was ULTRA VIRES. In fact concealed this time and again so
also from the Courts in other proceedings dealing with charges of FAILING TO VOTE.
Tim Evans, Director Elections Systems & Policy, Australian Electoral Commission
16 January 2006
• Because of the secrecy of the ballot, it is not possible to determine whether a
person has completed their ballot paper prior to placing it in the ballot box. It
is therefore not possible to determine whether all electors have met their
legislated duty to vote. It is, however, possible to determine that an elector
has attended a polling place or mobile polling team (or applied for a postal
vote, pre-poll vote or absent vote) and been issued with a ballot paper.
While the writer relies upon the issue that it can be established if a person attended to a polling
place “possible to determine that an elector has attended a polling place”, the truth is that the
defendant was known to have attended to the Polling Place, and so with his wife, yet no records of
this exist, as none are held. Indeed, the issue of ballot papers neither can be relied upon as
Part 1 Page 15
incorrect names are at times marked of and so people who are deemed to have voted in fact have
not and people who are deemed not to have voted in fact did vote.
Therefore, any charge of FAILING TO VOTE is not based upon accurate evidence but merely
based upon whatever the Australian Electoral Commission may deem applicable and then the
Defendant is given the onus of proving his/her innocence.
A person my have posted his/her ballot paper and it may never have been received by the
Australian Electoral Commission, beyond the fault of the person having posted the postal vote.
Law of Contract Case law dictates that when an offer is made then the respondent is deemed to
have accepted the offer by mailing the response of the offer of acceptance and the moment the
acceptance has been mailed and this can be confirmed by the Postal Authorities then the Post
Office act as an Agent for the offerer and so the agreement is deemed completed regardless if the
mail of acceptance never arrives. This is applicable unless pre-conditions are set otherwise.
Denning L.J. in Entores Ltd v. Miles Far East Corporation [1955] 2 Q.B. 327.
When a contract is made by post it is clear law throughout the common law countries that
the acceptance is complete as soon as the letter of acceptance is put into the post box, and
that is the place where the contract is made.
The Courts have for long held that if one could not rely upon the Post master to deliver then it
would undermine the confidence of people in the postal services.
It is nevertheless known that many letters and parcels send out via the postal authorities never
arrive at their destination, being it pilfering by employees of the postal authorities, being that mail
is accidentally destroyed by a motor vehicle collision involving a postal authorities vehicle, being
it that a plane containing postal material crashes or otherwise.
Because there is ano system in place that the Australian Electoral Commission can check if a
person has in fact posted a postal vote or not and neither is there any system in place that a elector
having mailed the postal vote can check if it has arrived, then for this also all the Australian
Electoral Commissioner is doing is to make some kind of game out of it all, that you can be lucky
your name is marked off regardless if you voted or not or you might be unlucky your name was
not marked of regardless you may have voted. A person who may have posted a postal vote may
discover that beyond his/her fault the postal vote is not received by the Australian Electoral
Commission and then face litigation and irrespective what in the end may or may not eventuate
the person is already harmed by the unsecured process used by the Australian Electoral
Commission that somehow demands a STAR CHAMBER COURT kind of process that a person
must prove himself/herself innocent. Yet, the Australian Electoral Commission may very well
have received the postal vote but mislaid it or marked of the wrong name and by this the real
culprit is the Australian Electoral Commission itself, but the burden of prove be made against the
elector. This ought never be accepted by a “Court of law”, and it should take the position that
unless the Australian Electoral Commission can prove beyond reasonable doubt its case there is
no case to answer and it should not be tolerated that it can cause criminal convictions upon
innocent people who may have not at all acted illegal or failed to act according to relevant legal
procedures.
16 January 2006
Resource Implications
• Proponents of compulsory voting argue that candidates can concentrate their
campaigning energies on issues rather than encouraging voters to attend a
polling place and vote.
• Opponents see this as wealth transfer, to the advantage of political parties,
while proponents see it as a wealth transfer to the advantage of the
democratic process.
Part 1 Page 16
• Opponents also argue that resources must be allocated for the enforcement
of compulsory voting – determining whether those who failed to vote have
“valid and sufficient reasons” and penalising those who do not.
• Parties would be anxious to maximise turnout at an election, not only for the
obvious need to secure sufficient votes, but also for the access to public
funding.
• If a candidate secures 4% of the formal vote cast in the electorate for which
they are a candidate, they are funded $1.95 for each formal vote. At the
October 2004 election, the total amount of public funding paid was $41 926
158.91.
And
• Opponents argue that it increases the number of safe electorates and clearly
identifies the marginal electorates on which government and opposition
parties need to concentrate.
• At its most extreme this could lead to “pork barrelling” with increased
government expenditure in marginal electorates and less in safer electorates.
This connects clearly the secret voting to party payments, and defies the intention of the Framers
of the Constitution that even a poor person should be able to be a candidate. Clearly with the
monies coming from funding of $1`.95 per vote, independents have opponent candidates who can
spend up on advertising knowing the party will be paid back on the votes acquired.
What this also means is, that a person residing in a small community may easily be detected as to
his/her voting preferences. In small towns of a few electors, one can basically trace if there were
any voted from that small rural town.
Secret voting is used to fund political parties in general by this, and one of the past TV
commercials showed barking dogs for the election as if this is an educational advertisement for
political purposes.
It undermines the very political liberty of people not having to vote and not having to contribute
financially to any candidate, where as the purported (albeit unconstitutional) obligation to vote
forces any elector to vote and by this ensure funds for the candidate they are giving their first
choice to. As such, the freedom to vote without providing cash out of Consolidated Revenue no
longer exist. People therefore are unconstitutionally force to fund political advertising from
consolidated Revenue, as no option is provided to vote for a candidate but refusing to provide
financial funding relating to that vote. the only current option is to vote informal to prevent usage
of consolidated Revenue to be used for election campaign funding!
16 January 2006
13
Resource Implications
• Proponents of compulsory voting argue that candidates can concentrate their
campaigning energies on issues rather than encouraging voters to attend a
polling place and vote.
• Opponents see this as wealth transfer, to the advantage of political parties,
while proponents see it as a wealth transfer to the advantage of the
democratic process.
People unknown about the payment per vote may vote without intending any payment to be made
to the candidate they list as number one. Others may refuse to vote altogether or vote informal as
to prevent any candidate to obtain monies.
Any situation of if they desire to exercise their franchise has therefore been compromised by
this also that to vote means to fund a candidate, where the elector may oppose such payment to be
made.

Part 1 Page 17
It also create a situation of corruption where candidates may make any promises as to get
maximum votes, and so maximum payment per vote, regardless that the candidate may have no
intent to honour his/her promises and nothing exist to hold the candidate accountable for his/her
promises.
It therefore corrupts the election process and denies electors of a FAIR and PROPER election.
Objective - subjective
No matter is any judicial officer were or were not to agree with the various issues raised by the
Defendant, including constitutional objections, it cannot be denied that the Defendant throughout
acted in a manner that the purported elections of 2001 and 2004 were ULTRA VIRES due to
failure of proper publication of the proclamation in the Gazette, the defective writs, and numerous
other issues. It then must be considered if it could be held that the Defendant had, if it were to be
deemed there should be a conviction – not that the Defendant seeks to indicate this could be the
end result- a subjective of objective intent to defy legislative provisions or that he deemed the
legislation ULTRA VIRES being contrary to constitutional doctrine embedded in the
Constitution and as such the very element to constitute a criminal offence in any event never
could be deemed to exist.
It ought to be kept in mind also that no person ever has presented such elaborate worked out
presentation as to the constitutional issues involved in the franchise issue.
The lacklustre conduct of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions to even present to
the Court a appropriate set out of issues before the Court and how constitutionally and otherwise
matters are applicable also ought to underline that the Defendant extraordinary effort to set out
relevant matters in the various ADDRESS TO THE COURT ought to underline that subjective
and objective the Defendant pursued proper application of constitutional provisions, regardless
that the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions may pursue otherwise.
Conduct of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions in litigation
While since at least 2002 the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions has been fully
aware about the Defendants objections in regard of constitutional issues and in fact on 4
December 2002 took the position to submit to the Magistrates Court of Victoria to order the
matters of constitutional issues to be determined by the High Court of Australia, nevertheless the
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, for so far the Defendant understand it, continued
nevertheless to pursue and obtained convictions against others it alleged having FAILED TO
VOTE in the 2001 and 2004 purported federal elections.
In my view this is a considerable issue, as if in the end it was found that indeed the elections were
ULTRA VIRES, then the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions has obtained
convictions contrary to its own submission to the Magistrates Court of Victoria on 4 December
2002 that the constitutional issues raised by the defendant should be determined by the High
Court of Australia.
It would mean that perhaps tens of thousands of people were fined and/or convicted where the
Australian Electoral Commission who is instructing the Commonwealth Director of Public
Prosecutions continued their conduct to use unconstitutional legislative provisions and concealing
from others relevant details.
This kind of manipulation and abuse of the legal processes never should be condoned!
If legislative provisions are not declared INTRA VIRES by the High Court of Australia then they
remain, from onset of legislation, to be ULTRA VIRES and this means that knowingly and
deliberately the Australian Electoral Commission and for them the Commonwealth Director of
Public Prosecutions engineered an ongoing deception to people involved, including to pervert the
course of justice time and again. If any criminal issue should attract the attention of the Courts
then surely it should be this conduct where the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions on
the one hand itself concede that there are constitutional issues raised by the Defendant that
Part 1 Page 18
required an appropriate judicial decision while knowing this then nevertheless continues to score
convictions against others (unbeknown of the legislation being ULTRA VIRES) using the very
legislation already subject to a constitutional challenge, and by this the legislation being ULTRA
VIRES.
While the magistrate on 17 November 2005 ruled he had legal jurisdiction, no magistrate can
overrule an earlier decision of another magistrate which was made upon the submission of the
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions on 4-12-2002 to have the matter adjourned
pending a judicial decision by the High Court of Australia upon constitutional issues.
It is my view, that once the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions made this submission
to the Magistrates Court of Victoria on 4-12-2002 then it should have stayed any charges against
anyone else unless the matter had first been adjudicated by the High Court of Australia.
If indeed the director of Public Prosecutions and/or the Commonwealth Electoral Commission
since 4-12-2002 pursued any person for allegedly FAILING TO VOTE, despite that the
constitutional validity of the legislation being under a constitutional objection became ULTRA
VIRES, and so wrongly obtained from people to pay the fines advised of and/or continued to have
the Courts convicting people, by concealing from each court that the relevant legislation was
ULTRA VIRES then this is a very serious matter.
It would indicate that the Australian Electoral Commission is not concerned a bit to provide FAIR
and PROPER elections but rather is a power hungry organization not concerned with what is its
statutory obligations and duties and via the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions has
been willing to have innocent people wrongly convicted and by this incurring a criminal
conviction.
I understand that a Mr John Wilson, of NSW, was convicted for FAILING TO VOTE and it
seems therefore that the Australian Electoral Commission and the Commonwealth Director of
Public Prosecutions have placed themselves above the law (so the Constitution) and this may also
be seen to reflect in its conduct towards the Defendant over the years.
I understand that people like Mr Derryn Hinch, radio broadcasters deems it inappropriate for
them to vote because of not wanting to be bias or seen to be bias where they are making public
comments about political parties. Yet, despite the fact that the Commonwealth Director of Public
Prosecutions (for the Australian Electoral Commission) conceded on 4-12-2006 that there
constitutional issues to be adjudicated upon, they nevertheless abused their powers to still
continue to fine people or score convictions.
It is this kind of grandeur and ignorance to a proper conduct that the Defendant so much
encountered so far in the litigation. As shown further also.
Lack of responses by Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions
The Defendant does wish to make known to this court that being it ignorance or otherwise there
has been a considerable failure by the Commonwealth of Director of Public Prosecutions to have
a sensible discussion about issues before this Court. Even the submission for proceedings in
regard of the charges to be stayed at least for more then 3 weeks, at the time of writing this part,
was still not responded upon. This is in that regard frustrating as the Commonwealth Director of
Public Prosecutions seems to take the position, as I view it, that they can litigate as they are
getting paid anyhow, no matter the cost to the taxpayers and so can ignore any form of proper
communication to seek to address issues in dispute. This in fact has been the line of conduct by
them over the years! One may ask then why should the Court spend it’s time to seek to address
issues if the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions cannot even bother to act
appropriately in communications that ordinary is appropriate between parties in a dispute to seek
to establish the real issues.
http://familyguardian.tax-
tactics.com/Subjects/LawAndGovt/ChallJurisdiction/AuthoritiesArticle/AuthOnJurisdiction.htm

Part 1 Page 19
37 Am Jur 2d at section 8 states, in part: "Fraud vitiates every transaction and all contracts.
Indeed, the principle is often stated, in broad and sweeping language, that fraud destroys the
validity of everything into which it enters, and that it vitiates the most solemn contracts,
documents, and even judgments."
In my view, the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions obtained fraudulently a

conviction in the Magistrates Court of Victoria by not presenting to the Court all relevant
details/information that the Court was required to consider before it could determine a decision as
to the guilt or innocence of the Defendant.
The following applies as much to Federal laws of the Commonwealth of Australia as it does to
federal laws in the USA;
http://familyguardian.tax-
tactics.com/Subjects/LawAndGovt/ChallJurisdiction/AuthoritiesArticle/AuthOnJurisdiction.htm
 The general misconception is that any statute passed by legislators bearing the appearance
of law constitutes the law of the land. The U.S. Constitution is the supreme law of the
land, and any statute, to be valid, must be in agreement. It is impossible for both the
Constitution and a law violating it to be valid; one must prevail. This is succinctly stated
as follows:
The general rule is that an unconstitutional statute, though having the form and name of
law, is in reality no law, but is wholly void, and ineffective for any purpose; since
unconstitutionality dates from the time of its enactment, and not merely from the date of
the decision so branding it. An unconstitutional law, in legal contemplation, is as
inoperative as if it had never been passed. Such a statute leaves the question that it
purports to settle just as it would be had the statute not been enacted.
Since an unconstitutional law is void, the general principles follow that it imposes no
duties, confers no rights, creates no office, bestows no power or authority on anyone,
affords no protection, and justifies no acts performed under it. . .
A void act cannot be legally consistent with a valid one. An unconstitutional law cannot
operate to supersede any existing valid law. Indeed, insofar as a statute runs counter to the
fundamental law of the land, it is superseded thereby.
No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law and no courts are bound to enforce
it.
Sixteenth American Jurisprudence

Second Edition, 1998 version, Section 203 (formerly Section 256)
The magistrate simply had no option, as he proved to do, to ignore the “CITIZENSHIP” issue
raised by the Defendant, in particularly where the State of Victoria itself implied accepted this
argument, where the State did not pursue charges against the defendant for allegedly FAILING
TO VOTE..
Because the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions had been for several years aware of
the Defendants numerous objections, it was their duty to place before the Court a proper set out,
and in writing, why the Court could invoke jurisdiction. The concealment, as the Defendant views
it, by the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions to do s itself may be deemed fraudulent
conduct as it was tantamount to deceiving the court in if it could invoke jurisdiction or not.

Part 1 Page 20
Sentencing options
While it might be early in the proceedings to start about sentencing option, nevertheless the
Defendant deems it appropriate to consider this at this stage.
Evidence Act 1958 (Vic)

Act No. 6246/1958
With or without conviction, order a fine

A fine is a monetary penalty which can be imposed by the Court. The maximum amount must not exceed
$24,000.
With or without conviction, adjourn the hearing on conditions

If the court has found a matter proven, it may, with or without conviction, adjourn the case for a period of
not more than 5 years. The person can enter into an undertaking on the conditions that they may be
required to reappear before the court on the return date if called upon, to be of good behaviour during the
period of the bond, and any other special conditions that the court thinks fit.
In making such an order, the court would consider:
 rehabilitation
 deterrence (General & Specific)
 the trivial, technical or minor nature of the offence
 circumstances in which it is inappropriate to record a conviction
 circumstances in which it is inappropriate to inflict any punishment other than a nominal punishment
 allowance for the existence of extenuating or exceptional circumstances that justify the court showing
mercy to an offender
Convict and discharge

A court may discharge a person whom it has convicted of an offence after taking into consideration the
matters mentioned in the last paragraph.
Dismiss the charge

A court on being satisfied that a person is guilty of an offence may, (without recording a conviction),
dismiss the charge for any of the reasons mentioned in the second last paragraph.
What is clearly an issue in these proceedings by the defendant is that a State Court cannot be
dictated by the Commonwealth how it shall conduct proceedings and impose any penalty,
conviction, etc.
Yet, the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 pursues a fine of $50.00 for a conviction and as such
is unconstitutional as it seeks to interfere with the judicial digression judicial officers in State
Courts have. In particularly in regard of the so called “first offenders”.
In that regard, somehow a person convicted for FAILING TO VOTE could end up with a
criminal record and a $50.00 fine, where as someone committing a other criminal offence could
be let of without conviction recorded, etc.
Clearly, this also highlights that it is essential that this Court first address the constitutional
standing of the Commonwealth of Australia to dictate State Court judicial officers what they can
or cannot do, which directly interfere with the judicial independence of State Courts.
Part 1 Page 21
The mere fact that the State itself does not pursue to prosecute the Defendant for allegedly failing
to vote in State elections, and the Federal elections after all are of State interest as they are
relating to electing representatives to legislate under the referred powers to the Commonwealth of
Australia, then it is also for this questionable why on earth the Commonwealth Director of Public
Prosecutions nevertheless pursued charges against the Defendant.
The fact that the Defendant as one of his objections of voting in State elections had that he was
not constitutionally an “Australian citizen”, and challenged the validity of the Australian
Citizenship Act 1948 to purport otherwise, as he was never granted State citizenship, as the
Attorney-General himself made clear that it does not exist, then where the state has accepted this,
the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions could not then circumvent the state
acceptance of this as to then pursue the defendant for allegedly FAILING TO VOTE in federal
elections! After all, the elections for Senators are of State interest as it is to represent the State in
the Senate in the Federal Parliament, and as such any charge for allegedly FAILING TO VOTE in
a Senate election is a State issue, as it are State electoral provisions.
While the Commonwealth of Australia may have the operation of Senate elections they are and
remain in principle depending upon State Governors issuing writs! For this, the Commonwealth of
Australia cannot pursue a matter that is essentially a State issue.
The modus operandi might lie with the Commonwealth but it nevertheless in essential issue is a
State issue. As the State has refrained from making any charges against the Defendant as to an
alleged FAILING TO VOTE then the issue arises what are the charges about of allegedly
FAILING TO VOTE? Is the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecution pursuing in Court,
do they relate to either Senate or House of Representative elections or both?
If the State of Victoria itself does not pursue any charges then can somehow the Director of Public
Prosecutions nevertheless pursue a charge in regard of Senate elections? Or is it just that the
Commonwealth director of Public Prosecutions himself is totally unable to explain what on earth
the charges are really about?
ABUSE OF THE LEGAL PROCESSES
&
THE GAME THAT WAS BEING PLAYED
The problem is that Defendants often have no financial resources to engage a lawyer to defend
them against any frivolous and vexatious charge which are an abuse of the legal processes but
faced with an Australian electoral commissioner and lawyers who at cost of the taxpayers can
mount any absurd litigation and regardless how they have abused their powers basically nothing is
there to punish them other then as Gillard J of the Supreme Court of Victoria himself made clear
was to order cost against lawyers involved who are abusing the legal processes. If this is not
applied then lawyers can continue to rampage this Court and continue their terrorising conduct
upon Defendants while earning good money doing so. Where then the Defendant cannot seek
cost, then it should be appropriate that the lawyers concerned pay into the poor box and/or to
some charity organization upon the Courts choice the equivalent of their litigation cost.
While the Defendant pursued to direct his correspondence to the Australian Electoral
Commission, the lawyers involved at the time (Australian Government Solicitors) however wrote
to the defendant that correspondence should be directed to them and not to the Australian
Electoral Commission. This kind of “GAME PLAY” appeared to be very obviously designed to
undermine the Defendants case, as after all, had the Defendant done so then the Prosecutor
(Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions) now could have argued that the correspondence
forwarded to the Australian Government Solicitors were not forwarded to the Australian Electoral
Part 1 Page 22
Commission and so was not something they could have considered. Hence, it was for the
Defendant critical he did write to the Australian Electoral Commissioner rather then just to the
Australian Government Solicitors.
There is a further considerable issue ion this “GAME PLAY” by the Australian Electoral
Commissioner who was the instructor to both the Australian Government Solicitors and to the
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, that is while the Australian Electoral
Commissioner instructed the Commonwealth director of Public Prosecution to apply to the court
on 4 December 2002 that the matter be transferred to the High Court of Australia for hearing of
the constitutional based objections raised by the Defendant together with the outstanding
NOTICE OF APPEAL the Defendant had on foot before the High Court of Australia,
unbeknown to the Defendant and so the Defendant understands likewise to the Commonwealth
Director of Public Prosecutions, the Australian Electoral Commissioner had instructed the
Australian Government Solicitors to file a Chamber Summons in 11 February 2002, this even so
not having filed any APPEARANCE once having been served with the NOTICE OF APPEAL
on 22 November 2001. As such it appeared to the Defendant that the Chamber Summons, which
was in fact never served upon the Defendant was filed for no other purpose but to abuse the legal
processes of the High Court of Australia and to , so to say, get the backdoor way into the High
Court of Australia. Once the Chamber Summons was filed, the Australian Electoral
Commissioner obviously never intended to proceed with it, so it appears to the defendant, and
hence it was never served, as it was a “GAME PLAY”. Indeed, the fact that it never was intended
to be proceeded with but merely was a backdoor way in was proven when the Australian electoral
commissioner then on 23 October 2002 filed a NOTICE OF MOTION, albeit that neither was
formally served according to the High Court rules.
So, here we had on 4 December 2002 the Director of Public Prosecutions still on instructions of
the Australian Electoral Commission pursuing a charge against the Defendant and submitting to
the magistrate to transfer the constitutional issues for hearing to the High Court of Australia with
the pending appeal, while the Australian Government Solicitors was concealing from them and
the defendant that then the Chamber Summons and the NOTICE OF MOTION were filed in the
High Court of Australia to prevent the NOTICE OF APPEAL to be heard on its MERITS.
In my view, the Australian Electoral Commissioner should have disclosed this conduct in the
High Court of Australia to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, the magistrate and
the defendant. After all, if the magistrate had been aware of this then the magistrate may have
made different orders then now eventuated.
In my view, the magistrate was deceived by the conduct of the Australian Electoral
Commissioner.
While the High Court of Australia held that the Defendant on 19 August 2003 was provided with
a copy of the NOTICE OF MOTION as part of the Application Book prepared by the Australian
Government Solicitors, the truth is that this is not the kind of service provided for in the High
Court Rules as to service. The High Court of Australia never formally did dismiss the numerous
objections the Defendant then had placed before the Court and as such the High Court of Australia
never did and could not have invoked legal jurisdiction, and so its orders to dismiss the NOTICE
OF APPEAL without a hearing on its MERITS for not being entitled to be filed is without legal
force (ULTRA VIRES).
At no time did the Commonwealth director of Public Prosecutions go back to the magistrate and
advise the magistrate who made the 4 December 2002 orders that they had made a submission
which the magistrate had granted, but by hindsight they discovered that the Australian Electoral
Commission had deceived them and as such the constitutional issues could not now be heard with
the appeal which the High Court of Australia refused to allow to be heard upon its MERITS.
As the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions had made the submission in the first place
on 4 December 2002 for a transfer of matters to be heard before the High Court of Australia

Part 1 Page 23
together with the then outstanding appeal then it was the duty of the Commonwealth Director of
Public Prosecutions to correct this matter.
It appears to have been a “GAME PLAY” by the Australian Electoral Commissioner to withhold
from the defendant that the CHAMBER SUMMONS and subsequently the NOTICE OF
MOTION was filed in the High Court of Australia as possibly to prevent the Defendant to oppose
the subsequent submission of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions of 4 December
2002.
Clearly, had the Australian Electoral Commissioner caused the defendant to have been served, as
is the normal legal procedures when an CHAMBER SUMMONS and/or a NOTICE OF
MOTION is filed then the Defendant would have been aware of it on 4 December 2002 and
could have notified the magistrate about this and so the magistrate may have more then likely
handed down different orders then that now were provided.
More then likely, the Australian Electoral Commissioner neither advised the Director of Public
Prosecutions that the Defendant had already indicated to rely also upon RELIGIOUS
OBJECTION as after all it could have jeopardize, as the Defendant perceives it, the
VENDETTA kind of litigation the Australian Electoral Commissioner was pursuing against the
Defendant.
It should not be under estimated how severe matters where the Defendant, not a trained lawyer, so
to say, was exposing all the wrongdoings of the Australian Electoral Commissioner in holding
elections in unconstitutional and illegal manner and conducting elections in a manner as if he had
the private ownership to do as he liked regardless what was legally appropriate.
The issue that ultimately should be explored, if the Court does decide to invoke legal jurisdiction
as to why the Australian Electoral Commissioner concealed from the Commonwealth Director of
Public Prosecutions that the Defendant had raised the issue of RELIGIOUS OBJECTION!
This is why the Defendant perceives the conduct of the Australian Electoral Commissioner to be
as some kind of VENDETTA, where he was deceiving the Courts, deceiving the commonwealth
Director of Public Prosecutions, deceiving the defendant in numerous ways all to seek to obtain
whatever judgment in his favour. Regretfully, experiences proved that the Courts rather then to
take their time to deal appropriately with matters were more concerned to please the lawyers and
grand orders which constitutionally and further legally was without justification.
In this case, the Defendant did make known for years to have “religious objections” in regard of
voting in the circumstances then prevailing, besides having other numerous constitutional and
other relevant legal objections, but despite of this, the Defendant nevertheless ended up convicted
on 17 November 2005 in the Magistrates Court of Victoria at Heidelberg, and this underlines that
there appears to be some sick minded mentality that at the taxpayers cost it is alright for lawyers
to abuse the legal processes and score some conviction where none ever ought to have been as to
somehow protect the exposure of the wrongdoings of the Australian Electoral Commission.
It is the kind of WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION and “CHILDREN OVERBOARD”
mentality where FICTION is more of their concern then the TRUTH and REALITY.
It is for this also the Defendant has to make elaborate submissions with considerable background
information, and rely upon the content of his past published books, to indicate that this litigation
pursued by the Commonwealth Directors of Public Prosecutions (Prosecutor) has nothing to do
with enforcing Commonwealth law but rather to do with abusing legal provisions to shield the
wrongdoers, such as the Australian Electoral Commissioner.
Few people indeed could have made such extensive and elaborate set out over the years to the
Australian Electoral Commissioner, all be in vain, as the real issue by the Australian Electoral
Commissioner was not, so it appears to the Defendant, to ensure FAIR and PROPER elections
were being held, but to ensure his abuse of power could flourish and curse anyone, such as the
Defendant, who dared to expose his abuse of power and other wrongdoings.
The Defendant takes the position that in the circumstances existing already before the purported
2001 federal election was held there never was any legal justification for any charge of FAILING
Part 1 Page 24
TO VOTE to be made against the defendant, and neither so subsequently in regard of the
purported 2004 election, but this all came about because the Australian Electoral Commissioner in
his desire to continue his abuse of power is left unchecked by anyone, including the
Commonwealth Ombudsman and the JSCEM (Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters) as
they cite ongoing litigation preventing them to investigate, etc, is left to do so at unlimited
finances at the cost of taxpayers, which the Defendant also is.
It is therefore upon this Court to prove its credibility, and to make clear that it will not condone
and tolerate this kind of preposterous abuse of the legal processes, in particularly not where this
relates to elections going to the core of democracy.
ROYAL COMMISSION
The Defendant submits, that a ROYAL COMMISSION should investigate all matters, as
extensively referred to by the Defendant in his material and other material the commission may
deem relevant, as after all so much is at stake. It may not be for this Court to order such, as it has
no judicial power to do so, but at the very least it could recommend such ROYAL
COMMISSION to be held.
RIGHT TO BE HEARD
Re; Commissioner of Police v. Tanos
Similarly in Commissioner of Police v. Tanos (1958) 98 CLR 383, at p 395 ,
Dixon C.J. and Webb J. said that "it is a deep-rooted principle of the law
that before anyone can be punished or prejudiced in his person or property by
any judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding he must be afforded an adequate
opportunity of being heard." (at p4)
And
Bringinshaw v Bringinshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 361,362

“Not inexact proof, indefinite testimony or indirect inference (By prosecution)”
And
Marriage of Baines (No. 2) (1981) 7 Fam LR 232 at 237;-

"We recognise that each party is entitled to a Fair and Proper trial and to an adequate
opportunity to adduce relevant evidence and to test the quality and veracity of the evidence
adduced by the other party."
The magistrate (On 17 November 2005) seemed to be in a hurry, so to say, to convict without
appropriately allowing evidence to be placed before the Court, albeit refusing to address critical
issues of the OBJECTION TO LEGAL JURISDICTION overruled this the magistrate seemed
to overlook that for purpose of the trial itself then the case ought to have been heard afresh and all
evidence should have been presented afresh. It appeared to me the magistrate simply relied upon
argument in regard of the OBJECTION TO LEGAL JURISDICTION and did not bother to
demand from the Director of Public Prosecution to appropriately present his case, regardless that I
made the claim NO CASE TO ANSWER.
JOHN RAYMOND BURRELL v. NICK JACENKO [1998] NSWLEC 310 (4 December 1998)
11. The question whether there is a case to answer arises at the end of the prosecutor's
evidence in chief. The tender of a document in the course of cross examination of a
prosecution witness does not change that temporal context. The question of law to be
answered after all is whether the defendant could lawfully be convicted on the evidence as it
stands at that time.

Part 1 Page 25
12. The Court is not satisfied that the defendant has lost the opportunity to make a no case
submission by the tender of the planting design.
The issue was at all times if at the closure of the Prosecutors case there was sufficient evidence
presented to the Court to warrant a conviction. The averment rule could not apply in that regard
where failing to vote itself was not to justify a conviction if there was a lawful excuse, and this the
Prosecutor never did overcome when presenting his case, this despite the Defendant in his
ADDRESS TO THE COURT already related to the religious objection issue. In fact, the
Prosecutor didn’t even bother to cross examine about this, perhaps because of being aware that
constitutionally religious beliefs cannot be tested.
The RIGHT TO BE HEARD surely must include that the actual trial of the charge allows all
relevant evidence to be presented, even if this means that details presented in regard of the
OBJECTION TO LEGAL JURISDICTION are to be canvassed again, this the magistrate
refused.
The magistrate refused to adjourn the hearing for the charges themselves, even so the previous
magistrate had directed that this was to be done, once the OBJECTION OF LEGAL
JURISDICTION had been disposed off, if it had been, so the Commonwealth Director of Public
Prosecutions first could serve upon me all material relied upon and then the matter be
subsequently listed for hearing.
In my view, where those orders remain on foot than this (adjournment) is the appropriate conduct
to be followed as otherwise it would rob me of my right to appropriately prepare my case in
defence of the charges.
A criminal conviction is a very serious matter, and albeit my wife and I no longer are in
employment, it does not mean that I then can have the luxury of a criminal conviction as a stain
against my name, merely because the Court may refuse to allow me the benefit of the decisions of
previous magistrates, and ignores to deal appropriately with constitutional based objections and
other relevant matters, and by this also denied a FAIR AND PROPER TRIAL.
NO MAN CAN BE A JUDGE IN HIS OWN CASE
Dimes v. Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal (1852) 3 II,L.C. 759

“The fundamental rule of English (Australian) law is that "No man can be a judge in his
own case". It has long been held that if there is bias or the appearance of bias such as to
deny justice or create the impression that justice has not been done, then that bias, or
apparent bias, is sufficient to invalidate the decision of those who made the decision.”
Reg v. The London County Council (1894) XI .L.R. 24
Sharp v. Carey (1897) 23 V.L.R. 248 Austin Digest 17.
Reg. v. Moleswort (1893) 23 V.L.R. 582 Austin Digest 17.
Black v. Black (1951) N.Z.L.R. 723
Ex Parte Blume (1958) W.N. (N.S.W.) 411Austin Digest 93,339,457,458
The Defendants submits, that “Australian citizenship” can only be obtained by obtaining
“State citizenship”, as it is not a nationality, but has to deal with being a recognised “State
citizens” where one AUTOMATICALLY then obtain “Australian citizenship”
(“Commonwealth citizenship” which includes franchise. Because lawyers require to make an
“Oath of alliance” when seeking to be admitted to the BAR to practice, which now is to a
LEGAL FICTIONAL “Queen of Australia” (as set out further in this ADDRESS TO THE
COURT), while being a Subjects of the British Crown, (as also set out further), then there is a
clear conflict for any judge to deal with this matter which would in effect involve his/her own
Part 1 Page 26
personal legal position if qualified to be a judge of this Court. Albeit judicial officers may not be
aware that their true constitutionally nationality is and remain to be British nationals and so any
“Oath of alliance” to a LEGAL FICTIONAL “Queen of Australia” would be a conflict. Where
the High Court of Australia in Sue v Hill ousted Heather Hill of being a member of parliament
upon the basis that she was having alliance to a foreign Queen, then as set out further in this
ADDRESS TO THE COURT, the same applies to all other persons, including judicial officers,
who by birth (including all those persons born within the Commonwealth of Australia) or by
naturalization are in fact “subjects of the British Crown.”
Hansard 2-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates;
Mr. BARTON.-I did not say that. I say that our real status is as subjects, and that we
are all alike subjects of the British Crown.
Dr. QUICK.-If we are to have a citizenship of the Commonwealth higher, more

comprehensive, and nobler than that of the states, I would ask why is it not implanted in the
Constitution? Mr. Barton was not present when I made my remarks in proposing the clause.
I then-anticipated the point he has raised as to the position we occupy as subjects of the
British Empire. I took occasion to indicate that in creating a federal citizenship, and in
defining the qualifications of that federal citizenship, we were not in any way
interfering with our position as subjects of the British Empire. It would be beyond the
scope of the Constitution to do that. We might be citizens of a city, citizens of a colony,
or citizens of a Commonwealth, but we would still be, subjects of the Queen.
Again;
we were not in any way interfering with our position as subjects of the British Empire.
It would be beyond the scope of the Constitution to do that.
The High Court of Australia deriving its judicial powers within the Constitution
(Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK)) cannot go beyond what is
embedded in the Constitution, hence the constitutional problem exist that judicial officers are
constitutionally (by birth or naturalization) “subjects of the British Crown” but wrongly
excluded by the Sue v Hill decision as being deemed to be by this having alliance to a foreign
Monarch.
In view that by the Sue v Hill ruling the effect is that all judicial officers within the
Commonwealth of Australia then are having alliance to a foreign Monarch then none of the
judicial officers (including those of the High Court of Australia) could possibly determine their
own status as only the Privi Council could do so.
As set out further in this document Subsection 51(xix) of the Constitution was provided for by the
British Parliament to naturalize “aliens” to become “British nationals”, and it never included any
purported “Australian nationality”. The High Court of Australia has no constitutional powers to
amend the Constitution as to purport this subsection 51(xix) has a different meaning then
intended by the Framers of the Constitution, and hence all persons born in the Commonwealth of
Australia and those “naturalized” are and remain “subjects of the British Crown” with their
alliance to the British Monarch. As also set out extensively further in this ADDRESS TO THE
COURT, no one can have alliance to two Monarchs and therefore any Oath that purports to be to
a “Queen of Australia” is a disqualification to serve as a judicial officer. With laws (legislation)
now being enacted under the name of “Queen of Australia” then all laws so enacted are
constitutionally ULTRA VIRES and so without legal force. This applies also to Proclamations
and writs.

Part 1 Page 27
The Defendant submits, that for this also the Proceedings are permanently stayed, so the
constitutional issues are to be sorted out by the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions as
to if this Court can invoke legal jurisdiction and if there is any judicial officer of any Court in the
Commonwealth of Australia who in fact is qualified to hear the case, or that by their “Oath of
alliance” to the LEGAL FICTION “Queen of Australia” they have all disqualified themselves
from being a judicial officer to hear and determine matters.
The Defendant submits, that the same applies to any lawyer seeking to prosecutor this case for
the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions.
Those who did not make an “Oath of alliance” to the LEGAL FICTION “Queen of Australia”
still have the problem that they are faced with a Court system that now purportedly (Sue v Hill)
operates under a LEGAL FICTION “Queen of Australia” and as such the conflict remains to
exist.
This ADDRESS TO THE COURT to some extend has quoted the intentions of the Framers of
the Constitution and the true meaning of “citizenship” including “Commonwealth citizenship”
(“Australian citizenship”) and how one obtain it. Including the various references of “Australian
citizenship” under the British nationality! It is the Sue v Hill judgment that has thrown it all in a
chaos where the High Court of Australia purported that “Australian citizenship” is a “nationality”
where in fact no such constitutional powers ever existed, in deed specifically was stated not to
exist. Where then nevertheless the Sue v Hill judgment prevents a British national to sit in the
parliament, contrary to the intentions of the Framers of the Constitution then it equally applies to
all other members of parliament and any judicial officers who unbeknown to themselves are in
fact “British nationals”.
In my 30 September 2003 published book (Of which 4 copies were provided that day to the High
Court of Australia Melbourne Registry, and a further 4 copies on 3 October 2003);
INSPECTOR-RIKATI® on CITIZENSHIP
A book on CD about Australians unduly harmed.
ISBN 0-9580569-6-X
I did set out then that with those who had joined Pauline Hanson One Nation were in fact
members regardless of what was stated otherwise on the flip side of their membership card.
Subsequently, in November 2003, the Court of Appeal precisely used this to overturn Pauline
Hanson and David Ettridge convictions.
Because the Commonwealth of Australia was specifically denied to define/declare citizenship by

the Framers of the Constitution then the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 is ULTRA VIRES, for
so far it purports to define/declare citizenship and by this all persons natural born in the
Commonwealth of Australia and those naturalized within the powers of subsection 51(xix) of the
Constitution are and remain in fact British nationals. By the, albeit ill-conceived judgment of Sue
v Hill therefore are deemed to be under an “Oath of alliance” of a “foreign monarch”. All
judgments handed down in the name of the “Queen of Australia” therefore are a legal nullity.
OBJECTION TO LEGAL JURISDICTION
The Defendant (Appellant) also relies upon the material, the ADDRESS TO THE COURT’s that
were previously filed in proceedings held in the Magistrates Court of Victoria at Heidelberg,
including the OBJECTION TO LEGAL JURISDICTION, that was made from onset in August
2002 when the initial proceedings commenced, and ever since maintained.

Part 1 Page 28
Main v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980).
"The law provides that once State and Federal jurisdiction has been
challenged, it must be proven."
Hagens v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 533,

- "Once jurisdiction is challenged, it must be proven" .
Standard v. Olsen, 74 S. Ct. 768,

- "No sanctions can be imposed absent proof of jurisdiction."
Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 2nd 906 at 910,
- "Jurisdiction can be challenged at any time, even on final determination."
Thompson v. Tolmie, 2 Pet. 157, 7 L.Ed. 381; Griffith v. Frazier, 8 Cr. 9, 3L. Ed. 471.
- "Where there is absence of jurisdiction, all administrative and judicial proceedings
are a nullity and confer no right, offer no protection, and afford no justification, and
may be rejected upon direct collateral attack."
It means that the Prosecutor has the onus to prove jurisdiction and must disprove each and
every objection that I place before this Court in support of my OBJECTION TO LEGAL
JURISDICTION.
I refer to the term “Framers of the Constitution” which refers to the delegates of the Constitution
Convention Debates in principle but also provides for the inclusion of the British Parliament
which amended the Constitution when dealing with the Bill before the British Parliament and
subsequent successful referendums that resulted to Section 128 amendments of the Constitution.
The term “Framers of the Constitution” also was used by the Delegates themselves, as shown
below.
Hansard 9-9-1897 Constitution Convention Debates;

Mr. HIGGINS: The great Civil War in America was owing to equal representation,
because the framers of the Constitution had in view the stopping of the slave trade and
slavery, but they were not able to bring it about in due time, and gradually, in consequence
of the slave states having equal representation in the Senate. As soon as the southern states
found that they could not persuade Texas to be subdivided, and they hoped to be able to get
in Texas two slave states, then it was that they determined to secede.
Australian Agricultural Co Ltd. v F.E.D.F.A of Australasia (1913) 17 CLR 261 and 278
“The oath of a justice of this court is ' to do right to all manner of people according to law'
Our sworn duty is to the law itself and to the organic nature of the constitution first of all.
If, then, we find the law to be plainly in conflict with what we or any of our predecessors
errornously thought it to be, we have, as I conceive no right to choose between giving
effect to the law, and maintaining an incorrect interpretation, It is not, in my opinion,
better that the court should be persistently wrong than that it should be ultimately right..
Whatever else may be said with respect to previous decisions - and it is necessary here to
consider the principals upon which a court should act in particular cases - so much at least
emerges as is undoubtedly beyond challenge, that where a former decision is clearly
wrong, and there are no circumstances countervailing the primary duty of giving effect to
the law as the court finds it, the real opinion of the court should be expressed.”
"In my opinion, where the prior decision is manifestly wrong, then, irrespective of the
consequences, it is the paramount and sworn duty of this court to declare the law truly...."

Part 1 Page 29
R v National Liquors Ltd. (1922) 2 AC at 156; (1922) ALL ER Rep at p 351
“Its jurisdiction is to see that the inferior court has not exceeded its own, and for that very
reason it is bound not to interfere in what has been done within that jurisdiction for in
doing so it would itself, in turn, transgress the limits within its own jurisdiction of
supervision, not of review, is confined. That supervision goes to two points; one is the area
of inferior jurisdiction and the qualifications and conditions of its exercise; the other is the
observance of the law in the course of its exercise.”
Bringinshaw v Bringinshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 361,362

“Not inexact proof, indefinite testimony or indirect inference (By prosecution)”
The Victorian Police Guide Fifth Ed. 1969

P156 2nd last Paragraph: “Accordingly where the person does not regularly plead
guilty, all the material allegations of fact and of law are put in issue or in question”
The following is quoted from the 25-9-2006 document in regard of the 2002 proceedings before
the magistrates Court of Victoria at Heidelberg;
QUOTE
OBJECTION TO LEGAL JURISDICTION THIS IS ONE OF NUMEROUS ISSUES
RAISED IN THE CONTENT OF THIS ENTIRE DOCUMENT.
Items are not placed in any order of importance, and ought not be perceived that they are.
This document does not portray to set out my entire case but at least it does set out some issues.
To assist the Court there are relevant quotations included so this Honourable Court can perhaps
obtain a point of view of the Accused (Defendant) what his position is, for so far outlined in this
document.
END QUOTE
And
QUOTE
Bowers v Smith (1953) 1 ALL ER 320 (Re Clarke Hall) and (Morrison on Children, 7 Ed,
P3)
"... the first business of the court is to try to issue whether or not the case is
bought within the terms of the statute, and only if this be proven by proper
evidence can the court proceed to decide upon treatment"
Schorel v Elms (1994) Unreported M2944X of 1989 SA27 of 1993
Page 16 and 17: -
"Justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done"
Article 11 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:

"Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until
proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which she/he has had all the guarantees
necessary for his defence."
END QUOTE
And
QUOTE

Part 1 Page 30
Obviously, where appropriate, I seek this Honourable Court to consider all Authorities
referred to in this ADDRESS TO THE COURT in the overall also, as such not limit the
application of such Authority when I happen to refer to it.
I am wondering, if I am before a state magistrates Court, what authority does this Court
have to deal with a Federal (Commonwealth) matter?
Surely being so very disadvantaged (as likely most accused are) standing humbly before this
Court, at the very least the Australian Electoral Commission ought to have pointed out upon
what legal grounds this Honourable Court can deal with this matter.
I, the accused, ought to be given duly and proper notification how on earth this applies.
I do not recall the Australian electoral commission setting out upon what legal basis this
Honourable Court can exercise Federal jurisdiction.
I do not belief it is the function of the Court to “ASSUME” it to be so, as it might very well
be that the legislative provisions for this may not exist.
END QUOTE
And
QUOTE
It ought to be clear that Commonwealth laws have a distinct different basis then State laws.
For example, the State Court is bound by a State Constitution and in Victoria, as set out below,
the STAR CHAMBER COURT ACT is part of Victoria’s law. Yet, it might not be part of some
other State.
The question then is; Upon what basis is the case conducted?
Is it upon Commonwealth law or upon State law of some combination upon that. If it were a
combination then the proceedings would be conducted in every State upon a different mixture of
legal applicable laws. Meaning, that the manner of giving evidence and the manner of in which
the Court conducts its business can be drastically differ.
The Federal Court have no inherited “common law” system in the same manner as each State has.
And, each State has a different “common law” system pending how it arrived at it.
So, being a very humble person and very disadvantaged in my presentation I seek this Honourable
Court to explain what is really going on?
Am I facing litigation that applies strictly Victorian State laws and Victorian constitutional
provisions, or am I facing litigation purely under Commonwealth law?
There is of course some tiny bit of a problem further.
I understood from reading the Constitutional Convention Debates, 1891, 1897 and 1898 that at the
time of creating the Commonwealth Constitution Bill the framers made clear (such as E, Barton a
then well respected lawyer, the First Prime minister of Australia and subsequently judge of the
High Court of Australia) that they (the framers) couldn’t give all legislative powers to the
Commonwealth because of the British law that applied aboard British ships who were being used
in Australian waters.

Part 1 Page 31
It is for this that the “evidence laws” and “criminal laws” legislative powers were not provided for
in the commonwealth constitution, this as it was held that State laws applies if a offence against a
Commonwealth law was occurring within a State and outside the states it was British maritime
criminal laws.
The framers made clear, they would never permit the Constitution to have powers to oust British
Imperial power or deny British subject who are citizens of a State (and so automatically obtain
Commonwealth Citizenship). Well we have since seen that Heather Hill was, so to say, kicked out
in the Sue v Hill case.
We also have now that the Commonwealth purportedly made criminal laws and evidence Act
despite the framers not having provided any legislative powers within Section 51 of the
Constitution to do so! It was specifically withheld from it.
I am about to publish the book
INSPECTOR-RIKATI® and the BANANA REPUBLIC AUSTRALIA

Subtitled;
Dictatorship & Deaths by stealth. Preliminary book edition on CD
And, in this book I set out the various recorded statements of the framers of the Constitution.
I have set out in this document some small parts of the quotations. However, further details could
be provided to the Court if deemed essential.
Act Interpretation Act 1901;
15A Construction of Acts to be subject to Constitution

Every Act shall be read and construed subject to the Constitution, and so as not to exceed
the legislative power of the Commonwealth, to the intent that where any enactment thereof
would, but for this section, have been construed as being in excess of that power, it shall
nevertheless be a valid enactment to the extent to which it is not in excess of that power.
While this may be considered in regard of the Australian Citizenship Act 1948, referred to in this
document, it ought not then be perceived that any Proclamation or Writ not duly and properly
Gazetted within the State of Victoria then becomes valid and applicable nevertheless.
WATSON v_ LEE (1979) 144 CLR 374
To bind the citizen by a law, the terms of which he has no means

of knowing, would be a mark of tyranny.
END QUOTE
Despite that I have from onset pursued this proceedings go on ignoring this. Surely that in itself
may underline how absurd proceedings are being held. Lawyers and judicial officers basing
proceedings upon LEGAL FICTIONS to cause convictions rather then to take a proper look at
what is legally applicable before seeking to deal, if at all, with what is alleged against the
Defendant.
While the magistrate made clear not to deal with the “citizenship” issue, as this was part of the
OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION. Clearly the magistrate never then invoked legal
Part 1 Page 32
jurisdiction by this. The Court must consider each and every part of an objection and unless it
disposes of each part of the objection it does not invoke legal jurisdiction.
And, in any event a Defendant is entitled to be advised prior to proceedings commencing to hear
any charge what are the relevant legislative provisions applicable., so that the Defendant can
prepare his defence. The Prosecutor seeking to pursue a charge has the onus to set out if the
proceedings are under State legislative provisions, Federal legislative provisions and/or both and
what is then applicable.
After all, issues such as Section 388 averment rule are depending upon what legal process is
applicable.. In particular where already a magistrate overruled Section 388 CEA1918 to be
applicable then the prosecution has the onus to accept this or should have lodged an appeal against
the 4-8-2005 decision, this they never did then.
The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions cannot now pursue that somehow this
County Court of Victoria retrospectively overrule a 4-8-2005 decision of a magistrate where they
are out of appeal time. Likewise so with the directions of the magistrate on 4-12-2002, by consent
of the parties. Simply this kind of “BACKDOOR” manner to try the Court to ignore previous
magistrates decisions in favour of the Defendant would be unacceptable.
Therefore, the court cannot invoke jurisdiction unless the 4-12-2002 orders are complied with, not
by the Defendant, but by the Commonwealth director of Public Prosecutions, who has the onus to
prove jurisdiction!
Because Section 388 CEA1918 conflicts with the provisions of the Act Interpretation Act 1980
(Victoria) then in that regard also it cannot be enforced.
1640 Star Chamber Act,

Division 2—Habeas Corpus
[1640] 16 Charles I c. X
(6) and that from henceforth no
court, council or place of judicature, shall be erected,
ordained, constituted or appointed within this realm of
England, or dominion of Wales, which shall have, use or
exercise the same or the like jurisdiction as is or hath
been used, practiced or exercised in the said court of
star-chamber.
QUOTE 25-9-2002 document;

Magistrates’ Court Act 1989, Act 51/1989 Section 27(1). Descriptions in charge:
(1) A charge must describe the offence which the defendant is alleged to have
committed and a description of an offence in the words of the Act or subscription
of an offence in the words of the Act or subordinate instrument creating it, or in
similar words, is sufficient.
(2) A charge must identify the provision of the Act or subordinate instrument (if any)
that creates the offence, which the defendant is alleged to have committed.
The Summons clearly fails to do so, as set out below in the 9-8-2002 letter included in this
ADDRESS TO THE COURT!
END QUOTE 25-9-2002 document;
And

Part 1 Page 33
ISSUE: THE QUESTION OF VALIDITY& OTHER RELEVANT
ISSUES IN REGARD OF THE LITIGATION UNDER THE
MAGISTRATES’ COURT ACT 1989, ACT NO. 51/1989, OR PART
THEREOF, OR OTHERWISE.
Constitution Act 1975 No. 8750
2
And whereas it is provided by section LX of the said The
Constitution Act that the Legislature of Victoria has full power and
authority from time to time by any Act or Acts to repeal alter or
vary all or any of the provisions of The Constitution Act and to
substitute others in lieu thereof:
Be it therefore enacted by the Queen’s Most Excellent
Majesty by and with the advice and consent of the
Legislative Council and the Legislative Assembly of
Victoria in this present Parliament assembled and by the
authority of the same as follows (that is to say):
1. Short title and commencement 1
(1) This Act may be cited as the Constitution Act 1975.
(2) This Act shall come into operation on a day to be fixed
by proclamation of the Governor in Council published
in the Government Gazette.
*****
2. Existing laws
(1) All laws which at the commencement of this Act are in
force within Victoria shall remain and continue to be of
the same force authority and effect as if this Act had
not come into force except insofar as the same are
repealed or varied by or under this or any subsequent
Act.
(2) All courts within Victoria and all offices judicial
administrative or ministerial therein and all charters
legal commissions powers and authorities except
insofar as the same may be abolished altered or varied
by or may be inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
or are abolished altered or varied by any Act or Acts
shall continue to subsist in the same form and with the
same effect as if this Act had not come into force.
(3) The Supreme Court of the State of Victoria as at
present constituted shall continue under and subject to
the provisions of this Act and shall for all purposes be
deemed to be the same court after as before the
commencement of this Act.
S. 1(3) amended by
No. 9254 s. 2(a),
repealed by No.
108/1994 s. 6(1)(a).
S. XL and XLI.
Constitution Act 1975 No. 8750

3 ANSTAT.
(4) If the appointed day for the Legislative Council under
the Electoral Provinces and Districts Act 1974 has
not passed at the time that this Act comes into
operation, section 26 shall have effect until that
appointed day as if for the expression “44 members”
there were substituted the expression “36 members”
and sub-section (1) of section 27 shall have effect as if
for the expression “22 provinces” there were
substituted the expression “18 provinces”.
(5) If the appointed day for the Legislative Assembly under
the Electoral Provinces and Districts Act 1974 has
Part 1 Page 34
not passed at the time this Act comes into operation
sub-section (1) of section 35 shall have effect until that
appointed day as if for the expression “81 districts”
there were substituted the expression “73 districts”.
3. Laws of England to be applied in the
administration of justice
(1) Subject to the Imperial Acts Application Act 1922
2
all
laws and statutes in force within the realm of England
on the 25th day of July, 1828 (not being inconsistent
with any law now in force) shall be applied in the
administration of justice in the courts of Victoria, so far
as they can be applied within Victoria.
(2) If any doubt arises as to the application of any such
laws or statutes in Victoria, it shall be lawful for the
Parliament by Act to declare whether such laws or
statutes shall be deemed to extend to Victoria, and to
be in force within Victoria, or to make and establish
such limitations and modifications of such laws and
statutes within Victoria as may be deemed expedient in
that behalf.
[1351-2] 25 Edward III St. V c. IV

“unless it be by indictment or presentment of good and lawful people of the same
neighbourhood where such deeds be done, in due manner, or by process made by writ
original at the common law;”
1640 Star Chamber Act,

Division 2—Habeas Corpus
[1640] 16 Charles I c. X
(6) and that from henceforth no
court, council or place of judicature, shall be erected,
ordained, constituted or appointed within this realm of
England, or dominion of Wales, which shall have, use or
exercise the same or the like jurisdiction as is or hath
been used, practised or exercised in the said court of
star-chamber.
5. Be it likewise declared and enacted by authority of this
present parliament, That neither his Majesty, nor his
privy council, have or ought to have any jurisdiction,
power or authority, by English bill, petition, articles, libel
or any other arbitrary way whatsoever, to examine or
draw into question, determine or dispose of the lands,
tenements, hereditaments, goods or chattels of any of
the subjects of this kingdom, but that the same ought to
be tried and determined in the ordinary courts of justice,
and by the ordinary course of the law.
As Defendant I did more then present my fair share of material before the Courts, and yet next to
nothing from the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, and as such merely by the
failure to counter act what I had presented to the Court that in itself should have resulted that the
charges never, so to say, had seen the light of day. However, it is in my view that because I am
unrepresented the Court rather tag along with the lawyers of the Commonwealth Director of
Public Prosecutions, and so perhaps also because of being unable or otherwise to comprehend the
constitutional and other legal technicalities that I presented to the Court.
Still, this should not the deny me as Defendant a FAIR and PROPER trial.
It therefore remains my view , and also considering what already has been placed on Court file,
that this Court cannot invoke legal jurisdiction to hear and determine the charges.
Part 1 Page 35
Where and how can the validity of a Proclamation be challenged?
A Proclamation, within the provisions of the Commonwealth Electoral Act

1918 clearly does not fall within the meaning of “electoral matter” and as
such neither an Issue that can be pursued before the Court of Disputed
Returns.
A Writ is an “electoral matter” when issued. However, if the writ was
“defective” then the writ never had any legal force and likewise
never could invoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Disputed Returns
but remained for all purposes a matter to be resolved by a Federal
Court operating as a “Court of Law” not sitting as a Court of Disputed
Returns.
The following as advertised by the Commonwealth Electoral Commission on
its website;
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918
The following relevant provisions on electoral advertising in the Commonwealth

Electoral Act 1918, are extracted for the convenience of readers. The extracted law is
current from 15 October 2001. In some instances, emphasis has been added to
keywords of particular relevance.
Interpretation
4 (1) In this Act unless the contrary intention appears:
..."electoral matter" means matter which is intended or likely to affect voting

in an election...
(9) Without limiting the generality of the definition of "electoral matter" in subsection
(1), matter shall be taken to be intended or likely to affect voting in an election if it
contains an express or implicit reference to, or comment on:
a. the election;
b. the Government, the Opposition, a pre vious Government or a previous Opposition;
c. the Government or Opposition, or a pre vious Government or Opposition, of a State or
Territory;
d. a member or former member of the Parliament of the Commonwealth or a State or of
the legislature of a Territory;
e. a political party, a branch or division of a political party or a candidate or group of
candidates in the election; or
f. an issue submitted to, or otherwise before, the electors in connection with the election.
Interpretation
322. In this Part, "relevant period", in relation to an election under

this Act, means the period commencing on the issue of the writ
for the election and expiring at the latest time on polling day at
which an elector in Australia could enter a polling booth for the
purpose of casting a vote in the election.

Part 1 Page 36
NEW SOUTH WALES v_ THE COMMONWEALTH ; QUEENSLAND v_ THE

COMMONWEALTH (1975) 134 CLR 201.
18. No attack is made in these submissions on the validity or effectiveness

of the proclamation of the double dissolution. It is submitted, and in my
opinion correctly submitted, in this connexion that the power simultaneously
to dissolve both Houses of the Parliament and the power subsequently to
convene a joint sitting are statutory and not prerogative powers. The
validity of the proclamation convening the joint sitting is attacked but the
submissions to which I have so far referred do not depend on the suggested
invalidity of the proclamation. (at p219)
Again;
The
validity of the proclamation convening the joint sitting is attacked but the
submissions to which I have so far referred do not depend on the suggested
invalidity of the proclamation.
This was a matter before the High Court of Australia, not sitting as a Court of Disputed Returns,
which underlines that to challenge the validity of a Proclamation is and remains before the High
Court of Australia sitting as a High Court of Australia and not sitting as a Court of Disputed
Returns.
This ought to be obvious as the act to prorogue the Parliament and to Dissolve the House of
Representatives are pre conditions to hold a general election but are not part of the “election”
itself that is managed by the Australian Electoral Commission.
Hence the ruling by Marshall J on 7 November 2001 that this was a matter for the Court of
Disputed Returns clearly was an error in law.
The Australian Electoral Commissioner Mr Becker, in his sub147parti submission to the JSCEM
on 16 August 2002 stated;
The Schorel-Hlavka application on the calculation of the election timetable. On 2 November

2001, Mr Gerrit Schorel-Hlavka applied to the Federal Court for an injunction under section
383 of the electoral Act to stop the election on the grounds that the date for the close of
nominations was calculated incorrectly. Mr Schorel-Hlavka contended that the term “not
less than 10 days” in subsection 156(1) of the electoral Act should be interpreted as meaning
not less that 10 full periods of 24 hours. On this interpretation the meaning of subsection
156(1), the date set for the close of nominations would have been a day later than the one
that was relied upon for the election. Mr Schorel-Hlavka argued that the cumulative effect
of this alleged error was that polling day could not be on 10 November 2001, as proclaimed
by the Governor-General on 8 October 2001. Mr Schorel-Hlavka submitted that polling day
should have been on or after 17 November 2001.
In Foster v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 421 at 445, Gibbs J referred to the general
rule that “not less than” so many days refers to clear days – “unless the context or the subject
matter reveals a contrary intention”.
Many an Appeal were dismissed because an appellant did not file within the time the Rules
provided for. For example, where an Appellant filed an appeal before statutory an Appeal could
be filed. Many other occasions the Court have made clear that “time” periods provided for are
essential. In this case where there are certain constitutional and other legal provisions relevant to
the conduct to publish a Proclamation, the issue of the writs and the time periods governing a
Part 1 Page 37
election process then where they are legislative provisions enacted as laws then a citizen is
entitled to rely upon those provisions.
Therefore if there is a failure to comply with the proper procedures to publish a Proclamation
and/or writs showing the legally required time periods then the writs are defective and without
legal force.
Forster v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 421 at 445 The true version of the
judgement under 5;
That where an instrument prescribes that a period of time may elapse between one event and
another, the words “at least”, not less than” and “not later than”, unless the context or the
subject matter reveals contrary intention, should be regarded as indicating that a clear or
full period of time must expire between the two events.”
Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28 (28 April 1998)
Dawson J pointed out in Hunter Resources Ltd v Melville when discussing the
statutory provision in that case: "substantial compliance with the relevant statutory
requirement was not possible. Either there was compliance or there was not."
Again;
"substantial compliance with the relevant statutory requirement was not possible.
Either there was compliance or there was not."
Forster v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 421 at 445 The true version of the
judgement under 5;
That where an instrument prescribes that a period of
time may elapse between one event and another, the
words “at least”, not less than” and “not later than”,
unless the context or the subject matter reveals
contrary intention, should be regarded as indicating
that a clear or full period of time must expire between
the two events.”
There is some authority for saying that the use, in a statute prescribing a time limit, of such
expressions as "at least" and "not less than" indicate an intention that the specified number
of "clear days" must elapse between two acts or events (see R. v. Justices of Shropshire
(1838) 8 Ad & E 173 (112 ER 803); Young v. Higgon (1840) 6 M & W 49 (151 ER 317);
Chambers v. Smith (1843) 12 M & W 2 (152 ER 1085); In re Railway Sleepers Supply Co.
(1885) 29 Ch D 204 and Ex parte McCance; Re Hobbs (1926) 27 SR (NSW) 35; 44 WN
43).
But it is clear, I think, that significance is attached to such expressions as "at least" or "not
less than" only in cases where the immediate purpose of the prescription of a time is to
define a period on the expiration of which an act may be done, and not in cases where the
immediate purpose is to define a period within which an act must be done. In the former
class of case the prescribed number of days must elapse between two acts or events. In
the latter class of case the act must (unless a contrary intention appears) be done before the
expiration of the last of the prescribed number of days (see, e.g. Radcliffe v. Bartholomew
(1892) 1 QB 161 and Armstrong v. Great Southern Gold Mining Co. (1911) 12 CLR 382).
Fullagar J in Associated Dominions Assurance Society Pty Ltd v Balford (1950) 81 CLR 161,
11. I should think that the document served in this case was an "instrument"
within the meaning of s. 46, and the argument was that, because the time
allowed by the notice expired on a Sunday (16th), s. 36 (2) extended the time
Part 1 Page 38
until midnight on the 17th. The notice having been served on the 3rd, the time
which s. 55 required to be allowed expired at midnight on the 17th. The
company, it was said, was entitled to have until that time to show cause. It
did have until that time. Therefore, it was said, the notice was a good and
valid notice. (at p186)
12. I would agree that the combined effect of the notice and of s. 36 (2) of
the Acts Interpretation Act is that the company may "show cause" at any time
up to midnight on 17th May. The last day of the period prescribed or allowed
by the instrument for the doing of the thing falls on a Sunday. The "thing,"
therefore, may be done on the following day, which is a Monday. In my opinion,
however, it does not follow that the notice was a good and valid notice.
Section 36 (2) of the Acts Interpretation Act does not say that the notice
shall be construed as if the period specified in it expired on Monday the
17th, instead of Sunday the 16th. And s. 55 of the Life Insurance Act does say
that the notice shall "specify" a period not less than fourteen days from
service of the notice. The notice actually served did not "specify" such a
period: it "specified" a period which was too short by one day, and the Acts
Interpretation Act does not affect this position. The two statutory
provisions, read together, mean simply this: the notice must specify a period
not less than fourteen days from service of the notice within which the thing
must be done, and, if the last day of the period so specified falls on a
Sunday, the thing may be done on the following Monday. The notice simply did
not specify such a period, and it is, therefore, bad. (at p187)
13. In my opinion, the appeal should be allowed, and there should be judgment
in the action for the plaintiff in the form of a declaration that the notice
is invalid and void, and an injunction to restrain the respondent from
instituting an investigation into the affairs of the company. (at p187)
And
There is some authority
for saying that the use, in a statute prescribing a time limit, of such
expressions as "at least" and "not less than" indicate an intention that the
specified number of "clear days" must elapse between two acts or events (see
R. v. Justices of Shropshire (1838) 8 Ad & E 173 (112 ER 803); Young v. Higgon
(1840) 6 M & W 49 (151 ER 317); Chambers v. Smith (1843) 12 M & W 2 (152
ER
1085); In re Railway Sleepers Supply Co. (1885) 29 Ch D 204 and Ex parte
McCance; Re Hobbs (1926) 27 SR (NSW) 35; 44 WN 43). But it is clear, I think,
that significance is attached to such expressions as "at least" or "not less
than" only in cases where the immediate purpose of the prescription of a time
is to define a period on the expiration of which an act may be done, and not
in cases where the immediate purpose is to define a period within which an act
must be done. In the former class of case the prescribed number of days must
elapse between two acts or events. In the latter class of case the act must
(unless a contrary intention appears) be done before the expiration of the
last of the prescribed number of days (see, e.g. Radcliffe v. Bartholomew
(1892) 1 QB 161 and Armstrong v. Great Southern Gold Mining Co. (1911) 12
CLR
382). In the latter case Griffith C.J. said: - "When you talk of doing a thing
within a period of a certain number of days, it is quite clear that the end of
the last day is the furthest limit. It is impossible to say that a thing
required to be done within seven days is done within seven days if done on the
Part 1 Page 39
eighth day, and it is impossible to make any alteration of the limit by adding
the word 'clear'" (1911) 12 CLR, at p 388. In the case of s. 55 of the Life
Insurance Act it is plain that the immediate purpose of the prescription of a
period is to fix a time within which cause must be shown. It follows that the
last day on which cause may be shown is the fourteenth day after the date of
the notice. (at p183)
What this indicates is that publications must done done appropriately or are not applicable
at all. After all, if it were accepted otherwise, then Ministers may just delay publications
until the passing of the objection/appeal period and by this circumvent any persons ability to
object/appeal.
Bodney v Westralia Airports Corporation Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1609 (13 November 2000).
Mayors and councils were elected (Pt IV). Part VIII conferred on a council power
to make by-laws upon a wide range of matters; by-laws came into effect when
confirmed by the Governor and published in the Gazette (s 186).
The Governor-General might direct that land be acquired by compulsory process (s
15(1)). The next step was the publication of a notification in the Gazette declaring
"that the land has been acquired under this Act for the public purpose therein
expressed" (s 15(2)). Upon publication of the notification, the land, by force of the
Act, was vested in the Commonwealth "freed and discharged from all trusts,
obligations, estates, interests, contracts, licences, charges, rates and easements" (s 16);
and the estate and interest of every person entitled to the land (including the title of the
State to any Crown land) was converted into a claim for compensation (s 17). After
publication of the notification, a copy was required to be served upon the owners of
the land "or such of them as can with reasonable diligence be ascertained" (s 18).
32 For present purposes, an important aspect of that scheme is that no notification to
owners was required before the publication in the Gazette; and the publication in the
Gazette vested the land in the Commonwealth and converted former estates or
interests in the land into claims for compensation. The scheme excludes the possibility
that a failure to notify owners under s 18 would prevent the acquisition from
becoming effective.
Where the Commonwealth acquired land by compulsory process, extinguishment took
place on the occurrence of the event which vested title in the Commonwealth: that is,
the publication of the notice in the Gazette.
Re: AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL EQUITY PTY. LTD. And: ROGER DAVID BARNARD BEALE,
SECRETARY TO THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS;
ROBERT LINDSAY COLLINS, MINISTER OF STATE FOR TRANSPORT AND
COMMUNICATIONS and THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA No. WA G14 of 1993
FED No. 141 Legislation (1993) 114 ALR 50 (1993) 41 FCR 242 (1993) 30 ALD 849 (extract)
His Honour concluded that in the case before him the
publication of the instrument was essential to the valid exercise of the power
and that no distinction could be drawn between the publication of the notice
and the exercise of the power.
At http://www.dofa.gov.au/infoaccess/informan/about_gazettes.html the following is provided
by Ausinfo – Commonwealth Gazettes of the Department of Finance and Administration;
Special Gazettes

Part 1 Page 40
Contains notices that would normally appear in any of the above Gazettes but which
are produced on demand when customers are unable to wait for the next Government
Notices Gazette to publish their notice.
Ben Ward & Ors v State of Western Australia & Ors [1998] 1478 FCA (24 November 1998).
As stated above in respect of pastoral leases, re-entry was effected by notice in the
Government Gazette (WA)
If it were proposed to grant a lease for a term longer than ten years, wide publication
of that intent was to be given by notice published in four consecutive numbers of the
Government Gazette (WA), the first publication to be at least one month before
the grant. The term of the lease was not to exceed twenty-one years.
Two special leases granted under the Land Act 1933 (WA) for grazing purposes were
said to have been issued in respect of land in the claim area. Neither lease is current.
Grazing is not a purpose specified in s 116 of the Land Act 1933 (WA) and it must be
assumed that it was a purpose approved by the Governor by notice in the Government
Gazette
Formal notice of cancellation of the lease was published in the Government Gazette
(WA) in 1996.
That the Act Interpretation Act 1901 also states;
6 Evidence of date of assent or proclamation
The date appearing on the copy of an Act printed by the Government
Printer, and purporting to be the date on which the Governor-General assented thereto,
or made known the King’s assent, shall be evidence that such date was the date on
which the Governor-General so assented or made known the King’s assent, and shall
be judicially noticed.
Gazettes’ are being issued with the wording “Commonwealth of Australia” and failing to show
any reference to “Government Printer” and for this also failing to be recognised official
publications.
However, this does not bind the State Court to allow evidence to be submitted as to the validity of
the date, as the Commonwealth cannot direct the state Court as to how it shall conduct its
proceedings. Therefore, if the Gazette does not bear anything of being government Printer, then it
would be open to the Court to entertain any legal challenge to determine if the Gazette and/or any
legislation is in fact a legal enforceable document.
WATSON v_ LEE (1979) 144 CLR 374;
Such as:
To bind the citizen by a law, the terms of which he has no means
of knowing, would be a mark of tyranny.
Such as:
In a case of emergency the regulation can be notified in the Gazette itself even if a
special issue of the Gazette has to be published. I regard the availability of the terms of
the law to the citizen of paramount importance.
Some other parts of the judgments
BARWICK C.J.
5. A question of the interpretation of s. 48 (1) (b) of the Acts
Interpretation Act was agitated during the hearing. That subsection provides that the
regulations shall take effect from the date of their notification "or where another date is
specified in the regulations, from the date specified".
Part 1 Page 41
It was argued that this date could be a date anterior to the notification of the regulation
including, of course, its prescription of that date. In my opinion, this date, unless the
Parliament has expressly and intractably directed otherwise, must necessarily be a date
subsequent to the date of notification. To bind the citizen by a law, the terms of which he
has no means of knowing, would be a mark of tyranny. Parliament, in s. 48 (1), has
recognized that justice requires that it be notified publicly before it becomes operative. I am
quite unable to construe s. 48 (1) as a Parliamentary mode of expression of intention that the
law should operate before it is notified. That would be so fundamentally unjust that it is an
intention I could not attribute to the Parliament unless compelled by intractable language to
do so. In my opinion, no semantic quirks of the draftsman would lead me to that
conclusion - a conclusion which would attribute to the Parliament an intention to act
tyrannically. In my opinion, what the section means is that the regulation will operate on or
from the day it is notified or from such other day, being a subsequent day, as the regulation
may specify. Such a construction is both reasonable, textually available and just. (at p379)
And
8. Section 5 (3), in my opinion, provides a means whereby the obligations of s. 48 (1) may
be satisfied. It is not intended, in my opinion, to provide any lesser obligation in regard to
notification of the regulation. The change is to allow notification of a place where a copy of
the regulation may be had in lieu of the publication of the text of the regulation in the
Gazette. Just as the latter is a means of affording the citizen the means of knowing the terms
of the law by which he is to be bound, so the former is to provide a like opportunity. So it
seems to me, in order to satisfy what I have called the alternate method of notification,
copies of the regulation must be procurable at the designated place when it is notified. This
means in substance that a stock of copies of the regulation available for sale must be in
hand. Just how large that stock should be will no doubt be a matter of judgment bearing in
mind the subject matter of the regulation and the numerical size of the section of the
community which its terms are designed to affect. (at p380)
And
JUDGE3 STEPHEN J.
21. Its great importance is apparent from the history of delegated legislation. That history
reflects the tension between the needs of those who govern and the just expectations of those
who are governed. For those who govern, subordinate legislation, free of the restraints,
delays and inelasticity of the parliamentary process, offers a speedy and flexible mode of
law-making. For the governed it may threaten subjection to laws which are enacted in secret
and of whose commands they cannot learn: their reasonable expectations that laws shall be
both announced and accessible will only be assured of realization by the imposition and
enforcement of appropriate controls upon the power of subordinate legislators, whose
power, as Fifoot observed "requires an adequate measure of control if it is not to degenerate
into arbitrary government": English Law and its Background (1932). (at p394)
And
23. These two enactments of the Commonwealth Parliament provide a mechanism for
parliamentary oversight of delegated legislation and, no less importantly, allow those
hom such laws affect to learn of their making and of their terms.
As Scott L.J. said in Blackpool Corporation v. Locker (1948) 1 KB 349, at p

361 , speaking there of sub-delegated legislation, "there is one quite general question . .
. of supreme importance to the continuance of the rule of law under the British
constitution, namely, the right of the public affected to know what that law is". The
maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse forms the "working hypothesis on which
the rule of law rests in British democracy" but to operate it requires that "the whole of
our law, written or unwritten, is accessible to the public - in the sense, of course, that at
any rate its legal advisers have access to it at any moment, as of right". It was, his Lordship
said (1948) 1 KB, AT p 370 , "vital to the whole English theory of the liberty of the subject,
Part 1 Page 42
that the affected person should be able at any time to ascertain what legislation affecting his
rights has been passed". (at p395)
And
JUDGE4 MASON J.
16. The subsections to which I have referred and the comments made in Dignan's Case
proceed upon the footing that a regulation takes effect from the date of its notification, or
where another date is specified in the regulations, from the date specified, for this is what s.
48 (1) (b) explicitly provides. Whether the requirement in s. 48 (1) (a) that the regulations
shall be notified in the Gazette would, viewed in isolation, call for the publication in the
Gazette of the regulations in their entirety is not a question that needs to be answered
because s. 5 (3) of the Rules Publication Act applies so that publication of a notice in the
Gazette that the regulations have been made and of the place where copies can be purchased
is a sufficient compliance with the statutory requirements respecting notification.
In Myer Queenstown Garden Plaza Pty. Ltd. v. Port Adelaide Corporation (1975) 11 SASR
504, at p 537 Wells J., referring to the requirement in s. 38 of the Acts Interpretation Act
1915-1972 (S.A.) that regulations "shall be published in the Gazette", said: "In the setting of
s. 38, and more especially because it is associated with the Government Gazette, the word,
in my judgment, means rather to make generally accessible or available to the public". It is
perhaps possible that the requirement in s. 48 (1) (a) that regulations "shall be notified in the
Gazette" means something less than this, but for the reason which I have already given, I
have no need to discuss this question. (at p405)
Section 32 of the Constitution
The Governor-General in Council may cause writs to be

issued for the general elections of members of the House of
Representatives.
After the first election, the writs shall be issued within ten
days from the expiry of a House of Representatives or from
the proclamation of a dissolution thereof.
Unlike the quoted Authority, in this case the Prorogue of the Parliament and the dissolution of the
House of Representatives was in that regard subject to Section 32 of the Constitution, hence an
unresolved constitutional issue that remains on foot, and where the subsequent writs issued by the
Governor-General therefore remain ULTRA VIRES, and without legal force, so also any
purported enforcement of Section 245 of the CEA1918.
THE QUEEN v_ PEARSON; Ex parte SIPKA (1983) 152 CLR 254
In accordance with constitutional practice a dissolution of the House of

Representatives or of both Houses occurs only on the advice to the
Governor-General of the Prime Minister. It is well known that during the
latter part of 1982 and early 1983 the Prime Minister, in repeated
announcements which were widely reported, stated that there would not be an
early election and towards the end of that period, that he was exploring the
possibility of an election in 1984. (See, e.g., The Australian, 3 February
1983.) However without any prior public notice the Prime Minister announced in
the late afternoon of 3 February 1983, that on his advice, the
Governor-General had that day agreed to a double dissolution of the Senate and
the House of Representatives; that the writs for the election would be issued
on 4 February 1983, the date for nominations would be fixed as 19 February
1983; for the polling day, as 5 March 1983, and for the return of the writs,
Part 1 Page 43
on or before 5 May 1983. Proclamations to this effect were issued on 4
February 1983. (at p266)
6. Thus, although s. 32 of the Constitution allows for issue within ten days,
the writs were issued on the same day as the proclamation of the dissolution.
Although that was done in 1914, the practice since then has been to allow a
space of some days between the proclamation of a double dissolution and the
issue of writs for the elections. In 1951 the writs were issued nine days
after the proclamation; in 1974 the writs were issued nine days after the
proclamation; in 1975 the writs for four States were issued six days after the
proclamation and the writs for the other two States were issued ten days after
the proclamation. (See Commonwealth Gazettes of 19 March 1951, 4 April 1974
and 11 November 1975.) (at p266)
And
A right to vote is so precious that it
should not read out of the Constitution by implication. Rather every
reasonable presumption and interpretation should be adopted which favours the
right of people to participate in the elections of those who represent them.
(at p268)
WESTERN AUSTRALIA v_ THE COMMONWEALTH ; NEW SOUTH WALES v_

THE COMMONWEALTH ; QUEENSLAND v_ THE COMMONWEALTH (1975) 134
CLR 201;
10. By the second paragraph of s. 57 his Excellency is empowered to perform

an executive act, namely, to convene a joint sitting of the members of the two
Houses of the Parliament. Once a joint sitting is convened the powers and
duties of the members present are defined by and derived from the third
paragraph of s. 57 and his Excellency has no power to increase or diminish
those powers or duties. The section provides that the members present at the
joint sitting may deliberate and shall vote together upon "the proposed law",
which means any proposed law which answers the requirements of the first two
paragraphs of the section (see Cormack v. Cope and Victoria v. The
Commonwealth). His Excellency is given no power to authorize or direct the
members present at a joint sitting to deliberate or vote upon any particular
proposed law.
It seems to be clear that the validity of the issue of the writs isn’t purely by the provisions of
Sections 12 and 32 nilly willy but rather as Section 2 indicates that the Governor-General shall
use the powers “subject to this Constitution” as such any legislated provisions under “Until the
Parliament otherwise provides” clearly is relevant as to the use of the powers of Section 12 and
32. The writs themselves acknowledge this by stating “subject to the law” and as such for all
purposes is intended to be so.
Section 9 of the Constitution however enshrines State legislative provisions as to Senate elections
as to time and places and therefore remains applicable as such.
WESTERN AUSTRALIA v_ THE COMMONWEALTH ; NEW SOUTH WALES v_ THE

COMMONWEALTH ; QUEENSLAND v_ THE COMMONWEALTH (1975) 134 CLR 201;
11. On behalf of the States it was argued that the proclamation must be
construed so as to give full effect to all that it contains, and that in the
absence of a statutory provision enabling a severance to be effected, the
Part 1 Page 44
inclusion of the concluding words of the proclamation rendered it entirely
invalid. It was submitted that if those words amounted to a direction or
authorization they converted the proclamation from one of an executive to one
of a legislative character, and that if they are merely descriptive they show
that his Excellency intended to convene a sitting of a kind which he had no
legal power to convene, namely, a sitting at which the members present should
vote upon the Petroleum and Minerals Authority Act 1973. It was accordingly
submitted that the proclamation was ineffective to convene a joint sitting for
the purposes of s. 57. (at p241)
12. The power which his Excellency purported to exercise was purely executive
in character. The first paragraph of s. 57 empowered him to do one thing only
- to convene a joint sitting. The section did not require him to employ any
particular means for that purpose; it did not require him to issue a
proclamation, although no doubt the issue of a proclamation was a natural and
appropriate way of signifying in a formal manner that his Excellency has
exercised the power given to him. If a proclamation is issued for the purpose
of convening a joint sitting under s. 57, it is unnecessary, although it may
be convenient, that it should refer to the proposed laws upon which it is
expected that the members present at the sitting will vote. The concluding
words of the proclamation were therefore an unnecessary addition to its
operative provisions. In the case of a legislative instrument that contains
some invalid provisions the question of interpretation that arises "is
whether, after the extent to which the intended operation of the enactment is
invalid has been ascertained, it is nevertheless the expressed will of the
legislature that the whole or any part of the rest of the intended operation
of the enactment should take effect by itself as a law...." (Bank of New
South Wales v. The Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1, at p 369 ). However, no
similar question of interpretation arises in the present case. The question
is whether his Excellency did convene a joint sitting. The answer, of course,
is that he did - in fact as a result of his act the members of both Houses
deliberated and voted together. If the concluding words of the proclamation
are regarded as a purported authorization and direction by his Excellency to
those present at the joint sitting to deliberate and vote on the six named
proposed laws, part of the proclamation was beyond power and invalid but the
invalidity of that part does not mean that his Excellency's act of convening a
joint sitting should be treated as nugatory. If the concluding words are
merely descriptive, the fact that the proclamation unnecessarily and
erroneously stated that those present at the joint sitting might deliberate
and should vote upon the Petroleum and Minerals Authority Act 1973 did not
mean that a joint sitting had not been convened. The ineffective words
unnecessarily included in the proclamation did not prevent it from taking
effect as an act by which his Excellency convened a joint sitting of the
members of both Houses of the Parliament. (at p242)
and
This submission is related to the

submission that the Governor-General's discretions either to prorogue or to
dissolve are alternatives and must be exercised once and for all; but it seems
to me that such a concept is quite foreign to the subject matter. It
translates a principle commonly applicable to a judicial or curial discretion
into the field of executive discretionary power. For it is an executive
Part 1 Page 45
discretion or power which the Governor-General exercises. He does not act as
a persona designata in a curial or quasi-judicial role. He acts either on the
advice of the Executive Council or as an officer under the instructions of the
Queen, in all cases subject to the Constitution. No doubt it was envisaged in
1900 that the Queen would at times give instructions on the advice of her
United Kingdom ministers but it may now be taken that not only the
Governor-General as the medium through which the Queen exercises her executive
and prerogative powers but also the Queen herself acts on the advice of her
Australian ministers in all matters appertaining to the government of the
Commonwealth. Neither the Queen nor the Governor-General acts personally. This
is true of the powers of the Governor-General under s. 57. He in all aspects
exercises his powers under the section on the advice of an Australian
minister. He exercises executive power and there is no place for a concept
that the power is exhausted or dissipated by his exercise of the other
executive power, namely, the power to prorogue the Parliament. (at p278)
What ought not to be overlooked is the usage of the word “may”

in Section 12 of the Australian Constitution in regard of the Governor
of a State and in Section 32 in regard of the “Governor-General in
council”
The word “may” leaves it entirely upon the relevant Governor or
the “Governor-General in council” to determine if the said
governor or “Governor-General in council” should or shouldn’t
issue a writ in regard of an election. The relevant parts in itself
do not commit the Governor and/or “Governor-General in
council” to issue writs. At most there is a usage of the word
“shall” where there is a dissolution. It doesn’t however compel
the relevant Governor or the “Governor-General in council” to
issue a writ if there is no dissolution.
This means that the usage of the word “may” implies that the
relevant “Governor and Governor-General in council” may or may
not decide to issue a writ upon their own personal consideration.
The fact that their personal “consideration” is applicable as to
accept or reject the advise of the Federal Executive Council ought
to indicate that therefore the “Governor-General in council” is
not bound by the advise given as such. The term “Governor-
General in council” rather then the usage of the term “Governor-
General” indicates that the issue of the writs doesn’t apply to the
Governor-General regardless of the Federal Executive Council
existing but rather that it is related to the advise of the Federal
Executive Council but not that the “Governor-General in council”
is bound by this. As to the reference of the “Governor of any
State” this clearly is subject to Section 9, Chapter I, of the
Australian Constitution and as such the Governor of a State is bound
to follow the legal provisions of any writs being issued. This
means that the relevant election period as prescribed in the
Sections 155, 156 and 157 must be adhered to. Likewise, Section 31
of the Australian Constitution dictates that where a Writ is issued
then the “Governor-General in council” is bound to comply with
the legal provisions enacted relevant to such election and
Part 1 Page 46
election period. As such, albeit the “Govern-General in council”
and/or any relevant Governor may or may not in certain
circumstances issue writs, once any of them decide or are
compelled due to a dissolution to do so, then the writs must be in
accordance to the legal provisions as applicable at the time of
issue of the writs.
Padfield v Minister of Agriculture & Fisheries and Food (1968) AC 997
(1968) 1 ALL ER 694 House of Lords - Lord Upjohn and Lord Hodson
Upjohn: - (Irrelevant consideration) “Here let it be said at once, he and
his advisers have obviously given a bona fide and painstaking
consideration to the complaints addressed to him; the question is
whether the consideration was sufficient in law.”
Clearly, in law, insufficient consideration was given where the

writs were issued in breach of legal provisions applicable at the
time of the issue of the writs. As like any invalid legislation an
invalid issue of writs equally can be ignored.
Where any of the Governor and/or the “Governor-General in

council” are in a position as to make a consideration to issue or
not to issue a writ then it must follow that those affected by such
decision ought to be entitled to contest the validity of such
decision. Being it a voter, a candidate or otherwise.
Likewise, where the relevant Governor and or the “Governor-
General in council” issue writs within the ambit of a dissolution
then any person affected by the issue of such writs ought to have
a legal right to contest such writ(s), irrespective if the writs
issues relate to more then one seat. This as the validity of a writ,
such as for the house of Representatives of a State clearly covers
more then one particular seat and it would be absurd if a person
legitimately could contest the validity of an election upon the
basis that the writ was found void but then the Court of Disputed
Returns only direct the issue of writs for one particular election
to be held while all other seats that were subjected to the same
void writ were to be maintained as valid. Past decisions of the
Court of Disputed Returns clearly restrict the Court of Disputed
Return to deal only with the validity of an election at a particular
seat and as such the Court of Disputed Return effectively has
ruled out its own legal jurisdiction to deal with any dispute
against a writ issue that relates to more then one seat.
This apparent legal abnormality also left the Defendant no other
course but to institute legal proceedings in the Federal Court of
Australia, as clearly, the disputing of the writ for the House of
Representatives seats, must be deemed as such to fall outside
the legal jurisdiction of the Court of Disputed Returns, at least by
its own past rulings to limit disputed elections to one seat.
That below indicates that indeed the avenue of Injunction was the
appropriate way for the Defendant to seek legal redress, as the Court
of Disputed Returns “it has nothing to do with the ordinary determination

Part 1 Page 47
of the rights of parties who are litigants”, and hence could not deal with
constitutional based objections.
Holmes v Angwin, (1906) 4 (Pt 1) CLR 297 at 309. Barton J said;

"The character of the jurisdiction which has been exercised by Parliaments as to
election petitions is purely incidental to the legislative power; it has nothing to do with
the ordinary determination of the rights of parties who are litigants."
The following
Mr. WISE: I would suggest before the amendment is moved that there are two
questions involved here, which ought to be kept distinct. There is the qualification of a
member or the question as to vacancies on the one side, and the question of a disputed
return, which is a matter of altogether a different character. I apprehend that only
questions of disputed returns should be dealt with by the Supreme Court, but that the
Senate should have all control [start page 682] over all questions of order or decency
over its own body which might lead it to expel a member.
Underlines that the question of “disputed returns” should be dealt with by the Supreme Court
(High Court of Australia) and not by the Parliament as this related to a “judicial” matter.
Sir EDWARD BRADDON: It is almost essential, to my mind, that these questions,

more especially the question of disputed returns, should be determined by the
Supreme Court, and not by the Senate.
As such, the Court of Disputed Returns is not the appropriate body to deal with a disputed return
unless it deals with the matter as an ordinary Court of law, this is does not. As such the title
“Court of Disputed Returns” is an abnormality, a constitutional misdemeanour, as it does not
provide the objectors with their constitutional and other legal rights normally entitled upon in a
Court of law.
but that the Senate should have all control [start page 682] over all questions of
order or decency over its own body which might lead it to expel a member. I
This indicates that it was aimed that the House would deal internally with “order and decency”
issues but leave judicial decisions over to the judiciary. The Court of Disputed Returns is however
not as such a Court of Law as ordinary the High Court of Australia is, regardless that it may
involve the same judges of the High Court of Australia, this, as the Court of Disputed Returns
does not operate in all manner as to the rights of the parties! Section 353 of the CEA1918
therefore was ill conceived, in that as Mr Wise and Sir Edward Braddon pointed out a disputed
return is a judicial matter where as the question of “order” and “decency” were internal House
decisions.
Remarcable is that somehow the Parliament purported to give the Courts the power to the Court of
Disputed Returns to deal with election issues, but as this all along was considered to be a judicial
issue then it should have been that the Court of Disputed Returns should have been constituted as
an ordinary Court of law exercising federal judicial powers and not limited in time, etc.
The very issue of dealing with “orders” and “decency” has been retained by the Parliament itself
and as such the Court of disputed Returns clearly was never intended to deal with non judicial
issues, and as such petitions actually cannot be incidental to judicial power and the Court of
Disputed Returns should operate as a ordinary Court of Law.
Holmes v Angwin, (1906) 4 (Pt 1) CLR 297 at 309. Barton J said;

Part 1 Page 48
"The character of the jurisdiction which has been exercised by Parliaments as to election
petitions is purely incidental to the legislative power; it has nothing to do with the ordinary
determination of the rights of parties who are litigants."
Clearly, this statement then must be deemed to be wrong, as the conception of the Court of
Disputed Returns was to deal with judicial decisions, not with purely incidental decisions to the
legislative power.
Clause 20.-Until The Parliament otherwise provides, any question respecting the
qualification of a member, or a vacancy in the Senate, or a disputed return, shall be
determined by the Senate.
Mr. BARTON: My hon. friend Mr. Carruthers has suggested an amendment to this
clause, which certainly should be made. I shall move:
To strike out in line 8, the word "return" and insert in lieu thereof "election."
That is a wider term. It covers more ground and increases the necessary jurisdiction
of the House over such questions.
Mr. HOWE: Supposing a vacancy occurs in the House of Representatives, is it likely that
a State will be put to the expense of an election for one representative?
Mr. BARTON: The matter of vacancies in the House of Representatives is a subsequent

matter. This clause deals with the Senate,
Sir EDWARD BRADDON: It is almost essential, to my mind, that these questions, more
especially the question of disputed returns, should be determined by the Supreme Court, and
not by the Senate. We have found out from practical experience the necessity of making this
change, and submitting these questions to the Supreme Court, and I hope that in making this
great and high departure and forming a Federal Parliament we shall not run into any errors
which will necessitate any changes whatever in the early stages of our Federal Government.
I shall move:-
That the words "High Court" be substituted for "Senate."
[start page 681]
Mr. BARTON: I would ask Sir Edward Braddon not to have his amendment formally
put. This matter was also a subject of very considerable discussion in the Constitutional
Committee, and the clause now represents the result of that discussion It amounted to this:
There were a good many of us who thought that matters of this kind should be decided by
the Judges, instead of what we have found to be a fallacious tribunal, a Committee of the
Houses of Parliament. At the same time, it was thought better to leave the matter as it stands
in the Constitution, only you must put a proviso in the beginning. That is to say, the words
will be placed in the section, "until The Parliament otherwise provides." It seems to me
that it is a matter for the Parliament of the Commonwealth to determine whether the
Houses, after they are called together, shall determine this question, or whether the

Part 1 Page 49
Judges should do it. It is a matter for the Federal Parliament to deal with. It increases the
freedom of action of the Parliament of the Federation, and for that reason it is also desirable
to leave it in the hands of the Parliament.
Mr. SYMON: It is quite open to the Parliament to decide.
Mr. BARTON: It is quite open to it, and if the Parliament will not undertake the
matter itself, it will delegate it to the High Court. But that is a matter of internal
arrangement.
Mr REID: I do not intend to propose an amendment, but I express my very great regret
that the Drafting Committee have not seen fit to place in the Constitution the power of
determining these disputed returns by some judicial authority.
Mr. BARTON: We followed the instructions of the Constitutional Committee.
Mr. REID: I understood that the feeling was strongly the other way.
Mr. BARTON: It was carried this way.
Mr. REID: I feel very strongly, looking at the constant scandals and outrages which
have occurred in the United States over this very question, when the existence of a
party has been at stake, that it is infinitely advisable that we should put in this
Constitution provision which shall protect the electors from frauds upon their rights,
which might be made to suit the interests of political party. It might happen that some
great struggle might be determined in the Senate of thirty-six members, according to
the decision of a political committee, as to whether a certain return was valid or not. I
think the time has come when we should alter this clause. I am perfectly sure that if it
is left to the Federal Parliament, that Parliament will never do it.
Mr. BARTON: It is done in England.
Mr. REID: But how long did it take? We all know how many years it took-an enormous
time, and an enormous struggle-before the power was taken out of the hands of Parliament.
Do we not remember the tremendous scandals which disfigured the election tribunals of
England when they were within the power of the House of Commons? I really think that I
ought to test the opinion of the Committee upon this, as I look upon it as a matter that might
at some future time affect the destinies of the whole of the Commonwealth, because it is a
very small body, and one vote might make all the difference.
Mr. BARTON: Substitute "High Court of Justice thereof."
Mr. REID: I would make it more elastic than that. I would prefer not to move an
amendment yet, but I hope we will settle it very soon.
Mr. WISE: I would suggest before the amendment is moved that there are two
questions involved here, which ought to be kept distinct. There is the qualification of a
member or the question as to vacancies on the one side, and the question of a disputed
return, which is a matter of altogether a different character. I apprehend that only
questions of disputed returns should be dealt with by the Supreme Court, but that the
Senate should have all control [start page 682] over all questions of order or decency
over its own body which might lead it to expel a member. I move:

Part 1 Page 50
To strike out the words, "or a disputed return."
Then we can deal with disputed returns in a subsequent section. I entirely concur with what
has fallen from my hon. friend Mr. Reid with regard to the power of the Election and
Qualification Committee to deal with disputed returns. I have had the advantage of
appearing before that body in every capacity. I have been there as counsel, I have been
there as member, and I have been there as the accused party, and I do not know in
which capacity I found them the least satisfactory.
Sir EDWARD BRADDON: I will put this question to the test by moving:
That the first words of the clause "Until the Parliament otherwise provides" be struck out.
Mr. REID: They had better be left in. If my hon. friend will allow me, I am just drafting
an amendment which I think will meet the case. I think we might pass on with the
amendment proposed by Mr. Wise, namely, to leave out the words "or a disputed return."
Then let the clause stand as it is, and by and bye I would suggest a new clause to follow that
clause. I will ask my hon. friend Mr. Barton to draw up some clause that will meet the
difficulty.
Mr. BARTON: I am tired of drafting clauses.
Mr. REID: Well, will my hon. friend allow me to draft one?
Mr. BARTON: Certainly.
Sir Edward Braddon's amendment withdrawn; Mr. Wise's amendment agreed to

clause, as amended, agreed to.
Another difficulty exist with the provision of Section 383(1) which

allow only a candidate or the Electoral Commission to make an
application for an Injunction. If this would be construed that this
would it the application to merely the seat of the candidate then this
too would result that effectively the disputed issue of the writs
relating to all seats of the House of Representatives in one State
effectively would result that then an Injunction could be sought by
one candidate and the Court could find that there is a justified ground
to issue the injunction but others seats subjected to the same writ
held invalid would continue to be unchallenged unless one of each of
those seat a candidate pursues litigation. This could hardly have been
the intention of the parliament and it would defy the right in common
law of the Defendant where he would be denied as a “voter” to
pursue an Injunction in regard of any illegal practices the Australian
Electoral Commission may be guilty of or be alleged guilty of in
regard of any seats for the Senate or House of Representative he
might wish to vote in. It appears that the Parliament perhaps never
envisigated that all the writs could be challenged albeit in WESTERN
AUSTRALIA v_ THE COMMONWEALTH ; NEW SOUTH WALES v_ THE
COMMONWEALTH ; QUEENSLAND v_ THE COMMONWEALTH (1975) 134 CLR
201 the conduct of the Governor-General in regard of the dissolution
was in question.
Part 1 Page 51
It appears to the Defendant that for this the High Court of Australia is
entitled to allow the Defendant to dispute matters which are affecting
his common law rights as a “voter’ being “enrolled”. Indeed, the
Defendant having refused to “vote” on the 10th day of November
2001 upon the position that there was no valid election being held
and so the poll held was invalid in law. As such, there is no compliance
required to vote in an election that isn’t an election in accordance to the
constitutional requirements (including laws enacted in aid of the
Constitutional requirements. Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally; Re Wakim; Ex
parte Darvall; Re Brown; Ex parte Amann; Spi [1999] HCA 27 (17 June 1999)
For constitutional purposes, they are a nullity. No doctrine of res judicata or issue
estoppel can prevail against the Constitution. Mr Gould is entitled to disregard the
orders made in Gould v Brown. No doubt, as Latham CJ said of invalid
legislation[100], "he will feel safer if he has a decision of a court in his favour". That
is because those relying on the earlier decision may seek to enforce it against
Mr Gould.
The Parliament exists of the Governor-General (for the Monarch) and those Members of
Parliament, which were duly and properly elected according to constitutional and other relevant
legislative provisions and then took up their seat in the Parliament.
Therefore, if there is no Parliament in session or summonsed, then the function of all Departments
seizes to exist, beyond the time of 3 years of the first sitting of the last Parliament.
Section 64 doesn’t and neither must be perceived to provide the Governor-General any
constitutional powers to appoint Ministers without bothering ever to issue writs for any election,
where there is no Parliament in session or summonsed.
David Russell Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation

Sections 62 and 64 of the Constitution combine to provide for the executive power
of the Commonwealth, which is vested in the Queen and exercisable by the
Governor-General, to be exercised "on the initiative and advice"[35] of
Ministers and limit to three months the period in which a Minister of State may
hold office without being or becoming a senator or member of the House of
Representatives.
While the Constitution does provide for the expiry of the Legislature (Parliament) and not the
Executive. It is clear however, that the Governor-General, within the ambit of provisions of the
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution could ongoing appoint Ministers without any elections
being held. As such, the appointment of Ministers is for a limited period only, and then this power
of appointment cannot proceed without holding any session of Parliament within a calendar year.
David Russell Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation

The requirement that the Parliament meet at least annually, the provision for
control of supply by the legislature, the requirement that Ministers be members of
the legislature, the privilege of freedom of speech in debate, and the power to
coerce the provision of information provide the means for enforcing the
responsibility of the Executive to the organs of representative government. In his
Notes on Australian Federation: Its Nature and Probable Effects[38], Sir Samuel
Griffith pointed out that the effect of responsible government "is that the actual
government of the State is conducted by officers who enjoy the confidence of the
people". That confidence is ultimately expressed or denied by the operation of the
electoral process, and the attitudes of electors to the conduct of the Executive may
Part 1 Page 52
be a significant determinant of the contemporary practice of responsible
government[39].
The Commonwealth powers are created by the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution and are
subject to there being a Parliament in session or a Parliament summonsed, apart of the period
before the first elections being held.
The framers made it a condition that there must always be a Parliament in session or
one summonsed within 10 days of the House of Representative expire or being
dissolved. Albeit, the writs are referred to in Section 32 of the Commonwealth of
Australia Constitution, there can be no summonsing of the Parliament if writs are not
issued.
Hansard 5-3-1891
Mr. PLAYFORD:
There solutions afterwards go on to provide for an executive, for a governor-

general, and for the appointment of his advisers:
such persons sitting in Parliament, and whose term of office shall depend upon
their possessing the confidence of the house of representatives expressed by the
support of the majority.
Constitutionally, where the writs were invalid in 2001 then no Parliament could have been
sitting, as there were no members validly elected, and therefore neither any laws can be
enforced.
Part of a correspondence forwarded to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions;
QUOTE part of 2-8-2005 correspondence

WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions 2-8-2005
C/o Judy McGillivray BA JBB
15th floor, 460 Lonsdale Street. Melbourne, Vic 3000
Tel; 96054333, Fax 9670 4295 Your reference; 05101011
Madam,
Thank you for your correspondence dated 1 August 2005, received today.
As I recall it, on 4 December 2002 you indicated that there was MERIT in my case and submitted
to the Court to adjourn matters as to enable the High Court of Australia to deal with the S78B
Judiciary Act 1903 constitutional challenge.
Contrary to your assertion, this constitutional challenge has not been disposed of and remains on
foot. Hence, I view, the current charge is ill conceived, as until and unless the Court pronounces
in favour of the legislations I objected against, those legislative provisions remain NULL AND
VOID (Ultra Vires). Your letter, dated 1-8-2005 does not refer to my 1-8-2005 correspondence to
the Deputy Registrar, and this most likely because your letter may have been sent out unaware my
1-8-2005 correspondence. I would urge you to consider the reference to Foster (1950) S.R.
(N.S.W.) 149, at p151 (Lord Denning, speaking on the role of an advocate)
It is my view, of our previous contact at the Court that you pursued matters honourable, and as
such my reference to Foster is not seeking to have a go at you, so to say, of past conduct as
person but rather that I desire you to be upfront to the Court about the current legal mess.
As you stated, “I act on behalf of the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) in relation to
the charge and summons..” Now, I for one, if I were in your position would have grave concerns
Part 1 Page 53
as to seemingly having been set up by my client to deceive the other party and the court on 4
December 2002, albeit then it being unknown to yourself, to me and the court.
Again, my impression of your conduct on 4 December 2002 was that you sought to act
honourable, but afterward, that is a considerable time later, I discovered that you have been, so to
say, uses as a fool by your client. After all, while you did submit to the Court to have the matter
adjourned person the hearing of the S78B constitutional challenge with the outstanding appeal
before the High Court of Australia, your client (Australian Electoral commission) was in fact, so
to say, playing a dirty game. This, as unbeknown to both yourself, my self and so also the
Magistrates Court at Melbourne, already in March 2002 your client had filed for a Chamber
Summons to have the appeal struck out/dismissed or whatever. In view that they did not serve me
with the Chamber Summons the true version of it remained unknown. Then on 23-10-2002 your
client then filed for a NOTICE OF MOTION, which neither was made known to you, myself
and so neither to the Magistrates Court of Victoria, sitting at Heidelberg, on 4 December 2002, to
have my appeal dismissed. On 3 October 2003 this NOTICE OF MOTION came before the
High Court of Australia, and I had filed numerous written objections, including that I was never
properly served with the NOTICE OF MOTION. The High Court of Australia did not make a
formal ruling to dismiss any of my objections, as such, upon legal principles, never invoked any
legal jurisdictions, but Gummow did comment that the NOTICE OF MOTION was part of the
Application Book, of 19 August 2003.
END QUOTE part of 2-8-2005 correspondence
And

As I indicated above, the onus is upon the Commonwealth of Australia to obtain a Court
order in its favour when legislation is challenged to constitutionally validate the legislation. I
need to do no more but to make an oral and/or written objection, and do not even need to pursue
litigation in that regard! It would be a gross error on your part if you were to assume otherwise.
You now have the option, so to say, to sell your sole and ignore your oath made or you will not
stand for being used by your client to have deceived the Court on 4 December 2002 and will seek
matters to be appropriately sorted out before any further litigation is pursued against me.
Your client, provided me with a form 17 Authorities of judicial decisions, but as I have set out
extensively to your client, those decision were made at a time when the Hansard records of the
Constitutional Convention Debates were not permitted to be used in the courts, where as since
the 1992 Franklin Dam case matters are different now that the Hansard records of the
Constitutional Convention Debates now are even used (albeit often in an incorrect context) by
the High Court of Australia itself. Hence, whatever past judicial decisions were, they must be
looked at again in view of the intentions of the Framers as expressed in the Hansard records of
the Constitutional Convention Debates.
In my view, where I was very much pursuing constitutional issues and used all efforts to try to
have matters heard, but your client using different lawyers then already sought to circumvent this
and in the end perverted the course of justice, as I view it, then I do not accept that the 20002
constitutional challenge has been disposed off. In my view, your client had an obligation to follow
through with the constitutional challenge to be determined by the High Court of Australia, and
have the lawyers it used representing in the High Court of Australia to make known to the Court
that there was a 4 December 2002 order on foot for this constitutional challenge.
As your client used deceptive conduct to not just frustrate but to prevent the constitutional
challenge to be heard and determined, then your client hardly could have the benefits of the fruits
sowed by this deceptive and misleading conduct. Neither do I accept therefore your proposition
that the 2002 case be joined, as this is a case that must be dealt with first of all in its own right
before the 2004 alleged failure to vote is to be dealt with. After all, if in the end my case were to
Part 1 Page 54
be found proven, and there is no obligation to vote, then clearly the 2004 issue would not arise.
Further, if indeed the 2001 election was unconstitutional then obviously the subsequent 2004
election would be unconstitutional. As they say in legal principles, no subsequent court order can
validate an court order made without legal jurisdiction!
And

As I was a candidate in the (purported) election, it ought to be obvious that no court ever had to
deal with a candidate objection to vote as having to vote for those he/she stood against. Hence, in
that regard also, no authority of the past can be relied upon as being a proper authority!
Just consider yourself to apply for becoming a partner in a law firm, and you then having to elect
other lawyers who also want to become a partner in the same law firm as to determine that the one
with the most votes will get the partner ship! Would that not be a nonsense? Well, so is the
unconstitutional demand to for me to vote for those candidates I oppose and stand against!
In my view, I should not be the one having to pursue all kinds of litigation what really is the task
of the Australian Electoral Commission, as to ensure that it conduct FAIR and PROPER
elections within the constitutional framework the Commonwealth Electoral Act was to have been
enacted. As the Framers made clear, if the Commonwealth were to have constitutional powers to
define/declare “citizenship” then it could in effect interfere with the political rights of an elector
in a State. By this prevent electors to vote in State lections and by this cause the abolition of the
States! Could you as an OFFICER OF THE COURT really lend your hand to allow this
undermining of State legislative powers to not just occur but to participate in this, if not directly
then indirectly, by assisting your client in the disgraceful manner of having misled the courts,
yourself and myself?
Why on earth did your client conceal from the Court on 4 December 2002 about what it was doing
in the High Court of Australia? Surely, their ulterior motives ought to be investigated?
QUOTE part of 1-8-2005 CORRESPONDENCE

WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Magistrates Court of Victoria, at Heidelberg 1-8-2005
C/o Jason Cabral Deputy Registrar
Phone 84582000
Fax 84582001 Ref; NV13 Hearing date 4-8-2005
Cc; Chief Magistrate, Magistrates Court of Victoria
Premier of Victoria Mr Steve Bracks, Parliament House, Fax 03 96515054
Australian Electoral Commission
Divisional Returning Officer for Division of JAGAJAGA
C/o Mr R H W MARTIN Fax 9457 6000
REPLY PAID 146, HEIDELBERG VIC 3084
AND TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN
Sir,
Despite of my previous correspondences to you, I have as yet not received any response as
to even confirm having received the faxed correspondence, let alone a more detailed response.
For the record, my computer keeps a record of faxes send out, and as such, I for one have a record
that those faxes were send and completed in sending.

Part 1 Page 55
In my view, if the matter were to proceed for hearing, I take the position it may last several days
for the Court to deal with the matter.
I notice that the charge makes a claim “did fail to vote” however, I have not noticed any
supportive evidence as to set out why this claim as such was made. Being it a criminal trial, under
criminal provisions, then surely I am entitled to be informed of relevant evidence prior to any trial
commencing, so that I can prepare any case in response. See also below for further set out of
averment of evidence. As the Framers of the Constitution Convention Bill 1898 made clear that
“DUE PROCESS OF LAW” must be provided in regard of any claims about breaches of
Commonwealth law, hence, this includes a proper and detailed set out why this claim is made.
END QUOTE part of 1-8-2005 CORRESPONDENCE
And
QUOTE part of the 1-8-2005 CORRESPONDENCE

no legal justification for this!
As author of the 30 September 2003 published book;
ISBN 0-9580569-6-X
I then also quoted the following;
Hansard records 17-3-1898 Constitutional Convention Debates
Mr. DEAKIN (Victoria).-
What a charter of liberty is embraced within this Bill-of political liberty and religious
liberty-the liberty and the means to achieve all to which men in these days can
reasonably aspire. A charter of liberty is enshrined in this Constitution, which is also a
charter of peace-of peace, order, and good government for the whole of the peoples
whom it will embrace and unite.
Mr. SYMON (South Australia).-I wish to say one word or two before we part. I do not
intend to enter into any detailed examination of, or any elaborate apology for, the
Constitution which we have been engaged in framing. But, sir, no man can remain unmoved
upon this momentous occasion. We who are assembled in this Convention are about to
commit to the people of Australia a new charter of union and liberty; we are about to
commit this new Magna Charta for their acceptance and confirmation, and I can
conceive of nothing of greater magnitude in the whole history of the peoples of the
world than this question upon which we are about to invite the peoples of Australia to
vote. The Great Charter was wrung by the barons of England from a reluctant king.
This new charter is to be given by the people of Australia to themselves.
Again;
What a charter of liberty is embraced within this Bill-of political liberty and religious
liberty-the liberty and the means to achieve all to which men in these days can
reasonably aspire.
And
The Great Charter was wrung by the barons of England from a reluctant king. This
new charter is to be given by the people of Australia to themselves.

Part 1 Page 56
And, if you had any appropriate education in constitutional provisions and limitations then you
may also be aware that the constitution was framed upon the widest possible election provisions
applicable in any State at the time of Federation.
In Queensland, in 1899 it was a criminal offence, to seek to force a person to vote, etc, which by
the subsequent Federation became applicable to all States as part of the minimum standards
applicable in the term “POLITICAL LIBERTY”!
CRIMES ACT 1914 (Cth)

28 Interfering with political liberty
Any person who, by violence or by threats or intimidation of any kind, hinders
or interferes with the free exercise or performance, by any other person, of any
political right or duty, shall be guilty of an offence.
Penalty: Imprisonment for 3 years.
Greg T (QC)
And
QUOTE
----- Original Message -----
From: Greg Tudehope
To: John Wilson ; JUSTICE GROUP ; Peter Gargan
Sent: Tuesday, July 13, 2004 8:51 PM
Subject: Re: $7,009.80 Bill of Costs for not voting.
John,
I don't bother to vote for any of the dishonest grubs in Queensland
either and as yet I have not been threatened with any offence for not
doing so.
I have contacted the Electoral Commission and stated that if any person ever
threatens me for not voting I will take advantage of the law that applies in
Queensland but they claimed that they were unaware of what I was talking about.
The facts are that if I am threatened by any body for not voting it is a criminal
offence and I believe it would be the same in NSW but I am unaware of what
the state of the law is down there.
I have attached a copy of the section of the Criminal Code Qld that applies here.
s 102 81 s 103
Criminal Code Act 1899
102 Undue influence

Any person who—
(a) uses or threatens to use any force or restraint, or does or threatens
to do any temporal or spiritual injury, or causes or threatens to
cause any detriment of any kind, to an elector in order to induce
the elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or on
Part 1 Page 57
account of the elector having voted or refrained from voting at an
election; or
(b) by force or fraud prevents or obstructs the free exercise of the
franchise by an elector, or by any such means compels or induces
an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election;
is guilty of a misdemeanour, and is liable to imprisonment for 1 year, or to
a fine of $400.
Greg Tudehope (QC) Qld Criminal

END QUOTE
QUOTE
Victorian Consolidated Legislation
CRIMES ACT 1958 - SECT 354

Indictments
354. Indictments
Upon the application of any person supported by an affidavit disclosing an indictable

offence and either that the same has been committed by some body
corporate or that a court has declined or refused to commit or hold to bail
the alleged offender or that no presentment was made against him at the court
at which the trial would in due course have taken place, or upon the
application of the Director of Public Prosecutions, it shall be lawful for the
Full Court to order the Juries Commissioner to summon a grand jury to appear
at a court to be holden at a time and place to be mentioned in the order; and
upon receipt of such order the Juries Commissioner shall summon not less than
twenty-three men to attend at such court at the time and place aforesaid to
inquire present do and execute all things which on the part of the Queen shall
then and there be commanded of them, and such men shall be taken from the jury
roll of the jury district in which such place is situate and at the time and
place aforesaid the said Juries Commissioner shall bring into court the said
order with the name, occupation and date of birth of every grand juror written
on a panel signed by him and sealed with his seal of office and shall deliver
the said panel to the proper officer of the said court, who shall in open
court call aloud the names of the grand jurors on the said panel one after
another, and the twenty-three men so first drawn and appearing or if
twenty-three men shall not appear such of them as do appear not being less
than twelve men shall be the grand jury and shall be sworn and act as such
accordingly:
Provided always that every such order shall be delivered to the

Juries Commissioner ten days before the day on which the indictment is
intended to be preferred.
END QUOTE
Again;
John,
I don't bother to vote for any of the dishonest grubs in Queensland

Part 1 Page 58
either and as yet I have not been threatened with any offence for not
doing so.
I have contacted the Electoral Commission and stated that if any person ever
threatens me for not voting I will take advantage of the law that applies in
Queensland but they claimed that they were unaware of what I was talking about.
The facts are that if I am threatened by any body for not voting it is a criminal
offence and I believe it would be the same in NSW but I am unaware of what
the state of the law is down there.
I have attached a copy of the section of the Criminal Code Qld that applies here.
s 102 81 s 103
Criminal Code Act 1899
While Mr Greg Tudehope (QC) Qld Criminal is a barrister in Queensland Criminal law, he
obviously was not aware of how it applied constitutionally to other States. However, in my
published books I have canvassed this extensively, that this is applicable and quoted Hansard
records for this also, of which some is quoted below;
If the Commonwealth is created they have all their electoral rights conserved to them
under this Constitution.
As any Commonwealth law must apply equally throughout the Commonwealth of Australia, then
any such rights preserved for Queenslanders by this clearly also became applicable for all other
electors of other States upon federation. Not to apply this would have been meaning that different
legislative provisions were to have been enacted for each State by the Commonwealth, which
itself would have been unconstitutional! The very purpose of having unified electoral provisions
was to provide the Commonwealth with legislative powers but so broadly based upon the
minimum applicable in any State. By this, providing that the minimum Standards ogf any State
became applicable to all States.
Mr. BARTON: I will come to that in a moment. What I wish to say now is that under the
proposal there is no deprivation to the women of South Australia. They have at present their
right to vote for all the concerns of the State. If the Commonwealth is created they have
all their electoral rights conserved to them under this Constitution. The only thing
would be that whether they were allowed to vote or not, the voting would have to be so
regulated that South Australia would only be allowed her proper strength in taking the
referendum.
And
Mr. DEAKIN: Some days ago I was one of those who was struck, on consideration, by
the fact that it was possible to be confronted by such a problem as has just been presented to
us. We ought to realise that the proposition of my hon. friend Mr. Barton means an entire
change in principle in the Bill of 1891 as to the making of amendments in the Constitution.
This is one of the most important provisions of the Bill. As adopted in 1891, it ran:
And if the proposed amendment is approved by the Conventions of a majority of the States,
and if the people of the States whose Conventions approve of the amendment are also a

Part 1 Page 59
majority of the people of the Commonwealth, the proposed amendment shall be presented to
the Governor-General for the Queen's assent.
Under this scheme a very large State, by mere abstinence on the part of its electors,
might render-the vote of a large majority of those who went to the poll fruitless. It does
not provide for the rule of the majority. On consideration it appeared to me that this was
unjust, and that the suggestion made by Mr. Lewis, the hon. member for Tasmania, was just,
inasmuch as it provided for the complete carrying out of the axiom requiring a majority of
the States and a majority of the people's vote. The only difficulty in the way of Mr. Lewis's
proposal was the franchise of South Australia. I differ from Mr. Barton in believing that the
votes of female electors of South Australia must be taken into account. Both male and
female votes must go to form the majority of the State. But when the question arises whether
in addition to having a majority of the States you have a majority of the people. Then in
order to put South Australia on a fair basis you must omit the female votes, because the
majority has to be a majority upon a uniform franchise.
And
Mr. BARTON: It has been suggested that the difficulty could be overcome by the
following amendment, which I will move:
To strike out sub-section 4, with the view of inserting the following sub-section: And if a
majority of the States and a majority of the electors voting approve the proposed law, the
proposed law shall be presented to the Governor-General for the Queen's assent; but, until
the qualification of electors of Members of the House of Representatives becomes uniform
throughout the Commonwealth, only one-half the votes for and against the proposed law
shall be counted in any State in which adult suffrage prevails.
Amendment agreed to.
Again;
and a majority of the electors voting
Therefore, it is not as to the voters registered and entitled to vote but rather the majority of those
actual voting. People not wanting to vote, and not casting any vote therefore cannot be counted.
As was stated;
by mere abstinence on the part of its electors, might render-the vote of a large majority
of those who went to the poll fruitless.
Clearly, it was recognised that electors could abstain from voting.
And this was provided for;
As for example under Queensland Criminal law it was a crime to force a person to vote!
Therefore, the same continues to apply, regardless if since federation this legislation was
maintained, as the Constitution embodies this principle throughout the Commonwealth!
Again;
QUOTE 26-7-2005 CORRESPONDENCE

Part 1 Page 60
Despite of the content of my 15-7-2005 correspondence, faxed to you and Mr King that day, I
have not received any response and as such now request you to place the matter in the hands of
the chief Magistrate of the Magistrates Court of Victoria for full and proper investigation. Also, I
request you to clarify if you issued the summons in ADMINISTRATIVE capacity or in a
JUDICIAL capacity.
END QUOTE 26-7-2005 CORRESPONDENCE

. My view is;
The Courts are not there to convict people but that they are there to hand down
JUSTICE. If the latter includes a conviction then so be it. This means that the court
must act without bias and seen to act without bias to hear and determine matters.
If any court acts in a way to score a conviction, either deliberately or without intention, by
denying a person of a fair and proper hearing then this itself undermines the credibility of the
court in question and also undermines the foundations of the democratic system.
END QUOTE part of the 1-8-2005 CORRESPONDENCE
And

The Commonwealth Parliament can pass whatever proposed legislation it desires, but once such a
legislation has been enacted and has been challenged, then the legislation objected against is and
remains ULTRA VIRES unless and until a competent court has ruled in favour of that legislation
objected against.
Hansard 1-3-1898
Mr. HIGGINS.-But suppose they go beyond their power?
Mr. GORDON.-It is still the expression of Parliament. Directly a Ministry seeks to

enforce improperly any law the citizen has his right.
And;
Mr. GORDON.-
The Constitution does provide in certain Sections;

“Until the parliament otherwise provides”
But that must be understood in its proper context!
Mr. BARTON.-
If we are going to give the Federal Parliament power to legislate as it pleases with
regard to Commonwealth citizenship, not having defined it, we may be enabling the
Parliament to pass legislation that would really defeat all the principles inserted
elsewhere in the Constitution, and, in fact, to play ducks and drakes with it. That is not
what is meant by the term "Trust the Federal Parliament."
Again;

Part 1 Page 61
we may be enabling the Parliament to pass legislation that would really defeat all the
principles inserted elsewhere in the Constitution, and, in fact, to play ducks and drakes
with it. That is not what is meant by the term "Trust the Federal Parliament."
Therefore, whatever electoral provisions may be enacted by the Commonwealth of Australia, it
remains subject to what the Framers of the Constitution intended.
Mr King clearly failed to pursue this option, to have first matters placed before the Court to
validate any legislation that was objected against!
It is not the duty of the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria to sort out the legal mess created by the
Federal Parliament as to what Mr King can or cannot do. The appropriate course would have been
for Mr King, the informer, acting for the Australian Electoral Commission, to have pursued this
before a competent court dealing with constitutional issues. It should have challenged the
matter in the High Court of Australia against the Commonwealth of Australia to obtain a
judicial ruling for this.
END QUOTE part of 1-8-2005 CORRESPONDENCE
And

In Preston Ice and Cool Stores Pty Ltd. v. Hawkings (1955) V.L.R. 89; (1955) Austin Digest
337.
“It was held that where there is a review/appeal the party having sought such review/appeal
is not bound by the grounds used in the original hearing but may refer to other grounds even
so, such grounds had not been upon which the original order was based.”
One has to question if the $20.00 original fine issued, I have already contested to be
constitutionally valid, was the purported original hearing by STAR CHAMBER COURT
conduct, IN MY ABSENTEEISM, then what are the proceedings before the Magistrates Court of
Victoria about?
How can we have that the Commonwealth of Australia dictate, contrary to the
NULLIFICATION provisions, some extra process that by STAR CHAMBER COURT ruling a
Electoral Officer, can issue a fine, undermining the authority of the magistrates Court of Victoria
to determine the matter in the first place DE NOVO, and then set in train some other legal
process but then dictating to the Magistrate/judge/judicial officer how to go about within State
legal provisions and State Court procedures as to the accepting of evidence. The Commonwealth
of Australia clearly has hereby interfered with the State jurisdiction of the State of Victoria, as
with other States, unconstitutionally. There is absolutely no constitutional powers for the
commonwealth of Australia to do so. It may pass legislation and have them enacted by the
governor-General but it can do no more. The right to have certain legislation does not include
legal or other administrative enforcement, as this would undermine the very nature of the limited
POLITICAL UNION upon which the Federation was established.
END QUOTE PART OF 1-8-2005 CORRESPONDENCE
(Note; typing errors of the original documents were retained as such in the quotations)
This includes the right not to vote;

they have all their electoral rights conserved to them under this Constitution.
The fact that after federation the States began to make voting compulsory did not in any way give
the Commonwealth of Australia any right to circumvent the minimum standards applicable at
time of federation that voting was “VOLUNTARILY”!

Part 1 Page 62
With the cases of;
• Judd v McKeon (1926) 38 CLR 380

• Lubcke v Little [1970] VR 807
• Faderson v Bridger (1971) 126 CLR 271
• Krosch v Springell; ex parte Krosch [1974] QdR 107
• O’Brien v Warden (1981) 37 ACTR 13
None appear to be dealing with the fact that the electoral rights “not to vote” was “conserved” in
the Constitution as much as the right “to vote”. The cases merely seem to go into details as to the
reasons why a particular person did not vote. None of them were apparently candidates either in
any of the cases, and as such no argument as to having to vote for an opponent by way of
preference voting.
None of the aforementioned cases the Commonwealth Electoral Commission relies upon in his
Background No.17 document related to “citizenship” and the issue of “franchise” such as the
Defendant pursues to do. Simply this case is unique in that regard.
http://apps.aec.gov.au/_content/Why/committee/jscem/2001_election/sub147/sub147.htm
voters in the Antarctic. At the moment the only way for voters living at Australian
Antarctic research bases to vote is by having ballot papers faxed to those bases. After the
close of polls the Assistant Returning Officer (ARO) for each base phones the votes through
to the AEO for Tasmania. Voting is not compulsory for Antarctic electors because the
secrecy of the vote cannot be assured due to the process used to transmit the results. Under
an internet-based system these electors would have the right to a secret ballot restored to
them.
All laws enacted by the Commonwealth of Australia must be applicable throughout the
Commonwealth of Australia, and a s such Antarctic cannot be excluded from any compulsory
voting, if this was argued to be enforceable, as either the laws applies through the entire
Commonwealth of Australia or it does not apply anywhere.
Hence, the exclusion of people in Antarctic to vote makes it in itself unconstitutional. For this also
no one then can be forced to vote.
http://www.aec.gov.au/_content/What/media_releases/1998/sep/franchise.htm
By 1902 most men and women were able to vote at federal elections. However, what were
referred to as ‘Aboriginal natives’ of Australia, Asia, Africa or the Pacific Islands were
excluded from enrolment and voting.
And
It was 1949 when Aboriginal people were given the right to enrol and vote at federal
elections, and then only as long as they were entitled to enrol for State elections or had
served in the defence forces.
The truth is that constitutionally Aboriginals who were entitled to vote in State elections by
Section 41 of the Constitution then had an AUTOMATIC right to vote in Federal elections!
Reality is that after Federation Aboriginal were robbed unconstitutionally of their rights to vote,
where they had State franchise.
This is where the problem lies that from onset since Federation all kinds of laws were enacted and
even more than 100 years there still is no proper understanding as to what is constitutionally
appropriate, because of lack of proper trained “constitutionalist” being involved in the way laws
are enacted.
Part 1 Page 63
For this Court to INVOKE legal jurisdiction the issue therefore also is if the provisions of Section
245 of the CEA1918 are themselves constitutional valid in regard of enforcing such provisions
where it is not being done throughout the Commonwealth of Australia?
The issue is not if it might be difficult to vote in the Antarctic but that a law of the
Commonwealth of Australia to force compulsory voting can only be valid if it applies for the
whole of the Commonwealth of Australia. And this clearly does not appear to be so.
WHAT CONSTITUTES A RELIGIOUS OBJECTION?
&
UNCONSTITUTIONAL DISCRIMINATION/DISABILITY
&
Communication, or there lack thereof, by CDPP (Prosecutor)
In May and June 2006 the Defendant provided the Commonwealth Director of Public
Prosecutions with correspondences which included most of the submissions the Defendant
intended to make to the Court, including for a “PERMANENT STAY” of orders, and also about
religious objection, seeking the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions to consent to a
“PERMANENT STAY” of the proceedings relating to the charges. However, having done so, the
Defendant then is faced with the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions being for
warned as to what the Defendant intends to do in most issues and as such may seek to counteract
those arguments. It is not the counter argument itself that the Defendant is worried about, but the
deceptive conduct employed in the past by the lawyers acting for the Australian Electoral
Commission in their litigation to the extend as to deliberately replace words in what is claimed to
be an Authority being quoted as to pretend to the Court that a judge made a certain ruling even so
the ruling is a fraudulent version to deceive the Court. Such as Mr Peter Hanks QC did before the
Federal Court of Australia and later again made a deceptive statement to the High Court of
Australia.
For example, checking the transcript of the hearing, it is noted that Mr Peter Hanks QC in his
argument in point 22 and 22.1 of the OUTLINE stated the following;
QUOTE
22 In Foster v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 421 at 445, Gibbs J referred to
the general rule that “not less than” so many days refers to clear days – “unless the
context or the statutory intention reveals a contrary intention”.
END QUOTE
His quotation is again false and misleading!
Mr Peter Hanks QC quoted of the judgment the following;

QUOTE
“unless the context or the statutory intention reveals a contrary intention”
END QUOTE
This ought to be;
QUOTE
“unless the context or the subject matter reveals a contrary intention”
END QUOTE

Part 1 Page 64
Clearly, that is a gross deception. In legal terms there can be a significant difference in a case for
the Court to deal with a “statutory intention” versus “subject matter”.
Mr Peter Hanks QC stated to the Court (7 November 2001);
The researches of counsel have been unable to find provisions using simular language (“not
less that” or “at least” a number of days) where the language is as clear and specific as found
in ss156(1) and 157.
Thousands upon thousands of Internet references can be found upon a search “shall not be less
than” or “shall not be less that”. As such this statement by Mr. Peter Hanks QC for the
Australian Electoral Commission was a fraudulent statement. Likewise other statement were
found by the defendant to be deceptive and/or misleading.
We also have the fact that Counsel Mr peter Hanks QC argued the authority of the
ASSOCIATED DOMINIONS ASSURANCE SOCIETY PTY. LTD. v. BALMFORD

(1950) 81 CLR 161
What counsel did however was to make a false and misleading presentation of what the case
really was on about.
As the authority stated:
The notice actually served did not "specify" such a period: it "specified" a period which
was too short by one day, and the Acts Interpretation Act does not affect this position.
Mr Peter Hank QC didn’t argue that the authority wasn’t relevant, to the contrary he argued its
relevance only by misrepresenting how it applied and what the authority really was on about. As
such, it had nothing to do with “within” as Mr Peter Hanks QC argued as clearly the usage
“within” was in a different context and not at all as Mr Hanks sought to imply and did imply.
It ought to be considered a serious matter that a barrister employs these kind of tactics, indeed
deceptive tactics, but it seems the Australian Electoral Commissioner does not seem to worry
about the means as long as it achieves his end results.
Because I expect the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions to come up with any
nonsense and unable to verify the correctness of any claims they may make about any
AUTHORITY they may refer to I am left no alternative but to present my own research.
Lawyers are “OFFICERS OF THE COURT” but I experienced that when it comes to the
Australian Electoral Commissioner being the instructing party then it seems to me from
experiences their “oath of alliance” is worthless and they cannot be trusted, as set out also further
in this ADDRESS TO THE COURT.
It is my view, that had Mr Peter Hanks QC not concealed matters and not presented fraudulent
Authorities and how they applied then the Federal Court of Australia would not have ruled that it
had no legal jurisdiction, and would in fact have granted the orders I sought. And in the end this
case would never have eventuated before this Court as then matters could have been addressed
appropriately before any federal election had been held!
I take the position that Subsection 245(14) of the Constitution is not and cannot be regarded to
limit the right of a objection to be only a (theistic belief ) “religious objection” but includes also
any secular belief objection.
If Subsection 245(14) was limited to being “theistic belief” then it would be unconstitutional.
Part 1 Page 65
QUOTE 4-6-2006 CORRESPONDENCE FAXED 10.36 pm 4-6-2006

WITHOUT PREJUDICE
C/o Judy McGillivray, lawyer
Melbourne Office, 22nd Floor, 2000 Queen Street, Melbourne VIC 3000
GPO Box 21 A, Melbourne Vic 3001
Tel 03 9605 4333, Fax 03 9670 4295 ref; 02101199, etc
T01567737 & Q01897630
AND WHOM IT MAY CONCERN
Re; “religious objection” (Subsection 245(14) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918) offend
Section 116 if the Constitution if it excludes secular belief based objections.
Madam,
As you are aware I continue to refer to my religious objection albeit do wish to indicate
that while using the “religious objection” referred to in subsection 245(14) of the Commonwealth
Electoral Act 1918 I do not consider that this subsection 14 limits an objection only to an “theistic
belief” based “religious objection” but in fact it also includes any secular belief based “religious
objection”, as it must be neutral to whatever a person uses as grounds for an “objection”. This, as
Section 116 of the Constitution prohibit the Commonwealth of Australia to limit the scope of
subsection 245(14) to only “theistic belief” based “religious objections”. Therefore, any person
having a purely moral, ethical, or philosophical source of “religious objection” have a valid
objection.
Neither do I accept that a person making an “religious objection” requires to state his/her
religion, and neither which part of his/her religion provides for a “religious objection” as the
mere claim itself is sufficient to constitute what is referred to in subsection 245(14) as being a
“religious objection”. Therefore, the wording “religious objection” is to be taken as “objection”
without the word “religion” having any special meaning in that regard.
If you do not accept this as such, then there is clearly another constitutional issue on foot!
I request you to respond as soon as possible and set out your position in this regard.
Awaiting your response, G. H. SCHOREL-HLAVKA

END QUOTE 4-6-2006 CORRESPONDENCE FAXED 10.36 pm 4-6-2006
QUOTE 7-6-2006 CORRESPONDENCE FAXED 7-6-2006

WITHOUT PREJUDICE
C/o Judy McGillivray, lawyer
Melbourne Office, 22nd Floor, 2000 Queen Street, Melbourne VIC 3000
GPO Box 21 A, Melbourne Vic 3001
Tel 03 9605 4333, Fax 03 9670 4295 ref; 02101199, etc
T01567737 & Q01897630
AND WHOM IT MAY CONCERN
Re; Charges, etc
Madam,
With proceedings due next month, I view it would be more appropriate if you were to
make some effort as to communicate with myself regarding matters relating to the charges and
indeed the legal justification of them. After all, the Commonwealth Director of Public
Prosecutions may be litigating against many people allegedly failing to vote, besides myself, and
it may be born out by my material that none of such litigation could be constitutionally valid. In
my view, the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions must consider ALL RELEVANT
MATERIAL as to ensure it is not pursuing vexatious charges.
Part 1 Page 66
I assume that while you are a lawyer, more then likely you are not a “constitutionalist”, and as
such may lack the experiences and competence to understand and comprehend the material I am
relying upon, and for this you may do better to perhaps seek to consult a “constitutionalist” who
is appropriately trained in these matters. After all, if a “constitutionalist” were to conclude that
indeed I am on the right track that the charges have no constitutional validity then you could
surely save the Courts time to hear and determine vexatious charges or even to try to attempt to do
so.
Albeit, I am still working on the DRAFT version of the ADDRESS TO THE COURT, it
nevertheless is already comprehensive and would indicate to a “constitutionalist” that the charges
are ill conceived and without any constitutional bases to proceed with, and as such I am willing to
provide an electronic copy to you of the DRAFT, albeit not completed, version so you may
perhaps seek advise of a “constitutionalist”.
Awaiting your response, G. H. SCHOREL-HLAVKA

END QUOTE 7-6-2006 CORRESPONDENCE FAXED 7-6-2006
Firstly, I do wish to quote Section 117 and then 116 of the Constitution, both being relevant;
117 Rights of residents in States

A subject of the Queen, resident in any State, shall not be subject
in any other State to any disability or discrimination which would
not be equally applicable to him if he were a subject of the Queen
resident in such other State.
Despite this, the Defendant continues to find that he is excluded from accessing High Court of
Australia, Federal Court of Australia and other AuslII.edu files. This despite ongoing complaints
filed via the Victorian Government, High Court of Australia, Federal Court of Australia, etc.
It appears to the Defendant that this denial of access to judgments has been to try to limit the
Defendant to have relevant Authorities for litigation on foot.
After having filed a complaint via the Victorian Government then for about 2 weeks access was
enabled, only to be excluded again, as such, it is a deliberate conduct to prevent me to research
judgments on record so as to frustrate me in legal proceedings.
I view that this is in breach of Section 117 of the Constitution.
Because of this deliberate blockage to access Australian Authorities I am forced to rely often upon
US Authorities. In view that in the USA there is also a prohibition to legislate in regard of religion
then the equivalent Authority can be relied upon.
116 Commonwealth not to legislate in respect of religion

The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any
religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for
prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test
shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust
under the Commonwealth.
As shown below in greater extend the question of the Defendants religion itself would be an
invasion as to his rights. Further, there is no requirement to state any particular religion as the
matter in U.S. Supreme Court.
116 Commonwealth not to legislate in respect of religion

The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any
religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for
prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test
shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust
Part 1 Page 67
under the Commonwealth.
WELSH v. UNITED STATES, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), 398 U.S. 333, WELSH v. UNITED
STATES, CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
NINTH CIRCUIT, No. 76., Argued January 20, 1970, Decided June 15, 1970
1. The language of 6 (j) cannot be construed (as it was in United States v. Seeger, supra,
and as it is in the prevailing opinion) to exempt from military service all individuals who
in good faith oppose all war, it being clear from both the legislative history and textual
analysis of that provision that Congress used the words "by reason of religious training
and belief" to limit religion to its theistic sense and to confine it to formal, organized
worship or shared beliefs by a recognizable and cohesive group. Pp. 348-354.
2. The question of the constitutionality of 6 (j) cannot be avoided by a construction of that
provision that is contrary to its intended meaning. Pp. 354-356.
3. Section 6 (j) contravenes the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by
exempting those whose conscientious objection claims are founded on a theistic belief
while not exempting those whose claims are based on a secular belief. To comport with
that clause an exemption must be "neutral" and include those whose belief emanates from
a purely moral, ethical, or philosophical source. Pp. 356-361.
4. In view of the broad discretion conferred by the Act's severability clause and the
longstanding policy of exempting religious conscientious objectors, the Court, rather than
nullifying the exemption entirely, should extend its coverage to those like petitioner who
have been unconstitutionally excluded from its coverage. Pp. 361-367.
And;
http://www.vaccineinfo.net/exemptions/relexemptlet.shtml
Hints for Religious Exemptions to Immunization

Please read the text below before you download, print, or use the sample religious
exemption letter and support materials provided in the following link:
Sample Religious Exemption Letter and Supporting Documentation
Refer to the statutes. The laws require that immunization must conflict with the tenets and
practices of a recognized or organized religion of which you are an adherent or member.
However, the law does not require you to name a religion at all. In fact, disclosing
your religion could cause your religious exemption to be challenged.
And
Some schools and daycares attempt to require you to give far more information than
required by law. You are not required by law to fill out any form letters from a school or
daycare. The law allows you to submit your own letter and the letter only needs to meet the
bare requirements of the law. Keep it simple; do not feel you need to describe your
religious beliefs here as that also is not required by law.
And
Many times, when a school or day care questions your exemption, they are merely
unfamiliar with the law or trying to coerce you to go against your beliefs by
deliberately misrepresenting the law. They are betting on the fact that you don't know
your rights.

Part 1 Page 68
What appears to be clear is that a “religious objection” is not qualified to a specific religion and
neither can be as this would in fact offend Section 116 of the Constitution. Neither can it be
associated with any particular religion as this would also interfere with Section 116 of the
Constitution. Likewise, any person objecting under the “religious objection” Subsection 245(14)
of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 neither can be required to be a religious person as this
would also offend Section 116 of the Constitution, as the equivalent in WELSH v. UNITED
STATES, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), 398 U.S. 333 made clear that it (the “religious objection” applies
as much to non religious persons as religious persons. Therefore, anyone objection for his/her
personal reasons to vote clearly is entitled to do so regardless of having any specific religion
mentioned.
Again, because I have been prevented from researching judgments of the High Court of Australia
and other judgments in general which are under control of AusLii.edu I am unable to research
that avenue as to locate simular judgments within Australia judgments.
Still, for purpose of this case, I should not be denied the benefits of my research, where I am
wrongly excluded from my constitutional rights to access Australian judgments.
When the Australian Electoral Commissioner provided me with a fact sheet No. 17 about certain
decisions, I checked out the relevant judgments and responded to the Australian Electoral
Commission that none of those judgment were relevant. Since then I discovered having been
excluded from access High Court of Australia and other judgments.
I may state that when I am able to obtain certain website addresses of High Court judgments then
at times I ask others to download it for me and to email it to me. They have no problem to access
the web-address I provide them with even so I cannot access the same, which I understand is
because my computer has been blocked to access the websites. As such, it is not a error in web-
address (as others can access it for me) but a deliberate blocking me out.
Obviously I cannot expect others to download thousands of cases for me, and neither should this
be the way for me to obtain access to judgments that are published on the Internet or available
through the internet normally.
It merely underlines that the deliberate blocking out of my computer to access judgments for my
research is to FRUSTRATE me in presenting my case before the Court in a manner I desire with
relevant Australian judgments.
I view, this in itself is a denial of a FAIR and PROPER trial!
In my view any judicial officer should take it very serious that this kind of tactic is employed to
prevent a party to litigation being able to present his case with relevant Australian authorities to be
referred to as much as possible.
SET OUT AS TO WHY THE DEFENDANT VIEWS AN ORDER TO PERMANENT

STAY OF PROCEEDINGS RELATING TO THE CHARGES IS APPROPRIATE
The Defendant albeit not being able to dictate how the Court has to consider matters and its
judgment, nevertheless provide the following submissions, besides those otherwise provided in
his ADDRESS TO THE COURT, as to why a permanent stay in regard of proceedings
concerning the charges is in his view appropriate by listing some of his main issues, albeit not
stated in any order of importance, as follow;
There proceedings against the Defendant Mr. Gerrit Hendrik Schorel-Hlavka, formally known as
Mr Gerrit Hendrik Schorel, are before this Court as an appeal, for a hearing DE NOVO, against
the orders of the Magistrates Court of Victoria at Heidelberg of 17 November 2005, which
dismissed the then OBJECTION TO LEGAL JURISDICTION and convicted as per issued
Part 1 Page 69
Order the Defendant of failing to vote on 10 November 2001 and on 1 January 2005, the latter
orders appeared to have been incorrectly issued, as no federal election was held on 1 January 2005
but one was held in 2004. The Defendant claims that he notified the Court about the incorrect date
but was refused a copy of an Order which had the September 2004 election date.
The enrolment card which are on Court file, provided by the Commonwealth Director of Public
Prosecution (the Prosecutor) indeed confirm the name change having been on record by the
Australian Electoral Commission.
The Defendant has made known that his native language was Dutch, and that he never had any
formal education in the English language and neither so in legal studies but that he consider
himself to be a “self educated constitutionalist”. It is not perceived that the Defendant is seeking
to use an excuse of lack of possible language skill in regard of a defence against the charges
against him, rather it to be considered that his use of English grammar must be considered as
such.
The Defendant has placed before this Court that the he has the burden of CIVIL STANDARD
OF PROOF to raise excuses in regard of the charges and the Prosecutor has the burden of
CRIMINAL STANDARD OF PROOF that unless the Prosecutor can prove beyond reasonable
doubt that each and every excuse proffered by the Defendant cannot be sustained then he fails to
prove his case “beyond reasonable doubt” and as such no conviction can eventuate.
The Defendant submits, that STAR CAMBER COURT
The Defendant submits, that the charge of FAILING TO VOTE in regard of the (purported)
2004 federal election cannot have any legal justification, this as on 4 December 2002 upon the
submission of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, in view of constitutional
challenges by the Defendant, the Magistrates Court of Victoria at Heidelberg adjourned matters
pending a judicial decision by the High Court of Australia to determine if the legislative
provisions objected against were INTRA VIRES. Such decision has so far not been forthcoming.
Hence the legislative provisions objected against, including Section 245 CEA1918 remains
ULTRA VIRES. Hence, since 4-12-2002 Section 245 could no longer be used to pursue any
fines/charges against anyone and neither so against the Defendant. As such the FAILING TO
VOTE charge in regard of the (purported) 2004 federal election is without legal justification and
VEXATIOUS.
Hansard 1-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates Mr. GORDON.-

Part 1 Page 70
It ought to be considered a serious matter that the Australian Electoral Commission and/or the
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions since 4-12-2002 had fined/convicted tens of
thousands of people upon legislative provisions they were aware of was ULTRA VIRES, by
having perverted the course of justice and abused also the legal processes of the Court.
The Defendant submits, that Section 353 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 in its
current form is unconstitutional, as it purports to give legal jurisdiction to the Court of Disputed
Returns, acting for either House of Parliament, somehow to adjudicate upon legal issues in regard
of judicial powers neither House ever possessed neither can invoke within the provisions of the
Constitution, seeking to override constitutional provisions and limitations, beyond its power, this
as it is used in a manner, as Marshall J of the Federal Court of Australia on 7 November 2001
proved to do, as to deny a person his constitutional rights to challenge the validity of holding an
election before a appropriate Court of law. This, as while the Parliament had the original power to
determine if one of its own is validity elected, it has no power in that regard to determine the valid
application of constitutional provisions resulting to an election being held, as this remains to be a
specific legal issues beyond the powers of the Parliament to determine by itself and neither was
intended by the Framers of the Constitution to be within the powers of the Parliament to be
controlled by them without proper legal procedures. Indeed, where the High Court of Australia
specifically has jurisdiction to hear and determine matters arising under the Constitution, such as
the proper application of Section 32 of the Constitution, then the Defendants conduct, on
direction of the Registrar of the High Court of Australia to file his case in the Federal Court of
Australia was appropriate course to follow. And the High Court of Australia to NOT allow the
appeal against the 7 November 2001 judgment was a gross miscarriage of judgment, as
extensively canvassed in the ADDRESS TO THE COURT that was filed for the 16 and 17
November 2001 proceedings before the Magistrates Court of Australia at Heidelberg, that is part
of the court file before this Court.
Therefore, this Court exercising federal jurisdiction is not bound by Section 353 of the
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, if this section was to purport that only the Court of Disputed
Returns could determine matters in regard of elections, as this Court cannot be denied the federal
jurisdiction invested in it to determine matters “according to law”, including the validity of the
proclamation and writs that causes an election to be held”, as set out also further in this
ADDRESS TO THE COURT.
Electoral matters governed by legislation only can be appropriately dealt with by a Federal Court
or a Court exercising federal jurisdiction operating as a “Court of law”.
The Court of Disputed Returns clearly does not operate specifically as a “Court of law” as it can
dismiss a petition, regardless if the petitioner is deemed to be right in the petition if the Court of
disputed Returns take the view that a re-election would not make much difference to the end result
of the election. As such, it is not a “Court of law” where not the end result but rather the legal
doctrine is superior.
The ruling by the Federal Court of Australia on 7 November 2001 that it had no legal jurisdiction
did not and could not have disposed of any constitutional challenge to the validity of the writs. As
the framers of the Constitution made clear only a ruling by the High Court of Australia declaring
the writs to be INTRA VIRES could have validated the writs, as like any other piece of
legislation contested to its constitutional validity. Therefore, if the writs were not constitutionally
validly issued, being in breach of Section 9 and/or 32 of the Constitution then this remains
ULTRA VIRES and the Country Court of Australia could never invoke any legal jurisdiction to
purportedly deal with criminal charges allegedly arising out of a failure to vote of purported
elections which constitutionally did never take place.

Part 1 Page 71
It is essential to consider Section 32 of the Constitution, also that the writs must be issued within
10 days “from” the expiry of the House of Representative. This means writs issued prior to the
Proclamation having been published are NULL AND VOID, and so without legal force and
therefore Section 245 of the CEA1918 for this also cannot be invoked.
Likewise, Section 9 of the Constitution requires writs to be issued according to relevant State
laws, and as this never eventuated then the wits for the Senate were also constitutionally floored.
Constitutionally, each and every federal election held prior to 2001 likewise befall the same
constitutional argument, but there are for purpose of the charges not relevant, albeit it does not
alter the fact that previous elections conducted in breach of constitutional provisions are without
legal force, and while the Australian Electoral Commissioner’s lawyers may argue they have
always conducted federal elections in this manner, this does not for one of iota make is
constitutionally valid rather may indicate how terrible and disgraceful and indeed
unconstitutionally elections are conducted. It then is ironic that the Australian Electoral
Commission seeking to have the Court by way of conviction, etc, punish the Defendant for
alleged breaches of law where no such breaches exist, while his own conduct of breaches of
constitutional and other relevant legal provisions are being ignored. The Parliament never had any
powers to make legal determinations, and so neither either House of the Parliament, and for this
neither could bestow by way of Section 353 authority upon the Court of Disputed Returns this
kind of power. The Court of Disputed Returns jurisdiction therefore for all purposes must be
limited to decide non-legal issues as otherwise it would act unconstitutional. It would equate that
the Court of Disputed Returns on behalf of the Parliament as adjudicating on legal issues,
including State legal provisions such as the application of the Senate election act of a State. This
is a sheer abnormality, where the States jurisdiction has been hijacked unconstitutionally.
Where it relates to State laws, such as the Senator Election Act of any State then it is enforceable
by a State Court without needing to invoke federal jurisdiction. The Framers of the Constitution
never anticipated that somehow the Commonwealth of Australia was to take over State judicial
enforcement of State legislative provisions. While the “modus operandi” of Senate elections were
provided to the Commonwealth of Australia, State times and places and so the appointment of a
Senator to the Senate remains to be with the State and the State governor.
The State writs are enforceable under State laws, unless they are defective. Any charge of “failing
to vote” is nonsensical if it does not specify for which election this is. Two elections being held on
the one day, one being the Senate and one for the House of Representatives. One writ issued by
the Governor of the State and one being issued by the Governor-General for the House of
Representatives, albeit the Governor-General also issue the writs for the Territory for Senate
elections.
The Court of Disputed Returns therefore cannot operate as a Federal Court exercising State
judicial powers in regard of Senate elections. As there is no such constitutional powers for a State
to invest State jurisdiction in a Federal Court (consider also 1999 HCA27 Wakim case.).
As the Framers of the Constitution made clear, the Commonwealth of Australia was to rely upon
the State electoral rolls as to who was eligible to vote within Section 41 of the Constitution in
federal elections. The Framers of the Constitution also made clear that there was no “registration”
(enrolment) required for the Commonwealth of Australia as the State electoral rolls would do it.
While the AEC may conduct elections for the states, in the end an alleged “failing to vote” is a
State matter governing a Senate election, whereas in regard of a House of Representative election
it is a federal issue.
Neither the Senate or the House of Representative could possibly themselves have dealt with
enforcing State and of Federal laws against any person, as this would bridge the separation of
powers of legislative powers and judicial powers. Hence, the Federal Parliament (either Houses)
never had any constitutional powers to adjudicate on electoral matters, and the true intend was
that that a Court of Disputed Returns would be a Court dealing with disputed elections as any
other Court of Law.

Part 1 Page 72
While the high court of Australia had legal jurisdiction dealing with all matters arising out of the
Constitution, the Federal Court of Australia cannot be deemed to have this equivalent power and
as such cannot be deemed wither to have any judicial powers to deal with Senate elections and
any breaches of them. Yet, Section 383 of the CEA1918 purports it has.
In view that the Court of Disputed Returns is to deal with disputed elections and not dealing with
if a member should be ousted from the Parliament because of misconduct to the rules of the
House or other improper conduct, then the Court of disputed Returns must be deemed to be to
operate as a “Court of law” as any other Court normally does to deal with the rights of the parties.
It must be considered that if the Parliament were to reverse the application of Section 353 of the
CEA1918 and take back its powers to decide if a Member in its midst should or should not remain
in the House upon judicial grounds, then surely no judicial officer could accept that then the
Parliament could make judicial determinations in regard of Section 75(v) of the Constitution and
other petitions based upon proper application of the Constitution, as to allow for this would in
effect mean that the “judicial powers” invested in the High Court of Australia would be
transferred, in part, to the Parliament.
The separation of judicial powers and legislative powers cannot be eroded by an incorrect
application of Section 353 and therefore this Court must hold that as much as the Parliament never
was provided with any constitutional powers to adjudicate constitutional issues such as the
validity of the writs, then regardless if Marshall J on 7 November 2001 decided otherwise, this
Court is not bound to accept that ruling made in error of law but must observe the true and proper
application of constitutional provisions, and therefore accept that the constitutional objections
pursued by the Defendant even prior to any purported election being held remains on foot until the
High Court of Australia declare the writs to be INTRA VIRES, and until, if at all, it does so the
writs remain ULTRA VIRES, therefore section 245 cannot be invoked if there were no valid
writs in the first place.
The Defendant submits, that the manner elections were/are conducted forced an elector to
participate with bribery conduct and other illegal conduct which are offences within the
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, as set out extensively in this ADDRESS TO THE COURT.
The Defendant submits, that there is no such thing as “compulsory voting”, but rather
“pretended compulsory voting”, this as the High Court of Australia itself made clear (as set out
in this ADDRESS TO THE COURT) that voting is by secret ballot, and even if a person having
received the ballot papers then immediately places the blank forms in the ballot box then still no
one can report this as this would offend the secrecy provisions. As such, the issue is not “voting”
but rather “pretended voting”.
What therefore is to be considered is, has a person voted or is deemed to have voted because the
Australian Electoral Commission decides this to be so, irrespective that the person may never
have done so but the electors name was marked of by error by a staff member?
Is the elector deemed to have voted when his/her name is marked of from the electoral roll, when
receiving the ballot paper, irrespective that this person then may rip the ballot paper up and give it
back to the issuing officer?
Is the elector deemed to have voted because he/she was issued with the ballot paper even so by
error not have his/her name marked off?
Is the elector deemed to have voted, even so the electors name was not marked of by as having
voted but because the Australian Electoral Commission accepts the word of the elector having
done so, either personally, via mail or otherwise?
Is the elector deemed to have voted, even so the staff member refused to issue a ballot paper to the
elector because the staff member may have incorrectly decided against the issuing of a ballot
paper, and for this the attendance of the elector to the polling station is deemed to constitute
having voted, regardless it did not actually happen?
The Defendant submits, that there is within the legislation (The Commonwealth Electoral Act
1918) no clear definition that so to say, sets in concrete as to what constitute voting. People who
Part 1 Page 73
claim to have send in ballot paper, but the AEC claims never have received it nevertheless then
can be deemed to have voted provided the AEC accept this explanation, albeit others who may
make the same claim may be rejected and then be fined for “FAILING TO VOTE”, as such it is
not about the actual physical exercise of voting by filling in a ballot paper that constitute
“voting”, as it remains to be in a regard of a SECRET BALLOT, but rather if the Australian
Electoral Commissioner has made up his mind to conclude an elector did or did not vote.
People who are honest and claiming to have performed postal voting could still be fined for
“FAILING TO VOTE” and others who actually didn’t bother to turn up and vote, neither did
postal voting, would not be challenged for not doing so as their name might have been wrongly
marked of as having voted.
The Defendant submits, that the whole issue about “averment” is that the Australian Electoral
Commission, so the Prosecutor (Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions), would not have
one of iota evidence to prove a Defendant has not voted and hence use the averment rule to avoid
being challenged to prove their case. GUILTY UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT, being the
outlawed STAR CHAMBER COURT system. And it is upon this flimsy basis that Courts are
causing “CRIMINAL” convictions upon Defendants, even so they may in fact have voted!
Therefore it is not the “Rule of Law” being enforced but rather the conclusion of the Australian
Electoral Commissioner, yet his own conduct failing to adhere to constitutional and other relevant
legal issues seems to be ignored!
The Defendant has also raised the issue before the Magistrates Court of Victoria and now before
this Court the issue of religious objection, in fact for years also to the Commonwealth Electoral
Commission, albeit it seems to be ongoing ignored, provided for in ss245(14) of the
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, and as such in any event the Court cannot invoke legal
jurisdiction on this basis also.
Section 245 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918.

(14) Without limiting the circumstances that may constitute a valid and sufficient reason for not
voting, the fact that an elector believes it to be part of his or her religious duty to abstain from
voting constitutes a valid and sufficient reason for the failure of the elector to vote.
(15) An elector is guilty of an offence if the elector fails to vote at an election.
Penalty: $50.
(15A) Strict liability applies to an offence against subsection (15).
Note: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code.
(15B) Subsection (15) does not apply if the elector has a valid and sufficient reason for the failure.
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (15B) (see subsection
13.3(3) of the Criminal Code).
(15C) An elector who makes a statement in response to a penalty notice or to a notice under
subsection (9) that is, to his or her knowledge, false or misleading in a material particular is
guilty of an offence.
Penalty: $50.
(16) Proceedings for an offence against this section may be instituted only by the Electoral
Commissioner or an officer authorised, in writing, for the purpose by the Electoral
Commissioner.
While the notation states “Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the
matter in subsection (15B) (see subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code).”, this cannot be applied
Part 1 Page 74
in the State Court, even which exercise federal jurisdiction, as this would interfere with the
judicial processes of a State Court, regardless if it is exercising federal jurisdiction.
The Defendant submits, that “Religious objection” must be deemed to include any secular
objection as Section 245(14) requires to be “neutral” as otherwise it is unconstitutional as it would
offend Section 116 of the Constitution.
The Defendant submits, that albeit the Defendant is not required to give any evidence as to the
precise grounds of religious objection nevertheless some details have been set out which indicate
that the Defendant for many years had such religious objections. No duty was upon the Defendant
to specifically refer to this to the Australian Electoral Commission when it questioned about their
alleged failure to vote, as all along the Defendant contested the validity of the Australian Electoral
Commission to do so where the Defendant all along had his constitutional based objections on
foot against the elections being held. Considering other matters set out extensively the issue of if
the Defendant voted and if not why not is not relevant unless and until first all constitutional
based objections have been appropriately dealt with. If for example the Courts were to declare that
indeed section 245 of the CEA1918 is beyond constitutional powers then it was so ab initio and it
then is clearly for this also not relevant if the Defendant did or didn’t vote, and if he did not vote
why not as there is no legislation applicable for this. Indeed, the Defendant in his correspondence
to the Australian Electoral Commission made known that Fact sheet 17, that was provided by the
Australian Electoral Commission about various court decisions (authorities) regarding
“VOTING” that none of them were deemed by the Defendant to be relevant as they did not
reflect the intentions of the Framers of the Constitution.
IN RE WOOD (1988) 167 CLR 145 F.C. 88/018
END QUOTE
"The election is either valid or invalid. If
invalid, the reason of the invalidity is not
material so far as regards its consequences. We
think it follows that, upon the avoidance of the
election itself by the Court of Disputed Returns,
the case is to be treated for all purposes, so
far as regards the mode of filling the vacancy,
as if the first election had never been
completed, unless there is something in the
HYPERLINK "http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/c167/"
Constitution to lead to a contrary conclusion."
END QUOTE
The following details were shown on the FREEDOM OF INFORMATION released computer
records of the Commonwealth of Australia as to copies of the Gazette having been transferred,
after printing.
11/03/02 GO BOI 53/2 GAZETTES Wr-Off 20 0.20 MGIRVAN

11/10/01 GO SGAZ421 . Subs Issue Adj Dist -6 -0.06 HEMSAN
9/10/01 GO CAS0153391 Trf to CA Transfr -2 -0.02 CA ZZ BMO5IAI
9/10/01 GO ICN0910ADL ICN to AD Transfr -1 -0.01 AD ZZ DCRANE
9/10/01 GO ICN1076CAN ICN to CA Transfr -3 -0.03 CA ZZ DCRANE
9/10/01 GO ICN0907MEL ICN to ME Transfr -1 -0.01 ME ZZ DCRANE
9/10/01 GO ICN0886PER ICN to PE Transfr -1 -0.01 PE ZZ DCRANE
9/10/01 GO ICN0881TOV ICN to TH Transfr -1 -0.01 TN ZZ DCRANE
8/10/01 GO FGS0153363 CANPRINT PO-Fins 35 0.35 GHANNA
8/10/01 GO FGS0153363 CANPRINT Receipt 35 0.35 GHANNA

Part 1 Page 75
While 35 copies of the Special Gazette S421 was requested to be printed and the computer records
show they were on 8 October 2001, it also shows that not until 9 October 2001 first 2 copies and
later a further 3 copies had been transferred to Canberra (CA) As such the Proclamation was not
published until at the earliest 9 October 2001, and therefore in regard of all writs governing the
House of Representatives and the Senate sets for the territories there were no vacancies when the
writs were issued on 8 October 2001.
Despite a request by the Defendant in his 19 September 2002 correspondence, for example, to the
Australian Electoral Commission as to provide certain details to prove the validity of the elections
basically little had been forthcoming and no evidence at all as to the Proclamation in fact having
been published on 8 October 2001! To the contrary, evidence provided proves that not until 9
October 2001 the proclamation was published in Canberra and on later dates in States and
Territories. As such, where the writs were for this also defective then none of the members of the
House of Representatives were validly elected and neither the Senators for Territories.
IN RE WOOD (1988) 167 CLR 145 F.C. 88/018

QUOTE
The return does not meet the exigency of the writ (Drinkwater v. Deakin,
at p 638) because Senator Wood was incapable of filling the 12th place.
That is not to say that, putting to one side "a mere abuse of the right of
nomination or an obvious unreality" (Harford v. Linskey (1899) 1 QB 852,
at p 862 and cf. Pritchard v. Mayor, &c. of Bangor (1888) 13 App Cas
241), the Electoral Officer who makes a return has authority himself to
determine the qualifications of a candidate (who declares and maintains
that he is duly qualified: HYPERLINK
"http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/c167/s170.html"
s.170 (a)(ii) of HYPERLINK
"http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/c167/" the Act ) or to
refuse to return the name of an otherwise successful candidate whose
qualifications are in issue: see HYPERLINK
"http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/c167/s172.html" s.172
of HYPERLINK "http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/c167/"
the Act and Evans v. Thomas (1962) 2 QB 350. But the performance by the
Electoral Officer of his ministerial functions in these respects does not
determine the validity of the return or the efficacy of the election of an
unqualified person to a vacant place in the Senate.
END QUOTE
Clearly, the declaration by the Commonwealth Electoral Commission itself did not purportedly
validate the election and neither any candidate declared elected where there was no valid election.
Where then Mr John Howard was not elected in 2001, so neither others, then he neither could
have been Prime minister for any longer then 3 Months, as Section 64 limits the appointment of a
non elected person to no longer then a period of three months.
Hence, Mr John Howard was neither then Prime Minister to advise the Governor-General for a
general election in 2004! Indeed, neither was Mr John Howard in any legal position to be
involved in the appointment of the Governor-General Michael Jeffrey and as such that also the
appointment also is unconstitutional and invalid (without legal force- ULTRA VIRES).
THE DEFENDANT SUBMITS, THAT WITHOUT A GOVERNMENT OR A CARE

TAKING GOVERNMENT IN OFFICE THE COUNTRY GRINDS TO A HOLD. Where
there was no valid government since November 2001 then neither was there any authority for the
Australian Electoral Commission to pursue the Defendant as to alleged breaches of law, and the
Commonwealth of Public Prosecutions (Prosecutor) neither for this could have legal authority to
Part 1 Page 76
pursue the Defendant regarding the alleged FAILING TO VOTE in the purported 2001 Federal
election and the purported 2004 Federal election.
As the Senate elections also were ULTRA VIRES, because the writs had not been issued
according to relevant legislative provisions, then when half of the senators retired in 2002 there
were no duly elected replacements for them. Further, when the half of the Senate that retained
their seat in 2002 retired in 2005 then not a single Senator was left in the Senate as none had been
duly elected. All Bills passed since 2001 are for this also NULL AND VOID and without legal
force.
The Defendant submits, that the Prosecutor would have done better to first have attended to
this correspondence and have had the courtesy to set out to the defendant why the
Prosecutor didn’t agree with the set out by the Defendant as to the Authorities not being
relevant. Indeed, had the Prosecutor pursued that way then the matter may have been
resolved by written communication rather then by litigation.
The Defendant submits, that to reflect what the true position was of the Commonwealth of
Australia he did publish;
INSPECTOR-RIKATI® and the BANANA REPUBLIC AUSTRALIA

Dictatorship & deaths by stealth- Preliminary book edition on CD
ISBN 0-9580569-3-5
The Defendant submits, that no appointment of any judge to the High Court of Australia since
2001 is therefore valid as there was no legitimately elected government. Neither are any other
appointment made valid in law.
The Defendant submits, that the Australian Electoral Commission, and so the lawyers involved,
should have taken care, so to say, not to cross the Defendant path but rather should have taken
every opportunity to appropriately communicate with the Defendant from onset and to pursue the
High Court of Australia to immediately address the constitutional based objections and other
objections so that in the event the High Court of Australia was to have made a ruling adverse to
the conduct of the elections on foot then matters could still have been rectified before the then
Government (in care taking mode) finished. Indeed, it is for this the Framers of the Constitution
made clear that a new election should be held before the Parliament sits, where there is a dispute
about electoral matters.
The Defendant submits, that the Defendant in his affidavit before the Federal Court of Australia
on 7 November 2001 submitted an alternative election date, in accordance to constitutional and
other relevant legislative provisions for both the Senate and the House of Representatives to be
held on 15 December 2001. However, the Australian Electoral Commission opposed the Courts
legal jurisdiction and as such this, so to say, never came of the ground. It is the result of what the
Defendant perceives as a litigate obsessed Australian Electoral Commission and so the lawyers
involved but for the wrong litigation reasons, not to seek to resolve the real issues but to thwart
matters to be rectified.
The Defendant submits, that the Defendant all along intended to use the election issues as
material to write books, and for this sought to go through great lengths to give all kind of effort to
notify the Australian Electoral Commission and the lawyers involved about matters, this so that
afterwards it can be shown the defendant attempted to resolve matters but the Australian Electoral
Commission and the lawyers involved were having, so to say, TUNNEL VISION that they
simply refused to appropriately consider matters.
The Defendant expected all along that no matter what the Defendant would attempt to do to try to
have matters appropriately attended to the Australian Electoral Commission, the Government, the

Part 1 Page 77
lawyers involved, the Commonwealth Ombudsman and the Courts would simply have, so to say,
their TUNNEL VISION and refuse to act appropriately.
The Defendant submits, that it is like the illusive WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION,
that people are polarised and simply do not and perhaps cannot accept the concept that the
Defendant might be right. LEGAL FICTIONS and ILLUSIONS rather then reality and facts are
driving them.
Judges found more concerned to try to use, regardless how inappropriate, indeed illegal, to
railroad my cases then to adhere to the “oath of office” to provide a FAIR and PROPER trial
and NATURAL JUSTICE. All along providing the Defendant more material to publish in his
books, and to expose how absurd this all is where commonsense does not prevail.
The Defendant submits, that regardless of what this Court may decide, it cannot rectify that the
elections were and remain ULTRA VIRES and without legal force. This Court however can
declare the facts as they are and accept that ultimately it are the Australian Electoral
Commissioner, the Federal Government, the lawyers involved and the Courts and others involved
who combined must accept the responsibility for what went wrong.
The Defendant submits, that without a valid elected Federal Government the commonwealth of
Australia came to a hold, and then neither has this Court any federal jurisdiction (cannot invoke
legal jurisdiction) as without a duly and properly elected parliament there is no law enforcement
feasible. One cannot have that the Commonwealth of Australia can continue without a validly
elected Parliament, this as the Framers of the Constitution made clear there must always be a
Parliament, either sitting or summonsed by the Governor-General. Because of the invalidity of the
Proclamation and the Writs then there is no parliament summonsed.
The Defendant submits, that he did notify the Governor-General and Her Majesty Queen
Elizabeth II about the defective writs, etc, but never received any response. Still, that is a choice
that was made by them.
The Defendant submits, that the Government of the day can only act within the legislative
provisions provided for by the Parliament, and where there is no Parliament then there can be no
Government and neither any law enforcement such as the Australian Federal Police. And again,
no lawyers acting purportedly for the Commonwealth of Australia have any legal standing to do
so.
The Defendant submits, that the Prosecutor acting under Federal authority himself was bound to
act within the scope of relevant federal legislative provisions, for so far they are still enforceable
and/or applicable, regardless if this may not apply upon the State Court legal procedures, and
ought to have notified each and every State and Territory Governments about constitutional
objections raised by the Defendant, such as the issue of the validity of the Australian Citizenship
Act 1948, this, as by the objection, as like as landholder objecting a police officer to enter his
property without lawful authority that is effective from the moment the objection is made by the
landholder, the objection was effective, and the validity of the parts of the Australian Citizenship
Act 1948 objected against became immediately ULTRA VIRES, then this affecting also each and
every State and Territorian Government as to the validity of their legislative and/or constitutional
provisions based upon the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 provisions had therefore also an direct
interest in these matters.
The Defendant submits, that the magistrate on 16 and 17 November 2005 could not invoke
federal jurisdiction to deal with these and other matters because of the 4 December 2002
magistrate orders on foot adjourning the matter to the High Court of Australia. Neither could it be
accepted that a magistrate possibly could make a ruling about constitutional matters, even if
exercising federal jurisdiction, refusing whatsoever to place it on record in writing by way of a
comprehensive reason of judgment, why decisions were made. In particularly where State and
Part 1 Page 78
Federal Governments also are standing to collapse in view of the Australian Citizenship Act 1948
being ULTRA VIRES since the Defendant objected against the validity of the Australian
Citizenship Act 1948 since 2001 that it is beyond constitutional powers to define/declare
citizenship, then it could not be accepted that the magistrate possibly could have acted reasonable
in the circumstances.
The Defendant submits, that this Court neither could adjudicate upon these constitutional issues,
willy nilly, merely because the Prosecutor might fancy this Court to do so, as the 4 December
2002 magistrate decision remains a bar to this. Even if this decision was somehow to be vacated,
the Court, even if it were to declare it had the federal jurisdiction to adjudicate upon these and
other constitutional issues it would nevertheless have to produce an elaborate reason of judgment
in regard of the proclamations, writ(s), legislation already by the objections being ULTRA
VIRES, setting out why on constitutional grounds such proclamation, writs(s) legislation is
INTRA VIRES or ULTRA VIRES considering the constitutional powers and limitations. It must
be deemed that while this court legal procedures cannot be interfered with by Commonwealth
legislative provisions nevertheless it must be considered that the authority of the Prosecutor to act
in these matters may not be sufficient for the Prosecutor to act in such blatant disregard to exclude
State and Territorian Governments from being notified of the vital and critical constitutional
issues.
The Defendant submits, that this Court may reject the Prosecutor having unilateral authority to
pursue these proceedings in the manner it has done so far where Federal legislative provisions
provide that the State and Federal Attorney’s are to be notified in regard of constitutional matters
before the Court. This is an obligation to the prosecutor seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of this
Court, and not an obligation upon the Defendant and neither upon this Court. The issue therefore
is one of questionable authority of the Prosecutor to act in these proceedings as is currently being
done.
The Defendant submits, that would this Court order a permanent stay of proceedings in regard of
the charges then this would in fact relief the Prosecutor to pursue the Constitutional issues as then
it would be for the Commonwealth of Australia (including the Australian Electoral
Commissioner) to pursue matters that are now deemed to be ULTRA VIRES as to pursue to
obtain a declaration that they are INTRA VIRES, if that is what they would seek to achieve.
The Defendant submits, that in view that the High Court of Australia itself is on record to
indicate that “citizenship” is not a known constitutional power, as further outlined below in this
ADDRESS TO THE COURT, then as Latham J stated; “If it is beyond power it is invalid
ab initio.”.
Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally; Re Wakim; Ex parte Darvall; Re Brown; Ex parte Amann;

Spi [1999] HCA 27 (17 June 1999)
For constitutional purposes, they are a nullity. No doctrine of res judicata or issue estoppel
can prevail against the Constitution. Mr Gould is entitled to disregard the orders made in
Gould v Brown. No doubt, as Latham CJ said of invalid legislation, "he will feel safer if
he has a decision of a court in his favour". That is because those relying on the earlier
decision may seek to enforce it against Mr Gould.
Uniform Tax \case, 1942 (65CLR 373 at 408)

"Common expressions such as: 'The Courts have declared a statute invalid'," says Chief
Justice Latham, "sometimes lead to misunderstanding. A pretended law made in excess of
power is not and never has been a law at all. Anybody in the country is entitled to
disregard it. Naturally, he will feel safer if he has a decision of a court in his favor, but
such a decision is not an element, which produces invalidity in any law. The law is not

Part 1 Page 79
valid until a court pronounces against it - and thereafter invalid. If it is beyond power it is
invalid ab initio."
The Defendant submits, that any judicial officer who was natural born and/or naturalized was
and remained to be a British national with an alliance to the British Crown. And where such
judicial officer made an oath of alliance to the LEGAL FICTION “Queen of Australia” then this
judicial officer has an purported oath of alliance to two different monarchs and cannot be deemed
to be a acceptable judicial officer for purpose to make judicial determinations.
The Defendant submits, that as also further set out below, where any natural born and/or
naturalized person has made an oath of alliance to the LEGAL FICTION “Queen of Australia”,
then this would be an act of sedition.
The Defendant submits, that any natural born or naturalized person who made an oath of alliance
to the LEGAL FICTION “Queen of Australia” is by Section 44 of the Constitution disqualified
from being a Member of Parliament.
The Defendant submits, that because subsection 51(xix) of the Constitution provided for
“naturalization” of “aliens” to be granted “British nationality” then any notion by the ULTRA
VIRES Australian Citizenship Act 1948 legislation that they were granted “Australian
citizenship” is NULL AND VOID in that the were and remain to be actually made “British
nationals”.
The Defendant submits, that because the Victorian constitution relied upon the ULTRA VIRES
Australian Citizenship Act 1948 for certain rights and so also further legislation demand certain
government functions that the person must be an “Australian citizen” then all such persons, being
it police, judicial officers, Members of State parliament, etc, all failing to have “Australian
citizenship” as an ULTRA VIRES legislation cannot be enforced, by this all are without legal
right in their positions.
The Defendant submits, that by the ruling in Sue v Hill, that British nationals own alliance to a
foreign Monarch cannot hold a seat in Parliament, then for this also all natural born and
naturalized persons who are in fact British nationals by this ruling are disqualified from being a
Member of Parliament.
The Defendant submits, that therefore the legal power of any judicial officer involved in this
case to adjudicate may be ULTRA VIRES, if this judicial officer made an oath of alliance to the
LEGAL FICTION “Queen of Australia”, and it would result that this Court then constitutes to be
a STAR CHAMBER COURT, referred to in the Act Interpretation Act 1980 (Vic).
The Defendant submits, that as the Framers of the Constitution stated, legislative powers as to
“citizenship” remains with the States and “Australian citizenship” is AUTOMATICALLY
obtained when a person obtains “State citizenship”.
The Defendant submits, that legislation enacted by any parliament, where persons failed to have
Australian citizenship as derived from having State citizenship then any such legislation is and
remains ULTRA VIRES, and any legal enforcement by the Court of such legislation that is
ULTRA VIRES are NULL AND VOID and so also without legal force.
The Defendant submits, that for many years he has promoted the establishment of an OFFICE
OF THE GUARDIAN, a constitutional council, that advised the government, the people, the
Parliament and the Courts as to constitutional powers and limitations. If such an OFFICE OF
THE GUARDIAN had been established years ago, then the current proceedings may not have
eventuated and many issues may have been resolved.
Part 1 Page 80
The Defendant submits, that any lawyer acting for the Commonwealth who made an oath of
alliance to the LEGAL FICTION “Queen of Australia” is not a person who can lawfully conduct
litigation in the Courts and for this cannot be accepted to proceed in this case also. This also as
every lawyer is required to be an “Australian citizen” which can only be derived from being a
State citizen, and this the states have not provided for.
The Defendant submits, that this court has no jurisdiction to “Dismiss the charges” because this
would require to invoke legal jurisdiction and this is being contested to exist by the Defendant for
numerous reasons.
The Defendant submits, that the Prosecutor neither has the jurisdiction to “Withdraw the
charges”, as they are already subject to directions of previous magistrates, and as such the power
to withdraw without the consent of the Defendant does not exist, as the Defendant is entitled to
the benefit of the 4 December 2002 and 4-8-2005 orders on foot.
The Court cannot set aside the orders of 4-12-2002 and/or 4-8-2005 as this would require the
Court to invoke legal jurisdiction which the defendant contest this Court to have.
The Court cannot “Dismiss the charges upon being withdrawn”, as this would require the Court
to invoke legal jurisdiction which it cannot do so.
The Defendant submits, that from the moment the Defendant made known his objection, being it
by way of oral objection, written objection to the Australian Electoral Commission, to Mr. John
Howard or any other government official, in legal proceedings and/or otherwise then such
constitutional based objections for all purposes have caused all items subject to such
constitutional based objection to be ULTRA VIRES and without legal force, and purported
aborting of the charges cannot affect the constitutional based objections and their application in
any way whatsoever.
The Defendant submits, that a “Stay of proceedings regarding the charges” would not in any
way seek to interfere with the 4-12-2002 and/or 4-12-2005 orders outstanding and neither
interfere with the constitutional application regarding constitutional based objections but merely
does put a hold on the Prosecutor to continue with litigation regarding the charges while other
matters are and remain unresolved.
The Defendant submits, that basically the Court by ordering a “Stay of proceedings regarding
the charges” in effect is saying to the Prosecutor; “Look, you took the matter to Court and this
man relies upon his constitutional rights, and as the Court on 4-12-2002 made an order which you
cannot circumvent, you have the obligation to prove jurisdiction, and as such you must resolve
this first and have all relevant constitutional matters resolved before the High Court of Australia,
before this Court can invoke legal jurisdiction to deal with the Charges.”
The Defendant submits, that a “Stay of proceedings regarding the charges” would in effect
not be detrimental to either party as it merely would insist that the Prosecutor follows the
directions of the Court itself did submit was to be followed, and that was for the High Court of
Australia to determine constitutional issues first.
The Defendant submits, that for example, if the High Court of Australia were to declare the
Australian Citizenship Act 1948 to be ULTRA VIRES for so far it were to define/declare
“citizenship” then not only would this vindicate the Defendant position and all and any purported
“Australian citizenship” granted since enacting this Act are to be deemed to be “British nationals,
as intended by the Framers of the Constitution, but it also would mean that for that purpose not a
single elector could be obligated to vote, in that if the definition/declaration of “Australian

Part 1 Page 81
citizenship” is unconstitutional then any legislation based upon it also is and remain without legal
force.
The Defendant submits, that if the High Court of Australia were to determine that in view of the
intentions of the Framers of the Constitution, as expressed on 15 April 1897, compulsory
registration (enrolment) and voting is unconstitutional then these charges for that also are without
legal justification.
The Defendant submits, that if the High Court of Australia were to hand down a decision that it
would be a denial of NATURAL JUSTICE for a candidate in an election to be forced to vote that
may result in his opponent to be elected then for this also the charges would be without legal
force.
The Defendant submits, that if the High Court of Australia were to hand down a judgment that
the Australian Electoral Commission had a DUTY OF CARE towards the Defendant, and cannot
benefit to obtain a conviction it itself caused by FRUSTRATION by deceiving and otherwise
misleading the Defendant as to his rights, then for that also the charges would be without legal
justification.
The Defendant submits, that the Defendant having made his constitutional based objections then
is entitled to rely upon that the relevant legislation, proclamation and/or writ(s) are deemed for all
purposes ULTRA VIRES and without legal force, not just against the Defendant but against any
other person, unless and until the Court declares the legislation, proclamation and/or writ(s) to be
INTRA VIRES and then during the period of the constitutional based objection having not been
resolved for all purposes the legislation, proclamation and/or writ(s) were without legal force.
Hence, even if, not that the Defendant seeks to imply this, the High Court of Australia were to
declare anything to be INTRA VIRES it still could not result of any charges to proceed, for they
were made in regard of legislation, proclamation and/or writs that were ULTRA VIRES at the
time.
The Defendant submits, that no judge can adjudicate in his own cause, and as such where the
issue of “citizenship” and “oath of alliance” made to the LEGAL FICTION “Queen of
Australia” directly relates to each and every judicial officer within the Commonwealth of
Australia, including every judge of the High Court of Australia, then I view this constitutional
issues can only be adjudicated upon by the Privi Council. This as judges of the High Court of
Australia facing having committed sedition to swear an oath of alliance to the LEGAL FICTION
“Queen of Australia” would have a personal interest and as such are bias of perceived to be bias in
any judicial decision they were having to make in regard of the issue of “citizenship” and the true
meaning of Subsection 51(xix) of the Constitution.
The Defendant submits, that the Section 388 “averment” rule to be used in any State Court
would constitute to be an outlawed STAR CHAMBER COURT conduct, outlawed by the so
called 1640 Star Chamber Act and so enforced by the Act Interpretation Act 1980 (Vic), as it
would place the Defendant in a position to be deemed GUILTY as charged, and as such for this
also the conviction by the magistrate on 17 November 2005 is and remain without legal force,
where the magistrate relied upon the averment rule, this despite the defendant having objected to
it being applied.
The Defendant submits, that the right of the Defendant, so any elector, to vote or not to vote for
a certain candidate is embedded in the Constitution, and cannot be enforced by any legislation in
the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918;

Part 1 Page 82
Mr. SYMON: You limit the choice of the member; but you do not limit the choice of
the electors. The elected has to, say whether he will prefer the federal parliament with
its wider scope of interest and duty to the local parliament with its narrower scope.
And
Mr. SYMON:
But what I want hon. members to consider is whether it is not well for us not to say, "Let
the electors reject the men who are already in the local parliament, and who become
candidates for the federal parliament."
Therefore the right to vote or not to vote for a candidate remains with the elector, and any
obligation to vote using the preference voting system would force an elector to vote for a
candidate who he may not desire to vote for and who may not be eligible to take a seat in the
Parliament.
The Defendant understands that Kirby J of the High Court of Australia himself referred to these
debates in regard of the Sykes v Cleary matter and as such it one part of this debate was deemed
relevant then the same should apply to the rest of that debate. As a matter of fact while the High
Court of Australia had ruled in the Sykes v Clearly matter that holding state office of profit
disqualify a person to be a candidate in a federal election the truth is shown below of the same day
of Debates Kirby J referred to;
Mr. SYMON: They would be eligible. This provision would not prevent their [start
page 999] being elected; it merely says that if elected they shall not hold the two
offices!
And
The Hon. S. FRASER: They will be capable of being elected whilst holding the other
position.
Mr. SYMON: Certainly!
The Hon. S. FRASER: I agree with the right hon. member, Mr. Kingston. I do not think
that the commonwealth interests and the state interests will clash. I see no reason why
they should, and the federal parliament can deal with this matter if it is found to be a
drawback.
And also consider;
Mr. BARTON: Yes, it is; because it might otherwise be read to apply that way. The hon.
member will well remember the case of Sir Bryan O'Loghlen, whose election for County
Clare was upset on the ground that, while he was a Minister of the Crown in Victoria, he
was holding an office of profit under the Crown. That case shows the necessity of these
exceptions. Then those are exempted who receive a new commission in the Queen's navy or
army, or an increase of pay on a new commission. That covers the case of those who receive
a fresh commission, who happen to have been a member of the Queen's army drawing pay,
half-pay, or pension, or who receive an increase of pay, supposing they are only in receipt of
a half-pay or pension. But they are still persons employed under the Government of the
Part 1 Page 83
Queen, and not under the Government of the Commonwealth. Then the remainder of the
clause exempts anyone:
Who is in receipt only of pay as an officer or member of the military or naval forces of the
Commonwealth, and whose services are not wholly employed by the Commonwealth.
If he belongs to what is called the permanent force he will be disqualified, because he will
be in receipt of an ordinary office of profit under the Commonwealth. For instance, take
the case Sir George Turner put, of a general commanding the local forces. He has an
Imperial commission, but beyond that he in receiving pay from the Commonwealth, and
would be ineligible. Take the officers of his staff, who are also employed by the
Commonwealth; they are ineligible. Take the men under them; they would be employed in
the regular forces, and would be in receipt of pay under the Commonwealth, and so
ineligible. But as regards the members of what is usually known as the volunteer, or the
militia, or the partially paid forces, it was considered reasonable in the 1891 Bill to exempt
them, and I think it is reasonable to exempt them now.
Sir GEORGE TURNER: No one objects to that.
Mr. BARTON: The main point is that we exempt persons in receipt of pay, half-pay, or
pension, or commission in the Queen's service, apart from the Commonwealth, on the
ground that as they do not draw their pay from the Commonwealth, they have no
interest against the Commonwealth.
This makes it very clear that Mr Phil Cleary not having an office of profit under the
Commonwealth, and “that as they do not draw their pay from the Commonwealth, they have
no interest against the Commonwealth.” Then was entitled to be an elector and hold a seat in
federal parliament. This the judgment of the High Court of Australia never did bring out!
Therefore, electors are denied to vote for people who constitutionally are entitled to vote but are
wrongly excluded, being it Heather Hill, Phil Cleary and others. It is here that the Defendant as
a “constitutionalist” can show that FREE elections are undermined by the fact that judges
appointed on recommendation by a Government appear to the Defendant to be political bias and
by this willing to hand down judgments which no impartial Court would have as such handed
down. It is by this also that the Defendant takes the position that the “citizenship” issue cannot be
trusted to be decided without bias by the High Court of Australia but requires a Privi Council
decision, as the judges are bias or can be perceived bias, this also because for the High court of
Australia to make a ruling against the Australian Citizenship Act 1948, declaring it to be ULTRA
VIRES for so far it purports to define/declare citizenship and purports there is a LEGAL
FICTION of Australian nationality, then effective this may place in question their own personal
standing to be judges in the High Court of Australia.
Indeed, the Hansard 21-9-1897 Constitution Convention Debate shows;
The Hon. E. BARTON (New South Wales)[8.3]: I should like to say, without detaining
hon. members, that having spoken on this matter, and having expressed the strong
opinion that there ought to be some limitation that would prohibit any person from
being a member of the state parliament and at the same time a member of the
commonwealth parliament, I adhere to that opinion, but nevertheless that I have been
convinced by the arguments I have heard that this matter is not a subject for
incorporation in a document of this kind.
This underlines that the constitution never intended to deal with this, contrary to what the High
Court of Australia in Sykes v Clearly made it out to be.
And;
Part 1 Page 84
I do not want any absolute prohibition. I want to give the electors as free a hand as
possible, and experience will tell us which is the best course. I shall vote against the
proposed prohibition.
And
The Hon. I.A. ISAACS: It does not prevent such a person from being elected!
As such, the holding of a seat rather then the right to be elected was the issue and only regarding a
candidate who was having a disqualification in that regard.
As they also stated;
offices!
The Hon. S. FRASER: Men holding certainties are not likely to give up those
certainties.
Mr. SYMON: They are not asked to give them up until the other is made a
certainty!
The Hon. S. FRASER: That removes part of my objection certainly.
The Hon. R.E. O'CONNOR: They are not to come under this provision until they have
been elected and have a right to sit in the federal parliament!
position.
Therefore, it is beyond question that Section 44 of the Constitution did not deny a person to stand
for election and be elected but only be prevented from taking up the seat if for some reason this
person is under a disability unless the disability is disposed of prior to taking up the seat.
It also means that a Member of one House of the Parliament can be elected for another House but
has top relinquish the original held seat if desiring to take up the new seat elected for. Meaning
Bronwyn Brishop never needed to resign as a Senator to stand for election for the House of
Representatives, as she could have remained a Senator and only vacated the Senate seat if elected
for the House of Representatives. As the Framers of the Constitution stated; “They will be
capable of being elected whilst holding the other position. ” and this underlines that holding a
certain position such as an “office of profit with the Commonwealth of Australia” itself was
not a bar to be a candidate, but was a bar to take up a seat in the Parliament! As set out further in
this ADDRESS TO THE COURT the word “CHOSEN” in sections 11, 43 and 44 of the
Constitution has not them meaning being elected during an election but being “chosen” byu the
governor of the State or the Governor-General to take a seat in the parliament.The Defendant
views that the High Court of Australia has caused considerable misconceptions as to the true
intentions of the Framers of the Constitution and for this it is essential this is avoided in regard of
any judicial decision regarding “citizenship”.
This matter is also extensively canvases in my 30 September 2003 book;

Part 1 Page 85
ISBN 0-9580569-6-X
For example, the history of the creation to what eventually became Section 44 of the Constitution
is set out extensively in particularly also in CHAPTER 11 PHIL CLEARLY DISSASTER, in the
document; Chapter 11A Public service.doc. Other matters relating to Section 44 are also referred
to in such as in the in the following Chapters;
Folder; CHAPTER 00 Set out about CITIZENSHIP

Document; Chapter 00A Set out about CITIZENSHIP.doc
Folder; CHAPTER 11 PHIL CLEARLY DISSASTER

Document; Chapter 11A Public service.doc
Document; Chapter 11E RESTRICTION FOR PUBLIC OFFICE.doc
Folder; CHAPTER 33 CONSTITUTION CONVENTIONS;

Document; 18970417@U738-831.doc
Document; 18970921@U932-1035.doc
Folder; CHAPTER 75 ADDRESS TO THE COURT

Document; Address to the court-8.doc
Document; Address to the court-9-UPDATE.doc
Document; CHAPTER 75 ADDRESS TO THE COURT.doc
The High Court of Australia never itself ever conducted such extensive research when deciding
the Sue v Hill and the Sykes v Cleary cases, and by this ended up to hand down judgments based
on errors of constitutional law.
As such, the Defendant has made this “citizenship” and “who can be a candidate” very much an
issue over the years relevant to elections and very much is a part of this case that there were no
FREE elections (unrestrained elections) where people are being denied to be candidates
purportedly because of constitutional provisions which in fact do not exist as such as is shown in
the example referred to previously.
That Holmes v Angwin, (1906) 4 (Pt 1) CLR 297 at 309. Barton J said;
"The character of the jurisdiction which has been exercised by Parliaments as to election
petitions is purely incidental to the legislative power; it has nothing to do with the ordinary
determination of the rights of parties who are litigants."
The same applies to the Court of Disputed Returns, where the High Court of Australia is acting
for and on behalf of the Parliament, and not as a Court of Law to uphold the rights of the parties in
principle. Hence one ought to be very careful to seek to apply judicial decisions of the Court of
Disputed Returns as they are not binding in that regard, as are ordinary judgments of the High
Court of Australia. Gummow J decision in the Ned Kelly case not only defies the intentions of the
Framers of the Constitution but is made on behalf of the Parliament, and as such not binding as
any other Authority might be considered of a Court of law operating in normal judicial manner.
As such also, the Prosecutors issue of what Gummow J may have stated in that case about
publications of the Gazette is not relevant where it defies what is embedded in the Constitution.
The Proclamation was never published in a Gazette that showed the legal requirement demanded
in the Act Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) that it must show the wording “Government Printer”
and was neither published as required by the Framers of the Constitution before it could be acted
upon. Therefore the election process never even commenced within constitutional and other legal
requirements and as such in effect the elections were LEGAL FICTIONS, and so their results are
and remain ULTRA VIRES and so without legal force.

Part 1 Page 86
[ 1275] 3 Edward I {State of Westminster the First} C.V. whose law, adopted and enacted in
the Imperial Acts Application Act 1980 –
PART II – TRANSCRIBED ENACTMENTS STATES:
- And because elections ought to be free, the King commandeth upon great
fortfeiture, that no man by force of arms, nor by malice, or menacing,
shall disturb any to make free election.
In my view, the Court cannot pursue to force the Defendant to submit to some kind of election
where it is not a FREE election, neither use force to punish the Defendant in that regard as to
somehow seek to force the Defendant to vote in future.
Again;
certainties.
certainty!
Yet, we have now that police officers, fire brigade officers, soldiers, and others who are daily
putting their lives on the line now are denied to be a candidate unless they first resign their
positions, not because the Constitution requires this but because this is made out to be so required
by the High Court of Australia.
We have judges who are deemed to be competent to deal with trials and sentence murderers,
rapist and other criminals but unless they resign as a judge they are not allowed to stand as a
candidate in an election. Not because the Constitution require this, but because of High Court of
Australia judgments made in error of constitutional law.
How then can there be FREE ELECTIONS where these and other competent persons are
unconstitutionally denied to be a candidate?
How then could this Court, and indeed any other Court, in this regard also convict anyone of not
voting where the elections are held in an unconstitutional and illegal manner? After all if a Court
is to enforce the law of the land then it must not ignore the very Constitution which is the basis of
any sub ordinary law enacted under it.
The Defendant submits, that even so he does not require to state his religion and neither which
part of his religion is relevant for a religious objection as it can be a secular objection, he has
religious objections and one is that “THOU SHALL NOT KILL” where Mr. John Howard
unconstitutionally authorised the murderous invasions into Afghanistan and Iraq. How on earth
could anyone expect me to vote by preference voting for what I consider a mass murderer and one
who committed treachery, treason, sedition and committed crimes against humanity, and by this
voting for anyone who supported the war, such as members of his political party.
My right to abstain from voting could not be denied, neither be punished.
Likewise, in regard of the 2001 election where unconstitutionally, against International
obligations, such as the maritime report in regard of the sinking of the Titanic it is unlawful to
allow or to send any boat or ship away that is unseaworthy. Yet, we had the Government using the
navy to do so and refugees drowning in the process. We had the Australian Federal Police, a law
enforcement agency, being involved in what was claimed to be conduct to discourage people
smuggling, but it was being to prevent refugees to come to the Commonwealth of Australia, and
in the process we had the sinking of SIEV X, with 363 people aboard of which 146 children, on
19 October 2001.

Part 1 Page 87
The Defendant submits, that no one in his right mind could enforce any unconstitutional voting
electoral laws to force me to vote against me. I value human life to precious and it is my peaceful
way to protest against this kind of conduct.
The Defendant submits, that the Court rather seeking to enforce unconstitutional legislation
against the Defendant it would do better if the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions
were to occupy the Courts time instead to have Mr John Howard and others facing the Courts as
to their unconstitutional and otherwise illegal conduct.
To disregard the, what I consider plain murder of refugees, by towing their unseaworthy boats
back into the sea and so leave the occupants left to the perils of the sea in my view is unacceptable
and the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, so to say, ought to get his act together
and pursue those responsible for their day in Court. After all what are laws for if those in power
can unconstitutional authorise a murderous invasion and get away with it?
While the Australian Federal Police, as the Defendant understands it, seeks to excuse themselves
that they paid people to “discourage” refugees from coming to the Commonwealth of Australia, in
the defendants view, where any person acting so then goes to the extend to tamper with boats
causing the death of many, then the Australian Federal Police must be held accountable for their
deeds.
For this also, the Defendant holds that no one could demand nor expect that the defendant was to
cast a vote that could be utilised then by any person involved in such criminal conduct as to claim
to have the support of the people in view of the votes cast.
Because it is a preference voting system, the vote of an elector could turn out to go to a person
they never really wanted to vote for by the preference counting still could be.
The Defendant submits, that if the elections were held in a manner that an elector could vote for
the number of candidates he desire, and once those choices are exhausted then the vote simply no
longer is used, but because a preference voting system requires a voter to list all candidates, the
elector is by this robbed of a FREE election.
As a candidate, I opposed the murderous conduct against refugees in 2001 and for this also was
entitled not to vote where the major parties appeared to support the conduct to tow unseaworthy
boats in breach of Australian law, as well as International Law, back into Indonesian waters
regardless that people died as a result.
Hansard 31-1-1898 Constitution Convention Debates [page 354]
Mr. WISE (New South Wales).-
It might be that a law passed by the Federal Parliament was so counter to the popular feeling
of a particular state, and so calculated to injure the interests of that state, that it would
become the duty of every citizen to exercise his practical power of nullification of that
law by refusing to convict persons of offences against it. That is a means by which the
public obtains a very striking opportunity of manifesting its condemnation of a law,
and a method which has never been known to fail, if the law itself was originally
unjust. I think it is a measure of protection to the states and to the citizens of the states
which should be preserved, and that the Federal Government should not have the power to
interfere and prevent the citizens of a state adjudicating on the guilt or innocence of one of
their fellow citizens conferred upon it by this Constitution.
Every person in this case include also any judicial officer!

Part 1 Page 88
The Defendant submits, that therefore that no judicial officer having made an “oath of office”
could in any way whatsoever cause a conviction against a person who stands up against tyranny
and murderous conduct and other inhumane conduct for the advance of human rights and
humanity at general.
This Court, as all Court uses the Bible so people can make an oath when giving evidence, then
this Court cannot act contrary to the teaching of this Bible, THOU SHALL NOT KILL, and
somehow seek to punish me for doing what any humane person does and that is to refuse to join
and/or support in any way (including voting for) a group of callous murderers, where they are
using their powers to authorise the killing of so many.
The Defendant submits, that the issue is not if the Magistrates States Court of Victoria and/or the
County Court of Victoria is invested with federal jurisdiction, but rather if either could in this case
INVOKE legal jurisdiction. As I understand it, generally the Supreme Court of Victoria will not
accept any litigation to be conducted unless the party instituting proceedings can show that the
Court can INVOKE legal jurisdiction.
The Prosecutor’s only evidence, apart from relying upon the averment rule, appears to be having
filed enrolment cards, which in themselves upon what the Defendant submit cannot be relied upon
being some kind of proof that the Defendant was required by law to vote.
The Defendant submits, that the filling in of enrolment cards therefore is not a critical issue as to
evidence that a person is required to vote, and itself does not itself give any legal force against
anyone who is not lawfully eligible to vote, as many people fill them in, and even “cats and dogs”
were allegedly found to be registered, even so not legally entitled to vote, this as the incorrect
usage of the term “citizen” is causing such confusion that many people who are “aliens” but
regard themselves as being “citizens” within the constitutional concept therefore register, and
understand obligated to do so, even so they are not perhaps entitled to do so but are unaware of
this. As the legislation itself has provided, as the Defendant submits, “a failure to vote in itself
is not an offence” then the Prosecutor must not just prove why it is in this case an offence, and
must prove this beyond reasonable doubt, and so also that the Defendant did not vote in each
election, and that he had no lawful excuse not to do so, as to be able to invoke the jurisdiction of
the Court.
The Defendant has previously and maintains his issue of ss245(14) CEA1918 of objection under
religious grounds, including any secular objections, and if this objection were to be sustained in
any subsequent proceedings then any conviction must fail as clearly if s245 of the CEA1918 is
applicable, which the Defendant contest is unconstitutional, then even if the Prosecutor were to
succeed to prove the constitutional validity of s245 of the CEA1918, not that the Defendant seeks
to imply he can do so, he still has to get over the hurdle of each and every excuse the Defendant
may proffer, in addition to having first have to resolve the outstanding constitutional issues on
foot.
The Defendant submits, that he was denied “NATURAL JUSTICE” and a “FAIR and
PROPER trial” by the magistrate having failed to provide a REASON OF JUDGMENT, despite
having been requested by the Defendant to provide this. It may be noted that while these
proceedings come before this Court on Appeal to be heard DE NOVO, (And besides the right of
the Defendant, in particular where he had given such elaborate effort to present his case to be
made aware by a reason of judgment upon what grounds he was convicted, if not only he is
entitled upon this, but also perhaps to assess where he might have failed in the presentation of his
case so he could on appeal address those issues.) it is essential it is highlighted what may have
gone wrong to result to a conviction so the same errors may be avoided in any further
proceedings.

Part 1 Page 89
The Defendant submits, that the usage of the averment rule, even if allowed for, not that he
seeks to admit to this being appropriate, then it refers to contrary evidence, and where he filed
extensive contrary evidence then in that regard the averment rule never could be applied.
Further he claims that the Prosecutor having the burden to prove his case and using the averment
rule not to do so, then it was proper for the Defendant to claim NO CASE TO ANSWER, as it
was not relevant what was presented to the Court afterwards as at the time of NO CASE TO
ANSWER claim there was no evidence, and once the Defendant opened his case before the
magistrate it was not open to the Prosecutor then to reopen his case to call witnesses or introduce
other evidence he had specifically refused to use by seeking to rely upon the averment rule. The
Defendant claims that other then cross-examination the Prosecutor once relied upon the averment
rule and having his case closed then simply had no way then to challenge the Defendants excuses
given during his evidence in previous proceedings.
The Defendant submits, that as he had attended to the polling station each election, and this was
never disputed by the Prosecution, then without any evidence by the Prosecution as to what
eventuated in the polling station is not for the trial judge to assume and as such there never could
have been a conviction upon the basis that it was established “beyond reasonable doubt”, as the
Defendant did set out in his material that the Australian Electoral Commission often make errors
in crossing of the wrong names and as such without contrary evidence this point remained open.
The Defendant submits, that the Prosecutor failed to disprove each and every excuse the
Defendant gave, which is required to enable a conviction to occur, as many of the issues the
Defendant raised were ignored by the Australian Electoral Commission. If indeed the Defendant
is right about his claims that s245 of the CEA 1918 is ULTRA VIRES because of his
constitutional based objection then the Australian Electoral Commission failing to obtain a ruling
of a competent Court to make a declaration to the constitutional validity of what was objected
against then in any event the Court could never invoke legal jurisdiction as the legislation in that
regard is and remains ULTRA VIRES.
The Defendant submits, that even if in some point of time in the future the High Court of
Australia were to declare Section 245 of the CEA1918 to be constitutionally valid, not that the
Defendant seeks to indicate the Court might do so, it nevertheless in the mean time was ULTRA
VIRES, and as such the charges cannot be legally justified, as not until after the Court declares
the legislation that is ULTRA VIRES due to the constitutional based objection is declared
ULTRA VIRES it is and remains without legal force. So, likewise the proclamation and writ(s).
In any event, even considering every declaration were to go against what the Defendant claims, in
the end the issue then is if the Defendant had mens rea, to commit any criminal offence or in his
own views he was entitled to refuse to vote, if this the Court were to conclude he did, because of
his objections made.

Mr. GORDON.-
The Defendant has placed before the Court that that it cannot invoke legal jurisdiction to deal with
the charges on a number of grounds. He contents that he made numerous objections to the
Australian Electoral Commission, and in previous litigation, etc, about constitutional and other
legal issues affecting the Proclamation, the writs, and legislative provisions itself, and that it were
the lawyers of the Australian Electoral Commission who by their 25 October 2001 themselves
presented the option for the Defendant to pursue legal action in the Federal Court of Australia and
by this then there is an ESTOPPEL that they cannot then, while legal proceedings are ongoing
then they nevertheless seek to enforce the legislation by proceeding with the election as if no
constitutional based objection was made as so the Defendant makes clear, once he made his
Part 1 Page 90
constitutional based objection then the “legislation, part of legislation, proclamation and/or
writ(s)” are and remain ULTRA VIRES until the High Court of Australia adjudicate upon this to
declare it to be INTRA VIRES or ULTRA VIRES. The Defendant submits, that this in itself is
an ESTOPPEL as by the objections the Proclamation, writ(s) and legislation are all ULTRA
VIRES, and remain so, unless and until the High Court of Australia has made its declarations in
that regard to show otherwise. The Defendant has provided a wealth of information to support his
argument including quotations of the Hansard records of the Constitution Convention Debates
which appears to support the Defendants contention that this is embedded in the Constitution.
The Defendant submits, that the Australian Electoral Commissioner has and had a DUTY OF
CARE towards the Defendant, in his position of having to provide FAIR and PROPER
elections, and not have misled the Defendant as to the appropriate avenues to follow through
objections made by having its lawyers indicating that filing the case in the Federal Court of
Australia was the appropriate legal way to follow only then at commencement of the proceedings
on 7 November 2001, without prior notification, object to the legal jurisdiction of that Court.
The Defendant acknowledges that if the Federal Court of Australia indeed had no legal
jurisdiction, something he does not accept as otherwise by the various authorities it would come to
that then there would be no Court at all having legal jurisdiction to deal with constitutional and
legal issues raised, (This, even so the Defendant was directed by the Registrar of the High Court
of Australia to file his case in the Federal Court of Australia , which he did on 2 November 2001)
and this in a democratic society he argues cannot be tolerated, then the Australian Electoral
Commissioner was entitled to make such an OBJECTION TO LEGAL JURISDICTION to the
Federal Court of Australia provided the Australian Electoral Commissioner had advised the
Federal Court of Australia that the proceedings had in fact been instituted upon its corresponded
details, and as such the sudden OBJECTION TO LEGAL JURISDICTION by the Australian
Electoral Commission should be carefully considered and taken into account in any ruling the
Court would make.
The Defendant submits, that the objection/appeal process against the validity of the holding of
an election, such as the legal processes involved are part of the election and as such the Australian
Electoral Commission being duty bound to provide FAIR and PROPER elections failed to
provide this where he misled the Defendant and the objections remain outstanding.
The Defendant submits, that the passing of time does not alter for one of iota the
unconstitutional constitutional position of the elections neither if any subsequent elections have
been held.
The Defendant submits, that he has in an elaborate way made constitutional based objections
against the validity of the Australian Citizenship Act 1948, to declare/define citizenship as he
submit, “citizenship” is a State legislative power. Further more, he submit, that constitutionally
ss51(xix) provides only for the “naturalization” of “aliens” to become “British nationals”,
which when residing in the Commonwealth of Australia are referred to as Australians as much as
are “aliens” residing in the Commonwealth of Australia and as such where the Attorney-General
of the State of Victoria made known there is no State citizenship then the Defendant submits,
there can be no Australian citizenship either. In any event, the Defendant submits, that the
Racial Discrimination Act (Cth) enacted within subsection 51(xxvi) is in fact unconstitutional but
by it causes a disability against all Australians and for this not a single Australia has franchise as
this is in the citizenship which is removed by the effect of this Act.
The Defendant submits, that the Court cannot invoke legal jurisdiction unless first the High
Court of Australia has declared the “legislation, part legislation, proclamation and/or writ(s)”
declared INTRA VIRES, if it were to do so, as they remain ULTRA VIRES, and as such any
Part 1 Page 91
legislation the Prosecutor relies upon is not legally enforce without such declaration. The
Defendant cites for example the fact that the proclamation was not published in accordance with
the requirements of Section 32 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1918 (the
Constitution) and that his evidence on Court file proves that the writs were issued prior to the
proclamation having been published and as such the election process depending upon valid
published proclamation never even commenced. The Defendant submits, there were no valid
elections held, and as such in that regard s245 of the CEA1918 in that manner neither can apply,
as it requires a valid election.
More over, the Defendant submits, that on 15 April 1898 the Framers of the Constitution (the
Delegates to the Constitution Convention) refused to allow compulsory enrolment and voting and
as this was never before considered by any courts all and any authorities about being obligated to
vote were ill conceived and this opens the constitutional based objection against Section 245
CEA1918 in that it contradicts the intentions of the Framers of the Constitution.
The Defendant submit, that none of the Authorities on foot about having to vote related to a
candidate refusing to vote, and he cites an objection that where he stands as a candidate that he
does so because of opposing what other candidates are standing for, then it is unacceptable that he
could be forced, by way of preference voting, to end up voting for an opponent candidate. Indeed,
he cited his refusal to direct preference voting as an other issue. By this the Defendant makes clear
that he opposed the war involvement by the Commonwealth of Australia and could not vote or be
forced to vote by preference usage where his vote would could be used by those who are
supporting such kind of war as it goes against his religious beliefs.
The Defendant submits, that This Court is not the “County Court of Victoria” in hearing
matters but in fact is the “County Court of Victoria invested with federal jurisdiction” and by
this State Court legal procedures remain applicable and cannot be disturbed by Commonwealth
legislation such as s388 of the CEA1918 pertaining averment, the position of laws objected
against upon constitutional grounds being ULTRA VIRES unless and until the High Court of
Australia declare otherwise, but the Court is bound to follow constitutional doctrines embedded in
the Constitution and by this can invoke NULLIFICATION where the Court considers that
justice demand that those charges and or the legislation such as s245 of the CEA1918 are to be
NULLIFIED. The Defendant also raised with this the issue of DOUBLE JEOPARDY where he
argues that albeit this is a hearing DE NOVO nevertheless, the Prosecutor having used the
averment rule refusing to present evidence, and by this scoring a conviction, the Prosecutor as he
put it “can have a second bite of the cherry” by now with the DE NOVO hearing perhaps
presenting witnesses whom may now seek to counteract what the Defendant has placed before the
Court and this is an unfair and improper manner as this is also what the DOUBLE JEOPARDY
rule seeks to avoid, that Prosecutors cannot just keep changing their conduct so if they failed to
prove their case in the first place then they can devise tactics in each and every subsequent trial to
score finally some conviction. The Defendant submits, that the fact that the Court convicted
without jurisdiction does not prevent the DOUBLE JEOPARDY rule to be applied.
The Defendant submits, that this Court is duty bound to decide first and foremost if it can invoke
legal jurisdiction, and the Defendant oppose this also citing the fact that the magistrate on 4
December 2001, upon submission of the Prosecutor adjourned the charge then in regard of the
2001 election for the High Court of Australia first to deal with the various constitutional based
objections and that the Defendant consented to this. The Defendant submits, that it is not his
obligation to disprove legal jurisdiction or that the Court cannot invoke legal jurisdiction rather it
is up to the Prosecutor to prove this and to overcome each and every objection the defendant has
made, and in support of this the Defendant has provided ample of authorities, both within the
Australian legal jurisdiction as well as international authorities. The Defendant submits, that the
ruling of the magistrate on 4 August 2005 that the Prosecutor was to serve all relevant evidence it
sought to rely upon if the OBJECTION TO LEGAL JURISDICTION was dismissed upon the
Part 1 Page 92
defendant prior to the hearing of the charges. The Defendant submits, that neither orders were
appealed against and remained on foot.
The Defendant submits, that in view the Prosecutor did not fulfil the burden of proof, that the
Court could invoke jurisdiction, he was entitled to take it that the Prosecutor had abandoned the
charge relating to the 2001 election, albeit he further claims it did not and does not validate any
“legislation, part legislation, proclamation, writ(s)” that he claims are now ULTRA VIRES
because of the constitutional based objections made against them.

Dr. QUICK.-
we were not in any way interfering with our position as subjects of the British Empire.
It would be beyond the scope of the Constitution to do that. We might be citizens of a
city, citizens of a colony, or citizens of a Commonwealth, but we would still be, subjects
of the Queen.
The Defendant submits, that the statement “It would be beyond the scope of the Constitution
to do that.” in itself makes clear that any decision of the High Court of Australia itself is and
remain ULTRA VIRES, where it offence its constitutional powers to declare laws INTRA
VIRES beyond the provisions of the Constitution. Such as that Heather Hill was some kind of
“alien”, not entitled to hold a seat in the Senate. This, as the High Court of Australia cannot
declare a British subject an “alien” or not entitled to constitutional rights as this would be beyond
the scope of judicial powers provided to the High Court of Australia under the Constitution.
Where this judgment affected other British subjects, it is a major disaster at hand.
The Defendant also has relied upon the decision of the High Court of Australia in
Neil v Nott (1994) 68 ALJR 509 at 510 (High Court)
"A frequent consequence of self representation is that the court must assume the burden of
endeavouring to ascertain the rights of the parties which are obfuscated by their own advocacy"
This does not mean that the Court is obligated to conduct the case for the unrepresented
Defendant but is obligated to ensure that the proper legal processes are followed in proceedings
before the Court. In law, the Defendant is unrepresented and as such this duty applies.
When this Court faces an OBJECTION TO LEGAL JURISDICTION in that it cannot invoke
jurisdiction because of certain obstacles which have to be dealt with first, then this Court cannot
simply ignore those matters.
On the material on Court file it is clear, that the Defendant made elaborate constitutional based
objections, including that the elections were and remain unconstitutional, and there has been no
formal judgment on record that formally declared that the matters the Defendant claims are now
ULTRA VIRES in fact have been declared INTRA VIRES. It may never have donned nor
comprehended by the Australian Electoral Commission and/or any lawyers (including judges)
involved in these matters how constitutional based objections instanter had the effect to cause the
proclamation, writ(s), legislation objected against to be ULTRA VIRES and remain to be so
unless a competent Court of federal jurisdiction determine otherwise. Federal legislation that
purport to set out a legal process to be followed – as set out by the defendant in his ADDRESS
TO THE COURT- do not have any bearing upon the processes of a State Court, not even when
exercising federal jurisdiction, and neither can effect the rights of the Defendant where such
legislative provisions are beyond constitutional powers and/or are seeking to interfere/undermine
the defendants rights and application of his objections.

Part 1 Page 93
It is not for this Court at this stage to decide if the elections were or were not constitutionally or
otherwise validly elected as that remains in question considering the material on Court file.
In the Marriage of Tennant (1980) 5 FLR 777 at 780 (GS17)

"As no grounds for appeal are required to be specified in the notice of Appeal, which, on
filing institutes the appeal (reg 122), there is no limitations of the scope of the appeal and all
findings of fact and law made in the lower court in relation to the decree appealed are in
challenge and cannot be relied on by the appellant or the respondent. All the issues (unless by
consent) must be reheard. This of course brings me to the point of the absence of reason for
the magistrates decision in this case. Perhaps reasons were given orally but not recorded for
the record. Apart from the requirement of such reason for the purpose of the appeal process,
there is the basic ground of criticism that litigants who go to court, put their witnesses up,
argue their case and attempt to controvert the opposing case are entitled to know, if they lose,
why they lost. If they are given no reason they may be entitled to feel the decision against
them was conceived in prejudice, bias, or caprice. In such a case not only the litigant, but
justice itself, is the loser.
Magistrates should realise, even more than they seem to do, that this class of business is not
mere ordinary trivial work, and they should deal with these cases with a due sense of
responsibility which administrations of the summary jurisdiction Act and the far reaching
consequences of the orders that they make thereafter entail. [Baker v Baker (1906)95 LT
549; In Robinson v Robinson (1898) p135; and again in Cobb v Cobb (1900) p145] it was
stated that when making orders of this kind, from which lies an appeal to other courts, it is the
duty of the magistrate not only to cause a note to be made of the evidence, and of his
decision, but to give the reasons for his decision and to cause a note to be made of his
reasons... Elaborate judgements are not required, but the reasons which lead the magistrate to
make his order must be explicitly stated.”
Because there is no REASON OF JUDGMENT and neither was any verbal reasons given by the
presiding magistrate causing to convict the Defendant, this Court cannot therefore elicit if the
magistrate did or did not deal with the issue of religious objection.
It is not for this Court to assume the Magistrate and indeed the Prosecutor may have overlooked
this issue because of the considerable amount of material placed by the Defendant before the
Court, but ultimately, this is why there is a need for a Reason of Judgment so that it could have
been elicited if this was considered by the presiding magistrate.
The Defendant submits, that an entire day of audio recording allegedly was defective, and on
that basis there is neither any other way it can be verified if the Court did deal with the religious
objection issue, even it is shown to be raised in the ADDRESS TO THE COURT which was
then before the Court.
The Defendant submits, that he was and remained at the Bar table while the magistrate asked
him to plea against the charges and this is not the proper legal procedures to be followed in that
the sanctity of the Bar table should not be misused as such.
The Defendant submits, that the magistrate allowing, contrary to the 4 August 2005 ruling, for
the Prosecutor to use the averment provision while on the other hand he was denied the right of
the UNSWORN statement, this because the Victorian Parliament had abolished the right to make
an unsworn statement as to ensure that as much as the Defendant had a right to cross examine and
test the veracity of evidence presented by the Prosecutor then likewise the Prosecutor ought to be
given the same opportunity. The Defendant submits, that therefore the usage of the averment
provisions was inappropriate and denied him a FAIR and PROPER trial and indeed that without
specific legislation by the Victorian Parliament, as was in regard of ocean exploration, the
Part 1 Page 94
averment rule is not permitted in Victorian courts if not so provided for by specific legislation by
the Victorian Government. This issue, as in the HCA 27 of 1999 Wakim case regarding Cross
Vesting powers does appear to raise constitutional issues if the Commonwealth of Australia can or
cannot interfere with the State Court legal processes when they are exercising federal jurisdiction .
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)
25 Rights to make unsworn statements unaffected

This Act does not affect any right that a defendant in a criminal proceeding has
under a law of a State or a Territory to make an unsworn statement.
The Commonwealth of Australia itself clearly anticipated for the making of unsworn statement if
this right exist in a State or Territory. It then is an issue if in view of the abolition of that right, and
considering why the Parliament did so, as recorded in the Hansard, then in this regard the
averment rule likewise should not be allowed.
Marriage of Baines (No. 2) (1981) 7 Fam LR 232 at 237;-

"We recognise that each party is entitled to a Fair and Proper trial and to an adequate
opportunity to adduce relevant evidence and to test the quality and veracity of the evidence
adduced by the other party."
Clearly, there are numerous constitutional and other legal issues raised by the Defendant which
required to have been promptly dealt with as to ensure that any election held would be fair and
proper, and any litigation is based upon the appropriate forum of litigation, however on the
material before this Court the Australian Electoral Commission other then opposing the hearing of
matters before the Courts, apart of pursuing charges itself against the Defendant relating to the
same elections, failed to undertake any action that could be deemed appropriate to ensure those
issues were appropriately canvassed.
In my view, these proceedings in regard of charges of “failing to vote” appear to be indeed

frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the legal processes and on the material before the Court
doomed to fail, if indeed, just alone the religious objection were to be sustained.
The Defendant also relies upon

Sue v Hill [1999] HCA 30 (23 June 1999) :
These provisions are now reflected in Div 1 of the present legislation,

particularly in sub-ss (1) and (2) of s 354, but with additional provision in
respect of the Federal Court and Territory Supreme Courts. Further, s 192 of the
1902 Act still persists as s 353(1) of the Act. This states:
"The validity of any election or return may be disputed by petition

addressed to the Court of Disputed Returns and not otherwise."
(emphasis added)
The phrase "and not otherwise" implements the policy stated by Sir William Lyne in 1902,
to remove the dealing with election petitions from the control of the Committees of
Elections, and Qualifications to which such matters were then referred, and to direct the
petitions for trial in the Court of Disputed Returns.
This, the Defendant submits, underlines that the term “and not otherwise” is not preventing
challenges to the validity of the election process outside the Court of Disputed Returns and indeed

Part 1 Page 95
in regard of the validity of Senators of Territories to vote in the Senate this was instituted in the
High Court of Australia.
The validity of the election has been extensively canvassed by the Defendant and in view of the
constitutional and other legal objection made by the Defendant already since before the elections
were held then JUSTICE DEMAND that these proceedings in regard of charges are stayed
permanently until the Prosecutor first prove that this Court can invoke legal jurisdiction, and
before seeking to do so has ensured that the appropriate Court has declared if the “legislation, part
legislation, proclamation and/or writ(s)” as the Defendant refers to it are and remain ULTRA
VIRES or any or all are INTRA VIRES.
Unless these constitutional matters have been dealt with no charges and their validity can be
considered.
The Defendant submits, that the proceedings could not be terminated by the Prosecutor for that
this would be beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to do so as the constitutional and other legal
objections first are to be dealt with before this Court even can contemplate to invoke legal
jurisdiction to deal with the charges themselves.
The Defendant submits, that once he made constitutional based objections then from that
moment the “legislation, part legislation, proclamation and/or writ(s) were subject to be ULTRA
VIRES and as such remain to be so unless and until a competent Court decides otherwise by
declaring it to be ULTRA VIRES or INTRA VIRES and that the Defendant himself has no
position to withdraw such objections as to do so would allow anyone to manipulate constitutional
based objections for temporary purposes.
The Defendants submissions, appears to be the right course to follow, and that the Australian
Electoral Commission requires to address those issues on foot, as after all these matters cannot be
left unattended, indeed ought to have been attended to appropriately as a matter of urgency.
The Defendant also has raised the issue as to cost, that he never sought any personal financial gain
for himself, and so did not seek any cost to be awarded in his favour that would give him such
financial gain, but that in 2002 did indicate that the Court ought to make an order for cost against
the Prosecutor (Commonwealth of Australia) payable to the Salvation Army, as some way to
underline is displeasure about the abuse of the legal processes by it. The Defendant relies also
upon a statement made by His Honour Gillard J of the Supreme Court of Victoria that legislation
is in place for cost to be awarded against lawyers where they are abusing the legal processes,
protracting litigation, etc.
The Defendant position is that he cannot personally claim cost in that his wife and himself are
retired.
The issue of orders of cost in my view could not be reasonable regardless of which party were
ultimately to succeed in this matter as the issues raised by the Defendant are of such vital and
critical importance to the nation at large that it would be absurd to somehow seek to place
pressure upon the Defendant that he may face orders for cost for doing what he should have done
as a citizen of this country and what is of national importance. Indeed, considering that the
Prosecutor would not have any issue with cost if they were awarded against the Commonwealth
of Australia as by this the Defendant as a taxpayer still ends up paying towards any cost ordered it
placed the Defendant in a disadvantage that he is subjected to possible orders of cost while his
opponent is not.
The issue of ordering a payment toward the Salvation Army is to be seen as a payment into the
poor box, and could not be construed to be perceived as being an order of cost sought by the
Defendant in regard of himself. In any event, the Defendant did not seek any kind of cost in

Part 1 Page 96
regard of the charge relating to the 2004 election and as such it would be inappropriate to in any
event make such order for cost.
Love v Williams and AEC v Williams
Recognising the significance and novelty of the litigation, and its potential to save other
elections, Foster J agreed that the AEC should pay all the respondents' costs on an
unusually generous indemnity basis, as if the case had been a public interest proceeding
(reported separately in (1994) 54 FCR 383).
Appeal Nos. SA27 and SA37 of 1993 and SA21A and SA30L of 1994 No. ML2944X of 1989
64. Furthermore, we think it is also at least arguable that his Honour's order for costs of 10
March, 1994, works a substantial injustice to the father. Whilst the sum of $750.00 may not
seem a very large amount, we think that an order for the payment of even such a relatively
modest sum may work a substantial injustice to a person of modest means (as the father
appears to be) particularly if, in principle, no order for costs ought to have been made
against him.
Hansard, Friday 16 August 2002, JSCEM (Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters);
QUOTE
Senator ROBERT RAY – I was not going to go to any of the referendum stuff. I just want
to go briefly to electoral litigation. When someone seeks an injunction, do they have to
indemnify the Electoral Commission for damages? Quite often, when you seek
injunctive relief, you have to guarantee that this is going call cost to persons you are
injuncting.
Mr Becker- No.
Senator ROBERT RAY –You don’t have to? This has two sides to it, in fact. It
sometimes inhibits injunctions if you have those penalties. On the other hand, it is
somewhat fairer to the organization that is injuncted. But it does not apply to you; I did
not know that.
Mr Dacey- No, Senator.
It also ought to be considered that it may very well have been that if the matters had been
addressed appropriately by the Commonwealth Electoral Commission in the first place, when the
Defendant began to make his numerous objections known, then we may never have had these
current proceedings before this Court. It also may have avoided the cost so far incurred in
litigation.
The Defendant submits, that the orders of the Magistrates Court of Victoria of 17 November
2005 are and remain set aside, and further proceedings relating to these charges are permanently
stayed pending the prosecutor first to deal with the issues that are and remain in question.
Finally, this Court faced with a hearing DE NOVO as result of a appeal by the Defendant against
the conviction by the Magistrates Court of Victoria at Heidelberg on 17 November 2005 having
been faced with an OBJECTION TO LEGAL JURISDICTION has not sought and neither
seeks to indicate having done so to determine the rights or wrongs of each party in these
proceedings regarding the various constitutional and/or other legal claims made by each of them.
The issue before the Court first of all is to establish if it could invoke legal jurisdiction, and the
Defendant submits, his conclusion that in the circumstances this is not possible.

Part 1 Page 97
Having federal jurisdiction and being able to invoke it are two different matters. Unless and until
the Prosecution can satisfy that this court can invoke legal jurisdiction the matter simply remains
unresolved in that regard.
The decision to prosecute any person and cause upon that person a criminal conviction, if the
Prosecution were to be successful is not to be taken too lightly. This, as it marks the person for
ever, when convicted. In the current circumstances the Court should be deeply troubled by what
has been placed before this Court and in appear to have taken place during previous hearings and
what appears to have been a gross lack of appropriate response by the Australian Electoral
Commissioner in regard of the Defendants objections made.
Valuable court time appears to be wasted to pursue charges where this time could have been
rather used to seek to address the issues of the objections and to at least seek to ensure that any
thing subject to being ULTRA VIRES was as a matter of urgency placed before the appropriate
Court for its declaration.
The Australian Electoral Commission is basically the guardian of the people in regard of
elections, as to ensure that elections are FAIR and PROPER and it can only conclude that where
the Australian Electoral Commission very obviously did not as a matter of urgency have the
issues of the objections appropriately addressed then this is beyond the fault of the Defendant, and
he should not suffer as result. As shown below in a copy of a 17-12-2001 correspondence to the
Australian
Electoral Commissioner, it is he who advises what is a suitable election date, and hence if he
misinformed the Prime Minister, the Governor-General, the Governor’s and others as to how
relevant time tables apply then obviously it all goes wrong as no one is checking the Australian
Electoral Commissioner, as after all it is assumed he knows what he is talking about. Therefore
the Australian Electoral Commissioner cannot excuse his conduct to hold elections on breach of
constitutional and/or relevant legal provisions as he is the very cause of this being wrongly stated
in the writs.
Because the Prosecutor relied upon the averment rule, rightly or wrongly, other then the
enrolment cards, there is no evidence that can be relied upon disproving any of the Defendants
claims, and as such the usage of the averment rule may very well now be fatal to the Prosecutors
case in that regard, including the determination in regard of any issue of cost. Therefore, in view
also of the Authorities quoted, it cannot be accepted that orders for cost would be appropriate in
the circumstance.
The Defendant submits, that any judicial officer who is pursuing to adjudicate in any Court
seeking to exercise federal jurisdiction own it not only to the general community at large or
his/her oath of office but also to himself/herself personally to ensure that he/she acts in
accordance with constitutional requirements, being it expressed specifically or otherwise
embedded. It is hereby also that to ignore the citizenship and by this for example allows the
Federal Government to deport children born within the Commonwealth of Australia as Stateless,
regardless that those children are in fact the same nationals as our own children, then such judicial
officer merely is seeking to be a Pontius Pilates, but cannot clear himself/herself of the disgraceful
deed caused upon so many innocent children to be denied their birth rights as provided for within
the very Constitution this judicial officer pretends to seek to enforce, yet ignored to declare the
(constitutional) law as it is!
Australian Agricultural Co Ltd. v F.E.D.F.A of Australasia (1913) 17 CLR 261 and 278
“The oath of a justice of this court is ' to do right to all manner of people according to law' Our sworn duty is
to the law itself and to the organic nature of the constitution first of all. If, then, we find the law to be plainly
in conflict with what we or any of our predecessors erroneously thought it to be, we have, as I conceive no
right to choose between giving effect to the law, and maintaining an incorrect interpretation, It is not, in my
opinion, better that the court should be persistently wrong than that it should be ultimately right..
Whatever else may be said with respect to previous decisions - and it is necessary here to consider the
principals upon which a court should act in particular cases - so much at least emerges as is undoubtedly
Part 1 Page 98
beyond challenge, that where a former decision is clearly wrong, and there are no circumstances
countervailing the primary duty of giving effect to the law as the court finds it, the real opinion of the court
should be expressed.”
"In my opinion, where the prior decision is manifestly wrong, then, irrespective of the consequences, it is the
paramount and sworn duty of this court to declare the law truly...."
Again;
"In my opinion, where the prior decision is
manifestly wrong, then, irrespective of the
consequences, it is the paramount and sworn duty
of this court to declare the law truly...."
What is DE NOVO hearing & when can it be held?
&
NULLIFICATION
&
ESTOPPLE
&
DUTY OF CARE
A DE NOVO proceedings is where the Court revisit all and every matter in the case with a
disregard to what the judicial officer who originally dealt with the case concluded. The orders
issued by the previous judicial officer therefore are losing their legal status upon commencement
of any hearing DE NOVO and the Court hearing a case DE NOVO cannot rely upon orders made
previously for this but must issue its own orders as to avoid an implied bias that it merely seeks to
enforce previous orders and by this denied the right of a DE NOVO hearing.
However, as set out extensively below, the 4 December 2002 magistrate order that the matter be
dealt with by the High Court of Australia in regard of the constitutional issues regarding the
OBJECTION TO LEGAL JURISDICTION, upon submission of the Commonwealth Director
of Public Prosecutions, which I consented to, and considering that the Commonwealth Director of
Public Prosecution has the burden to prove jurisdiction, then the failure by the Commonwealth
Director of Public Prosecutions to place the matters before the High Court of Australia is a
ESTOPPLE for any further proceedings to be held as to determine the innocent or the guilt of the
Defendant.
Therefore, the magistrate on 16 and 17 November 2005, when advised by me that these orders
were still outstanding could not invoke any legal jurisdiction, as the magistrate has no legal
powers to overrule or ignore orders on foot of another magistrate.
Hence, a hearing De NOVO in my view neither could proceed where the Commonwealth
Director of Public Prosecutions failed to place the matter before the High Court of Australia as to
overcome the constitutionally based objections to prove that the Magistrates Court of Victoria
could invoke legal jurisdiction.
Neither can the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions withdraw the charges without
having first disposed of my OBJECTIONS TO LEGAL JURISDICTION, as set out
extensively below, and in the ADDRESS TO THE COURT filed in regard of the 16 and 17
November proceedings, once I made the objections as to the validity of the proclamation and writs
Part 1 Page 99
issued, then for all purposes the proclamation and writs are and remain ULTRA VIRES and so
any election outcome, and for this only a ruling by the High Court of Australia can overcome the
issue of validity of the proclamation, the writs, the validity of the elections having been held and
other issues objected against.
Further, neither can the Court dismiss the charges while my OBJECTIONS against the
proclamation, the writs and the validity of the elections remain on foot, as they cannot be disposed
of willy nilly but by a proper decision by the High Court of Australia, as is shown below in
quotations from the Framers of the Constitution.
Hence, this matter is in such a disastrous state that the Commonwealth Director of Public
Prosecutions has failed to follow through to prove legal jurisdiction and in the process has allow
the proclamation, writs, elections and other objected legislation to be and remain ULTRA
VIRES, and therefore without legal force.
While the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions may perhaps realise that no conviction
could eventuate where ss245(14) can be applied, nevertheless the mere fact that my objection
were made and remain to be alive today means that the validity of the elections remain a life issue
which cannot be disposed of even if the Court somehow could end the charges against me. It
simply has no constitutional powers to deny a rightful judicial decision as to the objections made,
again, as set out below extensively.
In my view, a hearing DE NOVO cannot proceed until and unless the constitutional objections
against the validity of the proclamation, writs, elections and other matters are appropriately
disposed off.
In my view, the orders of the magistrate of 17 November 2005 should be set aside and further
hearing of the charges to be stayed pending the commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions
having obtained a ruling regarding the matters subject to constitutional challenges.
On 2 November 21001 I then already challenged the validity of the writs and while the Federal
Court of Australia and the High Court of Australia refused to hear the matters upon their
MERITS this itself did not dispose of the constitutional objections. Proclamations and writs are
as any peace of legislation subject to being valid under the Constitution and once an objection to
its validity has been made, then they only way the objection can be disposed of is by a hearing by
the High Court of Australia by determining the validity of the legislation, proclamation and/or
writs subject to the constitutional objection. In my case both the Federal Court of Australia and
the High Court of Australia refused to entertain any application but never did formally dispose of
the objections themselves. As set out below, once an objection has been made then the legislation,
part of legislation, proclamation and/or writ(s) then the legislation, part of legislation,
proclamation and/or writ(s) are ULTRA VIRES and remain to be so unless the High Court of
Australia in an appropriate manner makes a ruling against the items that they are constitutionally
valid.
As a self educated “constitutionalist” and Author of various books about certain constitutional
and other legal issues I am well aware that once, so to say, the ball has been started to roll then no
one can stop it but only the High Court of Australia by handing down a judgment against the
legislation, part legislation, proclamation and/or writ(s) concerned.
Mr. GORDON.-
Again;
and it leaves open the whole judicial power once the question of ultra vires is raised

Part 1 Page 100
Therefore the critical moment is when an objection is made! There is no provision for an objector
to make an objection, by which the legislation, part legislation, proclamation and/or writ(s)
become ULTRA VIRES and then somehow as it might suit the objector having perhaps
needlessly nullified the legal enforcement of the matter subject to the objection then could have
the matter reinstated by withdrawn an objection. To allow for this would effectively mean that
anyone could lodge an objection as to, so to say, temporary make a law non active, as to be able to
freely have a conduct without any risk of being held in breach of law and then subsequently
withdraw an objection to reinstate the law.
Once an objection is made it cannot be withdrawn but can only be disposed of by a order of the
High Court of Australia handing down a judgement upon the MERITS of the objection and if the
objection is sustained or dismissed.
While I did advise the magistrate on 16 and 17 November 2005 about the fact that he could not
invoke legal jurisdiction because of the outstanding constitutional issues, he simply ignored that.
Still, it did not give him legal jurisdiction to proceed with the matter and so all and any
decision/orders remain without jurisdiction and without legal force, and should be immediately
vacated.
It appears to me that neither lawyers or judges so far involved had any perception as to the
application of constitutional objections and neither when they are effective.
They are effective immediately an objection is made and remain effective unless appropriately
disposed of by the High Court of Australia by a judgment that considers all relevant matters.
It is for this also that any delay in hearing the objection is critical to the legislation, part
legislation, proclamation and/or writ(s) subject to the objection as it remains ULTRA VIRES and
cannot be legally enforced.
It means that since 2001 the election had no legal force! It also means that any purported
successful candidate appointed to a seat in the Parliament never was so. It also means that any Bill
passed by the Parliament since then would be worthless, as there was no proper forum for this. It
also means that any conviction of any person upon legislation or part of legislation passed by the
Parliament is also NULL AND VOID, as the was no valid Parliament constituted.
Below is also extensively canvassed further problems in that regard.
Even if this Court were to proceed with the hearing DE NOVO, disregarding the constitutional
objections on foot, as the magistrate decided to do, in the end any orders would be NULL AND
VOID and without legal force as ignorance to constitutional objections cannot make it lawful.
Considering that nearly 5 years has passed since I commenced my objections upon constitutional
issues, I for one was all along aware that the longer this was dragged on to be ignored to be
appropriately attended to the more havoc this would cause. However, this was out of my hands, as
I cannot control the Court and neither can educate judges how they have to deal with
constitutional based objections, but to make known what the Framers of the Constitution
intended!
Mr. SYMON.-It is not a law if it is ultra vires.
Mr. GORDON.-It would be law by acquiescence. It would remain a law until it was
attacked. It might injure a few individuals, but that might be to the benefit of the whole. Or
if it were not, the party whose area of power was infringed on would attack if.
Again;
It would remain a law until it was attacked.
Part 1 Page 101
Clearly, once I objected to the constitutional validity of the proclamation, writ(s), election, etc
then from that moment it was and remained ULTRA VIRES.
For the Australian Electoral Commission, so to say, poesy footing about, playing games about
jurisdiction to avoid the matters to be determined upon their MERITS was in affect ensuring that
the purported election held was and remained ULTRA VIRES and without legal force.
In my it was darn right silly if not absurd for the Australian Electoral Commission to drag this
matter on, as he did, rather then himself insisting that the High Court of Australia immediately
made a ruling upon the constitutional validity of the election to be held.
That was in fact what the Framers of the Constitution intended should have to be done, so a new
election could be held or a election could be held instead of the originally planned election before
Parliament were to sit.
I have for years now urged for the establishment of an OFFICE OF THE GUARDIAN, a
constitutional council that advised the government, the people, the parliament and the Courts as to
constitutional powers and limitations, as then current disaster could have been largely avoided.
However, I am too well aware that more then likely those holding powers will abuse and misuse it
as to prevent anyone to expose them or to have matters appropriately attended to.
I am well aware that this Court may elect to ignore what is constitutionally proper and bulldoze
on, but in the end it does not and will not dispose of the constitutional objection that were made.
Worse, it would likely give an example to the community at large that, so to say, certain
lawbreakers can get away with it pending the power they are wielding.
In my view, and considering also what is stated in this ADDRESS TO THE COURT, this Court
cannot invoke and so not proceed with any hearing DE NOVO unless all constitutional objections
have been disposed off in the appropriate manner as intended by the Framers of the Constitution.
It also ought to be understood that regardless what legislation the Commonwealth of Australia
may have on foot as to how to proceed with a constitutional objection, ultimately it is not legally
enforceable where it denied or interferes with the process that the Framers of the Constitution
intended. Therefore, if the Parliament were to have or would enact legislation that were to put
some regime into follow that would effectively try to prevent an constitutional objection to be
dealt with, then it too would be ULTRA VIRES, as no such constitutional powers were given to
the parliament, as an constitutional objection is not based on when it is placed before a Court but
when it is actually made by the objector. Hence, it is neither having to wait if the Court finally
hears the objection as the objection is instanter applicable and therefore the onus is upon the High
Court of Australia to, so to say, have its act together to ensure that any constitutional objection is
heard and determined as a matter of urgency.
After all, once a constitutional objection has been made then there is no legal force in what was
objected against and as such to allow this objection to remain unattended to means that a object
objected against even so being ULTRA VIRES and so without legal force nevertheless can be
used somehow by the Courts and others and wrongly rob people of their rights.
Again, as a self educated “constitutionalist” I took considerable care to research this matter and
was all along aware that the so to say “game” the Australian Electoral Commission was playing to
prevent the constitutional objections to be disposed of was not working against me rather ensured
that the elections held are and remain unconstitutional, as they were held during a period the writs
were ULTRA VIRES. Even if the Court, not that I seek to indicate it will, were to eventually
declare the writs to have been within constitutional provisions and valid, nevertheless unless and
until such a decision is given the writs remained ULTRA VIRES.
The whole purpose of this is that people who make constitutional objections are protected against
any enforcement of the legislation, part legislation, proclamation and/or writ(s) against which a
constitutional objection was made.
Part 1 Page 102
The saying “Ignorance of the law is no excuse” perhaps fit very much to those involved in
having ignored the fact that my constitutional objections were applicable from the moment they
were made and remained valid unless and until appropriately disposed off.
In my view, no matter what may come from my constitutional objections, what is certain is that
because the constitutional objections are and remain on foot any purported election held are
ULTRA VIRES and so without legal force and no charge could be based on legal grounds to fail
to vote, irrespective if there was a failure to vote or not.
As set out below, a failure to vote in itself is not an offence if the person having failed to vote
has a reasonable excuse not to do so, and as such a failure to vote, being it on religious grounds,
being it because of the writs being defective, being it because of a constitutional objection causing
the legislation, part legislation, proclamation, and/or writ(s) to be ULTRA VIRES during the
period such objection(s) remains on foot then no duty to vote for this also could exist.
There appear to be no system in place dealing with objectors to vote because of certain religious
grounds, as none were presented to the magistrate on 17 November 2005 as such. Therefore a
person can have made a religious objection but for the magistrate, by the Commonwealth Director
of Public Prosecution using the averment rule and so refusing to present relevant evidence, there
clearly was no known system that the magistrate could elicit from what procedure was used when
a person object to vote upon certain religious grounds, and if the person is nevertheless required to
attend to a polling station or not. Or if the name of the objector is nevertheless marked of as if
he/she had voted or had been recorded as an invalid vote.
In my view, it was not for the magistrate to do mind reading to try to understand what the
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions knew or didn’t know as it was for the
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions to prove his case beyond reasonable doubt. This
clearly never occurred.
A failure to vote, on 1 January 2005, New Years Day notably, for example, as the magistrate in
regard of the 17 November 2005 issued order, clearly cannot be legally sustained as no election
was due and being held that day in regard of any local government, State or Federal election.
In my view any hearing DE NOVO would be doomed to fail from onset while constitutional
objections remain on foot. It is not relevant if lawyers/judges hold that they are on foot, as the
magistrate proved to ignore this, what is relevant if the constitutional objections were made and if
there was any judgment by the High Court of Australia appropriately dealing with each and every
objection made and what was the result of such determination.
As set out below further, the burden is upon the Commonwealth Director of Public
Prosecutions to prove jurisdiction, and where I made constitutional objections then unless and
until those objection also are appropriately disposed of no Court can entertain the charges pursued
by the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions.
In my view the charges are frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the legal processes but this is a
matter this Court cannot decide it this is so or not unless first the constitutional objections are
appropriately disposed off, and this remains the burden of proof for the Commonwealth Director
of Public Prosecutions
My wife, who’s father was a lawyer and who’s daughter (my step daughter) has various legal
degrees, obviously was upset that, so to say, I scored criminal convictions on the hand of a
magistrate refusing to follow proper legal procedures. It is her view, as she gave me the
understanding of, that this is worse then the communism she fled from. For her, at age 73 to make
such kind of statement may indicate that there is serious wrongdoings, and where those involved
seemingly are more concerned to score convictions then to address the subjects of my
constitutional objections as to ensure that lawful elections are being held.
Part 1 Page 103
There is a saying that a game is not finished until the last ball stops rolling. Elections are never
finished until the last appeal process has been completed. In that regard, where I made
constitutional objections even before the (purported) elections were held then the (purported)
elections remain in that regard also in question. It does not matter one iota if further elections or
purported elections were held as the legal rule is that no subsequent court order can make the
original court order valid if it was issued without legal jurisdiction. As such if the original Court
order was without legal jurisdiction then each and every subsequent order will so be likewise. The
same with a purported election!
In my view, the 17 November 2005 orders of the magistrate are and remain a nullity, and any
hearing DE NOVO cannot proceed in the current circumstances, as set out further also.
The Counsel for the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions on 16 November 2005 made
clear to the magistrate that he had no intention to read the ADDRESS TO THE COURT, well
this was his decision but had he read it he may have realised that on constitutional and other legal
ground he never could validity obtain a conviction!
The fact that nevertheless the magistrate did hand down convictions, even the vexatious failure to
vote on 1 January 2005 conviction, while refusing to give a written Reason of Judgment may
underline that there are serious ills in how unrepresented Defendants are dealt with and denied a
FAIR and PROPER trial.
While never having had any formal education in legal studies, I used to study past appeal
decisions of various courts including that of the High Court of Australia and from them elicit my
own list of Authorities. In the process I learned that the High Court of Australia made clear that
when a party has made an OBJECTION TO LEGAL JURISDICTION the Court cannot invoke
legal jurisdiction merely because it might, so to say, fancy itself it can proceed with the matters
but must first dispose in a formal manner of each and every OBJECTION made as failing to do
so it never invoked any legal jurisdiction and its orders would remain NULL AND VOID and
without legal force.
When then I had my case before the High Court of Australia for an appeal against the Marshall J
orders, I used the OBJECTION TO LEGAL JURISDICTION extensively against it legal
jurisdiction to entertain any application of NOTICE OF MOTION by the Australian Electoral
Commission as for example they had never filed an appearance and had sought to use some
backdoor tactic to try to get a foot in proceedings, etc. effectively, I had used what I had learned
from past High Court of Australia judgments against itself. The High Court of Australia simply
disregarded to formally attend to each and every OBJECTION, albeit acknowledging it had my
ADDRESS TO THE COURT which did set out various OBJECTIONS, and while it was
attempted by Gummow J to argue that I could not just at the hearing raise OBJECTIONS but
should have given advance notification to the other party, the ADDRESS TO THE COURT in
fact revealed that for a period of about 6 months prior to the hearing in fact I had done so, and
copies had been provided to the Registrar of the Court also.
Still, the Court failed to formally deal with each and every OBJECTION I had formally made
and placed before the Court and as such never invoked legal jurisdiction and by this its orders
were NULL AND VOID and of no legal force.
While the High Court of Australia may have “assumed” that it being the highest Court in the
Commonwealth of Australia it therefore has at all times legal jurisdiction, the truth is that the
High Court of Australia neither can INVOKE legal jurisdiction unless it does so in an appropriate
manner and dispose first of each and every element of an OBJECTION TO LEGAL
JURISDICTION. As I had set out, the Framers of the Constitution had made clear that there is a
right of appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of a Federal Court refusing to issue
a mandamus, prohibition and that the Commonwealth of Australia had no powers to interfere with
this.
Part 1 Page 104
Hence, no appeal to the Fill Court of the Federal Court of Australia was needed in that regard
concerning the Marshal J 7 November 2001 orders, as it was embedded in the Constitution that
one could directly appeal to the High Court of Australia.
Neither could the refusal to hear the Appeal on its MERITS in any way, so to say, get rid of the
constitutional objections I had made.
The truth of the matter was that the Federal Court of Australia never even had forms for my kind
of applications and the Registrar directed I create my own for this purpose! After more then 100
years of federation no one ever had taken the line of conduct I had done to make the kind of
constitutional objections as I did. Then again, no one ever may either have researched
constitutionally issues in such a particular manner as I did.
By this the High Court of Australia, as I view it, blundered in unchartered territory and rather then
to hold back and first assess what I was about with my objections rather decided to, so to say,
play along with the lawyers. The fact that it in the process never invoked any legal jurisdiction
and by this basically “went on strike”, so to say, refusing to hear and determine a constitutional
proper instituted appeal itself never did by this dispose of the constitutional objections I had made
against the writs and so the election processes, later supplemented with other constitutional
objections such as the proclamation being defective, etc.
What has however been established beyond reasonable doubt is that in the current climate of
litigation not a single judge (judicial officer) ever seems to have realised that the constitutional
objections are not pending upon when they are being heard by a Court of Law if at all but that
they are effective the moment they are made and for this it is a matter of extreme urgency that the
Courts, and in particularly the High Court of Australia fast track for hearing any
CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTION, as not unduly to protract the period of the particular
legislation, part of legislation, proclamation, and/or writ(s) to be and remain without legal force
(ULTRA VIRES).
For example, if a police officer seeks to enter private property without due legal authority and this
is objected against by those in charge of the property, then the moment the objection is made the
police officer would be without legal authority and even if the police officer were nevertheless
enter and collect items intended to be used as evidence in legal proceedings, then the Courts
subsequently cannot rule as to the validity of the police officers action as to when the Court
hearing was being held but would have to take the position that the objection was valid from the
time it was made and the objector didn’t require a court order to make the objection formally. As
such, the police officer not only tress passed but any so called “evidence” obtained would be in
admissible in Court.
Indeed, in the USA the court threw out a confession of murder obtained from a person after they
had illegally obtained items which they then used to obtain a confession.
The Courts must protect the rights of each person and guard against abuses and if this means that
at times those who otherwise might be found guilty walk free then this be so as after all the law
enforcement authorities must ensure they follow proper legal procedures and failing to do so they
themselves are the cause of the problem.
With the High Court of Australia and the magistrate there clearly was a disregard of following
proper procedures and as a naturalized person I have become owner of the Constitution as much
as anyone else and entitled to defend my property against any unconstitutional inroads. Hence, my
objections cannot be governed by some legislative provision the commonwealth of Australia may
devise as to seek to erode my constitutional rights, but rather I am protected to secure my rights
and my objections by what is embedded by the Framers into the Constitution.
The Constitution is the property of the people, and not of any Courts or Government!
My constitutional objections therefore are valid against anyone trespassing from the moment they
are made and as set out extensively in this ADDRESS TO THE COURT also they are applicable
from the moment they are made and not when, if at all, a Court might desire to deal with the
objections.
Part 1 Page 105
As much, there can be no argument that somehow the constitutional objections made somehow
automatically disappeared as they cannot and do not unless there is a formal and proper
adjudication as the framers of the Constitution made clear was required for this.
What has occurred is that we have ended up in some mind boggling constitutional and legal
situation that few can comprehend how severe it is.
It is what I anticipated from onset may be the end result, that I would have all kind of obstacles
placed in the way of pursuing constitutional objections by those who lack any kind of proper
understanding and perception as to how serious their conduct would amount to if they would do
so.
Basically, I placed in the hands for the lawyers (so judges) them self to become the terrorist, so to
say, to demolish the entire democratic system if they were to obstruct the proper hearing of my
constitutional based objections.
It ought to be clear that after nearly 5 years my constitutional based objections remain on foot, as
none were appropriately disposed off. Meaning that some day in time it might be realised that
after all I had been the creator of the largest destruction of a democratic system by using my
opponents power to achieve this if they were to obstruct my rights to have constitutional based
objections appropriately being dealt with.
In the mean time, for example, the Commonwealth of Australia has continued to purportedly
“naturalize” “aliens” to be come “Australian citizens” even so this legislation being subject to my
constitutional objection is ULTRA VIRES and so all those purported naturalizations are NULL
AND VOID.
It also means that those inducted to the bar making an oath of alliance may not be admitted at all
as this too is subject to a constitutional challenge. Indeed, any oath administered not that being to
the loyalty of the British Crown in fact is subject to the constitutional challenge raised by me and
which remains on foot.
For the purpose of any DE NOVO hearing, how on earth could the Court possible commence to
hear this matter where whatever is requires to decide, such as my innocence or guilt depends upon
the validity of the election and other constitutional based objections which never were disposed
off in a proper formal and legal manner.
During proceedings before the High Court of Australia Gummow J commented something like
that the ejection had been held 23 months ago! As if the passing of time somehow could override
a constitutional based objection that an election was unconstitutionally and illegally held.
What this comment implied to me was that Gummow J recognised the election had indeed been
invalid but that in view of the passing of time it was better to leave matters rest as they were. Just
that a constitutional based objection does not operate this way. Once it is made it is out of control
of anyone but can only be address in a proper manner by the High Court of Australia dealing with
the constitutional based objection in a appropriate manner upon the MERITS of the objection
made.
For all purposes passing of time does not circumvent the constitutional based objection
(constitutional objection) and the constitutional objections remains in force as such regardless if it
might take years or centuries. Otherwise, any Court of Law could simply ignore any constitutional
based objection in the hope it somehow disappear.
If passing of time could circumvent any constitutionally based objection then the High Court of
Australia could simply stay any proceedings involving constitutional based objections and by this
circumvent the very intentions of the Framers of the Constitution to have it appropriately dealt
with as to dispose of the constitutional based objection as to validate the legislation, part
legislation, proclamation and/or writ(s) objected against.
Part 1 Page 106
The purpose of the Court having to deal with the constitutional based objection is not to validate
the constitutional based objection made but rather to declare the law (including proclamation
and/or any writ) to be within constitutional powers. As such, the very purpose of a hearing is to
declare it to be INTRA VIRES or ULTRA VIRES by declaring it constitutional position.
For all purposes, I am not the one needing to have the matter to be heard, as my constitutional
based objection is effectively applicable from the moment it is made, as it is by a land owner
against a police officer seeking to enter a property without due legal authority, and it is for the
Government (Commonwealth of Australia) then to obtain some kind of Court order to give it legal
authority, such as by having the courts declaring the legislation, part legislation, proclamation
and/or writ(s) declared INTRA VIRES. It is the government therefore who is in need of a hearing
on the matter to be able to obtain authorisation.
Since 1982, I have conducted a special lifeline service under the motto MAY JUSTICE
ALWAYS PREVAIL® and by this having to deal with people contemplating suicide, murder
even mass murder, often because of being disillusioned by the court system where they were
robbed of their rights. People who are in utter despair that regardless they were innocent of any
wrongdoing they nevertheless ended up convicted or otherwise robbed of their rights because the
manner lawyers played with legal technicalities to achieve their desired result regardless what
JUSTICE demanded.
In one case, the Abbott case the Country Court of Victoria made an order by default, even so Mr
Abbott had filed an Appearance but because he had not filed an Affidavit in support, he was
unaware of and was not advised having to file, he ended up having to pay , even so the claim was
a manufactured one involving over $160.000,00 here we have that despite filing an Appearance
the Court does not accept this because no supportive Affidavit was filed and thereby even so well
aware of the intend by Mr Abbott to contest the vexatious and fraudulent claim he lost.
Yet, in the High Court of Australia where the Australian Electoral Commission failed to file not
only an appearance but also failed to serve a Chamber Summons then nevertheless the High Court
of Australia does not bother to continue as if for all purposes they had done so. As such, the
Courts have become the playground of lawyers versus unrepresented parties and JUSTICE
simply is a LEGAL FICTION.
It is this kind of conduct that I anticipated would be used ongoing, one of being to use the Courts
as some obstacle course to prevent my constitutional objections to be heard at all cost, not
realising that it was not an issue my constitutional objections were to be heard but rather for the
Court to declare the law INTRA VIRES or ULTRA VIRES once an constitutional based
objection was in place and had caused the legislation to be ULTRA VIRES. As such, I
contemplated to use the power of those opposing me to destroy the very fabrics of society if they
were to pursue this kind of conduct.
Prosecutors are not there to score convictions rather their duty is to place before the Court
all relevant details as for the Court to provide JUSTICE, if this includes a conviction then
so be it.
The Courts are not there to convict but to provide JUSTICE, if this includes a conviction
then so be it.
It never should be the aim for a prosecutor or a Court to pursue a conviction as to do so would be
bias and not serve the general community.
The history of NULLIFICATION is quoted further below, to indicate that it indeed was dealing
with nullifying laws that were deemed not acceptable to the jury to be enforced. Due to the recent
judgement by the Supreme Court of Victoria in the Abbott case about “NULLIFICATION” and
Part 1 Page 107
this might be used by the Prosecutor, I have no alternative but to address this issue in this
ADDRESS TO THE COURT, so to say, as a pre-emptive strike, as to ensure a better
perception is possibly obtained by those unaware of what NULLIFICATION is about.
It is of considerable concern that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Australia in the Abbott
case never appropriately did set out the relevant matters concerning NULLIFICATION and by
this now has placed on record some kind of denial of NULLIFICATION which may affect many
and would or likely would ensure that juries are denied their rightful entitlement to be advised of
this power of NULLIFICATION to be used! Indeed, Judicial officers also have every right to
apply NULLIFICATION, and this is often used, just that it may not have been known to the
relevant judicial officers as NULLIFICATION when they applied it!
It is essential that the true meaning of NULLIFICATION is addressed and that this Court also
understand that it can apply NULLIFICATION itself, as it is not dependent upon juries only
exercising such power as it is also invested in any judicial officer to exercise it.
HYPERLINK "http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/zenger/nullification.html"
http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/zenger/nullification.html
Jury nullification occurs when a jury returns a verdict of "Not Guilty" despite its
belief that the defendant is guilty of the violation charged. The jury in effect
nullifies a law that it believes is either immoral or wrongly applied to the
defendant whose fate that are charged with deciding.
As shown below, laws must be passed by juries and where they refuse to enforce laws, then the
laws fails to be enforceable. The USA example dates back to the Magna Carta which is also
applicable in Australian legal jurisdictions.
"Jury nullification of law," as it is sometimes called, is a traditional right that was rigorously
defended by America's Founding Fathers. Those great men, Patriots all, intended the jury to serve
as a final safeguard – a test that laws must pass before gaining sufficient popular authority for
enforcement. Thus the Constitution provides five separate tribunals with veto power –
representatives, senate, executive, judges – and finally juries. Each enactment of law must pass all
these hurdles before it gains the authority to punish those who may choose to violate it.
Again
Thus the Constitution provides five separate tribunals with veto power – representatives, senate,
executive, judges – and finally juries. Each enactment of law must pass all these hurdles before it
gains the authority to punish those who may choose to violate it.
Regretfully, as I perceive it, the focus of the Prosecutor and judicial officers often are more
transfixed upon scoring a conviction then to provide JUSTICE.
In fact in another Abbott case the Supreme Court of Victoria somehow seemed to underline this
when stating;
QUOTE Supreme Court of Victoria Abbott case judgment, 4 May 2006, of 255 of 2004
15. The first ground was that the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury as to a principle
which the applicant called legal nullification. The principle was taken from a speech in
1898 by a Mr Wise, a new South Wales politician, the applicant said, stated, “that if a law
was passed by the Federal Parliament which was counter to popular feelings in a particular
State and calculated to injure the interest of that State, it would become the duty of every
citizen to exercise his practical power of nullification of that law by refusing to convict
Part 1 Page 108
persons of proceedings after civil proceedings in the same subject matter.” According to
the applicant, the principle of nullification was unknown until “G.H. Schorel-Hlavka
pointed it out in his book.” The applicant contended that s21A of the Crimes Act was
nullified because an intervention order had been made before the applicant’s trial on the
charge of stalking.
16. The so-called principle by the applicant has echoes of estoppel and autrefois convict. In
fact there is no legal principle by which an intervention order made under the Crimes
(Family violence) Act 1987, as extended by s.21A(5) of the Act, in civil suit 1 can operate
to bar a conviction for stalking.
17. The applicant’s concept of nullification is also said to entitle a jury to return a verdict of
not guilty notwithstanding that they are satisfied that a breach of law has been committed
if the jury thinks the law unjust. The applicant contends that the trial judge in the present
case was obliged to tell the jury that they could treat s.21 of the Act thus.
18. It is recognised that juries may deliver merciful verdicts. As King C.J., said in R. v.
Kirkman 2;
“Sometimes juries apply in favour of an accused what might

be described as an innate sense of fairness and justice in
place of the strict principles of law. Sometimes it appears to
a jury that although a number of counts have been alleged
against an accused person and have been technically proved,
justice is sufficiently met by convicting him of less than the
full number.”
It is another matter altogether for a jury to determine

which laws of the land are to be enforced. The trial judge
was under no duty to instruct the jury that they could
return a verdict of not guilty if they thought s.21A of the
Act or its application in this case was unjust. Indeed, he
would have erred had he done so.
END QUOTE Supreme Court of Victoria Abbott case judgment, 4 May 2006, of 255 of 2004
And
QUOTE Supreme Court of Victoria Abbott case judgment, 4 May 2006, of 255 of 2004
2 (1987) 44 S.A.S.R. 591 at 593
END QUOTE Supreme Court of Victoria Abbott case judgment, 4 May 2006, of 255 of 2004
What is remarkable is that the Framers of the Constitution did not at all refer to what the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Victoria made out of it.
Actually the true version of what was stated in by Mr. Abbott was as follows:
QUOTE OUTLINE OF APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS
Part 1 Page 109
1. The presiding Judge (Justice Ross) failed and/or neglected to properly instruct the jury
on:
(a) Jury nullification being a legal principle and could be applied, if the jury wished to
do so in the circumstances presented in the case.
The Framers of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (then known

as the Commonwealth Constitution Bill), then made known (As quoted from
INSPECTOR-RIKATI® on CITIZENSHIP, A book on CD, about Australians
unduly harmed. ISBN 0-9580569-6-X. Published 30 September 2003, by Author Mr G.
H. Schorel-Hlavka);
Hansard 31-1-1898 [page 354]
Mr. WISE (New South Wales).-
It might be that a law passed by the Federal Parliament was so counter to

the popular feeling of a particular state, and so calculated to injure the
interests of that state, that it would become the duty of every citizen to
exercise his practical power of nullification of that law by refusing to
convict persons of offences against it. That is a means by which the
public obtains a very striking opportunity of manifesting its
condemnation of a law, and a method which has never been known to
fail, if the law itself was originally unjust. I think it is a measure of
protection to the states and to the citizens of the states which should be
preserved, and that the Federal Government should not have the power to
interfere and prevent the citizens of a state adjudicating on the guilt or
innocence of one of their fellow citizens conferred upon it by this
Constitution.
While this related to Federal law, the legal principle (High Court of Australia
Albert Lange case, principles applicable in the Commonwealth of Australia
Constitution Act also applicable in State provisions) provides that this also is
Part 1 Page 110
applicable in state litigation. As all breaches against commonwealth law in
effect must be conducted in a State Court exercising Federal jurisdiction
concerning a citizen of that State. As such the Framers were referring to the
legal principle of “NULLIFICATION” to be applied by a State Court! Hence,
the directions by Ross J to instruct the jury that they must find the accused
GUILTY if beyond reasonable doubt the charge s were proven was
misdirecting the jury, as the jury may have concluded that despite of the charge
being proven in the circumstances prevailing no conviction ought to be made.
Despite this legal principle of “nullification” the jury was never advised of this
option and in fact was instructed to come with a GUILTY finding contrary to
this legal principle, if beyond reasonable doubt the evidence sustained the
charge.
As a matter of fact, this legal principle neither appears to be used in any Court,
likely because it was unknown to exist until Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka pointed
it out in his book, which included a copy of the full version of the relevant
Hansard debates.
The fact that this legal principle might not have been known to the Courts, and
so by His Honour Ross J, and juries by this never were ever correctly
instructed, does not defeat the Appellants entitlement upon it.
END QUOTE OUTLINE OF APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS
And
QUOTE OUTLINE OF APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS
(a) While the Respondent does not appear to accept that Jury Nullification is
applicable and neither that the trial judge ought to instruct the jury to this, the truth
is that it is a matter of legal consequences of settlement that “NULLIFICATION”
and so also “JURY NULLIFICATION” is applicable at least in Victoria since it
became a sovereign colony (now State) as it was applicable while the now State of
Victoria was still part of the Colony New South Wales, from the landing of the first
fleet! I wish to underline the above with including in this an email, provided to me
by Mr. G. H. Schorel-Hlavka which albeit is of the USA, have the same application
of NULLIFICATION in view that they too inhered this in their laws.
QUOTE 15-10-2005 EMAIL
Part 1 Page 111
Date: Sat, 15 Oct 2005 11:13:59 -0400
From: "Themis" <justice96@msn.com>
Subject: [AMOJ_MAIN] HISTORY OF JURY VETO POWER
To: <AMOJ_MAIN@yahoogroups.com>,
<victimsoflaw@yahoogroups.com>,
<victimsoflaw_discuss@yahoogroups.com>
HISTORY OF JURY VETO POWER

HYPERLINK "http://www.levellers.org/jrp/orig/jrp.history.htm" \t "_blank"
http://www.levellers.org/jrp/orig/jrp.history.htm
America's Founders worried that the government they created might

someday grow too powerful, and begin to pass laws which would
violate the rights of the very people it was intended to protect:
ordinary, peaceful, productive folks. But they kept an "ace in the
hole", a
trump card they believed citizens could use to hold this new,
experimental government in check. That ace was the right to a trial
by a jury of one's peers.
How a jury can restrain a government? The key is that juries can say
"no" to bad laws and to arbitrary and unjust prosecutions. It's true!
The Founders realized that the temptations of power and corruption

would eventually prove to be too much for any of the three
branches of our government to resist, let alone check and balance
the other branches. They knew that government "of, by and for the
people" meant
that the people would every so often have to roll up their sleeves
and exert their authority, to act as the final check and balance on
the whole system. Since law is the main tool by which a government
exerts its control, trusting juries of ordinary citizens to veto the use of
bad law was the logical choice.
So they provided for trial by jury--once in the Constitution, and twice

more in the Bill of Rights. In those days, it was part of the definition of
the word "jury" that its members could judge the law as well as the
evidence, and the judge would often remind them of this power. For
example, if jurors found the law to be unjust or misapplied, or that the
defendant's rights had been violated in
bringing him or her to trial, they would acquit for those reasons,
despite good evidence.
In addition to veto power, our common law legal traditions also

provide that if a jury decides to acquit, its decision is final. A verdict
of "not guilty" cannot be overturned, nor can the judge harass the
jurors for voting for acquittal, or punish them for voting their
consciences, even after making them swear to follow the law as
Part 1 Page 112
given by the judge! And jurors may be asked, but cannot be
obliged, to explain their verdicts.
These principles were subject to contention for centuries in England

and the British Empire as citizen jurors fought to assert their rights
against the power interests of the crown.
In 1670, William Penn was arrested in London for preaching a Quaker

sermon, which broke a law establishing the Church of England as the
only legal church. His jurors, led by Edward Bushell, refused to convict
him, despite being held for days without food, water, tobacco or
toilet facilities -- and then fined. The most defiant four of them
refused to pay the fine and were then put in prison for nine weeks.
The highest court of England, upon releasing them, both

acknowledged and established that trial jurors could not be
punished for their verdicts. Recognition of our freedoms of religion,
peaceable assembly and speech thus all trace to the exercise of jury
power, wielded by a jury unintimidated by government judges.
In colonial America, the sedition trial of John Peter Zenger

established another landmark case. Zenger, a publisher, was
arrested for printing news critical of the Royal Governor of New York
Colony and his cronies, accusing them of corruption. His accusations
were all true, but the court informed his jury that under the law,
"...truth is no defense".
"Philadelphia lawyer" Andrew Hamilton then told the jurors the story
of William Penn, and argued that as judges of the merits of the law,
they should not in good conscience convict Zenger of violating such
a bad law. The jurors agreed. Zenger was acquitted in about fifteen
minutes, and his case spawned recognition of our right to a free
press.
Cases like these therefore were part of the political heritage of the
Founders, which may explain why they so appreciated jury power.
John Adams said it so well in 1771 that the Fully Informed Jury
Association (FIJA) put his words on a coffee mug: "It is not only...[the
juror's] right, but his duty... to find the verdict according to his own
best understanding, judgment, and conscience, though in direct
opposition to the direction of the court."
First U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Jay, writing in Georgia v.
Brailsford, 1794, concluded: "The jury has the right to judge both the
law as well as the fact in controversy".
President Thomas Jefferson in 1789 told Thomas Paine: "I consider trial
by jury as the only anchor yet devised by man, by which a
government can be held to the principles of its constitution."
Part 1 Page 113
And Noah Webster, who wrote his original 1828 dictionary in order to
preserve the integrity of the language of the Constitution, defined
"petty jury" as "...consisting usually of twelve men [who]...attend
courts to decide both the law and the fact in criminal prosecutions".
A detailed historical analysis of jury veto power, also called jury

nullification of law, appeared in the Yale Law Review in 1964. It held
that "The right of the jury to decide questions of law was widely
recognized in the colonies. In 1771, John Adams stated
unequivocally that a juror should ignore a judge's instruction on the
law if it violates fundamental principles: There is much evidence of
the general acceptance of this principle in the period immediately
after the Constitution was adopted."
However, during the next century, judges began chipping away at

this vital and fundamental right of free citizens, thereby transferring
citizen power to themselves. The biggest "chip" or usurpation took
place in 1895, when in Sparf and Hansen v. U.S., a bitterly split
decision by our Supreme Court held that failure of the judge to
remind the jurors of their powers was not a basis for mistrial or appeal.
That was the green light for trial judges to go mum on the topic, and
they did.
That is why very few lawyers or law professors, only some judges, and
practically no school teachers know about jury veto power: it's "not
part of the curriculum". Few history books give juries the credit they're
due -- for stopping the Salem witch trials, for overturning slavery in
state after state before the Civil War, and for ending Prohibition -- all
by refusing to convict because they thought the law itself was
wrong.
These days, trial by jury often doesn't accomplish all that it should.
And the usurpation continues: trial judges now falsely tell jurors that
their only job is to decide if the "facts" are sufficient to convict, and
that if so, they "should" or "must" convict. Defense attorneys can face
contempt in the face of court charges if they urge jurors to acquit if
they think the law is unconstitutional or unjust. And self-defenders are
usually stopped and rebuked if they even mention their motives, or
why they disagree with the law, to the jury.
Yet to this day, trial jurors retain the right to veto, or "nullify" bad laws,
though they are rarely told this by the courts. Prosecutors and judges
try to exclude people from serving on juries who admit knowing they
can judge the law, or who have doubts about the justice of the law.
This destroys the protections jurors were supposed to be able to
invoke on behalf of fellow citizens against unjust prosecutions: how
can our right to a trial by an impartial jury be met if those with any
qualms about the law are excluded from serving?
Part 1 Page 114
The fact is, it cannot. Jury selection has degenerated into a jury-
stacking contest between the attorneys and judge involved. And
then, if those who survive the selection process bring in a verdict that
the community does not like, who gets the blame?
Worse, after enough verdicts have disappointed or angered enough

people, the politicians move in for the kill, arguing that the "jury
system needs reform". By that they mean stripping even more power
from the jury, using juries in fewer and fewer kinds of cases, allowing
verdicts to be reached by a super-majority instead of a unanimous
vote, replacing ordinary citizens with government-licensed
professional jurors, etc.
Beware! All such reforms will lead only to a still more powerful
government, and a less powerful citizenry. Justice would come to
mean whatever the government says it means, and the people
would be left with no peaceful method of controlling government
tyranny.
Quotations and Comments on Fully Informed Juries
HYPERLINK "http://www.levellers.org/jrp/orig/jrp.jurquotes.htm" \t "_blank"

http://www.levellers.org/jrp/orig/jrp.jurquotes.htm
THE RIGHT OF JURIES TO JUDGE OF THE JUSTICE OF LAWS
An Essay On Trial By Jury By Lysander Spooner (1852)
HYPERLINK "http://www.lawcasella.com/spooner/TrialByJury.htm" \t
"_blank" http://www.lawcasella.com/spooner/TrialByJury.htm
END QUOTE 15-10-2005 EMAIL

(b) Anytime a judge/magistrate or other judicial officer “dismiss” charges regardless
that the accused has pleaded “GUILTY” then this is in fact “NULLIFICATION”,
as much as where a judge/magistrate or other judicial officer dismissed a charge
regardless where the evidence may indicate the accused did commit an offend
against the relevant legislative provision. While the Director of Public Prosecution
(the Respondent) may be unaware of the legal history of “NULLIFICATION”, as
much as I was until Mr. G. H. Schorel-Hlavka did give me information about it as
he had published in his books, it ought not to lead to that I am denied JUSTICE,
by having been convicted by a jury who may have “NULLIFIED” the relevant
Part 1 Page 115
legislative provision had it been made aware that this was within their powers to do
so. In particular in regard of other issues of appeal the Appellant does take the
position that the jury was denied to be a “fully informed jury”. This also where the
trial judge refused the witness Mr. G. H. Schorel-Hlavka to give certain evidence
about Section 21 and its legal history and that it in fact did not apply to a group of
people, as I was at the time being part of the “Blackshirts”, as set out further
below.
(c) That for the record, Mr. G. H. Schorel-Hlavka previously was called for duty
service at the County court in Melbourne, and upon having been shown a video
clip as to the rights of a Jury, he then did immediately contact the courts
coordinator about there being no information about “NULLIFICATION” and so
“JURY NULLIFICATION”. I understand that Mr. G. H. Schorel-Hlavka was
advised that this is up to the trial judge to advise the jury about. I understand that
Mr. G. H. Schorel-Hlavka subsequently then formally wrote to the Chief Justice of
the County Court as to express his concerns about the failure of a jury being
appropriately advised about their right of “NULLIFICATION”. As such, had the
court taken appropriate action having had both the oral and subsequent written
complaint from Mr. G. H. Schorel-Hlavka, then the Court may have avoided this
omission of proper instructions and information to the jury to have avoided.
Hereby I quote part of the 1-7-2003 correspondence of Mr. G. H. Schorel-Hlavka to Premier
Steve Bracks;
When called for duty service, I noticed that the jury is NOT advised of their
right to having the option of JURY NULLIFICATION, and as such, every
conviction by a jury could be overturned upon the ground that the jury had not
been appropriately instructed as to their rights. Albeit I did make a complaint ,
in person, to the County court at the time of my attendance for jury service, I
was told that it was for the judge to do so. Yet, we were shown a video that
purported to show what a jury was about, but it concealed the fact of the right of
JURY NULLIFICATION.
Regardless if the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (the
Respondent) or the trial judge may have been unaware of the right of a jury to
NULLIFY legislative provisions, what is relevant is that Mr. G. H. Schorel-Hlavka
more then a year prior to my trial did clearly bring the matter to the attention of the
Premier of Victoria Mr Steve Bracks and as such had appropriate action been
taken then I would not/may not have suffered a denial of a “fully informed jury”
End Quote OUTLINE OF APPLICANT’S SUBMISSIONS
Part 1 Page 116
END QUOTE OUTLINE OF APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS
The County Court of Victoria is clearly a State Court and its legal processes cannot be interfered
with by the Commonwealth of Australia, however, for the DE NOVO hearing the court must
follow the doctrine of the Framers of the Constitution and the issue of NULLIFICATION
therefore is to be considered. It is not and cannot be bound by the errors in judgment by the
Supreme Court of Victoria in the aforementioned judgment.
The Court first of all referred to “the applicant called legal nullification”. The applicant in fact
at no time used the term “legal nullification” and it ought to be a serious matter that the Court
misstate in its reasons of judgment what was stated by the applicant.
Further, the Court judgment also refers to;
by refusing to convict persons of proceedings after civil proceedings in the same subject
matter
The wording
after civil proceedings in the same subject matter
do not at all appear in this context at all in the applicants submission and rather appears to be
something fabricated by the Court itself. It is a serious issue where a Court does so and by this
give a total different meaning to what was submitted.
Also, when the judgment refers to King C.J statement;
“Sometimes juries apply in favour of an accused what might be described as an innate sense
of fairness and justice in place of the strict principles of law. Sometimes it appears to a jury
that although a number of counts have been alleged against an accused person and have
been technically proved, justice is sufficiently met by convicting him of less than the full
number.”
The principle of nullification is clearly shown, even if it were as the Court seems to imply to mere
a few charges. However it is more clearer that the quoted part is to be separated in;
“Sometimes juries apply in favour of an accused what might be described as an innate sense
of fairness and justice in place of the strict principles of law.
And
Sometimes it appears to a jury that although a number of counts have been alleged against
an accused person and have been technically proved, justice is sufficiently met by
convicting him of less than the full number.”
By this there are two separate statement and the first one clearly embodies the
NULLIFICATION principle in total to all or any charges!
For the Country Court of Victoria to even contemplate any DE NOVO or other kind of hearing
involving charges of breach of commonwealth law, then the ruling of the Supreme Court of
Victoria in the said Abbott case cannot influence a bit the Nullification principle, in that the
Constitution and so any laws enacted under the Constitution are and remain subject to the
nullification rule.
Part 1 Page 117
Therefore, there is yet another constitutional based objection that the County Court of Victoria
exercising Federal jurisdiction then is obligated to adhere to the principles embodied in the
constitution, this includes NULLIFICATION.
NULLIFICATION can be applied by a judge and/or jury.
What also is relevant to consider is that if the principle of NULLIFICATION is accepted to be

applicable in regard of enforcement of Commonwealth law, albeit there is no duty of it to be
applied by a judge and/or jury, then in that regard the withholding of the details to a jury that they
are entitled to apply such principle of NULLIFICATION itself would deny any Defendant a
FAIR and PROPER trial.
If it is to be accepted that a judge and/or jury can in fact apply the legal principle of
NULLIFICATION in regard of Commonwealth law enforcement then could it be deemed
acceptable that somehow the judge and/or jury cannot do the same in regard of State law charges
where in fact the 1670 William Penn ruling related to ordinary law enforcement and was as such
embedded in the Constitution to not just apply to commonwealth law but also to State laws?
We now have to attend to what the Prosecutor in the Abbott case stated;
Quote OUTLINE OF RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS

1.2 In so far as the Appellant complaints (paragraph (1b)) that the trial miscarried because
he was unrepresented and/or the failure of the Learned Sentencing Judge to act on this
fact, it is impossible to respond to this contention in the absence of particulars of
specific failures by his Honour to protect the Applicant’s “rights”.
End Quote OUTLINE OF RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS
Despite that the King C.J. judgment in R. v. Kirkman (1987) 44 S.A.S.R. 591 at 593 in itself
clearly implied NULLIFICATION principle by stating;
Sometimes juries apply in favour of an accused what might be described as an innate sense
of fairness and justice in place of the strict principles of law.
The Prosecutor in that case seemed to be unaware of this.
When one have lawyers engaged in their daily job of litigating in Court and they do not even
understand and/or comprehend what is applicable then one may have serious concerns as to the
legal processes applied, in particularly where it concerns unrepresented litigants who generally
lack any knowledge of legal principles applicable.
There is no need for me to further expose the errors in this particular Supreme Court of Victoria
judgment in the Abbott case, albeit I consider it was riddled with errors.
The problem being that the County court of Victoria may then seek to rely upon this kind of
judgment as being a judgment of a superior Court, even so it is not in that aspect as it was
handed down by the Supreme Court of Victoria sitting as a “Supreme Court of Victoria” and not
as a “Supreme Court of Victoria exercising federal jurisdiction”! Judgment that at times might
be justified under Victorian laws may not be if federal jurisdiction is invoked and by this legal
principles may be involved that would have a dramatic change in how the law is applied and
enforce.
Part 1 Page 118
QUOTE R v Bonat [2004] NSWCCA 240
The law relating to ground 1
MacKenzie (1996) 190 CLR 348
51 The seminal authority relating to inconsistent verdicts is the joint judgment of Gaudron,
Gummow and Kirby JJ in this case. The following passage (366-368) has been adopted and
applied on many occasions.
From a review of the cases, a number of general propositions can be stated:
1. A distinction must be drawn between cases of legal or technical inconsistency and cases
of suggested factual inconsistency. The former will generally be easier to resolve. On the
face of the court’s record there will be two verdicts which, in law, cannot stand together…..
2. Suggestions of factual inconsistency have arisen both as between different verdicts
affecting the same accused and different verdicts affecting co-accused or persons tried
separately in relation to connected events…..
3. Where, as is ordinarily the case, the inconsistency arises in the jury verdicts upon
different counts of the originating process in a criminal trial, the test is one of logic and
reasonableness.
A judgment of Devlin J in R v Stone is often cited as expressing the test:
“He must satisfy the court that the two verdicts cannot stand together, meaning thereby that
no reasonable jury who had applied their mind properly to the facts in the case could have
arrived at the conclusion, and once one assumes that they are an unreasonable jury, or they
could not have reasonably come to the conclusion, then the convictions cannot stand.”
4. Nevertheless, the respect for the function which the law assigns to juries (and the general
satisfaction with their performance) have led courts to express repeatedly, in the context
both of criminal and civil trials, reluctance to accept a submission that verdicts are
inconsistent in the relevant sense. Thus, if there is a proper way by which the appellate
court may reconcile the verdicts, allowing it to conclude that the jury performed their
functions as required, that conclusion will generally be accepted. If there is some evidence
to support the verdict said to be inconsistent, it is not the role of the appellate court, upon
this ground, to substitute its opinion of the facts for one which was open to the jury. In a
criminal appeal, the view may be taken that the jury simply followed the judge’s instruction
to consider separately the case presented by the prosecution in respect of each count and to
apply to each count the requirement that all of the ingredients must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Alternatively, the appellate court may conclude that the jury took
a “merciful” view of the facts upon one count: a function which has always been open to,
and often exercised by, juries. The early history of New South Wales was affected by English
juries which, in the face of clear evidence, declined to find the value of goods stolen
sufficient to attract the punishment of death, thereby affording to the offender the alternative
punishment of transportation. Australian decisions have acknowledged that the role of the
jury continues to be ameliorative in this respect.
In R v Kirkman, in the Supreme Court of South Australia, King CJ (with the concurrence of
Olsson and O’Loughlin JJ) observed:
“[J]uries cannot always be expected to act in accordance with strictly logical
considerations
and in accordance with the strict principles of the law which are explained to them, and
courts, I think, must be very cautious about setting aside verdicts which are adequately
supported by the evidence simply because a judge might find it difficult to reconcile them
with the verdicts which had been reached by the jury with respect to other charges.
Sometimes juries apply in favour of an accused what might be described as their innate
sense of fairness and justice in place of the strict principles of law. Sometimes it appears to
a jury that although a number of counts have been alleged against an accused person, and
have been technically proved, justice is sufficiently met by convicting him of less than the
full number. This may not be logically justifiable in the eyes of a judge, but I think it would
be idle to close our eyes to the fact that it is part and parcel of the system of administration
Part 1 Page 119
of justice by juries. Appellate courts therefore should not be too ready to jump to the
conclusion that because a verdict of guilty cannot be reconciled as a matter of strict logic
with a verdict of not guilty with respect to another count, the jury acted unreasonably in
arriving at the verdict of guilty.”
We agree with these practical and sensible remarks.
END QUOTE R v Bonat [2004] NSWCCA 240
Again;
“[J]uries cannot always be expected to act in accordance with strictly logical
considerations
and in accordance with the strict principles of the law which are explained to them
And
Alternatively, the appellate court may conclude that the jury took
a “merciful” view of the facts upon one count: a function which has always been open to,
and often exercised by, juries. The early history of New South Wales was affected by English
juries which, in the face of clear evidence, declined to find the value of goods stolen
sufficient to attract the punishment of death, thereby affording to the offender the alternative
punishment of transportation.
In my view, how the Supreme Court of Victoria presented its judgment about
“NULLIFICATION” using the Kirkman case is not consistent with what is set out in R. v Bonat.
It also stated;
QUOTE
[T]he court must not disregard or discount either the consideration that the jury is the body
entrusted with the primary responsibility of determining guilt or innocence, or the
consideration that the jury has had the benefit of having seen and heard the witnesses. On
the contrary, the court must pay full regard to those considerations.
END QUOTE
And
QUOTE
27 Wood CJ at CL, who in earlier cases had been of a somewhat different opinion,
reconsidered his views on the topic of inconsistency and came to a conclusion which seems
to me to be in substance the same as that of Spigelman CJ:
“238. Ultimately, the question remains one of fact and degree as to whether the difference
in
verdicts is such that as a matter of logic and reasonableness, bringing to account all of the
factors which I have mentioned, including the practical approach which juries are entitled
to
bring to their task, the conviction should be regarded as unreasonable or incapable of being
supported upon the evidence.” (emphasis in original)
END QUOTE
The latter statement that the jury might find it unreasonable could include the NULLIFICATION
issue.
Then
QUOTE
90 As to the possibility that the jury may have regarded the one conviction as sufficient,
Priestley JA said, at [54]:
54 It does not seem at all plausible that the jury were acting along the lines explained in
Kirkman and approved in MacKenzie; that is, it is very difficult to see how the jury could
Part 1 Page 120
have thought that justice would sufficiently be met by convicting the appellant of one only
out of the eleven counts they were considering if they thought he was guilty of more.
91 His Honour went on to say, at [55]:
55 Finally, it seems very difficult to me to understand how a jury which in the circumstances
of this case were not prepared to accept M’s evidence as proving ten out of eleven charges
beyond reasonable doubt could logically or reasonably have decided to accept her evidence
as proving the offence charged in count 11 beyond reasonable doubt.
END QUOTE
The judges never seemed to be aware that NULLIFICATION in fact may have been why juries in
some cases may not convict and do in others. It depends upon the composition of the judges, as to
their views regarding certain incidents that in fact can cause one jury to convict while another jury
if presented with the same evidence were refuse to convict.
In my view, the real test would be to have a pretended trial taking place where, say one hundred
people are participating as juries and later 8 groups of 12 jurors are from this selected for each
group to decide the guilt and innocence of the accused. Leaving some jurors spare in case of
someone has to leave or becomes ill.
Each and every group should have video taped their deliberations, so that afterwards it can be
analysed what caused each jury to come to a GUILTY, NOT GUILTY finding or failing to come
to a verdict. Only by such kind of test could possibly become clear how juries may come to their
verdicts or fail to come to one as ordinary it is confidential what juries deliberate and judges then
merely are assuming something, so to say stabbing in the dark, without having any clue if this is
so.
QUOTE
62 This case seems to me to fall into the category described by Spigelman CJ in par 78 of
his reasons in Markuleski (quoted in par 21 above). I can see nothing of any significance in
the present case to differentiate M’s evidence which the jury accepted beyond reasonable
doubt in regard to count 11 from the evidence which in my opinion the jury did not accept in
regard to the counts on which they acquitted the appellant. Thus, in my view, in this case the
MacKenzie test of logic and reasonableness was not satisfied.
63 On this ground, in my opinion, the conviction of the appellant on count 11 and the jury’s
guilty verdict should be set aside and a verdict and judgment of acquittal entered.
MFA (2002) 193 ALR 184
END QUOTE
In my view, if the jury decides to NULLIFY certain charges but not all then it should not be for
the Court to assume other charges cannot stand.
QUOTE
Summary of legal principles
106 I would summarise the principles laid down by these authorities as follows:
(1) There is no hard and fast rule. It all depends on the circumstances of the case.
(2) A primary consideration, in a case of inconsistent verdicts, is whether there is an acceptable
explanation for differentiation as a matter of logic and reasonableness.
(3) A likelihood that the jury has been satisfied of guilt in relation to the verdict or verdicts in
question and has otherwise acquitted the accused because the verdict or verdicts of guilty were
thought to be sufficient to serve the interests of justice should be excluded.
(4) In deciding whether to substitute a verdict or verdicts of acquittal rather than order a new trial,
a likelihood that compromise provides a complete explanation for the inconsistency should be
excluded.
Part 1 Page 121
(5) Where there are factors additional to the inconsistency between verdicts, tending to make the
verdict or verdicts in question unreasonable, that weighs in favour of quashing the verdicts in
question and in favour of substituting a verdict or verdicts of acquittal rather than ordering a new
trial.
END QUOTE
Again;
(3) A likelihood that the jury has been satisfied of guilt in relation to the verdict or verdicts
in question and has otherwise acquitted the accused because the verdict or verdicts of guilty
were thought to be sufficient to serve the interests of justice should be excluded.
This is a clear example that “NULLIFICATION” is being applied, just that in the whole Bonat
judgment the term “NULLIFY” or “NULLIFICATION” never was used. And so not considered.
QUOTE
117 It follows that verdicts of acquittal should be substituted for the convictions.
END QUOTE
In my view, this is a very dangerous kind of decision where a court of appeal because of
inconsistencies in verdicts may all together acquit a person who was found GUILTY on some
charge or charges, but not all.
It put the jury on the spot that if they decide to acquit on some charges and settle on convicting on
one or more other charges then the Court of Appeal could destroy this. I view, this is not what
should be done as to destroy the right of the jury to decide, how it desires to hand down its
verdict.
In my view, the legal principle of NULLIFICATION as set out in the William Penn case should
be adhered to and not be interfered with.
http://msxml.webcrawler.com/info.wbcrwl/search/web/nullification/1/-/1/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-
/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/417/top
QUOTE
1.
Jury Nullification: History, questions and answers about ...
Jury Nullification by Doug Linder (2001). What is jury nullification? Jury
nullification occurs when a jury returns a verdict of "Not Guilty" despite its
...
www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/zenger/nullification.html
[Found on Google, Yahoo! Search, MSN Search, Ask.com]
2.
The Avalon Project : President Jackson's Proclamation Regarding ...
President Jackson's Proclamation Regarding Nullification, December 10,
1832(1). Whereas a convention, assembled in the State of South Carolina, ...
www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/presiden/proclamations/jack01.htm
[Found on Google, Yahoo! Search, Ask.com]
3.
The Avalon Project : South Carolina Ordinance of Nullification ...
South Carolina Ordinance of Nullification, November 24, 1832. An ordinance
to nullify certain acts of the Congress of the United States, purporting to be
...
www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/sc/ordnull.htm [Found on Google,
Yahoo! Search, Ask.com]
Part 1 Page 122
4.
Downloadable Papers
Established site sells papers on Nullification.
Sponsored by: www.the-paper-store.com [Found on Ads by Yahoo!]
5.
Nullification - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Body nullification, the practice of removing body parts. Physical nullification,
a hypothesized process in which results when ordinary mass/energy ...
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nullification [Found on Google, Yahoo! Search]
6.
Nullification
Nullification is a constitutional theory that gives an individual state the right
to ... The origins of nullification are found in the Federalist-Republican ...
www.thenagain.info/WebChron/Glossary/Nullif.html [Found on Google,
MSN Search]
7.
Nullification Crisis - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
... continued donations keep Wikipedia running! Nullification Crisis. From
Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia ... The Nullification Crisis was a sectional
crisis during the presidency of ...
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nullification_Crisis [Found on Yahoo! Search, MSN
Search]
8.
Jury nullification - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The power of jury nullification derives from an inherent quality of most
modern ... Some argue that jury nullification could be used to nullify
important ...
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jury_nullification [Found on Google, MSN Search]
9.
nullification
nullification, in US history, a doctrine expounded by the advocates of extreme
... A closely reasoned reinforcement to the doctrine of nullification was set
...
www.infoplease.com/ce6/history/A0836166.html [Found on Google,
Yahoo! Search]
10.
Nullification Proclamation: Primary Documents of American History
(Virtual Program...
Nullification Proclamation: Primary Documents of American History (Virtual
Services and Programs, Digital Reference Team, Library of Congress) ... Tariff
of 1833 was eventually accepted by ...
www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/Nullification.html [Found on Yahoo!
Search, MSN Search]
11.
Jury Nullification
AN ONLINE RESOURCE GUIDE. Jury Nullification. Juries are charged today
with the responsibility of reaching a verdict based on the facts of a case
within the law as it is explained by the tr...
www.crfc.org/americanjury/nullification.html [Found on Yahoo! Search,
MSN Search]
12.
nullification. The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition. 2001-05
nullification. The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition. 2001-05.
Part 1 Page 123
www.bartleby.com/65/nu/nullific.html [Found on Google, Yahoo! Search]
13.
Lalor, Cyclopaedia of Political Science, V.2, Entry 379,
NULLIFICATION: Library of...
Lalor, John J., Cyclopaedia of Political Science. Complete book online. ...
NULLIFICATION. NULLIFICATION (IN U. S. HISTORY), the formal
suspension by a state government of the operation of ...
www.econlib.org/library/YPDBooks/Lalor/llCy770.html [Found on Yahoo!
Search, MSN Search]
14.
Jury Nullification
JURY NULLIFICATION. by Julian Heicklen. Juries originally were introduced
into England to protect the individual from the tyranny of government. ...
Jury nullification was introduced into A...
www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/j/p/jph13/JuryNullification.html [Found
on Yahoo! Search, MSN Search]
15.
From Revolution to Reconstruction: Outlines: American History
(1994): Chapter Five...
USA-project, outlines-area, An outline of American History by the United
States Information Agency ... citizens endorsed the states' rights principle of
"nullification," which was enunciate...
odur.let.rug.nl/~usa/H/1994/ch5_p5.htm [Found on Yahoo! Search]
16.
North Park University
A web chronology project sponsored by North Park University featuring
regional timelines spanning from 12,000 BC to present day.
campus.northpark.edu/history/WebChron/ [Found on Ask.com]
17.
Nullification Crisis
The biggest crisis of Jackson's Presidency, started by South Carolina
opposition to the tariffs leveled in 1828 and 1832 by Jackson supporters.
www.sparknotes.com/biography/jackson/terms/event_C.21.html
[Found on Ask.com]
18.
nullification -- Encyclopædia Britannica
nullification in U.S. history, doctrine upholding the right of a state to
declare null and void within its boundaries an act of the federal government.
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison ad...
www.britannica.com/eb/article-9056484 [Found on Yahoo! Search]
19.
Digital History
Digital History enhances history teaching and research through primary
sources, an online textbook, extensive reference resources, and interactive
materials. ... Jacksonian Democracy. Nulli...
www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/database/article_display.cfm?HHID=639
[Found on Yahoo! Search]
20.
Jury Nullification
Why you should know what it is. Article by Russ Emal.
www.greenmac.com/eagle/ISSUES/ISSUE23-
9/07JuryNullification.html [Found on Google]
END QUOTE
Part 1 Page 124
Yahoo SEARCH result in regard of “NULLIFICATION” returned 552,000 results, such as;
1. Nullification - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Nullification. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. The process of nullification may refer
to: The legal theory that a U.S. State has the right to nullify, or invalidate, any federal law
which that state has deemed unconstitutional.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nullification - 11k - Cached - More pages from this site - Save
2. Nullification Crisis - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
... continued donations keep Wikipedia running! Nullification Crisis. From Wikipedia, the free
encyclopedia ... The Nullification Crisis was a sectional crisis during the presidency of ...
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nullification_Crisis - 22k - Cached - More pages from this site - Save
3. From Revolution to Reconstruction: Outlines: American History (1994): Chapter Five:

Nullification Crisis (5/11)
USA-project, outlines-area, An outline of American History by the United States Information

Agency ... citizens endorsed the states' rights principle of "nullification," which was
enunciated by John C ... by adopting the Ordinance of Nullification , which declared both the
tariffs of ...
odur.let.rug.nl/~usa/H/1994/ch5_p5.htm - 6k - Cached - More pages from this site - Save
4. ISIL -- A History of Jury Nullification
This essay is widely-circulated in pamphlet form by activists in the International Society for
Individual Liberty. ... A HISTORY OF JURY NULLIFICATION. "If a juror accepts as the law
that which the judge states ... "Jury nullification of law," as it is sometimes called, is a ...
www.isil.org/resources/lit/history-jury-null.html - 22k - Cached - More pages from this site -

Save
http://www.isil.org/resources/lit/history-jury-null.html
QUOTE
A HISTORY OF JURY NULLIFICATION
"If a juror accepts as the law that which the judge states, then that juror has accepted the
exercise of absolute authority of a government employee and has surrendered a power
and right that once was the citizen's safeguard of liberty."
(1788) (2 Elliots Debates, 94, Bancroft, History of the Constitution, 267)
"Jury nullification of law," as it is sometimes called, is a traditional right that was rigorously defended by
America's Founding Fathers. Those great men, Patriots all, intended the jury to serve as a final safeguard
– a test that laws must pass before gaining sufficient popular authority for enforcement. Thus the
Constitution provides five separate tribunals with veto power – representatives, senate, executive, judges –
Part 1 Page 125
and finally juries. Each enactment of law must pass all these hurdles before it gains the authority to punish
those who may choose to violate it.
Thomas Jefferson said, "I consider trial by jury as the only anchor yet imagined by man, by which a
government can be held to the principles of its constitution."
From Magna Carta To Edward Bushell
The power of the jury to judge the justice of the law and to hold laws invalid by a finding of "not guilty"
for any law a juror felt was unjust or oppressive, dates back to the Magna Carta, in 1215. At the time of the
Magna Carta, King John could pass any law any time he pleased. Judges and executive officers,
appointed and removed at his whim, were little more than servants of the King. The oppression became so
great that the nation rose up against the ruler, and the barons of England compelled their king to pledge
that he would not punish a freeman for a violation of the law without the consent of his peers.
King John violently protested when the Magna Carta was shown to him, and with a solemn oath
protested, that "he would never grant such liberties as would make himself a slave." Afterwards, fearing
seizure of his castle and the loss of his throne, he reluctantly signed the Magna Carta – thus placing the
liberties of the people in their own safe-keeping. Echard's History of England, p. 106-107 [Spooner])
The Magna Carta was a great step forward in the control of tyrannical leaders. But its sole means of
enforcement, the jury, was often met with hostility. By 1664 English juries were routinely being fined for
acquitting defendants. Such was the case in the 1670 political trial of William Penn, who was charged with
preaching Quakerism to an unlawful assembly. Four of the twelve jurors voted to acquit – and continued to
acquit even after being imprisoned and starved for four days. Under such duress, most jurors paid the
fines. However, one juror, Edward Bushell, refused to pay and brought his case before the Court of
Common Pleas. As a result, Chief Justice Vaughan issued an historically-important ruling: that jurors could
not be punished for their verdicts. Bushell's Case (1670) was one of the most important developments in
the common-law history of the jury.
Jurors continued to exercise their power of nullification in 18th-century England in the trials of
defendants charged with sedition, and in mitigating death-penalty cases. In the American Colonies, jurors
refused to enforce forfeitures under the English Navigation Acts. The Colonial jurors' veto power prompted
England to extend the jurisdiction of the non-jury admiralty courts in America beyond their ancient limits of
sea-going vessels. Depriving "the defendant of the right to be tried by a jury which was almost certain not
to convict him [became] . . . the most effective, and therefore most disliked" of all the methods used to
enforce the acts of trade. (Holdsworth, A History of English Law (1938) XI, 110)
John Hancock, "the wealthy Massachusetts patriot and smuggler who as President of the Continental
Congress affixed his familiar bold signature to the Declaration of Independence" was prosecuted via this
admiralty jurisdiction in 1768 and fined £9,000 – triple the value of the goods aboard his sloop "Liberty"
which had been previously forfeited. (U.S. v One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S 618 F2d 453 [1980])
John Adams eloquently argued the case, chastising Parliament for depriving Americans of their right to
trial by jury. Adams later said of the juror, "it is not only his right, but his duty – to find the verdict according
to his own best understanding, judgment, and conscience, though in direct opposition to the direction of the
court." (Yale Law Journal, 1964:173)
Earlier in America, jury nullification decided the celebrated seditious libel trial of John Peter Zenger.
(Zenger's Case, 1735) His newspaper had openly criticized the royal governor of New York. The current
law made it a crime to publish any statement (true or false) criticizing public officials, laws or the
government in general. The jury was only to decide if the material in question had been published; the
judge was to decide if the material was in violation of the statute.
Zenger's defense asked the jury to make use of their own consciences and, even though the judge
ruled that the truth was no defense, they acquitted him. The jury's nullification in this case is praised in
history textbooks as a hallmark of freedom of the press in the United States.
Part 1 Page 126
At the time of the American Revolution, the jury was known to have the power to be the judge of both
law and fact. In a case involving the civil forfeiture of private property by the state of Georgia, first Supreme
Court Justice John Jay, instructed jurors that the jury has "a right to determine the law as well as the fact in
controversy." (Georgia vs. Brailsford, 1794:4)
The Fugitive Slave Law
Until the middle of the 1800s, federal and state judges often instructed the juries they had the right to
disregard the court's view of the law. (Barkan, citing 52 Harvard Law Review, 682-616) Then, when
northern jurors began to refuse to convict abolitionists who had violated the 1850 Fugitive Slave Law,
judges began questioning jurors to find out if they were prejudiced against the government's position and
dismissed any who were. In 1852 Lysander Spooner, a Massachusetts lawyer and champion of individual
liberties, complained "that courts have repeatedly questioned jurors to ascertain whether they were
prejudiced against the government. ... The reason of this ... was that 'the Fugitive Slave Law, so called'
was so obnoxious to a large portion of the people, as to render a conviction under it hopeless (if the jurors
were taken indiscriminately from among the people)." Modern treatments of abolitionism praise these jury-
nullification verdicts for the role they played in helping the anti-slavery cause – rather than condemning
them for "undermining" the rule of law and the uniformity of justice.
Labor Versus Big Business
In 1895, the Supreme Court, under pressure from large corporations, rendered in a bitter split decision
that courts no longer had to inform juries they had the power to veto an unjust law. The giant corporations
had lost numerous trials against labor leaders trying to organize unions. Striking was against the law at that
time. "Juries also ruled against corporations in damage suits and other cases, prompting influential
members of the American Bar Association to fear that jurors were becoming too hostile to their clients and
too sympathetic to the poor. As the American Law Review wrote in 1892, jurors had 'developed agrarian
tendencies of an alarming character.'..." (Barkan, Jury Nullification in Political Trials, 1983)[emphasis
added]
Prohibition
Despite the courts refusal to inform jurors of their historical veto power, jury nullification in liquor-law
trials was a major contributing factor in ending alcohol prohibition. (Today in Kentucky, jurors often refuse
to convict under the marijuana-prohibition laws).
As time went on fewer incidences of jury-veto actions occurred as the courts began concealing jurors'
rights from American citizens and falsely instructing them that they may consider only the facts as admitted
by the court. Researchers in 1966 found that jury nullification occurred only 8.8 percent of the time
between 1954 and 1958, and suggested that "one reason why the jury exercises its very real power [to
nullify] so sparingly is because it is officially told it has none." (California's charge to the jury in criminal
cases is typical: "It becomes my duty as judge to instruct you concerning the law applicable to this case,
and it is your duty as jurors to follow the law as I shall state it to you . . . You are to be governed solely by
the evidence introduced in this trial as the law as stated to you by me.") Today, no officer of the court is
allowed to tell the jury of their veto power.
The Vietnam War
Counsels for Vietnam War protest defendants tried to introduce moral and political arguments on the
war to gain jury sympathy. Most often the jury was given instructions such as "You must apply the law that
I lay down." (Conspiracy trial of Benjamin Spock et al., 1969) Jurors receiving such instructions usually
convicted, while feeling the pang of conscience expressed by the typical responses from Spock trial jurors:
"I had great difficulty sleeping that night – I detest the Vietnam War. ... But it was so clearly put by the
judge." And "I'm convinced the Vietnam War is no good. But we've got a Constitution to uphold. ...
Technically speaking, they were guilty according to the judge's charge." But in the few anti-Vietnam war
trials where juries were allowed to hear of their power, they acquitted.
Jury acquittals in the colonial, abolitionist and post-Civil War eras helped advance political activist
causes and restrained government efforts at social control. Legal scholar Steven Barkan suggests that the
Part 1 Page 127
refusal of judges during the Vietnam War to inform juries of their power to disregard the law frustrated the
anti-war goals.
As Lysander Spooner pointed out regarding the questioning of jurors to eliminate those who would bring
in a verdict according to conscience (a practice effectively accomplished today through the juror's oaths
and voir dire) "The only principle upon which these questions are asked, is this – that no man shall be
allowed to serve as juror unless he be ready to enforce any enactment of the government, however cruel
or tyrannical it may be. ... A jury like that is palpably nothing but a mere tool of oppression in the hands of
the government."
Those whose interests lie in maintaining government control of social behavior may argue that the
Constitution provides the necessary protection of liberties. But legislative bodies will always confirm the
constitutionality of their own acts. And the oaths sworn to uphold the Constitution by judges and public
servants have historically been only as good as the power to enforce such oaths. Nor are free elections
adequate to prevent tyranny without jury veto power, because elections come only periodically and give no
guarantee of repealing the damage done. Additionally, the second body of legislators are likely to be as
bad as the first, since they are exposed to the same temptations and use the same tactics to gain office.
Protecting Minorities From The Majority
Further, the jury's veto power protects minorities from "the body of the people, operating by the majority
against the minority." (James Madison, June 8, 1789) Twelve people taken randomly from the population
will represent both friends and opponents of the party in power. With fully-informed juries, the government
cannot exercise its powers over the people without the consent of the people. Trial by jury is trial by the
people. When juries are not allowed to judge law, it becomes trial by the government. "In short, if the jury
have no right to judge of the justice of a law of the government, they plainly can do nothing to protect the
people against the oppressions of government; for there are no oppressions which the government may
not authorize by law." (Lysander Spooner,"Jury Power" by L. & J. Osburn)
******************************************
END QUOTE
I view, that the above set out ought to be clear enough for any judicial officer that the power of
NULLIFICATION is with both any judicial officer and with juries. No one can force either to
use NULLIFICATION and neither can neither be denied to use it. However, it should not be
concealed from judicial officers and/or the jury that they have the right to apply
NULLIFICATION, and this the Supreme Court of Victoria in the Abbott case clearly erred in.
The issue of ESTOPPEL then follows also;

The issue of ESTOPPEL then follows also;
Estoppel is an equitable doctrine proposing that any person who asks the courts to enforce a
legal remedy should have a clear conscience.
As further in this ADDRESS TO THE COURT set out, I did on 20 October 2001 notify the
Australian electoral commission, as with others, that the writs were invalid and upon this the
Australian electoral commissioner then in their response dated 25 October 2001 indicated that I
could challenge matters in the Federal Court of Australia. This occurred on 2 November 2001
before Finkelstein J, and subsequently on 7 November 2001 before Marshall J who then faced
with an OBJECTION TO LEGAL JURISDICTION by the Australian electoral Commission
decided there was no LEGAL JURISDICTION. This was then appealed by me, but the High
Court of Australia refused to allow the appeal to be heard in 2003.
What is relevant is that, so to say, the Australian electoral commission having indicated to me that
I could litigate before the Federal Court of Australia, and I then did so, clearly then had no clear
conscience as after all I did what they indicated was then the proper course of action and while
the appeal was outstanding I could not be expected to then act contrary to my outstanding appeal.
Part 1 Page 128
The Australian Electoral Commission by indicating in their 25 October 2001 correspondence that
the appropriate manner was to pursue matters before the Federal Court of Australia in my view
was not only by this having an ESTOPPEL that it could not then enforce section 245 of the
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 against me in any manner to pursue charges, but also ought to
have been deemed to have had an ESTOPPEL as to raise any issue of OBJECTION TO
LEGAL JURISDICTION before Marshall J unless it had explained to the Court that in fact I
had acted upon the advise of the Australian electoral commissioner’s lawyers this to be the
appropriate way to pursue.
If the Federal Court of Australia had no legal jurisdiction then nothing could give the Federal
Court of Australia legal jurisdiction and for this nothing could be gained to argue against that,
however, what occurred was that the Federal Court of Australia did in fact have legal jurisdiction
but, so to say, Marshall J was deceived in to making a ruling it did not have legal jurisdiction and
it was concealed by the Australian Electoral Commission to Marshall J that they themselves had
recommended this course of litigation.
It is critical to FAIR and PROPER elections being held and be deemed held that the conduct of
the Australian Electoral Commissioner and so his lawyers are beyond reproach, and not are to
deceive objectors and judges as to railroad objections made.
While I understand that this is a common conduct by the Australian Electoral Commission to
pursue I view this Court cannot tolerate to become part of this elaborate deception and abuse of
powers to deny a FAIR and PROPER election to be held.
When the Australian Electoral Commissioner had his lawyers advising me about the option to
place matters before the Federal Court of Australia, then where I acted upon this it was the
obligation of the Australian electoral commissioner to rectify any deceptive information that had
been given to me and ensure that both Marshall J of the Federal Court of Australia as well as
myself had been then provided with details of the proper course that was to be followed.
It cannot now, so to say, come to this Court to pursue enforcement of legislation where it has itself
dirty hands, so to say, to have caused undue problems.
As also extensively in this ADDRESS TO THE COURT having been canvassed the issues of
constitutional based objections were not disposed off by the refusal of Marshall J to hear and
determine matters upon their MERITS, and for this neither so by the High Court of Australia
conduct to refuse to hear matters upon their MERITS.
If there had been no constitutional based objections made by me then perhaps the Australian
Electoral Commission might have again gotten away with the gross deceptive conduct, but
because I made constitutional based objections which caused the writs from onset to be ULTRA
VIRES, it would have therefore been in the best interest of the general community had the
Australian Electoral Commission explained to His Honour Marshall J as to their own advise to me
to institute proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia and they are now correcting this advise
and substituting it with appropriate advise how this is to be done.
Estoppel in English law is defined as: "a principle of justice and of equity.
And
It comes to this: when a man, by his words or conduct, has led another to believe in a
particular state of affairs, he will not be allowed to go back on it when it would be unjust or
inequitable for him to do so." in Moorgate Mercantile v Twitchings [1976] 1 QB 225, CA at
241 per Lord Denning MR.
Part 1 Page 129
Then where I acted on the advise of the Australian Electoral Commissioner’s lawyers advise then
I view they had no right to object to the jurisdiction of the Court without revealing to the Court
their own conduct involved.
The Court then may have taken a complete different approach to the matter and perhaps have
given more consideration if indeed the Court had no legal jurisdiction and not merely was being
used as a legal ploy by the Australian Electoral Commissioner to railroad objections.
The fact that the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions now have the carriage of the
proceedings instituted in regard of charges does not circumvent the fact that the Australian
Electoral Commission misled me and the Court and the Commonwealth Director of Public
Prosecutions have only acted upon the directions of the Australian Electoral Commission and so it
must be taken that they are for this purpose one and the same.
Estoppel in English law is defined as: "a principle of justice and of equity. It comes to this:
when a man, by his words or conduct, has led another to believe in a particular state of
affairs, he will not be allowed to go back on it when it would be unjust or inequitable for
him to do so." in Moorgate Mercantile v Twitchings [1976] 1 QB 225, CA at 241 per Lord
Denning MR.
The definition in American law is similar: "Speaking generally, estoppel is a bar which
precludes a person from denying or asserting anything to the contrary of that which has, in
contemplation of law, been established as the truth, either by the acts of judicial or
legislative officers, or by his own deed, acts, or representations, either express or implied."
28 Am Jur 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 1
http://dictionary.law.com/definition2.asp?selected=665&bold=
estoppel
n. a bar or impediment (obstruction) which precludes a person from asserting a fact or a right or
prevents one from denying a fact. Such a hindrance is due to a person's actions, conduct,
statements, admissions, failure to act or judgment against the person in an identical legal case.
Estoppel includes being barred by false representation or concealment (equitable estoppel), failure
to take legal action until the other party is prejudiced by the delay (estoppel by laches), and a court
ruling against the party on the same matter in a different case (collateral estoppel).
See also: collateral estoppel equitable estoppel estop laches
Place this dictionary on your site
what ought to be considered is that had the Australian electoral commission not deceived me and
neither so the Federal Court of Australia then the entire litigation history could have been
drastically different.
http://www.nolo.com/definition.cfm/term/7F1E56D5-7EC1-4CEB-86B3943F6990FF77
estoppel
(1) A legal principle that prevents a person from asserting or denying something in court
that contradicts what has already been established as the truth.
equitable estoppel
A type of estoppel that bars a person from adopting a position in court that contradicts his or
her past statements or actions when that contradictory stance would be unfair to another
person who relied on the original position.
estoppel by silence
A type of estoppel that prevents a person from asserting something when she had both the
Part 1 Page 130
duty and the opportunity to speak up earlier, and her silence put another person at a
disadvantage.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duty_of_care
Duty of care
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

For the English law, see duty of care in English law.
In tort law, a duty of care is a legal obligation imposed on an individual requiring that they
exercise a reasonable standard of care while performing any acts that could forseeably harm
others. For an action in negligence, there must be an identified duty of care in law.
Duty of care may be considered a formalisation of the implicit responsibilities held by an
individual towards another individual within society. It is not a requirement that a duty of
care be defined by law, but it will often evolve through the jurisprudence of common law.
Individuals who are considered to be professionals within society are often held to a higher
standard of care than those who are not. Engineers and doctors will be held to reasonable
standards for members of their profession, rather than those of the general public in cases
related to their fields.
Breach of duty of care, if resulting in an injury, may subject an individual to liability in tort.
Duty of care is an important prerequisite in the tort of negligence, as the duty of care must
exist and must have been breached for the tort to occur.
Again
Duty of care may be considered a formalisation of the implicit responsibilities held by an
individual towards another individual within society.
In my view the Australian Electoral Commissioner has a “DUTY OF CARE” one being to ensure
that when an objection is made regarding electoral matters then he (so his lawyers) do not deceive
the objector as to the appropriate manner to proceed.
The function of the Australian Electoral Commissioner is to ensure that FAIR and PROPER
elections are held and by deceiving the court and the objector directly contravenes the DUTY OF
CARE the Australian Electoral Commissioner has in that regard.
It also ought to be considered that if in fact Marshall J erred in his decision in view that the Court
of Disputed Returns has no legal jurisdiction to deal with a case such as I had filed in the Federal
Court of Australia, and so also subsequently to the Registrar of the High Court of Australia having
advised on 30 October 2001 that the Federal Court of Australia and not the High Court of
Australia was the proper venue to file the case in view of the amendment to Section 383 of the
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 now referring to the Federal Court of Australia, then with the
judgment of Marshall J in effect it means that there is no Court at all that can hear and determine
the objections on constitutional ground I had placed before the Federal Court of Australia and this
in itself is not only a legal absurdity but undermined the foundation of democracy as effectively
there is no avenue then to challenge in a legal manner defective writs, proclamation, etc.
In my view, such an absurdity cannot be tolerated to exist and I view requires a ROYAL
COMMISSION to have this fully investigated, after all with the legislation, part legislation,
proclamation and/or writ(s) subject to constitutional based objections now being ULTRA VIRES
ever since the constitutional based objections were made in itself ought top underline that this
kind of legal absurdity cannot be tolerated and should be appropriately investigated.
In my view, the fact that the elections were ULTRA VIRES and without legal force also because
of the constitutional based objections never having been disposed off in an appropriate manner by
Part 1 Page 131
the High Court of Australia to declare the objected legislation, part legislation, proclamation
and/or writ(s) to be INTRA VIRES or ULTRA VIRES, then unless and until this is decided it all
remains ULTRA VIRES and without legal force and is as such also any ESTOPPEL against any
legal enforcement where they are already ULTRA VIRES.
http://msxml.webcrawler.com/info.wbcrwl/search/web/estoppel/1/-/1/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-
/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/-/417/top
1.
Estoppel - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Estoppel by representation of fact is known as equitable estoppel in
American law. Equitable estoppel as understood in English law, includes: ...
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estoppel [Found on Google, Yahoo! Search, MSN Search,
Ask.com]
2.
Legal Definition of 'Estoppel'
The Legal Term * Estoppel * Defined & Explained. ... Equitable estoppel
prevents one party from taking a different position at trial than she did at an
...
www.lectlaw.com/def/e040.htm [Found on Google, MSN Search, Ask.com]
3.
MC Estoppel
MC Estoppel. All day long, I am created. -- Annie Dillard. Saturday, May 20.
OPEN SOUL . . . The Unlimited Mood asks: what do you do to keep your soul
open? ...
chaesq.blogspot.com/ [Found on Google, Ask.com]
4.
estoppel n. a bar or impediment (obstruction) which precludes a ...
Estoppel includes being barred by false representation or concealment
(equitable estoppel), failure to take legal action until the other party is
prejudiced ...
dictionary.law.com/definition2.asp?selected=665&bold= [Found on
Google, Yahoo! Search]
5.
Estoppel?
Brief and Straightforward Guide to Estoppel
Sponsored by: www.WiseGeek.com/ [Found on Ads by Google]
6.
PUNISHMENT AND PROPORTIONALITY: THE ESTOPPEL APPROACH
PUNISHMENT AND PROPORTIONALITY: THE ESTOPPEL APPROACH. N.
Stephan Kinsella* It is easier to commit murder than to justify it. Papinian. 1.
I. Introduction. No doubt punishment serves many p...
www.mises.org/journals/jls/12_1/12_1_3.pdf [Found on Yahoo! Search,
Ask.com]
7.
LII: lexicon: promissory estoppel
Promissory Estoppel -- What does it mean? Where does it fit? Promissory
Estoppel. The doctrine allowing recovery on a promise made without
consideration ...
www.law.cornell.edu/lexicon/promissory_estoppel.htm [Found on Google,
MSN Search]
8.
Civil Resource Manual 209 Estoppel
Part 1 Page 132
No decision of the Supreme Court holds that equitable estoppel lies against
... The Supreme Court has made it clear that before an estoppel will lie
against ...
www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title4/civ00209.
htm [Found on Google, Yahoo! Search]
9.
"Collateral Estoppel" Defined
Definition of "Collateral Estoppel"
www.caught.net/prose/collat.htm [Found on Yahoo! Search, MSN Search]
10.
Estoppel Certificate - Commercial Real Estate
Description of estoppel certificate and how its used in commercial real estate
closing ... The Estoppel Certificate is a very critical and important document
that is used mainly in commerci...
www.realogicinc.com/news/estoppel.htm [Found on Yahoo! Search,
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11.
law.com Law Dictionary
Law.com's online Real Life Dictionary of the Law. The easiest-to-read, most
user-friendly guide to legal terms. Use it free! ... estoppel. n. a bar or
impediment (obstruction) which preclud...
dictionary.law.com/default2.asp?selected=665&bold=|||| [Found on
Yahoo! Search]
12.
estoppel - legal definition
Alvin will not be able to deny this fact in subsequent lawsuits against him.
This type of estoppel is most commonly called collateral estoppel. ...
www.nolo.com/definition.cfm/term/7F1E56D5-7EC1-4CEB-
86B3943F6990FF77 [Found on Google]
13.
RECONSIDERING ESTOPPEL: PATENT ADMINISTRATION AND THE
FAILURE OF FESTO R. P
RECONSIDERING ESTOPPEL: PATENT ADMINISTRATION AND. THE FAILURE
OF FESTO. R. P. OLK. W. AGNER. Last Term, in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., the United States Supreme Co...
www.law.upenn.edu/polk/wagner.festo.pdf [Found on Yahoo! Search]
14.
Estoppel by deed - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Estoppel by deed is a doctrine in the law of real property that arises where a
party conveys title to land that he does not own to a bona fide purchaser ,
and then acquires title to that la...
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estoppel_by_deed [Found on MSN Search]
15.
estoppel - legal definition
Search for Products Search Entire Site Search Glossary. estoppel ...
estoppel by deed. A type of estoppel that prevents a person from denying
the truth of anything that ...
www.nolo.com/lawcenter/dictionary/dictionary_listing.cfm/Term/7F1E5
6D5-7EC1-4CEB-86B3943F6990FF... [Found on Yahoo! Search]
16.
Estoppel
Estoppel 1. Promissory estoppel a) Background: The rule that consideration
... v. Arun District Council 1976 3. Notabene a) Estoppel is primarily
Part 1 Page 133
www.peisker.de/ffa/6-Estoppel.htm [Found on Ask.com]
17.
Collateral estoppel - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Collateral estoppel. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Collateral
estoppel, also sometimes known as issue preclusion, is a common law
estoppel doctrine that prevents a person from reli...
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collateral_estoppel [Found on Yahoo! Search]
18.
estoppel legal definition of estoppel. estoppel synonyms by the Free
...
Definition of estoppel in the Ledal Dictionary - by Free online English
dictionary and encyclopedia. What is estoppel? Meaning of estoppel as a
legal term.
legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/estoppel [Found on MSN Search]
19.
Promissory estoppel
Acceptable alternative ways of describing promissory estoppel are: ...
Promissory estoppel is used where, although there may not otherwise be a
enforceable ...
homepage.gallaudet.edu/marshall.wick/bus447/promissory_estoppel.h
tml [Found on Google]
20.
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Creditnet Estoppel Discussion and a new estoppel letter. ... various credit
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ago someone posted ... posts that ba...
www.creditwrench.greatnow.com/Creditnet~Estoppel~Discussion.html
[Found on Yahoo! Search]
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estoppel
QUOTE
Estoppel
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Jump to: navigation, search
Estoppel is an equitable doctrine proposing that any person who asks the courts to enforce a legal
remedy should have a clear conscience. Wherever a law is broken, a right of action is created in
any person who has suffered a loss (the plaintiff or claimant in England and Wales). This right to
a remedy is enforced through the courts. In almost all cases, the state of the plaintiff's conscience
will be irrelevant to obtaining relief. But, if the plaintiff has said or done something that induced
the defendant to change his or her behaviour and that reliance was reasonable, the courts have a
discretion to deny the remedy to the plaintiff. Hence, an estoppel is not a remedy "at law" in
common law jurisdictions, but based on principles of equity. In the majority of cases, it is only a
defence and it works by preventing a plaintiff from enforcing established legal rights, or from
relying on a set of facts that would give rise to enforceable rights (e.g. words said or actions
performed) if that enforcement or reliance would be unfair to the defendant. Because its effect is
to defeat generally enforceable legal rights, the scope of the remedy is often very limited.
In the case of an existing debt, for example, an estoppel could arise where the creditor informs the
debtor that the debt is forgiven, but there is no formal termination of the contract. If the creditor
Part 1 Page 134
later tries to enforce the original contract terms, but the debtor has relied on the representation and
has innocently spent the money on something else, the creditor may be estopped from relying on
the usual contractual right to repayment because it would be unfair to allow the creditor to change
his or her mind. Similarly, a landlord may tell a tenant that the rent is reduced or cancelled for a
specific period of time, e.g. "You can pay half rent until the noise and dirt from the maintenance
of the common parts is over." If the tenant changes behavior as a result of what is said, the
landlord might be "estopped" from retrospectively claiming the full rent.
Estoppel is closely related to the doctrines of waiver, variation, and election and is applied in
many areas of law, including insurance, banking, employment, international trade, etc. In English
law, the concept of Legitimate expectation in the realm of administrative law and judicial review
is estoppel's counterpart in public law, albeit subtle but important differences exist.
See venire contra factum proprium in legal systems based on civil law.
Contents
[hide]
 1 Overview
o 1.1 Definition
o 1.2 Major types
 2 Reliance-based estoppels
o 2.1 Estoppel by representation of fact
o 2.2 Equitable estoppel
o 2.3 Proprietary estoppel
o 2.4 Promissory estoppel
 2.4.1 English law
 2.4.2 Australian law
 2.4.3 American law
 3 Other estoppels
o 3.1 Estoppel in pais
o 3.2 Estoppel by convention
o 3.3 Estoppel by acquiescence
o 3.4 Estoppel by deed
o 3.5 Issue Estoppel
 4 External links
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Overview
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Definition
Estoppel in English law is defined as: "a principle of justice and of equity. It comes to this: when
a man, by his words or conduct, has led another to believe in a particular state of affairs, he will
not be allowed to go back on it when it would be unjust or inequitable for him to do so." in
Moorgate Mercantile v Twitchings [1976] 1 QB 225, CA at 241 per Lord Denning MR.
The definition in American law is similar: "Speaking generally, estoppel is a bar which precludes
a person from denying or asserting anything to the contrary of that which has, in contemplation of
law, been established as the truth, either by the acts of judicial or legislative officers, or by his
own deed, acts, or representations, either express or implied." 28 Am Jur 2d Estoppel and Waiver
§1
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Part 1 Page 135
Major types
The main species of estoppel under English, Australian, and American laws are:
 Estoppel by record This frequently arises as issue/cause of action estoppel, judicial

estoppel or res judicata where the orders or judgments made in previous legal proceedings
prevent the parties from relitigating the same issues or causes of action,
 Estoppel by deed Where rules of evidence (often regarded as technical or formal
estoppels) prevent a litigant from denying the truth of what was said or done, and
 Reliance-based estoppels These are the most important forms. Under English law, this
class includes estoppel by representation of fact, promissory estoppel and proprietary
estoppel (see Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol 16(2), 2003).
o Estoppel by representation of fact is known as equitable estoppel in American
law.
o Equitable estoppel as understood in English law, includes:
 promissory estoppel, and
 proprietary estoppel,
 Although some authorities regard reliance-based estoppels as mere rules of evidence, they
are in reality rules of substantive law.
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Reliance-based estoppels
Under English law, estoppel may be:
 by representation of fact, where one person asserts the truth of a set of facts to another;
 promissory estoppel, where one person makes a promise to another, but there is no
enforceable contract; and
 proprietary estoppel, where the parties are litigating the title to land.
These are regarded as reliance-based estoppels by Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol 16(2), 2003.
Both Halsbury's and Spencer Bower (see below) describe all three estoppels collectively as
estoppels by representation. More simply, one party must say or do something and see the other
party rely on what is said or done to change behavior. So, suppose that:
 D has the money to repay a debt,

 but the creditor tells D that the debt is forgiven,
 so, without doing anything else, D buys a car that he would not otherwise have been able
to afford,
 and the creditor is aware of this reaction.
D is a bare promisee/representee. The original contract is still valid because D has not given any
value or consideration to make the termination of liability legally binding. Under normal
circumstances, a court will not enforce a bare promise but D may be given a remedy if, and only
if, the judge decides that it would be "unconscionable" for the creditor to renege on the promise or
represention knowing that D would be penalized. Estoppel is, therefore, an exception to the
normal operation of the law and gains its power from equity. Only proprietary estoppel can create
a cause of action in English law (and, then, only in very limited circumstances), while the other
two can support a defence and a counterclaim. Under Australian law, these estoppels can create
both a cause of action and a defense. Under American law, equitable estoppel is available only as
a defense, while promissory estoppel can be used as the basis of a cause of action.
To establish a reliance-based estoppel, the victimised party must be able to show both inducement
and detrimental reliance, i.e.:
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 there must be evidence to show that the representor actually intended the victim to act on
the represention or promise, or
 the victim must satisfy the court that it was reasonable for him or her to act on the relevant
representation or promise, and
 what the victim did must either have been reasonable, or
 the victim did what the representor intended, and
 the victim would suffer a loss or detriment if the representor was allowed to deny what
was said or done — detriment is measured at the time when the representor proposes to
deny the representation or withdraw the promise, not at the time when either was made,
and
 in all the circumstances, the behavior of the representor is such that it would be
"unconscionable" to allow him or her to resile.
Estoppel by representation of fact and promissory estoppel are mutually exclusive: the former is
based on a representation of existing fact (or of mixed fact and law), while the latter is based on a
promise not to enforce some pre-existing right (i.e. it expresses an intention as to the future). A
proprietary estoppel operates only between parties who, at the time of the representation, were in
an existing relationship, while this is not a requirement for estoppel by representation of fact.
The test for unconscionability in the English and Australian courts takes many factors into
account, including the behavior, state of mind and circumstances of the parties. Generally, the
following eight factors are determinative (Michael Spence, Protecting Reliance: The Emergent
Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel, Oxford: 1999, pp60-66):
 how the promise/representation and reliance upon it were induced;

 the content of the promise/representation;
 the relative knowledge of the parties;
 the parties' relative interest in the relevant activities in reliance;
 the nature and context of the parties' relationship;
 the parties' relative strength of position;
 the history of the parties' relationship; and
 the steps, if any, taken by the promisor/representor to ensure he has not caused preventable
harm.
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Estoppel by representation of fact

In English law, estoppel by representation of fact is a term coined by Spencer Bower. This
species of estoppel is also referred to as "common law estoppel by representation" in Halsbury's
Laws of England, vol 16(2), 2003 reissue.
In The Law relating to Estoppel by Representation, 4th edition, 2004 at para I.2.2, Spencer Bower
defines estoppel by representation of fact as follows:
Where one person (‘the representor’) has made a representation of fact to another person
(‘the representee’) in words or by acts or conduct, or (being under a duty to the
representee to speak or act) by silence or inaction, with the intention (actual or
presumptive) and with the result of inducing the representee on the faith of such
representation to alter his position to his detriment, the representor, in any litigation
which may afterwards take place between him and the representee, is estopped, as against
the representee, from making, or attempting to establish by evidence, any averment
substantially at variance with his former representation, if the representee at the proper
time, and in proper manner, objects thereto.
A second definition can be found at Wilken and Villiers, The Law of Waiver, Variation and
Estoppel, 2nd ed, Oxford: 2003, at para 9.02:
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An estoppel by representation [of fact] will arise between A and B if the following
elements are made out. First, A makes a false representation of fact to B or to a group of
which B was a member. [It is not necessary to demonstrate A knew that the representation
was untrue.] Second, in making the representation, A intended or [in the alternatively,]
knew that it was likely to be acted upon. Third, B, believing the representation, acts to its
detriment in reliance on the representation. [It must have been reasonable to rely on the
representation.] Fourth, A subsequently seeks to deny the truth of the representation.
Fifth, no defence to the estoppel can be raised by A.
A representation can be made by words or conduct. Although the representation must be clear and
unambiguous, a representation can be inferred from silence where there is a duty to speak or from
negligence where a duty of care has arisen. Under English law, estoppel by representation of fact
usually acts as a defence, though it may act in support of a cause of action or counterclaim.
Although there is some debate as to whether "unconscionability" is an element that English courts
need to take into account when considering estoppel by representation of fact, the Australian
courts clearly do (see Wilken and Villiers, para 9-03; The Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170
CLR 394 at 444 per Deane J.)
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Equitable estoppel
As noted above, although both English and Australian laws treat promissory and proprietary
estoppels as species of equitable estoppel, the status of estoppel by representation of fact is less
clear in Australia. The decisions of Waltons Stores (Interstate) v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387 and
Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, both purport to fuse common law and equitable
estoppels into a single unified doctrine, but the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Bryon Shire
Council v Vaughan [2002] NSWCA 158 continues to treat estoppel by representation at common
law as distinct from equitable estoppel. (See Meagher, Gummow & Lehane's Equity: Doctrines &
Remedies, 4th edition, Butterworth: 2002, Chapter 17 and Pakinson, The Principles of Equity, 2nd
edition, LBC: 2003, Chapter 7). This can be significant in deciding which court has jurisdiction to
adjudicate on the issue.
The American doctrine of equitable estoppel is the same as the English estoppel by representation
of fact:
The most comprehensive definition of equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais is that it is the
principle by which a party who knows or should know the truth is absolutely precluded,
both at law and in equity, from denying, or asserting the contrary of, any material fact
which, by his words or conduct, affirmative or negative, intentionally or through culpable
negligence, he has induced another, who was excusably ignorant of the true facts and who
had a right to rely upon such words or conduct, to believe and act upon them thereby, as a
consequence reasonably to be anticipated, changing his position in such a way that he
would suffer injury if such denial or contrary assertion was allowed. 28 Am Jur 2d
Estoppel and Waiver § 28
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Proprietary estoppel
The traditional version of proprietary estoppel arises in negotiations affecting title to land. So if:
 one party represents that he or she is transferring an interest in land to another, but what is
done has no legal effect, or
 merely promises at some time in the future to transfer land or an interest in land to another,
and
 knows that the other party will spend money or otherwise act to his or her detriment in
reliance on the supposed or promised transfer,
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an estoppel may arise. Thus, in Dillwyn v Llwellyn (1862) 4 De G.F.& J. 517 C.A. a father
promised a house to his son who took possession and spent a large sum of money improving the
property. The father never actually transferred the house to the son. When his father died, the son
claimed to be the equitable owner and the court ordered the testamentary trustees to convey the
land to him. See also Inwards v Baker [1965] 2 Q.B. 29, C.A.
In Wilmott v Barber (1880) 15 Ch D 96, Fry J considered that five elements had to be established
before proprietary estoppel could operate:
 the plaintiff must have made a mistake as to his legal rights;

 the plaintiff must have done some act of reliance;
 the defendant, the possessor of a legal right, must know of the existence of his own right
which is inconsistent with the right claimed by the plaintiff;
 the defendant must know of the plaintiff's mistaken belief; and
 the defendant must have encouraged the plaintiff in his act of reliance.
Although proprietary estoppel was only traditionally available in disputes affecting title to real
property, it has now gained limited acceptance in other areas of law. Proprietary estoppel is
closely related to the doctrine of constructive trust.
The term "proprietary estoppel" is not used in American law, but the principle is part and parcel of
the general doctrine of promissory estoppel.
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Promissory estoppel
The doctrine of promissory estoppel prevents one party from withdrawing a promise made to a
second party if the latter has relied on that promise and acted upon it.
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English law
In English law, a promise made without consideration is generally not enforceable. It is known as
a bare or gratuitous promise. Thus, if a car salesman promises not to sell a car over the weekend,
but does so, the promise cannot be enforced. But should the car salesman accept even one penny
in consideration for the promise, the promise will be binding and enforceable in court. Estoppel is
an exception to this rule.
The doctrine of promissory estoppel was first developed in Hughes v. Metropolitan Railway Co
[1877] but was lost for some time until it was resurrected by Lord Denning in the controversial
case of Central London Property Trust Ltd v. High Trees House Ltd [1947] K.B. 130.
In this case, the plaintiffs leased a block of flats to the defendants at an annual rent of £2500 - but,
because the defendants were unable to find enough tenants while London was being bombed
during WWII, they agreed to accept a reduction in rent to £1250. There was no consideration for
this promise to accept a lower rent. At the end of the war the flats were again fully let, and the
plaintiffs claimed the full rent for the remainder of the contract beginning the final half of that
year, 1945. Denning J held that, in good conscience, they were entitled to the full rent from the
end of the war, but noted that they were estopped from going back on their promise had they
claimed rents from the wartime period as well.
Promissory estoppel requires:
 (i) an unequivocal promise by words or conduct,

 (ii) evidence that there is a change in position of the promisee as a result of the promise
(reliance but not necessarily to their detriment),
 (iii) inequity if the promisor was to go back on the promise.
Estoppel is "a shield not a sword" — it cannot be used as the basis of an action on its own. It also
does not extinguish rights. In High Trees the plaintiff company was able to restore payment of full
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rent from early 1945, and could have restored the full rent at any time after the initial promise was
made provided a suitable period of notice had been given. It is to be noted that in this case, the
estoppel was applied to a 'negative promise', that is, one where a party promises not to enforce full
rights.
Estoppel is an equitable (as opposed to common law) construct and its application is therefore
discretionary. In the case of D & C Builders v. Rees the courts refused to recognise a promise to
accept a part payment of £300 on a debt of £482 on the basis that it was extracted by duress. In
Combe v. Combe Denning elaborated on the equitable nature of estoppel by refusing to allow its
use as a "sword" by an ex-wife to extract funds from the destitute husband.
Promissory estoppel is not available when one party promises to accept a lesser sum in full
payment of a debt, unless the debtor offers payment at an earlier date than was previously agreed.
This is the rule formulated in Pinnel's Case (1602) 5 Co Rep 117a, and affirmed in Foakes v. Beer
(1884) 9 App Cas 605.
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Australian law
The doctrine of promissory estoppel was adopted into Australian law in Legione v. Hateley (1983)
152 CLR 406; however, the plaintiffs were unsuccessful in that case because the reliance was
unreasonable and the promise not unequivocal.
In fact, now Australian law has gone beyond the position espoused in the High Trees case; it has
been extended successfully to cases where there is no pre-existing legal relationship between the
two parties, and promissory estoppel can be wielded as a "sword", not just as a "shield". Mason
CJ and Wilson J in Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v. Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387 held that if
estoppel is proven, it gives rise to an equity in favour of the plaintiff, and the court will do the
minimum equity that is just in the circumstances. From this case, it is also possible for the
promise to come from silence or inaction.
As noted above, in Australian law, there is an element of unconscionability, which is satisfied if
one party encourages the other party to create assumptions that lead to reliance.
Today, the principle of estoppel may give birth to an enforcable obligation even without a
consideration under the following conditions: 1. promise 2. unhonest behavior of the promittant 3.
special relationship between the promittant and the beneficior (eg: duty of information) 4.
irreversible changement of the situation of the beneficior of the promise
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American law
In the many jurisdictions of the United States, promissory estoppel is generally an alternative to
consideration as a basis for enforcing a promise. It is also sometimes referred to as detrimental
reliance.
The American Law Institute in 1932 included the principle of estoppel into § 90 of the
Restatement of Contracts, stating:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance
of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of
the promise. Restatement (Second) removed the requirement that the detriment be
"substantial".
The distinction between promissory estoppel and equitable estoppel should be noted:
Equitable estoppel is distinct from promissory estoppel. Promissory estoppel involves a
clear and definite promise, while equitable estoppel involves only representations and
inducements. The representations at issue in promissory estoppel go to future intent, while
equitable estoppel involves statement of past or present fact. It is also said that equitable
estoppel lies in tort, while promissory estoppel lies in contract. The major distinction
between equitable estoppel and promissory estoppel is that the former is available only as
a defense, while promissory estoppel can be used as the basis of a cause of action for
damages. 28 Am Jur 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 35
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Suppose that B goes to a store and sees a sign that the price of a radio is $10. B tells the
shopkeeper that he will get the money and come back later that day to purchase it; there is no
discussion of price. The shopkeeper says that when B returns, he will be happy to deal with B as
he deals with all his customers but that, if he sells all the radios (he has three), he will not be able
to help B. Hearing this, B goes and sells his watch for $10 (it was really worth $15, but since B
wanted the money right away, he chose not to wait for the best price). When B returns, the sign
says $11, and the owner tells B that he has raised the price. In Equity, can you argue that the
shopkeeper is estopped by conduct? B relied upon the implied representation that a radio would
be sold for $10 when he returned with the money; B has sold his watch at a price lower than the
market price, and thus he has acted to his detriment. (Note that if B's watch was worth $10, and he
received a fair price, there would be no detriment.) But the problem is that the shopkeeper did not
guarantee to hold one of the radios against the possibility of B's return nor did they agree a fixed
price. The shopkeeper's conscience might have been affected if he had known that B was going
home to collect the money and would definitely return to buy one of the three radios. Indeed, in
some common law jurisdictions, a promise by the shopkeeper to hold a specific radio would
create a binding contract, even if B had to go for the money. A promise to pay the owner in the
future is good consideration if it is made in exchange for a promise to sell a specific radio (one
from three is probably sufficiently specific): one promise in exchange for a second promise
creates equal value. So the shopkeeper's actual words and knowledge are critical to deciding
whether either a contract or an estoppel arises.
For an example of promissory estoppel in the construction industry, suppose that B Ltd
consolidates estimates from a number of subcontractors and quotes a single price on a competitive
tender. The client accepts B Ltd's quote and construction begins. But one of the subcontractors
then claims reimbursement above its original estimate and, because of this change, B Ltd cannot
profit from the works. If both parties knew that the accuracy of the individual estimates was
critical to the success of the tender and the profitability of the contract as a whole, a court might
apply promissory estoppel and allow B Ltd to pay only what the subcontractor originally
estimated rather than the new, higher price. But, if both parties hoped that there would be an
opportunity to increase the contract prices to reflect additional expenditure, the subcontractor's
conscience would not be as limited in seeking a higher payment and B Ltd might be penalised for
not building an adequate contingency sum into the tendered price.
One contentious point during the drafting of the Restatement was how to calculate the amount of
damages flowing from a promissory estoppel. During the deliberations, the following example
was considered: a young man's uncle promises to give him $1,000 to buy a car. The young man
buys a car for $500, but the uncle refuses to pay any money. One view was that the young man
should be entitled to $1,000 (the amount promised), but many believed that the young man should
only be entitled to $500 (the amount he actually lost). The language eventually adopted for the
Second Restatement reads: "The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires." —
a formula which leaves quantification to the discretion of the court.
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Other estoppels
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Estoppel in pais
Estoppel in pais (literally “by act of notoriety", or "solemn formal act”) is the historical root of
common law estoppel by representation and equitable estoppel. The terms Estoppel in pais and
equitable estoppel are used interchangeably in American law.
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Part 1 Page 141
Estoppel by convention
Estoppel by convention in English law (also known as estoppel by agreement) occurs where two
parties negotiate or operate a contract but make a mistake. If they share an assumption, belief or
understanding of how the contract will be interpreted or what the legal effect will be, they are
bound by that belief, assumption or understanding if:
 (i) they both knew the other had the same belief, and
 (ii) they both based their subsequent dealings on those beliefs.
Some say that that estoppel by convention is not truly an estoppel in its own right, but merely an
instance of reliance-based estoppel (estoppel by representation would be its most frequent form).
Others see it is no more than an application of the rule of interpretation that, where words in a
contract are ambiguous, you always interpret those words so as to give effect to the actual
intentions of the parties even though that would not be the usual legal outcome.
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Estoppel by acquiescence
Estoppel by acquiescence may arise when one person gives a legal warning to another based on
some clearly asserted facts or legal principle, and the other does not respond within "a reasonable
period of time". By acquiescing, the other person is generally considered to have lost the legal
right to assert the contrary.
As an example, suppose that Jill has been storing her car on Jack's land with no contract between
them. Jack sends a registered letter to Jill's legal address, stating: "I am no longer willing to allow
your car to stay here for free. Please come get your car, or make arrangements to pay me rent for
storing it. If you do not do so, within 30 days, I will consider the car abandoned and will claim
ownership of it. If you need more time to make arrangements, please contact me within 30 days,
and we can work something out." If Jill does not respond, she may be said to have relinquished
her ownership of the car, and estoppel by acquiescence may prevent any court from invalidating
Jack's actions of registering the car in his name and using it as his own.
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Estoppel by deed
Estoppel by deed is a rule of evidence arising from the status of a contract signed under seal —
such agreements, called deeds, are more strictly enforced than ordinary contracts and the parties
are expected to take greater care to verify the contents before signing them. Hence, once signed,
all statements of fact (usually found in the opening recital which sets out the reason(s) for making
the deed) are conclusive evidence against the parties who are estopped from asserting otherwise.
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Issue Estoppel
Issue Estoppel or Res Judicata The civil law use of issue estoppel or res judicata (literally
translated as "the fact has been decided") is relatively uncontroversial. It expresses a general
public interest that the same issue should not be litigated more than once even when the parties
are different. The criminal law application, called double jeopardy provides that a person should
not be tried twice for the same offence. In crime/mystery fiction, it is a common plot device to
have the villain exploit the rule. In the world of real crime, some cases have achieved notoriety,
e.g. in the Birmingham Six saga, the House of Lords ruled in Hunter v. Chief Constable of the
West Midlands Police (1982) that issue estoppel applied. Lord Diplock said:
The inherent power which any court of justice must possess to prevent misuse of its
procedure in a way which, although not inconsistent with the literal application of its
procedural rules, would nevertheless be manifestly unfair to a party to litigation before it,
Part 1 Page 142
or would otherwise bring the administration of justice into disrepute among right-thinking
people.
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External links
 On issue estoppel: House of Lords - Arthur JS Hall and Co. v. Simons
 Convergence of estoppels (1) : High Court of Australia - Walton Stores (Interstate) Ltd v
Maher
 Convergence of estoppels (2) : High Court of Australia - The Commonwealth v Verwayen
 Review of the state of convergence: High Court of Australia - Giumelli v Giumelli
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estoppel"
END QUOTE
In my view, the DUTY OF CARE requires the Australian Electoral Commissioner to still ensure
that the constitutional based objections are appropriately dealt with as to ensure that the
legislation, part legislation, proclamation and/or writ(s) are appropriately declared to be ULTRA
VIRES or INTRA VIRES.
There is no legal duty upon me to pursue this matter further, as once I made the constitutional
based objections, then for my part I had basically done what I could to have the legislation, part
legislation, proclamation and/or writ(s) become ULTRA VIRES.
It was then the duty of the Australian Electoral Commissioner to immediately seek relief from the
appropriate Court as to state the true constitutional position that may or may not have been to
declare the election process and so the election valid.
The Australian Electoral Commissioner having failed to do so, and by this the entire election was
ULTRA VIRES and remained for ever to be so, then there was no way Section 245 of the
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 could be invoked for this either.
Hence, the undisposed constitutional based objections became an ESTOPPEL against any
enforcement of Section 245 in that regard also.
The affirmative misconduct by the Australian Electoral Commission, having misled me as to the
appropriate process to pursue matters objected against to be rectified should therefore be a
ESTOPPEL against wrongful enforcement of what was objected against.
http://online.ceb.com/calcases/C3/3C3d462.htm
CITY OF LONG BEACH v. MANSELL (1970) 3 C3d 462
A similar statement of the doctrine has appeared in the statutes of California since 1872
(former Code Civ. Proc., § 1962, subd. 3), and section 623 of the Evidence Code now
provides: "Whenever a party has, by his own {Page 3 Cal.3d 489} statement or conduct,
intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true and to act upon
such belief, he is not, in any litigation arising out of such statement or conduct, permitted to
contradict it."
Attorney-General to certify legislation constitutionally valid
&
Need for an OFFICE OF THE GUARDIAN
Part 1 Page 143
The following will show that besides any Member of Parliament being able to challenge the
constitutional validity of a proposed Bill, the Speaker (House of Representatives) or the President
(Senate) can challenge constitutional validity of a Bill, as well as that the Attorney-General must
certify the constitutional validity of a proposed law (Bill).
But, as Attorney-Generals are political appointments recommended by a Prime Minister their
judgment could be clouded and for this also an OFFICE OF THE GUARDIAN, a constitutional
council, to advise the Government, the People, the Parliament and the Courts about constitutional
powers and limitations should be the way validity of proposed legislation (Bill)
As is seen with citizenship, religious objection, etc, legislation is put in place where no one seems
to have a clue what is constitutionally proper. Members of Parliament often rely upon the
Attorney-General or their political leader who may not have a clue what is or is not
constitutionally permitted. Hence, an OFFICE OF THE GUARDIAN could provide unbias
presentation and members of Parliament could obtain independent advise not tainted by political
motives. Likewise so the public.
Mr. ISAACS.-It seems that the Constitution is, made for the Senate, and not for the
people.
Mr. DEAKIN.-Not even for the Senate.
Sir JOHN DOWNER.-Now it is coming out. The Constitution is made for the people and
the states on terms that are just to both.
Mr. DEAKIN.-It is made for the lawyers under this clause.
Sir JOHN DOWNER.-I do not think so. If you say "Trust the Parliament," no
Constitution is required at all; it can simply be provided that a certain number of gentlemen
shall be elected, and meet together, and, without limitation, do what they like. Victoria
would not agree to that. But there is a desire to draw the very life-blood of the Constitution,
so far as the states are concerned, by this insidious amendment, which would give the
Houses authority from time to time to put different constructions on this most important part
of the Constitution. I hope we will do as we have done in many instances before, in matters
that have been much debated-adhere to the decision we have already arrived at.
Dr. QUICK-(Victoria).-In the earlier stages of the history of the Convention we heard the
doctrine propounded of "Trust the Federal Parliament." It seems that doctrine has been
exploded, and that we are approaching another doctrine-"Do not trust the Senate." Here is a
privilege supposed to be put in the Constitution especially to protect the Senate, and to
increase its power, influence, and independence. Now it is assumed that the Senate cannot
be trusted-that the Chamber for whose special benefit, honour, and dignity this power is to
be inserted cannot be trusted. You cannot trust it or its President, or its majority, to avail
itself of its own privileges; you want to place a power in this Constitution in another body
outside the Senate to protect the privileges of the Senate. I, for one, have a higher [start page
2007] opinion of the authority, influence, and independence of the Senate than those who
now want to hedge about the Senate with this judicial protection. In the first place, it is not
necessary to hedge the Senate about with this judicial protection. The Senate should be quite
capable of protecting and defending itself against any invasion of its privileges from another
Chamber. There are two methods in which the privileges of the Senate can be defended;
first, there is the President, whose absolute duty it would be to rule out of order any Bill
from the House of Representatives infringing or violating those privileges. It would be the
prerogative of the President to do this, absolutely regardless of the opinion of the Senate
itself. The President has not merely to act upon a point taken by a member of the Senate, but
Part 1 Page 144
is placed in his position to act of his own motion, without waiting to have his attention
directed to any particular clause infringing the Constitution. It would be the duty of a
President to say that the Bill was out of order, and it would then be sent back to the House
of Representatives with an intimation to that effect. I venture to question whether even a
majority of the Senate would dare to attempt to override a decision of the President. We are
asked to assume, firstly, that the President would not do his duty; then we are asked to go
further, and assume that the majority would either wink at infringements of the Constitution
or fail to do its duty. Secondly, we are asked to create a judicial body outside Parliament,
with power to declare that after the Bill has been passed, it is ultra vires, not on the ground
of substance, or that it deals with a matter with which it has no substantial jurisdiction to
deal-one could understand that-but that a Bill is ultra vires on the ground that there has been
some mistake in procedure in the progress of the Bill through Parliament. It would be, in my
opinion, an absolute degradation of the Federal Parliament to allow such power to be
exercised even by a judicial body, not only on account of the inconvenience which might
result, as pointed out by Mr. Isaacs, but also on account of the absolute indignity it would
inflict on the Federal Parliament. The Supreme Court would have undoubted and righteous
jurisdiction on a point of substance. But it is another matter to say that the Supreme Court
should have power to interfere in a technical question of procedure in reference to a Bill
passed by the two Federal Houses, and declare a Bill on that ground to be ultra vires. We
ought to fairly trust that that House which is clothed with privilege to exercise that privilege
will preserve it, and we ought not to assume that that House will not do its constitutional
duty.
Mr. CARRUTHERS (New South Wales).-It is worth while considering the stages that a
proposed law has to go through, and the opportunity afforded to a member of either House
or a member of the Executive to call attention to any infraction or infringement of the
Constitution. It does not require a majority of the members of the House of Representatives
to insist that the Constitution shall be obeyed in the matter of procedure; it only requires one
solitary member to rise to a point of order, and the Speaker has to give a legal interpretation
of the rules of procedure. It only requires one member of the Senate to call the attention of
the President to the fact that a Bill is introduced contrary to the Constitution for that
proposed law to be ruled out of order. It does not require a majority of the states to insist
that the Constitution shall be obeyed, because a majority of the states cannot by resolution
infringe the Constitution. Neither House could pass the standing order which would give the
majority power to dissent from the Speaker's or President's ruling. The standing orders only
confer certain explicit power. They give no power to either House to pass an order which
would enable its members to amend the Constitution.
[start page 2008]
Therefore, the protection is absolutely effective, when one member of either House can by
raising a point of order arrest the passage of a proposed law which infringes the rules
regulating procedure. Then, after the law has been passed by both Houses, it is presented to
the Governor for his assent. Under constitutional usage we know that the Governor always
insists upon the Law officer of the Crown giving him a certificate that everything necessary
to be complied with by law has been complied with. The Attorney-General for the time
being has to give a certificate to the Governor, and we may be sure that that practice will be
followed under the Federation. That is sufficient protection. Then there is the other ground,
that this is a proposal to protect the rights of the people against the encroachments of the
Legislature.
Part 1 Page 145
Attorney-Generals generally are lawyers who had limited practice experiences and unlikely are
“constitutionalist” yet their principle job is to certify that proposed laws (Bills) are within the
Constitutional powers to legislate.
A clear example at the moment is the Industrial Relations. Constitutionally “company” legislative
powers is only to Industrial Relations issues beyond the border of one State, but the Federal
parliament driven by political motives enacted draconic unconstitutional legislation, seemingly
certified by the Attorney-General as being within constitutional limits where had the Attorney-
General checked back on the Hansard records of the Constitution Convention Debates he may
just have discovered it is not so.
And here is the problem that without an OFFICE OF THE GUARDIAN there is no one who can
put up a reasonable set out what is constitutionally appropriate. This is also why since 1948 no
one even understood that “citizenship” is a State legislative power nothing to do with the
Commonwealth.
The same problems are with interpreting the true meaning of the Constitution. For example
Section 43 use the word “chosen” but this, as with “chosen” in section 44 refers actually to being
“chosen” by the Governor-General not as to being elected in a “election”. This, as the Framers of
the Constitution made clear that the electors could elected anyone, even if disqualified within
Section 44, provided the person get rid of any disability before taking up a seat in the Parliament.
Therefore the Governor-General cannot choose a person elected if this person is still subject of a
disability referred to in Section 44. Likewise, while a Member of one House can stand as a
candidate in an election for another House, the person if elected cannot be chosen by the
Governor-General to take the seat unless the person first relinquish the seat already held in the
other House.
By this electors are robbed of a FAIR and PROPER election, being unable to vote for those they
may desire to vote because a member of one House would not want to give up their seat without
first having the security of being elected to the other House!
44B. A member of either house of the parliament of the commonwealth shall be incapable
of being chosen or of sitting as a member of the other house of the parliament.
I think the phraseology conveys all that can be said in connection with the matter.
The Hon. E. BARTON: It is only a question of drafting!
The Hon. Sir P.O. FYSH: It is a question of drafting; and if the hon. and learned member
will make a note of it, it will obviate the necessity for any discussion on the point.
The Right Hon. Sir JOHN FORREST: The proposal to which the hon. member has
referred goes further than the proposal in this bill!
The Hon. Sir P.O. FYSH: It is a provision which we ought to apply to both houses, and I
submit that our proper course is to strike out the clause now, and to, reconsider it when we
come to Part IV.
The CHAIRMAN: Do I understand that the hon. member, Mr Wise, desires to, move an
amendment.
Mr. WISE (New South Wales)[9.59]: I do not desire to move an amendment at this stage;
but the question I wish to test is whether a member of the senate and the house of
Part 1 Page 146
representatives should not have the power to contest an election for a seat in the house of
which he is not a member without resigning his seat in the house to which he belongs.
The Right Hon. Sir JOHN FORREST: He might be elected without knowing it!
Mr. WISE: I do not wish to press the matter now. I have not the reports of the Tasmanian
debates before me; but I was under the impression that an amendment to this effect had been
moved by Mr. A.I. Clark. I think it is well worthy the attention of the Committee.
The Hon. E. BARTON (New South Wales)[10]: It will lead to considerable complication if
the electors of the whole commonwealth do not understand that when a person is a member
of the senate be cannot be made a member of the house of representatives. To place the
matter in this way in the constitution does not impair the efficiency of the clause, and it is, at
the same time, a clear indication to every elector as to what is intended.
The Hon. Sir P. 0. FYSH: Would it not be well to change the position of the clause?
The Hon. E. BARTON: It is not a question of position!
The CHAIRMAN: I understand that the hon. and learned member, Mr. Wise, does not
intend to move his amendment.
Mr. WISE: No!
The Hon. N.E. LEWIS (Tasmania)[10.1]: If this clause is to stand part of the bill I think it
should go further and provide that a member of the house of [start page 460] representatives
shall not be capable of being chosen or sitting as a member of the senate.
Mr. WISE: Do this later on!
The Hon. E. BARTON: It is possible the position of the clause will have to be changed!
The Hon. N.E. LEWIS: If you pass this clause you ought to have an alternative provision
in regard to the senate.
The Right Hon. G.H. REID (New South Wales)[10.2]: I think it would be well if this
clause were postponed, because there is a strong opinion that, if this clause is retained in the
bill, there should be a similar clause with reference to the members of the house of
representatives.
The Hon. H. DOBSON: They both come later!
The Right Hon. G.H. REID: Yes.
The Hon. E. BARTON (New South Wales)[10.3]: I have no objection to the postponement
of the clause, which will give us an opportunity to consider the matter.
Clause postponed.
Part 1 Page 147
offices!
certainties.
certainty!
The Hon. S. FRASER: That removes part of my objection certainly.
The Hon. R.E. O'CONNOR: They are not to come under this provision until they have
been elected and have a right to sit in the federal parliament!
position.
Again;
It will lead to considerable complication if the electors of the whole commonwealth do not
understand that when a person is a member of the senate be cannot be made a member of
the house of representatives.
A person elected is not a Member of Parliament unless first chosen by the Governor-General to
become a Member of Parliament and only when the elected person actually accepts this then the
person becomes a Member of Parliament.
There are in that regard three stages;
1. A person is elected
2. The elected person is “chosen” by the Governor General to become a Member of a House
of the Representatives or is “chosen” by the Governor of the relevant State to become a
Senator..
3. The elected and “chosen” person accept to take up a seat in the Parliament.
As the Framers of the Constitution made clear, a person may be elected but then decide not to
accept to take up a seat in the Parliament.
The Governor could “choose” to have a by the State nominated person to become a Senator, even
so this person was not elected! Hence, “chosen” and “elected” have different meanings.
Section 11 of the Constitution refers to “choose” and this does not refer to an “election” but a
failure by a State to nominate its Senator. For example, the State may refuse to nominate the
elected person to represent it as a Senate Member (Senator). The Governor of the State may refuse
to have “chosen” the elected person for whatever reason the Governor deems fit and proper! The
person elected may be in breach of Section 44 of the Constitution, being still subject to a bankrupt
order, etc.
Likewise, the Governor-General may not “choose” a sitting Member of the Senate to take up a
seat in the house of Representatives unless the person first resign his/her seat in the Senate.
Likewise, a Governor may refuse to “choose” a person elected to be a Senator if the Governor is
aware this person still is a Member of the House of Representatives.
A person may have been an eligible person to take up a seat in the Parliament (if elected and
chosen) at the time an election was held and subsequently elected but then when either the
Part 1 Page 148
governor or the Governor-General is due to choose the elected person this person is subjected to a,
say, bankrupt order. The Governor-General or the Governor cannot now “choose” this person as
the person, albeit eligible at the time the election was held no longer is entitled to become a
Member of Federal Parliament because of the bankrupt order made since the election was held.
It is therefore essential to differentiate as to what the word “chosen” means in the Constitution
and not confuse it with being elected.
This Court would likely never have had this case to be heard before it had the Attorney-General in
the first place not certified the validity of the Australian Citizenship Act 1948, as such. Likewise,
had the relevant Attorney-General not certified for Subsection 245(14) for “religious objection”
but had provided for a general objection, and indeed had never certified for compulsory voting
either. The same with the Australian Electoral Commissioner removing people of the electoral roll
because they cannot be located, which is in breach of Section 41 of the Constitution. Numerous
other electoral issues are relating to being unconstitutional but who to complaint to when those in
power have their, sot to say, TUNNEL VISION and the Australian electoral commissioner, such
as in the 25-10-2001 correspondence of his lawyers argues that it has all along been done that
way.
Every election thousands upon thousands of people are unconstitutionally fined for not voting
even so it is embedded in the Constitution that one does not have to vote. Regretfully, no court
dealing in the past with cases regarding the compulsory voting ever bothered to consider what is
constitutionally appropriate considering what the Framers intended. This is why an OFFICE OF
THE GUARDIAN is so essential, as then finally any Court can seek relevant and appropriate
information without overlooking relevant details.
No judge can be expected to spend years of research on each and every constitutional issue that
arises, as the Defendant has done. Hence, without an OFFICE OF THE GUARDIAN existing
problems will accumulate more and more with new problems and it all or at least most of it could
be avoided if just some central source of information was available to anyone who desired to be
aware of what might be constitutionally proper.
This Court unlikely is going to adjourn the matter and then for the presiding judge to study all
material relating to the Constitution Convention Debates as to discover what was the true
intention of the Framers of the Constitution. The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecution
hardly could be the appropriate source of information either, as they cannot even manage to be
aware of a “religious objection” and so any charge is without legal justification.
The Australian Electoral Commissioner hardly could be a source of information in that regard
either as the Australian Electoral Commissioner cannot even manage to apply the relevant
legislative provisions. It is therefore now that the Defendant is the more competent person and as
a self educated “constitutionalist” is the real source of information, and this is also demonstrated
in this ADDRESS TO THE COURT also.
Can the Commonwealth of Australia legislate as to influence constitutional provisions?
As set out extensively below the Commonwealth of Australia specifically has been excluded to in
any way legislate as to influence the meaning and application of the Constitution, this as the
Framers of the Constitution provided for Section 128 Referendum to do so.
Where the issues are statutory then the Commonwealth of Australia, for so far the legislation is
and remains within constitutional powers and limitations can amend its legislation. However,
below is given an example where there was an unconstitutional attempt to seek to amend the
meaning of proclamation referred to in Section 32 of the Constitution, and the usage of the word
“citizenship” and “Australian citizenship” and other constitutional provisions where this is and
remains beyond its constitutional powers to do so, and hence the Court must address those issues
Part 1 Page 149
as to what is constitutionally appropriate, not to show any bias as to stray from this to hand down
a judgment that may be seen to be politically motivated or otherwise a denial of JUSTICE.
"In any event, the problem, being statutory and not constitutional, is ultimately, as it was in
the beginning, susceptible of congressional disposition."
United States v. Price Et AL , Supreme Court of the United States 383 U.S. 787; 86 S. Ct. 1152;
1966 U.S. LEXIS 1963
THIS PART IS CONTINUED BY PART 2

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ADDRESS TO THE COURT

What is an ADDRESS TO THE COURT?

TRANSCRIPT & DENIAL OF REASON OF JUDGMENTS

UNREPRESENTED DEFENDANT A SELF EDUCATED “CONSTITUTIONALIST”

Andrei Sakharov, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/andrei_sakharov_quote_30a9)

Alexander Hamilton, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/alexander_hamilton_quote_71c2)

Fredrich August von Hayek, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quotes_by/fredrich+august+von+hayek )

Robert Lindner, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/robert_lindner_quote_a79f)

Page 2 ADDRESS TO THE COURT including SUBMISSIONS By the Defendant, Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka.

Friedrich Nietzsche, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/friedrich_nietzsche_quote_3039)

George Orwell, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/george_orwell_quote_304c )

Lysander Spooner, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/lysander_spooner_quote_654e)

Lysander Spooner, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote_blog/Lysander.Spooner.Quote.DEEB )

Voltaire, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/voltaire_quote_312a )

Ludwig von Mises, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/ludwig_von_mises_quote_bca5)

Immanuel Kant, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/immanuel_kant_quote_a319)

Page 3 ADDRESS TO THE COURT including SUBMISSIONS By the Defendant, Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka.

It is only by virtue of his citizenship of a state or of a territory

Likewise, any correspondence obtained by the Australian Electoral Commission under a

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 21 November 1991, LOCAL GOVERNMENT (ELECTIONS)

ENROLMENT AND CONDUCT OF ELECTIONS

Page 4 ADDRESS TO THE COURT including SUBMISSIONS By the Defendant, Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka.

The Victorian Justice Handbook 1962 page 83:

ADMISSION AND CONFESSIONS.

Confessions may be received in criminal matters. No confession which is tendered in

Comparison between Admissions and Confessions.

1. Civil proceedings. 1. Criminal proceedings.

2. Need not be voluntary. 2. Must be voluntary.

3. May be made by agent, 3. Usually made only by

“DESIRE” to vote cannot be compulsory to vote!

• In 1915, consideration was given to introducing compulsory voting for a

Voting as a Civic Duty

The Commonwealth of Australia legislative powers in regard of elections is bound by what is

Hansard 24-3-1897 Constitution Convention Debates

Page 8 ADDRESS TO THE COURT including SUBMISSIONS By the Defendant, Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

(For general comments on its implementation see

3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:

Page 9 ADDRESS TO THE COURT including SUBMISSIONS By the Defendant, Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka.

(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by

Hansard 1-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

Mr. SYMON.-It is not a law which is ultra vires.

Mr. SYMON.-It is not a law if it is ultra vires.

Mr. HIGGINS.-But suppose they go beyond their power?

Mr. GORDON.-It is still the expression of Parliament. Directly a Ministry seeks to

Page 11 ADDRESS TO THE COURT including SUBMISSIONS By the Defendant, Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka.

Mr. GLYNN.-That is pandering to the popular cry.

Mr. SYMON.-Why not make them the High Court at once?

Page 12 ADDRESS TO THE COURT including SUBMISSIONS By the Defendant, Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka.

[start page 1721]

Page 16 ADDRESS TO THE COURT including SUBMISSIONS By the Defendant, Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka.

Conduct of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions in litigation

Lack of responses by Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions

Page 18 ADDRESS TO THE COURT including SUBMISSIONS By the Defendant, Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka.

In my view, the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions obtained fraudulently a

Sixteenth American Jurisprudence

Page 19 ADDRESS TO THE COURT including SUBMISSIONS By the Defendant, Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka.

Evidence Act 1958 (Vic)

With or without conviction, order a fine

With or without conviction, adjourn the hearing on conditions

In making such an order, the court would consider:

Convict and discharge

Dismiss the charge