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To cite this article: Carolyn Price (2012) What is the point of love?, International
Journal of Philosophical Studies, 20:2, 217-237, DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2011.629367
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Abstract
Why should we love the people we do and why does love motivate us
to act as it does? In this paper, I explore the idea that these questions
can be answered by appealing to the idea that love has to do with close
personal relationships (the relationship claim). Niko Kolodny (2003) has
already developed a relationship theory of love: according to Kolodny,
love centres on the belief that the subject shares a valuable personal
relationship with the beloved. However, this account has some implausible consequences. I shall develop an alternative account, discarding the
assumption that love centres on a belief, and beginning instead from a
conception of love as an emotional attitude which, I suggest, involves
a form of evaluation that is not belief. As I explain, adopting this view
allows us to interpret the relationship claim, not as a claim about the
subjects beliefs, but as a claim about the function of love. This approach
allows us to answer the questions above, while avoiding the difficulties
that confront Kolodnys account. I end by exploring a case that might be
thought to raise some difficulties for my account.
Keywords: love; emotion; motivation; belief; evaluation; justification
1. Introduction
Niko Kolodny (2003) has recently developed a relationship theory of
love. His account centres on the claim that love is sustained and justified
by the personal relationship between the subject and the beloved. I
believe that Kolodny is right to emphasise the connection between love
and personal relationships.1 As I shall explain, however, Kolodnys relationship theory has some implausible consequences. My aim in this
paper is to propose an alternative version of the relationship theory
one that escapes these difficulties. Key to my account is the idea that
love is best understood as (what I shall call) an emotional attitude: once
we adopt this view, I shall argue, we can develop a more successful version of the relationship theory.
In what follows, I shall be concerned only with personal love: for
example, romantic or parental love. I shall focus on paradigm cases of
personal love: that is, cases in which one person loves another for an
extended period of time.
2. Three Assumptions
His
His
His
His
His
His
sense of humour
kindness
lop-sided grin
panache on the tennis court
passion for Roman mosaics
incurable untidiness
The questions that I raised in the last section are all questions about
why love takes the form that it does. To answer them, it seems, we need
to know more about what love is its nature or purpose. The relationship theory offers a way to fill this gap, because it begins from a claim
about the nature of love:
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Addie harbours a concern for Joes welfare and for the health
of the C-relationship that she shares with Joe.
Addie believes that these concerns, and the actions they produce, are justified by the fact that she shares a valuable F or
C-relationship with Joe.8
Love has two foci: loves concerns are focused both on the
beloved and on the subjects C-relationship with the beloved.
There is just one kind of justification for love: the existence of
a valuable F- or C-relationship between the subject and the
beloved.
How does this account resolve the puzzles that I set out in the last
section?
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Consider, first, the puzzle of lovability. Earlier, I mentioned that Kolodny denies that the personal qualities of the beloved constitute grounds
for love. We can now see why: for as R2 makes clear, Kolodny holds
that love is justified only by the value of the relationship that the subject
shares with the beloved. How, then, should we understand the claim that
Addie loves Joe for his lovable personal qualities? Kolodny suggests
(2003: pp. 155; 1712) that, in making this claim, we are describing the
qualities that Addie appreciates in Joe. These qualities, according to Kolodny, are Joes attractive qualities the qualities that entice Addie to
spend time with him. Because the time she spends with Joe helps to foster their C-relationship, Addies love gives her a reason to value these
attractive qualities. But although these qualities help to explain Addies
continuing love for Joe, they do not help to justify it.
Kolodnys account can easily accommodate the case of familial love.
According to Kolodny, Joes love for his newborn daughter will be justified, straightforwardly, by the valuable F-relationship that he shares with
her. The existence of this F-relationship justifies Joes love, in that it justifies his concerns both for Maia and for the C-relationship that they will
go on to develop.
The account also offers a solution to the puzzle of loves concerns.
According to Kolodny, Addies loving concerns stem from the value she
puts on her C-relationship with Joe. The value of this relationship
explains her concern for Joes welfare. But it also explains why she
wants to spend time with Joe: spending time with Joe helps to sustain
their C-relationship. Again, it explains why she wants him to reciprocate
her feelings: their C-relationship is partly constituted by Joes loving
feelings for her. She cares about these things, then, because she cares
about the health of their C-relationship.
Hence, Kolodnys account suggests solutions to all these puzzles
about love. Nevertheless, there are several objections that can be raised
to his account. In the next section, I shall mention three.
5.
6.
7.
I have suggested that an emotional attitude is characteristically generated and sustained by an evaluation of some kind. I have not yet said,
however, what I take an emotional evaluation to be. I am going to suggest that emotional evaluations are not beliefs, but intentional states of a
distinctive kind. There are several (oft-rehearsed) reasons for taking this
view. I shall mention two of them here.
First, an emotional response can conflict with a belief. In harbouring
a jealous attitude to Joe, for example, Addie may experience their relationship as under threat; yet, despite a parade of jealous thoughts, she
may not actually believe that it is. What someone feels, then, seems to
be distinct from what they believe.
It might be objected that this is too quick: perhaps Addie holds two
contradictory beliefs. But if this is Addies situation, she should be able
to resolve the conflict either by suspending judgement or by examining
the available evidence to reach a final verdict. A conflict between emotion and belief, however, can persist long after the subject has reached a
considered judgement on the issue: changing an emotional response is
often a much more extended and indirect process than revising a belief.
Like many other philosophers of emotion, I take this to suggest that
emotion and belief involve different processes of evaluation.15
Secondly, emotional responses and evaluative beliefs do not draw on
the same sources of information: in particular, emotional responses seem
to be particularly dependent on perception and imagination. One might
hear all the grisly details of a car accident and judge that it was a dreadful event. And yet one might not experience it as distressing until one
sees, or perhaps imagines, what has happened. I take it that this offers
further support to the claim that emotional responses are not sustained
by beliefs, but by intentional states of a distinctive kind.16
It is important not to overstretch this point. I am not denying that
an emotional response will characteristically involve certain beliefs.
Indeed, it is compatible with what I have said that emotional attitudes
necessarily involve beliefs. Emotional attitudes involve beliefs in at
least two different ways: first, as we have seen, an emotional attitude
directs the subjects attention to certain aspects of the situation and
motivates the subject to respond to it in certain ways: as a result, emotional attitudes involve certain characteristic trains of thought, and
these may well carry conviction when the subject thinks them. Addie,
for example, may well assent to her jealous thoughts as they form in
her mind; it is only when she examines them more closely that she
dismisses them as false. (In dismissing her thoughts, however, she need
not have dismissed her jealousy: she may still be strongly disposed to
have those thoughts, and she may have to expend some effort to keep
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career has no impact (or perhaps a negative impact) on the relationship that he shares with Addie. Moreover, because R3 allows that
personal qualities may constitute grounds for love, my account has no
difficulty in accommodating the case of unrequited love described earlier: Lauries intrinsic personal qualities may well give Edith adequate
grounds to love him.
Nevertheless, R3 does not imply that personal qualities are the only
grounds for love. R3 can also allow that the nature of the relationship
between two people can constitute grounds for love. That two people
have a close familial relationship, or that they already share a relationship of mutual concern, or that they find fulfilment in each others company might all constitute strong grounds for a loving appraisal, given R3.
Indeed, I take it that R3 leaves scope to recognise yet other kinds of
justification for love. In particular, I take it that grounds for love can
include past events: that Joe supported Addie through a difficult time, or
that they have achieved something valuable together might also constitute grounds for love. This may be, in part, because Joes behaviour on
these occasions provides particularly strong evidence of his lovable qualities or of his continuing concern for Addie. But another possibility is
that these experiences have demonstrated the worth of the relationship
itself, or increased the value of the relationship by fostering a shared
outlook on life. In some cases, past events might justify continuing love,
even though the subject is now estranged from the beloved.
This version of the relationship theory, then, licenses a relatively liberal interpretation of what might constitute grounds for love. In part,
this is because R3 assumes a relatively inclusive conception of a personal
relationship. But it is also because it does not presuppose that love must
be founded on a relationship that already exists. Rather, it claims that
love functions to foster a relationship in the future. Hence, although it
allows that there are cases (familial love, say) in which love is grounded
on an existing relationship, it can also allow that here are cases (unrequited love) in which there is, as yet, no relationship at all.
12.
Loves Concerns
claiming that fostering their relationship is something that she consciously sets out to do. Of course, Addie may have such beliefs and
goals: but if so, they will be the result of conscious reflection on the
value of her relationship with Joe and its importance to her. On my
account, this is something distinct from Addies love. To say that Addie
loves Joe implies that she wants to spend time with him, and that she
wants him to care for her in return. But these concerns do not depend
on her belief that she shares a valuable relationship with Joe. Indeed, as
we have seen, she might want these things despite believing that her
relationship with Joe is damaging or futile. If we want to explain why
Addie has these concerns, the best thing to say is simply that they are
part and parcel of her love for Joe.24 On this account, then, there is a
clear distinction between acting out of love and acting from a considered
appreciation of the value of a relationship.
If this is right, R3 has no role in explaining Addies loving actions:
Addies loving actions are explained, simply, by her love. R3 becomes
relevant only when we ask a more general question: why does love imply
concerns of these kinds? In other words, we can appeal to R3 to resolve
the puzzle of loves concerns. The explanation offered is a functional,
not an intentional one: it implies nothing about the beliefs or values of
the subject. Loves concerns make sense, given the function of love.
13. Love Without Hope
I have sketched an account of love as an emotional attitude, the function
of which is to foster an intense personal relationship between the lover
and the beloved. I have tried to show how this account might explain
why love takes the form it does, while avoiding the objections that I
raised to Kolodnys account. I shall end by considering a case that might
be thought to pose some difficulties for my account. As we shall see, the
case raises some broader issues, and as a result, I cannot resolve it decisively here. Instead, my aim is to explore the case, and to indicate my
preferred response.
Suppose that Zack loves Helen, with whom he has shared a close
relationship for many years. Recently, Helen has suffered a massive
stroke, leaving her paralysed and aphasic, unable to recognise Zack, to
remember their life together, or to respond to his presence. She is no
longer the witty and active woman with whom Zack fell in love. As he
comes to understand the situation, Zack is seized by grief and compassion for Helen. Yet he also continues to love her.
This is, of course, a case of unrequited love. However, it differs from
the case of Edith and Laurie in one crucial respect: there is no hope that
Zacks love will be returned. Hence, Helen is no longer a person with
whom Zack should or even could pursue an intense personal
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Conclusion
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
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References
Averill, J. (1980) A Constructivist View of Emotion, in R. Plutchik and H. Kellerman (eds) Theories of Emotion, New York: Academic Press, pp. 30612.
Brown, D. (1996) The Right Method of Boy-Loving, in R. E. Lamb (ed.) Love
Analyzed, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 4964.
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