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DISCUSSION
SYSTEMSPHILOSOPHYAS A WORLD HYPOTHESIS
A book has just come out that deserves more than usual attention,
and should stimulate a lot of constructivediscussion. I refer to Ervin
Laszlo's Introductionto Systems Philosophy.' To those of us interested
in synthetic treatmentsof philosophicalissues, this book comes as a
breath of fresh air, like opening a window in a crowded, smoke-filled
room.
It is a world hypothesisthoroughlyempiricalwithout any dependence
on items of self evidence or indubitability.Its paradigmor root metaphor is system or more specificallythe dynamic self-regulatingsystem.
This is a happy choice, and possibly the most fruitful or even the correct one for a detailed syntheticcomprehensionof the structureof the
universe. It seems applicable to the full range of empirical material
availablethroughthe sciences, the arts and elsewhere,and it can utilize
the results and methods of the extensive developmentof systems theoretical analysis.
After some introductoryconsiderationof the need of syntheticas well
as analytic specializedtreatmentsin philosophyand a preliminarysymmary of his method of "generalsystems synthesis,"he begins his constructivedevelopmentby applyinghis paradigmto the familiarhierarchy
of nature extendingfrom the subatomicelements throughthe atoms to
molecules, cells, organisms,societies of organismsand so on up.
He distinguishesfour characterizingfeatures of a self-regulatingsystem. The first is its inner structure,what might be called the anatomy
and physiologyof the system. His descriptionof this featureis "a coactive relation of parts in ordered wholeness in the state of the system."
The second is the "functionof adaptationto environmentaldisturbances
resultingin the re-establishmentof a previous steady state in the system." The third is the "functionof adaptationto environmentaldisturb1 Ervin Laszlo, Introduction to Systems Philosophy (Towards a New Paradigm
of ContemporaryThought). New York, London, Paris: Gordon & Breach. Pp. xxii,
320.
548
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549
The first feature gives the structureof a natural system. The second
stresses the continuityof a steady state for the system adaptingto its
environment.The third provides for the developmentor evolution of a
natural system towards increasingadaptabilityto its environment.The
fourth calls attentionto the place in the hierarchyof nature in which a
natural system is lodged. It calls attention to its function of being a
well-adaptedcoactive part of a higher level system in which it is contained, and also as a well-adaptedwhole integratingthe subsystemsof
a lower level that constitute its inner structure.Thus a molecule is a
whole integratingthe atoms which compose it, and possibly also a part
of a living cell within which it should be properly integrated.And a
man is an organismcomposed of cells which must be adapted to the
whole for his bodily health, but he is also a memberof a humansociety
to which he must adapt himself for the integrityof the society.
One cannot fail to note that the key term in this analysis of natural
systemsis "adaptation."A naturalsystem is never a completelyisolated
whole. It is always involved in an inner and outer environment.This
is a characteristicof nature which system analysisbrings out in a manner never so empiricallystressedbefore. Adaptationis a transactionin
wh ch everythingin the naturalworld is involved. Moreover,the natural
world in Laszlo's world hypothesiscompriseseverythingthat is. This is
what empiricallyturns out to be the case as becomes clearer and clearer
as we proceedwith his philosophy.And this is not a consequencesolely
of his systems theoreticalanalysis, his paradigm,and root metaphor.It
is ratherthe reverse, that the empiricalmaterialfrom the sciences and
elsewhere just shapes up that way. It just may be that an adequate
world hypothesiscan be developed through the guidance of this paradigm of a dynamic adaptive system (or selective system as it has also
been called).
After a carefulconceptualanalysisof the four featuresdescribedabove,
Laszlo applies them to an empirical interpretationof atoms as representative of physical systems, organisms for biological systems, and
human societies for social systems. These interpretationsare given in
considerabledetail with extensive referencesto scientific authoritiesin
these fields. In the biological field, for instance, he gives special attention to the morphologyof living organisms,to varieties of homeostasis,
to types of learning, and to reproduction,heredity, and evolution. He
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550
PHILOSOPHY
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH
and shows
calculatedby countingthe numberof parts, and those calculatedby consideringthe syntheticrelations between the parts. The former produce
heaps or aggregateswhose propertiesare simply the sum of the properties of the parts. But in the latter the dynamic relations of the parts
through mutual adaptation bring forth properties of the whole not
present in the parts. These syntheticpropertiesare simply the dynamic
results of the syntheticaction of the parts, and the syntheticcapacities
of the parts were alreadypotentialpropertiesof the parts.
For instancethe propertyof affinity for atoms is not an actual property of any of the constituentsof an atom. But the syntheticproperties
of the constituentsproduced a structurewith distributionof electrons
which rendersan atom availablefor furthersynthesiswith certainother
atoms and not with certain others. It could be said (though this is not
the crucial question)that with sufficientprior knowledgeof the properties of subatomicelementsthe propertiesof their atomic synthesescould
be predicted.
So here we come upon an interpretationof naturalpotentialitywhich
rendersany sort of Platonic theory of forms unnecessary.The forms of
the wholes are immanent in the dynamics of the parts. Aristotelian
teleology is likewise disposedof. Naturalforms (systems)are not pulled
into being from above by a Form of all forms, but under favorable
environmentalconditions are pushed up from below by the natural
dynamicsof their constituents.
At the same time Laszlo's scheme does not dispose of a natural
teleology altogether.By recognizinga naturalpotentialityin the synthetic
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HYPOTHESIS
AS A WORLD
PHILOSOPHY
SYSTEMS
551
.-*
--
--
->
I think Laszlo's view closely parallels mine in Concept and Quality (Open
Court, 1967), pp. 416 ff. In fact, my world hypothesis in that book, and Laszlo's
in his book under review so closely resemble each other in principle that one might
think we had influenced each other. Actually they were independently developed
without either of us knowing what the other was doing until very lately.
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552
PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH
and I would go along with him. But for me, there appearsto be a logical
consistency in accepting a complete qualitativeidentity theory in this
A naturalsystem may
situation.Laszlo calls his view "biperspectivism."
be observed from without behavioristically,or "may be 'lived' (i.e.,
observed) from an immanent viewpoint" and in the latter case "the
observer. . . is not merelyinspectingthe interiorof the system, he is the
system"(p. 151).
And now lastly about values. On a systems philosophybasis, it must
be apparent that values will extend throughout the whole range of
natural-cognitive systems. Thus at one stroke the harsh opposition of
553
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