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Article 87

Agapay vs. Palang

Miguel Palang and Carlina Vallesterol (private respondent) got married in July 16, 1949. A few months after the wedding,
Miguel Palang left to work in Hawaii.
Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned to the Philippines for good in 1972, he refused to live with
Carlina and their only child Hermania.
Miguel contracted a second marriage with Erlinda Agapay (petitioner). Two months earlier, May 17, 1973, they jointly
purchased a parcel of agricultural land. A house and lot in Binalonan, Pangasinan was likewise purchased on September 23,
1975, allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. TCT No. 143120 covering said property was later issued in her name.

On October 30, 1975, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement to settle the case.
The parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia Palang.
Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son, Kristopher, born on Dec 6, 1977. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted
of concubinage. Two years later, Miguel died.
Carlina and her daughter instituted this case for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against petitioner. They
sought to get back the land and the house and lot located at Binalonan allegedly purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with
petitioner. The lower court dismissed the complaint but CA reversed the decision.
Issue: Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded in favor of Erlinda? Whether there was a valid
donation between Miguel and Erlinda with respect to the money used to buy the house and lot?
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that
actual contribution is required by this provision.
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sarisari store but failed to persuade us that she actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact that
on the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only around twenty years of age and Miguel Palang was already sixtyfour and a pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she
contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject property, [11] there being no proof of the same.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland in Binalonan, Pangasinan, we
find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by the
Court of Appeals, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang.
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975 when she was
only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property reveals the
falsehood of this claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the purchase price and
directed that Erlindas name alone be placed as the vendee.
The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent by
express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation,
under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition
against donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without
a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal

Matabuena vs. Cervantes

Felix cohabitated with the respondent. In 1956, Felix donated a parcel of land to Petronila Cervantes. In 1962, Felix and Petronila
got married. Felix Matabuena died intestate on September 13, 1962. Petitioner, sister of Felix, sought the nullification of the
donation citing Article 133 of the Civil Code Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void.
The lower court ruled, in favor of Petronila Cervantes, that the donation was valid because it was made at the time the deceased
and Respondent were not yet married and that the prohibition does not apply to live-in partners.

Issue: Whether the ban on a donation between the spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship.

Yes. "To prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and
influence upon the donor
The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the
disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their
marriage on March 28, 1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other half.

Article 94
BA Finance Corp vs. CA

On July 1, 1975, private respondent Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner in the amount of P591,003.59 as evidenced
by a promissory note he signed in his own behalf and as representative of the A & L Industries. Respondent Yulo presented an
alleged special power of attorney executed by his wife, respondent Lily Yulo, who manages A & L Industries and under whose
name the said business is registered, purportedly authorizing Augusto Yulo to procure the loan and sign the promissory note.
About two months prior to the loan, however, Augusto Yulo had already left Lily Yulo and their children and had abandoned
their conjugal home. When the obligation became due and demandable, Augusto Yulo failed to pay the same.

On October 7, 1975, the petitioner filed its amended complaint against the spouses Augusto and Lily Yulo on the basis of the
promissory note. It also prayed for the issuance of a writ of attatchment alleging that the said spouses were guilty of fraud in
contracting the debt upon which the action was brought and that the fraud consisted of the spouses' inducing the petitioner to
enter into a contract with them by executing a Deed of Assignment in favor of the petitioner, assigning all their rights, titles and
interests over a construction contract executed by and between the spouses and A. Soriano Corporation on June 19, 1974 for a
consideration of P615,732.50 when, in truth, the spouses did not have any intention of remitting the proceeds of the said
construction contract to the petitioner because despite the provisions in the Deed of Assignment that the spouses shall, without
compensation or costs, collect and receive in trust for the petitioner all payments made upon the construction contract and shall
remit to the petitioner all collections therefrom, the said spouses failed and refuse to remit the collections and instead,
misappropriated the proceeds for their own use and benefit, without the knowledge or consent of the petitioner.
Private respondent Lily Yulo filed her answer with counterclaim, alleging that although Augusta Yulo and she are husband and
wife, the former had abandoned her and their children five (5) months before the filing of the complaint; that they were already
separated when the promissory note was executed; that her signature in the special power of attorney was forged because she had
never authorized Augusto Yulo in any capacity to transact any business for and in behalf of A & L Industries, which is owned by
her as a single proprietor, that she never got a single centavo from the proceeds of the loan mentioned in the promissory note; and
that as a result of the illegal attachment of her properties, which constituted the assets of the A & L Industries, the latter closed its
business and was taken over by the new owner.

Issue: Whether A & L Industries can be held liable for the obligations contracted by the husband.
A & L Industries is a single proprietorship and the registered owner thereof is private respondent Lily Yulo, the said
proprietorship was established during the marriage and its assets were also acquired during the same. Therefore, it is presumed
that this property forms part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses Augusto and Lily Yulo and thus, could be held liable for
the obligations contracted by Augusto Yulo, as administrator of the partnership.
There is no dispute that A & L Industries was established during the marriage of Augusta and Lily Yulo and therefore the same is
presumed conjugal and the fact that it was registered in the name of only one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature
(See Mendoza v. Reyes, 124 SCRA 161, 165). However, for the said property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the
husband must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership under Article 161 of the Civil Code. In the present case,
the obligation which the petitioner is seeking to enforce against the conjugal property managed by the private respondent Lily
Yulo was undoubtedly contracted by Augusto Yulo for his own benefit because at the time he incurred the obligation he had
already abandoned his family and had left their conjugal home. Worse, he made it appear that he was duly authorized by his wife
in behalf of A & L Industries, to procure such loan from the petitioner. Clearly, to make A & L Industries liable now for the said
loan would be unjust and contrary to the express provision of the Civil Code.

Marmont Resort Hotel Enterprises vs. Guiang


Article 96
Uy vs. CA
Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose. His wife, Gilda, filed a petition to be allowed as sole
administrator of their conjugal property and be authorized to sell the same as her husband is physically incapacitated to discharge
his functions. RTC ruled in favor of Gilda.
Teodoro, son of the spouses, filed a motion for consideration contending that the petition made by Gilda was essentially a
petition for guardianship of the person and properties of his father. As such it should follow the ruled governing special
proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court requiring procedural due process particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the
During pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son-in-law for a lower price.
Issue: whether petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property under Article
124 of the Family Code and dispose of a parcel of land with its improvements, worth more than twelve million pesos, with the
approval of the court in a summary proceedings, to her co-petitioners, her own daughter and son-in-law, for the amount of eight
million pesos.

In the condition of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., the procedural rules on summary proceedings in relation to Article 124 of the
Family Code are not applicable. Because Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. was unable to take care of himself and manage the conjugal property
due to illness that had rendered him comatose, the proper remedy was the appointment of a judicial guardian of the person or
estate or both of such incompetent, under Rule 93, Section 1, 1964 Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, petitioner earlier had filed
such a petition for judicial guardianship.
In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under the Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, the trial court did
not even observe the requirements of the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code. Thus, the trial court did not serve
notice of the petition to the incapacitated spouse; it did not require him to show cause why the petition should not be granted.

Article 101
De La Cruz vs. De La Cruz
Estrella de la Cruz filed a complaint alleging in essence that her husband, the defendant Severino de la Cruz, had not only
abandoned her but as well was mismanaging their conjugal partnership properties, and praying for (1) separation of property, (2)
monthly support of P2,500 during the pendency of the action, and (3) payment of P20,000 as attorney's fees, and costs.

Severino, on the other hand, denied having abandoning his wife and children, but admitted that in 1957, or a year before the
filing of the action, he started to live separately from his wife. When he transferred his living quarters to his office in
Mandalagan, Bacolod City, his intention was not, as it never has been, to abandon his wife and children, but only to teach her a
lesson as she was quarrelsome and extremely jealous of every woman. He decided to live apart from his wife temporarily because
at home he could not concentrate on his work as she always quarreled with him, while in Mandalagan he could pass the nights in
peace. Since 1953 he stayed in Manila for some duration of time to manage their expanding business and look for market outlets
for their texboard products. Even the plaintiff admitted in both her original and amended complaints that "sometime in 1953,
because of the expanding business of the herein parties, the defendant established an office in the City of Manila, wherein some
of the goods, effects and merchandise manufactured or produced in the business enterprises of the parties were sold or disposed
of". From the time he started living separately in Mandalagan up to the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff herself furnished him
food and took care of his laundry. This latter declaration was not rebutted by the plaintiff.
The defendant, with vehemence, denied that he has abandoned his wife and family, averring that he has never failed, even for a
single month, to give them financial support, as witnessed by the plaintiff's admission in her original and amended complaints as
well as in open court that during the entire period of their estrangement, he was giving her around P500 a month for support. In
point of fact, his wife and children continued to draw allowances from his office of a total ranging from P1,200 to P1,500 a
month. He financed the education of their children, two of whom were studying in Manila at the time of the trial and were not
living with the plaintiff. While in Bacolod City, he never failed to visit his family, particularly the children. His wife was always
in bad need of money because she played mahjong, an accusation which she did not traverse, explaining that she
played mahjong to entertain herself and forget the infidelities of her husband.

Issue: Whether there has been abandonment on the part of the husband? Whether the husband abused his authority as
administrator of the conjugal partnership
The fact that the defendant never ceased to give support to his wife and children negatives any intent on his part not to return to
the conjugal abode and resume his marital duties and rights. In People v. Schelske, 6 it was held that where a husband, after
leaving his wife, continued to make small contributions at intervals to her support and that of their minor child, he was not guilty
of their "abandonment", which is an act of separation with intent that it shall be perpetual, since contributing to their support
negatived such intent. In re Hoss' Estate, supra, it was ruled that a father did not abandon his family where the evidence
disclosed that he almost always did give his wife part of his earnings during the period of their separation and that he gradually
paid some old rental and grocery bills.
SC held that lower court erred in holding that mere refusal or failure of the husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership
to inform the wife of the progress of the business constitutes abuse of administration. In order for abuse to exist, there must be a
willful and utter disregard of the interest of the partnership evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts or omissions prejudicial to
the latter.

Article 109
Toda Jr. vs. Ca