Manufacturing Systems: Concurrent Engineering Failure Mode & Effect Analysis (FMEA)

Concurrent Engineering
11/5/2004
MANUFACTURING SYSTEMS
CONCURRENT ENGINEERING
Failure Mode & Effect Analysis
(FMEA)
05/11/2004
Dr. A.W. Labib (UMIST)
1
1
Concurrent Engineering:
Module Plan
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
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Definitions, concepts, and issues.

Essential techniques1: DFM.
Essential techniques2: DFA.
Essential techniques3: FMEA.
Essential techniques4: QFD.
Implementation issues and software
tools in CE.
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Introduction
n
n
n
FMEA was developed in the 1950s, and was one

of the first systematic methods used to analyse
failures in technical systems.
The method appeared under different names.
Nowadays, a requirement that an FMEA be
included as part of the design process, and that the
results from the analysis be part of the system
documentation.
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FMEA: Definition
n
An engineering technique used to define, identify, and

eliminate known and/or potential failures, problems,
errors, and so on from the system, design, process, and/or
service before they reach the customer.
[Omadhl 1988; ASQC 1983]
simple analysis method to reveal possible failures and

to predict the failure effects on the system as a whole.
[Aven, 1992]
N.B. Only one component is considered at a time, the other components
are then assumed to function perfectly. FMEA is therefore not suitable
for revealing critical combinations of component failures.
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FMEA: General Idea

n
The FMEA provides a systematic method of

examining all the ways in which a failure can
occur.
For each failure, an estimate is made of its effect
on :
the total system, and design,

its seriousness,
its occurrences (frequency), and
its detection.
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Levels of Failure Modes
Level 1
Failure
mode
Level 2
First-level
cause
System
Design
Process
Service
Failed to
work
Cannot
generate
pulse
Open circuit
Poor
material
feed.
Operator
variability.
Poor service.
On/off
switch
Lack of
training.
Material
too thin
(may be a
spec issue).
Level 3
Material
Secondbroken
level cause: (may be
root
a stress
cause
issue)
No
availability
of said
service.
Not enough
personnel.
N.B. The idea is to pursue the root cause.

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Severity
n
n
n
n
Severity is a rating indicating the seriousness of

the effect of potential failure.
There is a direct correlation between effect and
severity.
When one focuses on the cause, one must look at
the root cause, not the symptom of the failure.
Techniques can include cause-and-effect diagram
analysis, analysis of block diagram, ask why ?
five times.
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Occurrence
n
It is a rated value of frequency of the

estimated number of failures.
n Frequency can be identified using
Reliability mathematics.
n Redundancy can be used to minimise
frequency of occurrence.
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Detection
n
Detection is a rating corresponding to the

likelihood of failure being detected.
Questions can be:
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How can this failure be discovered ?

In what way can this failure be recognised ?
Performing FMEA (I)

n
Define functionality of each component.

n Assess conditions of operation, and
probability of failure.
n Analyse ease of detection of failure.
n Assess severity of the components failure
on the whole system .
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Performing FMEA (II)

A good FMEA:n Identifies known and potential failure modes.
n Identifies the cause and effect of each failure
mode and, provides for problem follow-up and
corrective action.
n Prioritises the identified failure modes according
to the risk priority number (RPN), where:
RPN = occurrence freq. x severity x detection.
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Risk priority Number (RPN)

n
The RPN defines the priority of the failure.

n This number is the product of severity,
occurrence, and detection.
n RPNs have no units, they are only used to
rank (define) the potential design
deficiencies.
n The objective of FMEA is to reduce the
RPN.
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Ref: MIL-STD-1629A
Increasing failure mode occurrence probability
A Criticality Matrix
A
B
lity
ica
t
i
r
c
ing
eas
r
c
In
Iso-criticality
curve
C
Minor
Marginal
Critical
Catastrophic
Increasing failure severity
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Same Criticality, but Different

Perspectives
(FMEA: RPN = SxOxD)
Seve Occu Dete RPN Y2K Example
rity rrenc ction
e
10
10
10
10
10
10
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If a nuclear power station or a

nuclear missile were out of
control
If day-to-day computer
applications were
malfunctioning
If embedded clocks in complex
systems were non Y2K
compliant
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Reducing RPN
n
n
n
Reducing RPN can be through the reduction in severity,

occurrence, and detection.
Severity can be reduced only through a change in design.
If this is attainable, then the failure is eliminated.
Occurrence can be reduced by improving engineering
specifications and/or customer requirements, with the
objective of reducing frequency of failures.
Detection can be reduced by improving the design
evaluation technique and/or adding detection equipment.
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4 Types of FMEA
I. System FMEA - Used to analyse systems and
subsystems in the early concept and design stage.
II. Design FMEA - Used to analyse products before
they are released to manufacturing.
III. Process FMEA - Used to analyse manufacturing
and assembly processes.
IV. Service FMEA - Used to analyse services before
they reach the customer.
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Other Tools Related to FMEA

n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
Fault Tree Analysis.

Task Analysis.
Process Flowchart.
Block Diagrams or Logic Diagrams.
Need and Feasibility Analysis.
Failure Mode Analysis.
Control Plan.
Process Potential Study.
Quality Function Deployment.
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Fault Tree Analysis (FTA):

Introduction
n
The FTA was originally developed by Bell telephone laboratories in

1962. The Boeing company further developed the technique during the
1970s. Since then, it became widely spread.
A fault tree is a logical diagram which shows the relation between

system failure, i.e. a specific undesirable event in the system as well as
failures of the components of the system.
The undesirable event constitutes the top event of the tree and the
different component failures constitute the basic event of the tree. For
example, for a production process the top event might be that the
process stops, and one basic event is that a certain motor fails .
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Results
n
A list of possible combinations of

component failures / basic events which
will ensure that the top event occurs.
n Identification of critical components /
events.
n The unreliability of the system, i.e. the
probability that the top event will occur.
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19

Stages
n Definition
of the top event and

framework conditions.
n Construction of the fault tree.
n Qualitative analysis of the fault tree.
n Quantitative analysis of the fault tree.
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Symbols
Logical symbols
Or gate
Basic (input) events
A
Normal input
E2
E1
And gate A
Secondary input
E2
E1
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connection to Reliability
Reliability block diagram
1
Fault tree
Top
Series structure
1
Top
2
3
Parallel structure
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11/5/2004
Example
Engine will not
start
Fuel flow
failure
Fuel pump
failure
Carburettor
failure
Ignition
failure
Blocked
jet
Faulty
jet
L.T.
failure
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05/11/2004
Ignition
system
Ignition
system
Blocked
fuel
H.T.
failure
23
24
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The figure shows a partial FTA for a food manufacturer who has a problem with potato chip
breakage. In this analysis, potato chips break because they are too thin or because they are too
brittle. The options for fixing the problem of too-thin chips--increasing thickness or reducing
size--are undesirable, as indicated by the Xs. The problem of too-brittle chips can be alleviated by
adding more moisture or having fewer ridges or adjusting the frying procedure. We choose to
adjust the frying procedure, which leads to the question of how hot the oil should be and how
long to fry the chip. Once these values are determined, the issue of too-brittle chips (and thus chip
breakage) is solved, as indicated.
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Example: Storage Tank

n
The figure shows an open container for preliminary storage of fluid for
use in the production process.The consumption of fluid is not constant.
Filling the tank is automatically controlled and can be described as

follows:
05/11/2004
When the the liquid level reaches a certain height - normal level, then
the Level Switch High (LSH) will be activated and send a closure signal
to the valve v1.The fluid supply to the tank then stops.
If this mechanism does not function and the liquid level continues to
increase to abnormal level, then the Level Switch High High (LSHH)
will be activated and send a closure signal to valve V2. The fluid supply to
the tank then stops. At the same time the LSHH send an opening signal to
valve V3 so that the fluid is drained.
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11/5/2004

From
source
LSH
V2
- LSH: Level Switch High.

- LSHH: Level Switch High
High.
LSHH
V1
Tank
To
consumer
V3
Drain
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27

Over-filling
of tank
Fault Tree
V1 does not
close
V1 does not
function
No signal
from LSH
LSH doe not
send signal
Associated
reliability
diagram
05/11/2004
V3 does not
open
V2 does not
close
V2 does not
function
No signal
from LSHH
LSHH doe not
send signal
V3 does not
function
No signal
from LSHH
LSHH doe not
send signal
Can you do it ?
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11/5/2004
Other Methods
(Coarse Risk Analysis)
Hazard
Cause
Main effects
Poisonous H 2S causes
release
cylinder
leakage
H 2S not
consumed in
the process
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Preventing/imp
roving action
Large releases
- Alert system.
may cause
- Minimise
severe accidents storage at the
site.
- Develop
procedures for
cylinder
inspection.
As above
- Construct
collection
system foe
excess of H2S,
and stop the
process.
30
Uses of FMEA
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
Identification of safety and reliability of critical failure

modes and effects.
Preparation of diagnostic routines such as flowcharts or
fault- finding tables.
Preparation of preventive maintenance requirements.
Design of built- in test (BIT), failure indications and
redundancy.
For analysis of testability.
For retention as formal records of the safety and reliability
analysis.
Design for ease of production.
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SUMMARY
FMEA definitions.
Severity.
Occurrence.
Detection.
Performing FMEA.
FMEA in a TQM
Context.
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Levels of Failure
Modes.
Risk Priority umber
(RPN).
4 Types of FMEA.
Other Tools Related to
FMEA.
Example.
33
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11/5/2004
Further Reading(s)
n
Stamatis, D.H., Failure Mode and Effect

Analysis, ASQC, 1995.
n Aven, T., Reliability and Risk Analysis,
Elsevier, 1992.
n OConnor, P.D., Practical Reliability
Engineering, John Wiley & Sons, 1990.
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Relevant Past Exam Questions in CE

March 96
b) Discuss the main principles of the Failure Mode and
effects Analysis approach used as part of the concurrent
engineering process.
n May 98
c) With reference to a simple example system of your choice,
and considering only failure during operation (not during
maintenance, outline the structure and principles of Failure
Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA).
n
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17<#>

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Concurrent Engineering

Dr. A.W. Labib (UMIST)

Dr. A.W. Labib (UMIST)

Definitions, concepts, and issues.

FMEA was developed in the 1950s, and was one

Dr. A.W. Labib (UMIST)

An engineering technique used to define, identify, and

simple analysis method to reveal possible failures and

Dr. A.W. Labib (UMIST)

Dr. A.W. Labib (UMIST)

FMEA: General Idea

The FMEA provides a systematic method of

the total system, and design,

Dr. A.W. Labib (UMIST)

Levels of Failure Modes

N.B. The idea is to pursue the root cause.

Dr. A.W. Labib (UMIST)

Dr. A.W. Labib (UMIST)

Severity is a rating indicating the seriousness of

Dr. A.W. Labib (UMIST)

It is a rated value of frequency of the

Dr. A.W. Labib (UMIST)

Dr. A.W. Labib (UMIST)

Detection is a rating corresponding to the

How can this failure be discovered ?

Dr. A.W. Labib (UMIST)

Performing FMEA (I)

Define functionality of each component.

Dr. A.W. Labib (UMIST)

Dr. A.W. Labib (UMIST)

Performing FMEA (II)

Dr. A.W. Labib (UMIST)

Risk priority Number (RPN)

The RPN defines the priority of the failure.

Dr. A.W. Labib (UMIST)

Dr. A.W. Labib (UMIST)

Increasing failure mode occurrence probability

Increasing failure severity

Dr. A.W. Labib (UMIST)

Same Criticality, but Different

Dr. A.W. Labib (UMIST)

If a nuclear power station or a

Dr. A.W. Labib (UMIST)

Reducing RPN can be through the reduction in severity,

Dr. A.W. Labib (UMIST)

Dr. A.W. Labib (UMIST)

Dr. A.W. Labib (UMIST)

Other Tools Related to FMEA

Fault Tree Analysis.

Dr. A.W. Labib (UMIST)

Fault Tree Analysis (FTA):

The FTA was originally developed by Bell telephone laboratories in

A fault tree is a logical diagram which shows the relation between

Dr. A.W. Labib (UMIST)

Dr. A.W. Labib (UMIST)

Fault Tree Analysis (FTA):

A list of possible combinations of

Dr. A.W. Labib (UMIST)

Fault Tree Analysis (FTA):

of the top event and

Dr. A.W. Labib (UMIST)

Dr. A.W. Labib (UMIST)