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HEALTH, SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT GUIDELINE

FERM Facility Plan


DOCUMENT ID
- GU 230
REVISION
- 2.0
DATE - 15/07/02

HSE GUIDELINE

Recommending Best Practice

Authorised for Issue by the HSE IC 15/07/02

Document Authorisation
Document Authority
dapo Oguntoyinbo
Ref. Ind: CSM
Date: 15/07/02

Document Custodian
Hamad Khalfeen
Ref. Ind: CSM/11
Date: 15/07/02

Document Author
Hamad Khalfeen
Ref. Ind: CSM/11
Date: 15/07/02

The following is a brief summary of the four most recent revisions to this document. Details of all
revisions prior to these are held on file by the Document Custodian.
Version No.
Version 2.0

Date
Jul 2002

Version 1.0

Jul 1998

Author
Hamad Khalfeen,
CSM/11

Scope / Remarks
Editorial changes, new format.
Original issue as HSE/97/13.

User Notes:
This document is a guideline only.
A controlled copy of the current version of this document is on PDO's EDMS. Before making reference
to this document, it is the user's responsibility to ensure that any hard copy, or electronic copy, is
current. For assistance, contact the Document Custodian.
This document is the property of Petroleum Development Oman, LLC. Neither the whole nor any part of
this document may be disclosed to others or reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in
any form by any means (electronic, mechanical, reprographic recording or otherwise) without prior
written consent of the owner.
Users are encouraged to participate in the ongoing improvement of this document by providing
constructive feedback.

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Contents
ABBREVIATIONS..................................................................................IV
1.0

INTRODUCTION............................................................................1

1.1 PURPOSE...................................................................................................... 1
1.2 SCOPE.......................................................................................................... 1
1.3 BACKGROUND................................................................................................ 1
1.3.1 Pre Fire Planning..................................................................................1
1.4 DISTRIBUTION AND TARGET AUDIENCE................................................................2
1.5 DOCUMENT REVIEW........................................................................................2
2.0

PREPARATION OF A FERM FACILITY PLAN.......................................3

2.1 GENERAL...................................................................................................... 3
2.2 DOCUMENTS REQUIRED...................................................................................3
2.2.1 Area Facility FES and Fire Protection Equipment Description..............3
2.2.2 Fire Protection Systems Maintenance Plans.........................................5
2.2.3 Pre-Fire Plan/Operator Response Sheet...............................................7
2.2.4 Fire Responder Capabilities.................................................................3
2.2.5 Shortfall Listing....................................................................................5
2.3 FIRE SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT..........................................................................6
2.3.1 General................................................................................................ 6
2.3.2 Resource Levels for Scenarios.............................................................6
3.0
3.1
3.2

EXAMPLES...................................................................................8
FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS MAINTENANCE PLANS.................................................8
FIRE SCENARIO WORKSHEETS.........................................................................10

ATTACHMENT I: BLANK FIRE SCENARIO WORK SHEET.................................29


ATTACHMENT II: BLANK PRE-FIRE PLAN/OPERATOR RESPONSE SHEET............38
ATTACHMENT III: BLANK FIRE RESPONDER COMPETENCIES.........................43

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Abbreviations

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AFFF
AFO

Aqueous Film Forming Foam


Airport Fire Officer

BA
BLL
BLEVE
BPD

Breathing Apparatus
Barrels
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion
Barrels Per Day

CAA

Civil Aviation Authority

DCS

Digital Control System

EOM
EP
ERD
ESD

Emergency Operations Manual


Engineering Practice
Engineering Reference Document
Emergency Shut Down

FCP
FERM
FES
FMECA

Field Change Proposal


Fire and Explosion Risk Management
Fire and Explosion Strategy
Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis

HSE

Health, Safety and Environment

ICAO
IR
IT

International Civil Aviation Authority


Infra Red
Information Technology

LEBC
LEL
LPG
lpm

Local Emergency Base Controller


Lower Explosive Limit
Liquefied Petroleum Gas
litres per minute

MAF

Mina Al Fahal

NED
NGL
NFPA

National Emergency Director


Natural Gas Liquids
National Fire Protection Agency

oo
ORC
OWS

out of (eg 2oo3 voting)


Oman Refinery Company
Oily Water Separator

PDO
PPE
PS

Petroleum Development Oman


Personal Protective Equipment
Production Station

QRA

Quantitative Risk Asssessment

RCM
RFF
RFFS
RMS

Reliability Centered Maintenance


Rescue and Fire Fighting
Rescue and Fire Fighting Service
Remote Manifold Station

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SCBA
SIEP

Self Contained Breathing Apparatus


Shell International Exploration and Production

UL
UV

Underwriters Laboratory
Ultra Violet

VESDA

Very Early Smoke Detection Apparatus

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1.0Introduction
1.1

Purpose
The prime objective of a FERM Facility Plan is to minimise the risk to life
and assets by maximising the potential for risk mitigation with manual
intervention, utilising available manpower and equipment.
It is intended that FERM Facility Plans be produced in a consistent manner
for both new facilities and modifications to existing facilities. Presently,
throughout PDO facilities there are differences in procedures, available
equipment, manpower and capability. The purpose of this Guideline is to
provide a consistent approach to identified fire hazards, by setting
standards for the preparation of specific pre-fire planning documents for
each PDO location.
This document supports the requirements provided in SP 1075,
Specification for Fire and Explosion Risk Management, and provides
examples where applicable.

1.2

Scope
This guideline is focused on FERM Facility Plans.

1.3

Background
Automated systems have the advantage of rapid response but are limited
in terms of assessment and usually follow a single pre-determined pattern
initiated by condition sensors. Only trained personnel can provide the
necessary assessment of a situation but their performance is very much
improved if all of the possibilities for escalation have been considered and
fully understood prior to any occurrence.
By preparing specific action plans for manual response based on identified
fire hazards and scenarios, simulated response exercises can be tested and
practised. The testing aspect provides information regarding any
weaknesses in the systems, or failures on demand; whilst the practice
induces a level of familiarity with tasks which then become routine, and
therefore more reliable. During an emergency, fire responders rely on their
ability to use equipment safely and effectively.

1.3.1

Pre Fire Planning


Pre-fire planning may be described as the advance preparation of
documentation and practical rehearsals, based on potential credible fire
scenarios, which can assist fire departments and line management
personnel to respond to and control fire events within company facilities.
Pre-fire planning addresses the nature of contribution from human
intervention as a recovery measure.
Pre-fire planning sets plant control, safeguarding and fire fighting
objectives and strategies so that in the case of a potential incident critical
time is saved should hazardous events come about. It also identifies
particular fire and explosion scenario resource requirements and hazards
that may be encountered during an incident. The appropriate actions to
be employed when applying mitigation and recovery measures are then
developed.

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Pre-fire plans need to be scenario specific. They should not be overly


detailed or inflexible since it is not possible to predict the precise events or
impact that may occur from any given scenario. Having identified plausible
fire scenarios and relevant control methodologies it is then possible to
identify the role of contributing systems, for example:

1.4

Response times and capabilities of fire responders


Physical site aspects including adequate access ways for the
assigned equipment taking wind directions into account
Clear communication procedures and systems
Availability of suitable quantities of foam, water or hand
extinguishers
Convenient location of equipment such as hydrants, monitors and
firemans equipment.

Distribution and Target Audience


This guideline has been developed for the use of PDO staff, contractors
and consultants that are involved in the design of new facilities and
modification of existing facilities.
It is also intended for use during the review of existing FERM Facility Plans
as they are completed on a periodic basis.

1.5

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Document Review
This Guideline shall be reviewed as necessary in line with any review and
modification of the related Specification.

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2.0Preparation of a FERM Facility Plan


2.1

General
This section provides guidance on how to prepare a FERM Facility Plan, and
provides a list of documents for a typical plan.
In establishing facility plans it is necessary to prepare a list of company
facilities, then list the processes, plants, operation, structures and
personnel within the facilities. From this list the numbers and types of
potential (moderate, serious and major fire) incident scenarios should be
further listed. It is anticipated that company personnel in the vicinity
would deal with minor or incipient fires and therefore such incidents should
not be used for pre-plans.
After confirming the credibility of the draft fire scenarios with line
management, supervisor actions to prepare for the event can be
developed. These should be in line with an emphasis on the impact on
operations, facility, plant and equipment to ensure accuracy of planning. A
final list of scenarios should then be converted into fully prepared pre-fire
plans with further investigative work on impact on the environment and
the public.
Establishing a pre-fire plan for every single potential fire incident in all
company facilities serves little useful purpose since it would take many
years to exercise the response to these incidents. Operators pre-plans
should be developed as well as those for fire fighters and the two should
be coordinated on a scenario basis.

2.2

Documents Required
The following documents are required in order to complete a FERM Facility
Plan:
1. Area Facility FES and Description of Fire Protection Equipment, for
reference, information and possible inclusions in the HSE Case.
2. Fire protection systems maintenance plans, for inclusion in the site
EPMARS.
3. Pre-fire plans/Operator response, for inclusion in the Site Emergency
Procedures, Part III.
4. Fire responder capabilities, for inclusion in the Operator Competency
Assurance Scheme and/or the Fire Brigade Training Programme.
5. Shortfall Listings, for inclusion in the EOM, Staff Training Plan and FCP
as required.

2.2.1

Area Facility FES and Fire Protection Equipment Description


Area Facility FES
This should be in accordance with PDOs FERM and FES levels assigned to
the facilities. Include a description of each main area of the site being
examined and list the strategy that is assigned.

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An example might be:


Strategy Level 1 (Minor Incident Intervention Only)
Remote manifolds 1 to n
Gathering station X
Camps and offices
Level description
Fire response is limited to trained personnel using portable extinguishers
or other types of first aid fire fighting equipment. In addition, in critical
areas, such as some areas of camps, automatic detection systems may be
installed to provide fast alarm and personnel escape.
Strategy Level 2 (Dedicated Fixed Fire Protection Systems)
Power station
Level Description
Automatic actuation of a self contained extinguishing system, for a specific
facility from detection systems.
Strategy Level 3 (Fixed Fire Protection Systems Plus Back Up)
Production Station
Level Description
Dedicated fixed fire protection systems and a fire water network with back
up from manual intervention by trained personnel using fire fighting
equipment.
Strategy Level 4 (Fixed Fire Protection Systems Plus Fire Brigade)
Airstrip
Level Description
Similar to strategy 3 with back up from a professional fire brigade.
Fire Protection Equipment
Each area identified above needs to have a description of the fire detection
and protection equipment installed, together with a conclusion as to the
adequacy, and applicability of the strategy level assigned.
An example might be:
Remote Manifold Stations Strategy Level 1
The remote manifolds have the following fire protection equipment in
place:

1 x 60kg dry powder trolley extinguisher

4 x 12kg dry powder extinguishers

2 x CO2 extinguishers
The extinguisher type and number are appropriate to the facilities. There
are no fixed fire systems at any RMS in accordance with strategy level 1.
The following fire and gas detection is in place:

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RMS 1 to 4 and 6 to 10
H2S gas detection (DCS building)
(external) only
Smoke detection (DCS building)
Break glass units (external)

RMS 5
Break

glass

units

Actuation of any of these devices will alarm in the control room and ESD
the respective RMS.
Conclusion:
Stations.
2.2.2

Strategy level 1 is applicable to the Remote Manifold

Fire Protection Systems Maintenance Plans


This section needs to identify the weekly, monthly, quarterly, 6 monthly
and annual maintenance requirements for each of the fire protection
systems at the site under consideration. It is intended for reference against
the facility EPMARS to ensure testing of systems hardware is carried out.
An example of a Fire Protection Systems Maintenance and Testing system
is provided below. Additional examples are provided in Section 3.1.
EXAMPLE 1. Fixed Semi-Sub Surface Foam Injection System (SSSFIS)
The following maintenance, inspections and tests and frequency applies to
the SSSFIS hardware either in addition to the existing maintenance
requirements or to enhance the requirements. The following considers the
operating environment, water supply and materials in use for the SSSFIS.
The fire and gas detection testing frequency and methods have been
checked and were generally found satisfactory:

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1.1

Weekly
Check all valves on the foam system and ensure they are all in the
correct stand-by positions;
Inspect firewater supply system to ensure pressure and flow
required for the SSSFIS;
Align valves to circulate foam concentrate back to tank, ensure
foam discharge to surge tank is fully isolated and run foam pump
and verify the duplex gauge foam pressure indicator is working;
Check foam tank and fittings for leakage;
Check storage temperature of foam concentrate to ensure it is
within manufacturers limits.

1.2

Monthly
Inspect full system for physical wear and tear or damage;
Remove, clean, inspect and reassemble foam concentrate line and
sensing line strainers;
Check foam generators air inlet screens and clean if necessary;
Align valves to circulate foam concentrate back to tank and ensure
foam discharge to surge tank is fully isolated then run foam pump
and check for leakage, excessive noise, vibration or overheating in
the pump or driver motor;
Ensure foam tank is isolated and water supply is isolated and cycle

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1.3

GU-230

valves from the control room fire and gas control panel or by
manual override at valves;
Inspect foam tank pressure/vacuum vent to ensure free movement
and that screens are clean.
Quarterly

Override solenoid switch for deluge valve operation

Remove solenoid, inspect, clean and test operation

Reassemble solenoid

Reinstate actuation system to stand-by mode

1.4

6 Monthly
Check complete system, all valves, fittings and connections for
leakage
Check flange bolts for tightness
Isolate and remove hose container from tank and inspect hose
condition, and return to service.
Check system for any external damage to paint surfaces.
Check supervision of control circuit and check air supply. Check low
air supply alarm and check for leakage/passing valve seats.
Remove, clean, test and reassemble the pressure vacuum vent on
the tank.
Remove, clean, test and recalibrate the duplex foam/water gauge.
Check that proper control system indicators are present, check
supervision of all circuits, check alarm operation, check system
operation and check that all indicators illuminate.
Isolate duplex foam/water gauge and clean water and foam lines to
gauge. Flush and pressure test gauge for water and foam
indications

1.5

Annually
1. Carry out annual discharge test, ensuring discharge to surge tanks
is fully isolated and check foam solution proportioning, foam
expansion and drainage in accordance with NFPA 11.
2. Check foam pump alignment in accordance with the manufacturers
instructions
3. Check that proper voltage is available at pump motor.
4. Check motor for proper rotation and rotate pump by hand to
ensure free movement.
5. Check that foam pump can supply adequate pressure for the foam
supply system by observing the duplex water/foam gauge. The
foam needle indicator (red) should be approximately 1 barg higher
than the water pressure.
6. Remove water filter from line and clean, inspect for damage and
reassemble.
7. Strip, clean, test and reinstall the system deluge valves in
accordance with manufacturers instructions.
8. Check foam pump relief valve setting for proper operation.
9. Take sample of foam concentrate and submit for analysis on
sedimentation, corrosion, dilution or contamination to an approved
foam supplier.

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2.2.3

Pre-Fire Plan/Operator Response Sheet


This section of the FERM facility plan should contain pre-fire plans for each
of the scenarios identified in the fire scenario development section.
In addition, an operator response sheet is also required for each scenario
developed.
An example of a Pre-Fire Plan and Operator Response Sheet for a surge
tank or full surface fire follows. Blank sheets with guidance notes, are
shown in Attachment II.

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PRE-FIRE PLAN FOR


SURGE TANKS T-XXXX OR TXXX FULL SURFACE FIRE
FIRE FIGHTING STRATEGY : Operator confirms fire in tank - Tanks inlet/outlet ESD and hydrocarbon ESD - Actuation of fixed foam system - Fire brigade response - Fire brigade
deploy portable water monitors for cooling adjacent tank roof - Fixed system foam application until extinguishment and thereafter until a secure foam blanket is achieved - Fire
brigade deploys foam monitor in case foam system requires supplementary application - Fire brigade stand-by until incident is declared over.
IMMEDIATE RESPONSE
ACTIONS
RESOURCES REQUIRED
[
] Control Room Operator
Request fire alarm fire confirmation
Outside operator to confirm fire event.
[
] Control Room Operator
Verify or activate site fire siren
Use control room fire siren switch if necessary.
[
] Control Room Operator
Alert fire brigade to respond to incident
Radio, telephone or pager call out.
[
] Control Room Operator
Alert LEBC and advise nature of incident
Telephone, radio or pager call out.
[
] LEBC
Request emergency team response
Emergency pager call out button in control room or individual telephone
[
] Control Room Operator
Check fixed foam system valves have activated
numbers.
[
] Control Room Operator
Check ESD is initiated for tanks and station and inform LEBC
Control room fire and gas panel
of status of shutdown
Radio or telephone.
[
] LEBC
Designate an OSC
Radio contact or control room telephone.
1st RESPONSE
ACTIONS
RESOURCES REQUIRED
[
] OSC or designated person
Check personnel evacuation status for missing persons
Personnel Log Book in control room
[
] OSC or designated person
Verify fire size/severity and any obvious immediate hazards
Radio in vehicle with external loudspeaker
and advise LEBC
[
] OSC or designated person
Ensure fixed foam system is operating correctly
Fixed semi-sub surface foam system pump and valves. Manual pneumatic
valves can be actuated at the foam skid if required. Foam system tank requires
[
] OSC or designated person
a minimum of 5880 litres foam concentrate for injection into one tank. 100%
quantity should be available for refilling within 24 hours.
Ensure both tank bund drains are closed.
Tank bund drains.
2nd RESPONSE
ACTIONS
RESOURCES REQUIRED
[
] Fire Brigade
Deploy/actuate cooling water monitors on next tank roof.
2 x 3000 lpm water monitors, 24 x 70mm x 20m delivery fire hose.
[
] OSC
Check foam system effectiveness in reducing and controlling
Visual assessment of fire size reduction. Foam system to be run for a minimum
tank fire and advise LEBC.
of 55 minutes. Should be signs of fire control after approximately 30 minutes.
If no visible fire reduction after 55 minutes then foam system obviously not
[
] OSC
Ensure cooling water does not drift into tank being foamed.
effective.
[
] Fire Brigade
Deploy foam monitor in readiness to support foam system
application in case some fire traps remain under tank shell
1 x 3400 lpm portable foam monitor, 12 x 70mm x 20 m delivery fire hose and
folds which the foam system cannot fully extinguish.
minimum 2040 litres 3% foam concentrate for 20 minutes supply foam
monitor.
OTHER ACTIONS/CONCERNS: Cooling of adjacent unaffected tank is necessary to prevent tank roof damage and protect tank integrity. To check if cooling is required, play a water
stream on to the roof and if steaming occurs, the roof needs to be cooled. If foam system does not achieve extinguishment after 55 minutes then all personnel should evacuate the
LPS and await boilover event. Crude oil and water pumpout from affected tank should be commenced as soon as it is obvious that foam extinguishment has failed. Pump out will not
prevent a boilover but may reduce the fireball and fire spread extent.

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ONGOING POTENTIAL HAZARDS : Crude oil boilover will occur if tank fire extinguishment is unsuccessful. Boilover event may overflow bund walls.
Fireball may achieve heights of 100m with resultant high radiant heat levels dangerous to fire responders and observers.
Probable escalation involving adjacent tank or separators once a boilover occurs. More than one boilover is possible . Personnel should not re-enter LPS after a first or second
boilover. The fire incident will only be safe once the tank fire, or fires, are burned out.

OPERATOR RESPONSE FOR


LPS SURGE TANKS T-XXXX OR T-XXXX FULL SURFACE FIRE
FIRE FIGHTING STRATEGY
Operator confirms fire in tank - Tanks inlet/outlet ESD and hydrocarbon ESD - Operator confirms fire event - Actuation of fixed foam
system - Fire brigade response - Fixed system foam application until extinguishment and thereafter until a secure foam blanket is
achieved - Fire brigade deploys foam monitor in case foam system requires supplementary application - Fire brigade stand-by until
incident is declared over.
CONTROL ROOM

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OPERATOR RESPONSE ACTIONS

Request outside operator to confirm fire in tank

Verify siren has activated or activate if necessary

Alert fire brigade to respond to incident

Alert LEBC and advise nature of incident

Alert Emergency Team if advised by

Check tanks foam system valves have actuated and advise LEBC

Check ESD operated for tanks and station - confirm to LEBC shutdown status.

Await further instructions from LEBC and act accordingly.

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2.2.4

Fire Responder Capabilities


Fire Responder Competencies
The fire responder competencies should be identified through the use of the
scenario worksheets. This will be in terms of the fire fighting or fire control
strategy and tactics which fire responders will have to apply, and also in
terms of the hardware they may or will have to utilise as part of the tactics.
Fire responder competencies should be developed for each fire scenario
identified.
A blank form for this is provided in Attachment III.
Fire Responder Fitness
To be analysed against the requirements laid down in EP 95-0351, Fire
Control and Recovery.
An example of fire responders competencies for a surge tank or full surface
fire follows.

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FIRE RESPONDERS COMPETENCIES FOR:

SURGE TANKS T-XXXX and T-XXXX FULL SURFACE FIRE

KEY ELEMENTS REQUIRED:


Knowledge of operations emergency plan, emergency team composition, chain of command.
Knowledge of firewater supply system for station .
Understanding of the need and use of personal protective equipment (PPE) for firefighting and emergency incident response.
Location of surge tanks within station, tanks construction and function and concept of pump out under emergency conditions.
Knowledge of location and manual operation of surge tanks foam system, minimum duration of foam system application on a surge tank and reasons for this.
Use of portable water and foam monitors, fire hose, fire hydrants and foam tanker for foam monitor concentrate supply.
Use of water for cooling heat affected plant and equipment, correct foam application rates for foam monitor application and application methods.
Knowledge of mechanisms of crude boilover and potential fire escalation by crude oil boilover and associated hazards

COMPETENCIES
RESPONDER KNOWS:

Area emergency plan, emergency team members and team call out system, emergency incident command structure and fire responder responsibilities.
Station firewater system normal flowrate and pressures, the location of firewater system isolation valves, how to use a fire hydrant safely and how to avoid water
hammer.
Function of surge tanks and basic tank design including roof-to-seam design and main gas and oil piping connections.
Types of portable water monitor and foam monitor in use at the station in particular and the area in general.
Types of delivery fire hose and connections in use at the station and the area.
Types of fire hydrants and number of hydrant outlets on hydrants at the LPS.
Types of foam in use at the station in the surge tank foam system and in the station fire cabinets and their correct proportioning ratio.
Types of portable foam inductors and foam branches in use in the station and the station area and their respective flowrates and pressures.
Hazards associated with crude oil boilover events.

RESPONDER IS ABLE TO:

Identify fire response personal protective equipment.


Describe surge tank pump out under emergency conditions and how this may affect boilover damage.
Identify all valves on fixed foam system to operate system manually at the foam station.
Explain what is meant by the terms boilover and pump-out.
Identify time before a 20 litre foam concentrate drum is empty using a given a portable foam branch.
Deploy and actuate water and foam monitors in use at the station in a safe and stable manner as part of a two man team and as one man.
Describe the objectives of cooling a fixed roof tank and explain where water streams should be directed to achieve maximum cooling protection.

RESPONDER DEMONSTRATES:

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Method of wearing PPE for fire response.


Method of delivery fire hose running, hose connection, disconnection, advancing/retiring a length of fire hose, connecting branches to fire hose and how to make
up fire hose.
Method of supplying foam concentrate to portable foam monitors from a foam tanker.
Method of setting up and stabilising portable water monitors using fire hydrants and fire hose as part of a two man team and as one man.
Method of handling a charged hoseline with branch as part of a two man team and as one man.
Method of setting up portable foam making equipment to produce foam from a foam branch as part of a two man hoseline team.
At least two methods of gentle foam application from a portable foam branch.

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2.2.5

Shortfall Listing
This section should list all shortfalls identified during the preparation of the
pre-fire plan in comparison to the FERM Specification requirements. The
listing should include statements regarding whether or not the shortfall is
acceptable and that a waiver from the Specification should be obtained. In
those shortfalls which are not acceptable, a priority shall be assigned,
together with personnel designated for action.
Examples of shortfall listings are provided in the worked examples of Fire
Scenario Worksheets in Section 3.2.

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2.3
2.3.1

Fire Scenario Development


General
This section needs to list the major fire scenarios identified after reviewing
the facilities.
Those scenarios of a minor nature need not be listed individually if for
these strategy level 1 types, the existing resources have been reviewed
and are considered adequate. Minor fire scenarios are equated to a FERM
strategy level 1. Minor fire scenarios are those which can reasonably be
expected to be dealt with by operators or staff using available fire
equipment.
The equipment would not normally exceed 1 or 2
extinguishers or a trolley extinguisher. Such minor fires may be a limited
hydrocarbon spill fire, refuse container fire, small office fire, or other easily
contained fires.
Serious and major fire scenarios are those involving critical production
equipment that present potentially serious consequences and require
specific protection or response resources. Serious or major scenarios can
be equated to a FERM strategy level 2, 3 or 4. The following procedure
should be followed when filling out the work sheet (refer to Attachment I
for a blank work sheet):

Identify the consequences from each


Identify the existing FERM measures in place
Compare existing and required FERM measures for each scenario
Establish the fire response and training for fire response
Identify shortfalls in resources and training for fire response.

The fire scenarios identified should then be listed. Section 3.1 of this
Guideline provides examples of typical major fire scenarios. Guidance is
provided below on how to complete the resource levels for scenarios.
A blank work sheet example showing the format and information
requirement is shown in Attachment I.
2.3.2

Resource Levels for Scenarios


The Scenario Worksheets contain quantities of resources identified for the
particular fire event described. The quantities should be based on the
following information.
Foam Concentrate
Calculations to be based on NFPA minimum application rates plus foam
blanket maintenance (top up) where required and considering foam
capacity of foam monitors or foam branches.
Fire Hoses
Review the nearest hydrants which may be used, number of hose inlets in
a portable water monitor or portable foam monitor or foam branch.

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Monitors
Judgemental based on practical fire ground experience and/or surface area
or number of exposure hazards to be cooled if for water monitors, or foam
solution capacity if for foam monitors.
Manpower
Based on the number of monitors or handlines to be deployed or SCBA to
be used. Typically, three men are needed for deploying a single monitor
and fire hose to the monitor, maintaining the flow direction of the water
stream or for maintaining the foam supply and direction of the foam
stream. Where obviously practical, man power for monitors are also used
to supply foam concentrate to foam hand lines if they are also in use.
For foam hand lines, typically, a minimum of 2 fire responders are needed
for each hand line excluding foam re-supply.
Vehicles
Generally, there is only one fire truck listed although a foam tanker may
also be used.
Specialist Equipment
Mainly SCBA sets. Based on one set per person for scenarios where
personnel may be exposed to smoke conditions or atmospheres.

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3.0EXAMPLES
3.1

Fire Protection Systems Maintenance Plans


EXAMPLE 2. Water Deluge System
Following maintenance, inspections and tests and frequency applies to the
water deluge system either in addition to the existing maintenance
requirements or to enhance the requirements. The following considers the
operating environment, water supply and materials in use for the deluge
system.
The fire and gas detection frequency and methods have been checked and
generally found satisfactory:

GU-230

2.1

Weekly
Check all valves to ensure they are in the normal stand-by mode;
Inspect firewater supply to ensure water supply will be operational
if required;
Check water supply and air supply valves for leakage;
Check deluge valve pressure gauges to ensure pressure differential
is maintained at the required settings.

2.2

Monthly
Check for system hardware wear and tear or physical damage;
Check for corrosion at drain/weep holes on discharge piping;
Check low air supply alarm for deluge valve;

2.3

Quarterly
Override or isolate executive actions on the fire detection and
alarm panel;
Override Solenoid switch for deluge valve operation
Remove solenoid, inspect, clean and test operation
Reassemble solenoid
Test solenoid actuator on deluge valve;
Actuate the system (from different detection or manual device
each time) to check each nozzle water pattern;
Remove and clean any blocked water nozzle;
Flush the discharge piping and nozzles;
Remove terminal nozzles from the discharge piping array;
Run deluge system for minimum 2 minutes with terminal nozzles
and any blocked nozzles removed for flushing purposes;
Close water discharge valve;
Reassemble all removed nozzles;
Reset the deluge valve;
Reinstate the fire detection system to normal operation;
Ensure discharge piping drain/weep hole is functioning correctly.

2.4

6 Monthly
Remove and clean water screen/filter and reassemble.

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2.5

Annually
Strip, clean, test and reinstall the deluge valve in accordance with
manufacturers instructions;

EXAMPLE 3 Turbine Enclosure CO2 System

GU-230

3.1

Weekly
Check all CO2 status lights are indicating outside the turbine
enclosures
The following maintenance, inspections and tests and frequency
applies to the CO2 system for the power station either in addition to
the existing maintenance requirements or to enhance the
requirements. Check system is on automatic release at F & G panel
and at enclosures
Check CO2 cylinders are in position and are securely fastened.
Check slave cylinder is in position
Check manual isolation device is available in the cylinder room
Check there are no fault signals on the fire and gas panel for the
generators
Test automatic/manual switch at enclosure and ensure this
indicates at F & G panel. Return switch to automatic.

3.2

Monthly
Check general condition of heat detectors,flame detectors and gas
detectors in the enclosures.
Check enclosure doors are properly closed and door seal is in good
condition.

3.3

6 Monthly
Check cylinders CO2 content either by non intrusive level detection
or by weighing cylinders. Any cylinder showing a net loss of 10% or
more should be refilled or replaced.
Check all piping and flexible hoses for wear and tear or damage.
Ensure system is isolated if weighing cylinders
Return system to service on completion of cylinder content checks.
Check flame detectors positioning and ensure they are aimed in
accordance with design intent.
Isolate or override flame detectors executive actions and test using
UV test lighting device.
Reinstate UV executive alarms.

3.4

5 yearly
All high pressure hoses should be removed and tested by hydrotest to
a pressure of 175 barg. Pressure to be maintained for one minute. Any
hose and/or coupling developing a leak during this time should be
replaced

REVISION 2.0

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3.2

Fire Scenario Worksheets


Example worksheets are provided for the following typical fire scenarios:

Full Surface Fire - coned roof tank.


Rim Seal Fire - floating roof tank.
Gas Compressor.

SCENARIO WORKSHEET 1
REFERENCE: XXX-1
FACILITY

Crude Oil Dewatering

FERM STRATEGY LEVEL

PLANT/EQUIPMENT Tank T-XXX. One of two surge tanks. No sparing. Tank is


27.5m diameter and 11.5m height. Tank maximum capacity
is 6830 m3.
FUNCTION

Surge/Dewatering Duty Tank.


Normal duty is between 55% level and 80% level at
approximately 45oC. Both tanks serve as buffer storage for
approximately 5 hours.

SCENARIO

Full surface open can fire occurs due to either internal


explosion or overfilling of tank. Tank roof is either partly or
wholly separated from tank shell.
Adjacent dewatering tank T-2613 roof affected by radiant
heat. Tank is full at time of fire event.

CONSEQUENCES
Immediate
Life safety Personnel not normally on the tank roof. If internal explosion occurs,
roof may totally separate resulting in spiralling heavy object. Personnel in the
general area may be at risk from this event. Radiant heat at grade level should
not present a life threatening condition from the full surface fire.
Environment Initially, smoke pollution only. Some crude may have spilled into
bund on roof separation but this will be retained in bund.
Business interruption Immediate shutdown.
Asset Loss/Production Deferment Involved tank damaged due to loss of roof and
burning surface. Immediate production deferment, will be approximately 14,000
m 3.
Escalation Route and Time Estimates
Adjacent surge/dewatering tank roof would be subjected to moderate radiant heat
that may result in roof damage or failure in the order of 50/60 minutes if no
cooling actions were taken. Radiant heat effects may increase if wind direction
and speed causes flame to tilt toward adjacent tank and therefore time to failure
may be much less than the above.

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If fire is not extinguished within first 1 or 2 hours, boilover will result some time
after this. Crude boilover may overflow tank bunds and then would involve
adjacent surge tank and possibly some of the bulk and/or test separators outside
the tank bund.
Post Escalation
Life safety Fire responders may be fatally or seriously injured if caught in the
vicinity of a crude boilover.
Environment Soil contamination will occur if crude overflowed bunds. Continued
smoke pollution.
Business interruption Prolonged station shutdown.
Asset Loss/Production Deferment Loss of both surge tanks due to escalation.
Production deferment would be approximately 14,000 m3/day.
EXISTING FERM
Detection
Process Tank low and high level alarms. High level trips tank inlet and outlet and
causes hydrocarbon ESD.
Fire Event Fusible plug heat detection ring on tank roof rim with 3 pressure
switches voting 2 out of 3 to cause tank ESD, hydrocarbon ESD, site fire siren,
foam pump start and foam system valve to tank opened.
Gas Event Not applicable for this event.
Mitigation
Process Controls Tank inlet/outlet valves, hydrocarbon ESD, Station ESD.
Containment Tank acts as containment. Tank walls will fold inward during fire
event. Bund acts as containment for oil spillage/release.
Drainage Bund drains provided and normally closed.
Passive Fire Control Single bund and intermediate bund between tanks.
Active Fire Control Fixed automatic semi sub-surface injection foam system
serving both tanks. Quantity of foam concentrate required in foam storage tank is
not precisely indicated but appears to be in the order of 8,500 litres. (See section
2.2.5). Firewater system taken from water injection header but it is not known if
the water pressure and supply can be increased under fire/emergency conditions.
Fire hydrants in the general area of the tanks. No fixed water monitors.
12
x fire boxes with typical contents as 6 fire hose, 120 litres 3% fluoroprotein foam
concentrate, 1 x 225 lpm foam branch and inductor and 1 x 450 lpm water
branch.
EFFECTIVENESS OF FIXED FIRE SYSTEMS
Applicability of Type
Applicable for the type of tank and tank duty although a base injection system is
the preferred foam system for such tanks. Use of a Universal foam concentrate is
unnecessary as a standard approved fluoroprotein concentrate would be just as
effective.
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System/Hardware Suitability
The firewater supply is pressure governed and during a test with a water monitor
only 3 barg was achieved. It was stated that the pressure would rise after a short
time but on a later foam discharge test the pressure was again low. The foam
discharged appeared to be weak although visual indications cannot prove
inaccurate proportioning. It is therefore necessary to carry out tests as soon as
practically possible to ensure correct proportioning across a range of pressures.
The foam concentrate storage tank has had leaks and the tank level is difficult to
read.
There is no clear level gauge and there is no information available as to the
minimum operating foam concentrate quantity that should be maintained in the
tank. There are 3 high backpressure foam generators (HBPG) but one of these is
normally valve locked closed, acting as a stand-by for maintenance. Generally,
the hardware is suitable but there are shortfalls as noted.
Reliability
System has actuated in 1996 although cause was a spurious fire alarm. The
design of the foam hose deployment inside the tank is unknown, i.e. is it vertical,
horizontal or inclined ? Sludge build-up in the tank over the course of 5 years
may prevent foam hose deployment and thus prevent foam application on the
tank fire. The foam inlet is less than 1 metre from the tank base.
During a discharge test, the foam/water duplex gauge did not function, indicating
blocked water and foam lines. The drain valves for the gauge did not work,
indicating lack of effective maintenance.
Operability
System is automatic from heat detection or remote at control room or locally by
pneumatic switch actuation. System actuated during test when pressure was
reduced in the fusible plug line. There are no instructions posted at the foam
station for manual operation of the system or which valve to open for which tank.
Also, the tank numbers cannot be seen from the foam station.
There are questions over the pressures available from the water injection supply
header. The pressure regulators appear to be set at a maximum of 10 barg but on
testing it was obvious that the pressure was much lower than this.
This scenario envisages use of water monitors and a foam monitor that will result
in an obvious pressure drop. It is not clear if this will impact on the foam system
and it is also not clear if the control valves on the water supply header can be
altered to meet water demand under emergency conditions.
Survivability (in incident)
Foam inlets are at lower tank area. Roof separation would not affect foam system
operation unless roof blow-off descends and impacts on foam inlets or inlet
piping.
FIRE PROTECTION & FIREFIGHTING STRATEGY OBJECTIVES
Heat detection and alarm - Tank inlet/outlet ESD and hydrocarbon ESD - Operator
confirms fire event - Actuation of fixed foam system to affected tank - Fire
brigade response - Fire brigade deploy cooling water monitors on adjacent tank
roof - Foam application until extinguishment and thereafter until a secure foam
blanket is achieved - Fire brigade deploys foam monitor in case foam system
requires supplementary application - Fire brigade stand-by until incident declared
over.
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Firefighting Tactics
Stage 1 Heat detector alarms in control room. Operators confirm fire event and
ensure tank ESD has initiated and foam system has actuated. Control room
selects relevant pre-fire plan and ensures site alarm has activated and alerts fire
brigade.
Stage 2 Fire brigade selects relevant pre-fire plan and responds to incident.
Stage 3 Control rooms alerts LEBC who designates OSC for the incident and
requests call out of emergency team.
Stage 4 Fire brigade deploys and actuates cooling water monitors on adjacent
tank roof to prevent potential fire escalation.
Stage 5 Fire brigade deploys foam monitor in event additional foam application
is required.
Stage 6 OSC monitors fire size and severity for foam system control impact and
ensures water streams are not affecting foam application.
Stage 7 Foam system application continued until extinguishment and thereafter
to ensure a secure foam blanket is achieved on the liquid surface.
Stage 8 Fire brigade actuate portable foam monitor if fire is controlled by foam
system but not fully extinguished due to fire trap areas of folded tank shell
maintaining minor fire pockets.
Stage 9 Fire brigade checks to ensure fire is totally extinguished and a secure
foam blanket is achieved.
Stage 10 Fire brigade stand-by until incident is declared over and stand-down is
announced.
RESOURCES REQUIRED TO MEET STRATEGY OBJECTIVES
Resources for Other than Fire Response Group
Detection
Process

As Existing FERM measures

Fire Event

As Existing FERM measures

Gas Event

Not applicable.

Alarm system
For Operator
Site Alarm

Tank level alarms, Heat detection alarm and

For Fire Brigade

Emergency Team Pager Call Out

Process Control

As existing FERM measures

Passive Fire Protection

As existing FERM measures

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Active Fire Protection


firewater

As existing FERM measures plus:Method and procedures for additional


supply/pressure under emergency conditions.
Instructions on manual operation of foam

system.
Fixed Syst. Firewater Flow
foam system.

3457 lpm for affected tank from fixed


3500 lpm for propane accumulator water
deluge system which will actuate on surge
tank heat detection.
Total = 6,957 lpm

Resources for Fire Brigade


Procedures

Pre-fire plans
Emergency response procedures

Hose
monitors.

12 x 70mm x 20m fire hose for water


12 x 70mm x 20m fire hose for foam monitor.
Total of 24 x 70mm x 20 delivery fire hose.

Monitors

2 x 3000 lpm water monitor


1 x 3400 lpm foam monitor

Foam Concentrate

5880 litres 3% AFFF for T-2623


3060 litres 3% FP for foam monitor (if used)
Total = 5,880 litres 3% AFFF
3,060 litres 3% FP.

Specialist Equipment
Manpower

None
6 fire responders for portable water monitors
3 fire responders for foam monitor
Total of 9 fire responders

Vehicles

1 x fire truck
1 x 9000 litre 3% flouroprotein foam tanker

Port. Equip. Water Flow

6000 lpm for water monitors


3400 lpm for foam monitor (if used)
Total = 9,400 lpm

Fixed and Port. Total Flow

3,457 lpm for fixed foam system


3,500 lpm for water deluge system
6,000 lpm for water monitors
3,400 lpm for foam monitor (if used)
Total = 16,357 lpm.

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Total Water Quantity


minutes)
(fixed & portable)
minutes)
supporting

190 m3 for fixed foam system (55


105 m3 for water deluge system (30 minutes)
360 m3 for portable water monitors (60
99 m3 for foam monitor (30 minutes the foam system if necessary).
Total =754 m3.

SHORTFALLS IN EXISTING FERM & STRATEGY LEVEL


The following are listed as shortfalls in procedures, hardware or resources when
compared to the facility FES Strategy Level or the FERM Specification SP 1075 as
noted during the development of this scenario worksheet:
i)

The operators do not have the necessary fire training to act as back-up for
the fixed systems or to assist the fire brigade. Reliance for back-up rests
solely with the fire brigade who may be on stand-by at the airstrip when
this scenario develops.

ii)

Fire cabinets and equipment within intended for operator use but
operators are not trained to use equipment in boxes. (FES Strategy Level 3
Issue)

iii)

A total of 9 fire responders are required for this scenario. There are only 5
fire brigade personnel to respond and the operators cannot back-up the
fire brigade due to lack of training in use of monitors and hose handling
etc.

iv)

Firewater supply taken from water injection system. Pressure is controlled


via pressure control valves (3 of) but there are no fire pumps. This is a
deviation but may be acceptable provided pressure and flow can be
maintained under emergency conditions.

v)

The maximum firewater demand for this scenario is 16,357 lpm but the
design firewater supply is listed as 12,000 lpm (720 m 3/h) @ 10 barg.
There is no known procedure or method for increasing firewater
pressure/supply under emergency conditions where additional water is
required. Although not listed in the Specification, this would be part of a
requirement for fire water pumps.

vi)

There are no instructions on the operation of the fixed foam system at the
foam station. These should be provided.

vii)

No labelling of main valve functions on the foam system.

viii)

No sight glass on foam concentrate tank.

ix)

It is understood that there is a sludge build up in the tanks over the course
of 5 years. It is possible, given the low location of the foam injection
system inlets, that depending on the design of the foam inlet within the
tank (vertical bend or straight pipe inlet) sludge will prevent or obstruct
the deployment of the foam hose in the tank. It is necessary to check the
inside of a tank to ensure the foam hose can be deployed.

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x)

The foam system flexible hose inspection quoted as every 5 years when
tank is down for maintenance but it is possible to remove the hose
container and visually inspect the hose as there is a tank isolation valve
downstream of hose unit and this should be done.

xi)

An annual foam discharge is carried out but the necessary proportioning,


expansion or drainage tests are not being carried out.

xii)

There is no foam test kit for proportioning, expansion and drainage


testing.

xiii)

The minimum foam concentrate quantity to be maintained in the foam


system tank is unknown. There appears to be approximately 8,500 litres
but this is not confirmed and the design quantity is not listed in the foam
system installation manual. Calculations (See below) illustrate that a
minimum of 5880 litres should be in the tank and as per NFPA there should
also be 100% of this quantity available within 24 hours. There is no exact
heading for this in the Specification but generally this is covered under SP
1075 - Foam Systems.

xiv)

Spare foam concentrate is located in drums at the foam station but there
is no identification of the concentrate type or expiry date or UL approvals
normally associated with approved foam concentrate supplies. The source
of the foam concentrate is unknown. It appears to be a polymer AFFF
(Universal type) but this cannot be confirmed without detailed analysis. It
is possible that this concentrate is decanted from the original
manufacturers drums but this is not confirmed.

xv)

The original concentrate in the system was a universal 3 & 6% AFFF foam
for use at 3% on hydrocarbon fires and 6% for polar solvent fuels. This is a
polymer-based concentrate. It is unclear if the spare drums concentrate is
the same type and if it has UL approvals etc.

CRUDE SURGE/DEWATERING TANK FULL SURFACE FIRE


FOAM/WATER CALCULATIONS SHEET
USING FIXED FOAM SYSTEM AND PORTABLE FOAM MONITOR
Fire Area (Tank Dia. 27.5m)

594 m2

Foam Concentrate

3% AFFF

System Design Application Rate


Installation Manual)

6 lpm/m2 (Taken from

Total Application Rate

594 x 6 = 3564 lpm/m2.

Foam Application Time

55 minutes

Total Concentrate Required

3564 x 0.03 x 55 = 5,880 litres

Total Water Required

3564 - 107 (3%) x 55 = 190 m3

Portable Foam Monitor Application

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Foam Monitor Capacity

3,400 lpm

Application Time

30 minutes

Total Concentrate Required

3,400 x 0.03 x 30 = 3,060 litres

Total Water Required

3400 - 102 (3%) x 30 minutes = 99 m3

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SCENARIO WORKSHEET 2
REFERENCE: XXX-2
FACILITY

Crude Oil Dehydration

FERM STRATEGY LEVEL

PLANT/EQUIPMENT Tank T-XXXX. One of six floating roof tanks. No sparing.


Tank is 29.2m diameter and 14.6m height. Tank maximum
capacity is 8586 m3.
FUNCTION

Crude Oil Dehydration Tank.


Normal duty is between 55% level and 60% level at
approximately 40oC. One of six dehydration tanks.

SCENARIO

Rim seal fire occurs on tank T-XXXX. Tank is 60% (5140 m 3)


full at time of fire event. Overfilling of tank. Adjacent
dehydration tanks are all almost full under normal
operating conditions.

CONSEQUENCES
Immediate
Life Safety Personnel not normally on the tank floating roof. Immediate life
safety risk is considered low.
Environment Smoke pollution only. Fire is contained in the tank rim seal area.
Business interruption Immediate shutdown on detection of rim seal fire, plus all
incoming oil MOV/ESDV from all areas will close-in.
Asset Loss/Production Deferment Involved tank seal damaged due to fire.
Production deferments from all gathering stations when surge tanks and storage
tank high levels are reached.
Escalation Route and Time Estimates
Rim seal fires have burned for several hours without escalation and in at least two
known cases, for more than 24 hours without escalation. However, this was due to
the high standard of effective maintenance of the tanks involved and it should not
be assumed that these time frames would apply to every floating roof tank rim
seal fire.
The main concern is that if the fire is unchecked it will continue around the full
seal circumference and thereafter the flame impingement would affect the tank
shell and roof. It is therefore prudent to expect escalation within a few hours if no
fire control or extinguishing actions are taken. Escalation would occur if the roof
tilted/jammed or sank, creating a full surface fire event.
Post Escalation
Life Safety Fire responders on the gaugers platform may be injured by burns if
they are at the tank top when the roof jams or tilts. Such an event should be
noticeable and therefore the risk to responders is considered low.
Environment Continued smoke pollution. Fire would still be contained.
Business interruption Prolonged shutdown.
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Asset Loss/Production Deferment Loss of affected dehydration tank due to


escalation. Production deferment for all areas will be approximately 70,000
m3/day.
EXISTING FERM
Detection
Process Tank low, high and high-high level alarms. High-high level trips tank
inlets and all incoming oil lines and causes Station ESD.
Fire Event Halon fusible plug detection. New fusible plug heat detection ring
provided around tank rim seal area with 3 pressure switches voting 2 out of 3 to
cause total ESD. This new detection system is installed but not yet commissioned.
Gas Event Not applicable for this event.
Mitigation
Process Controls Tank inlet/outlet valves, Station ESD remote from control room
and automatic on rim seal point heat detection.
Containment Tank acts as containment for rim seal fire.
Drainage Bund drains provided and normally closed.
Passive Fire Control The primary seal and secondary seal material specification
could not be confirmed during the study. It is doubtful if the material is fire
retardant.
Active Fire Control Fixed automatic halon system provided for the rim seal area.
Fixed manually operated rim seal foam pourer system using balanced pressure
proportioning. Foam system concentrate tank holds 1370 litres of 3%
fluoroprotein. Firewater system supplied from dedicated firewater tank. Fire
hydrants in the general area of the 6 x fire boxes strategically located throughout
the facility. Each box typically contains 1 x 250 lpm foam branch, 3 x 20 litre
fluoroprotein 3% foam concentrate drums, 1 x 450 lpm water branch, 4 x 70mm x
20m delivery fire hose.
Effectiveness of Fixed Fire Systems
Applicability of Type
Halon is being phased out and the rim seal foam system is designed to replace
the halon system.
Foam system is applicable for the type of tank and rim seal. An automatic system
would be more appropriate considering the low manning levels and the absence
of fire crews (airstrip stand-by) during daylight hours.
System/Hardware Suitability
Foam system hardware is suitable for a fixed manually operated system but
better weather protection of the system is necessary to prevent foam concentrate
deterioration and overall hardware wear and tear, especially valve identification
and instructions.
Reliability
Foam system has been commissioned in May 1998. With this type of system it is
necessary to either regularly flush the foam pump with clean water (weekly) and
maintain a dry foam pump or if pump permanently flooded with concentrate then
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regularly turn the pump over and cycle the foam concentrate back to foam tank.
Given the operating environment, it is important that a high frequency of foam
pump flushing or circulation running is provided, otherwise this system will
become very unreliable.
Operability
Foam system is manual only and requires operators or firefighters to actuate
during a fire event. There are no instructions on how to operate the system and
there are no foam tank valve and system valve identification labels. The original
labels have been damaged or the combination of sand and heat has erased them.
Survivability (in incident)
Foam system pourers are above the rim seal and therefore above the fire area. If
the tank roof is high and the rim seal fire is high the pourers may be subjected to
radiant heat and damage. Therefore it is important that the foam system is
actuated as quickly as possible to extinguish the fire.
FIRE PROTECTION & FIREFIGHTING STRATEGY OBJECTIVES
Heat detection and alarm and halon discharge - Tank inlet/outlet ESD, Station ESD
- Operator confirms fire event - Actuation of fixed foam system to affected tank Fire brigade response - Fire responders check if rim seal fire is extinguished and
a secure foam blanket is achieved in the rim seal area - Portable foam application
into rim seal to support fixed system application if required - Fire brigade standby until incident declared over.
FIREFIGHTING TACTICS
Stage 1 Rim seal heat detection alarms in control room. Operators confirm fire
event and halon discharge and ensure tank ESD and Station ESD has initiated.
Control room selects relevant pre-fire plan and ensures site alarm has activated
and alerts fire responders.
Stage 2 Fire responders select relevant pre-fire plan and responds to incident.
Stage 3 Control rooms alerts LEBC who designates OSC for the incident and
requests call out of emergency team.
Stage 4 Operator actuates the rim seal foam system for the affected tank.
Stage 5 Fire responders don SCBA and ascend tank and check to ensure rim
seal fire is extinguished and foam application covers all the foam dam area.
Stage 6 Fire responders in SCBA run a foam handline to the tank top and apply
foam into the rim seal to support the rim seal system if necessary. (This may
require responders to move on to the roof as there is no wind girder (walkway)
around the tanks)
Stage 7 OSC verifies fire is extinguished and a secure foam blanket is achieved
in the rim seal foam dam area.
Stage 8 Rim seal foam dam blanket is topped up to ensure foam blankert is
maintained effectively, acting as a vapour suppression blanket.
Stage 9 Fire brigade stand-by until incident is declared over and stand-down is
announced.

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RESOURCES REQUIRED TO MEET STRATEGY OBJECTIVES


Resources for Other than Fire Response Group
Detection
Process

As Existing FERM measures

Fire Event

As Existing FERM measures

Gas Event

Not applicable.

Alarm system
For Operator
alarm.

Tank high and high-high level alarms, Heat detection


Site Alarm

For Fire Brigade

Emergency Team Pager Call Out

Process Control

As Existing FERM measures

Passive Fire Protection

As Existing FERM measures

Active Fire Protection


halon

As Existing FERM measures and also removal of


system for the tanks.

Fixed Syst. Firewater Flow


system.

700 lpm for affected tank from fixed foam

Total = 700 lpm


Resources for Fire Brigade
Procedures

Pre-fire plans
Emergency response procedures

Hose

8 x 70mm x 20m fire hose for foam handline.


Total of 8 x 70mm x 20m delivery fire hose.

Monitors

None.

Foam Concentrate

420 litres 3% fluoroprotein for rim seal.


270 litres 3% fluoroprotein for handlines.
Total

Specialist Equipment
Manpower

= 690 litres.
Minimum 4 x SCBA sets

2 fire responders for foam handline


2 fire responders for support/stand-by
1 fire responder for foam concentrate supply
Total of 5 fire responders

Vehicles
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1 x 6300 litre 3% flouroprotein foam tanker


Port. Equip. Water Flow

450 lpm for foam handline.


Total = 450 lpm

Fixed and Port. Total Flow

700 lpm for fixed foam system


450 lpm for foam handline
Total = 1,150 lpm.

Total Water Quantity


minutes)
(fixed & portable)

14 m3 for fixed foam system (20


9 m3 for foam handline (20 minutes)
9 m for foam blanket top-up
3

Total =32 m3.


SHORTFALLS IN EXISTING FERM & STRATEGY LEVEL
The following are listed as shortfalls in either procedures, hardware or resources
when compared to the facility FES Strategy Level or SP 1075 FERM as noted
during the development of this scenario worksheet:
i)

The operators do not have the necessary fire training to act as back-up for
the fixed foam system or to assist the fire brigade. Reliance for back-up
rests solely with the fire brigade who stand-by for most of the daylight
hours at the airstrip, about 17 km distant and may be there when this
scenario develops. (Strategy Level 3 Issue)

ii)

Fire cabinets and equipment within are intended for operator use but
operators are not trained to use equipment in boxes. (FES Strategy Level 3
Issue)

iii)

There are no instructions on the operation of the fixed foam system at the
foam station and no valve labels or descriptions. These should be
provided.

iv)

Fire crews are not trained in the use of the fixed foam system.

v)

Fire crews are not trained to use foam handlines on a rim seal fire or for
moving on to a floating roof tank.

vi)

The foam system is not fully protected against direct sunlight and sand
erosion. This is leading to poor system condition.

vii)

The temperature varations are causing water condensation on the tank


inside cover that is affecting the foam concentrate. This is due to
inadequate weather protection.

viii)

It is understood that the commissioning tests for the fixed foam system did
not include a foam proportioning, expansion or drainage test. This could
not be confirmed during the study period.

ix)

It is understood that there is no foam test kit for proportioning, expansion


and drainage testing.

GU-230

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Recommending Best Practice

x)

Foam was discharged from the valve manifold connection during a brief
flow test (not to the tanks) and although there was no method of checking
the quality or proportioning of the foam the visual observations raised
doubts over the produced foam effectiveness for firefighting, mainly due
to the firewater contamination.

xi)

There is no clear responsibility for the maintenance


hardware/mechanical components of fixed foam system.

of

DEHYDRATION TANK RIM SEAL FIRE


FOAM/WATER CALCULATIONS SHEET
USING FIXED FOAM SYSTEM AND PORTABLE FOAM HANDLINE
Tank Dia.

29.2 m

Tank Circumference

95 m

Foam Dam Distance

0.6 m

Foam Dam Area

95 x 0.6 = 57 m2

Foam Concentrate

3% Fluoroprotein

System Design Application Rate

12.2 lpm/m2 (NFPA)

Total Application Rate

57 x 12.2 = 700 lpm.

Foam Application Time

20 minutes

Total Concentrate Required

700 x 0.03 x 20 = 420 litres

Total Water Required

700 - 21 (3%) x 20 = 13.5 m3

Portable Foam Handline Application


Foam Branch Capacity

450 lpm

Application Time

20 minutes

Total Concentrate Required

450 x 0.03 x 20 = 270 litres

Total Water Required

450 - 14 (3%) x 20 minutes = 8.7m3

GU-230

REVISION 2.0

Page 24

the

HSE GUIDELINE

Recommending Best Practice

SCENARIO WORKSHEET 3
REFERENCE: XXX-3
FACILITY

Gas Conditioning Unit

FERM STRATEGY LEVEL

PLANT/EQUIPMENT Propane Compressor K-XXX. Single compressor. No sparing,


no stand-by.
FUNCTION

Propane compressor for refrigerant gas sweetening


facilities. Normal discharge pressure is approximately 20
barg at 5oC. Loss of compressor would result in heavy
flaring requirement and probable shut down in the long
term but oil production could continue in the short term.

SCENARIO

Propane release from the compressor or associated


vessels/equipment on discharge side and ignition results in
a jet fire in the order of 25 metres in length. Jet flame
diffuses against compressor suction and interstage
scrubber vessels. Heat detection on compressor activates
compressor ESD, gas conditioning ESD and water deluge
system for propane accumulator. No hydrocarbon ESD. A
hole size of 25mm on the high pressure side would release
in the order of 3 kg/second.

CONSEQUENCES
Immediate
Life safety Personnel are not normally present in the gas conditioning area.
Personnel in the general area may be at risk from radiant heat on ignition.
Compressor is on upper level but two escape routes provided. Grade level Pumps
area is open on all sides. Life safety risk is considered low.
Environment Smoke pollution only.
Business interruption Immediate propane compressor and gas conditioning ESD.
No hydrocarbon ESD but operators would probably shut down the station for such
an incident.
Asset Loss/Production Deferment Damage to insulation and instrument fittings
and cabling on compressor and associated equipment. Would shutdown
immediately with resultant initial production deferment of approximately 14,000
m3/day.
Escalation Route and Time Estimates
Escalation would be caused by a prolonged jet fire or diffused gas fire impinging
on adjacent gas containing piping or scrubber vessels or the propane accumulator
vessel. For gas jet fires, time to failure of other equipment would typically be in
the order of 10 minutes or less for piping and vessels if no cooling or control
actions are taken. Gas jet flame impingement would involve radiant heat levels of
up to 300 kW/m2. It should be noted that cooling must be effective where the
flame impingement occurs rather than having a light water screen for radiant
heat general protection.
Post Escalation

GU-230

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Life safety Fire responders will be at serious risk if flame impingment occurs on
gas containing piping or equipment and no cooling takes place. All non-fire
responders should have evacuated the station.
Environment Air pollution only.
Business interruption Total station oil and gas shutdown due to hazards
presented by potential explosions and BLEVEs.
Asset Loss/Production Deferment Loss of propane compressor, vessels and
piping would result in several months shutdown. Production may be permitted for
several days or more without gas sweeting facility but wet gas export and heavy
flaring would eventually impact on equipment and enviroment. Therefore,
production would be halted. Production deferment for gas conditioning down time
would be approximately 14,000 m3/day.
EXISTING FERM
Detection
Process
Compressor has seal gas leak detection alarm, vibration monitor
alarm, high temperature alarm, low pressure suction and high pressure discharge
alarms as well as suction low flow alarms.
Fire Event Single heat detector located over compressor will cause a
compressor ESD and gas conditioning ESD, will activate the propane accumulator
water deluge valve and site fire siren.
Gas Event No gas detection provided.
Mitigation
Process Controls Compressor has seal gas leak detection trip, vibration monitor
trip, high temperature trip, low pressure suction trip/high pressure discharge trip
and suction low flow trip.
Containment Not applicable.
Drainage No spill drainage. Compressor base slab drains away from centres out
to open ground areas.
Passive Five Control Adjacent propane accumulator has fireproofing of vessel
saddles/support. No passive protection on vessel or compressor associated
vessels.
Active Fire Control Firewater system taken from water injection header but it is
unknown if the water supply can be increased under fire/emergency conditions.
Fire hydrants in the general area of the export pumps. No fixed water monitors.
12 x fire boxes with typical contents as 6 fire hose, 120 litres 3% fluoroprotein
foam concentrate, 1 x 225 lpm foam branch and inductor and 1 x 450 lpm water
branch.
Effectiveness of Fixed Fire System (for Propane Accumulator Vessel)
Applicability of type
Water deluge system is applicable for cooling gas vessels and protecting from
radiant heat where no gas jet impingement is anticipated. Gas jet fires, being
pressurised, can penetrate a water screen and cause vessel failure. The most
effective method of protection where gas jet fires may impinge is passive fire
protective coatings.

GU-230

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However, the location of the propane accumulator to the high pressure propane
compressor is such that gas jet fire impingement is not likely. Any gas jet fire
would diffuse on the suction and interstage scrubber vessels in between the
compressor and the accumulator. These vessels will depressurise/blowdown but
they should still be cooled if this scenario occurs.
System/Hardware Suitability
The fixed system hardware consists of open ended deluge nozzles with system
kept normally dry. There are no terminal flushing connections on the branch lines
to ensure solids are flushed out.
Reliability
The system failed to operate from a heat detector during a test requested by the
study team. The control room fire and gas panel indicated the system was
activated and this led the operators to believe the system was working since the
panel was indicating this was the case.
The manual pneumatic valve had to be actuated at the deluge valve station to
make the system work. The pneumatic valve release solenoid switch was
defective. In addition to this defect, 10 of the 35 deluge nozzles failed to operate
due to nozzle blockage by either corrosion particles or other solids. It is necessary
to provide screw plugs or valves at the terminals of the deluge pipe branches to
permit flushing after use. This will reduce, though not eliminate nozzle blockage.
Operability
Automatic, remote manual and local manual operation all occur by pneumatic
release. However, from known jet fire potential, the manual actuation at the
deluge valve station is within radiant heat levels of 37kW/m 2 and above from a jet
fire event on the propane accumulator vessel or associated equipment. The
maximum radiant heat level allowed at a deluge station is 5 kW/m 2 and therefore
radiation protective screening is considered necessary.
Survivability (in incident)
If a jet fire impinges on the system piping or valving for <5 minutes without water
flow then system may fail.
An additional concern is that if a large propane liquid release occurs on the
accumulator this may quickly migrate toward the deluge valve controls because
the vessel slab slopes toward the water deluge valve. Calculations should be
made to check if pool migration to the valve assembly is possible.
FIRE PROTECTION & FIREFIGHTING STRATEGY OBJECTIVES
Heat detection and alarm - Compressor and gas conditioning ESD - Operator
confirms fire event - Actuation of fixed water deluge for propane accumulator Fire brigade response - Fire brigade deploy portable water monitor to cool any
heat affected exposures - Cooling maintained until depressurisation - Fire brigade
stand-by until incident is declared over.
FIREFIGHTING TACTICS
Stage 1 Heat detector alarms in control room. Operators confirm fire event and
ensure compressor and gas conditioning unit ESD. Control room selects relevant
pre-fire plan and ensures site alarm has actuated and alerts fire brigade.
Stage 2 Fire brigade selects relevant pre-fire plan and responds to incident.

GU-230

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Stage 3 Control room alerts LEBC who designates OSC for the incident and
requests call out of emergency team.
Stage 4 Fire brigade arrive and ensure propane accumulator vessel water
deluge is activated.
Stage 5 Fire brigade deploy and actuate portable water monitors to cool
heat/fire affected vessels and piping.
Stage 6 Fire brigade evacuates to a safe distance to await gas depressurisation.
Stage 7 Cooling operations maintained until depressurisation of gas fire. Any
residual minor gas flame extinguished by dry powder extinguisher if considered
safe to do so.
Stage 8 Fire brigade stand-by until incident is declared over and stand-down
announced.
RESOURCES REQUIRED TO MEET STRATEGY OBJECTIVES
Resources for Other than Fire Response Group
Detection
Process

As Existing FERM measures.

Fire Event

As Existing FERM measures.

Gas Event

Point flammable gas detection for propane compressor.

Alarm system
For Operator Low flow alarms, high pressure alarms, vibration alarms, high
temperature alarms on compressor. Heat detection alarm. Site Alarm.
For Fire Brigade

Emergency Team Pager Call Out

Process Control

As Existing FERM measures.

Passive Fire Protection

As Existing FERM.

Active Fire Protection


As Existing FERM measures plus method and
procedures for additional firewater supply and pressure under emergency
conditions.
Fixed Syst. Firewater Flow
Estimated at approximately 3,500 lpm based
on a total of 35 spray nozzles @ 100 lpm.
Resources for Fire Brigade
Procedures Pre-fire plans
Emergency response procedures.
Hose

12 x 70mm x 20m fire hose for water monitor.


Total = 12 x 70mm delivery fire hose.

GU-230

REVISION 2.0

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Recommending Best Practice

Monitors

2 x 3000 lpm portable water monitors.

Foam Concentrate Not applicable for this scenario.


Specialist equipment

Not applicable for this scenario.

Manpower

6 fire responders for setting up two water monitors.


Total of 6 fire responders.

Vehicles

1 x fire truck.

Port. Equip. Water Flow

6000 lpm for water monitors.


Total = 6,000 lpm

Fixed and Port. Total Flow

3500 lpm for fixed water deluge system

6000 lpm for water monitors


Total = 9,500 lpm
Total Water Quality

105 m3 for water deluge system (30 minutes)


180 m for water monitors (30 minutes)
3

Total = 285 m3.


SHORTFALLS IN EXISTING FERM & STRATEGY LEVEL
The following are listed as shortfalls in either procedures, hardware or resources
when compared to the facility FES Strategy Level or SP 1075 FERM as noted
during the development of this scenario worksheet:
i)

Existing fire response personnel limited to 5 only. A minimum of 6


responders are required for this scenario.

ii)

The operators do not have the necessary fire training to act as back-up for
the fixed systems. Reliance for back-up rests solely with the fire brigade
who may be on stand-by or out on maintenance work or at the airstrip
when this scenario develops.

iii)

Radiant heat potential from a gas jet fire on the propane accumulator in
the direction of the water deluge valve will exceed the limit of 5 kW/m 2,
there is no protection for personnel who may have to manually operate the
deluge system.

iv)

10 of the 35 water deluge nozzles for the propane accumulator were


blocked during a functional test of the system. The reduced water
coverage was inadequate to provide protection under fire conditons. (Fire
Equipment Maintenance).

v)

No point combustible gas detectors at the propane compressor. Criticality


of compressor and associated equipment for production is such that
earliest possible gas release alarm should be considered.

vi)

The water deluge valves on the discharge piping are correctly wire
padlocked in the open position but the valve can actually be closed with
this wire and padlock in place.

GU-230

REVISION 2.0

Page 29

HSE GUIDELINE

Recommending Best Practice

vii)

Fire cabinets and equipment within are intended for operator use but
operators are not trained to use equipment in boxes.

viii)

No known procedure or method for increasing firewater pressure/supply


under emergency conditions.

ix)
No reference to gas detection in SP 1075 for propane vessels (propane
accumulator).
x)

GU-230

The propane accumulator vessel slab slopes to allow drainage of a


propane liquid release but the slope is toward the deluge supply piping
and valve assembly and disable the system. The Specification does not
have reference to the provision of sloping drainage under LPG vessels but
this is an acceptable practice provided the slope is not directed to
protective systems or potential escalation areas. This should be mentioned
in the Specification.

REVISION 2.0

Page 30

HSE GUIDELINE

Recommending Best Practice

Attachment I: Blank Fire Scenario Work Sheet


Notes:

GU-230

1)

The first worksheet contains guidance notes (4 pages).

2)

The second work sheet is blank for copying for use (4 pages).

REVISION 2.0

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Recommending Best Practice

SCENARIO WORKSHEET (Guidance Notes)


REFERENCE:
FACILITY

Operation or process

FERM STRATEGY LEVEL

For the overall station or facility

PLANT/EQUIPMENT

Particular item or vessels or tank

FUNCTION

Process performed, its criticality etc.

SCENARIO

Credible description of a major or serious fire event


and if any ESD will occur

CONSEQUENCES
Immediate
Life safety

Any immediate impact on personnel

Environment

On enviroment

Business interruption

By ESD for fire event

Asset Loss/Production Deferment

Immediate effects of fire

Escalation Route and Time Estimates


If any escalation, the method/route that this may take and the rough time frames
in which the escalation may occur.
Post Escalation
Life safety

Impact after escalation

Environment

As above

Business interruption

As above

Asset Loss/Production Deferment

As above

EXISTING FERM
Detection
Process

Means of detecting a leak or release through process alarms

Fire Event

The type of detection provided

Gas Event

The type of detection provided

GU-230

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Mitigation
Process Controls

For mitigation (ESD, manual isolation, trips etc.)

Containment
etc.)

Once spill/release occurs, any physical containment (bunds

Drainage

Process drains or OWS etc.

Passive Fire Control


Active Fire Control
extinguishers.

If any for vessel supports, structures etc.


All fire systems and equipment, other than portable fire

Effectiveness of Fixed Fire Systems


Applicability of Type

For the hazard

System/Hardware Suitability For the environment, operating conditions, type of


system etc.
Reliability

Any previous spurious alarms or discharges.


Availability, additional maintenance, complexity of
operation etc.

Operability
operation.

Auto, remote, local functions and transparancy of

Survivability (in incident)

If required to survive the scenario immediate impact


or scenario duration, can it survive.

FIRE PROTECTION & FIREFIGHTING STRATEGY OBJECTIVES


Headings on what should occur and from what equipment or systems, and the fire
fighting strategy necessary to effectively contain, control and if necessary,
extinguish the fire event.
FIREFIGHTING TACTICS
Stage 1
received.

Logical staged actions from the moment the alarm is raised or

Stage 2
Stage 3 etc.
RESOURCES REQUIRED TO MEET STRATEGY OBJECTIVES
Resources for Other than Fire Response Group
What hardware, systems and/or equipment is required for operations or other non
fire brigade personnel to deal with the incident in accordance with the chosen
strategy. To meet the strategy the requirements may be more than the existing
FERM but should still be listed below. The short falls are itemised as part of the
facility plan.

GU-230

REVISION 2.0

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Recommending Best Practice

Detection
Process

Either as existing FERM measures or the specific requirements over


and above the existing.

Fire Event

Either as existing FERM measures or the specific requirements over


and above the existing.

Gas Event

Either as existing FERM measures or the specific requirements over


and above the existing.

Alarm system
For Operator

Any specific alarms (process or fire) for the operators.

For Fire Brigade


brigade.

Any specific alarms (process or fire) for the fire

Process Control
Passive Fire Protection

Either as existing FERM measurements or the specific


requirements over and above the existing.

Active Fire Protection

Either as existing FERM measurements or the specific


requirements over and above the existing.

Fixed Syst. Firewater Flow


only)

Lpm for fire systems (water based systems

Resources for Fire Brigade


These heading apply only to the fire brigade (or fire responders) resources to
combat the fire event.
Procedures
response.

What procedures or plans they should have for the

Hose

Quantity and sizes.

Monitors

Type, quantity and capacity.

Foam Concentrate

Type and quantity.

Specialist Equipment

Type and quantity.

Manpower

Total for all actions required.

Vehicles

Limited to the type available only.

Port. Equip. Water Flow

Monitors, water or foam hand lines etc.

Fixed and Port. Total Flow


Total including any fixed system flow plus the
portable equipment flow.
Total Water Quantity
GU-230

REVISION 2.0

Self explanatory.
Page 34

HSE GUIDELINE

Recommending Best Practice

(fixed & portable)


SHORTFALLS IN EXISTING FERM & STRATEGY LEVEL
Some of these will be identified from the resources required to meet the strategy
level but some may also be noted as short falls in maintenance or location of
equipment or other deficiency during the development of the scenario. As far as
possible, where a short fall item is listed, reference should be made to why, either
by use of the SP1075 FERM or DEP or ICAO requirements.

SCENARIO REFERENCE:
FOAM/WATER CALCULATIONS SHEET
Fire Area

m2

Foam Concentrate

Type and ratio

Design Application Rate

lpm/m2

Total Application Rate


Foam Application Time

lpm/m2
minutes

Total Concentrate Required

litres

Total Water Required

m3

GU-230

REVISION 2.0

Page 35

HSE GUIDELINE

Recommending Best Practice

SCENARIO WORKSHEET
REFERENCE:
FACILITY
FERM STRATEGY LEVEL
PLANT/EQUIPMENT
FUNCTION
SCENARIO
CONSEQUENCES
Immediate
Life safety
Environment
Business interruption
Asset Loss/Production Deferment
Escalation Route and Time Estimates
Post Escalation
Life safety
Environment
Business interruption
Asset Loss/Production Deferment
EXISTING FERM
Detection
Process
Fire Event
Gas Event

GU-230

REVISION 2.0

Page 36

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Recommending Best Practice

Mitigation
Process Controls
Containment
Drainage
Passive Fire Control
Active Fire Control
Effectiveness of Fixed Fire Systems
Applicability of Type
System/Hardware Suitability
Reliability
Operability
Survivability (in incident)
FIRE PROTECTION & FIREFIGHTING STRATEGY OBJECTIVES
FIREFIGHTING TACTICS
Stage 1
Stage 2
Stage 3 etc.
RESOURCES REQUIRED TO MEET STRATEGY OBJECTIVES
Resources for Other than Fire Response Group

GU-230

REVISION 2.0

Page 37

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Recommending Best Practice

Detection
Process
Fire Event
Gas Event
Alarm system
For Operator
For Fire Brigade
Process Control
Passive Fire Protection
Active Fire Protection
Fixed Syst. Firewater Flow
Resources for Fire Brigade
Procedures
Hose
Monitors
Foam Concentrate
Specialist Equipment
Manpower
Vehicles
Port. Equip. Water Flow

GU-230

REVISION 2.0

Page 38

HSE GUIDELINE

Recommending Best Practice

Fixed and Port. Total Flow


Total Water Quantity
(fixed & portable)
SHORTFALLS IN EXISTING FERM & STRATEGY LEVEL
SCENARIO REFERENCE:
FOAM/WATER CALCULATIONS SHEET
Fire Area
Foam Concentrate
Design Application Rate
Total Application Rate
Foam Application Time
Total Concentrate Required
Total Water Required

GU-230

REVISION 2.0

Page 39

HSE GUIDELINE

Recommending Best Practice

Attachment II: Blank Pre-Fire Plan/Operator Response Sheet


Notes:
(1)
(2)

GU-230

The first pre-fire plan sheet contains guidance notes (2 pages).


The second pre-fire plan sheet is a blank for use (2 pages).

REVISION 2.0

Page 40

HSE GUIDELINE

Recommending Best Practice

PRE-FIRE PLAN FOR


FIRE FIGHTING STRATEGY :
IMMEDIATE
RESPONSE

ACTIONS

Typically, immediate actions


will be for operations.

Operator actions in terms of reaction and procedures


and call out etc.

1st RESPONSE

RESOURCES REQUIRED
The obvious hardware resources necessary to carry out the actions.

ACTIONS

Typically this will involce the


OSC or persons designated by
the OSC.

What fire control or fire event related actions should


be taken on arrival by the OSC or his designated
personnel

2nd RESPONSE
Typically, this will involve the
fire brigade or OSC or other
identified person.

RESOURCES REQUIRED
As above

ACTIONS

RESOURCES REQUIRED

Normally, the fire containment or fire control or


extinguishing actions required for the fire event.

These resources here should match the fire equipment, foam


concentrate etc. listed in the scenarios.

OTHER ACTIONS/CONCERNS:
Any actions which could assist in the control of the incident of which the responders should be aware. Any concerns which may impact on the course of actions
to control the incident.

ONGOING POTENTIAL HAZARDS :


Hazards which may endanger fire responders or non fire personnel, or the environment etc.

GU-230

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Recommending Best Practice

OPERATOR RESPONSE FOR


FIRE FIGHTING STRATEGY
A description of the strategy to be adopted for the fire, including the operator responses and fire brigade actions.

CONTROL ROOM

OPERATOR RESPONSE ACTIONS

1
2
3
4
5
6

GU-230

REVISION 2.0

Page 42

HSE GUIDELINE

Recommending Best Practice

PRE-FIRE PLAN FOR


FIRE FIGHTING STRATEGY :
IMMEDIATE RESPONSE

1st RESPONSE

2nd RESPONSE

ACTIONS

RESOURCES REQUIRED

ACTIONS

RESOURCES REQUIRED

ACTIONS

RESOURCES REQUIRED

OTHER ACTIONS/CONCERNS:

ONGOING POTENTIAL HAZARDS :

GU-230

REVISION 2.0

Page 43

HSE GUIDELINE

Recommending Best Practice

OPERATOR RESPONSE FOR


FIRE FIGHTING STRATEGY

CONTROL ROOM

OPERATOR RESPONSE ACTIONS

1
2
3
4
5
6

GU-230

REVISION 2.0

Page 44

HSE GUIDELINE

Recommending Best Practice

Attachment III: Blank Fire Responder Competencies


Notes:
(1) The first fire responder competencies sheet contains guidance (1
page).
(2) The second sheet is a blank for use (1 page).

GU-230

REVISION 1.0

Page 45

HSE GUIDELINE

Recommending Best Practice

FIRE RESPONDERS COMPETENCIES FOR:


KEY ELEMENTS REQUIRED:
This should list the knowledge required by the fire responder for dealing with the particular scenario, including the emergency plan, team
composition, chain of commond and specifics including knowledge of the equipment and locations.

COMPETENCIES
RESPONDER KNOWS:
Describe what the responder knows.

RESPONDER IS ABLE TO:


What are the fire responders capabilities ?

RESPONDER DEMONSTRATES:
To list what the responder can demonstrate, eg. wearing of PPE, method of running hoses etc.

GU-230

REVISION 2.0

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Recommending Best Practice

FIRE RESPONDERS COMPETENCIES FOR:


KEY ELEMENTS REQUIRED:

COMPETENCIES
RESPONDER KNOWS:

RESPONDER IS ABLE TO:

RESPONDER DEMONSTRATES:

GU-230

REVISION 2.0

Page 47

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