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Acta Sociologica(1992)35:107-122
1. Introduction
Commonto a great deal of modernas well
as classicalsociologicaltheorizingis a focus
on explanationsof socialactions. In a recent
article in Acta Sociologica, Therborn
writes: 'Sociological theorizingis likely to
change dramatically in the near future,
movingfrom focusingon conceptualization
onto explanation' (1991:177). That the
basic aim of sociological theorization(and
conceptualization)should be to contribute
to an explanatory science is a notion which
analyticaltheorizing,Turner(1987) argues
thatsociologicaltheorizationmustfocuson
causality in terms of abstract processes
which would
108
2. Weber's contributionto a
causal-explanatorysocial
science4
2.1. Verstehenand causal explanationan integratedapproach
The interpretation and presentation of
Weber'smethodologyhas to a large extent
been affected by the tendency towards
polarizationin the discussion concerning
methodologyin the social sciences. Many
have regarded him chiefly as a representative of the anti-positivist side in the
controversiesbetween understandingand
causalexplanation.andbetweenqualitative
and quantitativemethods. By and large,
Weber is most often presented as a 'verstehen sociologist',at the same time as his
developmentof the concept of causalityis
either ignoredor just mentionedin passing
(see e.g. Herva 1988). He has been used as Eliaeson (1982) puts it - as a 'stick with
whichto beat opponents'in 'the verstehen/
erklaren debate' (p. 22. translation my
own). In Swedishsociology the picture of
Weber has been in part coloured by the
longdrawn-out'softdatadebate', wherehe
has been cited as a representativeof a 'soft
data sociology' (Johansson 1966) or a
'qualitativesociology'(Hughes& Mansson
1988).
Sociology (in the sense in which this highly
ambiguousword is used here) is a science
concerning itself with the interpretive understandting of social action and thereby with a
causal
explanationi
an intentionalexplanatorymodel basically
divergingfrom the causal one - does not
appearto constituteanysortof problemfor
Weber.Intentionalityis regardedas one of
various causal processes jointly contributing to the production of a certain action
2.4. Contextuality,abstractionand
empiricalgeneralization
Weber's methodological reasoning representsthe takingof a particularattitudeto
the question of the relationshipbetween
contextuality, abstraction and empirical
generalization,a question that permeates
both the methodologicalconflictsin which
Weber was involved and the similar conflicts that have taken place during the
presentcentury. The starting-pointfor his
positions- as they are formulatedin. principally,the early methodologicalwritingsis a notion of reality as consisting of an
infinitelymanifoldandinexhaustiblecourse
of empirical and individual phenomena.
The standpointWeber develops- a standpoint influenced by neo-Kantianism involvesa repudiationof a numberof possible waysof handlingthis complexcontext.
First, there is a rejection of the radical
contextualismwhere the aim is to capture
a part of reality in its total manifoldness
without the aid of any conceptual framework: '.
112
113
religion, and between high economic development and the breakthroughof Protestantism. These quantitativecorrelations
are not used for givingexplanationsbut for
formulatingtheproblemon whichthe study
is then to focus, namely what causal processes- what effectiveforces- lie behind the
correlations(Weber 1976:35,68).
A distinctive feature of Weber's procedure is that he does not seek the causal
3. Criticalrealismand the
developmentof a generative
concept of causality
The mostimportantscientific-philosophical
contributionsto criticalrealism,and to the
generative view of causality that has
emerged within this tradition, have come
from Rom Harre and Roy Bhaskar (see
e.g. Bhaskar 1978a, b, 1979, 1989, 1990;
Harre 1979, 1986; Harre & Secord 1972;
Harre& Madden1975). During the 1970s
and 1980s the generative view has been
developed and appliedby philosophersof
science, sociologists, psychologists, econ-
114
3.1. A dialecticalperspective
The basicstandpointof criticalrealismcan
to a large extent be regarded as representingaspectsof a dielecticalphilosophy
of science. The dialecticperspective,which
is perhapsexpressedin its clearest form in
the works of Bhaskar,influencesboth the
notion of what objects of study are proper
to social science and the epistemological
and methodologicalguidelines.
Social reality, like nature,is regardedas
a changeable. complex and open system,
consisting of causally efficacious mechanismsin interaction(Bhaskar1978a, 1989;
Outhwaite1987).Thereis a sharprejection
of, on the one hand, the Humean mechanicaland atomisticontology, and the view
of society as a 'massof separableevents', a
view on which positivismis considered to
rest, and, on the other hand, the notion of
reality as constituted by subjective interpretations and meanings(Bhaskar 1978a,
b; Harr*& Madden 1975;Sayer 1984).
The generative theory of causality
implies a fundamentalcriticismof the succession view of causality,i.e. causalityas a
question of events following one another
with a certain regularity,and of the idea
that causal explanationscan be expressed
in the form of generalempiricallaws. The
essence of causal analysis is instead the
elucidationof the processes that generate
the objects, events and actionswe seek to
explain. Things. mental processes, social
relationsand structuresare taken to have
causalpower.a potentialfor bringingabout
change;not that this is a question, though.
of some mystical independently existent
power- it residesin propertiesof the things
and relations themselves. Causes are
neither events nor objects but properties.
These properties are effective/productive
and lie behindthe sequencesof events and
constant changes that can be observed in
the real world(Bhaskar1978b,1989;Harre
& Madden 1975; Keat & Urry 1975;
Outhwaite 1987;Sayer 1984).
A central feature of the dialecticalperspective is the notion of realityas stratified.
Concreteevents andabstractcausalpowers
are looked upon as two levels of reality related, but not reducible, to each other.
The abstract level is not associated with
heuristicconcepts but is taken as capturing
115
116
4. Concludingremarks
The covering law theory (likewise the succession theory) of causality has not been
successful when it comes to causal explanations of social actions (see e.g. Bhaskar
1978a;Giddens 1984;Turner1987). I have
here taken up what I regardas two fruitful
alternativesto this very influentialnotion
of causality. The fact that the discussion
withinScandinaviansocialsciencehas been
strongly influenced by the polarization
between positivismand hermeneuticshas
meant that such contributions have
remainedin the backgroundor have been
interpreted in the light of polarizing
perspective on understanding and
explanation.9 Hellenius (1990). for instance. looks upon critical realism as an
expression of 'impure crossing' and an
117
Acknowledgements
I amgratefulto MatsFranzen.andtwo anonymous referees. for commentingon earlier versionsof thisarticle.I also thankMalcolmForbes
for generoushelp with the language.
Received November 1991
FinalversionacceptedFebruary1992
I thinkmanysocialscientiststodaywould
agreethat social realitymustin principlebe
regardedas a constantlychangingcomplex
totality made up of interwoven,and partly
non-observable, effective and affected
social propertiesand processeson different
levels. Yet there is often a disregardof
this in concretecausal-explanatory
research
practice. Even though. for instance, the
mixing up of analysis of variations with
causal analysis has long been criticized, a
crucial proportion of the work in social
sciencedirectedtowardscausalexplanation
still has to do with preciselythe production
of statisticalcorrelationsbetween observable and externally related phenomena
(Lieberson 1985; Manicas 1989; Turner
1987).
Weber and the criticalrealists show the
way to a generativeview of causality.The
causal explanationof social action is to be
found in social properties and meanings
operatingin different contexts, and in the
processes whereby social phenomena are
producedout of pre-existingconditions,but
not in conjunction of events. They also
show the way to methodologieswherecontextualization and conceptualization are
central, indispensable and interrelated
partsof the searchfor causalexplanations.
It is at the same time in the view of concept
formation that we find the perhaps most
essential difference between Weber and
critical realism. With the latter comes a
methodology geared to attempting to
uncoverreal existing structuresand causal
mechanisms by going behind what is
directly observable, this through empirically based abstractionand generation of
theory. In the Weberianmethodology,on
the other hand, concept formation represents idealizations, artificial constructions, whose purposeis to lead the way to
the discovery of causal relations between
concreteempiricaland individualphenomena.
Notes
' Here I am consciouslyavoidinggoing into
the protractedand wide-rangingdebate concerningthe notion of causalityheld by the positivists, and all the variantsand modifications
thathavebeenset forth.I contentmyselfinstead
withformulatingthese- as I see it - fundamental
starting-pointsfor the debate.
2 Weber's writings concerning methodology
were promptedlargelyby the current- firstand
foremostGerman- debateon the subject(Eliaeson 1990a);theyarepolemicalessaysratherthan
systematic scientific-philosophicalworks. and
they contain certain assertionsand arguments
that are neitherconsistentover time nor given
precise definitionand subjected to systematic
discussion (Outhwaite 1983: Tenbruck 1980;
Turner 1986). But what in the first place the
criticalrealistsrepresentis preciselya scientificphilosophicalcurrent. one which was to be
furtherdevelopedabout70 yearslaterin Britain
and the USA.
- It goeswithoutsayingthatWeberandcritical
realism do not offer the only examples. For
instanceRicoeur(1988). fromwithinthe frameworkof the hermeneutictradition,has criticized
for example Dilthey and has argued for a dialectical perspectiveeliminatingthe dualism of
understanding/explanation.
Bunge (1959) has
formulatedsome importantbut not very influential ontologicaland methodologicalstartingpoints for a generative causal-explanatory
science. firstand foremostdirectedtowardsthe
uncoveringof the processesand causal powers
wherebythingsin realityare produced.
' The accountbelow is chieflybasedon three
works that are completelycentral in respect of
Weber'sexplicitdiscussionof methodology:the
essay Objectivityin Social Science and Social
Policy, which came out in 1904: Roscher and
Knies:TheLogicalProblemsof HistoricalEconomics, whichwas publishedin partsduringthe
period 1903-6 in Jahrbuchfar Gesetzgebung,
Verwaltungund Volkswirtschaft;
and the first
part of Economy and Societv. which was a
reworkingof the essay Uber einige Kalegorien
der Verstehenden
Soziologiefrom 1913.In order
to illustrateWeber'smethodologyin its application I also focus on The ProtestantEthic and
I 18
Criticalrealism
Internalrelations
A generativeview of causality
Repudiationof the Humeandefinition
of causality. and of 'covering law'
theory. Causalityas transactivecausal
powersand generativemechanisms
Causality as a question of qualities/
properties/effectivepowers.not of patterns of events formulatedby way of
statisticalcorrelations
Conceptualidealism
Conceptualrealism
Theoryand concept formation(incl. Abstractionsas propertiesin reality
the ideal type) as artificialheuristic Concept formation and theory conaidsin uncoveringconcreteempirical structionas centralgoals of science in
meaningsand relations(this the goal themselves
of science)
Theoriesas relatedto - but not reducible to - empiricalreality
Generalregularitiesas an important Radicalcriticismof the successiontheaid in establishingcausal explana- ory. Regularities say nothing about
tions
causality
Laws as empirical generalizations Causal laws are abstractions from
that can be means but not goal for reality and an important goal for
science
science
Contextualizingapproach
Scientific-historical Nominalisminfluencedby neo-Kanroots
tianism
Natural vs social Indicatesboth basic similaritiesand
science
basic differences. Criticismof positivism does not apply to natural
science
Relationship
Integrated in one and the same
between
causal-explanatory
social science
understanding,
intentionalexplanationand causalityin
social science
119
Contextualizingapproach
RealisminfluencedbydialecticalMarxism
Anti-positivistnaturalism.Criticismof
positivism and the succession theory
appliesto all science
Integratedin one and the same causalexplanatorysocial science
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