REYES VS TUPARAN
FACTS
Petitioner Mila Reyes owns a three-storey commercial building in
Valenzuela City. Respondent, Victoria Tuparan leased a space on
said building for a monthly rental of P4, 000. Aside from being a
tenant, respondent also invested in petitioner's financing business.
On June 20, 1988, Petitioner borrowed P2 Million from Farmers
Savings and Loan Bank (FSL Bank) and mortgaged the building and
lot (subject real properties). Reyes decided to sell the property for
P6.5 Million to liquidate her loan and finance her business.
Respondent offered to conditionally buy the real properties for P4.2
Million on installment basis without interest and to assume the bank
loan. The conditions are the following:
1. Sale will be cancelled if the petitioner can find a buyer of said
properties for the amount of P6.5 Million within the next three
months. All payments made by the respondent to the petitioner and
the bank will be refunded to Tuparan with an additional 6% monthly
interest.
2. Petitioner Reyes will continue using the space occupied by her
drug store without rentals for the duration of the installment
payments.
3. There will be a lease for 15 years in favor of Reyes for a monthly
rental of P8, 000 after full payment has been made by the
defendant.
4. The defendant will undertake the renewal and payment of the
fire insurance policies of the 2 buildings, following the expiration of
the current policies, up to the time the respondent has fully paid the
purchase price.
They presented the proposal for Tuparan to assume the mortgage to
FSL Bank. The bank approved on the condition that the petitioner
would remain as co-maker of the mortgage obligation.
Petitioner's Contention
Under their Deed of Conditional Sale, the respondent is obliged to
pay a lump sum of P1.2 Million in three fixed installments.
Respondent, however defaulted in the payment of the installments.
To compensate for her delayed payments, respondent agreed to pay
petitioner monthly interest. But again, respondent failed to fulfill
this obligation. The petitioner further alleged that despite her
success in finding another buyer according to their conditional sale
agreement, respondent refused to cancel their transaction. The
respondent also neglected to renew the fire insurance policy of the
buildings.
Respondent's Answer
Respondent alleges that the deed of Conditional Sale of Real
Property with Assumption of Mortgage was actually a pure and
absolute contract of sale with a term period. It could not be
considered a conditional sale because the performance of the
obligation therein did not depend upon a future and uncertain
event. She also averred that she was able to fully pay the loan and
secure the release of the mortgage. Since she also paid more than
the P4.2 Million purchase price, rescission could not be resorted to
since the parties could no longer be restored to their original
positions.
ISSUE
Can the transaction or obligation be rescinded given that the
conditions were not satisfied?
RULING(S)
RTC
The deed of conditional sale was a contract to sell. It was of the
opinion that although the petitioner was entitled to a rescission of
the contract, it could not be permitted because her non-payment in
full of the purchase price may not be considered as substantial and
fundamental breach of the contract as to defeat the object of the
parties in entering into the contract. The RTC believed that
respondent showed her sincerity and willingness to settle her
obligation. Hence, it would be more equitable to give respondent a
chance to pay the balance plus interest within a given period of
time. The court ordered the respondent to pay the petitioner the
unpaid balance of the purchase price.
CA
The CA agreed with the RTC that the remedy of rescission could not
apply because the respondents failure to pay the petitioner the
balance of the purchase price in the total amount of 805,000.00
was not a breach of contract, but merely an event that prevented
the seller (petitioner) from conveying title to the purchaser
(respondent). Since respondent had already paid a substantial
amount of the purchase price, it was but right and just to allow her
to pay the unpaid balance of the purchase price plus interest.
SC
The SC agrees that the conditional sale is a contract to sell. The title
and ownership of the subject properties remains with the petitioner
until the respondent fully pays the balance of the purchase price and
the assumed mortgage obligation. Without respondents full
payment, there can be no breach of contract to speak of because
petitioner has no obligation yet to turn over the title. The court
agrees that a substantial amount of the purchase price has already
been paid. It is only right and just to allow Tuparan to pay the said
unpaid balance of the purchase price to Reyes. Granting that a
rescission can be permitted under Article 1191, the Court still cannot
allow it for the reason that, considering the circumstances, there
was only a slight or casual breach in the fulfillment of the obligation.
The court considered fulfillment of 20% of the purchase price is NOT
a substantial breach. Unless the parties stipulated it, rescission is
allowed only when the breach of the contract is substantial and
fundamental to the fulfillment of the obligation. Whether the breach
is slight or substantial is largely determined by the attendant
circumstance. As for the 6% interest, petitioner failed to
substantiate her claim that the respondent committed to pay it.
Petition is denied.
RELEVANT JURISPRUDENCE
Art. 1458. By the contract of sale, one of the contracting parties
obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a
determinate thing, and the other to pay therefore a price certain in
money or its equivalent. The essential elements of a contract of sale
are the following:
a) Consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer
ownership in exchange for the price;
b) Determinate subject matter; and
c) Price certain in money or its equivalent.
In a contract to sell, the seller explicitly reserves the transfer of title
to the prospective buyer. The first element (in the contract of sale) is
missing. There is no consent yet to the transfer of ownership of the
property. (Nabus v Joaquin). The payment of the price is a positive
suspensive condition, failure of which is not a breach but an event
that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from
becoming effective. (Chua v CA)
Art. 1191 does not apply in a contract to sell since the breach
contemplated in said article is an obligors failure to comply with an
existing obligation. It does not apply in the failure of a condition to
make that obligation arise.
the letter of agreement between SSE and Msgr. Cirilos. SSE cannot
revert to the original terms stated in Licup's letter to Msgr. Cirilos
since it was not privy to such contract. The parties to it were Licup
and Msgr. Cirilos. Under the principle of relativity of contracts,
contracts can only bind the parties who entered into it.
ABAD, J.:
PRICE
Facts:
On April 17, 1988 Ramon Licup wrote Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos,
offering to buy three contiguous parcels of land in Paraaque that
The Holy See and Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC) owned for
P1,240.00 per square meter. Licup accepted the responsibility for
removing the illegal settlers on the land and enclosed a check for
P100,000.00 to "close the transaction. He undertook to pay the
balance of the purchase price upon presentation of the title for
transfer and once the property has been cleared of its occupants.
Msgr. Cirilos, representing The Holy See and PRC, signed his name
on the conforme portion of the letter and accepted the check. But
the check could not be encashed due to Licup's stop-order payment.
Licup wrote Msgr. Cirilos on April 26, 1988, requesting that the titles
to the land be instead transferred to petitioner Starbright Sales
Enterprises, Inc. (SSE). He enclosed a new check for the same
amount. SSE's representatives, Mr. and Mrs. Cu, did not sign the
letter.
On November 29, 1988 Msgr. Cirilos wrote SSE, requesting it to
remove the occupants on the property and, should it decide not to
do this, Msgr. Cirilos would return to it the P100,000.00 that he
received. On January 24, 1989 SSE replied with an "updated
proposal. It would be willing to comply with Msgr. Cirilos' condition
provided the purchase price is lowered to P1,150.00 per square
meter.
On January 26, 1989 Msgr. Cirilos wrote back, rejecting the "updated
proposal." He said that other buyers were willing to acquire the
property on an "as is, where is" basis at P1,400.00 per square meter.
He gave SSE seven days within which to buy the property at
P1,400.00 per square meter, otherwise, Msgr. Cirilos would take it
that SSE has lost interest in the same. He enclosed a check for
P100,000.00 in his letter as refund of what he earlier received. The
property was eventually sold to Tropicana Properties and then sold
Standard Realty.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a perfected contract existing between SSE
and land owners, represented by Msgr. Cirilos.
Ruling:
Three elements are needed to create a perfected contract: 1) the
consent of the contracting parties; (2) an object certain which is the
subject matter of the contract; and (3) the cause of the obligation
which is established. Under the law on sales, a contract of sale is
perfected when the seller, obligates himself, for a price certain, to
deliver and to transfer ownership of a thing or right to the buyer,
over which the latter agrees. From that moment, the parties may
demand reciprocal performance.
The Court believes that the letter between Licup and Msgr. Cirilos,
the representative of the property's owners, constituted a perfected
contract. However, when Licup ordered to stop his deposit and
instead transferred the property to SSE, a novation took place.
Novation serves two functions - one is to extinguish an existing
obligation, the other to substitute a new one in its place - requiring
concurrence of four requisites: 1) a previous valid obligation; 2) an
agreement of all parties concerned to a new contract; 3) the
extinguishment of the old obligation; and 4) the birth of a valid new
obligation. In the given case, it was noted that the signatures
present during Licup and Msgr. Cirilos agreement are not present in
Facts:
The RTC ruled in favor of the Fuentes spouses ruling that there was
no forgery, that the testimony of Atty. Plagata who witnessed the
signing of Rosario must be given weight, and that the action has
already prescribed.
On the other hand, the CA reversed the ruling of the CA stating that
the action has not prescribed since the applicable law is the 1950
Civil Code which provided that the sale of Conjugal Property without
the consent of the other spouse is voidable and the action must be
brought within 10 years. Given that the transaction was in 1989 and
the action was brought in 1997 hence it was well within the
prescriptive period.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Rosarios signature on the document of
consent to her husband Tarcianos sale of their conjugal land to the
Fuentes spouses was forged;
3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not
had, could bring the action to annul that sale.
Issue:
RULING: 1. The SC ruled that there was forgery due to the difference
in the signatures of Rosario in the document giving consent and
another document executed at the same time period. The SC noted
that the CA was correct in ruling that the heavy handwriting in the
document which stated consent was completely different from the
sample signature. There was no evidence provided to explain why
there was such difference in the handwriting.
2. Although Tarciano and Rosario was married during the 1950 civil
code, the sale was done in 1989, after the effectivity of the Family
Code. The Family Code applies to Conjugal Partnerships already
established at the enactment of the Family Code. The sale of
conjugal property done by Tarciano without the consent of Rosario
is completely void under Art 124 of the family code. With that, it is a
given fact that assailing a void contract never prescribes. On the
argument that the action has already prescribed based on the
discovery of the fraud, that prescriptive period applied to the
Fuentes spouses since it was them who should have assailed such
contract due to the fraud but they failed to do so. On the other
hand, the action to assail a sale based on no consent given by the
other spouse does not prescribe since it is a void contract.
3. It is argued by the Spouses Fuentes that it is only the spouse,
Rosario, who can file such a case to assail the validity of the sale but
given that Rosario was already dead no one could bring the action
anymore. The SC ruled that such position is wrong since as stated
above, that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the
land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that
sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership of the
Held:
Delivery
EQUATORIAL REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC., vs. MAYFAIR THEATER,
INC.
Posted on September 21, 2013 by winnieclaire
Standard
[G.R. No. 133879. November 21, 2001.]
FACTS:
Mayfair Theater, Inc. was a lessee of portions of a building owned by
Carmelo & Bauermann, Inc. Their lease contracts of 20 years (1.
which covered a portion of the second floor and mezzanine of a twostorey building with about 1,610 square meters of floor area, which
respondent used as a movie house known as Maxim Theater 2. two
store spaces on the ground floor and the mezzanine, with a
combined floor area of about 300 square meters also used as a
movie house Miramar Theater)
Lease contracts contained a provision granting Mayfair a right of first
refusal to purchase the subject properties.
However, before the contracts ended, the subject properties were
sold for P11,300 by Carmelo to Equatorial Realty Development, Inc.
This prompted Mayfair to file a case for the annulment of the Deed
of Absolute Sale between Carmelo and Equatorial, specific
performance and damages.
In 1996, the Court ruled in favor of Mayfair.
Barely five months after Mayfair had submitted its Motion for
Execution, Equatorial filed an action for collection of sum of money
against Mayfair claiming payment of rentals or reasonable
compensation for the defendants use of the subject premises after
its lease contracts had expired.
Maxim Theater contract expired on May 31, 1987, while the Lease
Contract covering the premises occupied by Miramar Theater lapsed
on March 31, 1989.
The lower court debunked the claim of Equatorial for unpaid back
rentals, holding that the rescission of the Deed of Absolute Sale in
the mother case did not confer on Equatorial any vested or residual
propriety rights, even in expectancy.
It further ruled that the Court categorically stated that the Deed of
Absolute Sale had been rescinded subjecting the present complaint
to res judicata.
Hence, Equatorial filed the present petition.
loss, petitioner must bear it in silence, since it had wrought that loss
upon itself. Otherwise, bad faith would be rewarded instead of
punished.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. Suffice it to say that,
clearly, our ruling in the mother case bars petitioner from claiming
back rentals from respondent. Although the court a quo erred when
it declared void from inception the Deed of Absolute Sale between
Carmelo and petitioner, our foregoing discussion supports the grant
of the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that our prior judgment in
GR No. 106063 has already resolved the issue of back rentals. On the
basis of the evidence presented during the hearing of Mayfairs
Motion to Dismiss, the trial court found that the issue of ownership
of the subject property has been decided by this Court in favor of
Mayfair. . . . Hence, the trial court decided the Motion to Dismiss on
the basis of res judicata, even if it erred in interpreting the meaning
of rescinded as equivalent to void. In short, it ruled on the
ground raised; namely, bar by prior judgment. By granting the
Motion, it disposed correctly, even if its legal reason for nullifying
the sale was wrong.