Politics, Religion & Ideology

Vol. 12, No. 4, 391 411, December 2011

Stalin the Charismatic Leader?: Explaining the

Cult of Personality as a Legitimation Technique

CAROL STRONGa and MATT KILLINGSWORTHb

a

University of Arkansas at Monticello; bUniversity of Tasmania

ABSTRACT This article reassesses Stalins attempts to construct legitimacy through the development of a cult of personality, built through an overt co-option of the charismatic authority
generated by Lenins revolutionary leadership. While seemingly counterintuitive, it will be
argued that Max Webers theory of charismatic authority offers a constructive tool with
which to examine Stalins attempt to construct legitimacy through the creation of the cult of
personality. Through the application of routinised charisma, Stalins attempts at legitimation
are not only better understood, but also present further avenues for exploring non-democratic
legitimation techniques through the use of modern media.

Introduction
The upcoming twentieth anniversary of the collapse of the Soviet Union provides us with an
ideal opportunity to explore one of the more contentious aspects of Soviet rule; political
legitimacy. At a time when the legitimacy virtues of democratic regimes are loudly espoused
(announcements that simultaneously imply the illegitimacy of non-democratic regimes), it is
an opportune moment to return to investigate one of the more infamous non-democratic
regimes of the twentieth century and reassess attempts to construct Stalins legitimacy
through the development of a cult of personality, a cult built through an overt co-option
of the charismatic authority generated by Lenins revolutionary leadership.
While not claiming to provide an in-depth analysis of the dynamics of Stalinism per se,
this paper attempts to clarify previously neglected issues in Webers concept of charismatic
authority and thereby create a new, more holistic tool with which to analyse leaders such as
Stalin from a new perspective. More importantly, it provides the foundation from which to
find more objective ways to assess the popular appeal of more contemporary examples of
non-democratic leaders who have used/instituted a cult of personality around their
leadership in order to legitimate their rule.
Two claims are made here. Firstly, we argue that charismatic authority need not only be
associated with the charismatic leader; rather, it can be repurposed to support an individual not readily associated with various forms of charisma. Secondly, following from the
initial claim, it will be argued that Stalins rule, despite claims to the contrary, can be
understood within Webers charisma legitimation type.

Email: strong@uamont.edu

Email: Matt.Killingsworth@utas.edu.au

ISSN 2156-7689 Print/ISSN 2156-7697 Online/11/040391-22 # 2011 Taylor & Francis

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2011.624410

392

C. Strong and M. Killingsworth

To do this, this article will be delivered in three parts. The first discusses the issue of
legitimacy more generally, thereby providing a foundation for the examinations of the
ways in which leaders attempt to create a sense of legitimacy for a newly established,
post-revolutionary government.
The discussion in the second section will then turn to Webers tripartite authority typology, with a particular focus on charismatic authority, which is delivered in two subsections:
the first presents an overview of Webers charismatic authority type; and in the second, the
routinisation of charisma and the concept of manufactured charisma are introduced, providing the theoretical foundation for the examination of the cult of personality as a legitimation technique.
The third and final part shows how, through an overt co-option of Lenins legacy, Stalin
manufactured a charismatic bond with the Soviet people. By highlighting the ways in
which Stalin manufactured charisma, this article will show how the cult of personality
can be viewed as a legitimation technique using manufactured charisma as a tool.

Legitimacy in the Context of Totalitarian Politics

This article localises the issue of how to address the concept of legitimacy within a totalitarian context and focuses on the role of the leader.1 It should be made clear from the
outset that the central objective is not to examine legitimacy per se, but to emphasise
the potential for political leaders to generate a sense of legitimacy for the state, and
more importantly to mobilise popular support for the continued legitimacy of the state.
Further to this and, considering that the debate concerning legitimacy in Soviet-type
regimes often appears compromised by Cold War, Manichean dichotomies, this article,
rather than indulge in the debate centred on the legitimacy status of the Soviet Union
under Stalin, will address the process by which Stalin attempted to legitimate the Soviet
state after the death of Lenin.
Legitimacy is a complex and multi-faceted concept that has different applications
depending on the type of system under consideration. It is nevertheless based on certain
underlying principles, with Max Webers tripartite classification of authority (or legitimate
domination) often cited as the dominant model for empirical investigations of legitimacy.
For Weber, legitimacy is understood as the normative validity of an order resting on
whether or not the actions of individuals are supported by a corresponding belief by the
people in the existence of a legitimate order in a particular system.2 It derives from his
question: By what right do some individuals in social systems claim to exercise
command over others and gain acceptance of their claims and obedience to their directives
from those others as their right? Weber concludes that the people must view authority as
1

A great deal of literature is devoted to discussions on the usefulness of totalitarianism as an analytical tool, some of
it promoting the argument that totalitarianism lost most of its value when it was appropriated as an anti-communist weapon during the Cold War (for example, see K. Mueller, East European Studies, Neo-Totalitarianism and
Social Science Theory in A. Siegel (ed), The Totalitarian Paradigm After the End of Communism: Towards a Theoretical Reassessment (Amsterdam and Atlanta, Ga.: Rodopi, 1998), pp. 55 90; and B. Barber and H. Spiro, CounterIdeological Uses of Totalitarianism, Politics and Society, 1 (1970), pp. 3 21). However, such arguments focus on
the analytical value of the term post-1953. The use of the term here adopts Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinskis six basic features or traits. . . generally recognised to be common to totalitarian dictatorships, an approach that
constituted the most dominant paradigm in studies on Communist systems up to the beginning of the 1960s (see
C.J. Friedrich and Z. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, 2nd ed., (New York, Washington and
London: Praeger, 1966), p. 22).
2
Max Weber,; transl. A. R. Henderson and Talcott Parsons The Theory of Social and Economic Organization
(London: William Hodge, 1947), p. 113.

Stalin the Charismatic Leader?

393

exemplary and binding, and that the associated rules of the game are accepted as valid,
whether this acceptance occurs by virtue of tradition, charisma, or a belief in legality.3
Building on Webers idea, most definitions of legitimacy emphasise two key points of the
idea; the claim to authority and the degree of compliance demanded by such a claim.
Hence, as Taros Fatifa points out, legitimacy should be understood as constituting both
an objective and subjective connotation.4 Thus T.H. Rigby, argues that legitimacy is best
understood as:
The expectation of political authorities that people will comply with their
demands. . . based not only on such considerations as the latters fear of punishment, hope of reward, habit or apathy, but also on the notion that they have
the right to make such demands. This notion both inheres, explicitly or implicitly,
in the claims of the authorities, and is reciprocated, to a greater or lesser extent, in
the minds of those whom compliance is demanded.5
Rigby elaborates on notions of order and on the nature of the relationship between rulers
and ruled. This second part is especially important; it is what distinguishes naked force
from authority. This is essentially how Weber understood legitimacy, as denoting the
difference between authority and power, where authority is understood as legitimately exercised power.6
However, while applied with (relatively little) controversy to liberal democracies, there
are those who argue that the category of legitimacy is of little relevance when studying
the politics of the Communist world.7 Such arguments are often premised on the idea
that political power was established and maintained by means of terror and total social
control.8 Even those analysts, including Stephen White, who attributed at least basic
levels of legitimacy to the Soviet systems, were less than enthusiastic about it. White
couples the legitimacy in Soviet systems with a prolonged period of uncontested public
support; he does not associate it with genuine grassroots support.9 The idea presented is
that whatever traces of legitimacy managed to emerge were based on the premise that
routine activities can be translated over time into new social traditions.
3

Max Weber, transl. H.P. Secher Basic Concepts in Sociology (New York: The Citadel Press, 1962), pp. 7172.
Fatos Tarifa, The Quest for Legitimacy and the Withering Away of Utopia, Social Forces, 76:2 (1997),
pp. 437 473 (p. 439).
5
T.H. Rigby, Introduction: Political Legitimacy, Weber and Communist Mono-organisational Systems in T.H.
Rigby and F. Feher (eds), Political Legitimation in Communist States (London: MacMillan, 1982), p. 1.
6
Tarifa, p. 440; emphasis added.
7
Mark Wright, Ideology and Power in the Czechoslovak Political System in P. G. Lewis (ed), Eastern Europe: Political Crisis and Legitimation (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1984), p. 111.
8
Often these critics upheld those sections of Machiavellian theory that create the impression that certain leaders
have the potential to rule by coercion and terror tactics alone. Paradoxically, this approach is not fully supported
by Machiavelli, who in contrast to the misinformed conclusion that to be Machiavellian was to employ raw (and
often brutal) power, actually worked against such a concept. Machiavelli issues a warning to potential leaders that if
the choice is made while accumulating political power to kill ones fellow citizens, betray ones friends, be without
pity, and without religion, all virtue and glory is forfeited (Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince and The Discourses
(New York: The Modern Library, 1950), p. 32). Even here, it is intimated that political leaders must always
keep their subjects in mind, if legitimacy was to be retained. Having said this, Machiavelli certainly did not
dismiss the use of brute force, instead arguing that it is necessary to order things so that when. . . [the people]
no longer believe, they can be made to believe by force. The implication is that it was safer for a prince to be
hated rather than loved, but only if one of the two has to be wanting (Machiavelli, p. 9).
9
Stephen White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics (London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1979), pp. 180 188; see
also Carol Strong, The Role of Charismatic Leadership in Ending the Cold War: The Presidencies of Boris Yeltsin,
Vaclav Havel and Helmut Kohl (New York: The Edwin Mellon Press, 2009), pp. 59 62.
4

394

C. Strong and M. Killingsworth

Despite this, one is still moved to ask, as Jan Pakulski does, how one can explain apparent mass compliance and stability in these societies?10 The actions undertaken by both
Lenin and Stalin not only demonstrate an appreciation of the need to secure at least a
limited level of sustained legitimacy if their power was to become sustainable, but their
actions also serve to justify the focus placed here on the leader. At a deeper theoretical
level, there is further evidence that the leader is critical to the legitimation process
within totalitarian systems. Whereas legitimacy is accomplished in liberal democracies
under the auspices of the rule of law and through such channels as broadening the
scope of government intervention, increased regulation and bureaucratisation,11 the
same opportunities do not exist in totalitarian systems; hence the need to explore more
objective ways to assess the popular appeal of non-democratic leaders who have used/
instituted a cult of personality around their leadership in order to legitimate their rule.
Max Weber, Charismatic Authority and its Application to Soviet Politics
In Economy and Society, Max Weber outlines three ideal types of authority: legal-rational,
traditional, and charismatic, and then elaborates on these, assigning specific characteristics
to each in an attempt to establish their individual legitimacy. The focus of this article is on
the latter, charismatic authority, but even more specifically on Webers conception of
routinised charisma, whereby spontaneous forms of charismatic authority are transformed into more stabilised forms in an attempt to sustain longer-term legitimacy than
revolutionary and/or transitional periods afford. To clarify the inherent differences
between the two types of charisma, the Weberian conception of pure charismatic authority
will be briefly examined first, before proceeding to its manufactured forms.
Weber designates charismatic authority as unique and focused on the individual in that it
is qualitatively delimited from within and not based on an external order.12 In contradistinction to leaders chosen because of family ties or economic prowess, the charismatic
phenomenon thus rests on the devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism, or exemplary
character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed by a
particular person.13 Weber further specifies that charismatic authority is attributed to individuals who have abilities believed to be supernatural (and) not accessible to everybody.14
Even acknowledging the differentiation between manifestations of leadership and
authority, charismatic authority clearly diverges from other forms of authority precisely
because the leaders influence emanates not from the position obtained, but from a
sense of personal idiosyncratic power.15 As a result, the leader must be emphasised as a
key aspect of the charismatic legitimation process.
Exploring this further, Weber dictates that:
. . .The power of charisma rests upon the belief [of the people] in revelation and
heroes, upon the conviction that certain manifestations whether. . .religious,
ethical, artistic, scientific, political, or other kind are important and valuable.16
10

Jan Pakulski, East European Revolutions and Legitimacy Crisis, in Janina Frentzel- Zagorska (ed), From a
One-Party State to Democracy: Transition in Eastern Europe (Amsterdam-Atlanta, Ga.): Rodopi, 1993), p. 45.
11
Aleksandar Pavkovic, Slobodan Jovanovic: An Unsentimental Approach to Politics (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1993), p. 122.
12
Weber, Economy and Society, vol. 3, p. 1113.
13
Weber, Economy and Society, vol.1, pp. 215, 241 242.
14
Weber, Economy and Society, vol.1, pp. 241242.
15
Jay Conger & Rabindra Kanungo, Charismatic Leadership in Organisations (Thousand Oaks, CA.; London: Sage
Publications, 1998), p. 89; see also Strong, pp. 128 130.
16
Weber, Economy and Society, vol. 3, p. 1116.

Stalin the Charismatic Leader?

395

There are two points to be taken from this. Reinhard Bendix, for example, concludes that if
a leader derives his/her authority through charismatic means/charisma, it is immaterial
whether they are prophets and heroes, magicians and demagogues, doctors and quacks,
leaders of mobs or orchestras of robber bands. Whether they are criminals or saints,
people will follow these individuals because of their role in society, as witnessed by the
fact that both very evil and very good men. . . [have] exercised domination through
their extraordinary gifts of mind and body.17
In addition, the use of the word believes can be taken to imply that charismatic authority can only emerge and be legitimated, if a leader gains committed followers. If this
interpretation is accepted, then an association with charismatic authority is made not by
the leaders ability to demonstrate his/her power in isolation, but through the requisite
faith of the people (Weber designates them as disciples) in that power, whatever the
power is conceived to be.18 Again the possibility of applying the concept to more than
one type of leader is provided, but also the implication that such leaders only retain
charismatic authority for the time that the people recognise his/her political worth. As
concluded by Weber, if (and when) it is decided that the chosen leader can no longer
fulfil his/her promises, the charismatic mission of that particular leader abruptly ends
and the associated authority disappears.19 In this context, charismatic authority is not
classified as a quality to be possessed by an individual leader, but is instead a status that
is freely given (or taken as the case may be) according to the will of the people. Thus,
as elaborated on by Strong, charismatic authority is transitory, and is best understood
as unpredictable, but more importantly as an inherently volatile and unsettled phenomenon, primarily because it depends on the interaction of the leader with his/her
followers.20
Having said this, it cannot be assumed that this type of authority is generated and/or
gained by accident, but (more often than not) through the intentional repurposing of
the ensuing transformational political environment. This is based on the Weberian tenet
that genuine charismatic leaders do not wait to be recognised by their followers, but that:
. . .The genuine prophet, like the genuine military leader and every true leader in
this sense, preaches, creates, or demands new obligations most typically, by
virtue of revelation, oracle, inspiration, or of his own will, which are recognised
by the members of the religious, military, or party group because they come
from such a source. Recognition is a duty.21
Bringing these two ideas together, while transformational and/or revolutionary leaders
rarely create the demand for change, the successful generation of charismatic authority
requires that the leader act in such a way that the people respond to his/her leadership,
but more importantly believe that he/she was indeed responsible for the ensuing events
and is thereby the natural candidate for leadership. For Lepsius, there comes a
point where a group of people, as they try to make sense of a chaotic situation, begin
to look desperately for an individual with whom they can forge a relationship of
supreme trust,because they see them as the personification of the change process
17

Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber, an intellectual portrait (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor, 1962), pp. 299 300;
see also Strong, pp. 79 83.
18
Bendix, p. 301.
19
Weber, Economy and Society, vol. 3, pp. 1113 1116.
20
Strong, pp. 204 207.
21
Weber, Economy and Society, vol. 1, pp. 243 244.

396

C. Strong and M. Killingsworth

itself.22 The relationship forged between the emergent leader and his/her followers is then
perpetuated until such a time that the crisis period has ended and the people are ready for a
return to normalcy.
As beneficial as this is during the transitional period, however, there are serious implications for the normalisation of charismatic authority. When legitimacy is based solely
on ideological objectives, for example, the leaders authority becomes limited by the recurrent need to reassure the people that the professed goals of the revolutionary period remain
obtainable, whatever obstacles emerge. Machiavelli substantiates this through his observation that while groups often accept change readily, at least in the beginning, it is often
difficult to sustain an adequate level of popular support, once the hardships of everyday
life return.23
According to Weberian theory, if ideological perspectives are perpetuated into the posttransitional phase without having been altered to reflect the changed political atmosphere,
the charismatic message of the revolutionary period can easily be reduced to dogma, doctrine, theory, regalement, law or petrified tradition, regardless of the best efforts to retain
the purity of the professed ideals. Moreover, if this happens, whatever traces of legitimacy
happen to survive the initial transitional period are extremely tenuous, with the excitement
of radical change suffering a slow death by suffocation under the weight of [the] material
interests associated with the post-transitional period.24 According to this logic, charismatic
authority dissipates along with the popular support for revolution or transformational
change and the associated leader. In this context, and in order to maintain viable,
charismatic authority must therefore be transformed (or to use Weberian terminology,
routinised) into other more stable forms of authority that better adhere to the need for
stability and predictability associated with a consolidated regime.
Charismatic Authority, Routinised
Despite the transitory nature of charismatic authority, and the difficulty of prolonging its
effect, Weberian theory provides the foundation for traces of charisma to survive the transformational period and subsequently become part of the traditional framework of society.
While not prominent in his work, Weber postulates that the potential exists for charisma to
be transmitted by ritual means from one bearer to another through a process of routinisation and thereby become associated with a particular political position and/or office, not a
particular individual.25 Consider, for example, the Weberian tenet that:
. . .When the tide that lifted a charismatically led group out of everyday life flows
back into the channels of workaday routines, at least the pure form of charismatic domination will wane and turn into an institution.26
Whereas the leader was previously the primary point of emphasis for charismatic authority,
it can be shifted from the individual and redirected to the acquired qualities and to the
22
M. Rainer Lepsius, Charismatic Leadership: Max Webers Model and its Applicability to the Rule of Hitler in
Carl F. Graumann and Serge Moscovici (eds) Changing Conceptions of Leadership (New York: Springer-Verlag,
1986), pp. 5366; see also Strong, pp. 114 120.
23
Machiavelli, p.22.
24
Weber, Economy and Society, vol.3, pp. 1120 1122.
25
Weber, Economy and Society, vol.1, pp. 246249; see also Wolfgang Schluchter,; transl. Neil Solomon Rationalism, Religion, and Domination: A Weberian Perspective (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford: University of California
Press, 1989), pp. 230 239; and Strong, pp. 114 120.
26
Weber, Economy and Society, vol.3, p. 1121.

Stalin the Charismatic Leader?

397

effectiveness of the ritual acts inherent to the office assumed.27 In this way, authority is
transferred from the leader into the newly established institutional framework of the
new regime, where it must stay, if the system is to remain stable and viable.
However, while signalling a diminishing importance of the individual and individual
actions, it should not be assumed that the initial bond between the leader and his/her followers is broken. Charismatic authority is instead no longer the dominant mode in which
the leader garners his legitimacy,28 as charisma is radically transformed by the powers of
tradition and/or of rational socialisation, and thereby incorporated into the permanent
political structure and/or traditions of a particular community.29 This returns to the
idea that a sense of legitimacy must be associated with all political systems if the institutional framework is to assume a sustainable level of effectiveness and efficacy. Without
it, the people would have to be perpetually subdued through the use of violence, which
is brittle and will over the longer-term breed instability and rebellion among the citizens
of a post-transformational society.
Weber refers to this process as the routinisation of charisma.30 While pure charisma is
designated as highly personalised, Weber appreciates that historically, charisma has also
existed as a depersonalised quality once effectively combined with other (more stable)
forms of authority. In Webers view, one is justified in speaking of impersonal charisma
as long as:
. . .The characteristics of an extraordinary quality are preserved, which is not
accessible to everyone and which in principle possesses pre-eminence as over
the endowment of those who are subject to charismatic rule.31
With this, the antagonistic interaction of charisma and tradition and/or legal-rationalism is
transformed such that they fuse into variable forms of new traditionalism driven by charismatic appeal.32 In what Weber terms as institutional charisma, hereditary charisma, or
alternatively the charisma of office, charisma is transformed from its original radical
nature, as outlined above, into a more stable form of domination33 and is thereby effectively
mechanised as a mere component of a concrete historical structure.34
Applying this concept to post-revolutionary situations specifically, pure charisma, while
dynamic and extraordinary during periods of radical change, if it survives the revolutionary
period at all, becomes routinised, or alternatively de-radicalised once the transformational
cycle is completed. To outline a generalised process, an initial sense of systemic legitimacy is
predominantly secured based on the residual enthusiasm of the revolutionary period itself.
However, as the economic concerns of everyday life return to society, especially if quantifiable success is not achieved in what the people deem to be an appropriate amount of time,

27

Weber, Economy and Society, vol.1, p. 248.

This is further emphasized when Weber writes If this [pure charismatic authority] is not to remain a purely
transitory phenomenon, but to take on the character of a permanent relationship. . .it is necessary for the character
of charismatic authority to become radically changed. . .It cannot remain stable, but becomes either traditionalized
or rationalised, or a combination of both (Weber, Economy and Society vol.3, p. 1222).
29
Max Weber, The Meaning of Discipline in; transl. Hans Gerth and Charles Wright-Mills From Max Weber:
Essays in Sociology (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 253.
30
Weber, Economy and Society, vol.1, pp. 246 254.
31
Weber, Economy and Society, vol.3, p. 1121.
32
Weber, Economy and Society, vol.3, p. 1122.
33
Joseph Bensman and Michael Givant, Charisma and Modernity: The Use and Abuse of a Concept, Social
Research, Winter (1975), pp. 570615 (p. 580).
34
Weber, Economy and Society, vol.3, p. 1121. See also Bensman and Givant, p. 580.
28

398

C. Strong and M. Killingsworth

support for the new leadership inevitably becomes strained and the potential for popular
discontent emerges.35 Under these circumstances, legitimacy becomes tenuous and
requires immediate attention, if stability is to be sustained.
To avoid this scenario, while it can happen that legitimacy will naturally develop,
general practice requires the formulation and introduction of an official legitimation
process by the new leaders. This was particularly true in the case of the former Soviet
Union through the construction of a cult of personality firstly around Lenin, then
around Stalin. Hence, while the application of routinised charisma appears, at first
glance, to be almost an afterthought, it should be explored as an important qualification
in the Weberian text. It moreover prompts a closer examination of whether or not charisma can be harnessed and used as part of a political technique utilised as a key vehicle to
prolong the life of a stagnating system, or alternatively the consolidation of a postrevolutionary regime.

The potential applications of manufactured charismatic authority

Moving from the discussion of charismatic authority and its routinisation, the focus now
moves to exactly how this process works in practice and more specifically, how one form of
legitimacy could be sustained through the application of another manufactured form; in
this case, it is the use of charisma as a legitimating tactic for long-term legitimacy for
Stalin. The discussion is then guided by the Weberian tenet that charismatic authority
has the ability to be transferred through artificial means,36 as expanded upon by the theories of Ronald Glassman.37
When reading Webers theory on routinised charisma, it would appear that the normalisation of charisma, or more specifically the transformation of charismatic authority to the
charisma of office (or one of the other forms), could only occur through a spontaneous
development. But just as charismatic authority is rarely applied to a leader who has not prepared for leadership in one form or another, whether through formal or informal channels,
the normalisation process of charisma is often a co-opted, or even a manufactured process.
Since the advent of mass communication, the allure of charismatic leadership and/or
authority remains as strong as ever, in particular because it is the only form of legitimacy
that combines massive usurpation with total consent giving. It is therefore not surprising
that this has translated into intentional attempts to manufacture charisma in such a way as
to create and/or institutionalise permanent leadership roles associated with charisma
through the use of the media tools ranging from the newspaper to, more recently, the Internet.38 For Ronald Glassman, this argument follows logically from the idea that the relationship between leaders and followers has always, to a certain degree, been manufactured.39
However, while the symbols of legitimation in the past might have been magic symbols,
35

Weber, Economy and Society, vol.3, p. 1120; see also Strong, pp. 114 120.
Weber, Economy and Society, vol.3, p. 1139.
37
This debate is further inspired by Habermas, who questions whether or not it is possible to create, re-enforce, or
even replace a sense of legitimacy in society once it has been compromised. In accordance with his conclusion that
stagnated or fragile forms of legitimation can indeed be re-invigorated (Jurgen Habermas in William Outhwaite
(ed), Habermas Reader (Cambridge and Oxford: Polity Press in association with Blackwell Publishers Ltd.,
1996), pp. 58, 261).
38
Ronald Glassman, Legitimacy and Manufactured Charisma, Social Research, Winter 1975, pp. 615636 (p.624).
While historically disparate from this article, it could be argued that contemporary forms of mass media, in particular the scope of the Internet, brings the people closer to their leaders, or at least allow it to appear that way,
rather than moving them farther apart.
39
Glassman, p. 618.
36

Stalin the Charismatic Leader?

399

animal skins, and carved objects, the tools used today are more sophisticated and include
newspapers, magazines, and perhaps most significantly, radio, television, and film.
Glassman expands on this when he argues:
. . .Newspapers, magazines and printed posters create an atmosphere in which the
political leader seems ever-present and larger than life. Since the charismatic
relationship functions best when the group feels a personal, trusting, infantilizing
bond with the leader, the constant presence in bright images helps manufacture such leader-led relationships.40
The potential for manufactured charisma, Glassman concludes, has been created in contemporary politics, especially as the charisma of a leader is now often consolidated or compromised by the associated media coverage and presentation. A situation has indeed
developed where a successful leader must now have just the right combination of good
looks, oratorical restraint, wit, and style during televised appearances and interviews.41
While these observations apply specifically to the use of television in manufacturing charismatic authority, less modern forms of mass communication have been used in the past to
manufacture charismatic authority. Lenin himself acknowledged the potential of using the
press to influence public opinion as early as during the Russian Revolution in 1917. 42
However, just as Webers theory of charismatic authority has been questioned in relation to
contemporary politics, so too has the potential relationship between the media and charismatic
authority. For example, focusing on the pure nature of the charismatic bond, Joseph Bensman
and Michael Givant argue that any attempt to construct a charismatic relationship in the
modern political arena, particularly through the use of modern mass communications,
cannot be analysed using Webers typology. Indeed, they argue that the charismatic idealtype is historically limited, and not at all suited to modern politics.43 For Bensman and
Givant, the fact that modern politics involves the participation of millions of people means
that an intimate, personal relationship between the leader and follower can no longer exist.
It is argued in this article, by contrast, that such a conclusion is premature, especially as a concurrent trend has emerged whereby the mass media has created an environment in which the
people believe that they are indeed intimately acquainted with those in power.
Somewhat similarly, Karl Loewenstein argues that while:
. . .Democratization has strengthened beyond all expectations the plebiscitary
components in the power process. . .at the same time it has decidedly diminished
the chances for the development and operation of true charisma. . . .The leader
who shows himself daily. . .is less magical and magnetic than the leader who is
not seen at all, or only rarely on occasions especially favourable to him. Far
from reinforcing charisma and spreading its magic in a wider context, the mass
media in an open society act as disenchantments. . .It would [thus] appear that
charisma. . .has become a victim of modern technology.44
40

Glassman, p. 630.
Glassman, pp. 630 632; see also Strong, pp. 197 199.
42
Vladimir Lenin, What Is to Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement (Peking: Foreign Languages Press,
1975) p. 45.
43
Bensman and Givant, p.601. This argument is representative of analysts that believe that modern forms of communication, and the way they are utilized in modern politics, depersonalize the relationship between leader and
lead, and hence remove any magic or mysticism that underpins the charismatic bond.
44
Karl Loewenstein,; transl. Richard and Clara Winston Max Webers Political Ideas in the perspective of our Own
Time (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1966), pp. 8486.
41

400

C. Strong and M. Killingsworth

While Loewensteins argument is slightly more persuasive than that made by Bensman and
Givant, they both remain flawed since the onus for the charismatic bond lies with the follower or disciple. Hence, if the people respond in the requisite manner, then it is of little
consequence if the relationship is started or perpetuated through the means of modern
media.45

Stalin: Manufactured Charisma as a Legitimation Technique

When considering Stalin, two predominant approaches to legitimacy can be discerned.
Firstly, in contrast to the utopian perspectives of Trotskys theory of permanent revolution, or even the obscure assurance of a future attainment of communist-inspired equality,
Stalins policies were increasingly related to the more immediate issues of national interests
and state security.46 Secondly, and of particular interest to the questions at hand here, was
the creation of Stalins cult of personality. To overcome the problem that a well-formed
ideological framework had not yet been fully consolidated under Lenin before his death,
Stalins own political legitimacy was justified in terms of the enduring Bolshevik legacy.
With this tactic, Stalin was simultaneously able to combine elements of a new (official)
form of Soviet nationalism with traces of traditionalism in order to provide a historical
foundation for the legitimacy of his leadership.
Directly following the Russian Revolution of 1917, the legitimacy of the newly established Soviet political system was underpinned by the unwavering faith and singleness
of vision projected by the Bolshevik revolutionaries.47 Lenin, in particular, enjoyed a
form of popular legitimacy directly related to the ideological zeal of the revolutionary
period itself, perpetuated into the post-revolutionary period and projected into his
image.48 However, while Lenin may have recognised the need to promote his longerterm legitimacy, he was not the one to take this process to its logical conclusion.
Whether he was unwilling to abandon his commitment to communism in its entirety,
or alternatively if he was not in power long enough to lose his revolutionary appeal,
Lenin refrained from fully consolidating his revolutionary appeal into a more stabilised
form of authority.49 It was instead the Party and Stalin, between 1929 and 1953, which promoted and utilised this technique. The premise to be explored in the remainder of this
paper is thus whether the creation of a cult of personality firstly around Lenin, but
later around Stalin himself, qualifies as a legitimation tactic based on charisma.
Theodore von Laue argues that the primary motivation for the construction of Stalins
cult was to provide a foundation for his claim that he was Lenins legitimate heir
45
This idea is supported by Anne Ruth Willner, who argues that mass communications media can serve as a
powerful means for promoting charismatic appeal; it is doubtful if they can create it where there is little or no
basis for its generation (Anne Ruth Willner, Charismatic Political Leadership: A Theory (Centre of International
Studies, Princeton University, 1968), p. 14.
46
Ralph Miliband and Marcel Liebman, Reflections on Anti-Communism, Socialist Register, 21 (1984), pp. 9 22
(p. 14).
47
John Wheeler-Bennett, Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace, 1918 (London: Macmillan Press, 1938), pp. 1618.
48
Heller, p. 47. See also Nina Tumarkin, Lenin Lives! The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia, (Cambridge, MA and London:
Harvard University Press, 1997); see also Strong, pp. 163171.
49
It is commonly understood that Lenin shunned pubic adulation. Note the following abstract from The Nation;
Three cities, innumerable villages, collectives, schools, factories, and institutions have been named after (Stalin),
and now someone has started a movement to Christen the Turksib the Stalin Railway. I have gone back over the
newspapers from 1919 to 1922: Lenin never permitted such antics and he was more popular that Stalin can ever
hope to be (cited in Robert Tucker, The Rise of Stalin s Personality Cult, The American Historical Review, 84:2
(1979), pp. 347 366 (pp. 348 349).

Stalin the Charismatic Leader?

401

apparent.50 While the association with Lenin in the establishment of the cult is important,
the motivation behind the establishment of the cult, as observed by David Brandenburger,
is better understood as a desperate attempt to mobilise a society that was too poorly educated to grasp the philosophical tenets of the Party line. . . Party ideologists. . . turned to the
Stalin cult as a new way of bolstering popular loyalty to the Party and state.51
Combining traditionalism and charismatic authority, a cult of personality was developed
around Lenin, the founding father of Soviet communism in order to later shift the focus to
Stalin. While Heller designates Lenin as anything but a charismatic leader, and further
argues that his charismatic appeal was only through the co-option of his legacy by his successors,52 the revolutionary leadership exhibited by Lenin during the Russian Revolution
inspired levels of devotion associated with the manifestation of charismatic authority.53
Again, it is not important whether Lenin or Stalin were charismatic leaders in the pure
Weberian sense, but rather that the charismatic aura of Lenins revolutionary leadership
created a phenomenon strong enough to encourage a widespread commitment to revolutionary ideals.54 It moreover provides the foundation for an examination of Stalins cooption and/or creation of the Leninist cult of personality in the former Soviet Union.
As Nina Tumarkin observes, while the Lenin cult did not survive the tenth anniversary
of his death. . .some individual practises were retained. A number of them were absorbed
into the Stalin cult, converting the traditional mode of revering Lenin into a public veneration of Lenin and Stalin together.55 Indeed, according to Tumarkin, a central tenet of the
cult was the portrayal that Stalin and Lenin had always been spiritual brothers, devoted
companions, the closest friends and colleagues.56 Stalin, somewhat paradoxically, was simultaneously presented as a pupil of Lenins, while also being portrayed as the foremost
interpreter and/or source of post-Lenin communism in the former Soviet Union. At the
most fundamental level, Stalin intended to transfer the levels of enthusiasm and support
enjoyed by Lenin as an individual, directly to the system itself and then attribute this
energy to his own leadership once fully consolidated.
The success of such hero-worship might appear to contradict the fundamental tenets of
Marxism-Leninism.57 From another perspective, it is a telling example of Stalins awareness
of the cult, if not necessarily his promotion of it, since he was of the opinion that Marxism
provided a theoretical justification of the cult of heroes. Paraphrasing Georgii Plekhanov,
Stalin justified the place of the hero-genius thus:
50

As concluded by Von Laue, Stalin was the perfect Leninist by more than his own, all too brazenly proclaimed
judgment. His rise to power did not mark, therefore, a Thermidorian reaction, but rather Fructidor, the high
summer of fruition for the most dynamic and emotion-charged element of Bolshevism (Von Laue, p. 202).
51
David Brandenburger, Stalin as Symbol: a case study of the personality cult and its construction, in Sarah Davies
and James Harris (eds) Stalin: a new history (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005),
p. 251.
52
Agnes Heller, Phases of Legitimation in Soviet-Type Societies, in T.H. Rigby and F. Feher (eds), Political
Legitimation in Communist States (New York: St Martins Press, 1982), p. 50.
53
See Nina Tumarkin, Lenin Lives! The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia, (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard
University Press, 1997), pp. 64111.
54
Michael Kimmel, Revolution: A Sociological Interpretation (Cambridge and Oxford: Polity Press, 1990), pp. 34,
191.
55
Tumarkin, pp. 252 253.
56
Tumarkin, p. 253.
57
Barrington Moore, Soviet Politics: The Dilemma of Power (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950),
pp. 228 229. Also see Georg Brunner, Legitimacy Doctrines and Legitimation Procedures in East European
Systems in T.H. Rigby and F. Feher (eds) Political Legitimation in Communist States (London: MacMillan,
1982), pp. 27 44; and Graeme Gill, Personal Dominance and the Collective Principle: Individual Legitimacy
in the Marxist-Leninist Systems, in T.H. Rigby & F. Feher (eds), Political Legitimation in Communist States,
(New York: St. Martins Press, 1982), p. 95.

402

C. Strong and M. Killingsworth

Marxism does not at all deny the role of eminent personalities or the fact that
history is made by people. . . But, of course, people make history not in such a
way as any kind of phantasy inspires them to. . . Every new generation finds
certain conditions. . . And great people are worth anything only in so far as they
are able to understand these conditions correctly, to understand how to change
them. . . Marxism has never denied the role of heroes. On the contrary, it recognises this role as considerable, but with those reservations about which I just
spoke.58

Even with this defence of hero-worship, by many accounts, Stalin was a modest man.59
Thus, according to Erik van Ree, Stalins understanding of the cult, and thus his promotion
of it, while a conscious instrument of his power strategy, was nonetheless framed within
Marxist understanding of the laws of history.60
Exploring this further, efforts to manufacture the cult provide an example of a new
leaders deliberate attempt to forge a common identity with his inspirational predecessors
in the search for political notoriety and/or legitimacy. It is a process that involves an
intentional attempt by a leader to weave contemporary values into historic traditions.
Palmer compares these efforts to those of a master tailor, skilfully blending new
threads with old into a fabric of unity and purpose,61 which are in turn successful specifically, to cite Kets de Vries, because they facilitate a sense of continuity between past,
present and future.62 In this way, rather than interpreting social attitudes, to better
incorporate them into traditional norms, the associated leader utilises various forms of
intentionally manipulated social tradition based on his/her vested interests to underpin
their leadership. This is also true of Stalin, as already shown, but what distinguishes this
as a legitimation tactic, as opposed to a genuine manifestation of charismatic authority,
is that it was a manufactured application by the Party and Stalin, not something that
spontaneously emerged throughout the population during the course of the transformational period.
Ideally, this process would naturally emerge and be consolidated during a transformational period, as the people view the emergent revolutionary leaders as a personification
of change.63 That said, the same process rarely applies to any successor to follow, which
in turn requires a different tactic from all post-revolutionary leaders, if the zeal of the
revolutionary period itself is to be perpetuated. In the case of Stalin, the tactic used
was the creation of a cult of personality, which in situations where charisma is viewed
as an ideal type, and therefore something that can be approached but not achieved,
the leader cult can be seen as an attempt to create an authority relationship in which
the charismatic element is dominant, even if it is not spontaneous. Thus the cult of personality is better termed a legitimation tactic, and not a manifestation of charismatic
authority, by virtue of the fact that it must be purposefully manufactured to fit the
58

Cited in Eric van Ree, The Political Thought of Joseph Stalin: A study in twentieth-century revolutionary patriotism
(London and New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 162.
59
See Roy Medvedev, Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism (New York, Columbia University
Press, 1989), pp. 817 818; van Ree, pp. 163 168; and Plamper, p. 41.
60
van Ree, p. 168.
61
Monte Palmer, Dilemmas of Political Development: An Introduction to the Politics of the Developing Areas (Itasca:
F.E. Peacock Publishers Inc., 1985), p. 186.
62
Manfred F.R. Kets de Vries, Origins of Charisma: Ties that Bind the Leader and the Led, in Jay Conger, Rabindra Kanungo and Associates (eds) Charismatic Leadership: The Elusive Factor in Organisational Effectiveness
(San Francisco and Oxford: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1988), p. 240.
63
Strong, pp. 120 122.

Stalin the Charismatic Leader?

403

rapidly changing post-revolutionary environment, as it is not a natural occurrence within

the newly transformational society.64
Echoing Hellers indignation over the application of charisma to Lenin, Carl Friedrich
appears to be morally outraged that a concept that originally applied to religious inspiration
could be extended to politics, specifically when applied to leaders that communicate with
secular fervour: . . .Hitler and Jesus Christ, Mussolini and Moses are being identified as
essentially engaged in the same kind of work. But are they? It is repellent to even have to
ask such a question; yet the abuse of the term charismatic makes it vital to do so.65 As a
result, Friedrich concludes that the Weberian theory which he presents as basically
unsound in principle should be omitted from critical discourse, in that it encourages
analysts to conflate the categories between demagogues, leaders of totalitarian movements
and founders of religions.66 While not as outraged as Heller and Friedrich, Pakulski and
Rees also raise doubts about the applicability of Webers typology to Soviet leaders.67
Admittedly, at first glance, any attempt to create and maintain Stalins authority on
the basis of a charismatic tie with his followers appears counterintuitive, especially as
Stalin had failed to distinguish himself as the consummate heroic figure in 1917, but
more importantly during the ensuing civil war period. By all accounts, Stalin was moreover
neither representative of an awe-inspiring public speaker, nor was he endowed with an
imposing physical presence.68 Similarly, his glorified leadership during the Great Patriotic
War was achieved in spite of him being viewed as a poor commander, with a weakness
for. . .underestimating the enemy and overestimating his own forces. He was moreover
short-sighted and cruel, careless of losses, little interested in the fate of soldiers or the
common people.69 How then, when he fails to have even the most basic charismatic
attributes, could it be argued that Stalin could consolidate a form of legitimacy intricately
tied to charismatic appeal and response? The creation of the enduing cult of personality
in the Soviet Union thus requires further analysis.
As discussed above, the cult is best understood as an attempt to mobilise support for the
post-revolutionary, post-Lenin regime. But efforts to legitimise the regime via materialist
propaganda tended to be too abstract to resonate with the USSRs poorly educated population.70 Stalin recognised that orthodox materialism was unpopular on the mass level, as
expressed through his contention that . . .the people do not like Marxist analysis, big
phrases and generalized statements.71 Thus, according to Brandenburger, Soviet ideologists apparently decided to invest in Stalin-centred propaganda patterned after the Lenin
cult in order to augment the inscrutable nature of Marxism-Leninism with the celebration
64
Leslie Holmes, Post-Communism: An Introduction (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), p. 47; see also
Plamper, pp. 169 225.
65
For Friedrich, Hitler represents a very different kind of leadership than the founders. . .of a religion. To further
explore his argument and critique, see Carl Friedrich, Political Leadership and the Problem of Charismatic Power,
The Journal of Politics, 23:1 (1964), pp. 3 24 (p. 15).
66
Friedrich, p. 16.
67
Pakulski argues that none of the Weberian types of legitimate authority seem to apply to Soviet-type societies
(Pakulski, Legitimacy and Mass Compliance: Reflections on Max Weber and Soviet-Type Societies, British Journal
of Political Science, 16:1 (1986), pp. 35 56 (p. 45), while Rees suggests that whilst Webers typology offers a useful
starting point for discussing leader cults it is also in some ways misleading (E.A. Rees, Leader Cults: Varieties,
Preconditions and Functions in B. Apor, J. Behrends, P. Jones and E. A. Rees (eds) The Leader Cult in Communist
Dictatorships: Stalin and the Eastern Bloc (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) pp. 3 29).
68
Jeffrey Brooks, Thank you Comrade Stalin!: Soviet Public Culture from the Revolution to the Cold War (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 60.
69
Roy Medvedev,; transl. E. de Kadt On Stalin and Stalinism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 770.
70
Brandenburger, p. 254.
71
Cited in Brandenburger, p. 255.

404

C. Strong and M. Killingsworth

of a tangible, living hero familiar to one and all.72 The main tool used to achieve this was
the press. Such was Stalin and the Partys resolve that by 1929, there was not a single nonParty publication left, nor any private publishing houses that could have served as vehicles
for opposition views.73 The idea was that he, Stalin, should have ultimate control and influence over whatever media outlet served as a possible source of information on the new
Soviet leader, thereby ensuring his status as the chief architect of the Soviet Union as it
moved from a post-revolutionary society struggling to consolidate power to a dominant
power on the world stage. Even Pravda was co-opted as the apex of the media in order
to showcase Stalins evolving image as a world leader, since within its pages no one
could tinker with his image without his approval.74
Expanding on this idea, Graeme Gill explains that with this development, Pravda ceased
to be a free tribune for influential Party members, and instead became a propaganda
mouthpiece for Stalin. The technique adopted was to highlight the progression of Stalin
from Lenins contemporary to his heroic successor. Between 1929 and the early 1930s,
for example, the Soviet media projected an image of Stalin as always closely associated
with Lenin. Stalin was portrayed in several guises, as the true best pupil of Lenin, his
single most reliable aid, but most importantly as the closest associate and constant companion of Lenin.75 This was predictably not to last, as Lenin was slowly moved from the
foreground of political commentary and presentation to the background behind Stalin.
Admittedly, the change was gradual. While Lenin continued to appear in fake historical
scenes with Stalin into the early 1930s, he was nevertheless slowly effaced by his successor.
The change of emphasis is epitomised by the cover of The Peasant Newspaper in 1933,
which shows a silhouette of Lenin in the background while a larger, full figured photograph
of Stalin dominates the page. Another example of this tactic is found in Pravda on May Day
1938, when Stalin was portrayed as leading a huge procession throughout Moscow, with
Lenin represented by only a poster strategically placed in the background.76 The result is
that while not all participants in the Soviet press may have agreed with what was taking
place, the unique power held by the state over the press ensured that the official view
would prevail, and the Stalin cult would continue to grow.
Importantly, the cult was not static. As E.A. Rees correctly identifies, Stalins cult projected different images at different times: the apprentice revolutionary and Lenins pupil
and heir; the defender of the state; the prophet, apostle, and teacher; the builder of the
new world; the inspirer of his people, whose bounteous good fortune was to live under
his rule.77 The initial representations of Stalin as the revolutionary heir and Lenins best
pupil were tactically modified during the collectivisation phase and the initiation of the
Great Terror in an attempt to shift public attention away from the privations of this
period towards a more optimistic assessment of the future. For example, during this
period, Pravda hosted covers showing Stalin standing in front of Soviet factories appraising
the good work done by the Soviet citizenry and The Peasant Newspaper featured him visiting collective farms talking with the happy farmers in front of their tractors.78 Because the
changed political environment no longer demanded the revolutionary leadership of Lenin,
72

Brandenburger, p. 254.
Medvedev, On Stalin and Stalinism, p. 187.
74
Paul Wingrove, The Mystery of Stalin, History Today, 53:3 (2003), pp. 1820 (p. 18); see also Jeffrey Brooks,
Stalins Politics of Obligations, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 4:1 (2003), pp. 47 68 (pp. 49 50).
75
Graeme Gill, The Soviet Leader Cult: Reflections on the Structure of Leadership in the Soviet Union, British
Journal of Political Science, 10:2 (1980), pp. 167 186 (p. 168).
76
Brooks, Thank you Comrade Stalin!, p. 61.
77
Rees, p. 15; see also Brooks, 2003, pp. 4750.
78
Brooks, Stalins Politics of Obligations, p. 50.
73

Stalin the Charismatic Leader?

405

but instead needed a protector of Soviet interests, Stalin thus endeavoured to present
himself as the steady, purposeful hand which, however dreadful the sacrifices, would
guide the masses on the arduous path to communism.79
More than this, events such as the Stalin Constitution in 1936, Stalins 60th birthday celebrations in 1939 and the release of his official biography in 1940 all helped consolidate
Stalins position as the defender of the state, the single leader with the capacity to best
protect the USSR from enemies both within and outside the state.80 Then, with the
Great Patriotic War, Stalin subsequently presented himself as the consummate war
hero and indisputable leader of the USSR. In effect, Stalin took these calculated steps to
project the image that he had single-handedly transformed the country and won the
Second World War.81 To ensure the acceptance of this new role, he orchestrated a
media reputation for valour by glorifying his achieved status as the architect of a great
victory in film, art, and literature.82 Of central importance to this was his identification
with the many successes of the Red Army, but most importantly his leadership in the decisive victory over Nazism/Fascism in 1943 in the battle of Stalingrad.
Even some of Stalins harshest critics reluctantly acknowledge the mobilising effect
Stalins image had during the war:
Stalins name became a sort of symbol existing in the popular mentality independently from its actual bearer. During the war years, as the Soviet people were battered by unbelievable miseries, the name of Stalin, and the faith in him to some
degree pulled the Soviet people together, giving them hope of victory.83
Obviously, winning World War Two only served to strengthen the heroic myth, whereby
Stalin was heralded as a prominent world leader within the international community. This,
in turn, helped to solidify his reputation at home as the conquering hero and the staunch
defender of Soviet national interests.
Another dimension of the transformation was ideological. Because the communist revolution had also claimed moral superiority over the capitalist West, Stalin ensured that he
was depicted as a defender of Marxism-Leninism. Through his continued manipulation
of the media, Stalin arrogated the position of Party historian, which ultimately allowed
him to assume the role of a socialist theorist, the equal of Marx and Lenin. In 1930, for
example, Stalin conducted a conversation in Pravda, an exchange that involved a list of
questions and answers. It began:
In the theses. . .adopted by the Third Congress of the Comintern, Lenin spoke of
the existence of two main classes in Soviet Russia. We know speak of eliminating

79

Wingrove, p. 18.
Sarah Davies argues that during the 1930s, Stalin expressed some reservations about the promotion of the cult,
arguing that to focus on the leader was unbolshevik (Sarah Davies, Stalin and the Making of the Leader cult in the
1930s, in B. Apor et. al., pp. 2946). This said, Stalin, who was undoubtedly in the position to do so, did not cease
the cultivation of the cult. The cult could not have assumed such proportions without his approval.
81
Brooks, 2003, p. 49.
82
See John Barber, The Image of Stalin in Soviet Propaganda and Public Opinion During World War 2 in John
Garrard and Carol Garrard (eds) World War 2 and the Soviet People: Selected Papers from the Fourth World Congress
for Soviet and East European Studies, Harrogate, 1990 (New York: St. Martins Press 1993), pp. 3850. Among the
more famous odes to Stalin is M. Ciaurelis The Fall of Berlin, in which Stalin not only makes a visit to defeated
Berlin, but also reunites two lovers who were separated by the war (Robert H. McNeal, Stalin: Man and Ruler
(Houndmills: Macmillan Press, 1988), p. 264).
83
Roy Medvedev, Let History Judge, p. 749.
80

406

C. Strong and M. Killingsworth

the kulaks and the new bourgeoisie as a class. Does this mean that in the NEP
period a third class has taken shape in our country?
Stalins answer: Lenin spoke of two main classes. But he knew, of course, there
was a third, the capitalist class. . .84

In correcting Lenin, Stalin demonstrated intimacy with the founders canon, while at the
same time asserting his own leadership. Again, this is an example of Stalin manufacturing
association with the one Soviet hero.
Returning again to a key aspect of charismatic authority, the most important facet of this
relationship between leader and lead is the mystical union that develops between the leader
and his followers and that this sense of union (is) bought about through the direct association
of the leader with the traditional myths, symbols and heroes of the culture of his followers.85
Through re-appropriating Bolshevist history, Stalin worked tirelessly to anoint himself as a
central revolutionary figure. However, as he was not actually this type of figure, a seemingly
major problem emerges when trying to forge an association of charismatic authority to Stalin.
To counter this, it is argued that by placing him with important revolutionary figures, and
at important revolutionary events, Stalin and the Party were able to manufacture a direct
association that was to endure long after his death. An example of this can found in Stalins
infamous October 1931 letter to the journal Proletarskaia revololiutsiia, in which he demanded
that the party pasts of real revolutionaries be evaluated not on the basis of documents that
archive rats might turn up or fail to uncover, but rather by virtue of their individual deeds
and services to communism.86 The letter demanded that a party historian should be guided
not by what they could document, but by what they knew must be true.
What followed was a frenzied period, deemed the great reorganisation in light of
Comrade Stalins remarks, whereby (as highlighted by Nadezhda Mandelstam, who then
worked for the journal For A Communist Education) all . . . [political] manuscripts were
rechecked in great panic, if not revised and reinterpreted beyond recognition.87 Another
excellent example of this type of revision is found in an article published in Pravda
shortly after the publication of Stalins letter, in which a book on Comintern history was
denounced because Stalins name was only mentioned twice in its analysis. The argument
presented: without [an exposition] showing Comrade Stalins leading role in the history of
the Comintern, there can be no Bolshevik textbook on the history of Comintern.88
While the propaganda never referred to Stalin as a god per se, certain qualities classically
attributed to mystical beings were applied to him. As Kriukovas Glory to Stalin Shall be
Eternal illustrates, the Soviet folklore of this period depicted Stalin as omniscient and
omnipotent:
(Stalin) looks and looks but cant get enough
He listens to everything with his keen ear
He sees everything with his keen gaze
He hears and sees how the people live
How the people live, how they work
He rewards everyone for good work.89
84

Cited in Brooks, Thank you Comrade Stalin!, p. 64.

Gill, Personal Dominance, p. 101.
86
Cited in Tucker, The Rise of Stalins personality cult, p. 356.
87
Nadezhda Mandelstam,; transl. M. Hayward Hope against Hope: a Memoir (London: Collins, 1971), p. 259.
88
Cited in Tucker, The Rise of Stalins Personality Cult, p. 363.
89
Cited in Karen Petrone, Life Has Become More Joyous, Comrades: Celebrations In the Time of Stalin (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2000), p. 217.
85

Stalin the Charismatic Leader?

407

Furthermore, a girl recalled her childhood feelings toward Stalin in the following words:
They said there was no God, and I made my God of Stalin. Its funny, but let me
tell you. If I was sick or something hurt me, then I thought it would go away
because Stalin knew. He was just like a God.90
Stalin was the friend to humanity, the great thinker, and the creator of the peoples happiness.91 As explained by Brooks, exemplary citizens thanked Stalin for their well-being in
pictures and newspaper articles, outdoing each other in avowing how much they owed the
State and leader for what they had.92
The power that settled around Stalin furthermore took on an almost magical quality. The
writer, Kornei Chukovski, noted in his diary the effect of Stalins appearance at a congress
of the Komsomol in April 1936:
And HE stood, a little weary, pensive and stately. One could feel the tremendous
habit of power, the force of it, and at the same time something feminine and soft. I
looked about: Everyone had fallen in love with this gentle, inspired, laughing face.
To see him, simply to see him, was happiness for all us.93
Through the manipulation and control of the media, a political environment was cultivated
in which the people developed a sense that while life might be difficult, only Stalin could fix
the problems prevalent in society.
With this, a cult of personality specific to Stalin emerged. In response, a situation developed over time whereby the people might have disagreed on whether his leadership had
been good or bad, but they nevertheless always portrayed him as omnipotent and invincible. This again speaks to the existence of a genuine bond between Stalin and his followers.
Hence, while it is virtually impossible to speak with authority of public opinion in Stalins
Soviet Union, the enduring nature of the Stalin myth gives a clear indication of its overarching impact. Stalin should thus not be viewed as power itself, but as an image of power
which . . . [was] manipulated and exaggerated beyond proportion, but which . . . [was]
also vulnerable to erosion and collapse, if the people were ever to reject it outright.94
Consequently, the nature of the cult was actively worked and re-worked in response to
changing regime priorities. Over time, the base of the cult changed. For example, those who
benefited directly from Stalins industrialisation policies and even from the purges formed
the new base of the cult as the post-revolutionary regime gained increasing stability.
However, it would be unfair to suggest that the cult only manifested through Stalins
toadies, since much of the basis of the cult was drawn from real achievement. The
great projects of the state the five year plans, the Moscow Metro, the building of new
industrial centres were all identified with the leader. Similarly, the exploits of modern
Soviet heroes war heroes, cosmonauts, scientists, explorers were all associated with
the vozhd.95

90

Cited in Raymond Bauer, The Pseudo-Charismatic Leader in Soviet Society, Problems of Communism, 2:3-4
(1953), pp. 11 14 (p. 13).
91
Cited in Brooks, Thank you Comrade Stalin!, p. 66.
92
Brooks, Stalins Politics of Obligations, p. 48.
93
Cited in Brooks, Thank you Comrade Stalin!, p. 60.
94
Sara Fenander, Author and Autocrat: Tertzs Stalin and the Ruse of Charisma, The Russian Review, 58 (April
1999), pp. 286 97 (p. 286).
95
Rees, pp. 1213.

408

C. Strong and M. Killingsworth

Furthermore, the cult was personal in its nature, best highlighted by Lev Kopelev, who
describes how he felt on hearing Stalin, in 1941, assuring Soviets of victory within a half
year or a little more:
. . .In my memory the pain and the horror of 1933 and 1937 had not grown cold. I
remembered how. . . (Stalin) had deceived us, how he had lied to us about the past
and the present. . .And nevertheless I believed him all over again, as did my comrades. I believed him more than at any time in the past. Because, perhaps, at the
moment I first felt a spontaneous, emotional attachment to him. . . This belief and
heart felt devotion could not easily be broken. It was not broken by many years of
prisons and camps.96
The point to remember is that while Kopelev actively realised that he had been lied to, he
still believed Stalin.
In this, Kopelev presents a perfect profile of the sort of relationship that Weber believed
would exist between the charismatic leader and his disciples. As Willner notes, such
emotions devotion, awe, reverence, and, above all, blind faith are what the charismatic
leader generates in his followers. . .this relationship involves the abdication of choice and of
judgement by followers and the surrender of the mandate to choose and judge to the
leader.97 The irrational nature of charismatic authority is thereby shown to be not only
in opposition to societal norms or routine structures. The belief that the followers have
in the charismatic leader is also of an irrational nature, as demonstrated by the fact that
Kopelev feels an emotional attachment to a leader who he knows has committed wrong,
and although he tries, he cannot help but believe. Kopelev has been neither tricked, nor
does he appear to be under any form of hypnosis. It is instead indicative of the type of
relationship that must exist between a leader destined to change everything about a countrys regime, if that change is to be solidified and perpetuated.
Finally, the reaction of Soviet citizens following the death of Stalin further supports the
argument that a charismatic bond existed between the leader and his followers that was perpetuated throughout the entire existence of the former Soviet Union in one form or
another. Following the death of Stalin in 1953, the government assaulted the Stalin cult,
first obliquely, then explicitly, portraying Stalin as a mass murderer,98 But, rather than
destroying the cult, Stalins death caused, to varying degrees, a traumatic crisis of faith.
Indeed, it led the people to wonder whether Stalin was still the exemplary hero of the
cults discourse or the polar opposite, an enemy of the people.99
The strength of the charismatic bond was such that the revelations after the death of
Stalin caused some people to re-evaluate their own lives. Among those who suffered
from a crisis of faith was Kopelev:
. . .Several years were required after the first disclosures of the cult of personality,
years during which I determinedly reflected on my own recollections, wrenching
from myself drop by drop the world view and world conception, the ideology
96

Lev Kopelev,; transl. Gary Kern The Education of a True Believer (New York: Harper, 1980), pp. 266 267.
Willner, p. 6.
98
Nikita Khrushchevs secret speech, delivered to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
in 1956, spoke explicitly of errors committed by the Stalin regime. It wasnt until 1961 that Khrushchev made
reference to crimes committed by the regime. Although it was a secret speech, samizdat copies were circulated
throughout the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
99
Polly Jones, From Stalinism to Post-Stalinism: De-Mythologising Stalin, 1953-56, Totalitarian Movements &
Political Religions, 4:1 (2003), pp. 127 132 (p.132).
97

Stalin the Charismatic Leader?

409

and psychology of a slavish, doctrinaire myth making, before I could finally begin
to understand what an ugly little pygmy I had imagined to be a handsome giant,
how irremediably disastrous our my dialectical illusions and grand faith had
been.100
In this passage, it becomes clear that Kopelev felt betrayed by Stalin. Using the charismatic
typology, this betrayal can be regarded as a breaking of the charismatic bond. Once Stalin
was dead, he was no longer able to prove himself, and hence the charismatic bond was
broken. The fact that his followers lost faith in him, and hence Stalin lost his charismatic
authority, shows that the charismatic leader concept is applicable to Stalin. To take this one
step further, again using the Weber typology, the charismatic bond developed by Stalin was
not transferred to his office following his death. By making a deliberate decision to reveal
Stalins errors, then crimes, the new Soviet leaders no longer sought to claim authority
based on a charismatic tie with his followers.
While it has been argued here that the cult was manufactured, which directly implies that
the charismatic bond could be characterised as fabricated, it would be wrong to describe
Stalins cult of personality as a form of mass hypnosis that affected the complete strata
of the Soviet population.101 According to Sarah Davies, this would lead to an oversimplification of the situation. While the charismatic, god-like image of the leader had adherents, as demonstrated, this was not the only image that appealed to other segments of
society. The conclusion drawn by Davies is that ordinary people selected those aspects
of the official cult language which conformed to their own ideas about leadership.102
The examples above further strengthen this argument: the peasant Kriukovas verse, the
childs leader worship, and the intellectual Chukovskis rapture all demonstrate both the
different demographic responses to the cult and its broad cross-demographic appeal.
The charismatic bond that existed between Stalin and his followers, while manufactured,
was still personal in its nature. Furthermore, at whom the bond was aimed is of limited
importance, as Webers charismatic typology does not explicitly define what could be
termed the charismatic demographic. It is not paramount that one identifies who the audience is that the cult is trying to reach, only that it created a particular type of follower
response, which in the case of Stalin was that of the protector of Russia.
Conclusion
Appreciating that the cultivation of Stalins cult of personality represented an attempt to
manufacture a charismatic bond provides academics and scholars alike with an opportunity to reassess the applicability of Webers charismatic authority type when analysing the
legitimacy of the Soviet state under Stalin In turn, it provides a tool to analyze other nondemocratic, even non-charismatic (at least in the traditional sense of the word) leaders and
find more objective interpretations about how they create, consolidate and perpetuate
popular, mass support for their leadership.
As Stalin initially had only dubious claims to charismatic authority, it is not unreasonable
to argue that he manufactured it. He was, after all, not the consummate hero of the Russian
revolution, nor did he have many of the attributes traditionally associated with charismatic
appeal. Finally, he was not privy to the type of popular adulation afforded Lenin as the
100

Kopelev, p. 267.
See Medvedev, Let History Judge, pp. 302 303.
102
Sarah Davies, The Leader Cult: Propaganda and its Reception in Stalins Russia, in John Channon (ed) Politics,
Society and Stalinism in the USSR (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), p. 131.
101

410

C. Strong and M. Killingsworth

accepted leader of the Russian Revolution. Consequently, Stalin co-opted the Lenin cult to
the degree that Lenins legacy became a legitimation technique for his own leadership.
When explored further, it becomes clear that rather than having the luxury to allow political traditions to develop in their own time in the former Soviet Union, Stalin acted to
create a new form of traditionalism to legitimate his power base. The cult of personality,
while negating the basic tenets of communist theory, at least in relation to the role of the
leader, created a political atmosphere in which Stalin was revered as the saviour of Russia.
Through it, he successfully transformed his dull, bureaucratic reputation as administrator
to that of the dynamic leader. This is not to imply that he became a charismatic leader, or
even that he wielded charismatic authority in the strict Weberian sense, but rather to highlight the response of the people to his leadership. As a result of this harnessing of the
political atmosphere of the Soviet Union, the people responded to Stalin with adulation
and devotion and thereby created a charismatic myth around Stalin reminiscent of even
the most comprehensive reading of Webers theory of routinised charisma. Stalins legitimacy can thus best be explained as a combination of routinised charismatic authority and
more mundane legalistic forms of authority.
The problem with a rudimentary conceptualisation of charismatic authority is that it
does little to explain how dictatorial leaders can generate such levels of devotion and
loyalty, with the follower responses similar to that of revolutionary leaders, if the regime
itself is not considered by outsiders to be a legitimate form of governance. In this
respect, charismatic authority per se is not particularly useful as an analytical tool to
analyse stabilised forms of authority. Through the routinisation process, by contrast, the
charismatic element of the forms of authority mobilised during the change period is transformed into more functional forms. Only then can the idea of charisma become pertinent
to the study of stabilised forms of authority. In this sense, the case of Stalin provides a
unique study of the routinisation of charisma, whereby an inherently transient form of
authority can be consolidated into more enduring forms of legitimate authority premised
on charismatic legacy, if applied to the legacy consolidated around a prominent leader
within a totalitarian system.
In totalitarian systems, power and legitimacy rest in the ability of the leader to convince
the population that there is a genuine reason why their natural rights are curtailed by governmental policies and control. In these cases, since the vitality of the established institutional framework is dependent on the reciprocal support of the people, the leader
plays an integral role in perpetuating the revolutionary zeal of a regime that no longer
espouses the heady ideals professed during the actual change period. Often these leaders
assume the role of a guardian of the people, who promises to ensure that the lofty goals
espoused by the vanishing revolutionary guard is still important and is a continuing objective of the people. In the case of Stalin, this process is exemplified. While not one of the
revolutionary guard, he managed to guide the Soviet Union from a period of economic privation to a position of power within the international community following World War II.
That this was consolidated through the construction of a manufactured, even fabricated
cult of personality does not downplay the legitimating force created by Stalins leadership.
When viewed from this perspective, manufactured charisma does not render Webers
typology redundant. Nor, as suggested by Friedrich, does the application of the typology
to dictators undermine the leadership of traditional charismatic leaders. Furthermore,
more people hearing of the deeds of a particular leader does not subtract from the charismatic appeal of this leader. Such arguments reflect a misunderstanding of the core relational aspect of Webers typology. It is important to remember that Weber was very
particular about where the charismatic leaders authority came from; his followers or disciples. If these followers felt that the leader was no longer worthy of support, then the leader

Stalin the Charismatic Leader?

411

would lose his/her authority to lead. The charismatic nature of the leader is still scrutinized
by the followers, and an inability by the leader to prove his/her abilities in the moment still
results in the charismatic bond being broken. Thus, despite claims to the contrary, Webers
typology does offer us insights into Stalins attempts to legitimate his rule. More specifically,
through the application of routinised charisma, Stalins attempts at legitimation are not
only better understood, but also present further avenues of exploring non-democratic
legitimation techniques through the use of modern media.
Notes on Contributors
Dr Carol Strong is an assistant professor at the University of Arkansas at Monticello; she is
also concurrently an Honorary Fellow at the Contemporary Europe Research Centre at the
University of Melbourne (Australia). She received her PhD in political science from the
University of Melbourne.
Dr Matt Killingsworth is an associate lecturer in international relations at the University of
Tasmania, Australia. He has published on post-communist justice (lustration) in Poland
and the Czech Republic, legitimacy and lustration and dissent and opposition in the
former Communist countries of Eastern Europe.

Copyright of Politics, Religion & Ideology is the property of Routledge and its content may
not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's
express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for
individual use.