(Labor Law Rev Digests) (Batch 1) PDF

Labor Law Review |Sobrevinas | August December 2014|Page
Viana v. Al-lagadan
20 August 2014
Ponente: Concepcion
Lia
SUMMARY:
Vianas sailboat sank, and crew member Alejandro disappeared with
the craft, prompting the latters parents (respondents) to file a claim
for compensation. Both the WCC Referee and the Commissioner found
ER-EE relationship by considering Alejandros share, which he should
have received at the end of the trip, as wages. The SC ruled it could
not determine whether Alejandro was an industrial partner or an
employee, as the facts are insufficient to warrant a reasonable
conclusion. Only element 2 could be assumed to exist.
DOCTRINE:
In determining the existence of ER-EE relationship, the following
elements are generally considered:
(1) the selection and engagement of the employee;
(2) the payment of wages;
(3) the power of dismissal; and
(4) the power to control the employees conduct although the latter
is the most important element
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Viaas sailboat Magkapatid sank in Sept 1948. Alejandro AlLagadan, member of the crew, disappeared with the craft. His parents
(respondents) filed a claim for compensation under Act No. 3428.
2. A Referee of the Workmens Compensation Commission (WCC) ordered
Viaa to pay P1,560. He based his decision on the report that the basis of
engaging the services of crewmen is determined in accordance with the
contract executed between the owner and the patron. The contract
commonly followed is on a share basis after deducting all the expenses. Onehalf goes to the owner, and the other half goes to the patron and the
members. The hiring of the crew is done by the patron himself. Usually, when
a patron enters into a contract with the owner, he has a crew ready with him.
2. The Commissioner affirmed the Referees decision. He sustained the
finding of an ER-EE relationship, and considered the share which Alejandro
received at the end of each trip was in the nature of wages which is defined
under sec 39 of the Compensation Act. This is so because such share could be
reckoned in terms of money.
3. Viaa brought the matter to SC for review by certiorari, on the ground that
Alejandro was, at the time of his death, an industrial partner, not an
employee. He alleged in his petition that the practice observed in engaging
the services of crewmen is on a partnership basis, such that that the owner
receives half of the earnings after deducting the expenses, the other half is
divided pro rata among the members, the patron receiving 4 parts, the piloto
3 parts, the wheelsman 1 1/2 parts and the members 1 part each.
ISSUES/HELD:
Was Alejandro an industrial partner or an employee? Could not be
determined. Case remanded to WCC.
RATIO:
In determining the existence of ER-EE relationship, the following elements
are generally considered:
(1) the selection and engagement of the employee;
(2) the payment of wages;
(3) the power of dismissal; and
(4) the power to control the employees conduct although the latter is the
most important element (35 Am. Jur. 445).
Assuming that the share received by Alejandro could partake of the nature of
wages and that the 2nd element exists, the record does not contain any
specific data regarding the 3rd and 4th elements.
With respect to the 1st element, the facts are insufficient to warrant a
reasonable conclusion.

On the one hand, the report suggests that the members are chosen by the
patron, seemingly, upon his sole responsibility and authority. However, the
report referred to a practice commonly and usually observed in a given
place. No record on whether such practice had been followed in this case.
More important still, the language used in the report may be construed as
intimating, not only that the patron selects and engages the crew, but, also,
that the members thereof are subject to his control and may be dismissed by
him. The report is open to the conclusion that the crew has a contractual
relation, not with the owner, but with the patron, and that the latter is either
their employer or their partner.
Upon the other hand, the very allegations of the petition show otherwise, for
Viaa explicitly averred that Alejandro was his industrial partner. This
implies that a contract of partnership existed between them and that,
accordingly, if the crew was engaged by the patron, the latter did so merely as
agent of Viaa. Again, if Viaa were a partner of the crew members, then
neither Viaa nor the patron could control or dismiss the latter.
In the interest of justice and equity, it would be better to remand the case to
the WCC for further evidence and findings on the following questions:
(1) who selected the crew of the Magkapatid and engaged their services;
(2) if selected and engaged by the patron, did the latter act in his own name
and for his own account, or on behalf and for the account of Viaa;
(3) could Viaa have refused to accept any of the crew members chosen and
engaged by the patron;
(4) did Viaa have authority to determine the time when, the place where
and/or the manner or conditions in or under which the crew would work;
and
(5) who could dismiss its members.
Tirzo Cruz1 and his orchestra furnished music to the Manila Hotel for
several years before they were given written notice in 1994 that the Hotel would be
leased to Bay View Hotel and that employees to be laid off would be granted
separation gratuity.
Cruz and his musicians claimed gratuity but were denied so they filed a case
in CFI of Manila. CFI dismissed the action however stating Cruz and co had no cause of
action because they were not employees of the hotel.
They appealed directly to the SC.
Issue:
W/N Cruz and his band were employees of the Manila Hotel. No.
Ratio:
SC decided case based on the written notice (referred to in the case as Annex A)
and the contract (referred to in the case as Exhibit 1).
Cruz and friends not covered by the written notice2
-
Cruz contends they are employees as stated in the announcement;

Court: Cruz and cos right not predicated on some statutory provision but
upon the offer or promise contained in the notice; the notice is not a contract
but a mere offer of gratuity, the beneficiaries normally depended upon the
selection of the offeror;
Vda. de Cruz et al v Manila Hotel

1 He died during pendency of case but Court decided to refer to him as if he is still a party
1957 | Bengzon, J.
2 . . . . It is for this reason that the necessary authority has already been secured for the payment of
separation gratuity to the employees to be laid off as a result of the lease and who are not yet
entitled to either the optional or compulsory retirement insurance provided under Republic Act
No. 660, as amended, . . . .

-
Analysing the terms of the notice, it extends to those employees who were
not yet entitled to either the optional or compulsory retirement
insurance provided under RA 660;
They are not entitled to the gratuity because the announcement implied
reference to employees insured by GSIS; since they were never members,
they could not be covered by the same;
Cruz is an independent contractor

-
Manila contracted the services of Cruzs orchestra composed of 15

musicians including Tirso Cruz plus Ric Cruz as vocalist at 250 per day;
Features of the contract:
o Theyll play 7 30pm to closing daily;
o Music arrangement left at leaders discretion;
o Instruments belong to the orchestra;
o Musicians and instruments not selected by the Hotel;
o Hotel had no reserved power to discharge any musician;
o Salary given left to the orchestra or leader; lump sum
compensation given weekly to Cruz;
From above, Cruz and band are an independent contractor; definition:
o One who engages to perform a certain service for another,
according to his own manner and method, free from the control
and direction of his employer in all matters connected with the
performance of the service, except as to the result of the work
Factors to be considered:
a. carrying on an independent business;
b. work is part of the employer's general business;
c. nature and extent of the work;
d. skill required;
e. term and duration of the relationship;
f. right to assign the performance of the work to another;
g. power to terminate the relationship;
h. existence of a contract for the performance of a specified piece of work;
i.
control and supervision of the work;
j.
mployer's powers and duties with respect to the hiring, firing, and
payment of the contractor's servants;
k. control of the premises;

l.
duty to supply the premises, tools, appliances, material and labor; and
m. mode, manner, and terms of payment.
Dismissal Affirmed.
LVN Pictures Inc. v. Philippine

Musicians Guild
January 28, 1961
J. Concepcion
Jerome Marcelo
SUMMARY: The Phil. Musicians Guild filed in the Court of Industrial

Relations a petition for certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agency for all musicians working in 3 film companies. To defeat this
petition, it was alleged that the musicians were not employees of the film
companies, but worked for independent contractors called musical
directors. CIR: There is an employer-employee relationship. Petition for
certification is meritorious. SC: CIR affirmed.
DOCTRINE: An employer-employee relationship exists where the person
for whom the services are performed reserves a right to control not only
the end to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such end.
The decisive nature of said control over the "means to be used" is
illustrated in the Gilchrist Timber case in which, by reason of said control,
the employer-employee relationship was held to exist between the
management and the workers, notwithstanding the intervention of an
alleged independent contractor, who had, and exercised, the power to hire
and fire said workers.
FACTS: The Philippine Musicians Guild (Guild) filed a petition before the
Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), praying that it be certified as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agency for all musicians working in LVN Pictures, Inc.
(LVN) and Sampaguita Pictures, Inc. (Sampaguita) and Premiere Productions,
Inc..
The Guild averred that it is a duly registered legitimate labor organization;

that LVN, Sampaguita and Premiere Productions are corporations engaged in
the making, processing and distribution of motion pictures; that said
companies employ musicians to make music recordings without which a
motion picture is incomplete; that 95% of the musicians playing for said
companies are members of the Guild; and that the Guild has no knowledge of
the existence of any other legitimate labor organization representing them.
The 3 companies denied that they have any musicians as employees, and
alleged that the musical numbers in the filming of the companies are
furnished by independent contractors called musical directors.
CIR: Theory of the Guild is sustained. The Guild is certified as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agency of all musicians working with said companies.
A reconsideration of the order having been denied by the Court en banc, only
LVN and Sampaguita filed these petitions for review by certiorari.
ISSUE/HELD
1. WON the musicians are employees of the film companies. YES
RATIO: Apart from impugning the conclusion of the CIR on the status of the
Guild members as alleged employees, LVN maintains that a petition for
certification cannot be entertained when the existence of employer-employee
relationship between the parties is contested. However, this claim is neither
borne out by any legal provision nor supported by any authority. So long as,
after due hearing, the parties are found to bear said relationship, it is proper
to pass upon the merits of the petition for certification. The real issue in these
cases, is whether or not the musicians in question are employees of the film
companies.
The musical directors above referred to have no such control over the
musicians involved here. The musical directors control neither the music to
be played, nor the musicians playing it. The film companies summon the
musicians to work, through the musical directors. The film companies,
through the musical directors, fix the date, the time and the place of work.
The film companies, not the musical directors, provide the transportation to
and from the studio. The film companies furnish meals at dinner time.
Also, during the recording sessions, the motion picture director who is
an employee of the company, not the musical director, supervises the
recording of the musicians and tells them what to do in every detail. The
motion picture director, not the musical director, solely directs the
performance of the musicians before the camera. The motion picture director
supervises the performance of all the actors, including the musicians who
appear in the scenes, so that in the actual performance to be shown in the
screen, the musical director's intervention has stopped. The movie director
directly controls the activities of the musicians.
It is well settled that an employer-employee relationship exists where the
person for whom the services are performed reserves a right to control not
only the end to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such end
(Alabama Highway Express). The decisive nature of said control over the
"means to be used" is illustrated in the case of Gilchrist Timber Co. in which,
by reason of said control, the employer-employee relationship was held to
exist between the management and the workers, notwithstanding the
intervention of an alleged independent contractor, who had, and exercised, the
power to hire and fire said workers. The aforementioned control over the
means to be used in reading the desired end is possessed and exercised by
the film companies over the musicians in the cases before us.
RULING: The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against petitioners.
Torillo v. Leogardo
May 27, 1991
Ponente: Fernan, J.
Naomi Q.

SUMMARY: Petitioner was illegally dismissed by private respondent. The
Ministry of Labor ordered the private respondent to reinstate petitioner
and pay backwages and holiday pay. But because reinstatement was no
longer possible, the Ministry of Labor modified the order and stated that
petitioner shall instead be awarded separation pay. Petitioner argues that
he is entitled to separation pay and backwages.
DOCTRINE: In the event that reinstatement is no longer possible,
separation pay is awarded to the employee. The award of separation pay is
in lieu of reinstatement and not of backwages.
FACTS:
Petitioner Valentino Torillo was employed as an organist by private
respondent Aberdeen Court, Inc. in October 1977.
On July 2, 1978, he invited his co-employees for a night out in his hometown
in Rosario, Cavite in celebration of his birthday. Private respondent objected
to such activity, requesting its employees to refrain from attending because
the following day was a working day. Petitioner pushed through with his
birthday party.
Petitioner reported for work the next day, July 3. On July 4 he was dismissed
from his employment for having defied private respondent's order.
Petitioner filed with the MOLE Region IV, a complaint against private
respondent for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement with
backwages, including payment of his unpaid wages from July 1 to July 3,
1978, holiday pay and premium pay from February to July 1, 1978.
Private respondent tried to justify petitioner's dismissal by claiming that the
latter abandoned his work in failing to report for duty after his birthday
celebration.
Ministry of Labor through Director Estrella found petitioners dismissal
illegal and ordered private respondent Aberdeen Court, Inc. to:
reinstate petitioner to his former position without loss of seniority
rights and privileges
with full backwages from date of dismissal on July 4, 1978 until date
of actual reinstatement
and holiday pay for seven (7) days plus his unpaid wages from July 1
to 3, 1978.
Private respondent appealed to the Ministry of Labor.

After 7 years, Ministry of Labor and Employment, thru Deputy Minister
Leogardo issued an order affirming that of Director Estrella. Modification: in
lieu of reinstatement, petitioner should be paid separation pay equivalent to
petitioner's wages for two (2) months.
Private respondent filed MR. Denied.
Private respondent filed a motion for leave to file 2nd MR attaching thereto
the said 2nd motion.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion for execution and appointment of special
sheriff, which was opposed by private respondent.
Ministry of Labor issued a writ of execution on May 13, 1986. By virtue of
said writ, personal properties of private respondent were levied upon.
Before they were sold in a public auction, private respondent filed a motion
to quash the writ of execution on the grounds that:
2nd MR has not yet been acted upon,
backwages should not be awarded to petitioner since the order
stated that petitioner should only be paid separation pay
assuming he is entitled to backwages, the law allows the employer to
deduct his income earned elsewhere during the time he was out of
work; and
private respondent should be present during the computation of the
monetary award.
Petitioner filed an opposition to this motion as well as a supplemental motion
for execution citing Section 2, Rule XV of the IRR of the New Labor Code,
which states that the decision of the Secretary of Labor shall be immediately
executory, pending appeal, unless stayed by the order of the President of the
Philippines.
Ministry of Labor at first issued a restraining order enjoining the assigned

sheriff from proceeding with the auction sale. However, on July 23, 1986, he
recalled the restraining order issued and directed the sheriff to proceed with
the execution.
Private respondent appealed to the Office of the Minister of Labor.
Deputy Minister Leogardo set aside the order dated July 23, 1986, stating
therein that the February 13, 1986 Order stands, with the clarification that
the affirmative relief granted to complainant does not include the payment of
backwages. In addition, the writ of execution to enforce payment of
backwages in the amount of P280,715.00 was quashed.
Petitioner filed a MR of said order. Denied. Hence, this recourse.
ISSUES/HELD: WON it is proper to award backwages AND separation pay to
an illegally dismissed employee whose reinstatement is no longer feasible
YES
RATIO:
The clarificatory order is erroneous in so far as it declared that the
affirmative relief of backwages is available only where reinstatement is
ordered.
An illegally dismissed employee may be awarded both backwages and
separation pay.
Art. 280 (now Art. 279) of the Labor Code provides that "an employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss
of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages
Backwages are granted on grounds of equity for earnings which a worker or
employee has lost due to his illegal dismissal. Reinstatement, on the other
hand, means restoration to a state of condition from which one had been
removed or separated. Backwages and reinstatement are two reliefs given to
an illegally dismissed employee.
In the event that reinstatement is no longer possible, separation pay is

awarded to the employee. The award of separation pay is in lieu of
reinstatement and not of backwages.
Santos vs. NLRC: These twin remedies-reinstatement and payment of
backwages make the dismissed employee whole who can then look
forward to continued employment. Thus do these two remedies give meaning
and substance to the constitutional right of labor to security of tenure. The
two forms of relief are distinct and separate, one from the other.
Separation pay is the amount that an employee receives at the time of his
severance from the service and is designed to provide the employee with "the
wherewithal during the period that he is looking for another employment."
Payment of backwages is a form of relief that restores the income that was
lost by reason of unlawful dismissal; separation pay, in contrast, is oriented
towards the immediate future, the transitional period the dismissed
employee must undergo before locating a replacement job.
Petitioner is entitled to both separation pay and backwages.
However, the amount of backwages shall be based on the Mercury Drug Rule
which limits backwages of illegally dismissed employees to an amount
equivalent to their wages for three (3) years, without qualification and
deduction.
The Court has adopted the practice of fixing the amount of backwages at a
reasonable level without qualification and deduction so as to relieve the
employees from proving their earnings during their layoffs and the employer
from submitting counter proofs and thus obviate the twin evils of idleness on
the part of the employees and attrition and undue delay in satisfying the
award on the part of the employer. This practice has been hailed as a realistic,
reasonable and mutually beneficial solution.
Petitioner shall be awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.
He shall receive the amount equivalent to 1 month salary for every year of
service, including the three-year period in which backwages are awarded.

Basis: Grolier International, Inc. vs. Amansec, wherein we held that in the
computation of separation pay, the three (3) year period in respect of which
backwages are awarded, must be included (although private respondent had
not actually served during the last three (3) years)
Moreover, his actual service with private respondent for approximately nine
(9) months, counted from October 1977 to July 1978 shall be considered as
one (1) year, in accordance with Article 283 of the Labor Code, which
provides that a fraction of at least six (6) months is considered one (1) whole
year.
Dispositive: Petition granted. Private respondent is hereby ordered to pay
petitioner the amount of P146,255.37 representing his backwages,
separation pay, holiday pay and unpaid wages by reason of his illegal
dismissal.
LEGEND HOTEL (MANILA)

vs. HERNANI S. REALUYO
July 18, 2012
Ponente: Bersamin, J.
Digest Maker: John Michael Gabriel Vida
SUMMARY:
Realuyo/Roa was a pianist in the employ of Legend, with the
restaurant manager of Legend providing control over the manner of
work of Realuyo. Eventually, Realuyo was dismissed, which prompted
him to file an illegal dismissal complaint. The Court ruled that an EREE relationship exists and enumerated the factors involved in the
Four-Fold test, which is the yardstick used to determine the existence
of an ER-EE relationship used by the Court.
DOCTRINE:
The Court enumerated the Four-Fold doctrine used to determine
whether or not an ER-EE relationship exists. The factors to consider
are [SWeDE]:
a. Selection powers of the employer
b. Wage payment of the employer
c. Dismissal powers of the employer
d. Employee control or the control test
FACTS:
This is a labor case involving Realuyo, with stage name Joey Roa, a pianist
employed by Legend Hotel. Realuyo filed a complaint for alleged ULP,
constructive illegal dismissal, and underpayment of premium pay for
holidays, separation pay, service incentive leave pay, and 13th month pay,
with further prayer for attorneys fees and moral and exemplary damages.
Realuyo averred that he had worked as a pianist for the Legend Hotels
Tanglaw Restaurant from September 1992, starting with an initial rate of
P400/night, eventually increasing to P750/night. He could not choose the
time of his performance, as it was fixed from 7:00 pm to 10:00 pm for 3-6
times per week. He also stated that the Legend Hotels restaurant manager
required him to follow the hotel motif, and that he had been subjected to the
rules on employees representation checks and chits (which was a privilege
given to employees).
On July 9, 1999, however, hotel management informed Realuyo that, due to
cost-cutting measures undertaken by the hotel, his services would no longer
be required effective July 30, 1999 (only 21 days after informing him of his
dismissal). Realuyo insisted, however, that the hotel was lucratively

operating at the time of filing of the complaint.
the Madison Coffee Shop and Tanglaw Restaurant from September 1992
until July 1999.
In its defense, Legend denied the existence of any employer-employee (EREE) relationship with Realuyo, and that he was only a talent engaged to
provide live music at Legends Madison Coffee Shop for 3 hours/day on 2
days/week. Legend also averred that, due to the economic crisis,
management was constrained to dispense with his services.
Legend was found to have wielded the power of selection when it

entered into the service contract with Realuyo, as well as express written
recommendations by the restaurant manager for increase of
remuneration.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint for lack of merit upon the
finding that there was no ER-EE relationship between Realuyo and Legend.
This finding was based on the admission of Realuyo on a letter stating that
what he received from Legend in exchange for his services was a talent fee
and not a salary. This was reinforced by the fact that Realuyo received his
salary nightly, unlike the other employees who received their salaries
monthly. Upon appeal, the NLRC affirmed the same.
The CA, however, reversed the LA and NLRC, stating that the four elements of
ER-EE relationship exists, most importantly the element of employee control
in the form of the supervision and control exercised by the restaurant
manager of Legend.
ISSUES/HELD:
2. WON Realuyo was an employee of Legend Hotel. YES, ER-EE relationship
existed between the parties.
3. WON Realuyo was validly terminated.
RATIO:
1. The Court found for Realuyo in stating that an ER-EE relationship indeed
existed between the parties. The Court enumerated the four-fold test
factors, namely:
Power to select the employee
Payment of employees wages
Power to dismiss the employee
Exercise of control over the methods and results by which the
work of the employee is accomplished (employee control)
Applying these factors to the case at hand, the Court found that Realuyo
was indeed Legend Hotels employee. He was employed as a pianist in
Further to this, the Court pointed out that, despite the denomination of
the received remuneration as talent fees, these remunerations were
considered as included in the term wage in the sense and context of the
Labor Code, regardless of the designation. As stated in Article 97(f) of the
Labor Code:
Wage paid to any employee shall mean the remuneration or earnings, however
designated, capable of being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or
ascertained on a time, task, piece, or commission basis, or other method of calculating
the same, which is payable by an employer to an employee under a written or
unwritten contract of employment for work done or to be done, or for services
rendered or to be rendered, and includes the fair and reasonable value, as determined
by the Secretary of Labor, of board, lodging, or other facilities customarily furnished
by the employer to the employee.
From the case, it was clear that Realuyo indeed received compensation
for services rendered as the hotels pianist.
Also, the fact that Realuyo worked for less than 8 hours/day was of no
consequence and did not detract from finding for the existence of the EREE relationship. In providing that the "normal hours of work of any
employee shall not exceed eight (8) hours a day," Article 83 of the Labor
Code only set a maximum of number of hours as "normal hours of work"
but did not prohibit work of less than eight hours.
Thirdly, the power of control over the work of Realuyo, considered as the
most significant determinant of the existence of an ER-EE relationship,
was seen on the following facts:
He could not choose the time of his performance, which
petitioners had fixed from 7:00 pm to 10:00 pm, three to six
times a week;
He could not choose the place of his performance;
The restaurants manager required him at certain times to

perform only Tagalog songs or music, or to wear barong Tagalog
to conform to the Filipiniana motif; and
He was subjected to the rules on employees representation
check and chits, a privilege granted to other employees.
(c) The retrenchment must be reasonably necessary and likely to

effectively prevent the expected losses; and
(d) The alleged losses, if already incurred, and the expected
imminent losses sought to be forestalled must be proved by
sufficient and convincing evidence.
It must be noted that the employer need not actually supervise the
performance of duties by the employee, for it sufficed that the employer
has the right to wield that power.
From the case itself, the Court concluded that the burden of proof of
Legend to prove that the dismissal was for a valid or authorized cause
was not given by Legend, as it did not submit evidence of the losses to its
business operations and the economic chaos it would imminently suffer.
The statements regarding Realuyos termination due to present
business/financial condition were considered as insufficient to show a
valid retrenchment. As a result, the Court cannot allow the termination of
Realuyo due to retrenchment.
Finally, the Court pointed out that Legend possessed the power to
dismiss Realuyo in that the memorandum informing Realuyo of the
discontinuance of his service because of the present business or financial
condition of Legend showed that the latter had the power to dismiss him
from employment.
2.
It must be noted that retrenchment is one of the authorized causes for

the dismissal of employees recognized by the Labor Code. It is a
management prerogative resorted to by employers to avoid or to
minimize business losses. Article 283 of the Labor Code states:
Article 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. The employer may
also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving
devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of
operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of
circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers
and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended
date thereof. xxx. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or
cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business
losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month
pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.
A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year.
The Court has provided the standards that an employer should meet to
justify retrenchment, namely:
(a) The expected losses should be substantial and not merely de
minimis in extent;
(b) The substantial losses apprehended must be reasonably
imminent;
However, the lapse of time since the retrenchment may have made a
return to the job as unfeasible, therefore the Court ordered Legend to pay
separation pay at the rate of 1 month pay for every year of service
rendered, as well as full backwages.
Labor Law Review |Sobrevinas | August December 2014|Page 10
Javier v. Fly Ace Corp.

February 15, 2012
Ponente: Mendoza, J.
Digested by: JM Arcilla
SUMMARY:
Javier filed a case for illegal dismissal against Fly Ace before the NLRC,
alleging that he was a regular employee working as a
stevedore/pahinante when he was terminated without notice. Fly Ace
denied that Javier was its employee because he was only contracted on
a pakyaw basis.
DOCTRINE:
Before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper, an employer-employee
relationship must first be established by the petitioner by substantial
evidence.
The burden lies on the petitioner to pass the well-settled tests to
determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, viz:
(1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of
wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the
employees conduct. Of these elements, the most important criterion is
whether the employer controls or has reserved the right to control the
employee not only as to the result of the work but also as to the means
and methods by which the result is to be accomplished.
FACTS:
Javier filed a complaint before the NLRC for underpayment of salaries and
other labor standard benefits.
Javier alleged that:
a) he was an employee of Fly Ace since September 2007, performing
various tasks at the respondents warehouse except when he would
be ordered to accompany the companys delivery vehicles, as
pahinante;
b) he reported for work from Monday to Saturday from 7AM to 5PM;
c) he was never issued an identification card and payslips by the

company;
d) on May 6, 2008, he reported for work but he was no longer allowed
to enter the company premises by the security guard upon the
instruction of Ruben Ong, his superior. He later found out that it was
related to Mr. Ong courting his daughter.
e) thereafter, Javier was terminated from his employment without
notice.
Javier presented an affidavit, subscribed before the labor arbiter, of one
Bengie Valenzuela who alleged that Javier was a stevedore or pahinante of Fly
Ace from September 2007 to January 2008.
Fly Ace averred that
a) it was engaged in the business of importation and sales of groceries.
b) In December 2007, Javier was contracted employee Mr. Ong, as extra
helper on a pakyaw basis at an agreed rate per trip.
c) Mr. Ong contracted Javier roughly 5 to 6 times only in a month
whenever the vehicle of its contracted hauler, Milmar Hauling
Services, was not available. On April 30, 2008, Fly Ace no longer
needed the services of Javier.
Fly Ace denied that Javier was its employee and insisted that there was no
illegal dismissal. It submitted a copy of its agreement with Milmar Hauling
Services and copies of acknowledgment receipts evidencing payment to
Javier for his contracted services bearing the words, daily manpower
(pakyaw/piece rate pay) and the latters signatures/initials.
The LA dismissed the complaint and said that Javier failed to present proof
(ID, document of his receipt of benefits accorded to regular employees) that
he was a regular employee of Fly Ace, and that since there is a regular hauler
to deliver Fly Aces products, more weight was given to the claim that Javier
was contracted on pakyaw basis.
The NLRC ruled for Javier and said that a pakyaw-basis arrangement did not
preclude the existence of employer-employee relationship, and that Javier
was a regular employee of Fly Ace because there was reasonable connection

between the particular activity he performed as a pahinante in relation to the
usual business or trade of the employer.
right to control the employee not only as to the result of the work but also as
to the means and methods by which the result is to be accomplished.
CA annulled the NLRC ruling and said that it is incumbent upon Javier to
prove the employee-employer relationship by substantial evidence, but he
failed to discharge his burden. The non-issuance of a company-issued
identification card to Javier supports Fly Aces contention that Javier was not
its employee.
Javier could not submit competent proof that Fly Ace engaged his services as
a regular employee; that Fly Ace paid his wages as an employee, or that Fly
Ace could dictate what his conduct should be while at work. In other words,
Javiers allegations did not establish that his relationship with Fly Ace had the
attributes of an employer-employee relationship on the basis of the abovementioned four-fold test. All that Javier laid down were bare allegations
without corroborative proof.
ISSUES/HELD:
4.
WON Javier was a regular employee of Fly Ace. NO.
RATIO:
Before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper, an employeremployee relationship must first be established. The petitioner needs to
show by substantial evidence that he was indeed an employee of the
company against which he claims illegal dismissal. "Whoever claims
entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right
thereto". Javier failed to adduce substantial evidence as basis for the grant of
relief.
All that Javier presented were his self-serving statements
purportedly showing his activities as an employee of Fly Ace. Clearly, Javier
failed to pass the substantiality requirement to support his claim.
The lone affidavit executed by one Bengie Valenzuela was
unsuccessful in strengthening Javiers claim that he was a regular employee.
In said document, all Valenzuela attested to was that he would frequently see
Javier at the workplace where the latter was also hired as stevedore.
The Court is of the considerable view that on Javier lies the burden to
pass the well-settled tests to determine the existence of an employeremployee relationship, viz: (1) the selection and engagement of the
employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the
power to control the employees conduct. Of these elements, the most
important criterion is whether the employer controls or has reserved the
Fly Ace does not dispute having contracted Javier and paid him on a
"per trip" rate as a stevedore, albeit on a pakyaw basis. The Court cannot fail
to note that Fly Ace presented documentary proof that Javier was indeed paid
on a pakyaw basis per the acknowledgment receipts admitted as competent
evidence by the LA. Unfortunately for Javier, his mere denial of the signatures
affixed therein cannot automatically sway us to ignore the documents
because "forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive
and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging
forgery."
APEX MINING CO. v. NLRC

22 April 1991
Justice Gancayco
Lindain
SUMMARY: Sinclitica Candido was employed by Apex Mining Company to
perform laundry services at its staff house. On December 18, 1987, while she
was attending to her assigned task and she was hanging her laundry, she
accidentally slipped and hit her back on a stone. Candidos immediate
supervisor offered her 5,000 pesos to quit her job, but she refused the offer. She
was subsequently dismissed. Candido filed a request for assistance with the
DOLE. The Supreme Court said that Candido is not a house helper or
domestic servant under Rule XIII, Section 1 (b), Book 3 of the Labor Code. She
was an employee of the company entitled to the privileges of a regular
employee.
DOCTRINE: The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of
the employer in the home of said employer. While it may be true that the nature
of the work of a househelper, domestic servant or laundrywoman in a home or
in a company staffhouse may be similar in nature, the difference in their
circumstances is that in the former instance they are actually serving the family
while in the latter case, whether it is a corporation or a single proprietorship
engaged in business or industry or any other agricultural or similar pursuit,
service is being rendered in the staffhouses or within the premises of the
business of the employer. In such instance, they are employees of the company
or employer in the business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular
employee.
FACTS:
Sinclitica Candido (CANDIDO) was employed (May 1973) by Apex
Mining Company to perform laundry services at Apexs staff house located at
Masara, Davao Del Norte. In the beginning, she was paid on a piece rate basis.
Subsequently, she was paid on a monthly basis.
On December 1987, while she was hanging her laundry, she
accidentally slipped and hit her back on a stone. She reported the incident to
her immediate supervisor and to the personnel officer. CANDIDO was
permitted to go on leave for medication. The Immediate supervisor offered
CANDIDO 5,000 pesos to persuade her to quit her job. CANDIDO refused the
offer. Apex Mining did not allow her to return to work. She was dismissed in
February 1988. CANDIDO filed a request for assistance with DOLE. The labor
arbiter (LA) required the two parties to submit a position paper.
RATIO:
1. The definition under Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 33 of the Labor Code
does not include househelp or laundrywomen working in staffhouses of a
company, like CANDIDO who attends to the needs of the companys guests.
Also, the definition, by the same token, does not include the driver, houseboy,
or gardener exclusively working in the company, the staffhouses and its
premises.
The said definition contemplates such househelper or domestic
servant who is employed in the employers house to minister exclusively to
the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employers family.
The criterion is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of
the employer in the home of said employer. While it may be true that the
nature of the work of a househelper, domestic servant or laundrywoman in a
home or in a company staffhouse may be similar in nature, the difference in
their circumstances is that in the former instance they are actually serving
the family while in the latter case, whether it is a corporation or a single
proprietorship engaged in business or industry, service is being rendered in
the staffhouses or within the premises of the business of the employer. In
such instance, they are employees of the company or employer in the
business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular employee.
2. The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working within
the premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in
connection with its business, as in its staffhouses for its guest, warrants the
conclusion that such househelper or domestic servant is and should be
considered as a regular employee of the employer and not as a mere family
househelper or domestic servant as contemplated in Rule XIII, Section l(b),
Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended.
LA DECISION: Ruled in favor of CANDIDO. (Asked Apex to pay salary

differential, emergency living allowance, 13 th month pay differential,
separation pay one month for every year of service from 1973 to 1988.)
NLRC DECISION: Affirmed LA ruling.
ISSUE: Is the househelper in the staff houses of an industrial company a
domestic helper or a regular employee of the said firm? REGULAR EMPLOYEE
3 The term "househelper" as used herein is synonymous to the term "domestic servant" and shall
refer to any person, whether male or female, who renders services in and about the employer's
home and which services are usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment
thereof, and ministers exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer's
family.

o
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the appealed decision

and resolution of public respondent NLRC are hereby AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Remington Industrial Sales

Corporation v Erlinda Castaeda
November 20 2006
Ponente: Puno, J.
Leigh Siazon
SUMMARY: Castaeda alleged that she was illegally dismissed as a

cook. Remington alleged that she was not a regular employee: she only
cooked meals for the other employees, and she was actually the
domestic helper of Antonio Tan (managing director). SC ruled that she
was an employee who was illegally dismissed. That she works within
company premises, and that she does not cater exclusively to the
personal comfort of Tan, is reflective of the existence of the
Remingtons right of control over her functions, which is the primary
indicator of the existence of an employer-employee relationship.
DOCTRINE: The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is

working within the premises of the business of the employer and in
relation to or in connection with its business, as in its staffhouses for
its guest or even for its officers and employees, warrants the
conclusion that such househelper or domestic servant is a regular
employee of the employer and not as a mere family househelper or
domestic servant.
FACTS:
- Castaeda instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal plus several
monetary claims against Remington, a company engaged in business of
trading in construction materials. The complaint impleaded Antonio Tan
in his capacity as Managing Director of Remington. She alleged that:
o She started working in August 1983 as company cook with a P4,000
salary
o She worked 6 days a week, starting at 6:00am until 5:30pm or later
On January 15 1998 she reported for work at the new site where
Remington relocated in Caloocan City, only to be informed that her
services were no longer needed.
Remington denied that it illegally dismissed Castaeda, alleging that
o She was a domestic helper and not a regular employee. She worked
as a cook, which has nothing to do with Remingtons business
o Her duty was merely to cook lunch and merienda, after which her
time was hers to spend
o Remington did not exercise any degree of control and supervision
over her work
o She was the one who refused to report for work when Remington
moved to Caloocan
Labor Arbiter: dismissed complaint. Castaeda was a domestic helper
under the personal service of Antonio Tan. Her work was not usually
necessary and desirable in the ordinary course of trade and business of
Remington, and the latter did not exercise control over her functions.
Also, it was she who refused to go to Caloocan when Remington
transferred offices; therefore, she could not have been illegally dismissed.
NLRC: reversed LA decision. Castaeda was an employee: her work as
cook inured not for the benefit of Tans family, but solely for the
Remington employees.
o Her employment is bolstered by a certification issued by the
corporate secretary, certifying that she is their bonafide employee.
o As to the illegal dismissal: Castaedas refusal to join the workforce
due to poor eyesight could not be considered abandonment of work
or voluntary resignation.
o Under Art. 287 of the Labor Code, an employee who reaches the age
of 60 has the option to retire or to separate from the service with
payment of separation pay/retirement benefit. When Castaeda filed
the complaint, she was already 60 years old. She is thus entitled to be
paid her separation pay/retirement benefit equivalent to 1/2 month
for every year of service.
o Ordered the payment of: Salary differential - P12,021.12. Service
Incentive Leave Pay - 2,650.00. 13th Month Pay differential 1,001.76 Separation Pay/retirement benefit - 36,075.00 (Total
P51,747.88)
Both parties filed MR. Castaedas was granted, and the award of
retirement pay was increased, to P62,437.50. Remington filed Petition

for Certiorari, which the CA dismissed. Remington filed petition for
review.
ISSUES/HELD: (not including procedural issues)

WON Castaeda is Remingtons regular employee: REGULAR EMPLOYEE
WON Castaeda was illegally dismissed: ILLEGALLY DISMISSED
RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE:
Remington contends that Castaeda is Antonio Tans domestic helper and not
a regular employee of the company; that it did not exercise control and
supervision over her functions; and that Castaedas work as a cook was not
necessary or desirable in its usual line of business. The SC rejected this, citing
Apex Mining Company Inc. v NLRC:
Under Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the terms
"househelper" or "domestic servant" are defined as follows:
The term househelper is synonymous to domestic servant and shall refer to any
person who renders services in and about the employers home and which services
are usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and
ministers exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employers family.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in
the home of said employer. While it may be true that the nature of the work of a
househelper, domestic servant or laundrywoman in a home or in a company
staffhouse may be similar in nature, the difference is that in the former, they are
actually serving the family, while in the latter, whether it is a corporation or a single
proprietorship, service is being rendered in the staffhouses or within the premises of
the business of the employer. In such instance, they are employees of the company or
employer in the business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular employee.
The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working within the
premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in connection with its
business, as in its staffhouses for its guest or even for its officers and employees,
warrants the conclusion that such househelper or domestic servant is and should be
considered as a regular employee of the employer and not as a mere family

househelper or domestic servant as contemplated in Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of
the Labor Code, as amended.
The situs and nature of Castaedas work as a cook, who caters to the needs
of Remingtons employees, makes her fall squarely within the definition of a
regular employee under the doctrine in the Apex Mining case. That she works
within company premises, and that she does not cater exclusively to the
personal comfort of Tan and his family, is reflective of the existence of
Remingtons right of control over her functions, which is the primary
indicator of the existence of an employer-employee relationship.
It is also wrong to say that if the work is not directly related to the employer's
business, then the person performing such work could not be considered an
employee of the latter. The determination of the existence of an employeremployee relationship is defined by law according to the facts of each case,
regardless of the nature of the activities involved. It would be unjust if we
were to hold that despite the fact that Castaeda was made to cook for the
Remington employees, she was merely a domestic worker of Tan.
SECOND ISSUE
Remington contends that there was abandonment when Castaeda refused to
report for work when they transferred to Caloocan, claiming that her poor
eyesight would make long distance travel a problem; thus, it cannot be held
guilty of illegal dismissal. The SC also rejected this.
A regular employee enjoys the right to security of tenure under Article 279
and may only be dismissed for a just or authorized cause, otherwise the
dismissal becomes illegal and the employee becomes entitled to
reinstatement and full backwages. Abandonment is a just cause for
termination of employment by the employer under Article 282. Two factors
should be present: 1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid
or justifiable reason; and 2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee
relationship, manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the
employee has no more intention to work. The intent to discontinue the
employment must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and
unjustified, which Remington failed to do. In termination cases, the burden of
proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just and

valid cause. doubt exists between the evidence presented by the employer
and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.
Petition denied.
San Miguel Brewery Sales Force

Union (PTGWO) v. Ople
February 8 ,1989
Ponente: Grio-Aquino, JJ.
Al Mohammadsali
SUMMARY:
SMC implemented a new distribution system where its beer products
were sold to wholesalers directly from the sales offices. The labor
union contested this on the ground that it affects the take-home pay of
salesmen and their truck helpers. MOLE dismissed the complaint. SC
affirmes MOLE.
DOCTRINE:
Management prerogatives are valid when they exercised in good faith
for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose
of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special
laws or under valid agreements.
FACTS:
San Miguel Corporation (SMC) and San Miguel Brewery Sales Force
Union (Union) had an existing CBA (effective May 1, 1978 until
January 31, 1981) where this clause is incorporated: Art. IV, Section
1. Employees within the appropriate bargaining unit shall be entitled
to a basic monthly compensation plus commission based on their
respective sales.
In September 1979, the company introduced a marketing scheme
known as the "Complementary Distribution System" (CDS) whereby
its beer products were offered for sale directly to wholesalers
through San Miguel's sales offices.
The Union filed a complaint for ULP in the Ministry of Labor, with a
notice of strike, on the ground that the CDS was contrary to the
existing marketing scheme whereby the Route Salesmen were

assigned specific territories within which to sell their stocks of beer,
and wholesalers had to buy beer products from them, not from the
company. They argue that CDS violates the CBA because the
introduction of the CDS would reduce the take-home pay of the
salesmen and their truck helpers, as the company would be
competing with them.
MOLE dismissed the complaint with notice of strike. He said that
SMCs actions were part of its overall plan to improve efficiency and
economy and at the same time gain profit to the highest. This was not
to discourage union organization or diminish its influence.
Hence, the petitioners recourse to the SC.
ISSUES/HELD:
WON SMCs CDS marketing scheme violates the CBA? No.
RATIO:
It is not a violation of the CBA because it is a valid exercise of
management prerogatives.
Except as limited by special laws, an employer is free to regulate,
according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of
employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods,
time, place and manner of work, tools to be used, processes to be
followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of
employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline,
dismissal and recall of work.
Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of the employees, it must
also protect the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly
management prerogatives. The free will of management to conduct
its own business affairs to achieve its purpose cannot be denied.
So long as a company's management prerogatives are exercised in
good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for
the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the
employees under special laws or under valid agreements, they will
be upheld.
SMCs offer to compensate the members of its sales force who will be
adversely affected by the implementation of the CDS by paying them
a so-called "back adjustment commission" to make up for the

commissions they might lose as a result of the CDS proves the
company's good faith and lack of intention to bust their union.
Sime Darby Pilipinas v NLRC and

Sime Darby Salaried Employees
Association (ALU-TUCP)
April 15, 1998

Ponente: Bellosillo, J.
Kitty
SUMMARY: Sime Darby issued a memorandum which changed the

work schedule of its employees and eliminated their paid on call
lunch break. The union filed a case for ULP, discrimination, and
evasion of liability. LA dismissed. NLRC reversed. SC ruled in favor of
petitioner, stating that the petitioner was not guilty of committing ULP
but was merely exercising its management prerogative.
DOCTRINE: Management is free to regulate, according to its own
discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring,
work assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work,
processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations,
transfer of employees, work supervision, lay off of workers and
discipline, dismissal and recall of worker.
FACTS:
Sime Darby Pilipinas, petitioner, is engaged in the manufacture of

automotive tires, tubes and other rubber products. The respondent,
Sime Darby Salaried Employees Association (ALU-TUCP) is an
association of the monthly salaried employees of the petitioner at its
Marikina factory.
Prior to the controversy, the workers in the factory worked from
7:45am to 3:45pm with a 30-minute paid on call lunch break.
August 14, 1992: Petitioner issued a memorandum advising the

employees that except for those in the Warehouse and Quality
Assurance Department, a change in work schedule would become
effective on September 14, 1992.
o 7:45am to 4:45pm; Monday to Friday; Lunch break 12:00nn
to 3:30pm
o 7:45am to 11:45pm; Saturday
o No more paid on call lunch break
Respondent filed a case in behalf of its members with the Labor
Arbiter for ULP, discrimination and evasion of liability pursuant to
the resolution of the SC in Sime Darby International Tire Co. Inc. v
NLRC.
LA dismissed the complaint on the ground that the change in
schedule and the elimination of the paid lunch break constituted a
valid exercise of management prerogative. The LA also said the
benefits granted to the workers did not have the effect of diminishing
benefits previously granted as the working time remained at 8 hours.
He also held that the employees would be unjustly enriched if they
continued to be paid for their lunch break even though they were no
longer on call.
Private respondent appealed to the NLRC which sustained the LAs
decision and dismissed the appeal.
Upon respondents MR, the NLRC reversed its previous decision. It
considered the SC decision in the aforementioned Sime Darby case of
1990 as the law of the case wherein the petitioner was ordered to
pay the money value of these covered employees deprived of lunch
and/or working time breaks.
Petitioner went up to the SC alleging that the public respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
SolGen filed, in lieu of comment, a manifestation and motion
recommending that the petition be granted, alleging that the August
14 memo was not discriminatory of the union members, nor did it
constitute ULP on the part of the petitioner.
ISSUES/HELD:
5. Did the petitioner commit unfair labor practice? NO.
RATIO:
The right to fix the work schedules of the employees rests principally
on their employer. In this case, the employer cited as reason for the
adjustment the efficient conduct of its business operations and its
improved production. Since the employees are no longer required to
work during this new one-hour lunch break, there is no more need
for them to be compensated for this period. SC agreed with LA that
the new work schedule fully complied with the daily work period of
8 hours without violating the Labor Code.
o Also, the new schedule applied to all employees in the
factory and not just union members.
As shown by the records, the change effected by
management with regard to working time is made
to apply to all factory employees engaged in the
same line of work, whether or not they are
members of the respondent union. There is no
prejudice to the right of self-organization.
The ruling in the earlier Sime Darby case is not applicable here as the
issue there involved the matter of granting lunch breaks to certain
employees while depriving others of the same break.
Every business enterprise endeavors to increase its profits. In the
process, it may devise means to attain that goal. Even as the law is
solicitous of the welfare of the employees, it must also protect the
right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management
prerogatives.
o Management is free to regulate, according to its own
discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment,
including hiring, work assignments, working methods, time,
place and manner of work, processes to be followed,
supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of
employees, work supervision, lay off of workers and
discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. Management
retains the prerogative, whenever exigencies of the service
so require, to change the working hours of its employees.
Interphil Employees Union vs.

Interphil Laboratories
Dec. 19, 2001
Ponente: Kapunan, J.
Angelo Zantua
SUMMARY:
Employees work stoppage after the companys refusal to discuss the
period of the new CBA. They alleged that there was no illegal strike as
they stopped working after rendering work for 8 hours, which was the
stated work schedule in the CBA. The SC ruled that the long standing
12-hr shift has effectively changed the CBAs provision on work
schedule.
DOCTRINE:
The working hours (even if stated in the CBA) may be changed by
management prerogative. The company implemented the 12-hr shift
due to the nature of the business and demands of the clients. The
unequivocal adherence to this by the employees is deemed as waiver
of the 8-hr shift.
FACTS:
ILEU-FFW is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees of the pharmaceutical company. Months before the expiration of
the CBA, 2 union officers met with the VP-HRD regarding making the new
CBA effective for 2 years but were denied.
The next day, the employees stopped working, leaving the containers and
raw materials unsealed. The 6am-6pm workers left at 2pm while the 6pm6am workers left at 2am. After told to wait for the formal negotiations, they
continued the overtime boycott and even engaged in work slowdown.
Company filed a case with NLRC illegal strike. Preventive mediation at
NCMB failed. Union filed notice of strike. DOLE Sec issued an assumption
order RTW order to workers while the company will accept all striking
workers. DOLE Secs finding, adopting the LAs decision there was illegal

strike. MR denied. Certiorari and MR with CA denied. Petition for review on
certiorari with the SC.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. WON the CA and DOLE Sec committed erred in disregarding the
parol evidence rule in the evaluation of evidence.
RATIO:
The union said that the CA and LA disregarded the parole vidence rule when
they upheld the companys allegation that the work schedule was 6am-6pm
and 6pm-6am. The CA and LA should not have admitted any evidence
contrary to what the CBA states,
Section 1. Regular Working Hours A normal workday shall consist of not
more than eight (8) hours. The regular working hours for the Company shall
be from 7:30 A.M. to 4:30 P.M. The schedule of shift work shall be maintained;
however the company may change the prevailing work time at its discretion,
should such change be necessary in the operations of the Company. All
employees shall observe such rules as have been laid down by the company
for the purpose of effecting control over working hours.
SC - The reliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. In labor cases
before the NLRC or LA, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or
equity are not controlling. Rules of procedure and evidence are not applied in
a very rigid and technical sense in labor cases. Hence, the LA is not precluded
from accepting and evaluating evidence other than, and even contrary to,
what is stated in the CBA.
Moreover, the latter part of Sec.1 states that the working hours may be
changed at the discretion of the company if it is necessary for its operations.
The 24-hr daily work schedule, in place since 1988, is in place due to the
nature of the business and demands of its clients.
The employees are deemed to have waived the 8-hr schedule since they
followed, without any question or complaint, the 12-hr shift before and
during the effectivity of the CBA. The 12-hr shift effectively changed the CBAs
stated working hours. As the employees assented by practice to this, they
cannot claim now that the overtime boycott is justified because they were not
obliged to work beyond eight hours.
Other issues: The DOLE Secs jurisdiction was upheld A263(g) of the Labor
Code. Illegal strike was committed by the union.
Arica vs. NLRC

Date: February 28, 1989
Ponente: Froessel, J.
Mara V.
SUMMARY: Workers Arica et. al file a case against StanPhilCo so that

the latter would pay for the 30 minute waiting time they spend at the
company preparing for work. The Court cites that this practice of the
workers were long unpaid by custom and the decision of the Ministry
of Labor in another case involving their labor union against the
company operates as a bar to the litigation of this one by virtue of res
judicata.
DOCTRINE: (Waiting Time)
The thirty (30)-minute assembly is a deeply- rooted, routinary practice
of the employees, and the proceedings attendant thereto are not
infected with complexities as to deprive the workers the time to attend
to other personal pursuits. They are not new employees as to require
the company to deliver long briefings regarding their respective work
assignments. Their houses are situated right on the area where the
farm are located, such that after the roll call, which does not
necessarily require the personal presence, they can go back to their
houses to attend to some chores. In short, they are not subject to the
absolute control of the company during this period, otherwise, their
failure to report in the assembly time would justify the company to
impose disciplinary measures. The CBA does not contain any provision
to this effect; the record is also bare of any proof on this point. This,
therefore, demonstrates the indubitable fact that the thirty (30)minute assembly time was not primarily intended for the interests of
the employer, but ultimately for the employees to indicate their
availability or non-availability for work during every working day.
FACTS:
Arica et al filed a case against Standard Phil Fruits Corporation with
the Labor Arbiter to have the 30 minutes assembly time (from 5:30 -6:00a
am)by the workers considered as compensable on the following grounds:
1. It is a roll call, followed by distribution of work assignments.

2.
3.
4.
It is time spent for them to accomplish the Laborers Daily

Accomplishment Report.
It is time spent by workers to get the working materials from the
stockroom.
It is the time spent by workers travelling from the stockroom with
the tools to get to the fields.
StanPhilCo on the other hand avers that the same case has already
been ruled upon by the NLRC in the case of Associated Labor Union vs.
Standard Fruit Corp where the Minister of Labor held (and should be
considered res judicata) that:
The thirty (30)-minute assembly time long practiced and
institutionalized by mutual consent of the parties under Article IV,
Section 3, of the Collective Bargaining Agreement cannot be
considered as waiting time within the purview of Section 5, Rule I,
Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code.
Public respondent NLRC, on January 30, 1987, issued a resolution
denying for lack of merit petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence this
petition for review on certiorari filed on May 7, 1987.
ISSUES/HELD:
6. WON the 30 minute assembly time long practice can be considered
waiting time or work time and therefore compensable? No.
RATIO:
1.
2.
It is clear that herein petitioners are merely reiterating the very

same claim which they filed through the ALU and which records
show had already long been considered terminated and closed by
this Court in G.R. No. L-48510. Therefore, the NLRC can not be
faulted for ruling that petitioners' claim is already barred by resjudicata.
Moreover, as a rule, the findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies
which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined
to specific matters are accorded not only respect but at times even
finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence
Rada v. NLRC
09 January 1992
Ponente: J. Regalado
Roe Anuncio
SUMMARY:
Petitioner was hired by Respondent for a project as a driver. His
contract was renewed/extended for a few times until it finally expired
without having been further renewed. He filed for non-payment of
separation pay, as well as for unpaid overtime pay. He claims overtime
pay for the time he spent driving for the other employees to and from
work. SC says said travel time constitutes compensable work hours
and should herein be accordingly considered as overtime work.
DOCTRINE:
Travel time spent by an employee for the benefit of the employer is
compensable.
FACTS:
Petitioner's initial employment with this Respondent was under a
"Contract of Employment for a Definite Period" whereby Petitioner
was hired as "Driver" for the construction supervision phase of the
Manila North Expressway Extension, Second Stage for a term of
"about 24 months effective July 1, 1977.
Petitioner's first contract of employment expired on June 30, 1979.
Meanwhile, the main project, MNEE Stage 2, was not finished on
account of various constraints.
A second Contract of Employment for a Definite Period of 10 months
was executed between Petitioner and Respondent.
Respondent renewed Petitioners contract of employment
Accordingly, a third contract of employment was executed.
This third contract of employment was subsequently extended for a
number of times, the last extension being for a period of 3 months,
that is, until December 31, 1985.
Upon the expiration of the contract, Petitioner applied for "Personnel
Clearance" with Respondent. Petitioner also released Respondent
from all obligations and/or claims, etc. in a "Release, Waiver and
Quitclaim.

Petitioner filed a Complaint for non-payment of separation pay and
overtime pay, alleging that he was illegally dismissed and that he was
not paid overtime pay although he was made to render three hours
overtime work form.
LA rendered a decision: company to reinstate the complainant to
his former position without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges with full backwages from the time of his dismissal to his
actual reinstatement; company to pay the complainant overtime
pay for travel time in transporting other employees to and from
work.
NLRC reversed the LA decision.
ISSUES/HELD:
7. WON the time spent by Petitioner driving other employees to and
from work constitutes work time and should be compensated as
overtime work: YES
RATIO:
Re the claim for overtime compensation, petitioner is entitled.
The fact that he picks up employees of Philnor at certain specified
points along EDSA in going to the project site and drops them off at
the same points on his way back from the field office going home to
Marikina, Metro Manila is not merely incidental to petitioner's job as
a driver. On the contrary, said transportation arrangement had been
adopted, not so much for the convenience of the employees, but
primarily for the benefit of the employer, herein private respondent.
Memo of Respondent company:
The herein Respondent resorted to the above transport arrangement
because from its previous project construction supervision
experiences, Respondent found out that project delays and
inefficiencies resulted from employees' tardiness; and that the
problem of tardiness, in turn, was aggravated by transportation
problems, which varied in degrees in proportion to the distance
between the project site and the employees' residence. So the
company opted to allow employees to use the project vehicle for
convenient transportation.
The assigned task of fetching and delivering employees is
indispensable and consequently mandatory, then the time required
of and used by petitioner in going from his residence to the field

office and back, that is, from 5:30 a.m. to 7:00 a.m. and from 4:00 p.m.
to around 6:00 p.m., which the labor arbiter rounded off as averaging
three hours each working day, should be paid as overtime work.
REMERCO vs. Minister of Labor

Date: February 28, 2985
Ponente: Cuevas J.
Mara V.
SUMMARY: Private respondents Zenaida Bustamante, Luz Raymundo

and Ruth Corpuz were the employees of Remerco Garments
Manufacturing, who refused to render overtime work and was
summarily dismissed by the company. Now they filed a case of illegal
dismissal against the company. SC rules in their favor.
DOCTRINE: (Weekly Rest Periods)
The New Labor Code is clear on this point. It is the duty of every
employer, whether operating for profit or not, to provide each of his
employees a rest period of not less than twenty four (24) hours after
every six (6) consecutive normal work days. 14 Even if there really
existed an urgency to require work on a rest day, (which is not in the
instant case) outright dismissal from employment is so severe a
consequence, more so when justifiable grounds exist for failure to
report for work.
FACTS:
Petitioner Remerco Garments Manufacturing seeks the nullification of the
decision 1 of the Minister of Labor and Employment dated January 21, 1981,
declaring the dismissal of Zenaida Bustamante, Luz Raymundo and Ruth
Corpuz, (its employees) illegal, and ordering their reinstatement to their
former positions without loss of seniority rights and privileges and with full
backwages. The said decision set aside, on appeal, the order 2 of Acting
Director, National Capital Region, MOLE, dated March 6, 1978, granting
petitioner's clearance application to terminate the employment of its three
(3) employees.

It appears that Luz Raymundo was required to work on October 15,
1978, a Sunday, despite her request for exemption to work on that Sunday,
her rest day. Her request was disapproved. For failure to report for work
despite denial of her request, she was notified of her dismissal effective upon
expiration of her suspension. Thereafter or more specifically on October 16,
1978, petitioner filed a clearance application to dismiss her on grounds of
insubordination. Raymundo opposed said application by filing a complaint
for illegal dismissal and for money claims.
With respect to Zenaida Bustamante, she failed to report for work
despite the expiration of her suspension on October 23, 1978. Petitioner
contends that said failure constitutes abandonment which it later invoke as
ground for clearance application to dismiss her from employment filed on
November 10, 1978. Like Raymundo, Zenaida Bustamante opposed the
clearance application by filing a complaint for illegal dismissal claiming that
her alleged failure to report for work was due to illness, as in fact, she was
treated by one Dr. Lorenzo Yuson for fever and severe stomach ache on
October 15, 1978. Ruth Corpuz, like the two aforenamed co-respondents of
hers, was also given a warning for refusal to render overtime work on
another date, August 30, 1978. She was subsequently dismissed on October 4,
1978 for having written a chalk mark on a nylon jacket for export allegedly a
violation of Rule 26 of petitioner's rules and regulations, which provides:
"Employees are strictly prohibited from defacing or writing on walls of the
factory, toilets or any other company property." The clearance application for
her dismissal was filed only on October 5, 1978 which she also opposed by
filing a complaint for illegal dismissal.
On March 6, 1979, the Acting Director of National Capital Region,
MOLE, issued an order granting petitioner's application for clearance to
terminate the employment of private respondents and dismissing their
complaints for lack of merit. On January 20, 1981, the Minister of Labor
rendered a decision reversing the appealed order and directed petitioner to
reinstate private respondents Luz Raymundo, Zenaida Bustamante and Ruth
Corpuz to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and
privileges and with full backwages.
ISSUES/HELD:
8. WON there are sufficient ground to uphold the dismissal of the 3? No.
RATIO:
1. While it is true that it is the sole prerogative of the management to
dismiss or lay-off an employee, the exercise of such a prerogative,
however, must be made without abuse of discretion, for what is at
stake is not only private respondents' positions but also their means
of livelihood.
2. In the case of Luz Raymundo, she was charged of insubordination for
allegedly refusing to work on a Sunday, October 15, 1978, which was
her rest day. In fact, she was granted a clearance slip. The
disapproval of her request by top management reasonably creates
the impression of a hostile attitude. Petitioner has not shown that
Luz Raymundo's failure to report for work on that Sunday, October
15, 1978, constitutes one of the just causes for termination under
Article 283 of the New Labor Code.
3. Zenaida Bustamante allegedly abandoned her employment by failing
to report for work after the expiration of her suspension on October
23, 1978. Like Luz Raymundo, her one week suspension arose from
her failure to report for work on a Sunday. It is a recognized
principle that abandonment of work by an employee is inconsistent
with the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal. 12 It
would be illogical for Zenaida Bustamante to abandon her job and
then immediately file an action seeking her reinstatement. At that
time.
4. The lack of sympathetic understanding of the underlying reasons for
their absence aggravated by the indecent haste attendant to the
efforts of petitioner to terminate the services of private respondents
portray a total disregard of the constitutional mandate of "security of
tenure" and "just and humane conditions of work" which the State is
mandated to protect. The New Labor Code is clear on this point. It is
the duty of every employer, whether operating for profit or not, to
provide each of his employees a rest period of not less than twenty
four (24) hours after every six (6) consecutive normal work days.
Even if there really existed an urgency to require work on a rest day,
(which is not in the instant case) outright dismissal from
employment is so severe a consequence, more so when justifiable
grounds exist for failure to report for work.
5. The objections raised grounded on procedural technicalities devoid
of merit. The mere failure to furnish copy of the appeal

memorandum to adverse party is not a fatal defect. We have
consistently adhered to the principle clearly held in Alonso vs.
Villamor that "technicality when it deserts its proper office as an aid
to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves
scant consideration from court." In a more forceful language, Mr.
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, speaking for the Court, in
Meracap vs. International Ceramics Manufacturing Co., Inc. 16 stated
"for the strictly juridical standpoint, it cannot be too strongly
stressed, to follow Davis in his masterly work, Discretionary Justice,
that where a decision may be made to rest on informed judgment
rather than rigid rules, all the equities of the case must be accorded
their due weight. Finally, labor law determinations, to quote from
Bultmann, should be not only secundum retionem but also secundum
caritatem. "
San Miguel Corp. vs. CA

January 30, 2002
J. Kapunan
Jerome Marcelo
SUMMARY: SMC did not pay non-Muslim employees their regular Muslim
holiday pay (factory was in Iligan City). Regional Director Macaraya issued
a compliance order directing SMC to consider Muslim holidays as regular
holidays and to pay both its Muslim and non-Muslim employees holiday
pay of 200% of basic salary. DOLE Main Office: Regional Director Order
affirmed. CA: Modified the holiday pay from 200% to 150%. SC: CA
affirmed.
DOCTRINE: There is no distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims as
regards payment of benefits for Muslim holidays. Wages and other
emoluments granted by law to the working man are determined on the basis of the
criteria laid down by laws and certainly not on the basis of the workers faith or
religion.
FACTS: On 17 October 1992, the DOLE Iligan District Office, conducted a

routine inspection in the premises of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) in Sta.
Filomena, Iligan City. It was discovered that there was underpayment by SMC
of regular Muslim holiday pay to its employees. SMC contested the findings so
DOLE conducted summary hearings. Still, SMC failed to submit proof that it
was paying regular Muslim holiday pay to its employees. Alan Macaraya,
Director IV of DOLE Iligan District Office issued a compliance order directing

SMC to consider Muslim holidays as regular holidays and to pay both its
Muslim and non-Muslim employees holiday pay within 30 days from receipt
of order.
The SMC appeal to the DOLE main office was dismissed for having been filed
late. This dismissal of the appeal was later on reconsidered in the order of 17
July 1998 after it was found that the appeal was filed within the reglementary
period. However, the appeal was still dismissed for lack of merit and the
order of Director Macaraya was affirmed. SMC went to the SC for relief via a
petition for certiorari. The SC referred the petition to the CA.
SMC did not deny that it was not paying Muslim holiday pay to its nonMuslim employees. SMC merely contends that its non-Muslim employees are
not entitled to Muslim holiday pay.
CA Ruling: The order dated 17 December 1993 of Director Macaraya and
Order dated July 17, 1998 of Undersecretary Espaol is hereby MODIFIED
with regards the payment of Muslim holiday pay from 200% to 150% of the
employee's basic salary. Let this case be remanded to the Regional Director
for the proper computation of the said holiday pay.
ISSUE/HELD
1. WON non-Muslim employees are entitled to Muslim holiday pay. YES
RATIO
Muslim holidays are provided under Articles 169 and 170, Title I, Book V, of
PD 1083 (Code of Muslim Personal Laws):
Art. 169. Official Muslim holidays. - The following are hereby recognized as
legal Muslim holidays:
(a) Amun Jadd (New Year), which falls on the first day of the first lunar month
of Muharram;
(b) Maulid-un-Nab (Birthday of the Prophet Muhammad), which falls on the
twelfth day of the third lunar month of Rabi-ul-Awwal;
(c) Lailatul Isr Wal Mirj (Nocturnal Journey and Ascension of the Prophet
Muhammad), which falls on the twenty-seventh day of the seventh lunar month
of Rajab;
(d) d-ul-Fitr (Hari Raya Puasa), which falls on the first day of the tenth lunar
month of Shawwal, commemorating the end of the fasting season; and

(e) d-l-Adh (Hari Raya Haji),which falls on the tenth day of the twelfth
lunar month of Dhl-Hijja.
Art. 170. Provinces and cities where officially observed.
(1) Muslim holidays shall be officially observed in the Provinces of Basilan,
Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, North Cotabato, Iligan, Marawi,
Pagadian, and Zamboanga and in such other Muslim provinces and cities as
may hereafter be created;
(2) Upon proclamation by the President of the Philippines, Muslim holidays
may also be officially observed in other provinces and cities.
The foregoing provisions should be read in conjunction with Art. 94 of the

Labor Code, which provides:
Art. 94. Right to holiday pay. (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays,
except in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than ten
(10) workers;
(b) The employer may require an employee to work on any holiday but such
employee shall be paid a compensation equivalent to twice his regular rate; x x
SMC argues that Art. 3(3) of PD 1083 provides that "(t)he provisions of this Code
shall be applicable only to Muslims x x x."
However, there should be no distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims

as regards payment of benefits for Muslim holidays. The CA did not err in
sustaining Undersecretary Espaol who stated: Assuming that the respondents
position is correct, then by the same token, Muslims throughout the Philippines are
also not entitled to holiday pays on Christian holidays declared by law as regular
holidays. We must remind the respondent-appellant that wages and other
emoluments granted by law to the working man are determined on the basis of the
criteria laid down by laws and certainly not on the basis of the workers faith or
religion.
At any rate, Art. 3(3) of PD 1083 declares that "x x x nothing herein shall be
construed to operate to the prejudice of a non-Muslim."
Also, the 1999 Handbook on Workers Statutory Benefits, approved by then

DOLE Sec. Laguesma categorically stated: Considering that all private
corporations, offices, agencies, and entities or establishments operating within the
designated Muslim provinces and cities are required to observe Muslim holidays, both
Muslim and Christians working within the Muslim areas may not report for work on the
days designated by law as Muslim holidays.
Regarding the jurisdiction of the Director Macaraya, Article 128, Section B of

the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730 provides:
Article 128. Visitorial and enforcement power. xxx
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 129 and 217 of this Code to the
contrary, and in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists,
the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives
shall have the power to issue compliance orders to give effect to the labor
standards provisions of this Code and other labor legislation based on the
findings of labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety
engineers made in the course of the inspection. The Secretary or his duly
authorized representative shall issue writs of execution to the appropriate
authority for the enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the
employer contests the findings of the labor employment and enforcement
officer and raises issues supported by documentary proofs which were not
considered in the course of inspection.
Here, Director Macaraya acted as the duly authorized representative of the

Secretary of Labor and Employment and it was within his power to issue the
compliance order to SMC. In addition, the SC agrees with the Solicitor General
that SMC did not deny that it was not paying Muslim holiday pay to its nonMuslim employees. Indeed, SMC merely contends that its non-Muslim
employees are not entitled to Muslim holiday pay. Hence, the issue could be
resolved even without documentary proofs. In any case, there was no
indication that Director Macaraya failed to consider any documentary proof
presented by SMC in the course of the inspection.
RULING: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
Jose Rizal College v. NLRC & Natl

Alliance of Teachers/Office
Workers
Dec. 1, 1987
Ponente: Paras, J.
L. Agliam

SUMMARY:
Petitioner JRC seeks to annul the NLRC decision declaring that private
respondents NATOW (hourly paid faculty members) are entitled to
holiday pay. While SC exempted petitioner from paying private
respondents their pay for regular holidays, it ordered petitioner to pay
private respondents on days declared as special holidays for some
reason classes are called off or shortened for the hours they are
supposed to have taught, whether extensions of class days be ordered
or not.
DOCTRINE: (Holiday Pay)
Regular holidays specified by law are known to both school and faculty
members as no class days; and so, the latter do not expect payment for
said unworked days. But when a special public holiday is declared, the
faculty member paid by the hour is deprived of expected income, and
so they must be paid, whether or not extensions (i.e. make-up classes)
are ordered.
FACTS:
Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. It has 3
groups of employees:
1) personnel on monthly basis - with uniform monthly salary
throughout the year, irrespective of the actual number of
working days in a month without deduction for holidays;
2) personnel on daily basis - paid on actual days worked and
they receive unworked holiday pay; and,
3) collegiate faculty - paid on the basis of student contract
hour. Before the start of the semester they sign contracts
with the college undertaking to meet their classes as per
schedule.
Respondents NATOW filed with the Ministry of Labor a complaint
against JRC for alleged non-payment of holiday pay from 1975 to
1977.
Labor Arbiter decision:
1) monthly paid employees - presumed to be already paid the
10 paid legal holidays and are no longer entitled to separate
payment for the regular holidays;
2) daily paid employees - entitled to be paid the 10 unworked

regular holidays according to the pertinent provisions of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code
3) Collegiate faculty paid by the student contract hour - NOT
entitled to unworked regular holiday pay considering that
these regular holidays have been excluded in the
programming of the student contact hours
NLRC decision: modified above #3 decision; declared that teaching
personnel paid by the hour are ENTITLED to holiday pay
ISSUES/HELD:
WON the school faculty who according to their contracts are paid per lecture
hour are entitled to unworked holiday pay (NO to regular holiday pay; YES to
special holiday pay)
RATIO:
The petitioner is under obligation to give pay even on unworked
regular holidays to hourly paid faculty members subject to the terms
and conditions provided in the following provisions:
1) Art. 94 of the Labor Code provides:
Art. 94. Right to holiday pay (a) Every worker shall be paid his
regular daily wage during regular holidays, except in retail and service
establishments regularly employing less than ten (10) workers;
(b) The employer may require an employee to work on any holiday but
such employee shall be paid a compensation equivalent to twice his
regular rate;
2) Implementing Rules and Regulations,, Rule IV, Book III,
provides:
SEC. 8. Holiday pay of certain employees. (a) Private school
teachers, including faculty members of colleges and universities,
may not be paid for the regular holidays during semestral
vacations. They shall, however, be paid for the regular holidays
during Christmas vacations. ...
Regular holidays specified by law are known to both school and

faculty members as no class days; and so, the latter do not expect
payment for said unworked days. However, both the law and the IRR
governing holiday pay are silent as to payment on Special Public

Holidays.
The declared purpose of the holiday pay is the prevention of
diminution of the monthly income of the employees on account of
work interruptions. It is defeated when a regular class day is
cancelled on account of a special public holiday and class hours are
held on another working day to make up for time lost in the school
calendar.
When a special public holiday is declared, the faculty member paid
by the hour is deprived of expected income, and it does not matter
that the school calendar is extended in view of the days or hours lost,
for their income that could be earned from other sources is lost
during the extended days.
Similarly, when classes are called off or shortened on account of
typhoons, floods, rallies, and the like, these faculty members must
likewise be paid, whether or not extensions are ordered.
Union of Filipro Employees v Vivar

January 20, 1992
Ponente: Guttierez Jr, J.
De Leon
SUMMARY:
This labor dispute stems from the exclusion of sales
.
personnel from the holiday pay award and the change of the divisor in the
computation of benefits from 251 to 261 days.
DOCTRINE:
The law requires that the actual hours of work in the field be
.
reasonably ascertained. The requirement that "actual hours of work in the
field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty" must be read in
conjunction with Rule IV, Book III of the Implementing Rules
The criteria for granting incentive bonus are: (1) attaining or
.
exceeding sales volume based on sales target; (2) good collection
performance; (3) proper compliance with good market hygiene; (4) good
merchandising work; (5) minimal market returns; and (6) proper truck
maintenance.
The divisor assumes an important role in determining
.
whether or not holiday pay is already included in the monthly paid
employee's salary and in the computation of his daily rate.
FACTS:
- Filipro, Inc. (now Nestle) filed with the NLRC a petition for declaratory relief
seeking a ruling on its rights and obligations respecting claims of its monthly paid
employees for holiday pay in the light of the Court's decision in Chartered Bank
Employees Association v. Ople.
- Arbitrator Vivar rendered a decision directing Filipro to pay its monthly paid
employees holiday pay pursuant to Article 94 of the Code, subject only to the
exclusions and limitations specified in Article 82 and such other legal restrictions
as are provided for in the Code.
- Filipro filed a motion for clarification seeking (1) the limitation of the award to
three years, (2) the exclusion of salesmen, sales representatives, truck drivers,
merchandisers and medical representatives (hereinafter referred to as sales
personnel) from the award of the holiday pay, and (3) deduction from the holiday
pay award of overpayment for overtime, night differential, vacation and sick leave
benefits due to the use of 251 divisor.
o The Union answered that the award should be made effective from the date
of effectivity of the Labor Code, that their sales personnel are not field
personnel and are therefore entitled to holiday pay, and that the use of 251
as divisor is an established employee benefit which cannot be diminished.
o The arbitrator issued an order declaring:
that the effectivity of the holiday pay award shall
0.
retroact to November 1, 1974, the date of effectivity of the Labor Code
that the company's sales personnel are field
0.
personnel and, as such, are not entitled to holiday pay.
with the grant of 10 days' holiday pay, the
0.
divisor should be changed from 251 to 261 and ordered the reimbursement
of overpayment for overtime, night differential, vacation and sick leave pay
due to the use of 251 days as divisor.
o The petitioner insists that respondent's sales personnel are not field
personnel under Article 82 of the Labor Code.
o The respondent company asserts that under Article 82, field personnel are
not entitled to holiday pay. Said article defines field personnel as "nonagritultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the
principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual
hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty."
- It is undisputed that these sales personnel start their field work at 8:00 a.m. after
having reported to the office and come back to the office at 4:00 p.m. or 4:30 p.m.
if they are Makati-based.

-
The petitioner maintains that the period between 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 or 4:30 p.m.
comprises the sales personnel's working hours which can be determined with
reasonable certainty.
ISSUES/HELD:
Whether or not the sales personnel are entitled to holiday pay;
Whether or not, concomitant with the award of holiday pay, the divisor
should be changed from 251 to 261 days and whether or not the previous use of
251 as divisor resulted in overpayment for overtime, night differential, vacation
and sick leave pay.
RATIO:
No. The sales personnel are field workers and thus not entitled to holiday
pay.
The law requires that the actual hours of work in the field be
.
reasonably ascertained. The company has no way of determining whether or not
these sales personnel, even if they report to the office before 8:00 a.m. prior to
field work and come back at 4:30 p.m, really spend the hours in between in actual
field work.
Moreover, the requirement that "actual hours of work in the field
.
cannot be determined with reasonable certainty" must be read in conjunction
with Rule IV, Book III of the Implementing Rules
(e) Field personnel and other employees whose time and
.
performance is unsupervised by the employer . . .
The aforementioned rule did not add another element to
.
the Labor Code definition of field personnel. The clause "whose time and
performance is unsupervised by the employer" did not amplify but merely
interpreted and expounded the clause "whose actual hours of work in the field
cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.
The petitioner claims that the fact that these sales personnel are
.
given incentive bonus every quarter based on their performance is proof that
their actual hours of work in the field can be determined with reasonable
certainty.
The Court thinks otherwise. The criteria for granting
.
incentive bonus are: (1) attaining or exceeding sales volume based on sales
target; (2) good collection performance; (3) proper compliance with good market
hygiene; (4) good merchandising work; (5) minimal market returns; and (6)
proper truck maintenance.
Sales personnel are given incentive bonuses precisely

because of the difficulty in measuring their actual hours of field work. These
employees are evaluated by the result of their work and not by the actual hours
of field work which are hardly susceptible to determination.
The divisor to be used in computing holiday pay shall be 251 days.
The arbitrator ruled that:
the divisor should be changed from 251 to 261 days to
.
include the additional 10 holidays and the employees should reimburse the
amounts overpaid by Filipro due to the use of 251 days' divisor.
When the claim of the Union for payment of ten holidays
.
was granted, there was a consequent need to abandon that 251 divisor. To
maintain it would create an impossible situation where the employees would
benefit with additional ten days with pay but would simultaneously enjoy
higher benefits by discarding the same ten days for purposes of computing
overtime and night time services and considering sick and vacation leave
credits. Therefore, reimbursement of such overpayment with the use of 251 as
divisor arises concomitant with the award of ten holidays with pay.
The divisor assumes an important role in determining whether or
not holiday pay is already included in the monthly paid employee's salary and in
the computation of his daily rate.
In the petitioner's case, its computation of daily ratio
.
since September 1, 1980, is as follows:
monthly rate x 12 months
251 days
0.
The use of 251 days' divisor by respondent Filipro indicates that holiday
pay is not yet included in the employee's salary, otherwise the divisor should
have been 261.
The daily rate, assuming there are no intervening salary increases, is a
constant figure for the purpose of computing overtime and night differential pay
and commutation of sick and vacation leave credits. Necessarily, the daily rate
should also be the same basis for computing the 10 unpaid holidays.
The respondent arbitrator's order to change the divisor from 251
to 261 days would result in a lower daily rate which is violative of the prohibition
on non-diminution of benefits found in Article 100 of the Labor Code. To maintain
the same daily rate if the divisor is adjusted to 261 days, then the dividend, which
represents the employee's annual salary, should correspondingly be increased to
incorporate the holiday pay.
There is thus no merit in respondent Nestle's claim of overpayment
of overtime and night differential pay and sick and vacation leave benefits, the
.

computation of which are all based on the daily rate, since the daily rate is still the
same before and after the grant of holiday pay.
Nestle's invocation of solutio indebiti due to its use of 251
.
days as divisor must fail. All doubts in the implementation and interpretation
of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved
in favor of labor.
Additionally the company was on a 6-day working
.
schedule, the divisor used by the company was 303, indicating that the 10
holidays were not paid. When Filipro shifted to a 5-day working schedule it had
the chance to rectify its error, if ever there was one but did not do so. It is now
too late to allege payment by mistake.
Nestle insists that the reckoning period for the application of the
.
holiday pay award is 1985 when the Chartered Bank decision became final and
executory, and not from the date of effectivity of the Labor Code. Although the
Court does not entirely agree with Nestle, we find its claim meritorious.
In IBAAEU v. Inciong, the Court declared that Section 2,
.
Rule IV, Book III of the implementing rules and Policy Instruction No. 9, issued
by the then Secretary of Labor on February 16, 1976 and April 23, 1976,
respectively, and which excluded monthly paid employees from holiday pay
benefits, are null and void.
The "operative fact" doctrine realizes that in declaring a
.
law or rule null and void, undue harshness and resulting unfairness must be
avoided. Applying the doctrine, it is not far-fetched that Nestle, relying on the
implicit validity of the implementing rule and policy instruction before this
Court nullified them, and thinking that it was not obliged to give holiday pay
benefits to its monthly paid employees, may have been moved to grant other
concessions to its employees, especially in the collective bargaining agreement.
The grant of holiday pay be effective, not from the date of
.
promulgation of the Chartered Bank case nor from the date of effectivity of the
Labor Code, but from October 23, 1984, the date of promulgation of the IBAA
case.
VIVIAN Y. IMBUIDO, petitioner, vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, INTERNATIONAL
INFORMATION SERVICES, INC. and

GABRIEL LIBRANDO, respondents
March 31, 2000
Ponente: Buena, J.
Paula Parungao
SUMMARY: Imbuido, a project employee, was allegedly illegally

dismissed by ISSI for participating in filing a petition for certification
election with the BLR. SC held that Imbuido obtained the status of a
regular employee, and thus, was illegally dismissed.
DOCTRINE: Once a project or work pool employee has been: (1)

continuously, as opposed to intermittently, re-hired by the same
employer for the same tasks or nature of tasks; and (2) these tasks are
vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the
employer, then the employee must be deemed a regular employee, under
Art. 280, LC.
FACTS:
Vivien Imbuido was employed as a data encoder by International
Information Services, Inc., (IISI) a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of data encoding and keypunching, from August 26, 1988
until October 18, 1991 when her services were terminated.

From 26 August 1988 until 18 October 1991, Imbuido entered into 13
separate employment contracts with ISSI, each contract lasting only 3
months. Aside from the basic hourly rate, specific job contract number
and period of employment, each contract contains the following terms
and conditions:
"a. This Contract is for a specific project/job contract only and shall be
effective for the period covered as above-mentioned unless sooner
terminated when the job contract is completed earlier or withdrawn
by client, or when employee is dismissed for just and lawful causes
provided by law. The happening of any of these events will
automatically terminate this contract of employment. Slxmis
"b. Subject shall abide with the Companys rules and regulations for its
employees attached herein to form an integral part hereof.
"c. The nature of your job may require you to render overtime work
with pay so as not to disrupt the Companys commitment of scheduled
delivery dates made on said job contract."
Imbuido filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with service incentive

leave pay and 13th month differential pay with the NLRC Arbitration
Branch.
LA Aquino ruled in favor of Imbuido and ordered her reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and privileges and the payment of
backwages and service incentive leave pay.
On appeal, NLRC reversed the LA, ruling that Imbuido was a regular
employee under Art. 280, LC judging from the function and work for
which she was hired. The NLRC held that the complainant
[Imbuido], while hired as a regular worker, is statutorily guaranteed,
in her tenurial security, only up to the time the specific project for
which she was hired is completed." Hence, the NLRC concluded that
"[w]ith the specific project "at RCBC 014" admittedly completed, the
complainant [petitioner herein] has therefore no valid basis in
charging illegal dismissal for her concomittant (sic) dislocation."
ISSUES/HELD:
In September 1991, Imbuido and 12 other employees of ISSU allegedly

agreed to the filing of a petition for certification election involving the
rank-and-file employees of ISSI under Lakas Manggagawa sa Pilipinas
(LAKAS).
1. WON Imbuido is a project employee. YES.
8 October 1991, the petition was filed with the BLR.
The principal test for determining whether an employee is a project

employee or a regular employee is whether the project employee was
assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking, the duration
and scope of which were specified at the time the employee was
engaged for that project. A project employee is one whose
employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the
Subsequently, Imbuido received a termination letter from Edna

Kasilag, ISSI Administrative Officer, allegedly "due to low volume of
work"
RATIO:
Imbuido is a project employee.

completion or termination of which has been determined at the time
of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be
performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the
duration of the season.
employment status of a project or work pool employee in accordance

with what is fait accompli, i.e., the continuous re-hiring by the
employer of project or work pool employees who perform tasks
necessary or desirable to the employer's usual business or trade.
In the recent case of Maraguinot, Jr. vs. NLRC, SC held that "[a] project
employee or a member of a work pool may acquire the status of a
regular employee when the following concur:
All that we hold today is that once a project or work pool employee
has been: (1) continuously, as opposed to intermittently, re-hired by
the same employer for the same tasks or nature of tasks; and (2) these
tasks are vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or
trade of the employer, then the employee must be deemed a regular
employee, pursuant to Article 280 of the Labor Code and
jurisprudence. To rule otherwise would allow circumvention of labor
laws in industries not falling within the ambit of Policy Instruction No.
20/Department Order No. 19, hence allowing the prevention of
acquisition of tenurial security by project or work pool employees
who have already gained the status of regular employees by the
employer's conduct."
1) There is a continuous rehiring of project employees even after [the]

cessation of a project; and
2) The tasks performed by the alleged "project employee" are vital,
necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the
employer."
The evidence on record reveals that Imbuido was employed by ISSI as
a data encoder, performing activities which are usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of her employer, continuously
for a period of more than 3 years, from August 26, 1988 to October 18,
1991 and contracted for a total of 13 successive projects.
"[H]owever, the length of time during which the employee was
continuously re-hired is not controlling, but merely serves as a badge
of regular employment." Based on the foregoing, Imbuido has attained
the status of a regular employee of ISSI.
SC notes the following:
The decision does not burden an employer the duty of re-hring a
project employee even after the completion of the project. What this
decision merely accomplishes is a judicial recognition of the
Being a regular employee, Imbuido is entitled to security of tenure and

could only be dismissed for a just or authorized cause, as provided in
Article 279, LC, as amended:
"Art. 279. Security of Tenure In cases of regular employment, the
employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a
just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive
of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent
computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to
the time of his actual reinstatement."
The alleged causes of Imbuidos dismissal (low volume of work and

belatedly, completion of project) are not valid causes for dismissal
under Articles 282 and 283, LC. Thus, she is entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, and to her full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to her other benefits or their
monetary equivalent computed from the time her compensation was
withheld from her up to the time of her actual reinstatement.
With regard to claim for service incentive leave pay, Imbuido is
entitled to service incentive leave pay, as provided in Article 95, LC:
"Article 95 Right to service incentive leave
petitioners did not report for work. The Labor Arbiter held that there was
illegal dismissal. It ordered Lhuillier to pay separation pay, service incentive
leave pay with full backwages without qualification. The NLRC remanded the
case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
petitioners/ employees.
DOCTRINE: The clear policy of the Labor Code is to grant service incentive
leave pay to workers in all establishments, subject to a few exceptions. Sec. 2,
Rule V, Book III of the IRR provides that every employee shall be entitled to a
yearly service incentive leave of five days with pay. It is a right which accrues to
every employee who has served within 12 months, whether continuous or
broken reckoned from the date the employee started working, including
authorized absences and paid regular holidays unless the working days in the
establishment as a matter of practice or policy, or that provided in the contract,
is less than 12 months, in which case said period shall be considered as one
year. It is also commutable to its money equivalent if not used or exhausted at
the end of the year.
(a) Every employee who has rendered at least one year of service shall
be entitled to a yearly service incentive leave of five days with pay.
FACTS:
xxx xxx xxx."
Fernandez v. NLRC
28 January 1998
Justice Panganiban
Lindain
SUMMARY: The eleven petitioners in this case filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against Agencia Cebuana-H. Lhuillier and/ or Margueritte Lhuillier.
The Agencia Cebuana is a sole proprietorship operated by Margueritte
Lhuillier. The petitioners demanded an increase in their salaries since
Lhuilliers business was making good. The petitioners also alleged that
Margueritte Lhuillier was evading payment of taxes by making false entries in
her records of account. Lhuillier threatened them that something would happen
to their employment if they would report her to the BIR. Subsequently, Lhuillier
suspected them of stealing jewelry from the pawnshop and verbally informed
them not to report for work as their employment had been terminated. The
Petitioners are employed by Agencia Cebuana-H. Lhuillier and Margueritte

Lhuillier. They filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Lhuillier. The first set of
petitioners (Fernandez and others) alleged that prior to and during early July 1990,
they demanded from Lhuillier an increase in their salaries since Lhuilliers business
was making good and that she was evading payment of taxes by making false entries
in her records of account. Subsequently, Lhuillier suspected them of stealing jewelry.
Lhuillier verbally informed them not to report for work as their employment had been
terminated. After 4 days, they filed the instant complaint.
Petitioners Marilyn Lim and Joseph Canonigo (second set of petitioners)
alleged that they demanded increases in their salaries since they noted that Lhuilliers
business was profitable. They also informed Lhuillier that they intended to join the
Associated Labor Union. Lhuillier subsequently advised them to resign as they were
reportedly responsible for some anomalies at the Agencia Cebuana-H Lhuillier.
Lhuilliers position: a) Lhuillier received a report that Lim sold to a company
consumer her own jewelry, in violation of the house rules; Lim admitted having
committed the violation complained of; she tendered an irrevocable letter of
resignation; in effect, there was no illegal dismissal; b) As to the other petitioners, the
pawnshop was found to have lost the amount of 174,000 pesos because the
petitioners over-declared the weights and values of certain items of jewelry pawned

to the company; said petitioners did not report for work 2 days after Lhuillier found
out about the over-declaration.
(Procedural) Trial on the merits ensued and hearings were scheduled on July
5, 8, and 12, 1991. On July 8, counsel for Lhuillier failed to appear to cross-examine
Marilyn Lim.
LA DECISION: Ruled in favor of the employees; ordered Lhuillier to pay separation
pay, service incentive leave pay with full backwages without qualification, moral
damages (P 100,000), exemplary damages (P 100,000), plus attorneys fees (10% of
the total award) and P 30, 000 for litigation expenses
NLRC DECISION: Remanded the case to the labor arbiter for further proceedings. This
was to allow Lhuillier to formally present her evidence and to allow petitioners to
cross-examine Lhuilliers witnesses.
ISSUES:
1. Did the NLRC acquire jurisdiction over the appeal notwithstanding the alleged
insufficiency of the appeal bond? YES
2. Were private respondents (Lhuillier) deprived of the due process of law by law
arbiter? NO
3. [RELEVANT] Were petitioners illegally dismissed? YES (However, Lim and
Canonigo were validly dismissed)
4. [RELEVANT] Assuming petitioners were illegally dismissed, was the computation of
backwages, service incentive leave pay and damages valid and correct? YES
RATIO:
Issue 1
Lhuillier/ employer: Although the total monetary award in their favor
was P1,078,200.55, Lhuillier posted a cash bond in the amount of P752,183.00
only. In computing the monetary award for the purpose of posting an appeal bond,
Lhuillier relied on Rule VI, Section 64, of the 1990 New Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC and excluded the award for damages, litigation expenses and attorneys fees.
Petitioners/ employees: The said rule cannot prevail over Article 2235 of the Labor
Code, which does not provide for such exclusion.
Supreme Court: There is no conflict between the two provisions. Article 223 lays
down the requirement that an appeal bond should be filed. The implementing rule, on
the other hand, explains how the appeal bond shall be computed. The rule explicitly
excludes moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees from the computation of
the appeal bond.
The rule requiring the employer to post a cash or surety bond to perfect his
appeal assures the workers that they will receive the money judgment awarded to
them upon the dismissal of the employers appeal. It also discourages employers from
using an appeal to delay or even evade their obligation to satisfy the just and lawful
claims of their employees.
Hence, deducting from the total monetary award of P1,078,200.55 the
amount of P200,000.00 for moral and exemplary damages, P98,018.25 for attorneys
fees and P30,000.00 for litigation expenses, the amount of the bond should
be P750,182.55. Thus, the appeal bond actually posted in the amount of P752,183 is
even more than the amount of appeal bond that may be required from private
respondents under Respondent NLRCs rules.
Issue 2
Lhuillier/ employer: Labor arbiter erred in stating that the absence of their counsel
during the July 8 and July 12 hearings resulted in the waiver of their right to crossexamine the other partys witness and their right to present evidence.
Petitioners/ employees: Lhuillier was able to submit its position paper with supporting
affidavits and documents. Lhuillers counsels failure to appear on July 8 and July 12
hearings, without any justification or motion for postponement, warranted the
The Commission may, in meritorious cases and upon Motion of the Appellant, reduce the amount
of the bond. However, an appeal is deemed perfected upon the posting of the bond equivalent to
the monetary award exclusive of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees.
4 Section 6. Bond. In case of the decision of a Labor Arbiter involves a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued
by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award.
5 In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected
only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment
appealed from.

submission of the case for decision pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule V6 of the 1990 New Rules
of Procedure of NLRC.
Supreme Court: Lhuillier was able to file position papers and the documents in
support thereof, and all these were duly considered by the labor arbiter. Indeed, the
requirements of due process are satisfied where the parties are given the opportunity
to submit position papers.
In any event, Respondent NLRC and the labor arbiter are authorized under
the Labor Code to decide a case on the basis of the position papers and documents
submitted. The holding of an adversarial trial depends on the discretion of the labor
arbiter, and the parties cannot demand it as a matter of right. The filing of position
papers and supporting documents fulfilled the requirements of due process.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, to explain
ones side, or to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the
case at bar, Lhuillier was given ample opportunity to do just that but failed
Issue 3
Lhuillier/ employer: There was no illegal dismissal. Petitioners abandoned their
employment. They did not report for work without any excuse.
Petitioners/ employees: Lhuillier told them not to report for work because their
employment had been terminated. Thus, they did not report for work the following
day. Then, they filed their respective complaints before the Regional Arbitration
Board of NLRC.
Supreme Court: There was no abandonment. To succeed in pleading abandonment as a
valid ground for dismissal, the employer must prove (1) the intention of an employee
to abandon his or her employment and (2) an overt act from which such intention
may be inferred; i.e., the employee showed no desire to resume his work. Mere
absence is not sufficient. The employer must prove a deliberate and unjustified
refusal of the employee to resume his employment without any intention of returning.
Lhuillier failed to prove the two elements. The claim of abandonment was
inconsistent with the immediate filing of petitioners complaint for illegal dismissal
and prayer for reinstatement. Said petitioners were illegally dismissed, with neither
just cause nor due process.
6 (c) In case of two (2) successive unjustified non-appearances by the respondent during his
turn to present evidence, despite due notice, the case shall be considered submitted for decision
on the basis of the evidence so far presented.
As regards Marilyn Lim and Joseph Canonigo, there was no illegal dismissal.
Marilyn Lims admission of the offense charged (see facts) shows that
she was not coerced to resign. Besides, the fact that her complaint for illegal
dismissal was filed long after her resignation on February 24, 1990 suggests that it
was a mere afterthought. Like Petitioner Lim, Joseph Canonigo did not immediately
file a complaint for illegal dismissal, doing so only on July 23, 1990. He voluntarily
tendered his resignation on the assurance of separation pay.
Issue 4
Solicitor general: The award of service incentive leave should be limited to 3 years,
based on Art. 2917 of the Labor Code.
Petitioners/ employees: Art. 291 of the LC speaks of the prescription of filing an action
upon monetary claims within 3 years from the time the cause of action accrued, but it
is not a prescription of a period of time for the computation of monetary claims.
Supreme Court: Service incentive leave is a right which accrues to every employee who
has served within 12 months, whether continuous or broken reckoned from the date
the employee started working, including authorized absences and paid regular
holidays unless the working days in the establishment as a matter of practice or
policy, or that provided in the employment contracts, is less than 12 months, in which
case said period shall be considered as one year. [Sec. 3, Rule V, Book III, IRR of the
Labor Code]
It is also commutable to its money equivalent if not used or exhausted at
the end of the year.[Sec. 5, Rule V, Book III, IRR of the Labor Code] In other words, an
employee who has served for one year is entitled to it. He may use it as leave days or
he may collect its monetary value. To limit the award to three years, as the solicitor
general recommends, is to unduly restrict such right. The law indeed does not
prohibit its commutation.
Since a service incentive leave is clearly demandable after one year of
service -- whether continuous or broken -- or its equivalent period, and it is one of the
benefits which would have accrued if an employee was not otherwise illegally
7 ART. 291. Money Claims. -- All money claims arising from employer-employee relations
accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the
cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.

dismissed, its computation should be up to the date of reinstatement as provided
under Section 2798 of the Labor Code.
However, the IRR clearly state that entitlement to benefit provided under
this Rule shall start December 16, 1975, the date the amendatory provision of the
[Labor] Code took effect. Hence, petitioners, except Lim and Canonigo, should be
entitled to service incentive leave pay from December 16, 1975 up to their actual
reinstatement.
As to the reinstatement and backwages, the Supreme Court has held that
illegally dismissed employees are entitled to reinstatement and full backwages. If
reinstatement is not possible, the employees are entitled to separation pay
and full backwages. Accordingly, the award to petitioners of backwages for three
years should be modified in accordance with Article 2799 of the Labor Code, as
amended by R.A. 6715, by giving them full backwages without conditions and
limitations, the dismissals having occurred after the effectivity of the amendatory law
on March 21, 1989.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The labor arbiters decision
is REINSTATED with MODIFICATIONS, such that the award of separation pay is deleted
and the service incentive leave pay is computed from December 16, 1975 up to
petitioners actual reinstatement. Full backwages, including the accrued thirteenth
month pay, are also awarded to the nine petitioners -- Leiden Fernandez, Brenda
Gadiano, Gloria Adriano, Emelia Negapatan, Jesus Tomongha, Eleonor Quianola,
Asteria Campo, Florida Villaceran and Florida Talledo -- from the date of their illegal
8 ART. 279. Security of Tenure. -- An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalentcomputed from the time his compensation is withheld from him up to the time of his
actual reinstatement.
9 Article 279. Security of Tenure. [as amended by Section 34 of RA 6715]. -- In cases of regular
employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just
cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall
be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent
computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement.
dismissal to the time of their actual reinstatement. Petitioners Lim and Canonigo,
whom we find to have voluntarily resigned, are not entitled to any benefit.
JPL Marketing Promotions v CA,

NLRC, Noel Gonzales, Ramon Abesa
III, and Faustino Aninipot
July 8 2005
Ponente: Tinga, J.
Leigh Siazon
SUMMARY: JPL, in the business of recruitment, assigned private

respondents to work in CMC. JPL notified private respondents that
CMC was going to close down, but that JPL would reassign them.
Private respondents got other jobs then filed a case against JPL. SC
ruled that the private respondents were not entitled to separation pay
as they were never dismissed. However, JPL had to pay 13th month
pay and service incentive leave pay. Said benefits are mandated by law
and should be given to employees as a matter of right.
DOCTRINE: Service incentive leave is a yearly leave benefit of 5 days
with pay, enjoyed by an employee who has rendered at least one year
of service. Unless specifically excepted, all establishments are required
to grant service incentive leave. At least one year of service shall
mean service within 12 months, whether continuous or broken
reckoned from the date the employee started working. While
computation for the 13th month pay should begin from the first day of
employment, the service incentive leave pay should start a year after
commencement of service, for it is only then that the employee is
entitled to said benefit.
FACTS:
- JPL is engaged in the business of recruitment and placement of workers.
Gonzales, Abesa and Aninipot (private respondents) were employed by
JPL as merchandisers and assigned at different establishments as
attendants to the display of California Marketing Corporation (CMC).
- On August 13 1996, JPL notified private respondents that CMC would
stop its merchandising activity, effective August 15 2006. They were
advised to wait for further notice as they would be transferred to other

clients. However, on October 17 2006, private respondents filed before
the NLRC complaints for illegal dismissal, praying for separation pay, 13 th
month pay, service incentive leave pay and payment for moral damages.
Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaints:
o Gonzales and Abesa were employed even before the lapse of the 6month period given by law to JPL to provide private respondents a
new assignment. They unilaterally severed their relation with JPL.
o It was incumbent upon private respondents to wait until they were
reassigned by JPL. If after 6 months they were not reassigned, they
can file an action for separation pay but not for illegal dismissal.
o The claim for 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay was
denied since private respondents were paid way above the minimum
wage during their employment
NLRC affirmed LA that private respondents were not illegally dismissed.
However, because JPL was not able to reassign them, they were entitled
to separation pay.
JPL filed petition for certiorari with CA. CA dismissed petition.
o No illegal dismissal, but CA justified the award of separation pay on
the grounds of equity and social justice
o Rejected JPLs argument that the difference in the amounts of private
respondents salaries and the minimum wage should be considered
the service incentive leave and 13th month pay
JPL filed petition for review.
o The case does not fall under any of the instances where separation
pay is due
o Assuming arguendo that they are entitled to the benefits award, the
computation should only be from their first day of employment with
JPL (August 15 1996) up to the date of termination of CMCs contract,
and not up to the finality of the NLRC resolution (July 27 2000).
o Erroneous to compute service incentive leave pay from the first day
of their employment up to the finality of the NLRC resolution, since
an employee has to render at least 1 year of service before he is
entitled to the same. Thus, service incentive leave pay should be
counted from the second year of service.
Private respondents also alleged that they were deprived of due process
because the notice of termination was sent to them only 2 days before
actual termination. To this, JPL replied that they merely sent a memo
notifying private respondents about the end of merchandising of CMC.
ISSUES/HELD:
1) WON private respondents are entitled to separation pay, 13th month pay,
and service incentive leave pay? Only to 13th month and service incentive
2) Granting that they are so entitled, what should be the reckoning point for
computing said awards: for 13th month pay first day of employment. For
service incentive leave pay 1 year after commencement of service
RATIO:
AS TO SEPARATION PAY
Separation pay is authorized only in cases of dismissals due to these reasons:
-
Under arts. 283 and 284 of the Labor Code:

(a) Installation of labor saving devices
(b) Redundancy
(c) Retrenchment
(d) Cessation of the employer's business; and
(e) When the employee is suffering from a disease and his continued employment
is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his or his co-employees health
As a measure of social justice in those cases where the employee is validly
dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his
moral character, but only when he was illegally dismissed.
Sec. 4(b), Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules to Implement the Labor Code
provides for the payment of separation pay to an employee entitled to
reinstatement, but is no longer feasible
In all these instances, the employee was dismissed by the employer. In the
instant case, private respondents were not dismissed, whether legally or
illegally. What they received from was not a notice of termination of
employment, but a memo informing them of the termination of CMCs
contract with JPL. They were also advised that they were to be reassigned.
Furthermore, Art. 286 allows the bona fide suspension of the operation of a
business for a period not exceeding 6 months, wherein employees are placed
on the so-called floating status. When that floating status lasts for more
than 6 months, he may be considered to have been illegally dismissed from
the service, entitling him to separation pay. However, in this case, private

respondents sought employment from other establishments even before the
expiration of the 6-month period. JPL did not terminate their employment;
they themselves severed their relations with JPL. Thus, they are not entitled
to separation pay.
AS TO 13TH MONTH AND SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE PAY
JPL cannot escape the payment of 13th month pay and service incentive leave
pay. Said benefits are mandated by law and should be given to employees as a
matter of right. PD 851, as amended, requires an employer to pay its rank and
file employees a 13th month pay not later than 24 December of every year.
On the other hand, service incentive leave, as provided in Art. 95 of the Labor
Code, is a yearly leave benefit of 5 days with pay, enjoyed by an employee
who has rendered at least one year of service. Unless specifically excepted,
all establishments are required to grant service incentive leave to their
employees. The term at least one year of service shall mean service within
12 months, whether continuous or broken reckoned from the date the
employee started working.
Private respondents were not given their 13th month pay and service
incentive leave pay. Instead, JPL provided salaries which were over and
above the minimum wage. The Court rules that the difference between the
minimum wage and the actual salary received by private respondents cannot
be deemed as their 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay as such
difference is not equivalent to or of the same import as the said benefits
contemplated by law.
While computation for the 13th month pay should properly begin from the
first day of employment, the service incentive leave pay should start a year
after commencement of service, for it is only then that the employee is
entitled to said benefit. On the other hand, the computation for both benefits
should only be up to 15 August 1996, or the last day that private respondents
worked for JPL. These benefits are given by law on the basis of the service
actually rendered by the employee. There is no cause for granting said
incentive to one who has terminated his relationship with the employer.
Petition is GRANTED IN PART. CA decision MODIFIED. The award of
separation pay is deleted. JPL is ordered to pay private respondents their
13th month pay commencing from the date of employment up to 15 August
1996, as well as service incentive leave pay from the second year of
employment up to 15 August 1996.
Sugue v. Triumph International

(Phils.), Inc.
January 30, 2009
Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro, J.
Al Mohammadsali
SUMMARY:
Two employees were absent from work and this absence was charged
against their vacation leave credits. They also filed applications for
leave which were denied to due to non-compliance with imposed
conditions. The SC eventually ruled that the conditions imposed were
valid.
DOCTRINE:
In the grant of vacation and sick leave privileges to an employee, the
employer is given leeway to impose conditions on the entitlement to
the same as it is not a standard of law, but a prerogative of
management. It is a mere concession or act of grace of the employer
and not a matter of right on the part of the employee. Thus, it is well
within the power and authority of an employer to deny an employees
application for leave and the same cannot be perceived as
discriminatory or harassment.
FACTS:
Virgina Sugue was respondents Assistant Manager for Marketing
and Renato Valderrama was one of respondents Direct Sales
Manager. In 1999, respondents sales declined. Sales target, which
were set by Valderrama himself , were not met. The low sales
performance was the subject of correspondence between
Valderrama and the top management,
Sugue and Valderrama filed a complaint with the NLRC against
Triumph for payment of money claims arising from allegedly unpaid
vacation and sick leave credits, birthday leave and 14th month pay
for the period 1999-2000.
On 19 June 2000, Sugue and Valderrama attended a preliminary
conference of the case they filed. They did not file a leave and used
company car and driver. They were asked to explain where they
were in the morning of 19 June 2000. Sugue and Valderrama said
they went to the preliminary conference of the case and thought that
they could use company time.
Triumph charged Sugue and Valderramas one-half day absence to
their vacation leave credits.
Valderrama was absent from July 3 to July 5. He filed an application
for sick leave, which was denied because Valderrama failed to
present a medical certificate. The company policy requires such a
certificate for sick leave for more than one day.
Valderrama applied for leave for his executive check-up. This was
denied because of the arrival of the companys regional manager
(international region).
Sugue filed an application for leave for July 14 and 15, but the
approval of the same was conditioned on her submission of the 2001
Marketing Plan.
Sugue also applied for leave for his executive check-up. This was also
denied because of the arrival of the companys regional manager
(international region).
When Valderrama left (claiming constructive dismissal), Sugue
complained that she was asked to report to Temblique, who she
claims was her assistant and therefore she is being demoted.
Valderrama and Sugue then filed another complaint for constructive
dismissal.
LA ruled in their favor. On appeal to the NLRC, the LA was reversed.
On certiorari to the CA, the LAs decision was reinstated with the
modification of deletion of the attorneys fees and reduction of moral
damages.
Sugue and Valderammas heirs (Valderrama died sometime during
the pendency of the case) appealed to the SC to question the
modification of the LA decision. Triumph appealed to question the
NLRC reversal and reinstatement of the LA decision.
ISSUES/HELD:
1.
2.
3.
WON Sugue and Valderrama were constructively dismissed? No.

WON Sugue and Valderrama application for leaves were validly
denied? Yes.
WON the crediting of their half-day absence to their leave credits
was valid? Yes.
RATIO:
Sugue and Valderrama were not constructively dismissed. The
circumstances do not warrant a finding of constructive dismissal.
Explained below are the explanation for Triumphs actions. Anent
Sugues claims that she was demoted, this was found to be
unfounded by the Court. The person to whom she was to report to
was not under Sugue, but he was in the same level as Valderrama
(Sugues boss).
Sugue and Valderrama wanted to have their executive check-ups

when their regional manager (officer from abroad) was in town. It
was fair for the company to require them to be present because of
their function. They had to coordinate and meet with the regional
manager. They were not precluded to have their check-up after the
regional manager leaves.
Valderramas rejected sick leave application are also valid. It was
shown that he did not comply with the company policy on the
application for sick leave. He failed to present a medical certificate.
Sugues rejected application was also valid considering that what
was required of her was actually part of her functions. The
preparation and submission of the marketing plan was a valid
condition to be imposed.
In the grant of vacation and sick leave privileges to an employee, the
employer is given leeway to impose conditions on the entitlement to
the same as it is not a standard of law, but a prerogative of
management. It is a mere concession or act of grace of the employer
and not a matter of right on the part of the employee. Thus, it is well
within the power and authority of an employer to deny an

employees application for leave and the same cannot be perceived
as discriminatory or harassment.
Sugue and Valderramas absence from work to go to the preliminary

conference of their first case was not compensable time. Triumph
was justified in charging the absence to their vacation leave credits.
The age-old rule governing the relation between labor and capital or
management and employee is that a "fair day's wage for a fair day's
labor." If there is no work performed by the employee there can be
no wage or pay, unless of course, the laborer was able, willing and
ready to work but was illegally locked out, dismissed or suspended.
Mayon Hotel & Restaurant, Pacita O.

Po, and/or Josefa Po Lam v Rolando
Adana, Chona Bumalay, Roger
Burce, Eduardo Almares, et.al.10
April 15, 1998
Ponente: Bellosillo, J.
Kitty
SUMMARY: Mayon Hotel and Restaurant initially operated at Rizal

Street with 16 employees. In April 1997, their operations ceased and
they moved to a new location. Only 9 of the 16 were employed at the
new location. The 16 employees filed complaints for underpayment of
wages and other money claims with the LA. LA ruled in favor of the
petitioner. NLRC reversed. Respondents filed an MR with the NLRC
which was denied. They then went up to the CA on certiorari. CA ruled
in favor of the respondents. Petitioners MR was denied and they went
up to the SC. SC ruled in favor of the respondents. There was illegal
dismissal in this case and the respondents were entitled to their
money claims.
DOCTRINE: (in relation to syllabus topic) A profit share is in the
nature of a service charge when the amounts received are not fixed
and the same are not paid on a monthly basis.
FACTS:
10 Mayon Hotel & Restaurant, Pacita O. Po, and/or Josefa Po Lam v Rolando Adana, Chona
Bumalay, Roger Burce, Eduardo Almares, Amado Almaes, Edgardo Torrefanca, Lourdes
Camigla, Tedoro Laurenaria, Wenefredo Loveres, Luis Gaudes, Amado Macandog, Paterno
Llarena, Gregorio Nicerio, Jose Attractivo, Miguel Torrefranca and Santos Bronola)
Petitioner Mayon Hotel & Restaurant is a single proprietor business

registered in the name of the petitioner Pacita Po, whose mother,
petitioner Josefa Po Lam, manages the establishment. The hotel and
restaurant employed around 16 employees.
March 31, 1997: Hotel operations of the business were suspended
due to the expiration and non-renewal of the lease contract for the
rented space occupied by said hotel and restaurant at Rizal Street. It
continued its operations at a new location on Elizondo Street,
Legazpi City. Only 9 of the 16 employees continued working there.
April to May 1997: The 16 employees filed complaints for
underpayment of wages and other money claims against petitioners.
July 14, 2000: Executive Labor Arbiter Gelacio Rivera rendered a
Joint Decision in favor of the employees who awarded substantially
all of the money claims of the respondents and held that respondents
Loveres, Macandog, and Llarena were entitled to separation pay,
while resondents Guades, Nicerio, and Alamares were entitled to
retirement pay.
NLRC reversed the LA. Respondents filed an MR with the NLRC
which was denied.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which
rendered the now assailed decision.
Petitioners filed an MR with the CA which was denied. Petitioners
went up to the SC.
ISSUES/HELD:
9. Were respondents Loveres, Guades, Macandog, Atractivo, Llarena
and Nicerio illegally dismissed? YES.
10. Are respondents entitled to money claims due to underpayment of
wages, and nonpayment of holiday pay, rest day premium, SLIP,
COLA, overtime pay, and night shift differential pay? YES.
RATIO:
On illegal dismissal
o The cessation of employment for more than six months was
patet and the employer had the burden of proving that the
termination was for a just or authorized cause, pursuant to
Art. 286 of the Labor Code.
o Petitioners initially claimed with the LA that it could not be
illegal dismissal because the lay-off was merely temporary
and due to the expiration of the lease contract over the old
premises of the hotel. After the LA ruled that there was

already illegal dismissal when the lay-off had exceeded 6
months, it raised a new argument stating that the failure to
reinstate the employees could not be attributed to the
petitioners as the fact that the employees were out of work
was due to circumstances beyond the petitioners control.
While the closure of hotel operations in April 1997 may have
been temporary, the evidence on record belie any claim of
the petitioners that the lay-off was merely temporary.
Rather, the SC held that evidence showed that petitioners
meant for it to be permanent.
The illegal dismissal complaints were filed
immediately after the closure of operations on Rizal
Street.
Petitioners made no mention in their position paper
with the LA that they had any intent to recall the
respondents to work upon the completion of the
new premises.
Petitioners made allegations in various pleadings
that the respondents were responsible for
mismanagement of the establishment and for abuse
of trust and confidence. These accusations are
inconsistent with a desire to recall them to work.
Petitioners memorandum on appeal also averred
that the case was filed not because of the business
being operated by them or that they were
supposedly not receiving benefits, but because of
the fact that the source of their livelihood, whether
legal or immoral, was stopped on March 31, 1997.
Petitioners, in the same pleading, alleged that there
was only temporary cessation or suspension of
operations but also stated the separation was due to
severe financial losses and reverses leading to
closure of the business and that petitioner Po had to
close shop.
The LA had the uncontroverted finding that the
petitioner terminated all the oter respondents by
not employing them when the establishment

relocated to their new side on Penaranda Street.
o While the aforementioned factors may be inconclusive
individually, when taken together, they lead to the
conclusion that petitioners really intended to dismiss all
respondents
o Even assuming that the closure was due to a reason beyond
the control of the employer, it still had to accord to its
employees some relief in the form of severance pay.
o Under these circumstances, the award of damages was
proper. As a rule, moral damages are recoverable where the
dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud
or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
On money claims.
o SC agreed with the CA and LA that the respondents have set
out with particularity in their complaint, position paper,
affidavits, and other documents the labor standard benefits
they are entitled to, and which they alleged the petitioners
failed to pay them. Thus, the burden was on the petitioners
to prove that they have paid these money claims.
o Despite repeated orders from the LA petitioners failed to
submit the pertinent employee files, payrolls, records,
remittances and other similar documents which would
show that respondents rendered work entitling them to
payment for overtime work, night shift differential, premium
pay for work on holidays and rest day, and payment of these
as well as the COLA and the SILP documents which are not
in respondents possession but in the custody and absolute
control of petitioners
By choosing not to fully and completely disclose
information and present the necessary documents
to prove payment of labor standard benefits due to
respondents, petitioners failed to discharge the
burden of proof
o Petitioners claimed that the cost of food and snacks
provided facilities to respondents should have been
included in reckoning the payment of respondents wages.
o
o
They claimed that these benefits made up for whatever

inadequacies there may have been in compensation.
They specifically invoked Sec. 5 and 6 of Rule II-A
which allowed the deduction of facilities provided
by the employer through an appropriate Facility
Evaluation Order issued by the Regional Director o
the DOLE.
Petitioners also averred that they give 5% of the gross
income each month as incentives.
SC ruled that the cost of meals and snacks purportedly
provided to respondents cannot be deducted as part of
respondents minimum wage.
While petitioners submitted Facility Evaluation
Orders issued by the DOLE Regional Office, the cost
of meals in the Order cannot be considered as
applicable to the respondents. The latter were never
interviewed by the DOLE as to the quality and
quantity of the food, nor was it shown that the
respondents voluntarily acecepted them.
Even granting that meals and snacks were provided and
indeed constituted facilities, such facilities could not be
deducted without compliance with certain legal
requirements.
As stated in Mabeza v NLRC, the employer simply
cannot deduct the value from the employee's wages
without satisfying the following: (a) proof that such
facilities are customarily furnished by the trade; (b)
the provision of deductible facilities is voluntarily
accepted in writing by the employee; and (c) the
facilities are charged at fair and reasonable value.
There was also uncontroverted testimony of
respondents on record that they were required to
eat in the hotel and restaurant so that they will not
go home and there is no interruption in the services
of Mayon Hotel & Restaurant.
The SC also did not agree with the petitioners that the 5%
gross income of the establishment can be considered as part
of the respondents wages.

LA: While complainants, who were employed in the
hotel, receive[d] various amounts as profit share,
the same cannot be considered as part of their
wages in determining their claims for violation of
labor standard benefits. [The] [so-]called profit
share is in the nature of share from service charges
charged by the hotel. This is explained by
[respondents] when they testified that what they
received are not fixed amounts and the same are
paid not on a monthly basis. Also, [petitioners]
failed to submit evidence that the amounts received
by [respondents] as profit share are to be
considered part of their wages and had been agreed
by them prior to their employment. Further, how
can the amounts receive[d] by [respondents] be
considered as profit share when the same [are]
based on the gross receipt of the hotel[?] No profit
can as yet be determined out of the gross receipt of
an enterprise. Profits are realized after expenses
are deducted from the gross income.

(Labor Law Rev Digests) (Batch 1) PDF

Diunggah oleh

Informasi Dokumen

Deskripsi Asli:

Judul Asli

Hak Cipta

Format Tersedia

Bagikan dokumen Ini

Bagikan atau Tanam Dokumen

Opsi Berbagi

Apakah menurut Anda dokumen ini bermanfaat?

Apakah konten ini tidak pantas?

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

(Labor Law Rev Digests) (Batch 1) PDF

Diunggah oleh

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

Labor Law Review |Sobrevinas | August December 2014|Page

Labor Law Review |Sobrevinas | August December 2014|Page

Cruz contends they are employees as stated in the announcement;

Vda. de Cruz et al v Manila Hotel

Labor Law Review |Sobrevinas | August December 2014|Page

Cruz is an independent contractor

Manila contracted the services of Cruzs orchestra composed of 15

k. control of the premises;

LVN Pictures Inc. v. Philippine

SUMMARY: The Phil. Musicians Guild filed in the Court of Industrial

Labor Law Review |Sobrevinas | August December 2014|Page

The Guild averred that it is a duly registered legitimate labor organization;

Labor Law Review |Sobrevinas | August December 2014|Page

Private respondent appealed to the Ministry of Labor.

Labor Law Review |Sobrevinas | August December 2014|Page

Ministry of Labor at first issued a restraining order enjoining the assigned

In the event that reinstatement is no longer possible, separation pay is

Labor Law Review |Sobrevinas | August December 2014|Page

LEGEND HOTEL (MANILA)

Labor Law Review |Sobrevinas | August December 2014|Page

dismissal). Realuyo insisted, however, that the hotel was lucratively

Legend was found to have wielded the power of selection when it

Labor Law Review |Sobrevinas | August December 2014|Page

The restaurants manager required him at certain times to

(c) The retrenchment must be reasonably necessary and likely to

It must be noted that retrenchment is one of the authorized causes for

Labor Law Review |Sobrevinas | August December 2014|Page 10

Javier v. Fly Ace Corp.

c) he was never issued an identification card and payslips by the

Labor Law Review |Sobrevinas | August December 2014|Page 11

WON Javier was a regular employee of Fly Ace. NO.

APEX MINING CO. v. NLRC

Labor Law Review |Sobrevinas | August December 2014|Page 12

LA DECISION: Ruled in favor of CANDIDO. (Asked Apex to pay salary

Labor Law Review |Sobrevinas | August December 2014|Page 13

RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the appealed decision

Remington Industrial Sales

SUMMARY: Castaeda alleged that she was illegally dismissed as a

DOCTRINE: The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is

Labor Law Review |Sobrevinas | August December 2014|Page 14

ISSUES/HELD: (not including procedural issues)

considered as a regular employee of the employer and not as a mere family

Labor Law Review |Sobrevinas | August December 2014|Page 15

San Miguel Brewery Sales Force

existing marketing scheme whereby the Route Salesmen were

Labor Law Review |Sobrevinas | August December 2014|Page 16

Sime Darby Pilipinas v NLRC and

April 15, 1998

SUMMARY: Sime Darby issued a memorandum which changed the

Sime Darby Pilipinas, petitioner, is engaged in the manufacture of

August 14, 1992: Petitioner issued a memorandum advising the

Labor Law Review |Sobrevinas | August December 2014|Page 17

Interphil Employees Union vs.

Labor Law Review |Sobrevinas | August December 2014|Page 18

Arica vs. NLRC

SUMMARY: Workers Arica et. al file a case against StanPhilCo so that

Labor Law Review |Sobrevinas | August December 2014|Page 19

It is time spent for them to accomplish the Laborers Daily

It is clear that herein petitioners are merely reiterating the very

Labor Law Review |Sobrevinas | August December 2014|Page 20

of and used by petitioner in going from his residence to the field

REMERCO vs. Minister of Labor