SAN ILDEFONSO LINES, INC., and EDUARDO JAVIER vs.

COURT OF APPEALS
SAN ILDEFONSO LINES, INC., and EDUARDO JAVIER vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Thirteenth
Division)
and
PIONEER
INSURANCE
and
SURETY
CORPORATION
G.R.
No.119771.
24
Apr
1998.
FACTS: At around 3:30 in the afternoon of June 24, 1991, a Toyota Lite Ace Van being driven by its
owner Annie U. Jao and a passenger bus of herein petitioner San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. (hereafter,
SILI) figured in a vehicular mishap at the intersection of Julia Vargas Avenue and Rodriguez Lanuza
Avenue in Pasig, Metro Manila, totally wrecking the Toyota van and injuring Ms. Jao and her two (2)
passengers
in
the
process.
A criminal case was thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig on September 18, 1991
charging the driver of the bus, herein petitioner Eduardo Javier, with reckless imprudence resulting
in
damage
to
property
with
multiple
physical
injuries.
About four (4) months later, or on January 13, 1992, herein private respondent Pioneer Insurance
and Surety Corporation (PISC), as insurer of the van and subrogee, filed a case for damages against
petitioner SILI with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, seeking to recover the sums it paid the
assured under a motor vehicle insurance policy as well as other damages, totaling P564,500.00
(P454,000.00 as actual/compensatory damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 as
attorney's fees; P10,000.00 as litigation expenses; and P500.00 as appearance fees.)
ISSUEs: 1) If a criminal case was filed, can an independent civil action based on quasi-delict under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code be filed if no reservation was made in the said criminal case?
2) Can a subrogee of an offended party maintain an independent civil action during the pendency of
a criminal action when no reservation of the right to file an independent civil action was made in
the criminal action and despite the fact that the private complainant is actively participating
through
a
private
prosecutor
in
the
aforementioned
criminal
case?
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
February 24, 1995 and the Resolution dated April 3, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration
thereof are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The "MANIFESTATION AND MOTION TO SUSPEND
CIVIL
PROCEEDINGS"
filed
by
petitioners
is
GRANTED.
RATIO: Now that the necessity of a prior reservation is the standing rule that shall govern the
institution of the independent civil actions referred to in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, past
pronouncements that view the reservation requirement as an "unauthorized amendment" to
substantive law - i.e., the Civil Code, should no longer be controlling. There must be a renewed
adherence to the time-honored dictum that procedural rules are designed, not to defeat, but to
safeguard the ends of substantial justice. And for this noble reason, no less than the Constitution
itself has mandated this Court to promulgate rules concerning the enforcement of rights with the
end in view of providing a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases
which should not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Far from altering substantive
rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is, to borrow the words of the Court in "Caos v.
Peralta"
Clearly then, private respondent PISC, as subrogee under Article 2207 of the Civil Code, is not
exempt from the reservation requirement with respect to its damages suit based on quasi-delict
arising from the same act or omission of petitioner Javier complained of in the criminal case. As
private respondent PISC merely stepped into the shoes of Ms. Jao (as owner of the insured Toyota
van), then it is bound to observe the procedural requirements which Ms. Jao ought to follow had
she herself instituted the civil case.

LRT vs. NAVIDAD

G.R. No. 145804. February 6, 2003
FACTS:

Navidad was drunk when he entered the boarding platform of the LRT. He got into an altercation
with the SG Escartin. They had a fistfight and Navidad fell onto the tracks and was killed when a
train came and ran over him.
The Heirs of Navidad filed a complaint for damages against Escartin, the train driver, (Roman) the
LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization and Prudent Security Agency (Prudent). The trial court found
Prudent and Escartin jointly and severally liable for damages to the heirs. The CA exonerated
Prudent and instead held the LRTA and the train driver Romero jointly and severally liable as well
as removing the award for compensatory damages and replacing it with nominal damages.
The reasoning of the CA was that a contract of carriage already existed between Navidad and LRTA
(by virtue of his havA ing purchased train tickets and the liability was caused by the mere fact of
Navidad's death after being hit by the train being managed by the LRTA and operated by Roman.
The CA also blamed LRTA for not having presented expert evidence showing that the emergency
brakes could not have stopped the train on time.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not LRTA and/or Roman is liable for the death.
(2)
Whether
or
not
Escartin
and/or
Prudent
(3) Whether or not nominal damages may coexist with compensatory damages.

are

liable.

HELD:
(1) Yes. The foundation of LRTA's liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify
the victim arising from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high
diligence required of a common carrier.
(2) Fault was not established. Liability will be based on Tort under Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code.
(3) No. It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages.
RATIO:
Liability of LRTA Read Arts. 1755,1756, 1759 and 1763 of the New Civil Code
A common carrier is required by these above statutory provisions to use utmost diligence in
carrying passengers with due regard for all circumstances. This obligation exists not only during
the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises where they ought to
be in pursuance to then contract of carriage.
Art. 1763 renders a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through
the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or (b) on account of willful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers if the common carriers employees through theexercise of due diligence
could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. In case of such death or injury, a carrier is
presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is
relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the
burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force
majeure.
Liability of Security Agency If Prudent is to be held liable, it would be for a tort under Art. 2176
in conjunction with Art. 2180. Once the fault of the employee Escartin is established, the employer,
Prudent, would be held liable on the presumption that it did not exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees.
Relationship between contractual and non-contractual breach How then must the liability of
the common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other hand, be
described? It would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the
same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa
aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even
under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act

which constitutes a breach of ontract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual
liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached
by
tort,
thereby
allowing
the
rules
on
tort
to
apply.
Nominal Damages - The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable.
Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. It is an established rule that nominal
damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages. The award was deleted/\.

Chavez vs. Gonzales (2008) (Political Law)

Francisco Chavez vs. Raul M. Gonzales and NTC | G.R. No. 168338 | February 15, 2008

Facts: As a consequence of the public release of copies of the Hello Garci compact disc audiotapes
involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation between then-President Gloria Arroyo and
Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters
that those who had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held
liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes
were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated that he had
ordered the NBI to go after media organizations found to have caused the spread, the playing and
the printing of the contents of a tape. Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned TV and radio stations
that their broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a
just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations
issued to the said media establishments. Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against
respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC directly with the Supreme Court.

Issues: (1) Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify straitjacketing
the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press? (2) Did the mere press statements of
respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constitute a form of content-based prior restraint that has
transgressed the Constitution?

Held: (1) No, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will not justify
straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. A governmental action that
restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the
government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and
present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media.
Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of
the press, failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. For this failure of the respondents
alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to
uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of
the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State.

(2) Yes, the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constituted a form of
content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution. It is not decisive that the press
statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or
circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents while in the exercise
of their official functions. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the
government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an act
does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the

non formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of
the prohibition on prior restraint.

PANTALEON VS AMERICAN EXPRESS

Posted by kaye lee on 11:30 PM
G.R. No. 174269, May 8 2009 [Credit Transaction]

FACTS:

After the Amsterdam incident that happened involving the delay of American Express Card to
approve his credit card purchases worth US$13,826.00 at the Coster store, Pantaleon commenced a
complaint for moral and exemplary damages before the RTC against American Express. He said that
he and his family experienced inconvenience and humiliation due to the delays in credit
authorization. RTC rendered a decision in favor of Pantaleon. CA reversed the award of damages in
favor of Pantaleon, holding that AmEx had not breached its obligations to Pantaleon, as the
purchase at Coster deviated from Pantaleon's established charge purchase pattern.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not AmEx had committed a breach of its obligations to Pantaleon.
2. Whether or not AmEx is liable for damages.

RULING:
1. Yes. The popular notion that credit card purchases are approved within seconds, there really is
no strict, legally determinative point of demarcation on how long must it take for a credit card
company to approve or disapprove a customers purchase, much less one specifically contracted
upon by the parties. One hour appears to be patently unreasonable length of time to approve or
disapprove a credit card purchase.

The culpable failure of AmEx herein is not the failure to timely approve petitioners purchase, but
the more elemental failure to timely act on the same, whether favorably or unfavorably. Even
assuming that AmExs credit authorizers did not have sufficient basis on hand to make a judgment,
we see no reason why it could not have promptly informed Pantaleon the reason for the delay, and
duly advised him that resolving the same could take some time.

2. Yes. The reason why Pantaleon is entitled to damages is not simply because AmEx incurred delay,
but because the delay, for which culpability lies under Article 1170, led to the particular injuries
under Article 2217 of the Civil Code for which moral damages are remunerative. The somewhat
unusual attending circumstances to the purchase at Coster that there was a deadline for the
completion of that purchase by petitioner before any delay would redound to the injury of his
several traveling companions gave rise to the moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and social humiliation sustained by Pantaleon, as concluded by the RTC.

1179-1192

ANGELES VS. CALASANZ

135 SCRA 323

FACTS:
On December 19, 1957, defendants-appellants Ursula Torres Calasanz and plaintiffs-appellees
Buenaventura Angeles and Teofila Juani entered into a contract to sell a piece of land located in
Cainta, Rizal for the amount of P3,920.00 plus 7% interest per annum. The plaintiffs-appellees
made a down payment of P392.00 upon the execution of the contract. They promised to pay the
balance in monthly installments of P41.20 until fully paid, the installment being due and payable on
the 19th day of each month. The plaintiffs-appellees paid the monthly installments until July 1966,
when their aggregate payment already amounted to P4,533.38.

On December 7, 1966, the defendants-appellants wrote the plantiffs-appellees a letter requesting

the remittance of past due accounts. On January 28, 1967, the defendants-appellants cancelled the
said contract because the plaintiffs failed to meet subsequent payments. The plaintiffs letter with
their plea for reconsideration of the said cancellation was denied by the defendants.

The plaintiffs-appellees filed a case before the Court of First Instance to compel the defendant to
executein their favor the final deed of sale alleging inter alia that after computing all subsequent
payments for the land in question, they found out that they have already paid the total amount
including interests, realty taxes and incidental expenses. The defendants alleged in their answer
that the plaintiffs violated par. 6 of the contract to sell when they failed and refused to pay and/or
offer to pay monthly installments corresponding to the month of August, 1966 for more than 5
months, thereby constraining the defendants to cancel the said contract.

The Court of First Instance rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
Has the Contract to Sell been automatically and validly cancelled by the defendants-appellants?

RULING:
No. While it is true that par.2 of the contract obligated the plaintiffs-appellees to pay the defendants
the sum of P3,920 plus 7% interest per annum, it is likewise true that under par 12 the seller is
obligated to transfer the title to the buyer upon payment of the said price. The contract to sell, being
a contract of adhesion, must be construed against the party causing it. The Supreme Court agree
with the observation of the plaintiffs appellees to the effect that the terms of a contract must be
interpreted against the party who drafted the same, especially where such interpretation will help

effect justice to buyers who, after having invested a big amount of money, are now sought to be
deprived of the same thru the prayed application of a contract clever in its phraseology,
condemnable in its lopsidedness and injurious in its effect which, in essence, and its entirety is most
unfair to the buyers.

Thus, since the principal obligation under the contract is only P3,920.00 and the plaintiffs-appellees
have already paid an aggregate amount of P4,533.38, the courts should only order the payment of
the few remaining installments but not uphold the cancellation of the contract. Upon payment of
the balance of P671.67 without any interest thereon, the defendant must immediately execute the
final deed of sale in favor of the plaintiffs and execute the necessary transfer of documents, as
provided in par.12 of the contract.

ROQUE VS. LAPUS

96 SCRA 741
FACTS:

Sometime in 1964, plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement of sale covering Lots 1, 2 and
9, Block 1, of said property, payable in 120 equal monthly installments at the rate of P16.00, P15.00
per square meter, respectively. In accordance with said agreement, defendant paid to plaintiff the
sum of P150.00 as deposit and the further sum of P740.56 to complete the payment of four monthly
installments covering the months of July, August, September, and October, 1954.

On January 24, 1955, defendant requested plaintiff that he be allowed to abandon and substitute
Lots 1, 2 and 9, the subject with Lots 4 and 12, Block 2 of the Rockville Subdivision, which are
corner lots, to which request plaintiff graciously acceded. The evidence discloses that defendant
proposed to plaintiff modification of their previous contract to sell because he found it quite
difficult to pay the monthly installments on the three lots, and besides the two lots he had chosen
were better lots, being corner lots. In addition, it was agreed that the purchase price of these two
lots would be at the uniform rate of P17.00 per square meter payable in 120 equal monthly
installments, with interest at 8% annually on the balance unpaid. Pursuant to this new agreement,
defendant occupied and possessed Lots 4 and 12, and enclosed them, including the portion where
his house now stands, with barbed wires and adobe walls. However, aside from the deposit of
P150.00 and the amount of P740.56, which were paid under their previous agreement, defendant
failed to make any further payment on account of the agreed monthly installments for the two lots
in dispute, under the new contract to sell. Plaintiff demanded upon defendant not only to pay the
stipulated monthly installments in arrears, but also to make up-to-date his payments, but defendant
refused to comply with plaintiff's demands.

On or about November 3, 1957, plaintiff demanded upon defendant to vacate the lots in question
and to pay the reasonable rentals thereon at the rate of P60.00 per month from August, 1955. On
January 22, 1960, petitioner Felipe C, Roque filed the complaint against defendant Nicanor Lapuz
for rescission and cancellation of the agreement of sale between them involving the two lots in
question and prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the rescission and cancellation of the
agreement of sale, the defendant to vacate the two parcels of land and remove his house therefrom
and to pay to the plaintiff the reasonable rental thereof at the rate of P60.00 a month from August
1955 until such time as he shall have vacated the premises, and to pay the sum of P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees, costs of the suit and award such other relief or remedy as may be deemed just and
equitable in the premises.

The Court of Appeals rendered its decision that the defendant Nicanor Lapuz is granted a period of
ninety (90) days from entry hereof within which to pay the balance. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Can private respondent be entitled to the Benefits of the third paragraph of Article 1191, New Civil
Code, for the fixing of period

RULING:

No. Respondent as obligor is not entitled to the benefits of paragraph 3 of Art. 1191, NCC Having
been in default and acted in bad faith, he is not entitled to the new period of 90 days from entry of
judgment within which to pay petitioner the balance of P11,434.44 with interest due on the
purchase price of P12,325.00 for the two lots. To allow and grant respondent an additional period
for him to pay the balance of the purchase price, which balance is about 92% of the agreed price,
would be tantamount to excusing his bad faith and sanctioning the deliberate infringement of a
contractual obligation that is repugnant and contrary to the stability, security and obligatory force
of contracts. Moreover, respondent's failure to pay the succeeding 116 monthly installments after
paying only 4 monthly installments is a substantial and material breach on his part, not merely
casual, which takes the case out of the application of the benefits of pa paragraph 3, Art. 1191, N.C.C.

Pursuant to Art. 1191, New Civil Code, petitioner is entitled to rescission with payment of damages
which the trial court and the appellate court, in the latter's original decision, granted in the form of
rental at the rate of P60.00 per month from August, 1955 until respondent shall have actually
vacated the premises, plus P2,000.00 as attorney's fees. The Court affirmed the same to be fair and
reasonable. The Court also sustained the right of the petitioner to the possession of the land,
ordering thereby respondent to vacate the same and remove his house therefrom.

AYSON-SIMON VS. ADAMOS AND FERIA

G.R. NO. L-39378 AUGUST 28, 1984

FACTS:
Defendants, Nicolas Adamos and Vicente Feria, purchased two lots forming part of the Piedad
Estate in Quezon City, from Juan Porciuncula. Thereafter, the successors-in-interest of the latter
filed Civil Case No. 174 for annulment of the sale and the cancellation of TCT No. 69475, which had
been issued to defendants-appellants by virtue of the disputed sale. The Court rendered a Decision
annulling the sale The said judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Court and had attained finality.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case above, defendants sold the said two lots to Petitioner
Generosa Ayson-Simon for Php3,800.00 plus Php800.00 for facilitating the issuance of the new
titles in favor of petitioner. Due to the failure of the defendants to deliver the said lots, petitioner
filed a civil case for specific performance. The trial court rendered judgment to petitioners favor.
However, defendants could not deliver the said lots because the CA had already annulled the sale of
the two lots in Civil Case No. 174. Thus, petitioner filed another civil case for the rescission of the
contract.

Defendants were contending that petitioner cannot choose to rescind the contract since petitioner
chose for specific performance of the obligation. Also, even though petitioner can choose to rescind
the contract, it would not be possible, because it has already prescribed.

ISSUES:
1. Can petitioner choose to rescind the contract even after choosing for the specific performance of
the obligation?
2. Had the option to rescind the contract prescribed?

RULING:
1. Yes. The rule that the injured party can only choose between fulfillment and rescission of the
obligation, and cannot have both, applies when the obligation is possible of fulfillment. If, as in this
case, the fulfillment has become impossible, Article 1191 allows the injured party to seek rescission
even after he has chosen fulfillment.

2. No. Article 1191 of the Civil Code provides that the injured party may also seek rescission, if the
fulfillment should become impossible. The cause of action to claim rescission arises when the
fulfillment of the obligation became impossible when the Court of First Instance of Quezon City in
Civil Case No. 174 declared the sale of the land to defendants by Juan Porciuncula a complete nullity
and ordered the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 69475 issued to them. Since the two
lots sold to plaintiff by defendants form part of the land involved in Civil Case No. 174, it became
impossible for defendants to secure and deliver the titles to and the possession of the lots to
plaintiff. But plaintiff had to wait for the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 174, According to
the certification of the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (Exhibit "E-2"), the
decision in Civil Case No. 174 became final and executory "as per entry of Judgment dated May 3,
1967 of the Court of Appeals." The action for rescission must be commenced within four years from
that date, May 3, 1967. Since the complaint for rescission was filed on August 16, 1968, the four
year period within which the action must be commenced had not expired.