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Value with Different Growth Opportunities

Kaifeng Chen

Abstract

In this paper, we will try to empirically test the influence of the debt structure on the

company value given different growth opportunities with the companies incorporated

in the Netherlands. It is well accepted that the market value of any firm is independent

of its capital structure, given the assumptions of capital markets are perfect. It is

observed that the optimal capital structures are closely related to the growth potential

of the firms and some other variables, such as: the size and the industry

characteristics. Building on the argument that high-growth firms corporate value is

negatively correlated with leverage, whereas for lowgrowth firms corporate value

is positively correlated with leverage, we should observe that the growth opportunities

may influence the optimal capital structure. The reason is that the optimal leverage

may shift with the changes of growth opportunities that lead to the changes of agency

costs of debt and cost of managerial discretion. In this context, we will try to

empirically test 1: The correlation between Tobins Q and leverage will be positive

given the differences in growth opportunities; and 2: The correlation between Tobins

Q and leverage will be negative for high-growth firms and positive for low-growth

firms. We expect that the signalling function of the debt will overweight the influence

of the growth opportunities on the debt structure if hypothesis one is proved.

Otherwise, the influence of the growth opportunities on the shift of the agency cost of

debt and agency cost of managerial discretion will dominate the model. Finally, the

influence of zero-debt capital structure is tested and discussed.

Address: Chemin de Champrilly 26, 1008 Lausanne, Swiss. Tel: +41-21-692-3332. Fax: +41-22-3121026. E-mail: kevin6557@yahoo.com

Index

1.Introduction.................................................................................................................3

2.Data description...........................................................................................................5

3.Empirical tests.............................................................................................................7

3.1 Capital structure and company value....................................................................7

3.2 Robustness ..........................................................................................................13

4. Conclusion and discussion....................................................................................13

5. References .............................................................................................................14

1.Introduction

One of the cornerstones of the modern corporate finance theory is the capital structure

irrelevancy proposition (Modigliani-Miller 1958). Modigliani and Miller (1958)

conclude that the market value of any firm is independent of its capital structure,

given the assumptions of capital markets are perfect, which means arbitrage-free,

competitive and efficient, no tax distortions and no bankruptcy. After tax is

introduced into their model, tax shield and bankruptcies costs add more complications

to the optimal capital structure decision-making process. It is observed that the

optimal capital structure are closely related to the growth potential of the firms

(McConnel & Servaes1995; Jung, Kim, & Stulz 1996) and some other variables, such

as: the size and the industry characteristics (Titman & Wessels1988). In this paper, we

will try to empirically test the influence of the debt structure on the company value

given different growth opportunities with the companies incorporated in the

Netherlands.

Debt policy and equity ownership structure matter and that the way in which they

matter differs between firms with many and firms with few positive net present value

projects (McConnel & Servaes). Leland & Pyle (1977) and Ross (1977) propose that

managers will take debt/equity ratio as a signal, by the fact that high leverage implies

higher bankruptcy risk (and costs) for low quality firms. Since managers always have

information advantage over the outsiders, the debt structure may be considered as a

signal to the market. Rosss model suggests that the values of firms will rise with

leverage, since increasing leverage increases the markets perception of value.

Suppose there is no agency problem, i.e. management acts in the interest of all

shareholders. The manager will maximize company value by choosing the optimal

capital structure: highest possible debt ratio. High-quality firms need to signal their

quality to the market, while the low-quality firms managers will try to imitate.

According to this argument, the debt level should be positively related to the value of

the firm.

Assuming information asymmetry, the pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf,

1984) predicts that firm will follow the pecking order as optimal financing strategy.

The reason behind this theory is that if the manager act on behalf of the owners, they

will issue securities at a higher price than they are truly worth. The more sensitive of

the security, the higher the cost of equity capital, since the action of the manager is

giving a signal to the market that the securities is overpriced.

Stulz (1990) argues that debt can have both a positive and negative effect on the value

of the firm (even in the absence of corporate taxes and bankruptcy costs). He develops

a model in which debt financing can both alleviate the overinvestment problem and

the underinvestment problem. Stulz (1990) assumes that managers have no equity

ownership in the firm and receive utility by managing a larger firm. The power of

manage may motivate the self-interest managers to undertake negative present value

projects. To solve this problem, shareholders force firms to issue debt. But if firms are

forced to pay out funds, they may have to forgo positive present value projects.

Therefore, the optimal debt structure is determined by balancing the optimal agency

cost of debt and the agency cost of managerial discretion.

Building on the argument that high-growth firms corporate value is negatively

correlated with leverage, whereas for lowgrowth firms corporate value is positively

correlated with leverage (McConnell & Servaes, 1995), we should observe that the

growth opportunities may influence the optimal capital structure. The reason is that

the optimal leverage may shift with the changes of growth opportunities that lead to

the changes of agency costs of debt and cost of managerial discretion (Jung, Kim,

Stulz. 1996). Assuming that the managers are self-interest, the growth opportunities of

the firm may be positively related to the level of the goal congruent of the firm and its

manager, therefore negatively related to the cost of managerial discretion (Jung, Kim,

Stulz. 1996). On the other hand, the agency cost of debt is positively related to the

growth opportunities.

According to Stulz (1990), McConnell & Servaes (1995), Jung, Kim, Stulz (1996),

the influences of the debt on the firms value depending on the presence of growth

opportunities. For firms facing low growth opportunities, the debt ratios are positively

related to the firm value. For firms facing high growth opportunities, the debt ratios

are negatively related to the firm value.

In this context, we will try to empirically test the relationship between capital

structure and the company value given the presence of different growth opportunities.

Hypothesis 1: The correlation between Tobins Q and leverage will be positive given

the differences in growth opportunities.

Hypothesis 2: The correlation between Tobins Q and leverage will be negative for

high-growth firms and positive for low-growth firms.

Our first Hypothesis is based on the argument by Ross (1977), and the second

Hypothesis is based on the argument by Stulz (1990), McConnell & Servaes (1995),

Jung, Kim, Stulz (1996). We think that the signalling function of the debt will

overweight the influence of the growth opportunities on the debt structure if

hypothesis one is proved. Otherwise, the influence of the growth opportunities on the

shift of the agency cost of debt and agency cost of managerial discretion will

dominate the model.

2.Data description

We gathered the data from Compustat. We concentrate our study on the data on

March 2001. The first criterion for data selection is that the companys country of

incorporation is the Netherlands. The sample includes 203 firms incorporated in the

Netherlands at the end of March 2001. Then we exclude companies belong to

financial industry. Since the previous literature as well as empirical study proved that

financial service companies have different characteristics from the other companies in

respect to the financial structure. This criterion reduces the sample to 176 firms.

Follow McConnell and Servaes (1995), in order to solve outlier problems, firms were

further deleted if their market to book value (Tobins Q), exceeded 6.0 or were less

than 0.16. From statistical point of view, outliers will strongly affect the samples

statistics characteristics. This further reduced the final sample to 127 firms.

The data included in this research include P/E ratio, Tobins Q, Pre-tax Profit Margin

(the sum of Pre-tax Income divided by Sales/Turnover (Net) plus Operating Revenues

and multiplied by 100), Tax Rate (the sum of Income Taxes divided by the Pre-tax

Income less Appropriations to Untaxed Reserves and multiplied by 100), Total

Capital Expenditures, Total Current Liabilities, Total Long Term Debt, and Total

Assets.

Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of our sample. The mean price-to-earnings

ratio, P/E, is 21.55, while the median P/E is 8.65. The largest P/E ratio is 449.89,

which comes from KLM-Royal Dutch Airlines. The mean current liabilities to assets

ratio and long-term debt to assets ratio is 42.12 and 11.10 respectively. In the sample

there are 11 firms has no debt at all, while 22 firms long-term debt to total assets

ratio are between zero and one per cent. Totally 25.98% of the firms in our sample

have chosen near zero debt financial structure. By construction, the Tobins Q are

between 0.16 and 6, and the median of Q is 1.73. The median of our samples total

assets is 193.13 million United States Dollar, USD. The largest firm in our sample is

ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM NV, whose total assets book value is 36,184.10

million USD.

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics

PE

Mean

21,55

Median

8,65

Maximum 449,89

Minimum -17,27

Std. Dev.

61,29

Skewness 6,06

Kurtosis

41,42

Obser.

112

TQ

2,12

1,73

5,80

0,18

1,36

0,87

2,82

112

PM

TR

3,81

31,04

4,61

32,47

100,25 226,75

-169,39 -14,82

23,84

28,96

-4,31

4,39

35,94

29,13

112

112

CE

7,17

6,50

29,41

0,00

4,98

1,47

6,28

112

TC

42,12

40,03

78,76

5,16

16,45

0,07

2,61

112

TL

TA

11,10 1741,05

7,49

193,13

57,38 36184,10

0,00

4,11

12,12 5236,88

1,20

5,43

4,11

34,67

112

112

PE:

Price to Equity ratio

TQ:

Tobin's Q, Market to book ratio

PM:

Pre-tax Profit Margin

TR:

Tax Rate

CE:

Capital Expenditures to Total Asset

ratio

TC:

Current Debt to Total Asset ratio

TL:

Long-term Debt to Total Asset ratio

TA:

Total Assets

3.Empirical tests

3.1 Capital structure and company value

McConnell and Servaes (1995) conjecture that the correlation between Tobins Q and

leverage will be negative for high-growth firms and positive for low-growth firms.

They employ samples of 1173 firms in 1976, 1093 firms in 1986 and 830 firms in

1988, which are listed on the New York Stock Exchange or American Stock

Exchange, and use P/E ratio to differentiate the sample to high-growth subsample and

low-growth subsample. They find evidence to support their conjecture.

Follow their methodology, we use P/E ratio to differentiate our sample. Firms are

ranked according to their P/E ratio. The one-third of the firms with the highest P/E

ratio is placed into a high-growth sample, and the one-third with the lowest P/E ratio

is placed into a low-growth sample. Thus there is a high-growth sample of 42 firms

and a low-growth sample of 42 firms. Table 2 presents the summary statistics of

subsamples.

Table 2

Summary statistics of subsamples

PE

TQ

PM

TR

CE

TC

TL

TA

Definition

PE:

TQ:

PM:

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

LowGrowth

2,30

5,67

1,51

1,10

-4,78

4,80

29,84

32,07

7,56

7,34

42,89

41,70

12,53

8,61

1758,56

129,35

HighP Value

Growth

of Diff.

53,60

0,00

18,81

0,00

2,67

0,00

2,29

0,00

9,44

0,02

4,33

0,24

35,25

0,54

32,72

0,37

7,10

0,70

6,28

0,18

37,46

0,22

38,06

0,17

11,22

0,33

4,47

0,36

2367,24

0,57

183,50

0,88

of the variables :

Price to Equity ratio

Tobin's Q, Market to book ratio

Pre-tax Profit Margin

TR:

CE:

TC:

TL:

TA:

Tax Rate

Capital Expenditures to Total Asset

ratio

Current Debt to Total Asset ratio

Long-term Debt to Total Asset ratio

Total Assets

We use Eview to test the equality of the mean and median. When we do the test of the

equity of sample median, we use the method of Wilcoxon / Mann-Whitney. By

construction, the differences in the P/E ratios between the high- and low-growth

samples are dramatic. For example, the low-growth samples median P/E ratio is 5.67,

while the high-growth samples median P/E ratio is 18.81. Similarly, the average Q

ratios are dramatically different for the high- and low-growth samples: the median Q

of the former is 1.10 and the median Q of the later is 2.29. Both the short-term and

long-term leverage of the low-growth samples is larger than the high-growth one. But

the p-values of the tests of equity of means and medians of the low-growth samples

and the high-growth samples suggest that neither of them is significantly unequal.

These data cannot prove a significantly negative relation between growth

opportunities and leverage, which is reported by McConnell and Servaes (1995).

To see the relation of Capital structure and company value, we develop regressions.

The dependent variable in the regression is Tobins Q. The independent variables are

total debts to assets ratio, pre-tax profit margin ratio, tax rate, capital expenditures

ratio and total assets. The capital expenditures ratio is included here as proxy to

represent firms investment to future development. Pre-tax profit margin ratio, tax

rate, capital expenditures ratio and total assets are included as control variables.

Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) report that there is non-linear relation between

corporate value and insider equity ownership.

We can test whether the relation between corporate value and the debt differs between

firms with few and those with many growth opportunities. Consider in cross-sectional

regression

analysis,

there

is

heteroskadasticity

exists,

we

use

White

are standardized by the book value of assets. In the low-growth sample, the

coefficient of debt is positive and significant (p-value is 0.00). In the high-growth

sample, the coefficient of debt is positive but insignificant (p-value is 0.17). The result

of the regressions is reported in Table 3.

Table 3

The relation between corporate value and debt of firms

with different growth opportunities

Low-growth

Variable Coefficient

Prob.

n

42

Intercept

0.33

0.54

TB

0.03

0.00

PM

-0.01

0.06

TR

-0.00

0.84

CE

-0.06

0.19

TA

0.000026

0.04

R-squared

Adj. Rsquared

TB:

PM:

TR:

CE:

TA:

High-growth

Coefficient

Prob.

42

1.58

0.14

0.02

0.17

0.04

0.22

-0.01

0.28

0.01

0.69

-0.000037

0.58

0.23

0.10

0.14

0.00

Pre-tax Profit Margin

Tax Rate

Capital Expenditures to Total Asset

ratio

Total Assets

Our regression doesnt include equity ownership data since we cant find them in our

data source. It may affect the robustness of our results. But from McConnell and

Servaes (1995)s regression results, we think that insider equity ownership will not

influence the robustness of our general conclusion. Statistically speaking, it will not

cause a big problem. Note in their high-growth subsamples, the null hypothesis of

coefficients of insider equity ownership and square of insider equity ownership equal

zero cant be rejected in 1976 and 1988 sample. While the 1986 samples p-value is

0.04 and 0.06 respectively. Similarly, without large blockholders and institutional

investors holding will not cause the coefficient of debt ratio become insignificant.

Our preliminary regression results weakly support Ross model since it predict a

positive relation between the debt ratio and firm value in both high growth and low

growth sample. And we cannot draw a conclusion in respect to the validity of

McConnell and Servaes model since it require a negative and significant relation

between the debt ratio in high growth sample. The insignificant positive debt

coefficient in our high growth sample is incapable of proving both of the hypotheses.

As in accounting, current debt item mainly comes from accounts payable, which we

think is dealing with short-term cash short fall. The payment of short-term borrowing

comes from foreseeable sources. Long-term debt has larger influence on the

companys capital structure decision. So we divide the debt to current debt and longterm debt and develop the second regression models. The dependent variable in the

regression is Tobins Q. The independent variables are current debt to assets ratio as

well as long-term debt to asset. Control variables are pre-tax profit margin ratio, tax

rate, capital expenditures ratio, and total assets.

Table 4

The relation between corporate value, short-term and long-term

debt of firms with different growth opportunities

Low-growth

Variable Coefficient

Prob.

n

42

Intercept

0.03

0.97

TC

0.04

0.02

TL

0.02

0.25

PM

-0.01

0.05

TR

0.00

0.72

CE

-0.04

0.31

TA

0.000032

0.00

R-squared

Adjusted

R-squared

0.26

0.11

High-growth

Coefficient

Prob.

42

1.92

0.10

0.01

0.62

0.04

0.11

0.04

0.27

-0.01

0.26

0.02

0.51

-0.000052

0.50

0.17

0.10

Again, the regression results weakly support Ross model (the positive coefficient of

long term debt in the high-growth sample are significant at 10% level), but fail to

support McConnell and Servaes model. Increasing either current debt or long-term

debt will increasing company value, no matter if the companies have positive net

present value investment opportunities or not.

In our sample 25.98% of them has long-term debt to total assets ratio less than one per

cent. Why these firms in our sample chose such an extreme financial structure? Note

10

the largest firm in our sample, Royal Dutch Petroleum NV, also choose zero debt

capital structure. Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics of this subsample. The mean

P/E ratio is 32.81, much higher than the whole sample, whose mean P/E ratio is 21.55.

The mean and median Q is 2.31 and 2.29, also higher than the whole sample, whose

value is 2.12 and 1.73 respectively. As the statistics software we used (Eview 3.0)

cant do equality test of samples with different number of observations, we cant say

whether it is significantly higher. But we think that it might be an interesting topic to

investigate.

Table 5

Descriptive Statistics of Near Zero Debt Firms

PE

Mean

Standard Error

Median

Minimum

Maximum

Sum

Count

TQ

PPM

TR

CE

TC

32.81

2.31

9.60

26.98

6.21

39.28

13.78

0.25

3.48

2.69

0.94

3.46

9.85

2.29

5.23

32.99

4.21

38.43

-6.78

0.40 -30.05

-0.07

0.00

5.16

438.66 5.06 100.25

60.14

29.41

78.76

1082.71 76.21 316.76 890.18 204.87 1296.38

33

33

33

33

33

33

TL

TA

0.11

1184.40

0.04

1089.83

0.00

32.00

0.00

6.92

0.92 36046.73

3.79 39085.19

33

33

mechanism. Firms choose no debt mean that they dont want this discipline

mechanism. It will have negative impact on the company based on Ross (1977) model

since debt are positively related to the firm value in that model. A negative

consequence of long-term debt issue is the cost of disclosure. By disclosing the

financial information, firms are viable to public supervision and bankruptcy cost.

On the other hand, Stulz (1990) argues that debt can have negative effect on the value

of the firm. Managers of firms with high growth opportunities may have to forgo

positive present value projects, if firms have debt outstanding. So zero debt is good

news for high growth firms.

We add dummy variable of zero-debt to our regression (table 6). The dummy variable

of zero-debt is defined to equal one if the firms long-term debt ratio is less than one

11

per cent, other wise equal zero. The dependent variable in the regression is Tobins Q.

The independent variables are zero-debt dummy, current debt to assets ratio, longterm debt to asset, pre-tax profit margin ratio, tax rate, capital expenditures ratio, and

total assets. Our regression (table 6 regression1) result indicates zero-debt capital

structure has significantly positive impact to company value. The coefficient is 0.91,

with p-value 0.01. One problem of our regression is the dummy is correlated to longterm debt ratio. So we run our regression again without long-term debt ratio variable

in regression 2. The coefficient of zero-long-term-debt dummy becomes insignificant

(p-value 0.33), but still positive.

Table 6

Tests the Effects of Zero Debt

Regression 1

Variab. Coef.

Interc. 0.63

TC

0.02

TL

0.04

TD

0.91

PM

0.00

TR

-0.01

CE

0.00

TA 0.0000

22

Rsqua.

Adj. Rsqua.

Prob.

Regression 2

Coef.

0.18

1.53

0.00

0.02

0.01

0.01

0.31

0.43

0.00

0.17

-0.01

0.87

-0.01

0.23 0.0000

32

Prob.

0.00

0.04

0.33

0.87

0.09

0.79

0.18

Regression 3

Low-Growth

High-Growth

Coef.

-0.17

0.03

0.03

0.75

-0.01

-0.00

-0.03

0.0000

32

Prob.

0.80

0.01

0.04

0.19

0.19

0.57

0.54

0.00

Coef.

0.50

0.02

0.06

0.95

0.05

-0.01

0.03

-0.00

0066

Prob.

Regression 4

Low-Growth

High-Growth

(New)

(New)

Coef. Prob. Coef. Prob.

0.72

-0.11

0.26

0.03

0.03

0.03

0.23

0.67

0.20

-0.01

0.47

-0.00

0.34

-0.01

0.43 0.0000

27

0.82

0.00

0.02

0.13

0.32

0.38

0.60

0.01

0.25

0.03

0.06

0.88

0.05

-0.01

0.01

-0.00

0081

0.13

0.06

0.25

0.23

0.24

0.23

0.07

0.01

0.10

0.08

0.14

0.11

To test whether the relation between corporate value and zero-debt capital structure

differs between firms with few and those with many growth opportunities, we run

regression again with low-growth sample and high-growth sample separately (table 6

regression 3). In both samples, the coefficient is insignificantly positive. But if we

define high-growth sample as the one-half of the sample (new) with higher P/E ratios,

the coefficient becomes significantly positive (regression 4). Regression results are

reported in Table 6.

12

0.80

0.04

0.01

0.07

0.03

0.45

0.62

0.12

3.2 Robustness

To test our results robustness, we choose March 1995 (randomly selected) data from

Compustat to do our regression test again. The data selection criteria stay the same:

company incorporated in the Netherlands, not belong to financial industry, and

Tobins Q between 0.16 and 6.0. The sample includes 72 observations.

In the regressions, corporate value and debt are standardized by the book value of

assets. For the limited number of observations, we divide the sample to one half with

higher P/E ratio and the other half with lower P/E ratio. In the low-growth sample, the

coefficient of debt is positive and significant (p-value is 0.00). In the high-growth

sample, the coefficient of debt is positive and significant too (p-value is 0.00). To

investigate the effect of current liabilities and long-term debt separately, we use

current liabilities ratio and long-term debt ratio in our regressions. The coefficients of

current liabilities of the low-growth sample and the high-growth sample are all

positive and significant, while the coefficients of long-term debt are positive but

insignificant. Since the general conclusion is the same, we did not include the table in

this paper.

Our empirical tests provide weak support for the Ross (1977) model, but failed to

support the McConnell and Servaes (1995) model. We think that the particular

governance structure in the Netherlands may provide us partial explanation for the

insignificant positive coefficient of the debt ratio to firm value. The strong position of

the management board and the close link between the firm and the bank make the

debt an ineffective disciplining mechanism. Given the small number of observations,

it is difficult to generalise the conclusion. On the other hand, we also find evidence

that the company value will be increased if the company chooses no debt capital

structure in the Netherlands.

13

5. References

Jung, K., Kim, Y.C., and Stulz, R.M. 1996 Timing, investment opportunities,

managerial discretion, and the security issue decision, Journal of Financial

Economics

Leland, H. E. and Pyle, D. H. 1977 Informational asymmetries, financial structure,

and financial intermediation, Journal of Finance

McConnell, J. J & Servaes, H. 1995 Equity ownership and the two faces of debt,

Journal of Financial Economics

Modigliani, F. and Miller, M. H. 1958 The cost of capital, corporation finance and

the theory of investment, American Economic Review

Morck, R., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. 1988 Management ownership and market

valuation: an empirical analysis, Journal of Financial Economics

Myers, S. C. & Majluf, N.S. 1984 Corporate financing and investment decisions

when firms have information that investors do not have, Journal of Financial

Economics

Ross, S. A. 1977 The determination of financial structure: the incentive-signalling

approach, The Bell Journal of Economics

Stulz, R. 1990 Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies, Journal of

Financial Economics

Titman, S. and Wessels, R. 1988 The determinants of capital structure choice,

Journal of Finance

14

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