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CF ~ RMHMLJIMTTAENE
~
RIGHTS IN SERBIA
January 1999
osovo
from Serbia. On the other hand, the Serbian police and
Kosvo Serbs do not feel safe. They have the authority and
status, but intimately they know they the days of their
privileged status in Kosovo are numbered. They say that
the majority of their fellow-nationals have already left for
Serbia. They also feel that Beigrade, to which they would
relocate only if they could, has not only cuased their
predicament but also forgotten them.
Both communities in Kosovo, namely Serbs and
Albanians, enclosed in their ethnic cocoons, share the
same feelings of fear and uncertainty. Every constitutional
change in Kosovo brought about only the change of roles,
sometimes Albanians were a more-intimidated-party,
sometimes that happened to Serbs. All the while neither
side was completely satisfied with such changes, despite
nominally having the power. The post-1990 situation is no
exception to that rule.
Serbs and Albanians have been separated for eight
years now, and the only bonds between them are the
territory of Kosovo and a shared fear. After the Drenica
bloodbath it is more than clear that both Serbs and
Albanians will have to renounce their maximalist
objectives to the mutual benefit, and with a view to
avoiding a shared disaster.
Problems of Serbs and Albanians are problems of
double national minorities and majorities. Albanians are
an ethnic minority in Serbia, but they constitute a majority
in Kosovo, while Serbs are the majority people in Serbia,
but constitute a minority in Kosovo. In their statements
and communiqus the Serbian authorities and opposition
parties mention Albanians exclusively as an ethnic
minority, that is, present only one facet of this complex
relationship. At the same time they are aware how much
Albanians resent the term minority, as it was often
linguistically misused with the far-reaching political
consequences. That is why the first goodwill gesture
towards Albanians should be the use of the term Kosovo
majority. This would be a small linguistic gesture with a
deep significance, and not an attempt to prejudge a
political solution.
Because of a shared feeling of uncertainty with which
Serbs and Albanians await a final settlement of the Kosovo
status, it should be devised from bottom-up, and not from
top-down, contrary to all previous, overnight, radical
constitutional changes. Through a series of well-pondered
measures in social and economic sectors a potentially
negative shock-effect of the ultimate political solution
could be avoided. But each improvement or change
should satisfy both sides. In other words neither Serbs or
Albanians should feel unjustly damaged or unjustly
rewarded. A concrete progress feit in every day life of
Kosovo citizens could create a critically needed support
for normalization and become the strongest argument
against extremists.
A positive step forward could be the announced
implementation of the Education Agreement. lts hopefully
successful implementation could serve as a model for
other spheres of life in Kosovo. Maintained sovereignty
over activities proper by each community should not be
interpreted as endorsement of ethnic division, but rather
as elimination of causes of the marginalization feeling and
the move aimed at equalizing statuses of both
communities. This, in turn, would be the most
11
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KosovA
both the ruling party and the opposition ones for the first
time stood together on Skender-beg Square in Tirana
before several thousands-strong crowd. The Albanian
Prime Minister, Fatos Nano, stated that "Albanians are not
afraid of confrontation," while Salji Berisha, the leader of
the opposition Democratic Party said that "Albanians
wanted peace ... but they also knew how to wage war."
President of the Republic of Albania, Rexhep Meidani,
said that "the party flags were lowered to make place for
the well-hoisted national banner." Many analysts were
surprised by such responses, for Kosovars received
backing not only from the North of Albania, a traditional
stronghold of pro-Kosovar sentiments, but also from the
southern parts of Albania, notably Gjirokastra, deemed a
champion of pro-Greek interests, rather than the Kosovar
ones. At an emergency session of the Albanian
Parliament, with Kosovo topping the agenda, a resolution,
indicating MPs readiness to respond unanimously in the
defense of the national being, in solidarity and in support
of their Albanian brothers in Kosovo, was adopted. The
government also called on the UN Security Council to
urgently discuss the crisis in Kosovo, with a view to taking
preventive and stabilizing steps. Same other measures
were suggested and undertaken, for example the level of
military readiness was raised, and the lists of volunteers
ready to go to Kosovo in case of an open armed conflict
were spontaneously made.
This dramatic situation also jolted out of inactivity the
Albanian political leaders in Macedonian, Arben Dfaferia
and Abdurahman Haiti, who quickly staged pro-Kosovar
rallies attended by tens of thousands of Albanians in
Tetovo and Skopje, in sign of support of Kosovars and in
solidarity with them. Their message was similar to the one
voiced in Albania: "if it is necessary all Albanians in
Macedonia will defend the threatened national integrity."
Demonstrators shouted "the Liberation Army of Kosovo ...
we shall rather give our lives, than Kosovo." Although
Kosovars expected some reactions from their fellownationals, who have finished schools in Kosovo and have
strong bonds there, they were nonetheless surprised by
the reaction of the Macedonian government to the Kosovo
crisis.
Albanians in Montenegro, Presevo, Bujanovac and
Medveda also reacted to the crisis. The Albanian Diaspora
who has been following with undivided attention
developments in Kosvo and in the Albanian ethnic
territory, reacted strongly and promptly. lt organized
massive and intense demonstrations in several Western
countries (Switzerland, Germany, Belgium, England,
Canada, the United States) and immediately extended
large financial aid to Kosovo. Judging by the
aforementioned, and the regular 3% of earnings of all
Albanians (except those in Albania) allocated to the aid, it
can be said loud and clear that Albanian Diaspora is an
important factor in internationalization of the Albanian
issue, and also an important financial and social lever,
counted upon equally by political and nonpolitical factors.
In view of the current situation in Kosovo and five-year
lang inefficiency of its political factors, by all accounts the
nonpolitical factors will soon hold sway. On the basis of
information received to date, one gains the impression
that due to such a dramatic Situation a financial
mobilization, concentrated in the republican, rather than in
January 1999
January 1999
osovo
political autonomy of Kosovo with two assemblies, of
which the assembly of nationalities would function on the
principle of consensus. President of the Socialist Party of
Serbia promptly stated that the SPO stole its Kosovo
program. In recent past Socialists used to "borrow" the
nationalist programs from the SPO, now the latter did the
same by "borrowing" the Kosovo platform. The roles have
changed, whether for the better remains to be seen. Now
when SPO and SPS might form the government some
progress can be expected, that is a change of muchreiterated position that Kosovo is an internal issue.
lrrespective of the identity of coalition parties in the
government, it is high time that a highly inflammable
situation in Kosovo be treated seriously.
Two things must be done prior to launching dialogue
and initiating search for a compromise solution. Firstly, as
Mahmut Bakali stated recently, readiness to initiate a
dialogue, without prior conditions and maximalist
platforms, must be manifested, secondly, it must be
admitted that Kosovo needs a political solution, and
thirdly, an agreement must be reached on a presence of
the third party (international community).
In any case the final resolution should not be
prejudged. But a compromise would have to envisage
such a political-legal independence of Kosovo which
would firstly neutralize demands for independnet state,
secondly, make Serbs equitable constituent people of
Kosovo and thirdly, ensure internal and international
guarantees of Kosovo's independence. A name of that
form of political independence is less important...and
such a question should not stood in the way of the
dialogue-launching process.
Helsinki Charter, March 1998
KosovA
The commission could be headed by a governor or a
neutral administrator (from an European country).
This administration would be of technical character
and would not prejudge the questions of ethnicity and
sovereignty. Under this commission Kosovo would
continue to have economic links with the FR Yugoslavia (a
key concession to Beigrade), while its political status
would be frozen (Kosovo would no langer directly
influence elections in Serbia and Yugoslavia.) lf a
temporary solution of the issue how to proportionally
represent Kosovo in the Federal and Serbian Parliament
(Albanians will not easily accept it) were found, for which
there are no legal possibilities under the current
constitution, it could help transfer the dialogue in the
parliaments.
The next possibility is the constitution of Kosovo
Parliament and formation of inter-parliamentary
commission for the settlement of controversial legal
issues and those related to Kosovo administration.
The first ask of the commission would be to organize
elections for local authorities, in line with the principle of
provisional division of power. The commission would also
arbitrate local disputes.
As regards the Yugoslav army and police, the SRY
could be guaranteed a certain army presence in the
barracks, but the presence of Yugoslav police would exact
a compromise solution or international supervision.
Helsinki Charter, March 1998
January 1999
osovo
wanting independence, declining to openly condemn
11
terrorism 11 and refusing negotiations without international
mediation. In an article ran recently by an independent
weekly, "pacifist interventionism 11 advocated by 11 some
groups 11 in Beigrade was condemned. These groups, as it
seems, urge the deployment of international military
troops in Kosovo, tasked with preventing further conflicts,
like the one in Drenica. This condemnation fits the general
picture of Serbian society opposing 11 internationalization 11
of the Kosovo issue. lt also indicates the lack of
elementary empathy: the author of this article and other
supporters of his opinion would probably advocate
11
pacifist interventionism 11 if they were the victims, like
Albanians in Kosovo.
Admittedly the Serbian pro-regime media have a
difficult task to carry out. Namely on the one hand they
must convince the Serbian population of a great danger in
the shape of Albanian terrorism and separatism and on
the other hand they must indicate that the maximum
Albanians can get (in Serbia) is the cultural autonomy or a
kind of self-management. The media must also create a
favorable atmosphere motivating every Serb to defend
Kosovo until the last Albanian (of course) dies. The
situation is additionally complicated by the fact that
international community must be depicted in two ways:
namely international community sporadically condemns
Albanian 11terrorists 11 and opposes 11 secession 11 of Kosovo,
but also sporadically (barring China and Russia) plots
conspiracies against the Serbian people and dreams of its
downfall and destruction of its spirituality. On the other
hand international public opinion must be convinced that
the Serbian authorities sincerely wish to solve the Kosovo
problem and it also must be proved to all international
factors that Albanians are guaranteed all human and civic
rights.
Thus Slobodan Milosevic (as authority per se, but also
as the editor-in-chief of all the state-run media) is shown to
international community as Dr. Jackyll, and to the Serbian
community as Mr. Hyde. However the trouble is that this
schizophrenia cannot remain hidden for lang, particularly
in view of the fact that the patient has a lang history of
ailment
Helsinki Charter, March 1998
Serbfa
Afania
10
CHILDREN OF CATASTROPHE
In this context maybe citizens of Serbia would like to
know more about the life of young Albanians, a generation
called "the children of catastrophe 11 by an Albanian
schoolboy. The regime-controlled media have been
disregarding them for a decade now. The exception were
of course the excess situations (peaceful students'
demonstrations this fall) when the younger generation
bare the brunt of the media-bashing.
11
The children of catastrophe" have been educated for
years now in cellars, garages, sheds, private apartments
with dirty walls, and outdoors, in summer months. lf in
early Nineties there was enthusiasim for this alternative
way of studying, if some boys and girls were still 11turned
on" by the romantic ideas of "national liberation, 11 an icy
reality, an increasing pauperization, the cold walls of
abandoned and windowless houses which have not been
whitewashed, have definitely contributed to cooling off of
such efforts. Albanians came to understand that it was
futile for them to persist in their parallel system of
education.
At the parallel university the conditions of studying
were of course inadequate: many students became aware
that their diplomas would be worthless. They probably
came to realize that they could not become doctors if they
had not seen an operation, chemists, if they had never
seen chemical instruments, or electrical engineers without
ever using a powerful computer. The were faced with the
following questions: who will recognize diplomas of the
parallel university? Where will all these young people find
jobs tomorrow?
Helsinki Charter - Special Edition
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osovo
happening now or objectives to be attained in the future.
This notion (tradition) is used as an intrument for making
distinction between akin ethnic groups, which have been
living in peace and harmony for centuries (for example to
every good ethnologist or at least a careful observer it is
clear that Serbs from Croatia in many aspects (except
religion) are more similar to Croats than to Serbs from
Serbia.) Particularly problematic are constructions which
compound tradition and (national) history, for in thusimagined history some past events favoring "our causes"
are interpreted selectively. This concept of "our cause" is
very problematic in the Balkans (and in South East
Europe) where "peoples" like to vaunt about their long
tradition and unique origins. Additional problem is the fact
that all authorized representatives of "peoples" of this part
of Europe, either do not know, or do not want to know
what "ethnic identity" is.
The notion of ethnic identity is something
"understood" in every day discourses (notably in the
political sphere), or as Humpty Dumpty explains to Alice
"those who use it consider that the notion means exactly
what they think it means-neither more nor less." Ethnic
identity is in fact a construction and as such it is
completely artificial and arbitrary. This notion is
constructed with respect to the other "imagined" ethnic
identities as their opposite and as a symbolic denotation
of one community with respect to the other. This
practically means that the protagonists of the former and
current Yugoslavia's conflicts operate with imagined
notions and act (and believe) that their conduct is based
on something "real." Ethnic identity constitutes what is
understood as "Croatian," "Macedonian," or "Serbian
nation," and what is based on centuries-long tradition. lt
disregards certain historical and anthropological facts, for
example the fact that nations and national states in the
Balkans were formed in late Nineteenth century (in
Albanian and Macedonian case in early Twentieth
century.) Any mention of Serbian (or Greek, Bulgarian,
Croatian) nation (or national state) before Nineteenth
century is nonsensical.
Such stances cause a greet degree of
misunderstanding
between
representatives
of
"international community" and authorized representatives
of the Balkan peoples. lt is noteworthy that the much-used
concept of ethnic identity, considered "real" by the Balkan
nations, is viewed as a construction by the rest of the
world. What the Balkan countries establish as the product
of "blood and land," the world treats as an established fact
that people live in certain areas and respect laws and
norms of behavior of a certain community. For example,
anthropology views the notion of "nation" as the notion of
"race," in other words as something used in theory, but not
established in reality (although people often act in
conformity with such concepts and thus consequences of
their behavior are real. Sarajevo, Vukovar, and Mostar are
very real indicators of such consequences.) As the
authorized negotiatiors from this territory truly believe that
they represent the nation with the great (the greatest?)
freedom-loving tradition, which constitutes the basis of
their centuries-long ethnic identity, it is very difficult to
convince them that they are operating only with
constructions.
When tracing back their origins, many nations
January 1999
1999
January 1999
osovo
control of the Albanian side of the border which should
halt the arms smuggling.
Close and continual communication with both sides
will most probably positively channel the initial momentum
created by direct Milosevi6-Rugova meeting and their
expressed readiness to continue an unconditional search
for a political solution through dialogue. However one has
reservations that Milosevic's concession is just a
maneuver aimed at easing the Kosovo tension and laying
the groundwork for a showdown with reformist forces in
Montenegro, led and symbolized by Milo 8ukanovi6. lf
these premonitions come true, the survival of Montenegro
will be threatened, the future of Yugoslavia will be at stake,
Kosovo will be faced with a defeat and Serbia with all its
citizens with a tragedy.
Helsinki Charter, May i 998
20
January 1999
21
exit from Decane and Pe6. Similar are the stories of refugees accommodated in Rofaje. Senija Zenuni, a Muslim
married to an Albanian, crossed the mountain Kula.
"Five days ago, ten of us, all adults, with thirty
children, tried to leave Pe6 in a bus. The police stopped us
with the following explanation: 'lf our children are dying,
than yours should die too'. They 1 saw them beating
several youngsters at the police check-point, and then
forcibly returning them to Pe6. The following day
managed with nine members of my family to leave Kosovo
in a bus with the Montenegrin license plate and to arrive
in Rofaje. When we left there was no shooting in Pe6, but
after 4 p.m. there wasn't a soul on its streets. Tanks were
passing frequently and Chetnic songs were heard from
them. In the wake of their night rounds the rumors
circulated that people again disappeared in small hours.
Lists with names of persons entitled to get bread, milk and
other staple products are attached to the drugstores'
windows. All these names are Serbian. When Albanian
shop-owners manage to
some
it is immediately
taken from them.
belongs to the
say.
Almost everybody left," says Senija Zenuni.
People somehow manage to arrive in Montenegro.
Bosniak family from Vitomirica near Pe6, is
accommodated in an ancillary facility of the plant "Dekor."
They recounted to us their plight: ''We bought tickets for
Beigrade. One had better not teil anybody that one is
leaving. Vitomirica is not burning, but all the other places
are. Notorious criminals are walking along the streets
dressed in the fatigue uniforms," says the father of the
family. A ten-year old boy told us that he saw soldiers,
who, like in the movies, had painted faces. They
threatened they would kill him and his father.
750 Romany from Kosovo were accommodated in the
shantytown where their relatives live. In Konik, near
Podgorica, in the improvised huts live 10-15, and
sometimes even 40 people. "We escaped both from
Shiptari and Serbs. When they started fighting we came
here, as we had nowhere eise to go. Some Romany
stayed in Kosovo, but as the lines were cut, we do not
know anything about them. We were allowed to go to
Montenegro. They just registered us, that is Sait Aljija from
Drenovac, Municipality of Klina, near Pe6."
President of the Romany Association of Montenegro
lsen Gasi struggles to to find accommodation for the
newly-arrived refugees. He claims that 7-8 families arrive
every day, hence the problem of accommodation is
becoming acute. "We asked the Commissariat for
refugees to provide us with tents. In the beginning we got
bread for refugees, but now
don't give us any food.
We receive two mattresses and two soaps for 10-member
families," says Gasi. Berisa Nezir ran away two days ago
with six children from Pecka Banja. "We did not have any
food. There's nothing there. At the last elections we voted
for Serbs. Recently two Albanians came to my house and
beat me up," says Nezir, showing bruises on his face.
told me: 'You must leave this place. lf you don't do
that we shall kill you. And that's it." The majority of Kosovo
refugees have only words of praise for the way the
Montenegrin authorities threat them.
January 1999
osovo
homes because their lives and lives of their family
members had been threatened. According to them the
police and the army were accountable for their fleeing.
They also spoke of the presence of paramilitary men,
other uniformed men, and groups of men dressed in black
with black bands around their heads. All of them had
machine-guns. These men, together with the army and the
police after the heavy shelling, burn down houses and loot
them. Refugees from Decane told us they saw truckloads
of looted stuft and cattle heading towards the monastery
Visoki Deeani. Almost all refugees after the shelling of their
village fled to the neighboring village, and when the same
thing happened there, they fled to the next one. Whenever
they had a chance they left the region. Refugees said that
the army, the police and paramilitary formations used
heavy artillery (tanks, mortars, ground-to-ground
missiles). Both army planes and choppers opened heavy
fire and in towns there were snipers. The policemen were
armed with automatic weapons, bayonets, knives and
guns. When they leave reception centers refugees mainly
find accommodation with relatives or some other families.
This most often happens in Ulcinj, where there are no
collective center. Refugees first come to municipalities
where a special committee tasked with taking care of
them finds them accommodation in various families. Citizens accept refugees without any discrimination on national grounds. A large number of refugees still want to go
back to Kosovo, although their houses have been ruined
or burnt down. Nota single refugee has seen the Kosovo
Liberation Army members or had any contact with them.
AREA OF MUNICIPALITY OF DECANI
In the area of municipality of Decani there are every
day joint operations of the army, police and paramilitary
units. According to the statements of witnesses the army
has heavy artillery from which it constantly shells Decani
proper and the neighboring villages. There are four
shelling points around Decani. Albanians who have
stayed in their houses, once their food supplies are
finished - starve. Serbian civilians are armed and they
maltreat their Albanian fellow-citizens. Albanian refugees
often say that they "had to run away to save their lives."
A refugee from Decane came on foot from Pec to
Rofaje with his family. He said they left because they
feared the imminent shelling. He told us that the shelling
was effected from military bases, 80 km away. He also told
us that the army in Decani captured 200 women and
children and held them as hostages in an abandoned
building. He did not know what had happened to them.
According to him, in Decani many people died during the
shelling, and snipers hiding in many buildings in Decani
proper also killed many people.
He also told us that the army effected the shelling from
four points around the town. Two refugees from Decane,
a jurist and a doctor, once employed in Decani hospital,
told us that 250 shells feil on the elementary school in the
town. Refugees said that almost all Serbian houses
remained intact, while Albanian houses and public
facilities were completely destroyed. Albanians, in need of
the first aid, were banned access to hospital, which in the
meanwhile had been seized by the army. During the
shelling all Albanians stayed in their houses, mostly in
their cellars. They were too afraid to venture into the
The fetter of 21-year old soldier Du5an TasiC, who was killed in the vicinity of border check-point "Morina" in
Kosovo on 29 May, was sent to his brothers. When it was published in the Beigrade daily "Glas Javnosti" it shocked
the broad public and more than any other journalistic report indicated the proportions of drama unfolding in the
province.
Hi everybod.y,
This is my 218th day on the ground.
Darko's and mother's letters, which I received recently, made me very happy. In the meanwhile many things have happened and
changed. I have ran away from everybody and I am sitting near the brook and writing this fetter to you. Weather is indeed nice. Ufe
conditions are much better now. We are getting more food, enough, but not too much. The food is not so good, but at least the quantity.
You would probably like to know when I will return to the barracks, and then home. I would like to know that too. One thing is sure
and that is - it won't happen soon. The course I was supposed to attend in Prizren will be held here from 16 May to 15 June. Hopefully
after the course I will go back to the barracks.
In the past 28 days I had a bath only once. Then I called Darko and had. a talk with him. The second time I faked a skin disease, so
they had. to take me to the barracks. Our barracks are swarming with the military: police, infantry, scouts and. reconnaissance, reserve
units. There are also many tanks. What a confusion! Soldiers are sleeping in our dorms, so we had to move out. Our police are busy in
all villages, sometimes they shoot 24 hours. Jt's all happening just 5-6 km from the place where we are stationed. and. everything is heard
clearly. The army is at the moment neutral, but... Two days ago my camp and garrison were to attack the vilfage Ponosevac. As far as I
und.erstood that village was to be erased. Everybod.y was heavily armed (except me) and. we were told not to kill hostages. We were to
attack at 3 h at night. Being a member of the defense units I was not planned. for that action. Now they have postponed everything is
further commands are in the offing. Last night I was the errand boy of the duty officer so I saw furtively some plans and. charts and.
realized their plans. They wanted to attack the village with tanks, 120 mm artillery and all kinds of heavy weapons.
What a chaos! l'd rather teils you the truth instead of having someone lie to you. The army is helping the police. In Junik our heavy
artillery made minced meat of Shiptari. After that they were silent for two d.ays. lf they are smart they won't attack the army. tf that
happens half of Kosovo will be devastated. Shit, I must stop now.
Here I am again. lt is 10 May. The day before yesterday having heard the shooting behind the mountains I fled to the camp. But
everything was fine. When I went up there my colleagues were already in the shower, Now we take showers even on the ground. They
pitch a tent, fix 8 showers inside it and then !et 10-15 of us in. The night between 8 and 9 May I was in an ambush. We did. not go uphill
but close to our camp. The night was clear and it d.id. not rain. So everything was much easier forme. This is my sixth or seventh ambush
since we came here. What do I do! During the day I am on guard and then I wait in ambush. 10 soldiers are chosen, then heavily armed:
150 bullets, 2 bombs, tromblon shells and manual rocket-launchers. Burd.ened. as a horse ! have to go to the next hill. 1,150 meters above
the sea altitude. When I reach the peak I am soaked to the skin. The worst thing is that we climb in pitch-dark. They could. send. me to
A/bania, and I would not be aware of that. Near the peak we set the ambush. I make a cover of heaped-up stones, place bombs in front
of me, put bullets in the rifle, and I fie still until dawn. I have spasms the whole night. ! am stretched on wet soil, but lucki/y enough
the wind. which blows all the time dries up my clothes. But it is very difficult to protect one's kid.neys and. other equipment. Results of
ambushes are broad.cast. Nota word about my ambush. I must mention the parcel. I did not want to askyou, but the time passes quickly
and I need. some things. Above all! need socks, 2-3 pairs, not more. Darko should. buy the checkered ones, but of thicker fabric (my new
boots pinch me). I also need razor blades, shaving foam. and envelopes and stamps. I don't know how ! shall send this fetter. Mother
don't try to make some complicated. cakes. Make the most simple ones and buy me some biscuits.
Don't send me anything eise. I don't have a place to keep it. I hope I am not too demanding. But send mi this parcel as soon as
possib/e. Darko says i shou/d not mention the figure. I pray to God that everything turns out all right and that / don' have to stay in
this chaos severa/ years. Anyway 364 days is not too much and the time passes quickly.
Just to {et you know-this is my 219th d.ay.
Duci
January 1999
998
Helsinki
e same time
words it is
er in
air nor on
which precise!y reflects its status in
t the first glance it seems to be easy to determine the
role of the units of the
in the current
Kosovo crisis. But once this
is viewed
a
instrument
becomes clear that it is a
ditticult task. Both the national and
have trouble in
the
sum up all the
and destructive events in Kosovo.
1-JC>irh"J,nC' all these events ,.,,....,, . . '"'''"YY'l
calls "the
intensive
mutilations and
last six months. ls the
answer we must take into account
the Chiefs of Statt of the
Kosovo crisis.
Chiefs of Statt state that there is no war
but rather that "the SR
suppresses
the southern Serbian
is the
Kosovo Liberation
was made
Chiefs of Statt of
at the press
January 1999
osovo
predecessor Milovan Bojovic during his four-year
mandate in Kosovo earned all ranks of general and was
finally promoted from General-Colonel to the Assistant
Head of Chief of Staff): firstly due to an emphasis on
"Kosovo-the cradle of Serbhood" (Pavkovic: "... we
exclusively defend our homes, borders and graves of our
ancestors ... "); secondly, Yugoslav generals still adhere to
the geopolitical theory that "Kosovo and Metohija are a
geopolitical knot of the Balkans" without which Serbia and
the SRY would not have the strategic depth; and thirdly,
because Kosovo and Metohija have enormous mineral
and mining resources.
Currently the majority of the Corps troops are
"camping," as this was envisaged by the official plan and
program of training. This explanation is plausible, but even
more plausible is the assumption that the Chief of Staff
and Commander Pavkovic made a "protective" move in
order to avoid "the Slovenian and Croatian syndrome." In
other words they did no want their units to be surprised by
sudden actions of the opponent and find themselves
surrounded, like in a mouse-trap, in their barracks.
In the division of labor between the police and the
army the latter "protects the border belt" hence the focus
of its actions is along Pe6-8akovica-Prizren line. Since the
width of the belt is determined under special regulations
of every state, it is most certain that the Federal
Government passed an adequate act on the width of that
belt in Kosovo, without making it public. Judging by what
is happening on the ground, it can be concluded that the
belt extends approximately twenty kilometers from the
border with Albanian into the depth of our territory. In that
belt all actions of units are "legal and legitimate," for all of
them can be categorized as "the protection of border."
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Army, ColonelGeneral, Dragoljub Ojdanic, stated on 7 June that the
Yugoslav Army almost hermetically sealed off the border
with Albania, which of course is sheer nonsense. 1 am
mentioning this statement because it is indicative of an
initial "idea of maneuver" of the police and military
command in Kosovo: namely to "comb" the terrain
(Drenica being the first target) by fast actions of the antiterrorist units (and other special units), and force the
terrorists to flee to the "condensed network" of Corps in
the border area, where, the Army has already "destroyed
many terrorist bases." But the Drenica offensive indicated
that the Liberation Army of Kosovo is a tenacious
opponent, although its members were tagged as
"terrorists," "bandits" and "rogues." Speaking from the
military point of view the Yugoslav generals make the
mistake of underestimating their enemy. But we shall not
focus on that aspect in this analysis.
Information service continues to issue communiques
on "elimination of terrorists gangs" in actions of the border
battalions (they were probably reinforced by special units
from the Pristina Corps, but this is probably a military
secret). The most "famous operation" was the one carried
out in the vicinity of the border check-point "Kosava" when
on 23 April "200-strong terrorist formation was crushed."
Head of Information Service of the Chief of Staff, GeneralMayor Gradimir Zivanovic several times stated (as did the
other officials) that "the Yugoslav Army was not involved in
the Serbian police actions of suppression of terrorist
activities," as "under the Constitution it is not allowed to do
11
January
1999
that the passes were needed only for prison visits and not
for seeing refugees who are, after all, free people,
although they were compelled to leave their homes for
one reason or another. Perhaps did something illegal,
but l thought it was important to inform them about the
ongoing projects of Helsinki Committee in Serbia, as the
latter concerned them, and not some gentleman in various
ministries "of our dear country."
Thanks to the assistance of Ms. Lucia Elmi, from the
"ltalian Consortium of Solidarity" 1 first visited eight old
people from Krajina, accommodated in the "Horne for
Elderly, no.2". This institute is a part of the hospital, and
the elderly refugees initially came there for a treatment
and then stayed on. i apologize to those old people for
using the word "home," as the premises in which they live
can be called anything but that. But unfortunately that is
the place where they will die too, owing to the "care"
extended to them by this country. These refugees are
living their last days in two rooms. Men and warnen sleep
and eat together and keep the little personal stuft they
have in those two premises. They spend their days
on "their" beds, that is mattresses which are placed on
several empty cases. They have a TV and a strange stove
which belongs to an antique shop. These sick and seedy
old people are a very sad sight, and they seem to have
lost any hope that one day they will lead a more dignified
and peaceful life, befitting their age. Only two women said
they wanted to go harne and try to renew their lives in the
places from which they had been banished three years
ago. Their courage in face of their current living conditions
is amazing, and even more so their wish to start their lives
anew. Their modesty is touching for they have asked
humanitarian organizations to cut down their milk rations
(i liter per day) as
have
milk.
complain
is awful.
that the food which they get frorn the
Many of thern have stomach ulcers and because of poor
quality of food are often more hungry than saturated. The
hygiene conditions are very low; they only have cold
and
water, when it is available, and walls are very
wet. But despite their terrible
they made rne a cup
urged
of "home-made" sweet coffee and a
me to drink it while it was still hot.
all kissed me on
my departure and 1feit so sad ...
In "Pupil's Horne Miladin Popovic" the picture is
almost identical.
conditions are
rnany
a classroom. One
families live in a
classroom, one harne. In this
there are several
hundreds of refugees of different ages. They all have hard
time there. At the entrance i was rnet
a group of middleaged wornen. The schoolyard rerninds them of their home
gardens, so they like to spend their summer afternoons
there.
were very hostile, for they did not like
"somebody from the external world-an alien" to corne and
"lecture" them on their predicament...as if they were not
aware of it. But
relaxed a bit when
to them
the
of the project "1 want to go harne."
their rooms and showed me how
washed their
clothes and dishes
the toilets. i asked them how
bathe at the
for
January
1999
osovo
Kosovo has again made the headlines. Like in the late
Eighties the hate speech was again set in motion. And
Serbia repeats its old mistake from the late Eighties. Then
it strove to divide Kosovars in bad counter-revolutionaries
and good communists, while currently the division
effected is between terrorists and loyalists. Such a division
in the Albanian society has never been accepted, so it is
not likely to happen now. For Serbs UCK are terrorists,
and for Albanians they are the defenders of their homes,
although currently not-so-succesful ones.
Serbia should now offer to Kosovars a political option
protecting Albanians primarily from Serbia proper. That
would be the strongest argument for the laying down of
arms by those Albanians compelled by the war in their
back yard to take up the arms for the first time in their
lives. Only an essential change of the political status of
Albanians with guarantees that it cannot be arbitrarily
reversed, would create an environment in which the
Kosovar radicals would be marginalized in the fold of
Albanian community.
Thousands of frustrated Albanians are a direct
consequence of a decade-long Serbian rule over Kosovo.
lf the cease-fire is not brokered soon, kalishnikovs, UCK
and long fighting till the secession is achieved will, most
likely remain the only option.
The emergence of UCK was accompanied by the
euphoria which one could liken to the Albanians "getting
rid of fear." For the first time Albanians retaliated in Drenica
the last November. However the current absence of
political solution will have only one outcome: Albanian full
acceptance of all the war atrocities and suffering in the
pursuit of their objective, that is, until its attainment. Hence
pragmatists ready to interpret the independence of
Kosovo as the independence from Serbia (although not
so vociferously) and not as full political and territorial
sovereignty in international relations, will be eliminated
from the political scene.
"I do not want independence, not because 1 want
Kosovo to be in Serbia, but because 1do no want Kosovo
to unite with Albania," says a young Albanian girl. This is
not a widely shared position in Kosovo. But she is also
likely to change her mind and join the ranks of the majority
of her fellow-nationals in the demand that Kosovo be
granted full independence from Serbia, even it led to the
direct union with Albania.
Helsinki Charter, August 1998
early March, then one could as weil guess what the still
secret Contact Group document contains. Firstly, it most
certainly includes universally accepted principles and
standards of conduct, upheld also by the members of the
Group. Secondly, several applied models of ethnic
minorities autonomy (lreland, Belgium, Chechenia, Tyrol)
are included in it. All those models are probably cited only
as "an encouragement and are not likely to be forcefully
implemented in Kosovo. Thirdly, what is most probably
offered is the highest-level autonomy in line with the
existing Euro standards. In view of the Contact Group
refusal of any change of the SRY borders due to inevitably
dangerous regional implications thereof, and the
simultaneous Kosovar refusal of any solution envisaging
Kosovo in Serbia, the plan undoubtedly includes the socalled federal link ensuring the status of Kosovo through
its defined position within the altered federation (as
verified by Nesterushkin's hints at the change of both
Constitutions). And finally in order to resolve the complex
issue of blocking the right to secession, which could make
Montenegro vote against the offered solution, 1 think that
the proposal avoids the terms "republic" and perhaps opts
for the term "special status," which of course can
sublimate any ultimately established form of autonomy.
But how to attain that form is still a major problem, and
until it is resolved tragical developements in Kosovo (the
number of civilian casualties is on the rise, and particularly
in Albanian villages, constantly under heavy artillery fire)
will not be halted.
The British Ambassador Donnelley was happy to see
that the Federal Government was "pleased with the quality
of documents" offered by the Contact Group. He added
that the Contact Group was perchance willing to mediate,
but was not ready to impose solutions. Maybe the Federal
Government was pleased with the quality of documents
precisely because of such a stance of the Contact Group.
The Albanian side responded in principle positively to the
proposal by immediately setting up its negotiating team. lt
is quite certain that both sides will avoid situations in
which they would be forced to reject the Contact Group
proposal and consequently cause the anger of
international community. As there is currently no minimal
confidence between the two sides, and moreover their
positions are confronted and very distanced, it is not
realistic to expect that Serbs and Albanians would make
efforts to find the mutually acceptable solution. Hence
some international "pressure" is inevitable, and it is most
likely to take the shape of an international conference
(similarly to the Dayton solution). Understandably enough
any solution must be followed by lasting and adequate
international guarantees, and most probably by protective
monitoring in the first stage of implementation.
Armed conflict must be stopped before that, or rather,
at once. That is conditio sine qua non, without which
either talks or solution are not feasible. That is why the
Security Council of the UN placed the demand for an
immediate cease-fire on the top of its agenda (albeit with
some vacillation). lt's a pity that the Council did no show
more readiness to back this justified demand by an
energetic action.
January 1999
osovo
humanitarian aid. According to him many Krajina refugees
have left for Serbia, and about 700 of them emigrated to
the United States or Canada owing to the UNHCR efforts.
Unfortunately the Serbian government stopped this
emigration project.
M.V. was born in 1965, his wife M. in 1969, his
daughter M, born in 1993 has cerebral paralysis, and son
A., born in 1989, has asthma.
M.V. wants to emigrate due to his predicament.
Helsinki Charter, August 1998
IP
January 1999
11
January 1999
by sandra Sljepcevic
elsinki Committee team in August 1998 visited several
Romany villages in Novi Sad, Pancevo, and Beigrade
to interview Romany refugees from Kosovo. Due to
escalation of violence in Kosovo the number of refugees is
on the rise. The Commissariat for Refugees of the
Republic of Serbia has not registered any Romany
refugees from Kosovo.
We found Romany refugees, mostly of Muslim
religion, in Romany enclaves in the aforementioned cities.
The majority of them found refuge in makeshift dwellings
of their relatives and friends. Wooden or tin 'houses' in
those shanty towns are without windows and floors and
have poor sanitary conditions. Refugees have not
received any humanitarian aid. Children don't have
clothes, footwear and have not been enrolled in schools.
We also found several pregnant women. They are not
entitled to medical care because they don't have their
health booklets (many of them left them in Kosovo). They
are all unemployed and have no income whatsoever. They
take food from containers or beg for it in town.
A female Romany refugee left Kosovo in July 1998
because of armed conflicts. She says that both the police
and Albanians opened fire. After that they had problems
with Albanian neighbors who kept stoning their houses.
They did not see Albanian army, but are convinced that its
soldiers also opened fire. Her family lived in a Serbian
village, and she claims that their houses were stoned from
the adjoining Albanian village. She and her family took a
train to Novi Sad and had no problems on their journey.
All Romany from her village fled to Serbia. She adds that
the police advised women and children to leave for Serbia
and men to stay on to defend their homes. Her father was
in the "war" for two weeks and then joined the family in
Novi Sad.
A male Romany refugee left his village in the vicinity of
Kosovska Mitrovica in July 1998. He lived in an Albanian
village and admittedly had problems with his Albanian
neighbors. They used to barge in his house, threaten him
and criticize him for voted for Slobodan Milosevi6 at the
last elections. He and his family told Albanains they were
loyal to Serbia and would not fight against the Serbian
police. Then the Albanians began stoning his house. They
broke all windows and doors. He and his family decided
to leave when Albanians started threatening them anew
and warned them they their lives were at stake. The police
defended them for a while, but one day told them they
could not langer come and protect them every night. The
police gave weapons to some Romany, but did not have
enough to hand it out to all of them. In their village there
were 300 Romany houses. Not all Romany fled to Serbia.
He and his family took a train to Serbia and had no
problems on their journey.
A female Romany refugee came from the locality of
Kacanik in July 1998. Albanians asked her son to join the
January 1999
osovo
Kosovo. Gene Polo, Vice President of Democratic Party,
noted that Nano came to power with the idea of not
helping Kosovo and betraying the Albanian national
question.
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KosovA
parts will merge into a whole" heralded the next stage of
developments; namely the forcible suspension of Kosovo
autonomy and adoption of the new Serbian Constitution,
all of which was contrary to the principles of the existing
SFRY Constitution. Hence Serbia was the first republic of
the then Yugoslavia to take a secessionist position on the
AVNOJ Yugoslavia. The government then set out on a
deliberate policy of repression in Kosovo, which in turn
gave credibility to the Albanian ethnic nationalism and
secessionism, and recently resulted in the armed
denouement of the Kosovo crisis and suffering of both
Kosovar Albanian and Serbian people. Consequences of
this crisis can be indeed very serious if any side in the
conflicts continues to think that it will attain its objectives by
force of arms, for example, establish its central authority in
Kosovo (along with a kind of cultural autonomy) or
independence of Kosovo.
lt seems to me that we are faced with the some
manner of resolution of the Kosovo tangle (Kosovo as a
part of Serbia and subject of federalism) but with much
E KOSOVO MORAL
Dear Mr. Schiese/,
we are turning to you in order to express our concern over dramatic developments in Kosovo. For all of us, whose
countries were victims of Mi/osevic's military campaigns, every new day in Kosovo is reminiscent of events we have
already witnessed. Despite dec/arations of European politicians that they would not al/ow another war in the
Balkans, which is tantamount to indirect admittance of the errors they made during the previous Belgrade's
aggression, we watch with disbe/ief how their new policy gets increasingly removed from the possibility to play an
active and positive rote in the denouement of the Kosovo conflict.
We take the liberty to point out at current errors which seem to be the mere repetition of the previous failures
of the European po/icy which additiona/ly affected developments caused by the destructive policy of S/obodan
MiloseviC. To put it succinctly these errors are tantamount to turning a blind eye to Milosevic's responsibility in the
past and present wanton destruction.
All the wars which happened during the disintegration of the former Yugos/avia resulted from Milosevic's
rejection of agreed solutions. Albanians set a precedent in the most recent European history by defending for ten years
their legitimate interests in a non-violent manner. Albanian politica/ representatives in Kosovo have unsuccessfully
tried to reach a peaceful solution. We woufd like to point out that it is unrealistic to expect from Albanian people in
Kosovo to negotiate with the con man from Beigrade, to whom the policy of international community gives the
legitimacy of negotiator. We would also like to stress that the basis for realistic solution must be the acceptance of
Kosovar Albanians as equitable community in the family of European political entities. Hence a priori and
indisputable dictators mustn't be imposed as negotiators to such a community.
By extension only if Albanians are recognized as an equitable community the end of armed conflicts can be
expected. We wanted to point out that above fact and also to express our hope that the aforementioned mistakes in
the EU's policy towards Kosovo would be soon rectified.
Krsto CviicJ Bora Cosic; Ales Debeljak; Slavenka Drakulic; Heni Erceg, Vlado Gotovac; Zdravko GreboJ
Dievad Karahasan; Ozren Kebo; Mirko Kova~ Ivan lovrenovi~ luka Markeiic; Tomai Mastnak;
Dunja Melcic; Slobodan P. Nova~ Senad Pecanin; Nenad Popovi~ Abdulah Sidran
January 1999
41
January
1999
osovo
destructive forces in our country!
The aforementioned suggests that President of the
federal state played no role in the Kosovo drama, but that
the whole absurd game was initiated by forces of war and
chaos. And then the forces of sense, embodied in
Slobodan Milosevic interfered and -won! lt is quite all right
to identify S. Milosevic with "forces of sense," (as in the
negotiations Holbrooke was faced with Milosevic), but
then the New Democracy should also assume
responsibility for such interpretation.
On the other hand, Nebojsa Covic, the leader of the
Serbian Democratic Alternative, stressed that "Slobodan
Milosevic will not easily admit his total defeat. lf the extent
of Milosevic's policy were gauged by historical and
civilized meter than Mr. Covic's assessment would be
absolutely spot-on. But what kind of defeat is Milosevic
supposed to admit as concerns the effects of his own rule
if he does not have in his vocabulary the word "defeat
Today it is clear that he outmaneuvered all the other
factors in the Kosovo Rashomon (referendum on noninterference of foreign factors) irrespective of NATO's
moves or, as it had happened, victory of sense over the
forces of chaos and war."
The print media ran a host of comparative analysis by
qualified and less qualified military experts and
commentators. All of them talked about the number and
strength of famous cruise missiles called Tomahawks"
and the number of different types of bombers and fighterbombers of the NATO fleet which were to attack the
strategically important military targets in the FR
Yugoslavia. On the other hand they analyzed in depth the
domestic fleet and the capability of the Yugoslav antiaircraft defense. Although it is well-known that only i 5
Mig-29 of the Yugoslav Army are in the same league with
NATO's air force capability, both the civilian and military
authorities in Yugoslavia launched the thesis that the
Yugoslav Army can counter the terrible NATO" and also
inflict heavy lasses to this powerful organization. As it was
expected, most vociferous in response to the foreign
threats was Vice President of government of the Republic
of Serbia and leader of the Serbian Radicals, Dr. Vojislav
Seselj. We shall discuss his menaces at the end of this
article.
Hence a thesis is circulating in Beigrade that NATO
got cold feet in view of possible heavy losses, as it was
anticipated by General Mladen Karanovic, head of
Artillery-Missile Units of the Anti-Aircraft Defense of the
Army of Yugoslavia in his article ran by the issue of weekly
Vojska which had hit the news-stands on the eve of the
last round of Milosevic-Holbrooke negotiations. To make
the story even more convincing there were rumors that
Russians decided to stand by their Orthodox brethren by
backing them with their still "strong armada". This thesis
was eloquently explicated by retired General Radovan
Radovanovic, the pillar" of Institute of Geopolitical Studies
in Beigrade, before the BK TV auditorium, in prime-time
program, on Wednesday, 14 October. He also said that:
Russia's position on the Kosovo crisis and its relations
with Serbia and the FR Yugoslavia varied vary much: first
there was a condescending support for the UN Resolution
banning Yugoslavia to import arms, then a reluctant vote
for the Resolution 1199, and finally a decisive 'nyet' to
NATO bombardment." Suchtalk constitutes the basis of a
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Jariuary 1999
osovo
90% of houses in ten villages of Plav municipalities into
collective centers. The problem is how to speed up this
process - it is already winter in Plav and Rofaje. lt is
1mportant to speed up the system of distribution of aid, so
that our aid reaches not only towns but also all villages in
which refugees are accommodated", says Nata.
Montenegrin authorities adhered to their original
decision that children of refugees could only enroll in the
first grade of elementary schools. The others are not fit
because they attended Albanian and not Serbian schools.
Despite the insistence of international organizations
agreement on implementation of pilot project envisaging
education of other children has not been reached with the
Montenegrin
Education
Minister.
Humanitarian
organizations warn that children who don't attend school
will become a problem not only for their parents but also
for the society. But nobody pays heed to warnings that
such children can turn into sociopaths and criminals,
because they come from foreign, and not domestic
organizations.
But everybody believed the story that some Albanian
warnen tried to flee Kosovo hidden in the
trunk
compartments of buses heading for Montenegro. Diligent
policemen while controlling a Pristina-Podgorica bus of
the private company "BoZ.Ur" at the Berane check-point
found out five warnen in the trunk compartment. Together
with their children seated in the bus they wanted to arrive
in Ulcinj. But the police took them back by the official
police car to the Montenegrin border with Kosovo.
The rumor has it that that policemen are only human,
so they occasionally tend to close a blind eye to similar
~ncidents. But, the border crossing at Rofaje is an
1nsurmountable obstacle only for those who happen to
Authorities are
have Muslim and Albanian names.
authorities and they are merciless even if such people
were born in Montenegro or came to the burial of their
relative. But doors of the country, which does not wish to
become "a refugee camp", are wide open only to those
who have "correct" Serbian or Montenegrin names.
"We know that despite the ban in force a number of
people entered Montenegro even after 11 September. As
regards incidents at the police check-points they were
caused by some policemen who did not act properly. We
are very concerned about this ban, but we hope that a
solution will be shortly found, and that everybody will be
able to exercise the right to freedom of movement " said
Pier Francesko Nata.
'
In 1992 the Montenegrin authorities made a similar
faux pas, by returning Bosnian Muslims to Karadzic's
'care'. They also gained notoriety for adopting an internal
police provision under which refugees of Serbian and
Mo.ntenegrin ethnicity could get a Montenegrin passport,
wh1le other peoples and nationalities were given only " a
travel document," equal to one-way ticket.
Helsinki Charter, October 1998
January 1999
The attempt to attain ethnic homogenization in a multiethnic state is regularly motivated by political and other
interests of some groups. lnterests which are often hidden
or lurk in the background. The fact is that thanks to an
exclusive nationalistic policy the groups affiliated with
militarized political circles and robber barons also reap the
full benefits of war, sanctions and related business
transactions. Some other groups, although they do not
directly profit from war and/or sanctions, in view of the
nature of their particular interest are forced to distance
themselves from ethnic pluralism and national equality.
These groups regularly present their particular interests as
the general-national ones. Currently ethnic Albanians in
Kosovo aspire towards the republic (or state) which could
provide much more administrative positions and
sinecures than the most enhanced autonomy. On the
other side Serbs aspire to keep such positions in Kosovo,
and fear that they would lose their ethnic monopoly if the
status of Kosovo were changed. Taking exclusive ethnic
positions is usually linked to monopoly on business gains
or the official and administrative position-hunt, and the
chauvinist policy is considered skillful if these particular
interests are convincingly presented as national interests.
DIFFERING ADAPTABILITY OF MINORITIES
Ja11uary 1999
osovo
chauvinism are the global and the US-led trends, as weil
as the foreigners - migrants in Western European
countries. In the Balkans things are different: here
chauvinism presupposes a developed, ethnic-exclusive
position, "ousting" approach towards "foreigners" in the
country proper and a great risk of fascization.
Difference between the slogan "Europe to Europeans"
and concerted efforts to create "ethnically homogenous
states" represent the key difference between
contemporary European and the Balkan chauvinism. lt
bears stressing that different forms of the Balkan
nationalism (even of Serbian nationalism) are closely
interwoven in three modern ideologies: the liberal, the
socialist and the conservative one. A wider context of
these ideologies to some extent modifies their nationalistic
contents. Hence, in that sense, three nationalism can be
distinguished: the leftist, the liberal and the conservative
Serbian nationalism. Before we describe and comment
each of them, we shall indicate the criteria for the
distinction of the aforementioned modern ideologies.
The key criterion is the "enemy's design." Here we
shall cite a well-known example. The Serbian Radical
Party, as a markedly conservative party, in the following
way ranked its enemies: its first enemy is the Serbian
Renewal Movement (SPO), the second enemy are
cosmopolitan and liberal political organizations (UJDI and
SRSJ), and its third enemy is the "natural foe," that is the
ruling Croatian and Muslim parties. The enmity towards
the SPO, a moderate right-wing party was caused by
daily-political reasons. On the other hand branding of
domestic, political organizations with cosmopolitan
leanings as greater enemies than the Croatian HDZ or the
Muslim SDA, indicated a markedly reactionary form of the
basic conservative orientation of the Serbian Radical
Party. The extreme right in the past used to justify its main
ideas by religious reasons. Today a more reliable criterion
for its leanings can be its position on the nation. Some
classically conservative values are today incorporated into
chauvinism as a fundamental matrix, that is, traditionalism,
racism,
religious
intolerance,
xenophobia,
authoritarianism, anti-enlightenment, militant antisocialism,
etc.
lt is well-known that "the enemy design" can be used
in a more general context to the same end. To put it
briefly: some ideas are confronted with the enlightenment
heritage; they are advocated by the conservative forces.
Some other groups accept the enlightenment heritage,
but deny the ideas of socialism in general and of Marxism
in particular. They are represented by liberals. ldeologies
which are declaratively Marxism-based, independently of
their position on the real socialist heritage, in this context
are called the left-wing ones.
Now we have come to an important issue. lt is certain
that the left can be nationalistic, but this "charge" is usually
less permanent and more conditioned by daily-political
needs then in the case of the right, which is a staunch
upholder of such "nationalistic" values. In this context it
suffices to compare the nationalistic orientation of the
Socialist Party of Yugoslavia with the orientations
manifested by the Croatian HDZ or the Serbian Radical
Party. However the relations between the left and right
nationalisms are very complex. In the next part of my
expose 1 shall analyze the most developed form of the
lEFT
A
leftist character of the discussed
variant of Serbian nationalistic ~~~~,~,
two elements: a desirable vision of
of "enemy.''
new model of inter-ethnic relations
after the downfall of A. Rankovic-led
view
its historical
state
January
1999
osovo
with a leading nation represents a risky invocation of interethnic conflicts. This idea is not openly espoused in the
Memorandum, but is nevertheless recognizable due to
repeated insistence that criticism of Serbian nationalism
must be renounced and a unique educational system in
multinational and multilingual community established.
The concept of "enemy" underpins the leftist form of
the Memorandum nationalism. In addition to satanized
historical personalities, whose accomplishments are
overrated, bureaucracy, is mentioned as the obligatory
enemy either in the shape of "its bureaucratic willfulness"
or as "a holder of privileges and champion of corruption.
This is a spin-off of the Trockist tradition in social thinking,
which through its official "inflationary antibureaucratism"
dominated the official doctrine of the League of
Communist of Yugoslavia and ideas of its leftists critics,
both the Praxis group with international leanings (in the
Sixties and Seventies) and the Serbian leftist nationalists
in the Eighties. Criticism of the ruling communist cadres
("bureaucracy") is a widespread form of leftist criticism of
communism. lts typical Serbian feature was the shift from
criticism of bureaucracy to criticism of communist
internationalism, in the shape of a facile disapproval of
national polices of the League of Communists of
Yugoslavia and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. A
thesis that Serbian nationalism was engendered in
Beigrade is quite bizarre in the light of the fact that some
of its most influential proponents were not only the most
vociferous critics of Serbian nationalism, but also writers
who had a lot of understanding for different non-Serb
chauvinism in Yugoslavia, once new political "enemies"
emerged on the horizon. At this point it is worth
mentioning the position of one of the most prominent
authors of Memorandum, Mihajlo Markovic, who, at the
height of the Croatian Massive Movement advocating the
creation of confederation, in 1971, wrote that "there was a
realistic chance that the current nationalistic conflicts
would abate within a loose confederation ... the latter being
a better option than disintegration of the community or
vice versa, intervention of the "ruling conglomerate"'
(Power structure in Yugoslav society and dilemma of
revolutionary intelligentsia, Praxis 8, 1971, no. 6, page
823). Fear of intervention of the ruling conglomerate,
composed of the federal top leadership, the Yugoslav
People's Army and the B&H leadership, compelled the
author to back the Croatian nationalists demands. Not
much time has passed from insistence on loose federation
to insistence on strong federation, and experiences with
Yugoslav intellectuals compel us to assess that
fundamental positions are changed with some difficulty
only the first time, while, henceforth, a new set of
circumstance might induces some even more radical
changes thereof.
lt is evident that anticommunism and obsession with
nationalism are two interwoven dimensions of the same
syndrome afflicting the leftist form of nationalism. Laterstage forms of Serbian nationalism will strengthen both
aforementioned dimensions. Only the vestiges the thus
manifested leftist nationalism survived in late Nineties.
However its historical importance and liability of its
representatives should not be underrated. Through its
undiscriminating criticism of communist internationalism,
essential neglect of socio-economic basis of political and
LIBERAL NATIONAUSM
January 1999
BREAK
NATIONAUSM - PRECONDITION
OF DEMOCRACY
(Conservative Nationalism)
1999
the light of the fact that the Western way of thinking has
been for quite some time evolving along different lines,
our mutual, sincere misunderstanding becomes thenunderstandable.
When speaking about economy the picture we are
faced with is at the first glance even bleaker. Kosovo was
the paarest part of the then Yugoslavia, and was
noticeably poorer than the so-called "smaller Serbia." This
was due to the fact that the Serbian GNP was well below
a relatively modest Yugoslav gross national product. The
alleged 'comparative advantages' of Serbian agriculture,
based as much on the local land cult and small, private
allotments of land, as on its genuine and important
agricultural potential, indicated that Kosovo had the
largest, and Vojvodina the smallest number of landdependent people. However, farming revenues (per
capita) in Vojvodina were three times superior to the one
in "smaller" Serbia, and five times to the one in Kosovo. In
actual fact this is in direct and perfect proportion to the
aforementioned demographic reality of Kosovo and to an
almost negligible emancipation (in Kosovo and Serbia)
from the post-feudal syndrome. T o be perfectly honest, in
our textbooks, steeped as they were in Lenin's ideological
understanding of economy and society (More factoriesmore prosperity, Do not trust 'kulaks') Kosovo agriculture
was not mentioned, but Trepca and other, incredibly rich
mines were, and that profusely. am quite sure that
Kosovo' s mining wealth was and still is a matter of
national (rather than nationalistic) pride for many
Albanians and Serbs. would say that this myth was and
is the myth of an early romantic, post-industrial mind-set.
But the reality is different: even if under improved
circumstances, the tapping of this wealth proves to be
lucrative, in the foreseeable future it can not remain a
privileged lever in macro strategy against unemployment,
because of labour costs, new technologies non-existent
in Kosovo mines, ecology, to name just a few reasons.)
Basically i would like to stress that the economic power of
Kosovo is beyond the slogans "We shall not give our
Serbian Trepca" or "Trepca's operations build Beigrade."
Paradoxically enough this power is hidden in the very
industrial backwardness of Kosovo. To avoid
unnecessary misunderstandings, ! shall quote the
statement made by Mr. Richard Holbrooke, in August
1995. On top of everything that statement had to do with
Montenegro, rather than Kosovo. At that time his
reasoning was of this nature: ''We (that is, the US
Administration) have analyzed Montenegro and noticed
that its coastline is almost as long as Cote d'Azur; but
Montenegro has three times less inhabitants than Cote
d'Azur and luckily enough, has no industry; therefore we
see no obstacles impeding its political and economic
emancipation from Beigrade." Unfortunately Kosovo has
twice the population of Cote d' Azur per square kilometer,
it has no coastline -and these are all handicaps. But
Kosovo has one advantage over Cote d' Azur, namely its
fantastic acumen for self-financing. Thanks to this
characteristic of patriarchal societies, !arge quantities of
sound money (cash) are accumulated in fast and efficient
ways. Solidarity principles of bloodline are much more
effective than the operations of the best banks. However
it would be better if that money was not spent on purchase
of farming land, but rather channeled into what the
Helsinki Charter - Special Edition
10
January
1999
January
1999
January
1999
January 1999
January 1999
CROATS
Kosovo Croats were particularly pressurized to leave
the region. Hence of original 8,000 thousand Kosovo
Croats only 2,000 remained in the province. Croats in
Kosovo, named Janjevci, after their village, were the
autochthonous inhabitants of Kosovo, who had settled
there several centuries ago. All of them came from the
Dubrovnik area.
The largest number of Croats lived in Lipljane village
Janjevo (2.859), Sasare (1.569), Letnice (776), Vrnavolovo
(885) and Vrnez (787) in municipality Vitin. In 1991. and
1992. attacks on Croats and their property increased,
which in turn prompted their large-scale emigration. That
emigration trend continued, and now only 700 Croats live
in Kosovo. The manner of their emigration from other
Kosovo villages and their subsequent settlement in
predominantly Serb-populated areas in Croatia, indicates
that it was a planned move. For example 800 Croatian
families from Kosovo now live in Kistanja.
BOSNIAKS-MUSLIMS
NUMBER, ETHNOGENESIS AND EMIGRATION
The emergence of
Bosniaks-Muslims political
organizations coincided with the introduction of the
multiparty system in early 90's. The interests of this
nationality in Kosovo are currently represented by two
parties, the Democratic Action Party and the Muslim
Reform Party with the seat in Prizren.
The Democratic Action Party of Kosovo was founded
on 14 October 1990 in Pec. lts committees were founded
in other places in Kosovo and the DAP soon became the
January 1999
ROMANI ES
NUMBER, ETHNOGENESIS AND EMIGRATION
72
1999
TURKS
NUMBER, ETHNOGENESIS AND EMIGRATION
EPORTS
Beigrade. The process of Turkish emigration was
continued in the former SFRY.
The number of emigrants has never beem established
but the Turkish activists assess that in the post-W.W.11
period 400,000 Turks left Kosovo and Serbia. Since the
beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, that is, during the wars in
Bosnia and Croatia and Kosovo unrest, according to the
assessment of the Turkish Popular Party, more than 1,000
Turks left the province.
In Kosovo today there are merely 15,000 members of
the Turkish minority. They live in Prizren and in the
neigbouring villages. In the vicinity of Prizren there are
some "pure" Turkish villages. Mamusa is one of them.
Similar villages are found in the vicinity of Gnjilane
(Dobrcan), and some ethnic Turks also live in Pristina,
capital of Kosovo.
Ethnogenesis of Turks in Kosovo is characterized by
their links to the peoples of the same religion. Turks, alike
ethnic Albanians and Bosniaks-Muslims, officially use
Turkish language. As Turks have cohabited with
Albanians and Bosniaks-Muslims for centuries, mainly
aristocratic families of these three nationalities are so
closely interrelated that sometimes it is difficult to
determine the ethnicity of their members. This
phenomenon was also boosted by the mixed AlbanianTurkish marriages, which were customary among the
higher classes during the Ottoman empire.
POLITICAL ORGANIZA TIONS AND VIOLA TIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
the state must play a major role in this, private print and
electronic media must be also created in Kosovo.
Putting an end to the armed conflicts and actions
easing of tension and the commencement of a seriou~
negotiations on Kosovo are basic prerequisites for the
settlement of accumulated problems in this province. The
Serb-Albanian dialogue between the representatives of
the official Beigrade and Kosovo Albanians on the status
of Kosovo is the only possible way out from the Kosovo
crisis. But within the framework of such negotiations the
problems of national minorities in Kosovo should be also
handled.
Although national minorities make up only 10% of
population, representatives of national minorities must be
included in the serious process of decision-making
related to the Kosovo issue.
In other words minorities should become active
participants in this process of of decision-making instead
of being used as vehicles for eliminating the Albanian
separatism. Albanian political parties, on the other hand,
must accept the existence of other nations in Kosova and
recognize them officially by taking a public stand on the
status and rights of non-Albanian population of Kosovo.
In the current climate of mutual intolerance and nonexistence of the genuine opposition, above all on the
Serbian side, the settlement of Kosovo issue and
regulation of status of Kosovo is not possible without
direct participation or mediation of international
community. The establishment of the permanent OSCE
monitoring mission in Kosov, debate on the Kosovo
problem in the European institutions and in the UN
Security Council are necessary steps in that direction.
International representatives should also attach
greater attention to the status of national minorities in
Kosovo. lf that does not happen, emigration waves similar
to the. one of Kosovo Croats might be expected. By
extens1on these large-scale emigration waves could have
serious consequences and cause numerous casualties.
May 1998
January
1999
LEGAL STATUS
Ever since its integration into Serbia after the Balkan
Wars (1912-1913) and the constitution of the first
Yugoslavia (1918), the status of Kosovo and the status of
Albanians in a state where Serbs, associated with other
Yugoslav peoples, were a majority population, have been
a constant source of conflict and instability. In the first
Yugoslavia, Albanians were generally denied their ethnic
rights, and in the second, communist Yugoslavia (19451991) the Albanian problem in Yugoslavia and Serbia was
"solved" through various models of autonomy, from the
status of an autonomous region (1945) as a combination
of the cultural autonomy and some forms of limited
territorial and political autonomy to the highest-degree
auto~omy (Constitution of 1974) when it was only
nominally an autonomous province within Serbia,
whereas in fact it had all the state prerogatives and
functioned as one of 8 federal units of the so-called postBrioni Yugoslavia.
'.he Kosovo Assembly enjoyed high autonomy and
the nght of veto at the federal and republican level. in the
1970s and 1980s tendencies grew stronger in Kosovo to
have it recognised as the Republic of Kosovo, a federal
unit
of Serbia, with the right to secede. After
massive Albanian demonstrations in 1981, requesting the
of Kosovo, Serbia launched a forceful campaign
a rebellion of Kosovo Serbs and a largescale nationalistic movement across Serbia for the
annulment of the Constitution of 974, with a view to
restri.cting the Kosovo
and reintegrating it in
Serb1a. Beigrade realised these objectives in 1989 and
first
insistent and forcible amendments to
the Kosovo and Serbian constitutions, and then, in June
and
1
the introduction of "provisional
of the
and
Autonomous Province of Kosovo.
1999
REPORTS
one-sided approach to political and cultural events are
evident, testifying to the dominant DSK policy. Bujku
(Rilindja) continues as a paper which is intolerant and
aggressive towards different opinions and more flexible
and open treatment of current political, social and cultural
problems. Although during the critical period (1993 and
1994) it received help from the Soros Foundation (70
tonnes of paper), towards the end of 1994 and in 1995 it
launched a campaign against the Soros Foundation, a
typical reaction of media controlled by xenophobic and
autistic political circles.
In 1995 and 1996 there were attempts, or rather ideas,
to start another, competitive, daily in Kosovo. Under the
present conditions, however, it would be a costly and
highly uncertain project as the normal market conditions
are lacking. Nonetheless, this gave rise to a
competitive daily in Albanian in Western Europe. Agim
Mala, former manager of the Pristina Television and
former publisher of the weekly Zeri in Switzerland, and a
group of Albanian businessmen started a newspaper Bota
sot. lts staff are in Pristina and it is evident that
thought is given to its Kosovo edition. lt is curious that in
early September the police broke into its offices, otherwise
regularly registered, and seized all computer and other
equipment.
Note should also be made of a daily in Serbian:
Jedinstvo. lt comes out in a small number of copies and is
conceived as a combination of a Tanjug bulletin and local
news and comments. The editorial policy is pro-regime,
following the SPS line. As regards the Kosovo
question, it advocates largely the most radical and
extreme chauvinistic views.
WEEKLIES
January 1999
79
Publications
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