G.R. NO.

129242

January 16, 2001

PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, and ISABELITA MANALO ,petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA (BRANCH 35), PURITA S. JAYME, MILAGROS M. TERRE, BELEN M. ORILLANO,
ROSALINA M. ACUIN, ROMEO S. MANALO, ROBERTO S. MANALO, AMALIA MANALO and IMELDA MANALO, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Pilar S. Vda De Manalo, et. Al., seeking to annul the Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 affirming
the Orders 3 of the Regional Trial Court and the Resolution 4which denied petitioner' motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts 5 are as follows:
Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and
his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo,
Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo and Imelda Manalo, who are all of legal age.1wphi1.nt
At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business
under the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop with offices at No. 19 Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon City and at NO. 45 General Tinio Street, Arty
Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, namely; Purita, Milagros, Belen Rocalina,
Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition 6 with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila 7 of the judicial settlement of the estate of their late
father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.
On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing on February 11, 1993 and directing the publication of the order for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, and further directing service by registered mail of the said order upon the
heirs named in the petition at their respective addresses mentioned therein.
On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an order 'declaring the whole world in default, except the government,"
and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein on March 16, 1993. However, the trial court upon motion of set this order of general default aside
herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted then (10) days within which to file
their opposition to the petition.
Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating in the filling of an Omnibus Motion 8 on July 23, 1993 seeking;
(1) to seat aside and reconsider the Order of the trial court dated July 9, 1993 which denied the motion for additional extension of time file opposition; (2) to
set for preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal of the case; (3) to declare that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the persons of the oppositors; and (4) for the immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.
On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order 9 which resolved, thus:
A. To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for the oppositors on July 20, 1993, only for the purpose of considering the merits thereof;
B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of their affirmative defenses as ground for the dismissal of this proceeding, said
affirmative defenses being irrelevant and immaterial to the purpose and issue of the present proceeding;
C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors;
D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this Presiding Judge;
E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular administrator in the intestate estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo for
hearing on September 9, 1993 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 39851, after the trial
court in its Order 10 dated September 15, 1993. In their petition for improperly laid in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626; (2) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over their persons; (3) the share of the surviving spouse was included in the intestate proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest efforts toward
compromise among members of the same family; and (5) no certification of non-forum shopping was attached to the petition.
Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari in its Resolution 11promulgated on September 30, 1996. On May 6,
1997 the motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was likewise dismissed. 12
The only issue raised by herein petitioners in the instant petition for review is whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the
questioned orders of the respondent trial court which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate despite the
failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving members of the same family have been made prior to the filling of
the petition but that the same have failed.

Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary civil action involving members of the same family. They point out
that it contains certain averments, which, according to them, are indicative of its adversarial nature, to wit:
X

Par. 7. One of the surviving sons, ANTONIO MANALO, since the death of his father, TROADIO MANALO, had not made any settlement, judicial or
extra-judicial of the properties of the deceased father TROADIO MANALO.
Par. 8. xxx the said surviving son continued to manage and control the properties aforementioned, without proper accounting, to his own benefit
and advantage xxx.
X

Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO is managing and controlling the estate of the deceased TROADIO MANALO to his own advantage and to the
damage and prejudice of the herein petitioners and their co-heirs xxx.
X

Par. 14. For the protection of their rights and interests, petitioners were compelled to bring this suit and were forced to litigate and incur expenses
and will continue to incur expenses of not less than, P250,000.00 and engaged the services of herein counsel committing to pay P200,000.00 as and
attorney's fees plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court xxx. 13
Consequently, according to herein petitioners, the same should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that a
motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed on the ground that a condition precedent for filling the claim has not been complied with, that is, that the
petitioners therein failed to aver in the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made involving members of
the same family prior to the filling of the petition pursuant to Article 222 14 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The instant petition is not impressed with merit.
It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments 15 and the character of the relief sought 16 in the
complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful srutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and
Distribution of Estatein SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners' claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition
contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fat of death of the late Troadio Manalo
on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within
he country are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest.17The petition is SP.PROC No. 92-63626
also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in
the probate proceedings. In addition, the relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners therein
(private respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio Manalo, to wit;
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed for of this Honorable Court:
a. That after due hearing, letters of administration be issued to petitioner ROMEO MANALO for the administration of the estate of the deceased
TROADIO MANALO upon the giving of a bond in such reasonable sum that this Honorable Court may fix.
b. That after all the properties of the deceased TROADIO MANALO have been inventoried and expenses and just debts, if any, have been paid and
the legal heirs of the deceased fully determined, that the said estate of TROADIO MANALO be settled and distributed among the legal heirs all in
accordance with law.
c. That the litigation expenses of these proceedings in the amount of P250,000.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of P300,000.00 plus
honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court in the hearing and trial of this case and costs of suit be taxed solely against ANTONIO MANALO.18
Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains certain averments which may be typical of an ordinary civil action. Herein petitioners, as
oppositors therein, took advantage of the said defect in the petition and filed their so-called Opposition thereto which, as observed by the trial court, is
actually an Answer containing admissions and denials, special and affirmative defenses and compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral and exemplary
damages, plus attorney's fees and costs 19 in an apparent effort to make out a case of an ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its dismissal under Rule 16,
Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis--vis, Article 222 of civil of the Civil Code.
It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the late
Troadio Manalo by raising matters that as irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, siting as a probate court,
has limited and special jurisdiction 20 and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary
civil action. In addition, the rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an action, is determined by
the averments in the complaint and not by the defenses contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case either thrown
out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem. 21 So it should be in the instant petition for settlement of estate.

Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were to be considered as a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a
deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis--visArticle 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines would nevertheless apply as a ground for
the dismissal of the same by virtue of ule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which provides that the 'rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceedings.' Petitioners contend that the term
"proceeding" is so broad that it must necessarily include special proceedings.
The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the
invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo
inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough. To wit:
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have
been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035(underscoring supplied).22
The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or
persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the
enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. 23 A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the
enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. 24 Besides, an excerpt form the Report of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals the
intention of the Code Commission to make that legal provision applicable only to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of the
same family, thus:
It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort
should be made toward a compromise before litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is know that lawsuit between close
relatives generates deeper bitterness than stranger.25
It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant
was imploded therein. The Petition for issuance of letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special
proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. 26 the petitioners therein (private
respondents herein) merely seek to establish the fat of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so
that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special
jurisdiction of the probate court.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the petition in the above-entitled case, is DENIED for lack of merit, Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133000

October 2, 2001

PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO LETICIA DEL ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL RESORIO MANANGAN, ROSALINDA
FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO FUENTES, ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and EDUARDO DEL ROSARIO, respondent..
BUENA, J.:
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating
to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs?
Sought to be reversed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the decision1 of public respondent Court of Appeals, the decretal portion of
which declares:
"Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside and another one entered annulling the Deed
of Sale executed by Graciano Del Rosario in favor of defendant-appellee Patricia Natcher, and ordering the Register of Deeds to Cancel TCT No.
186059 and reinstate TCT No. 107443 without prejudice to the filing of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario
in a proper court. No costs.
"So ordered."
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land with an area of 9,322 square meters located in Manila and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11889. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, namely: Bayani, Ricardo,
Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate on 09 February 1954 adjudicating and dividing among
themselves the real property subject of TCT No. 11889. Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six children received 1/14 share
of the said property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980 was issued in the name of Graciano and the Six
children.1wphi1.nt
Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an "Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights" where they
subdivided among themselves the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 35980 into several lots. Graciano then donated to his children, share and share alike, a
portion of his interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters registered under Graciano's name, as covered by
TCT No. 35988. Subsequently, the land subject of TCT No. 35988 was further subdivided into two separate lots where the first lot with a land area of 80.90
square meter was registered under TCT No. 107442 and the second lot with a land area of 396.70 square meters was registered under TCT No. 107443.
Eventually, Graciano sold the first lot2 to a third person but retained ownership over the second lot.3
On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife
Patricia as a result of which TCT No. 1860594 was issued in the latter's name. On 07 October 1985,Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six
children by his first marriage, as heirs.
In a complaint5 filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, herein private respondents alleged that upon Graciano's
death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear that Graciano
executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 19876 in favor herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT no. 186059 in
the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes
have been impaired.
In her answer7 dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally married to Graciano in 20 March 1980 and thus, under the law,
she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner further alleged that during Graciano's lifetime, Graciano already distributed, in
advance, properties to his children, hence, herein private respondents may not anymore claim against Graciano's estate or against herein petitioner's
property.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a decision dated 26 January 1996 holding:8
"1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is prohibited by law and thus a complete nullity. There
being no evidence that a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or that there has been decreed a judicial separation of
property between them, the spouses are prohibited from entering (into) a contract of sale;
"2) The deed as sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation as it was equally prohibited by law under Article 133 of the New Civil Code;
"3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may however be regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of
Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of the deceased."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court's decision ratiocinating, inter alia:
"It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate. The court a quo, trying an ordinary action
for reconveyance / annulment of title, went beyond its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the
settlement of estate of a deceased person. XXX

"X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as advance inheritance. What the court should have done was merely to rule on
the validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted for that purpose. XXX"
Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective mantle through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and assails the appellate court's
decision "for being contrary to law and the facts of the case."
We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant petition.
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in this wise:
"XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
"A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are government by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for
a special civil action.
"XXX
"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact."
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one's right
in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The
term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special
proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an
application or motion."9
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds further:
"It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted according to the ordinary rules
and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity, and that special proceedings include those proceedings which are not ordinary in this
sense, but is instituted and prosecuted according to some special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without summons and prosecuted
without regular pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions. XXX A special proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and
independent proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted independently of a pending action, by petition or motion upon notice."10
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the
estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly
requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise
of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir may be
heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person
raising the questions and on the heir.
While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless clear that the same provision11contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the
"court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings".
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue
of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and annulment of title with
damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not
properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein
petitioner Natcher.
At this point, the appellate court's disquisition is elucidating:
"Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate of a deceased, it must first settle the estate in a special proceeding instituted for
the purpose. In the case at hand, the court a quo determined the respective legitimes of the plaintiffs-appellants and assigned the subject property
owned by the estate of the deceased to defendant-appellee without observing the proper proceedings provided (for) by the Rules of Court. From
the aforecited discussions, it is clear that trial courts trying an ordinary action cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding
because it is subject to specific prescribed rules. Thus, the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as an advance inheritance."12
In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our pronouncement in Coca vs. Borromeo13 andMendoza vs. Teh14 that whether a particular
matter should be resolved by the Regional Trial Court (then Court of First Instance) in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction
is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. In essence, it is procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived".15
Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents inasmuch as the six children of the decedent even assailed the authority
of the trail court, acting in its general jurisdiction, to rule on this specific issue of advancement made by the decedent to petitioner.

Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated the long standing principle that although generally, a probate court may not decide
a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of
ownership.16
Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had occasion to hold:
"In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation seeking appointment as estate administratrix which does not
necessarily involve settlement of estate that would have invited the exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a probate court. 17 (emphasis
supplied)
Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken
first.18 The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the
deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the
compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.19
A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the present case, reveals that the trial court failed to observe established rules of
procedure governing the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario. This Court sees no cogent reason to sanction the non-observance of these wellentrenched rules and hereby holds that under the prevailing circumstances, a probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best forum
to ventilate and adjudge the issue of advancement as well as other related matters involving the settlement of Graciano Del Rosario's estate.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 168799

June 27, 2008

EUHILDA C. TABUADA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. J. CEDRICK O. RUIZ, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Iloilo City, ERLINDA CALALIMAN-LEDESMA and YOLANDA
CALALIMAN-TAGRIZA, respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner assails the March 2, 2005 Order 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Iloilo City, Branch 39 in Special Proceedings (Sp. Proc.) No. 5198 and the May 20, 2005 Resolution 2 of the trial court denying the motion for the
reconsideration of the challenged order.
The very simple issue raised for our resolution in this case surfaced when the parties in Sp. Proc. No. 5198 (the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate
estate of the late Jose and Paciencia Calaliman) manifested to the RTC their desire to amicably settle the case. In light of the said manifestation, the trial court
issued the following Order3 on December 6, 2004:
In view of the strong manifestation of the parties herein and their respective counsel that they will be able to raise (sic) an amicable settlement,
finally, on or before 25 December 2004, the Court will no longer be setting the pending incidents for hearing as the parties and their counsel have
assured this Court that they are going to submit a "Motion for Judgment Based On An Amicable Settlement" on or before 25 December 2004.
Atty. Honorato Sayno Jr., Atty. Gregorio Rubias and Atty. Raul Retiro are notified in open court.
Serve a copy of this Order to Atty. Rean Sy.
SO ORDERED.4
The RTC, however, on March 2, 2005, invoking Section 3, 5 Rule 17, of the Rules of Court, terminated the proceedings on account of the parties' failure to
submit the amicable settlement and to comply with the afore-quoted December 6, 2004 Order. The trial court, in the challenged order of even date, likewise
denied all the motions filed by the parties.6
Petitioner, the administratrix of the estate, and private respondents separately moved for the reconsideration of the March 2, 2005 Order arguing, among
others, that the termination of the case was premature, there being yet no payment of the debts and distribution of the estate, and that they had already
prepared all the necessary papers for the amicable settlement. 7 Despite the said pleas for reconsideration, the trial court remained firm in its position to
terminate the proceedings; hence, in the assailed May 20, 2005 Resolution, 8 it affirmed its earlier order. Dissatisfied, petitioner scuttles to this Court via Rule
45.9
The petition is granted.
While a compromise agreement or an amicable settlement is very strongly encouraged, the failure to consummate one does not warrant any procedural
sanction, much less provide an authority for the court to jettison the case. 10 Sp. Proc. No. 5198 should not have been terminated or dismissed by the trial court
on account of the mere failure of the parties to submit the promised amicable settlement and/or the Motion for Judgment Based On An Amicable Settlement.
Given the non-contentious nature of special proceedings11 (which do not depend on the will of an actor, but on a state or condition of things or persons not
entirely within the control of the parties interested), its dismissal should be ordered only in the extreme case where the termination of the proceeding is the
sole remedy consistent with equity and justice, but not as a penalty for neglect of the parties therein. 12
The third clause of Section 3, Rule 17, which authorizes the motu propio dismissal of a case if the plaintiff fails to comply with the rules or any order of the
court,13 cannot even be used to justify the convenient, though erroneous, termination of the proceedings herein. An examination of the December 6, 2004
Order14 readily reveals that the trial court neither required the submission of the amicable settlement or the aforesaid Motion for Judgment, nor warned the
parties that should they fail to submit the compromise within the given period, their case would be dismissed.15 Hence, it cannot be categorized as an order
requiring compliance to the extent that its defiance becomes an affront to the court and the rules. And even if it were worded in coercive language, the parties
cannot be forced to comply, for, as aforesaid, they are only strongly encouraged, but are not obligated, to consummate a compromise. An order requiring
submission of an amicable settlement does not find support in our jurisprudence and is premised on an erroneous interpretation and application of the law
and rules.
Lastly, the Court notes that inconsiderate dismissals neither constitute a panacea nor a solution to the congestion of court dockets. While they lend a deceptive
aura of efficiency to records of individual judges, they merely postpone the ultimate reckoning between the parties. In the absence of clear lack of merit or
intention to delay, justice is better served by a brief continuance, trial on the merits, and final disposition of the cases before the court. 16
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The March 2, 2005 Order and the May 20, 2005 Resolution of the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 39 in Sp. Proc. No. 5198 areREVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 164108

May 8, 2009

ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS HOLDING CORPORATION,Petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 and
ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto
(administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino.1 At the time of his death, there were two pending civil cases against Benedicto
involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioner
Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners
Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein. 2
On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor,
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. The petition was raffled to Branch 21, presided by respondent Judge Amor A. Reyes. Said petition
acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent to be P5 Million, "net of liabilities."3 On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an order appointing
private respondent as administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration in her favor.4 In January 2001, private
respondent submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband.5 In the List of
Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then being litigated before
the Bacolod City courts.6 Private respondent stated that the amounts of liability corresponding to the two cases as P136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137
and P35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178.7 Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and
appraisal report pertaining to the estate.8
On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, 9praying that they be furnished with copies of all
processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Private respondent opposed the manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of petitioners
to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband. Even before the Manila RTC acted on the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus motion
praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private respondent of the required inventory of the decedents estate.10 Petitioners also filed
other pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of private respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the
inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.
On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not interested parties within the
contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate proceedings. 11 After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, a
petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. The petition argued in general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the civil cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.
On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision12 dismissing the petition and declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene, according to the appellate
court, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The Court of Appeals cited the fact that the claims of petitioners against the decedent were in fact
contingent or expectant, as these were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts.
Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower courts erred in denying them the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the
estate of Roberto Benedicto. Interestingly, the rules of procedure they cite in support of their argument is not the rule on intervention, but rather various
other provisions of the Rules on Special Proceedings. 13
To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the courts a quo. First, they prayed that they be henceforth furnished "copies of all
processes and orders issued" by the intestate court as well as the pleadings filed by administratrix Benedicto with the said court.14 Second, they prayed that
the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon
submission thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the
same.15 Third, petitioners moved that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administrator of her verified annual account, and, upon
submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation,
preservation and disposition of the estate.16
The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed by the rule on intervention. We can readily agree with the Court of Appeals
on that point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court x x x" While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening in the intestate proceedings, case
law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an intervenor "must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and
expectant."17
Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The
settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of Court,18 not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2,
Rule 72 further provides that "[i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to
special proceedings."
We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose
credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of "intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims.

Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they had
sought then before the RTC, and also now before us, do not square with their recognition as intervenors. In short, even if it were declared that petitioners have
no right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would not necessarily mean the disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the right
to intervene is not one of those reliefs.
To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be, let us now turn our focus to the Rules on Special Proceedings.
In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle "any interested persons" or "any persons interested in the estate" to participate in varying
capacities in the testate or intestate proceedings. Petitioners cite these provisions before us, namely: (1) Section 1, Rule 79, which recognizes the right of "any
person interested" to oppose the issuance of letters testamentary and to file a petition for administration;" (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the giving
of notice of hearing on the petition for letters of administration to the known heirs, creditors, and "to any other persons believed to have interest in the
estate;" (3) Section 1, Rule 76, which allows a "person interested in the estate" to petition for the allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an
individual interested in the estate of the deceased "to complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or
of evidence of the decedents title or interest therein;" (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the examination and allowance
of the Administrators account "to persons interested;" (6) Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons interested" before it
may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90, which allows "any person
interested in the estate" to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or
provided for.
Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or implied, then they should have filed their claim, even if contingent,
under the aegis of the notice to creditors to be issued by the court immediately after granting letters of administration and published by the administrator
immediately after the issuance of such notice.19 However, it appears that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his actions in
connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the
notice to creditors required under Rule 86.20These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced against the
administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as represented by its administrator, was
successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case 21 was already pending review before this Court at the time of Benedictos death.
Evidently, the merits of petitioners claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil cases where they were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In
the event the claims for damages of petitioners are granted, they would have the right to enforce the judgment against the estate. Yet until such time, to what
extent may they be allowed to participate in the intestate proceedings?
Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia, 22 and it does provide us with guidance on how to proceed. A brief narration of the facts
therein is in order. Dinglasan had filed an action for reconveyance and damages against respondents, and during a hearing of the case, learned that the same
trial court was hearing the intestate proceedings of Lee Liong to whom Dinglasan had sold the property years earlier. Dinglasan thus amended his complaint
to implead Ang Chia, administrator of the estate of her late husband. He likewise filed a verified claim-in-intervention, manifesting the pendency of the civil
case, praying that a co-administrator be appointed, the bond of the administrator be increased, and that the intestate proceedings not be closed until the civil
case had been terminated. When the trial court ordered the increase of the bond and took cognizance of the pending civil case, the administrator moved to
close the intestate proceedings, on the ground that the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial partition of the estate. The trial court refused to close
the intestate proceedings pending the termination of the civil case, and the Court affirmed such action.
If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it was only pursuant to their desire to protect their interests it appearing that the
property in litigation is involved in said proceedings and in fact is the only property of the estate left subject of administration and distribution; and the court
is justified in taking cognizance of said civil case because of the unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect and have
a far reaching consequence in the determination and distribution of the estate. In so taking cognizance of civil case No. V-331 the court does not assume
general jurisdiction over the case but merely makes of record its existence because of the close interrelation of the two cases and cannot therefore be branded
as having acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate proceedings pending determination of the separate civil action
for the reason that there is no rule or authority justifying the extension of administration proceedings until after the separate action pertaining to its general
jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot be entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real or personal
property from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced
against the executor or administrator." What practical value would this provision have if the action against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its
termination simply because the heirs desire to close the intestate proceedings without first taking any step to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule is but a
corollary to the ruling which declares that questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate but claimed by another person should
be determined in a separate action and should be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. These rules would be rendered nugatory if
we are to hold that an intestate proceedings can be closed by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs x x x 23 (Emphasis supplied) [Citations omitted]
It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed to an action-in-intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure, but we can
partake of the spirit behind such pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the Court, citing Dinglasan, stated: "[t]he rulings of this court have always been to
the effect that in the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests
are allowed to do so to protect the same, but not for a decision on their action."24
Petitioners interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but they are viable interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of Special
Proceedings allows not just creditors, but also "any person interested" or "persons interested in the estate" various specified capacities to protect their
respective interests in the estate. Anybody with a contingent claim based on a pending action for quasi-delict against a decedent may be reasonably concerned
that by the time judgment is rendered in their favor, the estate of the decedent would have already been distributed, or diminished to the extent that the
judgment could no longer be enforced against it.
In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any person interested in the estate, the right to participate in every
aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when such persons may accordingly act in those proceedings, we
deem that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate

court not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there is no other modality
under the Rules by which such interests can be protected. It is under this standard that we assess the three prayers sought by petitioners.
The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings
filed by the administrator of the estate. There is no questioning as to the utility of such relief for the petitioners. They would be duly alerted of the
developments in the intestate proceedings, including the status of the assets of the estate. Such a running account would allow them to pursue the appropriate
remedies should their interests be compromised, such as the right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate court if property of the estate
concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed.
At the same time, the fact that petitioners interests remain inchoate and contingent counterbalances their ability to participate in the intestate proceedings.
We are mindful of respondents submission that if the Court were to entitle petitioners with service of all processes and pleadings of the intestate court, then
anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent or otherwise, would have the right to be furnished such pleadings, no matter how wanting of merit the
claim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent that would mandate the service of all court processes and pleadings to anybody posing a claim to the estate,
much less contingent claims, would unduly complicate and burden the intestate proceedings, and would ultimately offend the guiding principle of speedy and
orderly disposition of cases.
Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been recognized by this Court, with respect to the petitioners herein, that addresses the core
concern of petitioners to be apprised of developments in the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge Reyes,25 the Court heard a petition for mandamus filed by
the same petitioners herein against the RTC judge, praying that they be allowed access to the records of the intestate proceedings, which the respondent judge
had denied from them. Section 2 of Rule 135 came to fore, the provision stating that "the records of every court of justice shall be public records and shall be
available for the inspection of any interested person x x x." The Court ruled that petitioners were "interested persons" entitled to access the court records in
the intestate proceedings. We said:
Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records tomonitor prompt compliance with the Rules governing the preservation and proper disposition
of the assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of the Inventory and the submission by the Administratrix of an annual accounting appears
legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of money against Roberto Benedicto, et al., they have an interest over the outcome of the settlement
of his estate. They are in fact "interested persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x 26
Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the
service of court processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and disposed
of in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access the records, rather than entitling them to the service of every court
order or pleading no matter how relevant to their individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the administrator and the heirs of the
decedent, while providing a viable means by which the interests of the creditors in the estate are preserved.1awphi1
Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all "interested parties" the petitioners as "interested parties"
will be entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and
place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or
administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application
for an order for distribution of the estate residue. After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the existence of the pending
cases filed by the petitioners.
We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be set for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and
complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof: the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue be required to assist in the
appraisal of the fair market value of the same; and that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administratrix of her verified annual
account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested
in the collation, preservation and disposition of the estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.
Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased within
three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an account of his administration within one (1) year from
receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. We do not doubt that there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either duty, but
a person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did delay in the performance of these
duties in the context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with
contingent claims against the estate.
Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the proper remedy is to seek the removal of the administrator in accordance with
Section 2, Rule 82. While the provision is silent as to who may seek with the court the removal of the administrator, we do not doubt that a creditor, even a
contingent one, would have the personality to seek such relief. After all, the interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets
to answer for the debt, and the general competence or good faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such purpose.
All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct. Nonetheless, as we have explained, petitioners should not be deprived of their
prerogatives under the Rules on Special Proceedings as enunciated in this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are
entitled to such notices and rights as provided for such interested persons in the Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons under the Rules on
Special Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-8409

December 28, 1956

In the Matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio. EUGENIO EUSEBIO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
AMANDA EUSEBIO, JUAN EUSEBIO, DELFIN EUSEBIO, VICENTE EUSEBIO, and CARLOS EUSEBIO,oppositors-appellants.
Francisco M. Ramos and Valeriano Silva for appellee.
Filemon Cajator for appellants.

CONCEPCION, J.:
This case instituted on November 16, 1953, when Eugenio Eusebio filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a petition for his appointment as
administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio, who died on November 28, 1952, residing, according to said petition, in the City of Quezon. On
December 4, 1953, Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos, all surnamed Eusebio, objected to said petition, stating that they are illegitimate children
of the deceased and that the latter was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, and praying, therefore, that the case be dismissed upon the ground that venue
had been improperly filed. By an order, dated March 10, 1954, said court overruled this objection and granted said petition. Hence, the case is before us on
appeal taken, from said order, by Amanda Eusebio, and her aforementioned sister and brothers.
The appeal hinges on the situs of the residence of Andres Eusebio on November 28, 1952, for Rule 75, section 1, of the Rules of Court, provides:
Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizens or an alien,
his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
It is not disputed that up to, at least, October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio was, and had always been, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, where he had his
home, as well as some other properties. Inasmuch as his heart was in bad condition and his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P.
Florentino St., Quezon City, on October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio bought a house and lot at 889-A Espaa Extention, in said City (Exhibit 2). While transferring
his belongings to this house, soon thereafter, the decedent suffered a stroke (probably heart failure), for which reason Dr. Eusebio took him to his (Dr.
Eusebio's) aforementioned residence, where the decedent remained until he was brought to the UST Hospital, in the City of Manila, sometimes before
November 26, 1952. On this date, he contracted marriage in articulo mortis with his common law wife, Concepcion Villanueva, in said hospital. Two (2) days
later, he died therein of "acute left ventricular failure secondary to hypertensive heart disease", at the age of seventy-four (74) years (Exhibit A).
Consequently, he never stayed or even slept in said house at Espaa Extention.
It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of the decedent was San Fernando, Pampanga, where he resided for over seventy (70) years,
the presumption is that he retained such domicile, and, hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, for it is well-settled that "a
domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained" (Minor, Conflict of Laws, p.70; Restatement of the Law on Conflict of Laws, p. 47; In re Estate
of Johnson, 192 Iowa, 78). Under the circumstances surrounding the case at bar, if Andres Eusebio established another domicile, it must have been one of
choice, for which the following conditions are essential, namely: (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (2) physical presence at the place chosen; and
(3) intention to stay therein permanently (Minor, Conflict of Laws, pp. 109-110; Googrich, Conflict of Laws, p. 169; Velilla vs. Posadas, 62 Phil., 624;
Zuellig vs. Republic of the Philippines, 46 Off. Gaz. Suppl. No. 11, p. 220). Admittedly, the decedent was juridically capable of choosing a domicile and had been
in Quezon City several days prior to his demise. Thus, the issue narrows down to whether he intended to stay in that place permanently.
There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does the decedent appears to have manifested his wish to live indefinitely in said city. His son, petitionerappellee, who took the witness stand, did not testify thereon, despite the allegation, in his answer to the aforemention, opposition of the appellants herein,
that "the deceased (had) decided to reside . . . for the rest of his life, in Quezon City". Moreover, said appellee did not introduce the testimony of his legitimate
full brother and son of the decedent, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, upon whose advice, presumably, the house and lot at No. 889-A Espaa Extention was purchased, and
who, therefore, might have cast some light on his (decedent's) purpose in buying said property. This notwithstanding, the lower court held that the decedent's
intent to stay permanently in Quezon City is "manifest" from the acquisition of said property and the transfer of his belonging thereto. This conclusion is
untenable.lawphil.net
The aforementioned house and lot were bought by the decedent because he had been adviced to do so "due to his illness", in the very words of herein
appellee. It is not improbable in fact, its is very likely that said advice was given and followed in order that the patient could be near his doctor and have
a more effective treatment. It is well settled that "domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one's own health", even if coupled with
"knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to return home." (The Conflict of Laws, by Beale, Vol. I, pp. 172-173; see, also,
Shenton vs. Abbott, Md., 15., A. 2d. 906; U.S. vs. Knight, D. C. Mont., 291 Fed. 129).
Again, the decedent did not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Moreover, some of his children, who used to live with him in San
Fernando, Pampanga, remained in that municipality. Then, again, in the deed Exhibit 2, by virtue of which said property at No. 889-A Espaa Extention,
Quezon City, was conveyed to him, on October 29, 1952, or less than a month before his death, the decedent gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence.
Similarly, the "A" and "B" residence certificates used by the decedent in aknowledging said Exhibit 2, before a notary public, was issued in San Fernando,
Pampanga. Lastly, the marriage contract Exhibit 1, signed by the deceased when he was married, in articulo mortis, to Concepcion Villanueva, at the UST
Hospital, on November 26, 1952, or two (2) days prior to his demise, stated that his residence is San Fernando, Pampanga. It is worthy of notice that Alfonso
Eusebio, one of the legitimate full brothers of the herein appellee, was a witness to said wedding, thus indicating that the children of the deceased by his first
marriage, including said appellee, were represented on that occasion and would have objected to said statement about his residence, if it were false.
Consequently, apart from appellee's failure to prove satisfactory that the decedent had decided to establish his home in Quezon City, the acts of the latter,

shortly and immediately before his death, prove the contrary. At any rate, the presumption in favor of the retention of the old domicile 1 which is
particularly strong when the domicile is one of the origin 2as San Fernando, Pampanga, evidently was, as regards said decedent has not been offset by the
evidence of record.
The lower court, however, rejected said Exhibits 1 and 2, upon being offered in evidence, and refused to entertain the same in the order appealed from. The
reason therefor are deducible from its resolution in rejecting said documents during the hearing of the incident at bar. The court then held:
Exihibits "1" and "2" are rejecting but the same may be attached to the records for whatever action oppositors may want to take later on because
until now the personality of the oppositors has not been established whether or not they have a right to intervene in this case, and the Court cannot
pass upon this question as the oppositors refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of this Court and they maintain that these proceedings should be
dismissed. (P. 10, t. s. n.)
In short, the lower court believed that said documents should not be admitted in evidence before appellants had established their "personality" to intervene in
the case, referring seemingly to their filiation. When appellants, however, sought, during said hearing, to establish their relation with the deceased, as his
alleged illegitimate children, His Honor, the trial Judge sustained appellee's objection thereto stating:
Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of this Court, and it seems that you are now trying to prove the status of your client; you are
leading so that. The main point here is your contention that the deceased was never a resident of Quezon City and that is why I allowed you to
cross-examine. If you are trying to establish the status of the oppositors, I will sustain the objection, unless you want to submit to the jurisdiction of
the Court. This is not yet the time to declare who are persons who should inherit. (p. 1, t. s. n.)
Thus, the lower court refused to consider appellant's evidence on the domicile of the decedent, because of their alleged lack of "personality", but, when tried to
establish such "personality", they were barred from doing so on account of the question of venue raised by him. We find ourselves unable to sanction either
the foregoing procedure adopted by the lower court or the inference it drew from the circumstances surrounding the case.
To begin with, His Honor, the trial Judge had taken inconsistent positions. While, on the one hand, he declared that appellants could not be permitted to
introduce evidence on the residence of the decedent, for they contestedthe jurisdiction of court, on the other hand, he held, in the order appealed from, that, by
cross-examining the appellee, said appellants had submitted themselves to the authority of the court.
What is more, this conclusion is refuted by the record. At the beginning of the hearing, in the lower court, appellants' counsel announced that he would take
part therein "only to question the jurisdiction, for the purpose of dismissing this proceeding," (p. 2, t.s.n.). During the cross-examination of petitioner herein,
said counsel tried to elicit the relation between the decedent and the appellants. As, the appellee objected thereto, the court said, addressing appellants'
counsel: "Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of the court. . . . It you are trying to establish the status of the oppositors, I will sustain the objection,
unless you want to submit to the jurisdiction of the court" (p. 7, t.s.n.). Thereupon, appellants' counsel refused to do so, stating: "I will insist on my stand." Then,
too, at the conclusion of the hearing, the court rejected Exhibits 1 and 2, for the reason that appellants "refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of this court and they
maintain that these proceedings should bedismissed." Thus, appellants specially made of record that they were not submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of
the court, except for the purpose only of assailing the same, and the court felt that appellants were not giving up their stand, which was, and is, a fact.
At any rate, appellants were entitled to establish facts tending to prove, not only their right to object to appellee's petition, but, also, that venue had been laid
improperly. Such facts were: (a) their alleged relationship with the decedent, 3 which, if true, entitle them to proceed him under the Civil Code of the
Philippines; and (b) his alleged residence is Pampanga. In other words, the lower court should have admitted Exhibits 1 and 2 in evidence and given thereto
the proper effect, in connection with the issue under consideration.
Appellee, however, asks: "What will happen if this case be dismissed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or
improper venue?" In this connection, it appears that on November 14, 1953, the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga received a petition of
appellants herein, dated November 4, 1953, for the settlement of the "Intestate Estate of the late Don Andres Eusebio". Attached to said petition was petition
for the docketing thereof free charge, pursuant to Rule 3, section 22, of the Rules of Court. The latter petition was granted by an order dated November 16,
1953, which was received by the cashier of said court on November 17, 1953, on which date the case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 957. On
December 14, 1953, Jesus, Eugenio, Amando and Alfonso, all surnamed Eusebio (the children of the decedent by first marriage, including petitioner herein),
moved for the dismissal of said proceedings, owing to the pendency of the present case, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, since November 16, 1953.
This motion was granted in an order dated December 21, 1953, relying upon the above Rule 75, section 1, of the Rules of Court, pursuant to which "the court
first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
Although said order is now final, it cannot affect the outcome of the case at bar. Said order did not pass upon the question of domicile or residence of the
decedent. Moreover, in granting the court first taking cognizance of the case exclusive jurisdiction over the same, said provision of the Rules of Court evidently
refers to cases triable before two or more courts with concurrent jurisdiction. It could not possibly have intended to deprive a competent court of the
authority vested therein by law, merely because a similar case had been previously filed before a court to which jurisdiction is denied by law, for the same
would then be defeated by the will of one of the parties. More specially, said provision refers mainly to non-resident decedents who have properties in several
provinces in the Philippines, for the settlement of their respective estates may undertaken before the court of first instance of either one of said provinces, not
only because said courts then have concurrent jurisdiction and, hence, the one first taking cognizance of the case shall exclude the other courts but, also,
because the statement to this effect in said section 1 of Rule 75 of the Rules of the Court immediately follows the last part of the next preceding sentence,
which deals with non-resident decedents, whose estate may settled the court of first instance of any province in which they have properties.lawphil.net
In view, however, of the last sentence of said section, providing that:
. . . The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceedings, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
if proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased resident are instituted in two or more courts, and the question of venue is raised before the same,
the court in which the first case was filed shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide said issue, and we so held in the case of Taciana Vda. De Borja vs. Tan, L-

7792 (July 27, 1955). Should it be decided, in the proceedings before the said court, that venue had been improperly laid, the case pending therein should be
dismissed and the corresponding proceedings may, thereafter, be initiated in the proper court.
In conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no
authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly; and that it should, accordingly, have
sustained appellants' opposition and dismissed appellee's petition.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed and appellee's petition is dismissed, with costs against the appellee. It is so ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch Vl, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAO, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B. GARCIA, respondents.
Francisco Carreon for petitioners.
Augusto G. Gatmaytan for private respondents.

MARTIN, J.:
These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word "resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring to the situs of
the settlement of the estate of deceased persons, means. Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a special administrator is sought to be reviewed.
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of
administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died
intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court." At the same time, she moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, 1973, contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix
was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters of administration has been served upon all persons interested in the estate; there has
been no delay or cause for delay in the proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be
preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed
that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and as regular administratrix after due hearing.
While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to remove Virginia G. Fule as
special administratrix alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground raised in the motion for reconsideration of May 8, 1973 that her appointment was obtained
through erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has adverse interest against the estate; and that she has shown
herself unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of the court.
In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration filed by Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna,
was published on May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in theBayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation in Southern Luzon.
On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of Regular Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule. This
supplemental petition modified the original petition in four aspects: (1) the allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased Amado G. Garcia, he was elected
as Constitutional Delegate for the First District of Laguna and his last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna; (2) the deletion of the names of Preciosa B.
Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G. Garcia; (3) the allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir in the original petition, is
the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that she has expressly renounced her preferential right to the administration of the estate in favor of Virginia G.
Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be appointed as the regular administratrix. The admission of this supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia
for the reason, among others, that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of Laguna, of which the court was not possessed at the
beginning because the original petition was deficient.
On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and supplemental petitions for letters of administration, raising the issues of
jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as special administratrix.
An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973, praying for authority to take possession of properties of the decedent allegedly in the
hands of third persons as well as to secure cash advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed
the motion, calling attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar on the power of the special administratrix, viz., "to making an inventory of the personal
and real properties making up the state of the deceased."
However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order, received by Preciosa B. Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying the motion of Preciosa B.
Garcia to reconsider the order of May 2, 1973, appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and admitting the supplementation petition of May
18,1973.
On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1) jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest has not been
acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as she is not entitled to inherit from the deceased
Amado G. Garcia.

On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, reasoning that the said Virginia
G. Fule admitted before before the court that she is a full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde, with whom the deceased
Amado G. Garcia has no relation.
Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one, to enjoin the special administratrix from taking possession of properties in the
hands of third persons which have not been determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the special administratrix for acting outside her
authority and against the interest of the estate; and still another, filed in behalf of the minor Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for want of cause of
action, jurisdiction, and improper venue.
On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion of Virgina G. Fule and the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving
the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the powers of the special administratrix are those provided for in Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of
Court, 1 subject only to the previous qualification made by the court that the administration of the properties subject of the marketing agreement with the
Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association should remain with the latter; and that the special administratrix had already been authorized in
a previous order of August 20, 1973 to take custody and possession of all papers and certificates of title and personal effects of the decedent with the
Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.,
was ordered to deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in her name without any qualifying words like "married to Amado Garcia" does not appear.
Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the issue of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of July 2, 1973, denying Preciosa B.
Garcia's motion to reconsider the appointment of Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental petition, the failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in her
original petition for letters of administration in the place of residence of the decedent at the time of his death was cured. Judge Malvar further held that
Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections thereto by praying to be appointed as special and regular
administratrix of the estate.
An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27, 1973 to clarify or reconsider the foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in view of previous
court order limiting the authority of the special administratrix to the making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also asked for the resolution of her motion to
dismiss the petitions for lack of cause of action, and also that filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia. Resolution of her motions to substitute and remove the
special administratrix was likewise prayed for.
On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motions to substitute and remove the special
administratrix, and the second, holding that the power allowed the special administratrix enables her to conduct and submit an inventory of the assets of the
estate.
On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the foregoing orders of November 28, 1973 and December 19, 1973, insofar as they
sustained or failed to rule on the issues raised by her: (a) legal standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c) jurisdiction; (d) appointment,
qualification and removal of special administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special administratrix of checks and papers and effects in the office of the Calamba
Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion for reconsideration of January 7, 1974. On July 19,
1974, Judge Malvar issued the other three questioned orders: one, directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc., to furnish Virginia G. Fule, as special administratrix, copy of the statement of accounts and final liquidation of sugar pool, as well as to deliver
to her the corresponding amount due the estate; another, directing Preciosa B. Garcia to deliver to Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles presumably belonging
to the estate; and another, directing Ramon Mercado to deliver to the court all certificates of title in his possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether
qualified with the word "single" or "married to Amado Garcia."
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C) before Judge Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule presented the death certificate of Amado G.
Garcia showing that his residence at the time of his death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented the residence certificate of the decedent
for 1973 showing that three months before his death his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified that Amado G. Garcia was residing in
Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna.
On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action for certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction before the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance
of Laguna, or, in the alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of that court, viz., one dated March 27, 1974, denying their motion for reconsideration of
the order denying their motion to dismiss the criminal and supplemental petitions on the issue, among others, of jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated
July 19, 1974, directing the delivery of certain properties to the special administratrix, Virginia G. Fule, and to the court.
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the proceedings before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First
Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule forthwith elevated the matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The case was
docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.
However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for
letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the same intestate estate of
Amado G. Garcia. On February 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta
granted the motion and appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed the office.
For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge Ericta of the pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna, and the annulment of the proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1975. She manifested, however, her willingness
to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738 should the decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc.
No. 27-C have not yet become final, it being the subject of a motion for reconsideration.

On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings before his court until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court of the final outcome of
the case pending before the Court of Appeals. This notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December 11, 1975, an "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay
Estate Obligations."
On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question Venue and Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated in the previous special
appearance of March 3, 1975, and calling attention that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration had
been appealed to this Court; that the parties had already filed their respective briefs; and that the case is still pending before the Court.
On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge Ericta, issued an order granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for Authority to
Pay Estate Obligations" in that the payments were for the benefit of the estate and that there hangs a cloud of doubt on the validity of the proceedings in Sp.
Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January 12,1976.
On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition for certiorari with temporary restraining order, to annul the proceedings in Sp.
Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani Cruz Pao from further acting in the case. A restraining order was issued on February 9, 1976.
We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-42670 for the reasons and considerations hereinafter stated.
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so
far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal
from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular regard to letters of administration, Section 2,
Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment
sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as death, the name and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets,
intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of
death of the intestate and his last residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate
rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court
to grant letters of administration. 3
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of
the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and
Processes. 4 It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure
dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the
subject matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply
directs the manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably
with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a
loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be
rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption
that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties. 5
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the
deceased. Because of the existence of numerous Courts of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however, purposedly fixes the venue or the place
where each case shall be brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of
administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that the
Revised Rules of Court properly considers the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled as "venue." 6
2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his
death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile."
This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. 7 In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. 9 Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. 10 No
particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 11
3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on the residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. In her
original petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973,
Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and
in other places within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and
improper laying of venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as "property owner of
Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in his
death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba court and in other papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel
Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last place of
residence was at Calamba, Laguna."

On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at
Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. 12 As it is, the death certificate of Amado G.
Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel
Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his death; the Marketing
Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971 turning over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba,
Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of
residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was
improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to improper venue is subject to waiver.
Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states: "When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the case before
Us the Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive
her objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to alternative
remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence
of the decedent.
4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as special administratrix is another issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference
to the appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any
cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the
estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment of a special
administrator was only proper when the allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment
and such appointment is now allowed when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree among
themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the probate court. 15That, however, is no authority for the judge to
become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that discretion must be based on
reason, equity, justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the same fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator
should not be taken into account in the appointment of a special administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the judge to consider the order of preference in the
appointment of a regular administrator in appointing a special administrator. After all, the consideration that overrides all others in this respect is
the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate of the decedent. 17 Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the
exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in
administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. The good or bad administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the naked
ownership of a property. 18
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of the late Amado G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that
Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever with Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable of any successional
rights. 19 On this point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the
issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed, 20 the appointing court does not determine
who are entitled to share in the estate of the decedent but who is entitled to the administration. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of
distribution, and the findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of distribution. 21 The preference of
Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G. Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B.
Garcia, he indicated therein that he is married to Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention
for the First District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. 23 Faced with these documents
and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia
can be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. 24
5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court under its supervisory authority over all inferior courts
may properly decree that venue in the instant case was properly assumed by and transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the interest of justice and
avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the deceased Amado G. Garcia and the
appointment of special administratrix over the latter's estate be approved and authorized and the Court of First Instance of Laguna be disauthorized from
continuing with the case and instead be required to transfer all the records thereof to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the
proceedings.
6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975, granting the "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed by
Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, subject matter of G.R. No. L-42670, and ordering the Canlubang Sugar Estate to deliver to her as special
administratrix the sum of P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of estate obligations is hereby upheld.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L-40502 and in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby denied, with costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973

ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN
CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA CUENCO GONZALEZ, respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34104-R, promulgated 21 November 1964, and its subsequent
Resolution promulgated 8 July 1964 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The pertinent facts which gave rise to the herein petition follow:
On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors' Hospital, Manila. He was survived by his widow, the herein petitioner, and
their two (2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus Salvador, both surnamed Cuenco, all residing at 69 Pi y Margal St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and by
his children of the first marriage, respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo
Cuenco Reyes and Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu.
On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late Senator) 1 respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the court of
first instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R), alleging among other things, that the late senator died intestate in Manila on 25 February 1964; that he was a
resident of Cebu at the time of his death; and that he left real and personal properties in Cebu and Quezon City. On the same date, the Cebu court issued an
order setting the petition for hearing on 10 April 1964, directing that due notice be given to all the heirs and interested persons, and ordering the requisite
publication thereof at LA PRENSA, a newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province of Cebu.
The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a new and modified one released on 13 March 1964, in view of the fact that the petition
was to be heard at Branch II instead of Branch I of the said Cebu court. On the same date, a third order was further issued stating that respondent Lourdes
Cuenco's petition for the appointment of a special administrator dated 4 March 1964 was not yet ready for the consideration of the said court, giving as
reasons the following:
It will be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding, the requisite
publication of the notice of hearing not yet having been complied with. Moreover, copies of the petition have not been served on all of the
heirs specified in the basic petition for the issuance of letters of administration. 2
In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing of the Cebu petition) herein petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition with
the court of first instance of Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her
favor, as the surviving widow and executrix in the said last will and testament. The said proceeding was docketed as Special Proceeding No. Q-7898.
Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed in said Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss,
dated 30 March 1964, as well as an Opposition to Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator, dated 8 April 1964. On 10 April 1964, the Cebu court
issued an order holding in abeyance its resolution on petitioner's motion to dismiss "until after the Court of First Instance of Quezon City shall have acted on
the petition for probate of that document purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco." 3 Such order of the Cebu
court deferring to the probateproceedings in the Quezon City court was neither excepted to nor sought by respondents to be reconsidered or set aside by the
Cebu court nor did they challenge the same by certiorari or prohibition proceedings in the appellate courts.
Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 10 April 1964,opposing probate of the will and assailing the
jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to entertain petitioner's petition for probate and for appointment as executrix in Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 in view of the
alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu court in Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R. Said respondent prayed that Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue.
In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the motion to dismiss, giving as a principal reason the "precedence of probate proceeding over an
intestate proceeding." 4 The said court further found in said order that theresidence of the late senator at the time of his death was at No. 69 Pi y Margal, Sta.
Mesa Heights, Quezon City. The pertinent portion of said order follows:
On the question of residence of the decedent, paragraph 5 of the opposition and motion to dismiss reads as follows: "that since the
decedent Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco was a resident of the City of Cebu at the time of his death, the aforesaid petition filed by Rosa
Cayetano Cuenco on 12 March 1964 was not filed with the proper Court (wrong venue) in view of the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 73
of the New Rules of Court ...". From the aforequoted allegation, the Court is made to understand that the oppositors do not mean to say
that the decedent being a resident of Cebu City when he died, the intestate proceedings in Cebu City should prevail over the probate
proceedings in Quezon City, because as stated above the probate of the will should take precedence, but that the probate proceedings
should be filed in the Cebu City Court of First Instance. If the last proposition is the desire of the oppositors as understood by this Court,
that could not also be entertained as proper because paragraph 1 of the petition for the probate of the will indicates that Don Mariano
Jesus Cuenco at the time of his death was a resident of Quezon City at 69 Pi y Margal. Annex A (Last Will and Testament of Mariano Jesus
Cuenco) of the petition for probate of the will shows that the decedent at the time when he executed his Last Will clearly stated that he is
a resident of 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and also of the City of Cebu. He made the former as his first choice and the
latter as his second choice of residence." If a party has two residences, the one will be deemed or presumed to his domicile which he
himself selects or considers to be his home or which appears to be the center of his affairs. The petitioner, in thus filing the instant
petition before this Court, follows the first choice of residence of the decedent and once this court acquires jurisdiction of the probate
proceeding it is to the exclusion of all others. 5

Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion for reconsideration of the Quezon City court's said order of 11 April 1964 asserting its exclusive jurisdiction over the
probate proceeding as deferred to by the Cebu court was denied on 27 April 1964 and a second motion for reconsideration dated 20 May 1964 was
likewise denied.
On 11 May 1964, pursuant to its earlier order of 11 April 1964, the hearing for probate of the last will of the decedent was called three times at half-hour
intervals, but notwithstanding due notification none of the oppositors appeared and the Quezon City court proceeded at 9:00 a.m. with the hearing in their
absence.
As per the order issued by it subsequently on 15 May 1964, the Quezon City court noted that respondents-oppositors had opposed probate under their
opposition and motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
(a) That the will was not executed and attested as required by law;
(b) That the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary or some other persons for
his benefit;
(c) That the testator's signature was procured by fraud and/or that the testator acted by mistake and did not intend that the instrument
he signed should be his will at the time he affixed his signature thereto. 6
The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of the notice of the hearing had been duly complied with and that all the heirs had been duly
notified of the hearing, and after receiving the testimony of the three instrumental witnesses to the decedent's last will, namely Atty. Florencio Albino, Dr.
Guillermo A. Picache and Dr. Jose P. Ojeda, and of the notary public, Atty. Braulio A. Arriola, Jr., who ratified the said last will, and the documentary evidence
(such as the decedent's residence certificates, income tax return, diplomatic passport, deed of donation) all indicating that the decedent was a resident of 69 Pi
y Margal St., Quezon City, as also affirmed by him in his last will, the Quezon City court in its said order of 15 May 1964 admitted to probate the late senator's
last will and testament as having been "freely and voluntarily executed by the testator" and "with all formalities of the law" and appointed petitioner-widow
as executrix of his estate without bond "following the desire of the testator" in his will as probated.
Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof, respondents filed
a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as case CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) to bar
the Rizal court from proceeding with case No. Q-7898.
On 21 November 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of respondents (petitioners therein) and against the herein petitioner, holding that:
Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, covers both testate and
intestate proceedings. Sp. Proc. 2433-R of the Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it is that court whose jurisdiction was first invoked and
which first attached. It is that court which can properly and exclusively pass upon the factual issues of (1) whether the decedent left or
did not leave a valid will, and (2) whether or not the decedent was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death.
Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in the Cebu CFI (Special Proceeding 2433-R), it follows that the said court
must exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in which the petition for probate was filed by the respondent Rosa Cayetano
Cuenco (Special Proceeding Q-7898). The said respondent should assert her rights within the framework of the proceeding in the Cebu
CFI, instead of invoking the jurisdiction of another court.
The respondents try to make capital of the fact that on March 13, 1964, Judge Amador Gomez of the Cebu CFI, acting in Sp. Proc. 2433-R,
stated that the petition for appointment of special administrator was "not yet ready for the consideration of the Court today. It would be
premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding ... . " It is sufficient to state
in this connection that the said judge was certainly not referring to the court's jurisdiction over the res, not to jurisdiction itself which is
acquired from the moment a petition is filed, but only to theexercise of jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the proceedings. At all
events, jurisdiction is conferred and determined by law and does not depend on the pronouncements of a trial judge.
The dispositive part of respondent appellate court's judgment provided as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the writ of prohibition will issue, commanding and directing the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX,
Quezon City, and the respondent Judge Damaso B. Tengco to refrain perpetually from proceeding and taking any action in Special
Proceeding Q-7898 pending before the said respondent court. All orders heretofore issued and actions heretofore taken by said
respondent court and respondent Judge, therein and connected therewith, are hereby annulled. The writ of injunction heretofore issued
is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, dated 8 July 1965; hence the herein petition for review
on certiorari.
The principal and decisive issue at bar is, theretofore, whether the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court
ordering it to refrain perpetually from proceeding with the testateproceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its
admission to probate of the decedent's last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond in compliance with the
testator's express wish in his testament. This issue is tied up with the issue submitted to the appellate court, to wit, whether the Quezon City court acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings filed with it, in
pursuance of the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings that it (the
Quezon City court) should first act "on the petition for probate of the document purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus
Cuenco" - which order of the Cebu court respondents never questioned nor challenged by prohibition or certiorari proceedings and thus enabled the Quezon

City court to proceed without any impediment or obstruction, once it denied respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion to dismiss the probate proceeding for
alleged lack of jurisdiction or improper venue, toproceed with the hearing of the petition and to admit the will to probate upon having been satisfied as to its
due execution and authenticity.
The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court from
proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the deceased's last
will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's express wish, for the following
considerations:
1. The Judiciary Act 7 concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First Instance over "all matter of probate, both of testate and intestate estates."
On the other hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules of Court lays down the rule of venue, as the very caption of the Rule indicates, and in order to prevent conflict
among the different courts which otherwise may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." The cited Rule provides:
Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
Province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of the
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence, of the decedent, or of
the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when
the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73) 8
It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely
of venue. This was lucidly stated by the late Chief Justice Moran inSy Oa vs. Co Ho 9 as follows:
We are not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that in probate cases the place of residence of the deceased is regarded as a
question of jurisdiction over the subject-matter. But we decline to follow this view because of its mischievous consequences. For
instance, a probate case has been submitted in good faith to the Court of First Instance of a province where the deceased had not resided.
All the parties, however, including all the creditors, have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and the case is therein
completely finished except for a claim of a creditor who also voluntarily filed it with said court but on appeal from an adverse decision
raises for the first time in this Court the question of jurisdiction of the trial court for lack of residence of the deceased in the province. If
we consider such question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter, the effect shall be that
the whole proceedings including all decisions on the different incidents which have arisen in court will have to be annulled and the same
case will have to be commenced anew before another court of the same rank in another province. That this is ofmischievous effect in
the prompt administration of justice is too obvious to require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206, December
31, 1942) Furthermore, section 600 of Act No. 190, 10 providing that the estate of a deceased person shall be settled in the province
where he had last resided, could not have been intended as defining the jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject-matter, because
such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters, and, as we have said time and again,
procedure is one thing and jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. (Attorney-General vs. Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.)
The law of jurisdiction Act No. 136, 11 Section 56, No. 5 confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases
independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Since, however, there are many courts of First Instance in the Philippines, the
Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. Thus, the place of residence of
the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject-matter but merely of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the new Rules
of Court the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly called "venue".
It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction.
The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estateof a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts."
A fair reading of the Rule since it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction indicates that the court with whom
the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.
Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the decedent
obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it
stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and
instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will.
2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it a motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in
abeyance its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon City court, awaiting its action on the petition for probate before that court. Implicit in
the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by the Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of
Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false and improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the
exclusion of all other courts. Likewise by its act of deference, the Cebu court left it to the Quezon City court to resolve the question between the parties
whether the decedent's residence at the time of his death was in Quezon City where he had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu City as claimed by
respondents. The Cebu court thus indicated that it would decline to take cognizance of the intestate petition before it and instead defer to the Quezon City
court, unless the latter would make a negative finding as to the probate petition and the residence of the decedent within its territory and venue.
3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of
the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court.

Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since
under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts,
which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had at
least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.
Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of the
Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City court their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the
scheduled hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared, as the appellate court did, to have acted without jurisdiction in admitting to
probate the decedent's will and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in accordance with the testator's testamentary disposition.
4. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental 12 with facts analogous to the present case 13 is authority against
respondent appellate court's questioned decision.
In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate proceedings over intestate proceedings in this wise:
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in
accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of
his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for the settlement
of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if
in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for
the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that state an administrator had already been appointed, the
latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This
however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue
as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate
proceedings. 14
The Court likewise therein upheld the jurisdiction of the second court, (in this case, the Quezon City court) although opining that certain considerations therein
"would seem to support the view that [therein respondent] should have submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court, [in this case, the Cebu court]
either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344," 15 thus:
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with
the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in this regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit we say that it
was not the proper venue therefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waivable procedural defect, and, in the light of the circumstances
obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the right to raise such objection or is
precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to consider in this connection that petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by
Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding
No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice of the existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the
filing of the petition for its probate with the Manila Court since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the
dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in
Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of all the
proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator with the will annexed but
also to admit said will to probate more than five months earlier, or more specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the
exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding
No. 51396 would put a premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings
regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings
repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection against said proceedings is
raised too late. 16
5. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the basis of the will duly presented for
probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City was the firstchoice of residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal home and domicile therein
with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court could not be contested except by appeal from said court in the original case. The last paragraph
of said Rule expressly provides:
... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall
not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears
on the record. (Rule 73)
The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record" could probably be properly invoked, had such deference in comity of
the Cebu court to the Quezon City court not appeared in the record, or had the record otherwise shown that the Cebu court had taken cognizance of the
petition before it and assumed jurisdiction.
6. On the question that Quezon City established to be the residence of the late senator, the appellate court while recognizing that "the issue is a legitimate one"
held in reliance on Borja vs. Tan 17 that.
... The issue of residence comes within the competence of whichever court is considered to prevail in the exercise jurisdiction - in this
case, the Court of First Instance of Cebu as held by this Court. Parenthetically, we note that the question of the residence of the deceased

is a serious one, requiring both factual and legal resolution on the basis of ample evidence to be submitted in the ordinary course of
procedure in the first instance, particularly in view of the fact that the deceased was better known as the Senator from Cebu and the will
purporting to be his also gives Cebu, besides Quezon City, as his residence. We reiterate that this matter requires airing in the proper
court, as so indicated in the leading and controlling case of Borja vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, et al., G.R. L-7792, July 27, 1955.
In the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of the intestate petition first filed with it and deferred to the testate proceedings filed
with the Quezon City court and in effect asked the Quezon City court to determine the residence of the decedent and whether he did leave a last will and
testament upon which would depend the proper venue of the estate proceedings, Cebu or Quezon City. The Quezon City court having thus determined in effect
for both courts at the behest and with the deference and consent of the Cebu court thatQuezon City was the actual residence of the decedent who died
testate and therefore the proper venue, the Borja ruling would seem to have no applicability. It would not serve the practical ends of justice to still require the
Cebu court, if the Borja ruling is to be held applicable and as indicated in the decision under review, to determine for itself the actual residence of the decedent
(when the Quezon City court had already so determined Quezon City as the actual residence at the Cebu court's behest and respondents have not seriously
questioned this factual finding based on documentary evidence) and if the Cebu court should likewise determine Quezon City as the actual residence, or its
contrary finding reversed on appeal, only then to allow petitioner-widow after years of waiting and inaction to institute the corresponding proceedings in
Quezon City.
7. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when it is taken into consideration that Rule 76, section 2 requires that the petition for
allowance of a will must show: "(a) the jurisdictional facts." Such "jurisdictional facts" in probate proceedings, as held by the Court in Fernando vs.
Crisostomo 18 " are the death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of
a foreign country, his having left his estate in such province."
This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that "(T)he probate of a will is a proceeding in rem. The notice by publication as a prerequisite to the allowance of a will, is a constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon
everybody, even against the State.The probate of a will by a court having jurisdiction thereof is conclusive as to its due execution and validity." 19 The Quezon City
court acted regularly within its jurisdiction (even if it were to be conceded that Quezon City was not the proper venue notwithstanding the Cebu court's giving
way and deferring to it,) in admitting the decedent's last will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof. Hence, the Quezon city court's
action should not be set aside by a writ of prohibition for supposed lack of jurisdiction as per the appellate court's appealed decision, and should instead be
sustained in line with Uriarte, supra, where the Court, in dismissing the certiorari petition challenging the Manila court's action admitting the decedent's will
to probate and distributing the estate in accordance therewith in the second proceeding, held that "it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to
annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings
repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction." As stressed by Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa, supra, "the mischievous effect in the administration of justice"
of considering the question of residence as affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court and annulling the whole proceedings only to start all over again the same
proceedings before another court of the same rank in another province "is too obvious to require comment."
8. If the question of jurisdiction were to be made to depend only on who of the decedent's relatives gets first to file a petition for settlement of the decedent's
estate, then the established jurisprudence of the Court that Rule 73, section 1 provides only a rule of venue in order to preclude different courts which may
properly assumejurisdiction from doing so and creating conflicts between them to the detriment of the administration of justice, and that venue is waivable,
would be set at naught. As between relatives who unfortunately do not see eye to eye, it would be converted into a race as to who can file the petition faster in
the court of his/her choice regardless of whether the decedent is still in cuerpo presente and in disregard of the decedent's actual last domicile, the fact that he
left a last will and testament and the right of his surviving widow named as executrix thereof. Such dire consequences were certainly not intended by the Rule
nor would they be in consonance with public policy and the orderly administration of justice.
9. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-widow, who under all the applicable rules of venue, and despite the fact that the Cebu court (where
respondent Lourdes Cuenco had filed an intestate petition in the Cebu court earlier by a week's time on 5 March 1964) deferred to the Quezon City court
where petitioner had within fifteen days (on March 12, 1964) after the decedent's death (on February 25, 1964) timely filed the decedent's last will and
petitioned for letters testamentary and is admittedly entitled to preference in the administration of her husband's estate, 20 would be compelled under the
appealed decision to have to go all the way to Cebu and submit anew the decedent's will there for probate either in a new proceeding or by asking that the
intestate proceedings be converted into a testate proceeding when under the Rules, the proper venue for the testate proceedings, as per the facts of record
and as already affirmed by the Quezon City court is Quezon City, where the decedent and petitioner-widow had their conjugal domicile.
It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to be executrix of the decedent's last will and settle his estate in accordance
therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time, money and effort to have
to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court everytime she has an important matter of the estate to take up with the probate court.
It would doubly be an unfair imposition when it is considered that under Rule 73, section 2, 21 since petitioner's marriage has been dissolved with the death of
her husband, their community property and conjugal estate have to beadministered and liquidated in the estate proceedings of the deceased spouse. Under the
appealed decision, notwithstanding that petitioner resides in Quezon City, and the proper venue of the testate proceeding was in Quezon City and the Quezon
City court properly took cognizance and exercised exclusive jurisdiction with the deference in comity and consent of the Cebu court, such proper exercise of
jurisdiction would be nullified and petitioner would have to continually leave her residence in Quezon City and go to Cebu to settle and liquidate
even her own community property and conjugal estate with the decedent.
10. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court did not act without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in declining to take
cognizance of the intestate petition and instead deferring to thetestate proceedings filed just a week later by petitioner as surviving widow and designated
executrix of the decedent's last will, since the record before it (the petitioner's opposition and motion to dismiss) showed the falsityof the allegation in
the intestate petition that the decedent had died without a will. It is noteworthy that respondents never challenged by certiorari or prohibition proceedings
the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 deferring to the probate proceedings before the Quezon City court, thus leaving the latter free (pursuant to the Cebu
court's order of deference) to exercise jurisdiction and admit the decedent's will to probate.
For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the
decedent's will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix in accordance with its testamentary disposition, in the light of the settled doctrine that the
provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule of venue, not of jurisdiction.

Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City court's order of May 15, 1964 admitting the will to probate and appointing petitioner as
executrix thereof, and said court concededly has jurisdiction to issue said order, the said order of probate has long since become final and can not be overturned
in a special civic action of prohibition.
11. Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority over all inferior courts, 22 it may properly determine, as it has
done in the case at bar, that venue was properly assumed by and transferredto the Quezon City court and that it is the interest of justice and in avoidance of
needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent (with the due deference and consent of the Cebu
court) and its admission to probate of his last will and testament and appointment of petitioner-widow as administratrix without bond in pursuance of the
decedent's express will and all its orders and actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be approved and authorized rather than to annul all such
proceedings regularly had and to repeat and duplicate the same proceedings before the Cebu court only to revert once more to the Quezon City court should
the Cebu court find that indeed and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City court on the strength of incontrovertible documentary evidence of
record, Quezon City was the conjugal residence of the decedent.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction originally filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) is ordered dismissed. No costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Fernando and Castro, JJ., took no part.

G.R. No. 133743

February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029

February 6, 2007

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and
set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its
May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his
lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely:
Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an
American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a
Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United
Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their
marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a
petition for letters of administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146
thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village,
Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedents surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second
marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any
unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper
venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna
because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she
was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10 of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the
trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing
that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila
which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to
prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue
of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to
dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous marriage with
Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from
hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed
the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 because
then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.

Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the
Order denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T.
Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent
to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as
his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected
governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that
respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio.
It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was
a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of
Felicisimos legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October
24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal
residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the
petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the
decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated
to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus
With the well-known rule express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the
reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view sweeping statement of Judge
Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts
cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having
been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992,32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason,
the marriage between the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the
said petition which was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because
at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC,
Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to return.
They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration
should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of the latters
marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void
bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration.
The petition lacks merit.

Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court
of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining
the residence as contradistinguished from domicile of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms
"residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same
meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place,
while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required
though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with
"domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction
between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are
treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of
fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which
may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may
have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in
Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that
the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the
period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of
membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48from 1988 to 1990 sent by the
deceaseds children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceaseds calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang
Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.
Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang,
Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino
who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on
June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family
Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a
divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties
from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest
in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation
of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a
wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that
party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as
petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not
be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject
to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect
and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 54 (Emphasis added)

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was
held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had
the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van
Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been
interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of
upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner
obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the
aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were
discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August
3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39
of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. TheVan Dorn case involved a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the
Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the
community, relief in some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive
of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the
alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in
light of this Courts rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to
be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of
the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted
in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of
the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be
sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a
situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead
is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without
regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where
these words import a policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate
this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when
the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be
dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would
have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is
insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the
U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a
writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the
annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated
in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the
subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their
joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule
79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far
as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the
existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her
marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This
provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void
from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners
shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code
which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are
incapacitated to marry. 78In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code
took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property regime under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live
together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only
be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding
shares shall be presumed to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous
marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue.
Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
opponents defense. x x x81

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the
surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court
which denied petitioners motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this
case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 144915

February 23, 2004

CAROLINA CAMAYA, FERDINAND CAMAYA, EDGARDO CAMAYA and ANSELMO MANGULABNAN,petitioners

vs.
BERNARDO PATULANDONG, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals Decision
dated June 19, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 53757, "In re: Petition for the Probate of the Codicil (Will) of Rufina Reyes; Bernardo Patulandong v. Anselmo
Mangulabnan v. Carolina G. Camaya, Ferdinand Camaya and Edgardo Camaya."
On November 17, 1972, Rufina Reyes (testatrix) executed a notarized will wherein she devised, among others, Lot No. 288-A to her grandson Anselmo
Mangulabnan (Mangulabnan). The pertinent portion of her will reads:
IKALIMA. - Aking inihahayag at ginagawa na tagapagmana, sa aking kusang loob, ang pinalaki kong APO na si ANSELMO P. MANGULABNAN, may sapat na
gulang, kasal kay Flora Umagap, at naninirahan sa San Lorenzo, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, at anak ng aking anak na si SIMPLICIA, at sa aking APO na si ANSELMO
ay aking ipinagkakaloob at ipinamamana, sa aking pagkamatay, ang mga sumusunod kong pagaari:
LOT NO.

TITLE NO.

KINALALAGYAN NABANGGIT SA

288-A

NT-47089

Sta. Cruz (1) p. 2

3348-A

100629

Poblacion (2) p. 2

3349-B

100630

Poblacion (3) p. 2

xxx1 (Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied)

The testatrixs son Bernardo Patulandong (Patulandong), respondent herein, was in the will appointed as the executor.
During her lifetime, the testatrix herself filed a petition for the probate of her will before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Nueva Ecija where it was
docketed as Sp. Pro. No. 128.
By Order2 of January 11, 1973, the CFI admitted the will to probate.
On June 27, 1973, the testatrix executed a codicil modifying above-quoted paragraph five of her will in this wise:
UNA. - Ang Lote No. 288-A na nakalagay sa barrio ng Sta. Cruz, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, magsukat 36,384 metro cuadrados, at nagtataglay ng TCT No. NT47089, na aking ipinamana sa aking apong si ANSELMO P.MANGULABNAN, sangayon sa Pangkat IKA-LIMA, pp. 5-6, ng aking HULING HABILIN
(Testamento), ay ipinasiya kong ipagkaloob at ipamana sa aking mga anak na sina BERNARDO, SIMPLICIA, GUILLERMA at JUAN nagaapellidong
PATULANDONG, at sa aking apong si ANSELMO P. MANGULABNAN, sa magkakaparehong bahagi na tig-ikalimang bahagi bawat isa sa kanila.
IKALAWA. - Na maliban sa pagbabagong ito, ang lahat ng mga tadhana ng aking HULING HABILIN ay aking pinagtitibay na muli.
x x x3 (Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied) On May 14, 1988, the testatrix died.
Mangulabnan later sought the delivery to him by executor Patulandong of the title to Lot 288-A. Patulandong refused to heed the request, however, in view of
the codicil which modified the testators will.
Mangulabnan thus filed an "action for partition" against Patulandong with the Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, docketed as Civil Case No. 552 (the
partition case).
On June 8, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision in the partition case, 4 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the court orders the partitioning of the properties and the defendant to deliver the copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-47089.
However, in view of the case cited by the plaintiff himself, the court holds that the partition is without prejudice [to]... the probate of the codicil in accordance
with the Rules of Court, [P]alacios vs. Catimbang Palacios cited by the plaintiff:
"After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the testator, it does not necessarily mean that he cannot alter or revoke the same before his death.
Should he make a new will, it would also be allowable of his petition and if he should die before he had a chance to present such petition, the ordinary probate
proceedings after the testators death would be in order."

The Court also orders that the right of the tenants of the agricultural land in question should be protected meaning to say that the tenants should not be
ejected. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On July 17, 1989 Patulandong filed before the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija a petition 5 for probate of the codicil of the testatrix, docketed as Sp. Proc. No.
218.
On December 28, 1989, the probate court issued an Order 6 setting the petition for hearing and ordering the publication of said order.
On February 7, 1991, by virtue of the decision in the partition case, Mangulabnan caused the cancellation of the title of the testatrix over Lot No. 288-A and
TCT No. NT-2157507 was issued in his name.
Mangulabnan later sold to herein petitioners Camayas Lot No. 288-A by a Deed of Sale dated February 19, 1991.8 TCT No. NT-215750 was thus cancelled and
TCT No. NT-2164469 was issued in the name of the Camayas.
On January 16, 1996, the trial rendered a decision10 in Sp. Proc. No. 218 admitting the codicil to probate and disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in the following manner:
1. Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-215750 issued by the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija in the name of Anselmo Mangulabnan dated
February 7, 1991 and the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by him in favor of the intervenors Carolina, Ferdinand and Edgardo, all surnamed Camaya
on February 19, 1991 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-216446 under date March 18, 1991 issued in the names of the above-named
intervenors as NULL and VOID and of no force and effect; and,
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel Transfer of Certificate of Title Nos. NT-215750 and NT-216446 and reissue the
corresponding Certificate of Titles to Bernardo R. Patulandong, Filipino, married to Gorgonia Mariano residing at San Vicente, Gapan, Nueva Ecija,
Juan R. Patulandong, Filipino, widower and residing at San Lorenzo, Gapan, Nueva Ecija; Guillerma R. Patulandong Linsangan of legal age, Filipino,
widow and residing at San Vicente, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Simplicia R. Patulandong Mangulabnan, of legal age, widow, and residing at San Lorenzo,
Gapan, Nueva Ecija and her grandson, Anselmo Mangulabnan with full personal circumstances stated herein to the extent of one fifth (1/5) each
pursuant to the approved codicil (will) of Rufina Reyes dated June 27, 1973.11
The Camayas who had been allowed to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. 218, and Mangulabnan, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above-said decision but it
was denied by Order12 of February 28,1996.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the Camayas and Mangulabnan (hereinafter referred to as petitioners) raised the following errors:
1. THERE WERE SERIOUS SUBSTANTIAL DEPARTURES FROM THE FORMALITIES REQUIRED BY THE RULES, THE LAW, AND THE AUTHORITY OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SETTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
2. THE OPPOSITOR DID NOT ONLY ACQUIRE LOT NO. 288-A BY WILL BUT HE ALSO ACQUIRED THE SAME BY PARTITION IN A CIVIL CASE WHERE
THE DECISION HAS ALREADY REACHED ITS FINALITY AND THEREFORE CAN NO LONGER BE NEGATED BY A QUESTIONABLE CODICIL.
3. THAT THE SUBJECT LOT 288-A IS NO LONGER WITHIN THE REACHED (sic) OF THE PETITIONER CONSIDERING THAT THE OPPOSITOR
VENDOR HAD A CLEAN TITLE AND THAT THE INTERVENORS-VENDEED HAD ACQUIRED THE SAME BY WAY OF SALE AS INNOCENT PURCHASER
IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE.13
By Decision14 of June 19, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed that of the trial court.
Hence, the present petition for Review on Certiorari proffering the following issues:
1. Whether the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared null and void and ordered the cancellation of the TCTs of petitioners and
the deed of sale; and
2. Whether the final judgment in Civil Case No. 552 bars the allowance of the codicil.
As to the first issue, petitioners contend that the under the law, the probate court has no power, authority, and jurisdiction to declare null and void the sale
and titles of petitioners;15 and that the probate court can only resolve the following issues:
1. Whether or not the instrument which is offered for probate is the last will and testament of the decedent; in other words, the question is one of
identity[;]
2. Whether or not the will has been executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; in other words, the question is one of due
execution[; and]
3. Whether the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will; in other words, the question is one of capacity.16

In Cuizon v. Ramolete, 17 this Court elucidated on the limited jurisdiction of a probate court, to wit:
It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute,
well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing partieshave to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.
xxx
Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the possession of third parties and more important, covered by a transfer certificate of
title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent court should have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the property
in question from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their possession and ownership of the
property. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Following Cuizon, the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it further declared the deed of sale and the titles of petitioners null and void, it having had
the effect of depriving them possession and ownership of the property.
Moreover, following Section 48 of the Property Registry Decree which reads:
SECTION 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law,
petitioners titles cannot, under probate proceedings, be declared null and void.
As to the second issue, petitioners argue that by allowing the codicil to probate, it in effect amended the final judgment in the partition case which is not
allowed by law;18 and that petitioner Camayas are innocent purchasers for value and enjoy the legal presumption that the transfer was lawful. 19
Petitioners first argument does not persuade.
Though the judgment in the partition case had become final and executory as it was not appealed, it specifically provided in its dispositive portion that the
decision was "without prejudice [to] ... the probate of the codicil."The rights of the prevailing parties in said case were thus subject to the outcome of the
probate of the codicil.
The probate court being bereft of authority to rule upon the validity of petitioners titles, there is no longer any necessity to dwell on the merits of petitioners
Camayas claim that they are innocent purchasers for value and enjoy the legal presumption that the transfer was lawful.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED IN PART.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 19, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 53757 affirming the January 16, 1996 Decision of Regional Trial Court, Branch 35,
of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
The decision allowing the codicil is AFFIRMED, but the 1) declaration as null and void of Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-215750 issued on February 7,
1991 by the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija in the name of Anselmo Mangulabnan, the February 19, 1991 Deed of Absolute Sale executed by him in favor of
the intervenors - herein petitioners Carolina, Ferdinand and Edgardo Camaya, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-216446 issued on March 18, 1991 in
favor of the petitioners Camayas, and 2) the order for the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel Transfer of Certificate of Title Nos. NT-215750 and NT216446 and reissue the corresponding Certificate of Titles to Bernardo R. Patulandong, Juan R. Patulandong, Guillerma R. Patulandong Linsangan, Simplicia R.
Patulandong Mangulabnan, and Anselmo Mangulabnan to the extent of one-fifth (1/5) each pursuant to the approved codicil are SET ASIDE, without prejudice
to respondent and his co-heirs ventilation of their right in an appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 127920. August 9, 2005

EMILIO B. PACIOLES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR AND HEIR OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF MIGUELITA CHING-PACIOLES, Petitioners,
vs.
MIGUELA CHUATOCO-CHING, Respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Oftentimes death brings peace only to the person who dies but not to the people he leaves behind. For in death, a persons estate remains, providing a fertile
ground for discords that break the familial bonds. Before us is another case that illustrates such reality. Here, a husband and a mother of the deceased are
locked in an acrimonious dispute over the estate of their loved one.
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Emilio B. Pacioles, Jr., herein petitioner, against Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, assailing the
Court of Appeals Decision1 dated September 25, 1996 and Resolution2 dated January 27, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571.3 The Appellate Court affirmed the
Order dated January 17, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 99, Quezon City denying petitioners motion for partition and distribution of the
estate of his wife, Miguelita Ching-Pacioles; and his motion for reconsideration.
The facts are undisputed.
On March 13, 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an estimated value of P10.5 million, stock investments worth P518,783.00, bank
deposits amounting to P6.54 million, and interests in certain businesses. She was survived by her husband, petitioner herein, and their two minor children.
Consequently, on August 20, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified petition 4 for the settlement of Miguelitas estate. He prayed that (a) letters of
administration be issued in his name, and (b) that the net residue of the estate be divided among the compulsory heirs.
Miguelitas mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed an opposition, specifically to petitioners prayer for the issuance of letters of
administration on the grounds that (a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties of an administrator; and (b) the bulk of Miguelitas estate is
composed of "paraphernalproperties." Respondent prayed that the letters of administration be issued to her instead. 5 Afterwards, she also filed a motion for
her appointment as special administratrix.6
Petitioner moved to strike out respondents opposition, alleging that the latter has no direct and material interest in the estate, she not being a compulsory
heir, and that he, being the surviving spouse, has the preferential right to be appointed as administrator under the law. 7
Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate because she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that
both of them "would undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of business partners."8
In her omnibus motion9 dated April 23, 1993, respondent nominated her son Emmanuel Ching to act as special administrator.
On April 20, 1994, the intestate court issued an order appointing petitioner and Emmanuel as joint regular administrators of the estate.10 Both were issued
letters of administration after taking their oath and posting the requisite bond.
Consequently, Notice to Creditors was published in the issues of the Manila Standard on September 12, 19, and 26, 1994. However, no claims were filed
against the estate within the period set by the Revised Rules of Court.
Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelitas estate. 11 Emmanuel did not submit an inventory.
On May 17, 1995, the intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor children as the only compulsory heirs of Miguelita.12
On July 21, 1995, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion 13 praying, among others, that an Order be issued directing the: 1) payment of
estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the estate among the declared heirs; and 3) payment of attorneys fees.
Respondent opposed petitioners motion on the ground that the partition and distribution of the estate is "premature and precipitate," considering that
there is yet no determination "whether the properties specified in the inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint venture."14 Respondent
claimed that she owns the bulk of Miguelitas estate as an "heir and co-owner." Thus, she prayed that a hearing be scheduled.
On January 17, 1996, the intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes and attorneys fees but denied petitioners prayer for partition and
distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed "premature." The intestate court ratiocinated as follows:
"On the partition and distribution of the deceaseds properties, among the declared heirs, the Court finds the prayer of petitioner in this regard to be
premature. Thus, a hearing on oppositors claim as indicated in her opposition to the instant petition is necessary to determine whether the properties
listed in the amended complaint filed by petitioner are entirely conjugal or the paraphernal properties of the deceased, or a co-ownership between
the oppositor and the petitioner in their partnership venture."
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution dated May 7, 1996.

Forthwith, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the intestate courts Order dated January 17, 1996
and Resolution dated May 7, 1996 which denied petitioners prayer for partition and distribution of the estate for being premature, indicating that it (intestate
court) will first resolve respondents claim of ownership.
The Appellate Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that in issuing the challenged Order and Resolution, the intestate court did not commit grave
abuse of discretion.
The Appellate Court ruled:
"Regarding the second issue raised, respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in entertaining private respondents unsupported claim of
ownership against the estate. In fact, there is no indication that the probate court has already made a finding of title or ownership. It is inevitable that in
probate proceedings, questions of collation or of advancement are involved for these are matters which can be passed upon in the course of the proceedings.
The probate court in exercising its prerogative to schedule a hearing, to inquire into the propriety of private respondents claim, is being extremely cautious in
determining the composition of the estate. This act is not tainted with an iota of grave abuse of discretion."
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorarianchored on the following assignments of error:
"I
RESPONDENT COURTS DECISION WHICH AFFIRMS THE INTESTATE COURTS ORDER IS A GRAVE ERROR FOR BEING CONTRARY TO THE SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE AND POLICY OF THE LAW THAT ESTATE PROCEEDINGS MUST BE SETTLED EXPEDITIOUSLY.
II
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE INTESTATE COURTS ORDER TO CONDUCT HEARING ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP
CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE, AS SAID FUNCTION IS OUTSIDE AND BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE INTESTATE COURT.
III
RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE INTESTATE COURTS ORDER AND RESOLUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THAT RESPONDENT
CHINGS OWNERSHIP CLAIMS ARE CONFLICTING, FRIVOLOUS AND BASELESS."
The fundamental issue for our resolution is: May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of ownership involving properties
claimed to be part of the decedents estate?
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the
estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings.15 The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises special and limited jurisdiction.16
A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose
is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. In such situations the adjudication is merely incidental and provisional. Thus,
in Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,17 we held:
"x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon
the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title."
The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the jurisdiction of the intestate court to conduct a hearing on respondents claim. Such
reliance is misplaced. Under the said principle, the key consideration is that the purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing and passing upon
questions of ownership is merely to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. The facts of this case show that such was
not the purpose of the intestate court.
First, the inventory was not disputed. In fact, in her Manifestation and Opposition 18 dated September 18, 1995, respondent expressly adopted the inventory
prepared by petitioner, thus:
"6. She adopts the inventory submitted by the petitioner in his Amended Compliance dated October 6, 1994, and filed only on November 4, 1994 not
October 5, 1995 as erroneously asserted in Par. 12 of the Omnibus Motion. Oppositor, however, takes exception to the low valuation placed on the real estate
properties and reserves her right to submit a more accurate and realistic pricing on each."
Respondent could have opposed petitioners inventory and sought the exclusion of the specific properties which she believed or considered to be hers.
But instead of doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory, taking exception only to the low valuation placed on the real estate properties.
And second, Emmanuel, respondents son and representative in the settlement of Miguelitas estate, did not submit his own inventory. His mandate, as coadministrator, is "to submit within three (3) months after his appointment a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased
which have come into his possession or knowledge."19 He could have submitted an inventory, excluding therefrom those properties which respondent
considered to be hers. The fact that he did not endeavor to submit one shows that he acquiesced with petitioners inventory.

Obviously, respondents purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a ruling of what properties should or should not be included in the inventory.
She wanted something else, i.e., to secure from the intestate court a final determination of her claim of ownership over properties comprising the
bulk of Miguelitas estate. The intestate court went along with respondent on this point as evident in its Resolution20 dated May 7, 1996, thus:
"On petitioners motion for partition and distribution of the estate of the late Miguelita Ching Pacioles, it is believed that since oppositor had interposed a
claim against the subject estate, the distribution thereof in favor of the heirs could not possibly be implemented as there is still a need for appropriate
proceedings to determine the propriety of oppositors claim. It must be mentioned that if it is true that oppositor owns the bulk of the properties, which she
allegedly placed/registered in the name of the deceased for convenience, Oppositor, therefore, has a material and direct interest in the estate and hence,
should be given her day in Court."
It is apparent from the foregoing Resolution that the purpose of the hearing set by the intestate court was actually to "determine the propriety of
oppositors (respondents) claim." According to the intestate court, "if it is true that the oppositor (respondent) owns the bulk of (Miguelitas)
properties," then it means that she has a"material and direct interest in the estate" and, hence, "she should be given her day in court." The intended
"day in court" or hearing is geared towards resolving the propriety of respondents contention that she is the true owner of the bulk of Miguelitas estate.
Surely, we cannot be deluded by respondents ingenious attempt to secure a proceeding for the purpose of resolving her blanket claim against Miguelitas
estate. Although, she made it appear that her only intent was to determine the accuracy of petitioners inventory, however, a close review of the facts and the
pleadings reveals her real intention.
Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been to maintain a hands-off stance on the matter.
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of decisions, that when a question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be
a part of the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased
but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or probate proceedings. The
intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction as a regional trial court.21 Jurisprudence teaches us that:
"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a
part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether
they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good,
but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so."22
Hence, respondents recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the resolution
of her adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate.
Now, even assuming that the intestate court merely intended to make a provisional or prima facie determination of the issue of ownership, still respondents
claim cannot prosper. It bears stressing that the bulk of Miguelitas estate, as stated in petitioners inventory, comprises real estates covered by the Torrens
System which are registered either in the name of Miguelita alone or with petitioner. As such, they are considered the owners of the properties until their
title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action. We find this Courts pronouncement in Bolisay vs. Alcid23 relevant, thus:
"It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to support her claim of ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have a
Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law itself,
which, of course, does not include, bringing up the matter as a mere incident in special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased
persons. x x x
x x x In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of
such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the
owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at
bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title. x x x"
Corrolarily, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, "The Property Registration Decree," proscribes collateral attack against Torrens Title, hence:
"Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.
A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law."
Significantly, a perusal of the records reveals that respondent failed to present convincing evidence to bolster her bare assertion of ownership. We quote her
testimony, thus:
"Q: I now direct your attention to paragraph (5) appearing on page 1 of this sworn statement of yours which I quote:" In accordance with the Chinese tradition
and culture in the distribution of properties to the legal heirs, we decided to give only a token to our daughter Miguelita and leave the rest to our only son
Emmanuel, with the undertaking that being the son he will take full responsibility of the rest of the family despite his marriage. Madame witness, do you recall
having stated that in your sworn statement?
A: Yes sir, but it was not carried out.
Q What was actually given to your daughter Miguelita is only a token, is that right?

A: Not a token, sir, but one half of the share of the estate was given to Lita and the other half was given to Emmanuel.
Q: What went to Emmanuel was also , is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What makes up the one half share of Lita, if you recall?
A: What was given to her were all checks, sir, but I cannot remember any more the amount.
xxxxxx
Q: Summing up your testimony, Madame, you cannot itemize the one half share of the estate of Miguelita, is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was there any document covering this partition of the estate among you, Emmanuel and Miguelita with respect to the estate of your late
husband?
A: If I only knew that this will happen
Q: Samakatuwid po ay walang dokumento?
A: Wala po."24
She further testified as follows:
"Q: Among the properties listed like the various parcels of land, stocks, investments, bank accounts and deposits both here and abroad, interests
and participation in IFS Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies, Inc. and various motor vehicles, per your pleasure, Madam Witness, how should
these properties be partitioned or what should be done with these properties? According to you earlier, you are agreeable for the partition of the
said properties with Emil on a 50-50 basis, is that right?
A: Kung ano po ang sa akin, iyon ang dapat na bumalik sa akin, sir.
Q Halimbawa ay ano po iyon? Real estate properties, parcels of land located in Pag-Asa, in Silangan, in San Lazaro, in Sta. Cruz, in San Francisco del
Monte and shares of stock. Alinsunod sa inyo, paano po ang dapat na partihan o hatian ninyo ni Emil?
A: Kung ano ang sa akin
xxxxxx
Q Ang tanong ko po sa inyo ay ganito, ito po ba ang inyong iminungkahi kay Emil? Ito po ba ang inyong paghahatian or hindi?
A: Iyo akin talaga na hindi nila pinaghirapan, sir."25
Unfortunately, respondent could not even specify which of the properties listed in petitioners inventory belong to her. Neither could she present any
document to prove her claim of ownership. The consistently changing basis of her claim did nothing to improve her posture. Initially, she insisted that the bulk
of Miguelitas estate is composed of paraphernal properties. 26 Sensing that such assertion could not strengthen her claim of ownership, she opted to change
her submission and declare that she and Miguelita were "business partners" and that she gave to the latter most of her properties to be used in a joint
business venture.27 Respondent must have realized early on that if the properties listed in petitioners inventory are paraphernal, then Miguelita had the
absolute title and ownership over them and upon her death, such properties would be vested to her compulsory heirs, petitioner herein and their two minor
children.28
At any rate, we must stress that our pronouncements herein cannot diminish or deprive respondent of whatever rights or properties she believes or considers
to be rightfully hers. We reiterate that the question of ownership of properties alleged to be part of the estate must be submitted to the Regional Trial Court in
the exercise of its general jurisdiction.29
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571 are hereby REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 167405

February 16, 2006

ANA JOYCE S. REYES, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. CESAR M. SOTERO, Presiding Judge, RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67, ATTY. PAULINO SAGUYOD, the Clerk of Court of Branch 67 of the RTC at
Paniqui, Tarlac in his capacity as Special Administrator, CORAZON CHICHIOCO, ANGELITO LISING, ERLINDA ESPACIO, GONZALO ZALZOS and
ERNESTO LISING, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review seeks to modify the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74047 as well as the Resolution dated May
14, 2005 denying the motion for reconsideration. In the assailed judgment, the Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the September 18, 2002 and November
12, 2002 Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67 in Spec. Proc. No. 204 but refrained from dismissing the petition for
letters of administration and settlement of estate on the ground that petitioner must first prove that she was legally adopted by the decedent, Elena Lising.
On September 15, 1998, respondent Corazon L. Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and settlement of estate of the late Elena
Lising before the RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, where it was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 204 and raffled to Branch 67. Chichioco claimed that she was the niece and
heir of Lising who died intestate on July 31, 1998. Named as co-heirs of Chichioco were Rosario L. Zalzos, Florante Zalzos, Erlinda Lising, Manuel Lising, Evelyn
Lising, Josephine Lising, Alfredo Lising and respondents Ernesto Lising and Erlinda Espacio.
According to Chichioco, the deceased left real properties located in the municipalities of Ramos and Paniqui, Tarlac, as well as assorted pieces of jewelry and
money which were allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of the deceased. Chichioco prayed that she be appointed
administrator of the estate, upon payment of a bond, pending settlement and distribution of Lisings properties to the legal heirs.1
On November 6, 1998, petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition2 to the petition, claiming that she was an adopted child of Lising and the latters husband, Serafin
Delos Santos, who died on November 30, 1970. She asserted that the petition should be dismissed and that the appointment of an administrator was
unnecessary, since she was the only heir of Lising who passed away without leaving any debts. She further asserted that Chichioco is unfit to serve as
administrator of Lisings estate because of her "antagonistic interests" against the decedent. Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs have questioned the
decedents title to a piece of real property which forms a large part of the estate.
On November 11, 1998, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Opposition3 attaching thereto the Certification4issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Paniqui,
Tarlac stating that on page 76, Book No. 01 of the Register of Court Decrees, Reyes was adopted by Elena Lising and Serafin Delos Santos pursuant to a
decision rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 1410 by Judge Julian Lustre of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac, Branch 3, promulgated on December 21, 1968
and duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar on January 29, 1969.
Petitioner also submitted a Certification5 issued by the Clerk of Court of the RTC-Tarlac City, stating that a judgment was rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 1410 on
December 21, 1968 decreeing petitioners adoption by Elena Lising and Serafin Delos Santos. She also presented a copy of Judicial Form No. 436 indicating that
the adoption decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac City, wherein the dispositive portion of the adoption decree was recorded as follows:
In view of the foregoing, the court finds this petition a proper case for adoption and therefore grants the same. Consequently, the Court declares that
henceforth, the child Ana Joyce C. Zalzos is freed from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural parents Orlando Zalzos
and May C. Castro, and is to all legal intents and purposes the child of the petitioners Serafin delos Santos and Elena Lising.7
Petitioner likewise submitted a Decree of Final Distribution8 issued by the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) showing that, upon the death of Serafin
Delos Santos, death benefits were paid to his widow, Elena Lising, and his "daughter", Ana Joyce Delos Santos, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
On April 5, 1999, the RTC ordered respondents to submit documentary evidence to prove the jurisdictional facts of the case and to comment on petitioners
opposition.9 Only Rosario L. Zalsos appears to have filed a Comment/Reply to Oppositors Opposition, 10 after which the RTC ordered the parties to submit
memoranda thereon.11 On July 22, 1999, the case was deemed submitted for resolution. 12
Meanwhile, on June 30, 1999, Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the adoption decree docketed as
SP No. 53457.13 They claimed that no proceedings for the adoption of petitioner took place in 1968 since the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) had no records of the adoption case. Petitioners natural mother supposedly connived with the court personnel to make it appear
that petitioner was adopted by the Delos Santos spouses and that the CFIs order for initial hearing was published in a weekly newspaper which was not
authorized to publish court orders in special proceedings.
Upon motion of Chichioco, the RTC ordered on October 4, 1999, the suspension of hearings in Spec. Proc. No. 204 pending the outcome of SP No.
53457.14 Subsequently, however, the Court of Appeals dismissed15 SP No. 53457 for failure to comply with the third paragraph of Section 4, Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court.16 The said dismissal became final and executory on March 8, 2000.17
Thereafter, on August 22, 2000, petitioner filed a motion before the RTC praying that the opposition to Spec. Proc. No. 204 be finally resolved and that the
petition be dismissed.18 This was followed by an Urgent Ex Parte Motion19 filed by petitioner on October 17, 2000 praying for the immediate resolution of her
opposition.
On November 16, 2000, respondents filed a Comment20 to the opposition stating that reasonable doubts have been cast on petitioners claim that she was
legally adopted due allegedly to certain "badges of fraud." Respondents also informed the RTC that they have filed a criminal complaint against petitioner

before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Tarlac City, for alleged falsification of the adoption decree and Judicial Form No. 43, docketed as I.S. No. 001016.
Subsequently, the RTC issued a Resolution21 dated December 12, 2000 deferring resolution of petitioners opposition to Spec. Proc. No. 204, pending the
outcome of the criminal case filed against the latter. In the meantime, the parties were enjoined from dissipating or disposing any or all of the properties
included in the estate of Elena Lising without order from this Court.
On December 13, 2000, Chichioco filed an Urgent Motion to Appoint Special Administrator 22 before the RTC on the ground that there was yet no true
determination and appraisal of the decedents universal estate. It was prayed therein that the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Paulino Saguyod, be appointed
special administrator as he was "an experienced and able person in the management of properties" and is "honest, impartial, competent and acceptable to the
majority of the interested parties."
In the meantime, the Provincial Prosecutor found probable cause to charge petitioner with falsification of public documents per resolution dated January 5,
2001.23 Petitioner thus appealed the said finding to the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor.
On August 8, 2001, the RTC granted respondents motion for the appointment of a special administrator and appointed its branch clerk of court, Atty.
Saguyod.24 Petitioner moved for reconsideration on the grounds that the branch clerk of court was disqualified from taking on the task of special
administrator, and that Atty. Saguyod was appointed without being required to file a bond. Petitioner also reiterated that the petition should be dismissed
because she is the sole heir of the decedent.25 However, the RTC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on November 5, 2001. 26
On January 14, 2002, the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor reversed the findings of the Provincial Prosecutor and dismissed the criminal complaint
against petitioner.27 Undaunted, Chichioco filed a petition for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Simultaneously, Chichioco and the other alleged co-heirs filed a motion before the RTC to enjoin petitioner from conducting business in a property belonging
to the estate. Respondent Chichioco alleged that petitioner converted the basement of Lisings residence into a billiard hall without authority of the special
administrator.28
Acting on said motion, the RTC issued a resolution on September 18, 2002, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Oppositor Ana Joyce Reyes is hereby enjoined from conducting business activity in any of the properties left by the decedent. The Special
Administrator is also empowered to take control and possession of the listed personal and real properties of the decedent and those that may be found to be
owned or registered in the name of the same.
SO ORDERED.29
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above resolution which was denied by the RTC on November 12, 2002. On even date, the DOJ also issued a
resolution dismissing respondent Chichiocos petition for review in the criminal case. 30
Subsequently, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74047,31 assailing the September 18,
2002 and November 12, 2002 resolutions of the RTC. Petitioner alleged that said resolutions were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
in excess of jurisdiction since as sole heir, she had the right to possess and use the decedents property, title over which automatically passed on to her upon
the latters death. Moreover, the special administrator, Atty. Saguyod, had yet to file a bond and submit an inventory of the decedents estate.
Additionally, petitioner insisted that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed since the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of SP No. 53457 constituted res
judicata as to the former. There was likewise no valid challenge to her adoption and she consequently remains to be the sole heir of the decedent. Thus, she
stressed that there was no need for the appointment of an administrator or for the settlement proceedings.
In due course, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment32 nullifying the resolutions of the trial court. It held that the presiding judge, Judge Cesar M. Sotero,
gravely abused his discretion in appointing his branch clerk of court as special administrator. Citing Balanay, Jr. v. Martinez,33 the appellate court reasoned
that such act could engender a suspicion that Judge Sotero and his clerk are in cahoots in milking the decedents estate. Moreover, Atty. Saguyod failed to
comply with the requirements of a bond and inventory and could not therefore take control and possession of any of the decedents properties.
However, the appellate court refused to dismiss Spec. Proc. No. 204 since the dismissal of SP No. 53457 was not a judgment on the merits and did not operate
as res judicata to the former. It was also incumbent upon petitioner to prove before the trial court that she was indeed adopted by the Delos Santos spouses
since, according to the appellate court, "imputations of irregularities permeating the adoption decree render its authenticity under a cloud of doubt."
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied on March 15, 2005, 34 hence this petition on the following assigned errors:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAD TO PROVE THE VALIDITY OF HER ADOPTION DUE TO IMPUTATIONS OF
IRREGULARITIES IN VIEW OF SECTION 47 OF RULE 39.35
B. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DISMISSAL IN SP NO. 53457 WAS NOT A DISMISSAL ON THE MERITS. 36
The petition is meritorious.
On the first assigned error, we agree with petitioner that she need not prove her legal adoption by any evidence other than those which she had already
presented before the trial court. To recall, petitioner submitted a certification from the local civil registrars office that the adoption decree was registered

therein and also a copy of Judicial Form No. 43 and a certification issued by the clerk of court that the decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTCTarlac City. Both certifications were issued under the seal of the issuing offices and were signed by the proper officers. These are thus presumed to have been
regularly issued as part of the official duties that said public officers perform. 37
It should be borne in mind that an adoption decree is a public document 38 required by law to be entered into the public records, the official repository of
which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements affecting the status of individuals, is the local civil registrars office as well as the court which rendered the
judgment.
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated.39 As such, the certifications issued by the local civil registrar and the clerk of court regarding details of petitioners adoption which are entered in the
records kept under their official custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of petitioners
adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere "imputations of irregularities" will not cast a "cloud of
doubt" on the adoption decree since the certifications and its contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered.
In this regard, it must be pointed out that such contrary proof can be presented only in a separate action brought principally for the purpose of nullifying the
adoption decree. The latter cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedents estate, as categorically held in Santos v.
Aranzanso.40 Accordingly, respondents cannot assail in these proceedings the validity of the adoption decree in order to defeat petitioners claim that she is
the sole heir of the decedent. Absent a categorical pronouncement in an appropriate proceeding that the decree of adoption is void, the certifications
regarding the matter, as well as the facts stated therein, should be deemed legitimate, genuine and real. Petitioners status as an adopted child of the decedent
remains unrebutted and no serious challenge has been brought against her standing as such. Therefore, for as long as petitioners adoption is considered valid,
respondents cannot claim any interest in the decedents estate. For this reason, we agree with petitioner that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed.
As succinctly held in Santos v. Aranzanso:41
From all the foregoing it follows that respondents - x x x and those who, like them x x x, claim an interest in the estate x x x as alleged first cousins, cannot
intervene, as such, in the settlement proceedings, in view of the fact that in the order of intestate succession adopted children exclude first cousins (Articles
979 and 1003, New Civil Code). The same holds true as long as the adoption must be - as in the instant case - considered valid. (Emphasis added)
Petitioner, whose adoption is presumed to be valid, would necessarily exclude respondents from inheriting from the decedent since they are mere collateral
relatives of the latter. To allow the proceedings below to continue would serve no salutary purpose but to delay the resolution of the instant case. After all, the
dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 204 is the logical consequence of our pronouncement relative to the presumed validity of petitioners adoption.
Moreover, it must be stressed that all the evidence pertinent to the resolution of the petitioners opposition, which is actually a motion to dismiss the petition
for letters of administration and settlement of the estate, is a matter of record in the instant case. The same has in fact been submitted for resolution before
the RTC more than six years ago and is so far the only pending incident before the RTC. The parties have likewise amply ventilated their positions on the
matter through their respective pleadings filed before the lower courts. No useful purpose will thus be served if we let the RTC resolve the matter, only for its
ruling to be elevated again to the Court of Appeals and subsequently to this Court. The remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence
is not necessary where the Court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the evidence before it. 42 This is in keeping with the avowed purpose of the
rules of procedure which is to secure for the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding.43 Hence, since the grounds for
the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 204 are extant in the records and there is no cogent reason to remand the case to the RTC, Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be
dismissed.
Based on the foregoing, the Court sees no need to discuss petitioners second assigned error.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Special Proceedings No. 204 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Branch 67 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-27082 January 31, 1978

Intestate Estate of the Spouses Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba. FILOMENO COCA, Administrator, PRIMA PANGILINAN, and HEIRS OF
CONCEPCION PANGILINAN-YAMUTA, namely, MARIA P. YAMUTA DE ATAY, EUSEBIO P. YAMUTA, and APOLINAR P. YAMUTA, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
GUADALUPE PIZARRAS VDA. DE PANGILINAN, HEIRS OF FRANCISCO PANGILINAN, namely, FRANCIS, ALGERIAN, BENJAMIN, PERLA and FRANCISCO,
JR., all surnamed PANGILINAN, and CRISPIN BORROMEO, oppositors-appellees.
G.R. No. L-29545 January 31, 1978
FILOMENO COCA, administrator-appellant,
vs.
CRISPIN BORROMEO and GUADALUPE PIZARRAS VDA. DE PANGILINAN and her Children, claimants-appellees.
Casiano U. Laput and Lorenzo D. de Guzman for appellants.
Paulino A. Conol and Felicidario M. Batoy for appellees.

AQUINO, J.:
These two cases involve the question of whether the ownership of a parcel of land, whether belonging to the deceased spouses or to their heirs, should be
decided in the intestate proceeding or in a separate action. Also in issue in these two cases is the liability of the decedents' estate for the litigation expenses
allegedly incurred in a case regarding that same land.
Being related cases, their adjudication in a single decision was allowed in this Court's resolution of August 13, 1969.
The spouses Juan Pan and Teresa Magtuba died intestate in 1943 and 1948, respectively. They possession a homestead, consisting of two parcels of land,
located at Barrio Bunawan or Mauswagon, Calamba, Misamis Occidental.
One parcel is Identified as Lot No. 1927. It has an area of 3.9791 hectares. It was covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 10 of the registry of deeds of
Oriental Misamis in the name of Juan Pangilinan issued in 1927. It is now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 86 (T-10) of the registry of deeds of
Misamis Occidental (p. 7, Appellees' brief in L-27082).
The other parcel is Identified as Lot No. 1112. It has an area of 18.0291 hectares. It is covered by OCT No. P-8419 issued on November 21, 1961 in the name of
the Heirs of Juan Pan , represented by Concepcion Pan de Yamuta (p. 73, Record on Appeal in
L-27082).
According to Guadalupe Pizarras and her children, a third parcel, Lot No. 1920, with an area of eight hectares which was surveyed in the name of Concepcion
Pan and which adjoins Lots Nos. 1927 and 1112, also forms part of the estate of the deceased Pangilinan spouses (pp. 61-64, Record on Appeal).
The Pangilinan spouses were survived by the following heirs: (1) Prima Pangilinan, (2) Maria, Eusebio and Apolinar all surnamed Yamuta, the children of
Concepcion Pangilinan Yamuta who died in 1961, and (3) Francis, A Benjamin Perla and Francisco, Jr., all surnamed Pan the children of Francisco Pan who
died in 1948 and who was also survived by his widow, Guadalupe Pizarras. (It is not clear whether Roseller, Demosthenes and Eliza, all surnamed Japay, were
the children of the deceased Helen Pangilinan, presumably a daughter of Francisco Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba. See pages 81-82, Record on Appeal).
Special Proceeding No. 508 of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental was instituted on September 5, 1963 for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouses, Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba.
On September 25, 1965 the administrator presented a project of partition wherein the combined areas of Lots Nos. 1112 and 1927, or 22.0082 hectares, were
partitioned as follows:
(a) To Crispin Borromeo as payment of his attorney's fees in Civil Case No. 560 or CA-G.R. No. 6721-R, February 27, 1952, Crispin Labaria
vs. Juan C. Pangilinan, in accordance with the lower court's decision dated July 19, 1965 in Civil Case No. 2440. Borromeo vs. Coca (p. 11,
Appellees' brief in L-27082), three hectares which should be taken from Lot No. 1112 and designated as Lot No. 1112-A;
(b) To the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan (Mrs. Pizarras and children), 5.3361 hectares taken from Lot No. 1112 and designated as Lot No.
1112-B;
(c) To Prima Pangilinan, 6.3361 hectares, taken from Lot No. 1112 and designated as Lot No. 1112-C, and presumably a daughter of
Francisco Pan 81-82, Record on Appeal).
(d) To the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan, 7.3360 hectares, consisting of Lot No. 1927 and the remainder of Lot No. 1112, which
remainder is designated as Lot No. 1112-D.

It was also provided in the project of partition that the sum of P5,088.50, as the alleged debt of the estate to Concepcion Pan should be divided equally among
the three sets of heirs, or P1,696.16 for each set of heirs, and that Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should pay that amount to the heirs
of Concepcion Pangilinan.
The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan (Guadalupe Pizarras, et al.) opposed that project of partition. They contended that the proposed partition contravened the
lower court's order of December 6, 1963 which recognized the right of the heirs of Francisco Pan to a twelve-hectare portion of Lot No. 1112; that Prima
Pangilinan, who sold her share to Francisco Pan should be excluded from the partition; that the total share of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan in Lot No. 1112
is 12.6720 hectares, while that of the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan is 6.3360 hectares, and that the claim of the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan for
115,088.50 had not been properly allowed.
The lower court in its order of October 2, 1965 directed the administrator to pay the debt of the estate to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan. It deferred action
on the project of partition until the ownership of the twelve hectares, which were claimed by the heirs of Francisco Pan and the six hectares, which were
claimed by Crispen Borromeo (eighteen hectares in all which were excluded from the inventory in the court's order of December 6, 1963) is determined in an
ordinary action.
On may 14,1966 the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan filed a supplemental opposition wherein they asked that Lot No. 1920, with an area of eight hectares, which
lot was surveyed at should be included in the project of partition.
On August 31, 1966 the lower court, apparently acting on its own volition, tackled once more the project of partition. After noting that no separate action had
been filed to determine the ownership of the twelve hectares, it issued an order approving the project of partition but excluding the twelve hectares claimed
by the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan.
That order on its face appears to be incomplete because, after excluding the twelve hectares, the lower court did not bother to decide how the remainder
should be partitioned and whether Prima Pangilinan had a share in that remainder.
That is the order under appeal in L-27082 by Filomeno Coca as administrator, Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan. However, the said
appellants in their brief also assail the lower court's order of December 6, 1963, excluding eighteen hectares from the inventory, which order was sustained by
the Court of Appeals in its decision in Atay vs. Catolico, CA-G.R. Nos. 33165-R, and 3426-R, May 14,1964, 5 CAR 1200. This Court refused to review that
decision in its resolution of July 29, 1964, in
L-23088-89, Atay vs. Court of Appeals.
The other incident involves the lower court's order of May 11, 1968 which directed that the claim of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan for reimbursement of
litigation expenses (apart from the sum of P1,459.49, as the value of the produce of the twelve hectares already mentioned, which was appropriated by the
special administrator), be referred to the clerk of court for reception of the evidence.
In another order, also dated May 11, 1968, the lower court reiterated its order of October 2, 1965 that the administrator should pay the heirs of Concepcion
Pan the. amount to be reimbursed to her estate. The court further directed the administrator to account for the income of the estate, to recover any amount
due from the special administrator, and to pay the claim of Crispin Borromeo and the amount due to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan as directed in its order
of August 31, 1966 and in its approval of the accounting of the special administrator.
The administrator, Filomeno Coca, Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of Concepcion Pan also appealed from those two orders dated May 11, 1968 (L-29545).
The appellant contend that the lower court, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to decide the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion of Lot No. 1112. On
the other hand, the appellees" or the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan counter that the lower court did not decide the ownership of the twelve hectares when it
ordered their exclusion from the project of partition. So, the problem is how the title to the twelve hectares should be decided, whether in a separate action or
in the intestate. proceeding.
It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its
limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not a jurisdictional question. In essence, it is a procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be
waived" (Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227, 232. Cf. Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484 re jurisdiction over the issue).
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in the estate or intestate proceeding. That question should be ventilated in a
separate action. (Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266). That general rule has qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and
convenience.
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a
piece of property without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action Lachenal vs. Salas, supra).
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs or the question is one of collation
or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of 'third parties are not impaired, then the
probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership (Pascual vs. Pascual 73 Phil. 561; Alvarez vs. Espiritu, L-18833, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 892;
Cunanan vs. Amparo, supra; 3 Morans Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 4731).
We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the general rule that questions of title should be ventilated in a separate action.
Here, the probate court had already received evidence on the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion during the hearing of the motion for its exclusion from
title inventory The only interested parties are the heirs who have all appeared in the intestate proceeding.

As pointed out by the appellees, they belong to the poor stratum of society. They should not be forced to incur additional expenses (such as filing fees) by
bringing a separate action to determine the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion.
The just, expeditious and inexpensive solution is to require the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan to the in the intestate, proceeding, Special Proceeding No. 568, a
motion in the form of a complaint wherein they should set forth their claim for the twelve hectares in question, stating the ultimate facts in support of their
claim, such as the partition made by Juan C. Pangilinan, their acquisition of the share of Prima Pangilinan and the usufructuary rights of their parents, their
long possession of the said portion, their claim for the produce of the land, the expenses incurred by them in Civil Case No. 560, Labaria vs. Pangilinan, and
their contention that Lot No. 1920 forms part of the estate of the Pangilinan spouses.
Copies of that motion should be serves upon the administrator and upon Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan (who are all represented by
the same lawyers). They should answer the motion within fifteen days from service. In their answer the appellants should set forth the ultimate facts and the
defenses (such as the violation of section 118 of the Public Land Law) to support their theory that Lot No. 1112 still forms part of the estate of the spouses
Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba and that the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should bear one-third of the expenses incurred by Concepcion Pan in Civil
Case No. 560.
After the issues have been joined and in case no amicable settlement has been reached, the probate court should receive evidence or, as indicated by the Court
of Appeals in Atay vs. Catolico, supra a full-dress hearing should be held.
Crispin Borromeo may set forth also his claim for the three hectares but only for the purpose of deciding what portion of the estate should be given to him in
satisfaction of his share. His claim for the sum of P416 had already been adjudicated by the lower court in its order of August 31, 1966 (pp. 26- 27, Record on
Appeal in L-29545). No appeal was interposed from that adjudication.
After trial the lower court's decision on the issues as to what constitutes the estate of the Pangilinan spouses should include the partition thereof and should
indicate what portion of the estate should be allocated to Crispen Borromeo. If necessary, the validity of the donation or partition of Lot No. 1112, made by
Juan C. Pangilinan during his lifetime, should be passed upon.
Considering that the respective claims of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan . and the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan for reimbursement of the litigation
expenses allegedly incurred in Civil Case No. 560 will be included in the trial, the two orders of the trial court dated May 11, 1968 regarding those matters (L29545) should not be enforced. They should be set aside.
WHEREFORE, (1) the lower court's amended order of August 31, 1966, excluding twelve hectares from the partition of the estate of the deceased Pan spouses
(L-27082) and (2) the two orders dated May 11, 1968, regarding the claim of Guadalupe Pizarras and her children and the debt of the estate to Concepcion
Pangilinan (L-29545) are reversed and set aside.
A new trial should be held on those matters after the filing of the proper pleadings and in case no amicable settlement is reached. The heirs of Francisco
Pangilinan should file their motion within thirty days from notice of the entry of judgment in this case.
The case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with the guidelines already set forth. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005]

ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR., petitioners, vs. LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., assail the September 24, 2002[1] Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 124[2] which dismissed, after trial, their complaint for annulment of title for failure to state a cause of
action and lack of jurisdiction.
From the records of the case are gathered the following material allegations
documentary evidence during the trial of the case:

testimonial and

On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz Lazo. [3]
On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta.[4]
On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy whom she named Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her herein co-petitioner.[5]
On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli,[6] later baptized as Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal, herein respondent.[7]
On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights[8] over the estate of their father,
Mariano Portugal, who died intestate on November 2, 1964. [9] In the deed, Portugals siblings waived their rights, interests, and participation over a 155 sq. m.
parcel of land located in Caloocan in his favor.[10]
On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34292 covering the Caloocan parcel of land in
the name of Jose Q. Portugal,married to Paz C. Lazo.[11]
On February 18, 1984, Paz died.
On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.
On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person [12] adjudicating to herself the
Caloocan parcel of land. TCT No. 34292/T-172[13] in Portugals name was subsequently cancelled and in its stead TCT No. 159813[14] was issued by the
Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City on March 9, 1988 in the name of respondent, Leonila Portugal-Beltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr.
Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still later of the 1988 transfer by respondent of the title to the Caloocan property in her name,
petitioners filed before the RTC of Caloocan City on July 23, 1996 a complaint[15] against respondent for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication executed by
her and the transfer certificate of title issued in her name.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the Caloocan
parcel of land and that she perjured herself when she made false representations in her Affidavit of Adjudication.
Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondents Affidavit of Adjudication and the TCT in her name be declared void and that the Registry of Deeds for
Caloocan be ordered to cancel the TCT in respondents name and to issue in its stead a new one in their (petitioners) name, and that actual, moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees and litigation expenses be awarded to them.
Following respondents filing of her answer, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order chronicling, among other things, the issues as follows:
a.

Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr., is valid?

b.

Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr.?

c.

Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by plaintiffs.

d.

Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under the complaint. [16] (Underscoring supplied)

After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18, 2001,[17] after giving an account of the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses and of their
documentary evidence, without resolving the issues defined during pre-trial, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action on the ground that petitioners
status and right as putative heirs had not been established before a probate (sic) court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case, citing Heirs of Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario.[18]
In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the trial court held:
The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not dissimilar to the case at bar.
xxx
In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage Contract, a Certificate of Live Birth, pictures (sic) and testimonial evidence to establish their right as heirs of
the decedent. Thus, the preliminary act of having a status and right to the estate of the decedent, was sought to be determined herein. However, the

establishment of a status, a right, or a particular fact is remedied through a special proceeding(Sec. 3(c), Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Court), not an ordinary
civil action whereby a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong (ibid, a). The operative term in
the former is to establish, while in the latter, it is to enforce, a right. Their status and right as putative heirs of the decedent not having been established, as
yet, the Complaint failed to state a cause of action.
The court, not being a probate (sic) court, is without jurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs cause to establish their status and right herein. Plaintiffs do not have
the personality to sue (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 3, in relation to Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 2, supra).[19] (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial courts ratio decedendi in dismissing the case as diametrically opposed to
this Courts following ruling inCario v. Cario,[20] viz:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the
previous void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993]) However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of
the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. (Nial, et al. v. Bayadog, GR No. 13378, March 14, 2000). In such cases, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such
previous marriage void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Conceding that the ruling in Cario was promulgated (in 2001) subsequent to that of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay (in 1999), the appellate court
found Cario to be inapplicable, however, to the case in this wise:
To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue in the Cario case was the validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago Cario,
whose death benefits was the bone of contention between the two women both named Susan (viz., Susan Nicdao Cario and Susan Yee Cario) both of whom
he married. It is not disputed in said case that SPO4 S. Cario contracted two marriages with said two women during his lifetime, and the only question
was: which of these two marriages was validly celebrated? The award of the death benefits of the deceased Cario was thus, merely an incident to the
question of which of the two marriages was valid. Upon the other hand, the case at bench is of a different milieu. The main issue here is
the annulment of title to property. The only undisputed fact in this case is that the deceased Jose Portugal, during his lifetime, owned a parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-34292. However, here come two contending parties, herein plaintiffs-appellants and defendantappellee, both now insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent. x x x. The status and rights of the parties herein have not, therefore, been definitively
established, as yet. x x x. Necessarily and naturally, such questions as to such status or right must be properly ventilated in an appropriate special proceeding,
not in an ordinary civil action, whereunder a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong. The
institution of an ordinary civil suit for that purpose in the present case is thus impermissible. For it is axiomatic that what the law prohibits or forbids
directly, it cannot permit or allow indirectly. To permit, or allow, a declaration of heirship, or the establishment of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child to
be determined in an ordinary civil action, not in an appropriate special proceeding brought for that purpose, is thus to impinge upon this axiom. x x
x[21] (Emphasis in the original, underscoring supplied).
The appellate court, by Decision of September 24, 2002, [22] thus affirmed the trial courts dismissal of the case.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,[23] faulting the appellate court to have erred when
I.
. . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the initiatory complaint as it failed to state a cause of action.
II.
. . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and Isabel] Yaptingchay despite the existence of a later and contrary ruling in Cario, and (ii) when the Honorable
CA and the lower court failed to render judgment based on the evidence presented relative to the issues raised during pre-trial, . . .[24] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thus prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme Court that the questioned CA decision be reversed, and a new one entered in accordance
with the prayers set forth in the instant complaint based on the above disquisition and evidence adduced by petitioners in the court a quo.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Honorable Supreme Court find that the pronouncements in Cario apply, a decision be entered remanding to the court a
quo the determination of the issues of which of the two marriages is valid, and the determination of heirship and legitimacy of Jose Jr. and Leonila
preparatory to the determination of the annulment of title issued in the name of Leonila.
Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.[25] (Underscoring supplied).
Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court misapplied Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay and in effect encouraged multiplicity of suits
which is discouraged by this Court as a reading of Cario shows; that Cario allows courts to pass on the determination of heirship and the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child so long as it is necessary to the determination of the case; and that contrary to the appellate courts ruling, they had established their
status as compulsory heirs.

In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs before they
can pursue the case for annulment of respondents Affidavit of Adjudication and of the TCT issued in her name.
In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,[26] the therein petitioners executed on March 17, 1994 an extrajudicial settlement of the
estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, owners-claimants of the two lots mentioned therein. They later discovered on August 26, 1994 that a
portion, if not all, of the two lots had been titled in the name of the therein respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation which in turn sold
portions thereof to the therein individual respondents. The therein petitioners Heirs thus filed a complaint for annulment of titles. The therein respondents
moved to dismiss the case for failure of the therein petitioners to, inter alia, state a cause of action and prove their status as heirs. The trial court granted the
motion to dismiss in this wise:
But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a semblance of itexcept the
allegations that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned Yaptinchaysthat they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now, the
determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for
reconveyance of property. This must take precedence over the action for reconveyance . . . [27] (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied).
On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court, albeit holding that the petition was an improper recourse, found that the trial court did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the case. Citing Litam et al. v. Rivera[28] and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,[29] this Court held that the declaration of heirship can
be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
In the above-cited case of Litam,[30] Gregorio Dy Tam instituted a special proceeding for issuance of letters of administration before the then Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging in his petition that he is the son of Rafael Litam who died in Manila on January 10, 1951 and is survived by him and his
therein named seven (7) siblings who are children of the decedent by his marriage to Sia Khin celebrated in China in 1911; that the decedent contracted in
1922 in the Philippines another marriage with Marcosa Rivera; and that the decedent left neither a will nor debt. Dy Tam thus prayed for the issuance of
letters of administration to Marcosa Rivera, the surviving spouse of the decedent. The CFI granted the petition and issued letters of administration to, on
Marcosas request, her nephew Arminio Rivera.
While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and his purported siblings filed a civil case before the same court, against the estate of Rafael Litam
administrator Arminio Rivera and Remedios R. Espiritu, duly appointed guardian of Marcosa. In their complaint, Dy Tam and his purported siblings
substantially reproduced the allegations made in his petition in the special proceeding, with the addition of a list of properties allegedly acquired during the
marriage of the decedent and Marcosa.
Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical to some unresolved incidents in the special proceeding, both were jointly heard by the trial court,
following which it rendered a decision in the civil case dismissing it, declaring, inter alia, that the plaintiffs Dy Tam et al. are not the children of the decedent
whose only surviving heir is Marcosa.
On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the two issues raised for determination was whether they are the legitimate children of Rafael Litam.
This Court, holding that the issue hinged on whether Rafael Litam and Sia Khin were married in 1911, and whether Rafael Litam is the father of
appellants Dy Tam et al., found substantially correct the trial courts findings of fact and its conclusion that, among other things, the birth certificates of Dy
Tam et al. do not establish the identity of the deceased Rafael Litam and the persons named therein as father [and] it does not appear in the said certificates
of birth that Rafael Litam had in any manner intervened in the preparation and filing thereof; and that [t]he other documentary evidence presented by
[them] [is] entirely immaterial and highly insufficient to prove the alleged marriage between the deceased Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and [their] alleged status
. . . as children of said decedent.
This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that the lower court should not have declared, in the decision appealed from, that Marcosa is the only
heir of the decedent, for such declaration is improper in the [civil case], it being within the exclusive competence of the court in [the] [s]pecial [p]roceeding.
In Solivio,[31] also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, there was a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased, who was
a soltero, filed before the RTC of Iloilo. In the special proceeding, Branch 23 of said court declared as sole heir Celedonia Solivio, the decedents maternal aunthalf sister of his mother. Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, the decedents paternal aunt-sister of his father, moved to reconsider the courts order declaring
Celedonia Solivio as sole heir of the decedent, she claiming that she too was an heir. The court denied the motion on the ground of tardiness. Instead of
appealing the denial of her motion, Concordia filed a civil case against Celedonia before the same RTC, for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and
damages. The civil case was raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC, which rendered judgment in favor of Concordia. On appeal by Celedonia, the appellate court
affirmed the said judgment.
On petition for review filed before this Court by Celedonia who posed, among other issues, whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to
entertain [the civil action] for partition and recovery of Concordia Villanuevas share of the estate of [the deceased] while the [estate] proceedings . . . were
still pending . . . in Branch 23 of the same court, this Court held that [i]n the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting
dispositions of a decedents estate, a court should not interfere with [estate] proceedingspending in a co-equal court, citing Guilas v. CFI Judge of
Pampanga.[32]
This Court, however, in Solivio, upon [c]onsidering that the estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless [therein private respondent-Concordia
Villanueva] had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, opted to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of
justice, and declared her an heir of the decedent.
In Guilas[33] cited in Solivio, a project of partition between an adopted daughter, the therein petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas (Juanita), and her adoptive
father was approved in theproceedings for the settlement of the testate estate of the decedent-adoptive mother, following which the probate court directed
that the records of the case be archived.
Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her adoptive father to annul the project of partition on the ground of lesion, preterition and fraud,
and prayed that her adoptive father immediately deliver to her the two lots allocated to her in the project of partition. She subsequently filed a motion in the
testate estate proceedings for her adoptive father to deliver to her, among other things, the same two lots allotted to her.
After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial court, noting the parties agreement to suspend action or resolution on Juanitas motion in the testate
estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the two lots alloted to her until after her complaint in the civil case had been decided, set said case for trial.
Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set aside the order setting it for trial on the ground that in the amended complaint she, in the meantime,
filed, she acknowledged the partial legality and validity of the project of partition insofar as she was allotted the two lots, the delivery of which she was
seeking. She thus posited in her motion to set aside the April 27, 1966 order setting the civil case for hearing that there was no longer a prejudicial question to

her motion in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the actual possession of the two lots. The trial court, by order of April 27, 1966, denied
the motion.
Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order before this Court.
The probate courts approval of the project of partition and directive that the records of the case be sent to the archives notwithstanding, this Court held
that the testate estate proceedings had not been legally terminated as Juanitas share under the project of partition had not been delivered to her. Explained
this Court:
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated (Siguiong
vs. Tecson, supra.); because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided
the prescriptive period therefor has not elapse (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to
demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or administrative
proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus
reverse a decision or order of the probate o[r] intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of
(Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol vs. Cano, supra,; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic vs. Agustines, L14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455, 460-461).[34] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966 order of the trial court setting the civil case for hearing, but allowed the civil case to continue because it
involves no longer the two lotsadjudicated to Juanita.
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special
proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of
the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where special
proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the
special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring
about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugals estate, executed on February 15, 1988[35] the
questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. [36] Said rule is an exception to the general
rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the
order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.[37]
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a
deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land,[38] to still subject it,
under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is
not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that
the parties to the civil case subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction
over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugals estate to administration proceedings
since a determination of petitioners status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, [39] the trial court should proceed to evaluate the
evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, which bear repeating, to wit:
1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal, is valid;
2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal (Sr.);
3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by plaintiffs;
4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the complaint.[40]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed September 24, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial court, Branch 124 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, for it to evaluate the evidence
presented by the parties and render a decision on the above-enumerated issues defined during the pre-trial.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-18148

February 28, 1963

DEOGRACIAS BERNARDO, executor of the testate estate of the deceased EUSEBIO CAPILI; and the instituted heirs, namely: ARMANDO CAPILI and
ARTURO BERNARDO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMOGENA REYES, namely: FRANCISCO REYES, ET AL., and JOSE ISIDORO, ET
AL., respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla Law Offices for petitioners.
Romerico F. Flores for respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This is a petition by certiorari for the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan holding that the
probate court in Special Proceeding 1101 had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the deed of donation in question and to pass upon the question of title
or ownership of the properties mentioned therein.
The facts are briefly stated in the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:
Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. The first died on July 27, 1958 and a testate proceeding for the settlement of his
estate was instituted in the Court of the Fist Instance of Bulacan. His will was admitted to probate on October 9, 1958, disposing of his properties in
favor of his widow; his cousins Armando, Ursula, and Buenaventura, all surnamed Capili; and Arturo, Deogracias and Eduardo, all surnamed
Bernardo. Hermogena Reyes herself died on April 24, 1959. Upon petition of Deogracias Bernardo, executor of the estate of the deceased Eusebio
Capili, she was substituted by her collateral relatives and intestate heirs, namely, Marcos, Vicente, Francisco and Dominga, all surnamed Reyes; and
Jose, Constancia, Raymunda and Elena, all surnamed Isidoro.
On June 12, 1959, the executor filed a project of partition in the testate proceeding in accordance with the terms of the will, adjudicating the estate
of Eusebio Capili among the testamentary heirs with the exception of Hermogena Reyes, whose share was alloted to her collateral relatives
aforementioned. On June 16, 1959 these relatives filed an opposition to the executor's project of partition and submitted a counter-project of
partition of their own, claiming 1/2 of the properties mentioned in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili on the theory that they belonged not to
the latter alone but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.
The probate court, in two orders dated June 24, 1959 and February 10, 1960, respectively, set the two projects of partition for hearing, at which
evidence was presented by the parties, followed by the submission of memoranda discussing certain legal issues. In the memorandum for the
executor and the instituted heirs it was contended: (1) that the properties disposed of in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili belonged to him
exclusively and not to the conjugal partnership, because Hermogena Reyes had donated to him her half share of such partnership; (2) that the
collateral heirs of Hermogena Reyes had no lawful standing or grounds to question the validity of the donation; and (3) that even assuming that
they could question the validity of the donation, the same must be litigated not in the testate proceeding but in a separate civil action.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice
to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
The oppositors and heirs of Hermogena Reyes, on their part, argued that the deed of donation itself was determinative of the original conjugal
character to the properties, aside from the legal presumption laid down in Article 160 of the Civil Code, and that since the donation was null and
void the deceased Eusebio Capili did not become owner of the share of his wife and therefore could not validly dispose of it in his will.
On September 14, 1960, the probate court, the Honorable M. Mejia presiding, issued an order declaring the donation void without making any
specific finding as to its juridical nature, that is, whether it was inter vivos or mortis causa, for the reason that, considered under the first category,
it falls under Article 133 of the Civil Code, which prohibits donations between spouses during the marriage; and considered under the second
category, it does not comply with the formalities of a will as required by Article 728 in relation to Article 805 of the same Code, there being no
attestation clause. In the same order the court disapproved both projects of partition and directed the executor to file another," dividing the
property mentioned in the last will and testament of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the properties mentioned in the deed of donation, Exhibit B,
between the instituted heirs of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the legal heirs of the deceased Hermogena Reyes, upon the basis that the said
properties were conjugal properties of the deceased spouses." On September 27, 1960, the executor filed a motion for new trial, reiterating and
emphasizing the contention previously raised in their memorandum that the probate court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim of the
legal heirs of Hermogena Reyes involving title to the properties mentioned in the will of Eusebio Capili and taking exception to the court's
declaration of the nullity of the donation "without stating facts or provision of law on which it was based." The motion for new trial was denied in
an order dated October 3, 1960.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals the order appealed from being affirmed, petitioners filed this present petition for review by certiorari.
The petitioners-appellants contend that the appellate court erred in not declaring that the probate court, having limited and special jurisdiction, had generally
no power to adjudicate title and erred in applying the exception to the rule.
In a line of decisions, this Court consistently held that as a general rule, question as to title to property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate
proceedings,"1 except where one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in which case the probate court
may pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. 2 However, we have also held that when the parties
interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a question as to title to property, and when so submitted, said
probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon (Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Manalac v. Ocampo, et al., 73 Phil. 661); and that with the consent of the

parties, matters affecting property under judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate proceeding, provided
interests of third persons are not prejudiced (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 229, 232).
In the light of this doctrine, may it be said correctly that the trial court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the power of the probate court in this
case to adjudicate in the testate proceedings, the question as to whether the properties herein involved belong to the conjugal partnership of Eusebio Capili
and Hermogena Reyes, or to the deceased husband exclusively?
At the outset, let it be clarified that the matter at issue is not a question of jurisdiction, in the sense advanced by appellants that the trial court had completely
no authority to pass upon the title to the lands in dispute, and that its decision on the subject is null and void and does not bind even those who had invoked
its authority and submitted to its decision because, it is contended, jurisdiction is a creature of law and parties to an action can not vest, extend or broaden it.
If appellants' contention is correct, then there can be no exception to the no-jurisdiction theory. But as has been stated in the case of Cunanan v.
Amparo (supra) the Supreme Court speaking through Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason: "Determination of title to property is within the jurisdiction of Courts of First
Instance. The responding Soriano's objection (that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to order the delivery of the possession of the lots to the estate) relates
exclusively to the procedure, which is distinct from jurisdiction. It affects only personal rights to a mode of practice (the filing of an independent ordinary
action) which may be waived". Strictly speaking, it is more a question of jurisdiction over the person, not over the subject matter, for the jurisdiction to try
controversies between heirs of a deceased person regarding the ownership of properties alleged to belong to his estate, has been recognized to be vested in
probate courts. This is so because the purpose of an administration proceeding is the liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs
and legatees. Liquidation means determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses. 3 Thereafter, distribution is made of the
decedent's liquidated estate among the persons entitled to succeed him. The proceeding is in the nature of an action of partition, in which each party is
required to bring into the mass whatever community property he has in his possession. To this end, and as a necessary corollary, the interested parties may
introduce proofs relative to the ownership of the properties in dispute. All the heirs who take part in the distribution of the decedent's estate are before the
court, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, in all matters and incidents necessary to the complete settlement of such estate, so long as no interests of third
parties are affected.4
In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the properties involved whether they belong to the conjugal
partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal
partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings, including, of
course, the widow, now represented because of her death, by her heirs who have been substituted upon petition of the executor himself and who have
appeared voluntarily. There are no third parties whose rights may be affected. It is true that the heirs of the deceased widow are not heirs of the testatorhusband, but the widow is, in addition to her own right to the conjugal property. And it is this right that is being sought to be enforced by her substitutes.
Therefore, the claim that is being asserted is one belonging to an heir to the testator and, consequently, it complies with the requirement of the exception that
the parties interested (the petitioners and the widow, represented by dents) are all heirs claiming title under the testator.
Petitioners contend additionally that they have never submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the probate court, for the purpose of the determination of
the question of ownership of the disputed properties. This is not borne by the admitted facts. On the contrary, it is undisputed that they were the ones who
presented the project of partition claiming the questioned properties as part of the testator's asset. The respondents, as representatives or substitutes of the
deceased widow opposed the project of partition and submitted another. As the Court of Appeals said, "In doing so all of them must be deemed to have
submitted the issue for resolution in the same proceeding. Certainly, the petitioners can not be heard to insist, as they do, on the approval of their project of
partition and, thus, have the court take it for granted that their theory as to the character of the properties is correct, entirely without regard to the opposition
of the respondents". In other words, by presenting their project of partition including therein the disputed lands (upon the claim that they were donated by
the wife to her husband), petitioners themselves put in issue the question of ownership of the properties which is well within the competence of the
probate court and just because of an opposition thereto, they can not thereafter withdraw either their appearance or the issue from the jurisdiction of the
court. Certainly, there is here a waiver where the parties who raise the objection are the ones who set the court in motion. 5 They can not be permitted to
complain if the court, after due hearing, adjudges question against them. 6
Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to raise the question of ownership of the properties involved because the widow herself,
during her lifetime, not only did not object to the inclusion of these properties in the inventory of the assets of her deceased husband, but also signed an extrajudicial partition of those inventoried properties. But the very authorities cited by appellants require that to constitute estoppel, the actor must have
knowledge of the facts and be appraised of his rights at the time he performs the act constituting estoppel, because silence without knowledge works no
estoppel.7 In the present case, the deceased widow acted as she did because of the deed of donation she executed in favor of her husband not knowing that
such deed was illegal, if inter-vivos, and ineffectual if mortis-causa, as it has not been executed with the required formalities similar to a will.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals being in accordance with law, the same is hereby affirmed with costs against appellants. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-44602

November 28, 1938

MARIA CALMA, as administratrix of the testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ESPERANZA TAEDO, assisted by her husband Felipe Mamaual, and BARTOLOME QUIZON, Deputy Sheriff of Tarlac, defendants-appellees.
AVANCENA, C.J.:
The spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit were the owners of the property described in the complaint, being their conjugal property. They were also
indebted to Esperanza Taedo, chargeable against the conjugal property, in the sums of P948.34 and P247, with interest thereon at 10 per cent per annum. On
October 10, 1933, Fausta Macasaquit died leaving a will wherein she appointed her daughter, Maria Calma, as administratrix of her properties. Upon the
commencement of the corresponding probate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, the said daughter, Maria Calma, was appointed judicial
administratrix of the properties of the deceased.
While these probate proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit were pending, Esperanza Tanedo, on January 27, 1934, filed a complaint against Eulalio
Calma for the recovery of the sums of P948.34 and P247. The Court of First Instance of Tarlac rendered judgment for the payment of this sum. In the execution
of this judgment, despite the third party claim filed by Fausta Macasaquit, the property described in the complaint was sold by the sheriff.
Maria Calma, as administratrix of the estate of Fausta Macasaquit, now brings this action and asks that the sale made by the sheriff of the property described
in the complaint be annulled and that the estate of Fausta Macasaquit be declared the sole and absolute owner thereof. lawphi1.net
The court absolved the defendants from this complaint.
The probate proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit were instituted in accordance with Act No. 3176 reading:
SEC. 685. When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and
liquidated, and the debts thereof shall be paid, in the testamentary or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse, in accordance with the
provisions of this Code relative to the administration and liquidation and partition proceeding, unless the parties, being all of age and legally
capacitated, avail themselves of the right granted to them by this Code of proceeding to an extrajudicial partition and liquidation of said property.
In case it is necessary to sell any portion of said community property in order to pay the outstanding debts and obligations of the same, such sale
shall be made in the manner and with the formalities established by this Code for the sale of the property of deceased persons. Any sale, transfer,
alienation or disposition of said property effected without said formalities shall be null and void, except as regards the portion that belonged to the
vendor at the time the liquidation and partition was made.
Prior to this Act, the liquidation of conjugal property was made under section 685 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Interpreting the scope of Act No. 3176, this
court, in the case of Caragay vs. Urquiza (53 Phil., 72), said that the amendment introduced by this Act consists in authorizing the institution of testate or
intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased spouse or of an ordinary action for the liquidation and partition of the property of a
conjugal partnership. It should be understood that these remedies are alternative, and not cumulative, in he sense that they cannot be availed of at he same
time, inasmuch as an anomalous and chaotic situation would result if conjugal property were administered, liquidated and distributed at the same time in a
testamentary proceeding and in an ordinary action for liquidation and partition of property. Consequently, the testamentary proceedings of Fausta
Macasaquit having been instituted, the liquidation and partition of the conjugal property by reason of her marriage to Eulalio Calma should be made in these
proceedings, to the exclusion of any other proceeding for the same purpose.
Interpreting this same Act No. 3176 in another decision, this court, in the case of Cruz vs. De Jesus (52 Phil., 870) said that when the marriage is dissolved by
the death of the wife, the legal power of management of the husband ceases, passing to the administrator appointed by the court in the testate or intestate
proceedings instituted to that end if there be any debts to be paid. This doctrine has been confirmed in the other case of Ona vs. De Gala(58 Phil., 881).
From the foregoing it follows that when Esperanza Tanedo brought suit against Eulalio Calma for the payment of the sums of P948.34 and P247, which wee
debts chargeable against the conjugal property, the power of Eulalio Calma. legal administrator of the conjugal property while Fausta Macasaquit was living,
had ceased and passed to the administratrix Maria Calma appointed in the testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit. Hence, this being an indebtedness
chargeable against conjugal property, no complaint for its payment can be brought against Eulalio Calma, who had already ceased as administrator of the
conjugal property; the claim for this amount had to be filed in the testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit.
Having to be filed according to Act No. 3176 under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relative to the administration and liquidation of properties of
deceased persons, it should be filed before the committee on claims in said testamentary proceedings and, at all events, thereafter, by appeal to the
corresponding Court of First Instance, in an ordinary action against the judicial administratrix.
On the other hand, he property described in the complaint is included among the inventoried properties subject to the testamentary proceedings of Fausta
Macasaquit because, belonging as it does to the conjugal property, it should, under Act No. 3176, be included among the properties of the testamentary
proceedings.
We conclude that, Eulalio Calma having ceased as legal administrator of the conjugal property had with his wife Fausta Macasaquit, no complaint can be
brought against him for the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal property, and that the action should be instituted in the
testamentary proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit in the manner provided by law, by filing it first with the committee on claims.

Wherefore, we hold that the sale of the property described in the complaint, made by the sheriff in execution of the judgment rendered against Eulalio Calma
for the collection of the indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal property, is void and said property should be deemed subject to the testamentary
proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit for all the purposes of that case.
The appealed judgment is reversed, without special pronouncement as to the costs. So ordered.
Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-2263

May 30, 1951

PAZ Y. OCAMPO, JOSEFA Y. OCAMPO, ISIDRO Y. OCAMPO, GIL Y. OCAMPO, MAURO Y. OCAMPO, and VICENTE Y. OCAMPO, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
CONRADO POTENCIANO, VICTOR POTENCIANO and LOURDES POTENCIANO, defendants.
VICTOR POTENCIANO and LOURDES POTENCIANO, defendants-appellants.
Salvador P. de Tangle for appellants.
Amado A. Yatco and Rosendo J. Tansinsin for appellees.
REYES, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari form a decision of the Court of Appeals.
From the findings of fact of said court, which are conclusive for the purposes of this appeal, it appears that on February 3, 1930, Edilberto Ocampo, married to
Paz Yatco, executed a deed purporting to convey to his relative, Conrado Potenciano, and the latter's wife, Rufina Reyes, by way of sale with pacto de retro for
the sum of P2,5000, a town a lot with a house as strong materials standing thereon. On that same day, Ocampo signed another document, making it appear
that, for an annual rental of P300, which, as may be noted, is equivalent to 12 per cent of the purchase price, the vendees were leasing to him the house and lot
for the duration of the redemption period.
The property involved in the above transaction is located at the center of the poblacion of Bian, Laguna, and in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, worth
between 20 and 25 pesos. Though registered in the name of Ocampo alone, it in reality belonged to him and his wife as conjugal property.
The period originally fixed for the repurchase was one year, "extendible to another year," but several extensions were granted, with the vendor paying part of
the principal in addition to interests. The last extension granted was for year from February 3, 1937, and the period having elapsed without the repurchase
having been made, Potenciano, on January 24, 1939, filed with the register of deeds of Laguna an affidavit for the consolidation of title, on the strength which
the register of deeds issued transfer certificate of title no. 18056 in the name of Potenciano and his wife. This, however, did not close the avenue for
settlement, for on February 28, 1939, with Edilberto Ocampo and Rufina Reyes already dead, Potenciano gave Paz Yatco an option to repurchase the property
for P2,500 within 5 years, and a lease thereon for the same period of time at annual rental of P300 which, as may again be noted, is equivalent to 12 per cent of
the purchase price. On or about February 7, 1944, Paz Yatco sought to exercise the option by tendering to Potenciano at his clinic in Manila the sum of P4,000
an amount sufficient to cover both principal and interest, and upon the tender being rejected, deposited the money in court and brought an action in her own
name and as judicial administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband to compel Potenciano to accept it and to have the title to the property reinstated in
her name and that of her husband.
Intervening in the case, Potenciano's children, Victor and Lourdes, filed a cross-complaint, alleging that the option to purchase granted by their father to
plaintiff on February 28, 1939, was null and void as to the share of their deceased mother Rufina Reyes in the property in litigation, which share passed to
them by right of inheritance, and that as to their father's share in the same property they, the intervenors, were exercising the right of redemption accorded by
law to co-owners of property held in common, for which purpose they had already tendered him the sum of P1,250 on the fifth day after they learned of said
option through plaintiff's complaint. To meet these allegations, plaintiff amended her complaint by including the intervenors as defendants and alleging, in
effect, that the pacto de retro sale in question was in reality a mortgage to secure a pre-existing debt, with the rental contract thrown in to cover the stipulated
interest of 12 per cent; that the option agreement for the repurchase of the property within five years from February 28, 1939, and for the payment of rental
for that period in an amount equal to an annual interest of 12 per cent on the loan, was also meant to be in reality an extension of the life of the mortgage; and
that the tender of payment was valid, the same having been made within the extended period. The Court of First Instance, after trial, upheld these allegations
and gave judgment in favor of the children of Edilberto Ocampo and Paz Yatco, who had substituted the latter after her death.
When the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, that court took a somewhat different view and rendered judgment declaring:
(a) That contract Exhibit A entered into between Edilberto Ocampo and Conrado Potenciano was one of mortgage, with interest at the rate of 12 per
cent per annum;
(b) That the "option to purchase" and the "contract of lease" (Exhibit E and E-1) were validly executed by defendant Conrado Potenciano and
binding upon the property in litigation;
(c) That appellants were not co-owners of said property, by inheritance of one-half of the same from their deceased mother Rufina Reyes;
(d) That appellants were not entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption (retracto legal) of the other half of the property belonging to their
father Conrado Potenciano;
(e) That the late Paz Yatco exercised her option to purchase the property in litigation within the time she had to do so;
(f) That the consignation of the P4,000 in Japanese military notes, made with the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Laguna in payment of the
property in question, was in accordance with the law and relieved the heirs of the spouses Ocampo-Yatco from paying anew said purchase price;
(g) Ordering defendant Conrado Potenciano to execute the corresponding deed of conveyance, sufficient in law to transfer the title of the property
in litigation to the heirs of the deceased spouses Edilberto Ocampo and Paz Yatco; and

(h) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Laguna to cancel transfer certificate of title No. 18056 (Exhibit 1) and issue in lieu thereof a new transfer
certificate of title for said property in favor of the heirs of the spouses Edilberto Ocampo and Paz Yatco, upon payment by appellees of the
corresponding fees and the registration in his office of the deed of conveyance mentioned in the next preceding paragraph.
This judgment that is now before us for review.
First thing to be noted is that the Court of Appeals found and it is not disputed that the pacto de retro sale made by Edilberto Ocampo in favor of Conrado
Potenciano and his wife was in reality a loan with security or an equitable mortgage, with simulated rental for interest. Such being the case, the lenders had no
right, through the unilateral declaration of one or both them, to consolidate title in themselves over the property given as security. The consolidation of title
effected by Potenciano in this case was, therefore, null and void.
The Court of Appeals, however, held that the mortgage contract was superseded, through novation, by the option agreement for the repurchase of the
property mortgaged, and the appellants now contend that this war error because Potenciano had no authority to enter into that agreement after the death of
his wife. To this contention we have to agree. The Court of Appeals erred in supposing that the surviving spouse had such authority as de facto administrator
of the conjugal estate. As pointed out by appellants, the decisions relied on by that court in support of its view are now obsolete. Those decisions laid down the
rule that, upon the dissolution of the marriage by the death of the wife, the husband must liquidate the partnership affairs. But the procedure has been
changed by Act No. 3176 (approved on November 24, 1924), now section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, which provides that when the marriage is dissolved
by the death of either husband or wife, the partnership affairs must be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 3rd ed., Vol. II, p. 324).
Furthermore, there is ground to believe that, as alleged by the appellees, the option agreement in question was nothing more than mere extension of time for
the payment of the mortgagee debt, since in the mind of the parties the real transaction had between them was that of loan with security, or equitable
mortgage, though as is usual in these cases, it was given the form of sale with right to repurchase.
It follows from the foregoing that at the time Paz Yatco made the tender of payment and consigned the necessary amount in court, the said contract of loan
with security was still in effect, and as the tender was made in legal currency (Haw Pia vs. China Banking Corporation,* 45 O.G. [Supp. 9] 229), the tender and
consignation must be held to produce their legal effect, which is that of relieving the debtor from liability. (Art. 1176, Civil Code; Limkakovs. Teodoro, 74 Phil.,
313.)
Under this view of the case, it is not necessary to consider the claim of the appellants Victor Potenciano and Lourdes Potenciano and that the Court of Appeals
erred in not declaring them owners of the property in question, they having inherited one-half of it from their mother and acquired the other half from their
father in the exercise of their right of legal redemption as co-owners. As ownership in the property never passed to their parents, these appellants acquired
nothing.
Wherefore, with the modifications of the judgment below, let judgment be entered, declaring the obligation evidenced by Exhibit "A", which is hereby held to
be mere contract of loan with security or equitable mortgage, already discharged, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Laguna to cancel transfer certificate of
title No. 18056 and to issue in lieu thereof a new certificate of title for said property in favor of the heirs of the spouses Edilberto Ocampo and Paz Yatco upon
payment of the corresponding fees. With costs against the appellants.
Paras, Bengzon, C.J., Montemayor, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
Tuason, J., concurs in the result.