No. 18
For those too young to remember, the Maginot Line was when the fire escapes the room of origin. When fire has
a system of defensive fortifications in Eastern France escaped the room where it originated and enters a public
along the German border that was intended to prevent corridor, then the plan calls for the closing of all doors to
penetration by hostile forces. The French nation pre- all rooms having access to that corridor. In this manner
sumably secure in its defensive fortifications slept while (presumably) occupants of rooms adjoining the fire in-
the German army developed a new technology. The Ger- volved corridor can "ride out" the fire within their own
man blitzkrieg shattered the French defense so decisively little fireproof cubicles.
that it revealed to the world the futility of relying on
static defensive measures in an age of highly sophisticated Note here the similarity between our current fire defense
and mobile warfare. It proved the point that the best plan and the defensive fortifications of France. Just as a
defense is a good offense. mobile army was able to circumvent fixed and rigid
fortifications, so has the unpredicable and agressive fire
We have a parallel situation in building construction to- been able to penetrate the static fire defenses being em-
day. Although I have dealt with this matter to some ex- ployed to date. The entire history of fire has shown that
tent in the past it is a subject that is so vital to the entire me, and especially the toxic gases, can penetrate the
field of building construction that it warrants further static structural fortifications of building construction.
discussion and analysis. Our currently accepted fire defense plan for hospitals
and similar buildings is an unsatisfactory plan for the
The present nationally accepted fire defensive plan for following reasons.
structures where people are sheltered or cared for
(Hospitals, Nursing Homes, etc.) is a plan which is. strik- The first phase of the Maginot Line of fire defense is to
ingly similar in concept AND PERFORMANCE to the contain a fire within the room where it originates. There
Maginot Line. This nationally accepted concept of build- are two fundamental flaws in this first portion of the de-
ing construction represents a static defensive plan, and it fensive plan.
has a long history of failure.
The first flaw is that fire sometimes originates outside of
The Maginot Line of fire defense is a fire wall. It is a fire a room where it can be trapped. Fires have been known
wall on each side of a public corridor which serves the to START IN THE CORRIDOR. The complete elimina-
wing of a hospital, nursing home, hotel, motel or insti- tion of combustibles and fire hazards from corridors is
tutional building. one of those nice rule book solutions that often proves
impractical in real life. For example, in a hospital it is
Buiidings are presently being designed in the belief that necessary to have nurses stations and other areas where
it is possible to trap both fire and smoke in the room of combustibles are inherent open to the corridor. Attempts
fire origin; and that this is a satisfactory solution to the to regulate a hospital to the point where all essential
fire problem for institutional buildings and similar struc- functions are isolated behind closed fire doors can never
tures. By closing the fireproof door in the fireproof wall fully succeed.
the fire is trapped in a fireproof room enclosure. This is
the plan. If fire strikes, close the door and contain the But even when the fire OCCURS WITHIN A FIREPROOF
fire until the fire department arrives. When the fire de- ROOM (and is therefore subject to being trapped simply
partment has their hose streams charged and ready, then by closing the door to the corridor), in truth, the door
the door can be opened and the fire attacked. from the room of fire origin to the corridor is most likely
to end up in the OPEN position.
There is a secondary phase to the Maginot Line of fire
safety. This secondary phase is put into effect if and It is time for the fire protection community to recognize
that it is the natural tendency of any rational person an automatic suppression system is very rarely installed
who is concerned about fire to OPEN the door when he to protect human life let us visualize what would have
sees smoke coming from a room. This is the only way to happened if the scene was repeated in a hospital or
see what's going on in there. Right or wrong, a person similar facility. A member of the staff responding to a
responding to a situation where smoke is coming out fire would have opened the door and discovered a fire
from a closed room will invariably OPEN that door. that appeared to be readily controllable. Let us assume
Thus, although our present basic fire safety plan is op- that the attendent (an amateur fire fighter at best) was
timistically predicated on the assumption that people can standing in the center of the room trying to figure out
be trained to close doors and trap fires during an emer- how to get a fire extinguisher to work when the fire
gency; in real life people invariably OPEN doors to see suddenly exploded across the ceiling with flames rolling
where the smoke is coming from, to asses the size and around his head. Can we expect this man to do any-
seriousness of the fire, and to fight the fire. A fire de- thing but drop the extinguisher and run for his life? Any
fense plan that does not recognize this fact of life is man who thinks not has not been close to fire when it
more fairy tale than a true fire solution. expands suddenly with an almost explosive violence.
THE FLASHOVER PHENOMENON Now, will this man who is suddenly driven from a room
by an overpowering fire remember to calmly close the
At this point it is important to discuss a phenomenon door as he exits? History and common sense tell us no.
called FLASHOVER. Flashover occurs when fire in one History and common sense also tell us that there is some-
portion of a room flashes across a super heated ceiling, thing fundamentally wrong with a defensive plan against
radiates intense heat to combustibles below, and then fire that is predicted on faulty assumptions. It is wrong
there is a sudden, virtually instantaneous, flashing of all to expect a man who is being chased down the hallway
of the combustibles in the room. by an exploding fire to remember and execute all those
sanctimoniously prepared fire procedures and instruc-
I recently witnessed an example of the initiation of this tions. He will no more close that door as he leaves with
phenomenon when in a room with fire during the recent the fire in hot pursuit, than he will go back and roast
fire test series at the Pioneer International Hotel in Tuc- marshmallows!
son, Arizona. We had a fire going in the corner of the
room, primarily involving one side of a s9fa and an end And, after room flashover, when heat and smoke and
table. Up until ten minutes after ignition the fire was a flame come out of that room and roar down the corridor,'
lazy one. There was very little smoke in the room and can we expect the staff to remember those previously
one observer described the fire as a "nice one for roast- prepared fire procedures, and calmly go about their
ing marshmallows." At ten minutes after ignition one appointed task of closing doors. Will they immediately
could have approached the fire quite closely because the remember to call the fire department, and do all the
heat was rising and stratifying at the ceiling. Unburned other little things we instruct them to do. I think not!
combustion gases were also accumulating at the ceiling
and radiant heat from the fire was raising the tempera- It should be borne in mind that fire and heat contained
ture of the draperies behind the sofa. within a structural zone can suddenly increase in an ex-
ponential manner. When fire has reached the point where
At ten minutes after ignition, ceiling temperature direct- it is expanding with explosive suddenness it is often too
ly over the center of the burning sofa (only one end was late for the fire training and the fire procedures. Too
burning) was only 300 degrees F. Suddenly, at 10:12 often, it is a case of get out right now, or die. There
fire flashed up the heated drapes behind the sofa igniting have been many fires that have built to a flashover stage
ceiling gases and the fire rolled across the ceiling with within the room of fire origin, and then have traveled
yellow flames churning and billowing downward. By down a public corridor with such speed that survivors
11:12, only 60 seconds later the thermocouple reading have described it as a "whoosh".
at the ceiling had jumped off the scale (above 2000 de-
grees) and the observors in the room were hugging the When the corridor is a sea of smoke, when fire bells clang
floor and being subjected to intense radiant heat from and pandemonium reigns, will the patients old and
the fire above. Fortunately, at this point the Life Safety young, weak and strong, ill and lame, calmly wait for
System (sprinkler system) being tested functioned per- help in their rooms? If the staff panics, will the patients
fectly and within another 30 seconds the fire was com- be able to get out of bed, close the doors to their rooms,
pletely extinguished. True room flashover, meaning the open their windows, and do all of the things we tell
complete ignition of all combustibles within the room them to do under these circumstance? History has given
never was completed, thanks to the performance of the us the answer to these questions. Unfortunately, the
suppression system. fire experts who plan our fire defenses and promulgate
our fire standards apparently have not heard the voice of
But let us pause here for a moment, and realizing that history.
A PLAN THAT DEFIES LOGIC fireproof cubicles which are presently built in the name
of fire safety, the inmate is totally isolated.
Our present fire safety plan is predicated on the assump-
tion that the occupant of the fireproof cubicle will have The sterile fireproof room and fire walls isolate the
the knowledge, capability, and the presense of mind to patient from the hospital staff. The elderly are similarly
close his door in event of fire, open his window to the isolated in their nursing homes.
outdoors, stuff wet rags around the door to keep the
heat and smoke out if necessary, and ride out the fire un- Institutional buildings could be light, open, and pleasant.
til help arrives. Instead they are confining. All this is done in the name of
a fire safety plan that usually fails when it is called upon
But who are the people who occupy the fireproof rooms, to save lives.
who must contribute to the fire safety plan in order to
survive. They include the elderly, some who are too I think that it is particularly horrifying that children
weak to get out of bed. They include the sick including who enter a hospital, who are sick and away from their
those with broken bones and those in traction. They in- parents for the first time, who are lonely and greatly in
clude small children and babies. HOW CAN WE JUSTIFY need of human contact, are placed in these fireproof
A FIRE SAFETY PLAN THAT REQUIRES A YOUNG dungeons.
CHILD TO GET OUT OF BED AND TO TAKE RA-
TIONAL ACTION TO SURVIVE? ECONOMIC COSTS
Another inconsistency of the structural defensive plan In addition to the human costs our ill conceived fire
is that although the construction may stop fire (provided safety plan has a high economic cost. Fire safety pre-
doors get closed when they have to be closed), the dead- dicated on long duration structural resistance to fire is
ly fire gases that are created are quite another problem. A the MOST EXPENSIVE kind of fire safety. Here is a par-
fire in a room or a corridor creates its own pressure to tial listing of the economic costs.
force toxic gases under and around doors. Even if the
occupied room is closed, even if the occupant remains Fire safety based on two rows of fireproof cubicles
calm and does not try to flee thru the smoke filled corri- divided by a corridor produces buildings of many wings.
dor, there is still no certainty that he will survive the These winged buildings with long corridors do not lend
fire within his supposedly fireproof cubicle. Even if the themselves to efficient flow of material or people. Travel
occupant opens the window as prescribed, assuming he distance is maximized. Staff efficiency is reduced.
has the knowledge and strength to do so, who is to say
that the passage of carbon monoxide and other danger- The winged building has an excessive external wall area
ous gases from the corridor into the room will not result in relation to the floor area. A large ratio of external wall
in death to the occupant. There has been more than to floor area produces high construction costs. The ex-
adequate proof for many years now that fire walls and cessive exterior wall area also produces high heating costs
fire resistive floors do not always act as satisfactory and air conditioning costs. Maintenance costs are also
smoke control systems. Perhaps the biggest flaw in the high because of the wall area exposed to the elements.
entire scheme is that the plan requires calm and deliberate
action under those conditions which are least conducive Long narrow buildings and winged buildings have a high
to calm and deliberate action. Fire frequently produces ratio of corridor area to usable area. Because exit re-
panic, even among grown and physically fit men, and quirements are related to travel distance,these buildings
the established plan goes up in smoke the moment panic also can produce stairway demands that are greater than
Occurs. normal.
THE INSTITUTIONAL DUNGEON The long corridors make for staff inefficiency and a high
cost of moving materials.
The cost of this irrational safety plan is not measured in
sacrificed lives alone. There are other costs, not the least THE SOLUTION
of which is the INSTITUTIONAL DUNGEON.
The solution to this problem lies in a positive fire con-
The requirements that call for a fireproof wall between trol plan to replace the present defensive plan.
corridor and occupied rooms are forcing institutions into
building isolated and dreary fireproof compartments Once fire occurs there is only ONE GOOD solution.
that have most of the characteristics of dungeons. This Escape is not a good solution because many people can-
atmosphere of heavy masonry wall and heavy door is not readily flee and because fire and smoke can often
not conducive to cheerfulness, humanity, or healing. In block escape routes. Trapping the fire is not a good
ajail cell you can at least see between the bars. But in the solution because fire too often escapes, and because