VICTORINO ALDABA, et al. vs.

COMELEC
FACTS:
This is an action to declare unconstitutional Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591), creating a
legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan, for violating the minimum population
requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.
Before 1 May 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through four
legislative districts -- the First Legislative District is comprised of the city of Malolos and the
municipalities of Hagonoy, Calumpit, Pulilan, Bulacan, and Paombong. On May 1, 2009, RA 9591
lapsed into law, amending Malolos City Charter by creating a separate legislative district for the
city. The population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute
that the House Bill from which RA 9591 sprung forth HB 3693 relied on an undated
certification issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO) that the
projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the
population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000.
Petitioners contended that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum
population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in Congress as provided
under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended
to the 1987 Constitution.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that Congress use of
projected population is non-justiciable as it involves a determination on the wisdom of the
standard adopted by the legislature to determine compliance with [a constitutional
requirement+.
ISSUE: Whether RA 9591 is unconstitutional.
RULING: YES. The Supreme Court grants the petition and declares RA 9591 unconstitutional for
being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.
HB 3693 cites the undated Certification of Regional Director Alberto N. Miranda of Region III of
the National Statistics Office (NSO) as authority that the population of the City of Malolos will
be 254,030 by the year 2010. The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on
demographic projections, is without legal effect.
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 135 provides that: first, certifications on demographic
projections can be issued only if such projections are declared official by the National Statistics

Coordination Board (NSCB); second, certifications based on demographic projections can be

issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer; third, intercensal
population projections must be as of the middle of every year.
(1) Executive Order No. 135 cannot simply be brushed aside. The OSG, representing
respondent Commission on Elections, invoked Executive Order No. 135 in its Comment.
Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must
be based on an official and credible source.
(2) Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification. The
Certification of Regional Director Miranda does not state that the demographic
projections he certified have been declared official by the NSCB. The records of this case
do not also show that the Certification of Regional Director Miranda is based on
demographic projections declared official by the NSCB.
(3) In addition, there is no showing that Regional Director Miranda has been designated by
the NSO Administrator as a certifying officer for demographic projections in Region III. In
the absence of such official designation, only the certification of the NSO Administrator
can be given credence by this Court.
(4) The Certification, which states that the population of Malolos will be 254,030 by the
year 2010, violates the requirement that intercensal demographic projections shall be
as of the middle of every year. In addition, intercensal demographic projections
cannot be made for the entire year. In any event, a city whose population has increased
to 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in the immediately following
election after the attainment of the 250,000 population.
(5) Based on its own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than
250,000 in the year 2010. Moreover, the Certification states that the total population
of Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291. The Certification also states that the
population growth rate of Malolos is 3.78% per year between 1995 and 2000. Based on
a growth rate of 3.78% per year, the population of Malolos of 175,291 in 2000 will grow
to only 241,550 in 2010. Also, the 2007 Census places the population of Malolos at
223,069 as of August 1, 2007. Based on a growth rate of 3.78%, the population of
Malolos will grow to only 248,365 as of 1 August 2010. Even if the growth rate is
compounded yearly, the population of Malolos of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will
grow to only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010.
(6) A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only in
the immediately following election. In short, a city must first attain the 250,000
population, and thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city shall have a
district representative. There is no showing in the present case that the City of Malolos
has attained or will attain a population of 250,000, whether actual or projected, before
the 2010 elections.
Clearly, there is no official record that the population of the City of Malolos will be at least
250,000, actual or projected, prior to the 10 May 2010 elections, the immediately following
election after the supposed attainment of such population. Thus, the City of Malolos is not

qualified to have a legislative district of its own under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
Lastly, the overwhelming weight of authority is that district apportionment laws are subject to
review by the courts. Compliance with constitutional standards on the creation of legislative
districts is important because the aim of legislative apportionment is to equalize population
and voting power among districts.

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., et al. vs. MAGDANGAL ELMA

FACTS:
Petitioners seek to declare as null and void the concurrent appointments of respondent
Magdangal Elma as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and
as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC) for being contrary to Section 13, Article VII and
Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. Elma was appointed as PCGG Chairman
on October 30, 1998, and was appointed as CPLC on January 11, 1999 during his tenure as
PCGG Chairman, but waived any remuneration that he may receive as CPLC.
Petitioners cited the case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary to support their position
that respondent Elmas concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC contravenes
Section 13, Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B. Petitioners also maintained that Elma
was holding incompatible offices.
Among others, Elma alleges that as per the Resolution in the Civil Liberties Union case, the strict
prohibition against holding multiple positions provided under Section 13, Article VII applies only
to heads of executive departments, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries; it does not
cover other public officials. Elma also claims that it is Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B that should
be applied in their case. This provision, according to the respondents, would allow a public
officer to hold multiple positions if (1) the law allows the concurrent appointment of the said
official; and (2) the primary functions of either position allows such concurrent appointment.
Since there exists a close relation between the two positions and there is no incompatibility
between them, the primary functions of either position would allow Elmas concurrent
appointments to both positions.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the appointment was violative of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B.
(2) Whether the appointment was violative of Section 13, Article VII.
RULING: The Supreme Court party granted the petition and declared Elma's concurrent
appointments as unconstitutional.
(NOTE: The resolution of this case had already been overtaken by supervening events. In 2001,
the appointees of former President Joseph Estrada were replaced by the appointees of the
incumbent president, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. The present PCGG Chairman is Camilo Sabio,
while the position vacated by the last CPLC, now Solicitor General Antonio Nachura, has not yet
been filled. There no longer exists an actual controversy that needs to be resolved. However,
being that the case presented a novel question of law, the SC opted to rule on the matter.)
(1) YES.

The Civil Liberties Union case construed the prohibition against multiple offices contained in
Section 7, par. 2., Article IX-B and Section 13, Article VII in this manner: that while all other
appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the
government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of
their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when
expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant
to be the general rule applicable to all public officials, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to
be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, members of the Cabinet,
and their deputies and assistants.
The general rule contained in Article IX-B permits an appointive official to hold more than one
office only if allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position. In the case of
Quimson v. Ozaeta, it was held that *t+here is no legal objection to a government official
occupying two government offices and performing the functions of both as long as there is no
incompatibility. The test in determining whether incompatibility exists between two offices
was laid out in People v. Green - whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense
that one office has the right to interfere with the other.
In this case, an incompatibility exists between the positions of the PCGG Chairman and the
CPLC. The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the
actions of the heads of various executive departments and agencies and to review
investigations involving heads of executive departments and agencies, as well as other
Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an agency under the Executive
Department. Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the review of the CPLC.
Elma will be required to give his legal opinion on his own actions as PCGG Chairman and review
any investigation conducted by the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, which may involve
himself as PCGG Chairman. Questions on his impartiality will inevitably be raised.
(2) NO.
Section 13, Article VII applies in particular to Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries. In the case of US v. Mouat, it is held that excluded from the provision's purview are
public officers who merely have the rank of secretary, undersecretary or assistant secretary.
The prohibition under Section 13, Article VII will thus be applicable neither to the PCGG
Chairman nor to the CPLC, as neither of them is a secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant
secretary, even if the former may have the same rank as the latter positions.