OCS 1ac

Navy
Removing OCS natural gas restrictions makes the shipbuilding industry sustainable
Mason 11 (Joseph Senior Fellow, The Wharton School, Louisiana State

University Endowed Chair of Banking and nationally-renowned economist, House
Natural Resources Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources Hearing;
Fisheries, Wildlife, Oceans and Insular Affairs Legislative Hearing on H.R. 306, H.R.
588, S. 266 and H.R. 285, 4/6, lexis)
Apart from national energy concerns, however, economic considerations also favor increased
development of OCS energy resources. Specifically, the boost provided to local onshore economies by
offshore production would be particularly welcome in the present economic climate. Similar to fiscal alternatives presently
under consideration, OCS development would provide a long-run economic stimulus to the U.S. economy
because the incremental output, employment, and wages provided by OCS development would be
spread over many years. Unlike those policies, however, this stimulus would not require government expenditures to support that
long-term growth. A. The Present State of Offshore U.S. Oil and Gas Production Despite its importance, U.S. oil and natural gas
production in offshore areas is currently limited to only a few regions. At the present time, oil and gas is only actively
produced off the coast of six U.S. states: Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, California, and Alaska. The Energy Information Administration
(EIA) reports that Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas are the only coastal states that provide access to all or almost all of their offshore
energy resources. Only two additional states--Alaska and California--are producing any offshore energy supplies. All California OCS Planning
Areas and most Alaska OCS Planning Areas, however, were not open to any new facilities until the recent end of the Congressional and
Presidential moratoria. The remaining 16 coastal states are not open to new production and are not presently extracting any offshore energy
resources. Even without those remaining sixteen states, plus California and Alaska, the
OCS is already the most important

source of U.S. energy supplies. According to the MMS, "the Federal OCS is a major supplier of oil and natural
gas for the domestic market, contributing more energy (oil and natural gas) for U.S. consumption than any single U.S. state or country in the
world." That is, OCS production presently meets more U.S. energy demand than any other single source, including Saudi Arabia. B. Offshore Oil
Offshore oil and gas production has a significant effect on local onshore
economies as well as the national economy. There are broadly three "phases" of development that contribute
to state economic growth: (1) the initial exploration and development of offshore facilities; (2) the extraction of oil
and gas reserves; and (3) refining crude oil into finished petroleum products. Industries supporting those phases are most evident in the
sections of the Gulf of Mexico that are currently open to offshore drilling. For example, the U.S. shipbuilding industry - based
largely in the Gulf region - benefits significantly from initial offshore oil exploration efforts. Exploration and
development also requires specialized exploration and drilling vessels, floating drilling rigs, and miles
Production Stimulates Onshore Economies
and miles of steel pipe, as well as highly educated and specialized labor to staff the efforts. The
onshore support does not end with production . A recent report prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy indicates that
the Louisiana economy is "highly dependent on a wide variety of industries that depend on offshore oil and gas production" and that
offshore production supports onshore production in the chemicals, platform fabrication, drilling services,
transportation, and gas processing. Fleets of helicopters and U.S.-built vessels also supply offshore
facilities with a wide range of industrial and consumer goods, from industrial spare parts to groceries.
As explained in Section IV.G, however, the distance between offshore facilities and onshore communities can affect the relative intensity of the
local economic effects. The economic effects in the refining phase are even more diffuse than the effects for the two preceding phases.
Although significant capacity is located in California, Illinois, New Jersey, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington, additional U.S.
refining capacity is spread widely around the country. As a result, refinery jobs, wages, and tax revenues are even more likely to "spill over" into
other areas of the country, including non-coastal states like Illinois, as those are home to many refining and chemical industries that ride the
economic coattails of oil exploration and extraction. II. OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS RESERVE ESTIMATES AND THE SOURCES OF THEIR ECONOMIC
BENEFITS As described in my 2009 white paper, "The Economic Contribution of Increased Offshore Oil Exploration and Production to Regional
and National Economies," available at www.americanenergyalliance.org/images/aea_offshore_updated_final.pdf, significant oil and gas
reserves lie under the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), the
OCS (including Alaskan OCS Planning Areas) contains approximately 86 billion barrels of recoverable oil and approximately 420
trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural gas. As noted by the White House, however, the OCS estimates are
conservative . Of the total OCS reserves, a significant portion was unavailable to exploration until recently. Specifically, Presidential and
Congressional mandates banned production from OCS Planning Areas covering approximately 18 billion barrels of recoverable oil and 77.61
trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural gas. These bans covered approximately 31 percent of the total recoverable OCS oil reserves and 25
percent of the total recoverable OCS natural gas reserves. Economic
benefits of utilizing OCS reserves accrue from three

primary sources: (1) exploration/platform investments; (2) production; and (3) refining. Sources (1) and (3) produce initial
effects--that is, new industry expenditures--today; in contrast, source (2) produce economic effects only once production
begins. The analysis therefore considers "initial" economic effects as those that flow from exploration or investments in new refining capacity
and long-term economic effects as those that flow from production and ongoing refining. A. Exploration and Offshore Facility Development In
contrast to other industries, the
high fixed investment costs associated with offshore oil and gas production
produce large initial investments that reverberate throughout the economy. Once oil or gas reserves are
located, billions of additional dollars must be spent before the well produces even $1 of revenue. For example, oil
exploration costs can amount to between $200,000 and $759,000 per day per site. Additional production in the U.S. will also require a costly
expansion refining capacity as well. Taken together, the
fixed expenditures that precede actual offshore oil and gas production can
amount to billions of dollars. For example, Chevron's "Tahiti" project in the Gulf of Mexico is representative of the large investments
that firms must make before production is achieved. In 2002, Chevron explored the Tahiti lease--which lies 100 miles off the U.S. coast at a
depth of 4,000 feet--and found "an estimated 400 million to 500 million barrels of recoverable resources." Chevron estimates that it will take
seven years to build the necessary infrastructure required to begin production at Tahiti. The firm estimates that its total development costs will
amount to "$4.7 billion--before realizing $1 of return on our investment." As a typical U.S. offshore project, the Tahiti project provides a wealth
of information regarding the up-front investment costs, length of investment, and lifespan of future OCS fields. As noted above, the Tahiti field
is estimated to hold between 400 million and 500 million barrels of oil and oil equivalents (primarily natural gas) and is expected to require an
initial fixed investment of $4.7 billion. Using the mid-point reserve estimate of 450 million barrels of oil equivalent, up-front development costs
amount to approximately $10.44 per barrel of oil reserves or $1.86 per 1,000 cubic feet of natural gas reserves. These costs will be spread over
7 years, resulting in average up-front development expenditures equal to $1.49 per barrel of oil and $0.27 per 1,000 cubic feet of natural gas.
Chevron also estimates that the Tahiti project will produce for "up to 30 years". Although investment and production times vary widely, the
analysis that follows uses the Tahiti project numbers - an average initial investment period of seven years followed by an average production
period of 30 years - as indicative of the "typical" offshore project. I will thus assume an average initial investment period of seven years
followed by an average production period of 30 years. The speed of OCS development also factors into the analysis. Because
most areas
of the U.S. OCS have been closed to new exploration and production for almost forty years, it is unclear how
quickly firms would move to develop new offshore fields. Given its large potential reserves, however , the OCS is
sure to attract significant investment. Without the benefit of government data, a rough estimate suggests that
annual total investment in OCS fields would be $9.09 billion per year. Those annual expenditures are expected to
last, on average, the full seven years of the development phase. Additional investment in states that already support significant production Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas - are limited. Some of the greatest benefits accrue to areas that are home to enormous - but
unavailable - total reserves: California and Florida. B. Production The
likely value of state recoverable oil and gas reserves are

estimated using the likely lifetime revenue that could be generated by the project. In that case, average
wholesale energy prices provide the information necessary to translate reserves into revenues. Taking the simple average of the EIA's latest
inflation-adjusted energy price forecasts through 2030 as provided by its Annual Energy Outlook 2009, the average inflation-adjusted price of
oil will be $110.64 per barrel and the average inflation-adjusted price of natural gas will be $6.83 per thousand cubic feet. At these prices,
the estimated OCS reserves are worth about $13 trillion . The value of each state's available reserves are calculated as
the sum of (1) its share of available OCS Planning Area oil reserves times $110.64 per barrel and (2) its share of available OCS Planning Area
natural gas reserves times $6.83 per thousand cubic feet. The same method applies to the valuation of total state OCS reserves. By those
estimation methods, states such as California, facing a budget crisis in the current recession, have an estimated $1.65 trillion in resources
available in nearby OCS planning areas. Florida, while not facing as dire a fiscal crisis, has about $0.55 trillion in resources available in nearby
OCS planning areas. Hence, a
permanent relaxation of all federal OCS production moratoria would unlock

more than $3.4 trillion in new production among all the coastal states. C. Investments in Incremental Refining Capacity Since
U.S. refineries are presently operating near maximum capacity increased offshore oil and gas production would also spur
investment in new refineries . The U.S. refining industry is presently operating at 97.9 percent of capacity and can no longer
depend on excess foreign refining to meet production shortfalls arising from seasonality or repairs. In response, many large refiners are already
considering refinery expansions: ConocoPhillips announced that it planned to spend $6.5 billion to $7 billion on capacity expansion at its U.S.
facilities; Chevron has also considered a major refinery expansion; and while Shell is completing a $7 billion expansion and its Port Arthur, Texas
refinery they are considering further expansion elsewhere. Additional refinery investments are likely to occur in the few U.S. states that already
host significant U.S. refineries. This result is largely due to environmental restrictions that severely limit the placement of new refining capacity.
Current capacity is primarily concentrated in California, Louisiana, and Texas. The U.S. presently has an operating refining capacity of
approximately 6.287 billion barrels of crude oil per year. Conservative estimates of OCS production would add approximately 3.773 billion
barrels per year, or about sixty percent of current U.S. operating refinery capacity. Because some OCS refining production would most likely
substitute for foreign production, however, the analysis conservatively assumes that only one-quarter of this new OCS production necessitates
additional U.S. refinery capacity. That is, I estimate that U.S. refinery demand would increase by 943.25 million barrels per year, or 15 percent
of current installed capacity. Even this modest capacity increase would require substantial new investments. In response to existing capacity
constraints, Shell is already increasing the capacity of its Port Arthur, Texas refinery. This expansion will take approximately two and one-half
years to complete and cost $7 billion. The facility will add 325,000 barrels per day (or 118.6 million barrels per year) in new capacity, at a cost of
approximately $59.02 per barrel of new annual capacity. As noted above, since tough environmental regulations effectively limit new refinery
capacity to a few states, refinery investments are likely to be limited to only a few states with large existing capacity. These states can be
reasonably assumed to be the same states the already have large installed refinery capacity. Hence, incremental refinery capacity will be added
predominantly in states already home to large refining capacity--those with a present capacity of more than 200 million barrels per year. There
are seven such states: California, Illinois, Louisiana, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington. Expected increases in offshore oil
production will induce approximately $22 billion in refining capacity investments each year for two and one half years. California, Texas, and
Louisiana will receive the bulk of this investment, but investments of more than $1 billion annually can be expected in Illinois, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Washington. III. INCREASED INVESTMENTS IN OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION WILL CAUSE SUBSTANTIAL INCREASES
IN WAGES, EMPLOYMENT, AND TAXES, AND PROFOUND EFFECTS ON COMMUNITIES THROUGHOUT THE NATION Onshore state and local
economies benefit from the development of OCS reserves by providing goods and services to
offshore oil and gas extraction sites. Onshore communities provide all manner of goods and services required by offshore oil and gas
extraction. A variety of industries are involved in this effort : shipbuilders provide exploration vessels,
permanent and movable platforms, and resupply vessels; steelworkers fashion the drilling machinery and specialized
pipes required for offshore resource extraction; accountants and bankers provide financial services; and other onshore employees provide
groceries, transportation, refining, and other duties. These onshore jobs, in turn, support other jobs and other industries (such as retail and
hospitality establishments). The statistical approach known as an "input-output" analysis measures the economic effects associated with a
particular project or economic development plan. This approach, which was pioneered by Nobel Prize winner Wassily Leontif, has been refined
by the U.S. Department of Commerce. The most recent version of the Commerce Department's analysis is known as the Regional Input-Output
Modelling System, or "RIMS II." The RIMS II model provides a variety of multipliers that measure how an economic development project--such
as offshore drilling--would "trickle down" through the economy providing new jobs, wages, and government revenues. This analysis can be
broken down into two parts: (1) a "direct" analysis measuring the benefits that arise from industries that directly supply offshore oil and gas
exploration and (2) the "final" analysis that measures the direct and indirect benefits associated with offshore exploration. The RIMS II model is
the standard method governmental authorities use to evaluate the benefits associated with an economic development project. According to
the Commerce Department, the RIMS II model has been used to evaluate the economic effects of many projects, including: opening or closing
military bases, tourist expenditures, new energy facilities, opening or closing manufacturing plants, shopping malls, sports stadiums, and new
airport or port facilities. A. Opening OCS Planning Areas would Unleash More than $11 trillion in Economic Activity The
broadest
measure of the incremental effect of increased OCS oil and natural gas extraction is the effect on total
economic output. Until OCS production begins, onshore communities will realize only the benefits
associated with offshore investment. These benefits take two forms: (1) the development of the
offshore facilities
themselves and (2) the expansion of onshore refining capacity. These two effects, taken together, provide a rough
approximation of the additional output that would be created by allowing greater access to offshore reserves. Of course, the investment
expenditures and resulting output estimated above is only made to facilitate oil and gas extraction. Once extraction begins, additional
economic activity continues for the lifetime of the oil and natural gas reserves. Using the total U.S. multipliers (2.2860 for refining and 2.3938
for extraction), the total increase in U.S. output from initial investment is estimated to be a total of about $0.5 trillion, or approximately $73
billion per year for the first seven years the OCS is open. For comparative purposes, a $73 billion stimulus amounts to approximately 0.5
percent of total U.S. output (GDP) per year. Increased OCS oil and gas extraction would yield approximately $5.75 trillion in new coastal state
output over the lifetime of the fields. Approximating the total increase in output associated with increasing offshore resource production
throughout the U.S. (including states in the interior), yields approximately $2.45 trillion in additional output. The total increase in output in the
United States is estimated to total approximately $8.2 trillion or about $273 billion per year, which amounts to just over two percent of GDP.
Because the OCS areas are currently unavailable, the entire amount--$8.2 trillion--is completely new output created by a simple change in
policy allowing resource extraction in additional OCS Planning Areas. B. Opening OCS Planning Areas could Create Millions of New Jobs An
economic expansion tied to increased OCS resource production would also create millions of new jobs
both in the extraction industry and in other sectors that serve as suppliers or their employees. The annual
increase in coastal state employment from initial investments in previously unavailable OCS planning areas and additional refining capacity is
estimated to be 185,320 full-time jobs per year. Again, this number does not consider the spill-over effects of investment in productive capacity
and refining to other U.S. states. The total increase in U.S. employment from the investment phase is approximately 271,570 full-time jobs per
year. Applying the BEA multipliers to the estimated production value results in approximately 870,000 coastal state jobs in addition to the jobs
created during the initial investment phase. Again, the total increase in U.S. employment in all states (including those in the interior) resulting
from increased OCS production is 340,000 greater, for a total of approximately 1,190,000 jobs be sustained for the entire OCS production
period. Increased
investment and production in previously unavailable OCS oil and gas extraction and the
ancillary industries that support the offshore industry
would produce thousands of new jobs in stable and valuable
industries . Among the 271,572 jobs created in the investment phase and sustained during the first seven years of the investment cycle.
The majority of new positions (162,541 jobs, or 60 percent) would be created in high-skills fields, such as health care, real estate, professional
services, manufacturing, administration, finance, education, the arts, information, and management. Although the largest total increase in
employment in the production phase would occur (quite naturally) in the mining industry, significant numbers of jobs would be created in other
industries. Again, many of these new jobs would be created in high-skills fields, representing approximately 49 percent
of all new jobs and approximately 61 percent of all new non-mining jobs. C. Opening OCS Planning Areas can Release Trillions of Dollars of
Wages to Workers Hit by Recession Those
jobs pay wages. OCS development is estimated to yield approximately
$10.7 billion in new wages in coastal states each year. OCS production would yield approximately $1.406 trillion in additional wage
income to workers in coastal states over the lifetime of the fields (or $46 billion per year over 30 years). Across the U.S., the investment
phase would generate approximately $15.7 billion in additional annual wages per year for the first seven years
and $70 billion per year for the next thirty years, or approximately $2.1 trillion in additional wage income. BLS data suggest
that all four broad industry classifications related to oil and gas extraction pay higher wages and similar jobs in other industries. Jobs in: (1) Oil
and Gas Extraction, (2) Pipeline Transportation of Crude Oil, (3) Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing, and (4) Support Activities for
Mining, typically pay higher wages than the average American job. Taking this broader measure, the average job created by increased offshore
oil and gas production pays approximately 28 percent more than the average U.S. job. D. Opening OCS Planning Areas can Contribute Trillions
of Dollars in Taxes and other Public Revenues to Local, State, and Federal Governments Greater
output, more jobs, and higher

wages translate into higher tax collections and increases in other sources of public revenues . The MMS
Report to Congress suggests that public revenues derived from OCS extraction are significant--the U.S. federal
government has collected more than $156 billion in lease and levy payments for OCS oil and natural gas production. Note that this amount
counts only lease and royalty payments and thus does not include any sales and income taxes paid by firms or workers supported by OCS
production. Conservative estimates suggest that seven years
of initial annual exploration and refining investments

would produce approximately $4.8 billion annually in coastal state and local tax revenue and $11.1 billion in U.S. federal tax
income. Over thirty years of production, I estimate that the extraction phase of OCS development would yield
approximately $561 billion ($18.7 billion per year) in coastal state and local tax revenue and approximately $1.64 trillion ($54.7
billion per year) in new U.S. federal tax income.
The industry is key to naval power
NLUS 12 (Navy League of the United States, Americas Maritime Industry The foundation of American
seapower, 2012, http://www.navyleague.org/files/americas-maritime-industry.pdf, Date Verification
http://gsship.org/industry-links/)
Defense Industrial Base: Shipbuilding The American Maritime Industry also contributes to our
national defense by sustaining the shipbuilding and repair sector of our national defense industrial
base upon which our standing as a seapower is based. History has proven that without a strong
maritime infrastructure shipyards, suppliers, and seafarersno country can hope to build and
support a Navy of sufficient size and capability to protect its interests on a global basis. Both our
commercial and naval fleets rely on U.S. shipyards and their numerous industrial vendors for building
and repairs. The U.S. commercial shipbuilding and repair industry also impacts our national economy by adding billions of dollars to U.S.
economic output annually. In 2004, there were 89 shipyards in the major shipbuilding and repair base of the United States, defined by the
Maritime Administration as including those shipyards capable of building, repairing, or providing topside repairs for ships 122 meters (400 feet)
in length and over. This includes six large shipyards that build large ships for the U.S. Navy. Based on U.S. Coast Guard vessel registration data
for 2008, in that year U.S. shipyards delivered 13 large deep-draft vessels including naval ships, merchant ships, and drilling rigs; 58 offshore
service vessels; 142 tugs and towboats, 51 passenger vessels greater than 50 feet in length; 9 commercial fishing vessels; 240 other selfpropelled vessels; 23 mega-yachts; 10 oceangoing barges; and 224 tank barges under 5,000 GT. 11 Since the mid 1990s, the industry has been
experiencing a period of modernization and renewal that is largely market-driven, backed by long-term customer commitments. Over the sixyear period from 2000-05, a total of $2.336 billion was invested in the industry, while in 2006, capital investments in the U.S. shipbuilding and
repair industry amounted to $270 million.12 The
state of the industrial base that services this nations Sea Services
is of great concern to the U.S. Navy. Even a modest increase in oceangoing commercial shipbuilding
would give a substantial boost to our shipyards and marine vendors. Shipyard facilities at the larger shipyards in the
United States are capable of constructing merchant ships as well as warships, but often cannot match the output of shipyards in Europe and
Asia. On the other hand, U.S.

unmatched in capability, but
yards construct and equip the best warships, aircraft carriers and submarines in the world. They are
must maintain that lead . 13
And its necessary for naval flexibility new projects are key
Alberto, et al., 5 (Lieutenant Colonel Ronald P., U.S. Army, Colonel Michael G. Archuleta, U.S. Air
Force, Lieutenant Colonel Steven H. Bills, U.S. Air Force, Commander William A. Bransom, U.S. Navy, Mr.
Kenneth Cohen, Department of State, Commander William A. Ebbs, U.S. Navy, George Manjgaladze,
Ministry of Defense, Republic of Georgia, Commander Elizabeth B. Myhre, U.S. Navy, Audrea M. Nelson,
DA, Robert L. Riddick, Department of Defense, Colonel Christopher M. Ross, U.S. Army, Julia N. Ruhnke,
DA, Lieutenant Colonel Gregory M. Ryan, U.S. Marine Corps, Colonel David D. Thompson, U.S. Air Force,
Commander Hugh D. Wetherald, U.S. Navy, Dr. Mark Montroll, faculty at the Industrial College of the
Armed Forces, Dr. Michael Farbman, USAID, faculty at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces,
Captain David B. Hill, U.S. Coast Guard, faculty at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces,
SHIPBUILDING, The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, 2005,
http://www.ndu.edu/icaf/programs/academic/industry/reports/2005/pdf/icaf-is-report-shipbuilding2005.pdf, Deech)
In conclusion, our
study found that the tremendous advantage the US enjoys in naval power directly
supports our national security through global power projection and maintaining freedom of the seas.
Our ability to build large, highly capable naval ships is a vital part of our naval superiority and is therefore
inexorably linked to our national security. The US must maintain it lead in naval power by protecting
its domestic shipbuilding industry . It is our conclusion that the number one issue facing the American military
shipbuilder today is the uncertainty in future orders for ship construction. The year to year fluctuation in the projected
naval order book adds uncertainty for the shipbuilder wanting to invest in capital and labor improvement, and adds cost to the vessels actually
being delivered. This fluctuation is exacerbated when the US Navy cancels entire ship classes or severely limits procurement of vessels that
have been programs of record, programs which the shipbuilders have used to make labor and capital investment decisions. We feel it is
imperative for the Navy to identify the force of the future and commit to a stable procurement plan to implement that force. The concept of
Seabasing must mature at least to the point where the major yards can invest in the infrastructure necessary to build the force. In this area, we
also conclude that the requirement for full funding of naval vessels in the year of authorization hampers the ability of the Navy and the industry
to maintain a steady shipbuilding plan. It is apparent to us that the US Navy shipbuilding program is often used as a bill payer for other DoD
priorities. In addition to the reality that the money is not obligated in the year of funding, the temptation to use the US Navy shipbuilding
account to pay current year expenses is greater if significant procurement dollars are available to pay the full cost of individual ships. While we
are convinced the
nation must maintain sufficient shipbuilding capacity to allow for surge in national
emergencies , we feel that the current and projected naval order book does not support the capacity being carried
by the six largest shipyards. Restructuring of the industrial base is necessary. This restructuring may entail the politically difficult decision to
allow some yards to close, but if the naval order book does not increase and the restructuring does not occur, unit cost will continue to
skyrocket out of proportion to the value to the nation of the vessel.
Naval power solves multiple scenarios of extinction
Conway et. al 7 (James General, US Marine Corps, Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gary
Roughead Admiral, U.S. navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Thad Allen Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard,
Commandant of the Coast Guard, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, p.
http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf)
The world economy is tightly interconnected . Over the past four decades, total sea borne trade has more than
quadrupled: 90% of world trade and two-thirds of its petroleum are transported by sea. The sea-lanes and supporting
shore infrastructure are the
lifelines of the modern global economy, visible and vulnerable symbols of the modern distribution
system that relies on free transit through increasingly urbanized littoral regions. Expansion of the global system has increased the prosperity of
many nations. Yet their continued growth may create increasing competition for resources and capital with other economic powers,
transnational corporations and international organizations. Heightened popular expectations and increased competition for
resources, coupled with scarcity, may encourage nations to exert wider claims of sovereignty over greater expanses of
ocean, waterways, and natural resourcespotentially resulting in conflict . Technology is rapidly expanding marine activities such as
energy development, resource extraction, and other commercial activity in and under the oceans. Climate change is gradually opening
up the waters of the Arctic, not only to new resource development, but also to new shipping routes that may reshape the global
transport system. While these developments offer opportunities for growth, they are potential sources of competition and
conflict for access and natural resources. Globalization is also shaping human migration patterns, health, education, culture, and the
conduct of conflict. Conflicts are increasingly characterized by a hybrid blend of traditional and irregular tactics, decentralized planning and
execution, and non-state actors using both simple and sophisticated technologies in innovative ways. Weak or corrupt governments,
growing dissatisfaction among the disenfranchised, religious extremism, ethnic nationalism, and changing
demographicsoften spurred on by the uneven and sometimes unwelcome advances of globalizationexacerbate tensions and are
contributors to conflict. Concurrently, a rising number of transnational actors and rogue states, emboldened and enabled with
unprecedented access to the global stage, can cause systemic disruptions in an effort to increase their power and influence. Their actions, often
designed to purposely incite conflict between other parties, will complicate attempts to defuse and allay regional conflict. Proliferation of
weapons technology and information has increased the capacity of nation-states and transnational actors to challenge
maritime access, evade accountability for attacks, and manipulate public perception. Asymmetric use of technology will pose a range of
threats to the United States and its partners. Even more worrisome, the appetite for
nuclear
and other
weapons
of mass
destruction is growing among nations and non-state antagonists. At the same time, attacks on legal, financial, and cyber systems can be
equally, if not more, disruptive than kinetic weapons. The vast majority of the worlds population lives within a few hundred
miles of the oceans. Social instability in increasingly crowded cities, many of which exist in already unstable parts of the world, has the
potential to create significant disruptions. The effects of climate change may also amplify human suffering through catastrophic storms, loss of
arable lands, and coastal flooding, could lead to loss of life, involuntary migration, social instability, and regional crises. Mass communications
will highlight the drama of human suffering, and disadvantaged populations will be ever more painfully aware and less tolerant of their
conditions. Extremist ideologies will become increasingly attractive to those in despair and bereft of opportunity. Criminal elements will
also exploit this social instability. These conditions combine to create an uncertain future and cause us to think anew about
how we view
seapower . No one nation has the resources required to provide safety and security throughout the entire maritime domain.
Increasingly, governments, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and the private sector will form partnerships of
common interest to counter these emerging threats. Maritime Strategic Concept This strategy reaffirms the use of seapower to influence
actions and activities at sea and ashore. The expeditionary character and versatility of maritime forces provide the U.S. the asymmetric
advantage of enlarging or contracting its military footprint in areas where access is denied or limited. Permanent or prolonged basing of our
military forces overseas often has unintended economic, social or political repercussions. The sea is a vast maneuver space, where
the presence of maritime forces can be adjusted as conditions dictate to enable flexible approaches to escalation, de-
escalation and deterrence of conflicts . The speed, flexibility, agility and scalability of maritime forces provide joint or combined
force commanders a range of options for responding to crises. Additionally, integrated maritime operations, either within formal alliance
structures (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) or more informal arrangements (such as the Global Maritime Partnership initiative),
send powerful messages to would-be aggressors that we will act with others to ensure collective security and prosperity. U nited
S tates seapower will be globally postured to secure our homeland and citizens from direct attack and to advance our interests around the
world. As our security and prosperity are inextricably linked with those of others, U.S. maritime forces will be deployed to protect and
sustain the peaceful global system comprised of interdependent networks of trade, finance, information, law,
people and governance. We will employ the global reach, persistent presence, and operational flexibility inherent in U.S. seapower to
accomplish six key tasks, or strategic imperatives. Where tensions are high or where we wish to demonstrate to our friends and allies our
commitment to security and stability, U.S. maritime forces will be characterized by regionally concentrated, forward-deployed task forces
limit regional conflict , deter major power war , and should deterrence fail, win our Nations
wars as part of a joint or combined campaign. In addition, persistent, mission-tailored maritime forces will be globally distributed in order to
with the combat power to
contribute to homeland defense-in-depth, foster and sustain cooperative relationships with an expanding set of international partners, and
prevent or mitigate disruptions and crises. Regionally Concentrated, Credible Combat Power Credible combat power will be continuously
postured in the Western Pacific and the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean to protect our vital interests, assure our friends and allies of our continuing
commitment to regional security, and deter and dissuade potential adversaries and peer competitors. This combat power can be selectively and
rapidly repositioned to meet contingencies that may arise elsewhere. These forces will be sized and postured to fulfill the following strategic
imperatives: Limit regional conflict with forward deployed, decisive maritime power. Today regional conflict has ramifications far beyond the
area of conflict. Humanitarian crises, violence spreading across borders, pandemics, and the interruption of vital
resources are all possible when regional crises erupt. While this strategy advocates a wide dispersal of networked maritime forces,
we cannot be everywhere, and we cannot act to mitigate all regional conflict. Where conflict threatens the global system and our national
interests, maritime forces will be ready to respond alongside other elements of national and multi-national power, to give
political leaders a range of options for deterrence, escalation and de-escalation. Maritime forces that are persistently
present and combat-ready provide the Nations primary forcible entry option in an era of declining access, even as they provide the means for
this Nation to respond quickly to other crises. Whether over the horizon or powerfully arrayed in plain sight, maritime forces can deter the
ambitions of regional aggressors, assure friends and allies, gain and maintain access, and protect our citizens while working to sustain the global
order. Critical to this notion is the maintenance of a powerful fleetships, aircraft, Marine forces, and shore-based fleet activitiescapable of
selectively controlling the seas, projecting power ashore, and protecting friendly forces and civilian populations from attack. Deter major power
war. No other disruption is as potentially disastrous to global stability as war among major powers. Maintenance and
extension of this Nations comparative seapower advantage is a
key component of deterring major power war .
While war with another great power strikes many as improbable, the near-certainty of its ruinous effects demands that it be
actively deterred using all elements of national power. The expeditionary character of maritime forcesour lethality, global reach,
speed, endurance, ability to overcome barriers to access, and operational agilityprovide the joint commander with a range of deterrent
options. We will pursue an approach to deterrence that includes a credible and scalable ability to retaliate against aggressors conventionally,
unconventionally, and with nuclear forces. Win our Nations wars. In times of war, our ability to impose local sea control, overcome
challenges to access, force entry, and project and sustain power ashore, makes our maritime forces an indispensable
element of the joint or combined force. This expeditionary advantage must be maintained because it provides joint and combined force
commanders with freedom of maneuver. Reinforced by a robust sealift capability that can concentrate and sustain forces, sea control and
power projection enable extended campaigns ashore.
Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase access to its
outer continental shelf for natural gas exploration and development.
Exports
Opening OCS drilling is necessary for U.S LNG exports
Davis 14 (Carolyn, Interior Takes First Step to Formulate 2017-2022 OCS Lease Sales, 6-13-14,
Natural Gas Intelligence, http://www.naturalgasintel.com/articles/98695-interior-takes-first-step-toformulate-2017-2022-ocs-lease-sales)
The Department of Interior on Friday took the initial step to develop the next schedule of potential
offshore oil and natural gas lease sales from 2017-2022, a multi-year process to evaluate all of the Outer Continental
Shelf (OCS) planning areas. Interior Secretary Sally Jewell and Acting Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) Director Walter Cruickshank
jointly made the announcement in what they said would be a "robust public engagement process" to develop the next schedule of offshore
lease sales. A notice, published in the Federal Register, begins a 45-day period for a request for information (RFI) and comments on preparing
the OCS oil and gas leasing program. The notice does not identify any specific course of action. All of the planning areas are to be reviewed in
the first stage. "Substantial public involvement and extensive analysis will accompany all stages of the planning process, which will take up to
three years to complete," Jewell said. "The development of the next five-year program will be a thorough and open process that incorporates
stakeholder input and uses the best available science to develop a proposed offshore oil and gas program that creates jobs and safely and
responsibly meets the energy needs of the nation." The publication Friday "marks the first step of engaging interested parties across the
spectrum to balance the various uses and values inherent in managing the resources of federal offshore waters that belong to all Americans
and future generations." The OCS leasing plan now in place was published in mid-2012 and extended to 2017
(see Daily GPI, June 29, 2012; Dec. 18, 2012). That plan proposed 15 lease sales in six offshore areas, including three in the Western and Central
Gulf of Mexico (GOM), and the portion of the Eastern GOM not under a Congressional moratorium (see Daily GPI, Dec. 2, 2010). The program
No sales were scheduled for the

Atlantic or Pacific coasts. The OCS Lands Act requires the Interior secretary, through BOEM, to prepare
and maintain a schedule of proposed lease sales in federal waters, indicating the size, timing and
location of auctions that would best meet national energy needs for the five-year period following its approval. In developing the
also included three potential lease sales in Alaska's Cook Inlet, Chukchi and Beaufort seas.
program, the secretary is required to achieve" an appropriate balance among the potential for environmental impacts, for discovery of oil and
gas, and for adverse effects on the coastal zone." "In issuing the RFI, BOEM does not propose to schedule sales in particular areas, or make any
preliminary decisions on what areas will be included in the schedule," said Cruickshank. "Rather, the RFI provides an opportunity for interested
parties to submit comments and suggestions about the potential for leasing and to identify environmental and other concerns and uses that
may be affected by offshore leasing." BOEM wants to consider a "wide array of input" on the "economic, social and environmental values of all
OCS resources, as well as the potential impact of oil and gas exploration and development on other resource values of the OCS and the marine,
coastal and human environments." With the information received, a draft proposed program would be prepared by BOEM, followed by a
proposed program and a proposed final program. At the same time, BOEM would prepare a programmatic environmental impact statement, as
required by the National Environmental Policy Act, to evaluate the potential environmental impacts of various OCS leasing alternatives under
the proposed program and to help inform decisions on the proposed final program. BOEM has held five sales thus far in the 2012-2017
program, including annual auctions in the Central and Western GOM and a single sale in the portion of the Eastern GOM. The five auctions have
offered more than 60 million offshore acres, with 4.3 million leased, generating more than $2.3 billion in high bids. A sixth lease sale scheduled
for August is to offer 21 million acres in the Western GOM (see Daily GPI, April 15). Offshore Alaska, the current five-year program, bedeviled by
lawsuits filed by conservation groups and stakeholders, still includes one potential sale each for the Chukchi Sea, Beaufort Sea and Cook Inlet.
BOEM manages about 6,200 active OCS leases, mostly in the GOM, that cover more than 33 million acres. Of those, 1,064 are producing leases
covering 5.2 million producing acres -- the highest acreage under production since 2008. In 2013, OCS oil and gas leases accounted for about
18% of domestic oil production and 5% of U.S. natural gas production. Industry
groups wasted no time in offering their

take on the Interior plan. "Opening new areas like the Atlantic and eastern Gulf of Mexico would
send a signal to the markets and to the world that America's oil and natural gas renaissance is here
to stay," said American Petroleum Institute Senior Policy Adviser Andy Radford. "America's long-term energy security can
only be ensured with a lasting commitment to expanding oil and natural gas development both on and
offshore." National Ocean Industries Association (NOIA) President Randall Luthi called the announcement "a long anticipated first step
toward what could mean more jobs, energy and revenue to the people of the United States." The current program expiring in
2017 "included no new access , and has put the U.S. far behind many other nations that are actively
pursuing offshore oil and natural gas energy development, particularly in the Atlantic basin and the Arctic... "Canada,
Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, Norway, Russia, Cuba and West African nations are examples of countries
actually moving ahead with Atlantic and Arctic offshore exploration and development plans. Contrast
that with the United States, where almost 87% of the Outer Continental Shelf has been off limits for
decades to even geophysical and geological surveys, let alone exploratory drilling." Friday's action "is a crucial,
but still only a first, step in truly adopting an all the above energy policy," said the NOIA chief. Sen. Mary Landrieu (D-LA), chair of the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, said
offshore exploration had helped to fuel the U.S. energy

revolution and positioned the country "to become an energy superpower...We need to open more
areas to offshore oil and gas exploration, not fewer. We need to press forward, not scale back."
Perception of inadequate supply causes domestic infighting over LNG exports
Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative Brookings,
Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala,
Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative Brookings, Liquid Markets: Assessing the
Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas, Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0
502_lng_exports_ebinger.pdf)
For an increase in U.S. exports of LNG to be considered feasible, there has to be an adequate and
sustainable domestic resource base to support it. Natural gas currently accounts for
approximately 25 percent of the U.S. primary energy mix.3 While it currently provides only a minority of U.S. gas
supply, shale gas production is increasing at a rapid rate: from 2000 to 2006, shale gas production increased by an average annual rate of 17
percent; from 2006 to 2010, production increased by an annual average rate of 48 percent (see Figure 2).4 According to the Energy Information
Adminis- tration (EIA), shale gas production in the United States reached 4.87 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 2010, or 23 percent of U.S. dry gas
production. By 2035, it is estimated that shale gas production will account for 46 percent of total domestic natural gas production. Given the
centrality of shale gas to the future of the U.S. gas sector, much
of the discussion over potential exports hinges on

the prospects for its sustained availability and development. For exports to be feasible, gas from
shale and other unconventional sources needs to both offset declines in conventional production and
compete with new and incumbent domestic end uses. There have been a number of reports and studies that
attempt to identify the total amount of technically recoverable shale gas resourcesthe volumes of gas retrievable using current technology
irrespective of costavailable in the United States. These estimates vary from just under 700 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of shale gas to over 1,800
tcf (see table 1). To put these numbers in context, the United States consumed just over 24 tcf of gas in 2010, suggesting that the estimates for
the shale gas resource alone would be enough to satisfy between 25 and 80 years of U.S. domestic demand. The estimates for recoverable
shale gas resources also compare with an estimate for total U.S. gas resources (onshore and offshore, including Alaska) of 2,543 tcf. Based on
the range of estimates below, shale gas could therefore account for between 29 percent and 52 percent of the total technically recoverable
natural gas resource in the United States. In addition to the size of the economically recoverable resources, two other major
factors
will have an impact on the sustainability of shale gas production: the productivity of shale gas
wells; and the demand for the equipment used for shale gas production . The productivity of shale gas wells
has been a subject of much recent debate, with some industry observers suggesting that undeveloped wells may prove to be
less productive than those developed to date. However, a prominent view among independent experts is that
sustainability of shale gas production is not a cause for serious concern, owing to the continued rapid improvement in technologies and
production processes.
Perception is key new supply removes uncertainty over shale gas that makes LNG
exports economical
Aside from the price impact of potential U.S.
LNG exports, a major concern among opponents is that such exports

exports would deny the United States of a strategically
important resource. The extent to which such concerns are valid depends on several factors,
would diminish U.S. energy security; that
including the size of the domestic resource base , and the liquidity and functionality of global trade. As Part I of this report
notes, geological evidence suggests that the volumes
of LNG export under consideration would not materially

affect the availability of natural gas for the domestic market . Twenty years of LNG exports at the rate of 6
bcf/day, phased in over the course of 6 years, would increase demand by approximately 38 tcf. As presented in Part I, four existing estimates of
total technically recoverable shale gas resources range from 687 tcf to 1,842 tcf; therefore, exporting 6 bcf/day of LNG over the course of
twenty years would consume between 2 and 5.5 percent of total shale gas resources. While the estimates for shale
gas reserves are

uncertain, in a scenario where reserves are perceived to be lower than expected , domestic natural
gas prices would increase and exports would almost immediately become uneconomic . In the longterm, it is possible that U.S. prices and international prices will converge to the point at which they settle at similar levels. In that case, the
United States would have more than adequate import capacity (through bi-directional import/export facilities)
to import gas when economic.
Offshore terminals solve these issues
Kilisek 12 (Roman Foreign Policy Association, Researcher - Energy Security Desk & Europe Desk,
Master of Arts, International Relations & Diplomacy Seton Hall University, Researcher for the President
& CEO Frederick Kempe, The Atlantic Council of the United States, The Bright Future of Floating LNG
Liquefaction, Regasification and Storage Units, 7/19, http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/07/19/thebright-future-of-floating-lng-liquefaction-regasification-and-storage-units/)
This is a newsworthy event in the LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) industry because it is the first time that a
floating liquefaction unit is moving from concept to commercial reality . What are the advantages of
those floating LNG facilities over conventional liquefaction plants? First off, there is an obvious
advantage in tapping offshore resources . In addition to the ability to station the floating vessel
directly over distant offshore fields and thereby saving on a costly subsea pipeline to shore , it allows
the operator of the facility to move the production facility to a new location once a field is depleted.
This would also allow energy companies to exploit smaller fields and now earn a realistic return on
investment. Other cost savings are to be expected during the construction phase for the required marine and
loading facilities which often end up costing billions of dollars. Finally , in a world full of risk it can significantly reduce the
security and political risk (inter alia, environmental regulation and permits) involved in choosing a landbased site for LNG export facilities in African countries (Nigeria, Angola and Mozambique) and countries in the Middle East as well
as South America. The US should contemplate something like this along the East Coast for export to Europe,
and along the West Coast for export to South America (Chile) and Asia.
Renegotiations create a unique window of opportunity
502_lng_exports_ebinger.pdf).
LNG exports will help to sustain market liquidity in what looks to be an increasingly tight LNG
market beyond 2015 (see Figure 10). Should LNG exports from the United States continue to be permitted, they will add to roughly
10 bcf/day of LNG that is expected to emerge from Australia between 2015 and 2020. Nevertheless, given the projected growth in demand for
natural gas in China and India and assuming that some of Japans nuclear capacity remains offline, demand for natural gas will outpace the
incremental supply. This makes U.S. LNG even more valuable on the international market. Although it will be important to global LNG markets,
it is unlikely that the emergence of the United States as an exporter of LNG will change the existing pricing structure overnight. Not only is the
market still largely dependent on long-term contracts, the overwhelming majority of new liquefaction capacity emerging in the next decade
(largely from Australia) has already been contracted for at oil-indexed rates.108 The incremental LNG volumes supplied by the United States at
floating Henry Hub rates will be small in comparison. But while U.S. LNG will not have a transformational impact, by
establishing an
alternate lower price for LNG derived through a different market mechanism, U.S. exports may
be central in catalyzing future changes in LNG contract structure . As previously mentioned, this impact is already
being felt in Europe. A number of German utilities have either renegotiated contracts or are seeking
arbitration with natural gas suppliers in Norway and Russia. The Atlantic Basin will be a more
immediate beneficiary of U.S. LNG exports than the Pacific Basin as many European contracts allow for periodic revisions
to the oil-price linkage.109 In the Pacific Basin this contractual arrangement is not as common and most consumers are tied to their respective
oil-linkage formulae for the duration of the contract.110 Despite the increasing demand following the Fukushima nuclear accident, however,
Japanese LNG consumers are actively pursuing new arrangements for LNG contracts .111 There are other
limits to the extent of the impact that U.S. LNG will have on global markets. It is unlikely that many of the LNG export facilities under
consideration will reach final investment decision. Instead, it is more probable that U.S. natural gas prices will have rebounded sufficiently to
the point that exports are not commercially viable beyond a certain threshold. (Figure 11 illustrates the estimated costs of delivering LNG to
Japan in 2020.) This threshold, expected by many experts to be roughly 6 bcf/day by 2025, is modest in comparison to the roughly 11 bcf/day of
Australian LNG export projects that have reached final investment decision and are expected to be online by 2020.
Scenario 1 is Japan LNG exports will go to East Asia
Owing to growing gas demand, limited domestic supply, and a more rigid and expensive pricing structure, Asia
represents a near-to-medium term opportunity for natural gas exports from the United States. The expansion of the
Panama Canal by 2014 will allow for LNG tankers to traverse the isthmus, thereby improving the economics of U.S.
Gulf Coast LNG shipments to East and South Asian markets. This would make U.S. exports competitive with future
Middle Eastern and Australian LNG exports to the region. However, challenges and uncertainties remain on both the demand and
supply side. The development of indigenous unconventional gas in China or India may occur at a faster rate than currently forecast, dampening
demand for LNG imports to the region. A change in sentiment in Japan may see nuclear power restarted at a greater rate than currently
anticipated; alternately, a greater-than-expected penetration of coal in the Japanese electricity sector would suppress gas demand. A change in
the cost of Australian LNG production or a reversal of the Qatari moratorium on gas development could disrupt the current supply projections,
as could the discovery of new conventional or unconventional resources. For instance, on December 29, 2010, Noble Energy, a U.S. oil and gas
exploration company, discovered between 14 and 20 tcf of gas in Israels offshore Leviathan gas field. Since then, other nations on the Eastern
Mediterranean are exploring for potentially similarly large gas fields. A number of large natural gas discoveries in Mozambique have also
prompted early interest in building significant liquefaction capacity in the Southeastern African nation. The high quality (low sulfur and carbondioxide content) and liquid-rich nature of Mozambican gas may make this resource a significant competitor in global LNG markets in the
medium term. Finally, the expansion of LNG export capacity from Alaska and the development of LNG export capacity in Western
Canada may provide a source of strong competition for U.S. Gulf-coast origin LNG. Although Alaskas Kenai LNG export facility, which has been
exporting small quantities of LNG to Northeast Asia for over 40 years, has been idled temporarily, some companies have
demonstrated interest in large-scale exports of LNG from Alaska to East Asia. On March 30, 2012, ExxonMobil, along with its
project partners BP and ConocoPhillips, settled a dispute with the Government of Alaska to develop its gas resources at Prudhoe Bay. The
gas from this field is expected to travel from Alaskas North Slope to Valdez on Alaskas southern coast , where it will
be liquefied and exported.67 According to FERC, there are currently three Canadian export facilities under consideration in British Columbia: a
proposed 1.4 bcf/day terminal at Kitimat (initial production would start at 0.7 bcf/day), which received a 20-year export license in October
2011; a proposed 0.25 bcf/day facility at Douglas Island; and a potential 1 bcf/day facility at Prince Rupert Island. Given the lower
transportation costs (as a result of the shorter distance), Alaskan and West Canadian exports may prove to be a source of strong competition at
the margin for U.S. LNG in the Pacific Basin.
LNG exports solidify US-Japan relations
Cronin et al 12 (Dr. Patrick, Senior Advisor and Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program
Center for a New American Security, Paul S. Giarra, President of Global Strategies & Transformation,
Zachary M. Hosford, Research Associate Center for a New American Security, Daniel Katz, Researcher
Center for a New American Security, The China Challenge: Military, Economic and Energy Choices
Facing the US-Japan Alliance, April, CNAS,
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_TheChinaChallenge_Cronin_0.pdf)
Although energy
security has long been an issue for the alliance, a new combination of global energy trends and
geopolitical realities will raise the issue to unprecedented levels of importance in coming decades. Whereas an abundant
supply of cheap energy underpinned tremendous post- World War II economic growth, future energy supplies are unlikely to be as
affordable. Acquiring the right mix of energy sources to maintain sufficient economic productivity while ensuring a gradual transition away
from fossil fuels to renewable sources of energy will be one of the most complex challenges for the alliance in this century. Indeed, the
means by which the United States and Japan seek to secure their own energy supplies in a complicated geopolitical environment, respond to the enormous and
increasing energy demands of a re-emerging China, and address the future of the development and implementation of civilian nuclear power at home and abroad
will have huge implications for the alliance. In the midst of U.S. and Japanese efforts to address their own energy security issues, global demand for energy is
increasing at a rapid rate. Total world energy use during the 2010 to 2025 time frame is projected to increase by nearly 30 percent, with China and India accounting
for 50 percent of that growth.63 Meanwhile, many countries around the globe depend increasingly on Middle Eastern oil, despite its susceptibility to disruption.
Further instability in the Middle East would likely pose a major geo-strategic stability threat to the United States, with the potential for cascading economic
effects.64 Global natural gas production is increasing, however, shifting currency and power flows to new areas. At the same
time, demand for nuclear power has bifurcated growing strongly throughout the developing world, while reaching an inflection point in both the United States
and Japan with as-yet unknown consequences. Both the United States and Japan are undergoing internal debates on energy strategy, and there is no consensus
among leaders in either country. To increase economic productivity, Japan will have to craft a new energy policy . Following the March 11, 2011,
partial meltdowns of three nuclear reactors at the Fukushima Dai-ichi power plant and the subsequent release of radiation, the Japanese people and government
have indicated that civilian nuclear power might play a reduced role in the countrys future energy mix. However, any increased reliance on fossil fuels that might
result from that decision will make Japan more vulnerable to supply disruptions and price spikes. Previous
disturbances in the global energy

market have prompted many countries including Japan to seek some guarantee of energy supplies outside traditional
market mechanisms, including investing in upstream oil production overseas, even if financial logic would dictate otherwise. Meanwhile, the Japanese
population favors increased investment in renewable energy sources, which are not yet sufficiently affordable to be a viable alternative. Japan: Running Out of
Power and Time Japan suffered from its reliance on foreign energy following the oil crises of 1973 and 1979. Although these supply disruptions led to massive
growth of the domestic nuclear power industry, Japan continues to be the worlds largest importer of liquefied natural gas (LNG) ,
with 90 percent of its supply originating overseas. In addition, Japan is the worlds second-largest importer of coal all of which comes from abroad and the thirdlargest importer of oil.65 Reliance on energy imports results in extremely low energy self-sufficiency (18 percent) compared with either the United States (75
percent) or China (94 percent).66 Although the nature of the global energy market offers some insulation because of supply-and-demand dynamics, Japanese
reliance on imported energy also leaves the country more vulnerable to shocks. In
a nation that already relies heavily on imported energy,

the Fukushima nuclear disaster complicated the countrys long-term strategy of cultivating domestic energy
sources. With much of the population wary of nuclear power following the radiation leaks and inaccurate government statements during the disaster, Japans
efforts to diversify and secure its energy sources have lost public support . The United States also finds itself in the midst of a heated
debate over energy security. The nation consumes large amounts of energy, and Americans are showing frustration with rising gas prices. There continues to be
support for a shift to renewable energy sources, but these sources including solar, wind, biomass and geothermal power remain costly and have not yet reached
the level of economic competitiveness. Meanwhile, technological
advances have increased the projected amounts of recoverable oil and

natural gas on U.S. land and in its surrounding waters. However, the widely publicized 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico and reports of contaminated water sources as a result of the natural gas extraction method known as
hydraulic fracturing have mobilized opponents against increases in domestic drilling. Nonetheless, the picture is somewhat rosier for the United
States than for Japan. Although the United States, like many industrialized countries, is witnessing a relative plateau in its overall energy demand, its energy
consumption from primary fuel is expected to rise from 98.2 quadrillion Btu (British thermal units) in 2010 to 108.0 quadrillion Btu in 2035.67 Largely as a result of
advances in recovering shale gas natural gas trapped in shale formations, only recently made cost-effective to extract the United States is projected to become a
net LNG exporter by 2016, a net pipeline exporter by 2025 and an overall net natural gas exporter by 2021.68 The United States is also poised to increase its crude
oil production from 5.5 million barrels per day in 2010 to 6.7 million barrels per day in 2020.69 The apparent move away from nuclear power in Japan following the
Fukushima reactor meltdowns, together with the shale gas revolution in the United States, is shifting the energy security environment. Currently, Japan
harbors concerns about the reliability of future U.S. energy supplies, which may be influenced by shifting
political winds in American energy policy.70 Thus, the United States could help reduce the volatility of Japanese
fossil fuel imports which appear set to remain high by providing a stable source of natural gas. However, if the allies fail to
consult on this issue, they could drift apart , thereby missing an opportunity to strengthen the alliance .
Thats key to solve terror, cyberattacks, and nuclear proliferation.

Gates 11 (Robert, U.S. Secretary of Defense, U.S.-Japan Alliance a Cornerstone of Asian Security,
Speech to Keio University, 1-14, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1529)
Over the course of its history, the
U.S.-Japan alliance has succeeded at its original core purpose to deter

military aggression and provide an umbrella of security under which Japan and the region can prosper.
Today, our alliance is growing deeper and broader as we address a range of security challenges in Asia. Some, like North
Korea, piracy or natural disasters , have been around for decades, centuries, or since the beginning of time. Others, such as global
terrorist networks, cyber attacks, and nuclear proliferation are of a more recent vintage. What these issues have in
common is that they all require multiple nations working together and they also almost always require leadership and
involvement by key regional players such as the U.S. and Japan. In turn, we express our shared values by increasing our alliances
capacity to provide humanitarian aid and disaster relief, take part in peace-keeping operations, protect the global commons, and promote cooperation and build
trust through strengthening regional institutions. Everyone gathered here knows the crippling devastation that can be caused by natural disasters and the U.S. and
Japan, along with our partners in the region, recognize that responding to these crises is a security imperative. In recent years, U.S. and Japanese forces delivered
aid to remote earthquake-stricken regions on Indonesia, and U.S. aircraft based in Japan helped deliver assistance to typhoon victims in Burma. We worked
together in response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, earthquakes in Java, Sumatra, and Haiti, and most recently following the floods in Pakistan. These efforts
have demonstrated the forward deployment of U.S. forces in Japan is of real and life-saving value. They also provide new opportunities for the U.S. and Japanese
forces to operate together by conducting joint exercises and missions. Furthermore, U.S. and Japanese troops have been working on the global stage to confront
the threat of failed or failing states. Japanese peacekeepers have operated around the world, including the Golan Heights and East Timor and assisted with the
reconstruction of Iraq. In Afghanistan, Japan represents the second largest financial donor, making substantive contributions to the international effort by funding
the salaries of the Afghan National Police and helping the Afghan government integrate former insurgents. Japan and the United States also continue to cooperate
closely to ensure the maritime commons are safe and secure for commercial traffic. Our maritime forces work hand-in-glove in the Western Pacific as well as in
other sea passages such as the Strait of Malacca between Malaysia and Indonesia, where more than a third of the worlds oil and trade shipments pass through
every year. Around the Horn of Africa, Japan has deployed surface ships and patrol aircraft that operate alongside those from all over the world drawn by the
common goal to counter piracy in vital sea lanes. Participating in these activities thrusts Japans military into a relatively new, and at times sensitive role, as an
exporter of security. This is a far cry from the situation of even two decades ago when, as I remember well as a senior national security official, Japan was criticized
for so-called checkbook diplomacy sending money but not troops to help the anti-Saddam coalition during the First Gulf War. By showing more willingness to
send self-defense forces abroad under international auspices consistent with your constitution Japan is taking its rightful place alongside the worlds other great
democracies. That is part of the rationale for Japans becoming a permanent member of a reformed United Nations Security Council. And since these challenges
cannot be tackled through bilateral action alone, we
must use the strong U.S.-Japanese partnership as a platform to do

more to strengthen multilateral institutions regional arrangements that must be inclusive, transparent, and focused on
results. Just a few months ago, I attended the historic first meeting of the ASEAN Plus Eight Defense Ministers Meeting in Hanoi, and am
encouraged by Japans decision to co-chair the Military Medicine Working Group. And as a proud Pacific nation, the United States will take over
the chairmanship of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum this year, following Japans successful tenure. Working through regional and
international forums puts our alliance in the best position to confront some of Asias toughest security challenges. As we have been reminded
once again in recent weeks, none has proved to be more vexing and enduring than North Korea. Despite the hopes and best efforts of the
South Korean government, the U.S. and our allies, and the international community, the character and priorities of the North Korean regime
sadly have not changed. North Koreas ability to launch another conventional ground invasion is much degraded from even a decade or so ago,
but in other respects it has grown more lethal and destabilizing. Today, it is North
Koreas pursuit of nuclear weapons and

proliferation of nuclear know-how and ballistic missile equipment that have focused our attention developments that
threaten not just the peninsula, but the Pacific Rim and international stability as well. In response to a series of provocations the most recent being
the sinking of the Cheonan and North Koreas lethal shelling of a South Korean island Japan has stood shoulder to shoulder with the Republic of Korea and the United States. Our three
countries continue to deepen our ties through the Defense Trilateral Talks the kind of multilateral engagement among Americas long-standing allies that the U.S. would like to see
strengthened and expanded over time. When and if North Koreas behavior gives us any reasons to believe that negotiations can be conducted productively and in good faith, we will work
with Japan, South Korea, Russia, and China to resume engagement with North Korea through the six party talks. The first step in the process should be a North-South engagement. But, to be
clear, the North must also take concrete steps to honor its international obligations and comply with U.N. Security Council Resolutions. Any progress towards diffusing the crisis on the Korean
Peninsula must include the active support of the Peoples Republic of China where, as you probably know, I just finished an official visit. China has been another important player whose
economic growth has fueled the prosperity of this part of the world, but questions about its intentions and opaque military modernization program have been a source of concern to its
neighbors. Questions about Chinas growing role in the region manifest themselves in territorial disputes most recently in the incident in September near the Senkaku Islands, an incident
that served as a reminder of the important of Americas and Japans treaty obligations to one another. The U.S. position on maritime security remains clear: we have a national interest in
freedom of navigation; in unimpeded economic development and commerce; and in respect for international law. We also believe that customary international law, as reflected in the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea, provides clear guidance on the appropriate use of the maritime domain, and rights of access to it. Nonetheless, I disagree with those who portray China as
an inevitable strategic adversary of the United States. We welcome a China that plays a constructive role on the world stage. In fact, the goal of my visit was to improve our military-to-military
relationship and outline areas of common interest. It is precisely because we have questions about Chinas military just as they might have similar questions about the United States that I
believe a healthy dialogue is needed. Last fall, President Obama and President Hu Jin Tao made a commitment to advance sustained and reliable defense ties, not a relationship repeatedly
interrupted by and subject to the vagaries of political weather. On a personal note, one of the things I learned from my experience dealing with the Soviet Union during my earlier time in
government was the importance of maintaining a strategic dialogue and open lines of communication. Even if specific agreements did not result on nuclear weapons or anything else this
dialogue helped us understand each other better and lessen the odds of misunderstanding and miscalculation. The Cold War is mercifully long over and the circumstances with China today are
vastly different but the importance of maintaining dialogue is as important today. For the last few minutes Ive discussed some of the most pressing security challenges along with the most
fruitful areas of regional cooperation facing the U.S. and Japan in Asia. This environment in terms of threats and opportunities is markedly different than the conditions that led to the
forging of the U.S-Japan defense partnership in the context of a rivalry between two global superpowers. But on account of the scope, complexity and lethality of these challenges, I would
argue that our alliance is more necessary, more relevant, and more important than ever. And maintaining the vitality and credibility of the alliance requires modernizing our force posture and
other defense arrangements to better reflect the threats and military requirements of this century. For example, North Koreas ballistic missiles along with the proliferation of these weapons
to other countries require a more effective alliance missile defense capability. The U.S.-Japan partnership in missile defense is already one of the most advanced of its kind in the world. It
was American and Japanese AEGIS ships that together monitored the North Korean missile launches of 2006 and 2008. This partnership which relies on mutual support, cutting edge
technology, and information sharing in many ways reflect our alliance at its best. The U.S. and Japan have nearly completed the joint development of a new advanced interceptor, a system
that represents a qualitative improvement in our ability to thwart any North Korean missile attack. The co-location of our air- and missile-defense commands at Yokota and the associated
opportunities for information sharing, joint training, and coordination in this area provide enormous value to both countries. As I alluded to earlier, advances by the Chinese military in cyber
and anti-satellite warfare pose a potential challenge to the ability of our forces to operate and communicate in this part of the Pacific. Cyber attacks can also come from any direction and from
Fortunately, the
U.S. and Japan maintain a qualitative edge in satellite and computer technology an advantage we
are putting to good use in developing ways to counter threats to the cyber and space domains. Just
last month, the Government of Japan took another step forward in the evolution of the alliance by
releasing its National Defense Program Guidelines a document that lays out a vision for Japans
defense posture. These guidelines envision: A more mobile and deployable force structure; Enhanced
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities; and A shift in focus to Japans southwest
islands. These new guidelines provide an opportunity for even deeper cooperation between our two
countries and the emphasis on your southwestern islands underscores the importance of our
alliances force posture. And this is a key point. Because even as the alliance continues to evolve in
strategy, posture, and military capabilities to deal with this centurys security challenges, a critical
component will remain the forward presence of U.S. military forces in Japan. Without such a presence:
North Koreas military provocations could be even more outrageous -- or worse; China might behave
more assertively towards its neighbors; It would take longer to evacuate civilians affected by conflict or natural disasters in the
a variety of sources state, non-state, or a combination thereof in ways that could inflict enormous damage to advanced, networked militaries and societies.
region; It would be more difficult and costly to conduct robust joint exercises such as the recent Keen Sword exercise that hone the U.S. and
Japanese militaries ability to operate and, if necessary, fight together; and Without the forward presence of U.S. forces in Japan, there
would be less information sharing and coordination, and we would know less about regional threats and
the military capabilities of our potential adversaries.
Cyberterror attacks lead to extinction.
Andres and Breetz 11 Richard Andres, Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and a Senior Fellow
and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy Chair in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the
National Defense University, and Hanna Breetz, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at The Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Small Nuclear Reactorsfor Military Installations:Capabilities, Costs, andTechnological Implications,
www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf
More recently, awareness has been growing that the
grid is also vulnerable to purposive attacks. A report sponsored by the Department

coordinated cyberattack on the grid could result in a third of the country losing
power for a period of weeks or months.9 Cyberattacks on critical infrastructure are not well understood.
It is not clear, for instance, whether existing terrorist groups might be able to develop the capability to conduct this
type of attack. It is likely, however, that some nation-states either have or are working on developing
the ability to take down the U.S. grid. In the event of a war with one of these states, it is possible, if not
likely, that parts of the civilian grid would cease to function, taking with them military bases located in
of Homeland Security suggests that a
affected regions. Government and private organizations are currently working to secure the grid against attacks; however, it is not clear that they
will be successful. Most military bases currently have backup power that allows them to function for a period of hours or, at most, a few days on their own.
If
power were not restored after this amount of time, the results could be disastrous. First, military assets taken
offline by the crisis would not be available to help with disaster relief. Second, during an extended
blackout, global military operations could be seriously compromised; this disruption would be
particularly serious if the blackout was induced during major combat operations. During the Cold War, this type of
event was far less likely because the United States and Soviet Union shared the common understanding that blinding an opponent with a grid
blackout could escalate to nuclear war . Americas current opponents, however, may not share this fear or be deterred by this possibility.
Scenario 2 is US-China Relations US LNG exports are necessary for U.S china relations
Livingston and Tu 12 (David, Junior Fellow in the Energy and Climate Program Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, and Kevin Jianjun, Senior Associate in the Energy and Climate
Program Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Feeding Chinas Energy Appetite, Naturally,
Energy Tribune, 7-17, http://www.energytribune.com/articles.cfm/11206/Feeding-Chinas-EnergyAppetite-Naturally)
Ever since CNOOC, one of Chinas big three national oil companies, made an ill-fated bid to take over Unocal Corporation in 2005, Sino-U.S.
energy relations have been marred with mistrust . Foreign acquisitions by Chinas national oil companies
thereafter have largely avoided the United States. Many were thus caught off guard by recent reports that Sinopec has emerged as a
leading suitor for some of the $7 billion in natural gas assets that Chesapeake Energy must shed to avoid a breach of its debt covenants. Yet
upon closer inspection, the move is deft and bears the imprint of lessons well-learned. Chinese national oil companies know from
prior experience that in the United States they must wear kid gloves to avoid getting burned . With U.S. natural gas prices
projected to remain at $2-4/Mmbtu and far higher returns on investment elsewhere around the globe, why would Sinopec pour capital into
American shale gas production when so many U.S. companies are shutting down rigs? There are a number of macro- and micro-dynamics at
play here. Chinas demand for gas is expected to grow rapidly in the coming years. Natural gas currently accounts for
only 4 percent of the countrys energy mix, but the International Energy Agency projects this rising to 13 percent by 2035. The same
organization predicts that China will account for roughly a quarter of global gas demand growth over the same period .
There is also a high level of uncertainty over how reliant the country will be on foreign gas. Much of this will depend on Chinas ability to exploit
its vast domestic shale gas resources. If unconventional development is well-orchestrated, Chinese gas imports as a share of total demand
could be as low as 20 percent in 2035. Alternatively, slow progress in unconventional gas development could lead to a dependency rate north
of 50 percent, according to the IEA. In either scenario, a stake in Chesapeakes gas assets could potentially pay dividends for
China. Chesapeake was one of the first to commit wholeheartedly to the potential of shale gas in the United States. It has snatched up vast
swaths of shale acreage, and possesses the technology and know-how to efficiently extract unconventional gas from these basins. Sinopec
would love nothing more than to gain firsthand experience with hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling techniques that could eventually be
applied to Chinas massive shale resources. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, technically recoverable shale gas reserves
in China are at least 50 percent greater than the sizeable shale endowment in the United States. Sinopec drilled its first shale gas well in
Chongqing on June 9, but until it develops the capacity to unlock domestic resources en masse at low cost, acquisitions are the quickest way to
bolster its gas reserves. The company might be seeking to secure a dedicated stream of U.S. natural gas production for
shipping to China as liquefied natural gas in the future. This is a complicated proposition, especially considering
that the scale of U.S. LNG exports is highly uncertain. The prospect of rising domestic gas prices as a consequence of satiating
Chinese demand would become a thorny political issue, whether merited or not. At the corporate level, Sinopecs own characteristics reveal an
internal logic to the prospective Chesapeake deal. The move is driven by its international market-oriented new boss, Fu Chengyu. Fu served at
the helm of CNOOC until 2010 and his failure to secure the Unocal deal in 2005 will undoubtedly inform his current attempt. Evidence of this
can already be seen in Sinopecs preference for partial assets over outright ownership. Of course, Sinopec precluding itself from an operational
role also potentially distances it from the technologies and methodologies that it covets. Nevertheless, Fu has remains tempted by U.S.
shale gas assets with attractive valuations. Sinopec has been slower getting into America than its rival CNOOC, which recently entered
into two billion-dollar joint ventures with Chesapeake in the Niobrara and Eagle Ford shale. Moreover, Sinopec suffers from an unbalanced
portfolio, with too many loss-making refineries and too few premiere upstream assets. Oil and gas projects in Iran that have been
abandoned by Western companies would normally be an attractive target, but Beijing has increasingly pressured
national oil companies to curtail involvement in the pariah state. Unsurprisingly, Sinopec has recently returned its gaze to the
United States. Although U.S. natural gas wont offer lucrative returns until prices rise, Chesapeakes acreage is likely to sell at a discount and
would allow Sinopec to hedge its holdings in more geopolitically tenuous markets. After his $2.5 billion deal with Devon Energy in January for
stakes in five different liquids-rich shale plays, a tie-up with Chesapeake would solidify Fus reputation as a shrewd CEO. For China, the deal
offers another geopolitical hedgethe opportunity to turn dollar-denominated treasury bills into real energy
assets. The Chinese government would likely play a key role in financing any large deals pursued by its national oil
companies. This is an aspect of the deal worth watching. CNOOCs critics back in 2005 objected to the assortment of low-interest and
interest-free loans backed by Chinese government coffers. Were Sinopec to rely on a similar arrangement of state support, it might be met with
resistance in the United States. But the U.S. congress is in a much weaker position than it was in 2005. Partial asset ownership is not the
wholesale surrender of a strategic corporation, and the American natural gas industry would welcome with open arms the
capital inflow. This points to the most constructive way forward for both Washington and Beijing. China is still trying to
grow a domestic shale gas industry without opening the market to international players. During the second round of shale gas bids in China, a
small window was opened for other domestic companies, but none of them have more sophisticated technology than CNPC, Sinopec, or
CNOOC. Sooner or later, China will realize that there are no shortcuts if shale gas is to be developed safely, efficiently, and responsibly. It
should follow its own offshore oil exploration model, offering up its domestic market in return for cutting-edge
technology. The Chesapeake deal may pay dividends to both the United States and China, but the synergy will go even further if
Beijing eventually returns the favor at home.
Specifically that removes Chinese fears of US encirclement solves US-China conflict

and spills over to clean tech cooperation
Stone 11 (Matt, Energy Consultant, US Foreign Policy Analyst, and Junior Associate McKinsey &
Company, Natural Gas, The Diplomat, 2-15, http://thediplomat.com/whats-next-china/natural-gas/)
In the space of just a couple of years, natural
gas has become the 'next big thing' in energy circles. The recent expansion of unconventional
gas production in North America has transformed the United States into the worlds top producer of the fuel .
Cleaner-burning than coal, gas is expected to benefit in a carbon-constrained world as it displaces coal in the electricity-generation sector. Moreover a
burgeoning interconnected global gas market , spurred by the expansion of the sea-borne liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade, is
helping to increase market flexibility so that disruptions like those caused by Russia-Ukrainian disputes have less
pernicious effects on downstream countries. Hoping to take advantage of these developments, China has crafted a strategy for natural gas that
aims to increase domestic production and secure access to gas resources in neighbouring countries. For Beijing, gas offers an opportunity to power its growing
economy in a less polluting way than burning coal (although coal is expected to remain vital to Chinas rapid economic ascent). Natural gas may also have a role to
play in the transportation sector, where Beijing is experimenting in dramatic fashion with compressed natural gas (CNG) in automobiles. Historically, oils prominent
and essential role in the transportation sector has driven its centrality in international affairs. A
transportation sector that could rely jointly on
oil and natural gas would allow China to be marginally more indifferent to Middle Eastern geopoliticsin stark contrast
with the US experience of the past half-century. The BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2010 estimates that China produced approximately 85 billion cubic
metres (bcm) of natural gas in 2009, while consuming 89 bcm, an import gap thats expected to expand rapidly in the coming years as gas demand outpaces
domestic supply. Indeed, the International Energy Agency (IEA) sees Chinas gas demand increasing by 6 percent annually through 2035. The reality is, though, that
the countrys own conventional natural gas resources are nowhere near enough to meet this growing demand,
forcing Beijing to ramp up its efforts to access gas supplies abroadparticularly in Central Asia, Russia and Burma.
Its here that the frequent portrayal of Beijing as a cash-flush power willing to throw money around to lock up resources is misplaced. China has in fact been
carefully expanding its influence in Central Asia and Russia in particular, biding its time until the right deal has come along. Negotiations
with Russia
over gas supplies, for example, have been ongoing for years (much to Moscows consternation). The proposal on the table now would mean two
pipelines entering Chinaone in Xinjiang from the Russian region of Altai and another in Manchuria from the Russian Far East. The former line would have a
capacity of 30 bcm per year, the latter 38 bcm per year. But lack of agreement on the price Russian state gas company Gazprom will charge has stalled things. Of
course, theres more to this than pricing. Although
Moscow enjoys a privileged position in the export of Russian oil and gas for both economic
manipulation of energy flows to Europe has tarnished the countrys reputation as a reliable
supplier of hydrocarbons. Meanwhile, investments in the gas fields that would supply China have been slow to
materialize. Both points will likely have made Beijing think carefully about the implications of an inconsistent supply of Russian
gas. This reticence over gas is in contrast with a deal struck over crude oil, with China having issued a $25 billion loan to Russia in February 2009 to secure a 20year supply of crude oil. At the same time, Beijing has postponed a decision on a loan for natural gasa conspicuous vote of no
confidence in Russias short-term attractiveness as a gas supplier. If the story of the Russia-China gas trade relationship is one of chesslike negotiations and Beijings reticence, Chinas experience in Central Asia has been more straightforward . China signed an agreement
and political reasons, its
to build a gas pipeline out of Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in 2006. Backstopped with a $4 billion loan to Ashgabat and upstream contracts for
Chinas state-owned CNPC in Turkmenistan, the pipeline came online in December 2009impressively swift. However, now that its operational, Beijing has
leveraged its position to extract concessions from the countries along the pipeline. Turkmenistan in particular is under pressure. Russia has cut its purchases of
Turkmen gas by three-quarters since 2008, prompting Ashgabat to push China to buy more gas. But Beijing, keenly
aware of its negotiating

advantage, has held out, purchasing only 4 bcm this year. In the case of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, China has spurred competition for access to the
pipeline, with the two engaging in development of gas fields and infrastructure in order to access the pipeline before the other. That said, China may decide its in
its own interests to selectively manage access to the pipeline in order to win concessions on price and upstream contracts in each country, which would provide it
potent political leverage with countries that would prefer to develop robust alternatives to exporting hydrocarbons to Russia. But can Beijing afford to play the long
game with neighbouring gas suppliers given its fast-growing demand? A
production and increasing
look at Chinas alternative sources of supply, particularly domestic
volumes of LNG in the countrys gas supply mix, offer a glimpse of a possible answer .
Beijing has prioritized the development of domestic gas supply, partnering with a number of Western oil firms to develop the countrys unconventional gas
resources, which are thought to be large. Washington
has promoted this cooperation through the US-China Shale Gas Resource
Initiative, a mechanism announced in November 2009 to share expertise and technology for unconventional gas production. In addition, LNG spot prices
are currently depressed, prompting Chinese energy firms to purchase spot cargoes through the countrys three
LNG import terminals. Sixteen more LNG import terminals are under consideration . Such trends point to a relative decline in
the importance of Russian and Central Asian gas to Chinas energy security futurea narrative that Beijings diplomats are sure to promote in Moscow, Ashgabat,
Tashkent and Astana. Chinese national oil companies operate with the explicit backing of the Chinese stateincluding the state budget.In a region where
governments treat their oil and gas resources as strategic commodities to be traded for political perquisites, Chinese companies therefore possess an in-built
advantage. But more importantly, Chinas unity of effortpolitical and commercialallows Beijing to act strategically, with long time horizons, in order to secure
the best deal. While China couldnt have predicted the revolution in unconventional gas production or the global recession, its patience has strengthened its
bargaining position vis--vis Russia and the Central Asian states. Beijings engagement also has the tacit consent of Washington. Western policy in the post-Soviet
period has been designed to reinforce Central Asian sovereignty by developing export corridors for oil and gas that avoid Russian (and Iranian) territory. While the
United States and Europe have had some success on the western edge of the Caspian Sea by constructing the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-TbilisiErzurum gas pipeline, large-volume trans-Caspian projects for Kazakh and Turkmen oil and gas have been delayed for commercial and geopolitical reasons. In this
regard, China has developed a non-Russian, non-Iranian export corridor for Turkmen, Uzbek, and Kazakh gas where the West couldnt (theres also a Kazakhstan-
should provide greater stability in an important and strategic part of the

world. And China, meanwhile, appears to have not yet attempted to translate its newfound economic heft into political
influence to the Wests detriment: Beijing has so far avoided pushing for the curtailment of the Western military
presence in Central Asia despite ongoing worries about encirclement. Chinas energy trade relationships with Russia and Central Asia
China oil pipeline in operation). In a sense, this
should also make the Middle Kingdom feel more assured about its energy security future. Much
of Chinas naval build-up and assertive
behaviour , especially in the South China Sea, in recent years is motivated by concerns about the security of Chinas sea-borne
energy imports from the Middle East, both oil and LNG. In the post-World War II period, the US Navy has played the role of
guarantor of open trade on the high seas, but Beijing appears to believe this commitment won't continue in the
event of conflict with Washington over Taiwan or North Korea. The United States efforts to help China expand domestic
gas production and its lack of opposition to China-bound pipelines out of Central Asia and Russia should be interpreted by Beijing as
indicative of the US commitment to help China grow comfortable about its place in the American-led world
order. Natural gas is clearly an important component of Beijings energy strategy over the next century. Thus far, Chinas
approach to accessing foreign and domestic sources of supply has proven collaborative, rather than
confrontational, in nature. US assistance on Chinese unconventional gas production presages greater cooperation
on energy matters , including in clean-tech where Beijing and Washington can best address climate-altering carbon
emissions. In Russia and Central Asia, meanwhile, China has husbanded its resources and influence to achieve advantageous deals.
There are tensions between the US and China in the status quo - even a small conflict
would escalate to nuclear war.
Lieven 12 (Anatol, Professor in the War Studies Department Kings College (London), Senior Fellow
New America Foundation (Washington), Avoiding US-China War, New York Times, 6-12,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/13/opinion/avoiding-a-us-china-war.html)
Relations between the United States and China are on a course that may one day lead to war . This month, Defense
Secretary Leon Panetta announced that by 2020, 60 percent of the U.S. Navy will be deployed in the Pacific. Last November, in Australia,
President Obama announced the establishment of a U.S. military base in that country, and threw down an ideological gauntlet to China with his
statement that the United States will continue to speak candidly to Beijing about the importance of upholding international norms and
respecting the universal human rights of the Chinese people. The dangers inherent in present developments in American, Chinese and regional
policies are set out in The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power, an important forthcoming book by the Australian international
affairs expert Hugh White. As he writes, Washington and Beijing are already sliding toward rivalry by default. To escape this, White makes a
strong argument for a concert of powers in Asia, as the best and perhaps only way that this looming confrontation can be avoided. The
economic basis of such a U.S.-China agreement is indeed already in place. The danger of conflict does not stem from a Chinese desire for global
leadership. Outside East Asia, Beijing is sticking to a very cautious policy, centered on commercial advantage without military components, in
part because Chinese leaders realize that it would take decades and colossal naval expenditure to allow them to mount a global challenge to
the United States, and that even then they would almost certainly fail. In East Asia, things are very different. For most of its history, China has
dominated the region. When it becomes the largest economy on earth, it will certainly seek to do so. While China cannot build up naval
forces to challenge the United States in distant oceans, it would be very surprising if in future it will not be able to
generate missile and air forces sufficient to deny the U.S. Navy access to the seas around China . Moreover, China is
engaged in territorial disputes with other states in the region over island groups disputes in which Chinese popular
nationalist sentiments have become heavily engaged. With communism dead, the Chinese administration has relied very heavily
and successfully on nationalism as an ideological support for its rule. The problem is that if clashes erupt over these
islands, Beijing may find itself in a position where it cannot compromise without severe damage to its domestic
legitimacy very much the position of the European great powers in 1914. In these disputes, Chinese nationalism collides with
other nationalisms particularly that of Vietnam, which embodies strong historical resentments. The hostility to China of Vietnam and
most of the other regional states is at once Americas greatest asset and greatest danger. It means that most of Chinas neighbors
want the United States to remain militarily present in the region . As White argues, even if the United States were to withdraw,
it is highly unlikely that these countries would submit meekly to Chinese hegemony. But if the United States were to commit itself to a military
alliance with these countries against China, Washington would risk embroiling America in their territorial disputes. In the event of a military
clash between Vietnam and China, Washington would be faced with the choice of either holding aloof and seeing its credibility as an ally
destroyed, or fighting China. Neither the United States nor China would win the resulting war outright, but they would
certainly inflict catastrophic damage on each other and on the world economy. If the conflict escalated into a
nuclear exchange , modern civilization would be wrecked . Even a prolonged period of military and
strategic rivalry with an economically mighty China will gravely weaken Americas global position . Indeed, U.S.
overstretch is already apparent for example in Washingtons neglect of the crumbling states of Central America.
Nuclear war turns and outweighs any environmental impactthe most recent studies
prove.
Toon et. al 8 Brian Toon is chair of the department of atmospheric and oceanic sciences and a
member of the laboratory for atmospheric and space physics at the University of Colorado at Boulder.
Alan Robock is a professor of atmospheric science at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, New Jersey.
Rich Turco is a professor of atmospheric science at the University of California, Los Angeles. [December,
2008, Environmental consequences of nuclear war, Physics Today,
http://ptonline.aip.org/journals/doc/PHTOAD-ft/vol_61/iss_12/37_1.shtml]
Environmental effects of soot
Figure 3a indicates changes in global average precipitation and temperature as a function of soot emission, as calculated with the help of a
modern version of a major US climate model.6,8 A relatively modest 5 Tg of soot, which could be generated
in an exchange
between India and Pakistan, would be sufficient to produce the lowest temperatures Earth has
experienced in the past 1000 yearslower than during the post-medieval Little Ice Age or in 1816, the so-called year without a
summer. With 75 Tg of soot, less than half of what we project in a hypothetical SORT war, temperatures
would correspond to the last full Ice Age, and precipitation would decline by more than 25% globally.
Calculations in the 1980s had already predicted the cooling from a 150-Tg soot injection to be quite large.3 Our new results, however,
show that soot would rise to much higher altitudes than previously believedindeed, to well above the
tops of the models used in the 1980s. As a result, the time required for the soot mass to be reduced by a
factor of e is about five years in our simulations, as opposed to about one year as assumed in the
1980s. That increased lifetime causes a more dramatic and longer-lasting climate response.
The temperature changes represented in figure 3a would have a profound effect on mid- and high-latitude agriculture. Precipitation changes,
on the other hand, would have their greatest impact in the tropics.6 Even a 5-Tg soot injection would lead to a 40% precipitation decrease in
the Asian monsoon region. South America and Africa would see a large diminution of rainfall from convection in the rising branch of the Hadley
circulation, the major global meridional wind system connecting the tropics and subtropics. Changes in the Hadley circulations dynamics can, in
general, affect climate on a global scale.
Complementary to temperature change is radiative forcing, the change in energy flux. Figure 3b shows how
nuclear soot changes the radiative forcing at Earths surface and compares its effect to those of two wellknown phenomena: warming associated with greenhouse gases and the 1991 Mount Pinatubo volcanic eruption,
the largest in the 20th century. Since the Industrial Revolution, greenhouse gases have increased the energy flux by 2.5 W/m2. The transient
forcing from the Pinatubo eruption peaked at about 4 W/m2 (the minus sign means the flux decreased). One implication of the figure is that
even a regional war between India and Pakistan can force the climate to a far greater degree than the
greenhouse gases that many fear will alter the climate in the foreseeable future. Of course, the durations of the
forcings are different: The radiative forcing by nuclear-weapons-generated soot might persist for a decade, but that from greenhouse gases is
expected to last for a century or more, allowing time for the climate system to respond to the forcing. Accordingly, while the Ice Agelike
temperatures in figure 3a could lead to an expansion of sea ice and terrestrial snowpack, they probably would not be persistent enough to
cause the buildup of global ice sheets.
Agriculture responds to length of growing season, temperature during the growing season, light levels, precipitation, and
other factors. The 1980s saw systematic studies of the agricultural changes expected from a nuclear war, but no such studies have been
conducted using modern climate models. Figure 4 presents our calculations of the decrease in length of the growing seasonthe time between
freezing temperaturesfor the second summer after the release of soot in a nuclear attack.6,8 Even
a 5-Tg soot injection reduces

the growing season length toward the shortest average range observed in the midwestern US corngrowing states. Earlier studies concluded that for a full-scale nuclear conflict, What can be said with
assurance is that the Earths human population has a much greater vulnerability to the indirect
effects of nuclear war [including damage to the worlds agricultural, transportation, energy, medical,
political, and social infrastructure], especially mediated through impacts on food productivity and
food availability, than to the direct effects of nuclear war itself. As a result, The indirect effects could
result in the loss of one to several billions of humans.4
Because the soot associated with a nuclear exchange is injected into the upper atmosphere, the stratosphere is heated and stratospheric
circulation is perturbed. For the 5-Tg injection associated with a regional conflict, stratospheric temperatures would remain elevated by 30 C
after four years.68 The resulting temperature and circulation anomalies would reduce ozone columns by 20% globally, by 2545% at middle
latitudes, and by 5070% at northern high latitudes for perhaps as much as five years, with substantial losses persisting for an additional five
years.7 The calculations of the 1980s generally did not consider such effects or the mechanisms that cause them. Rather, they focused on the
direct injection of nitrogen oxides by the fireballs of large-yield weapons that are no longer deployed. Global-scale models have only recently
become capable of performing the sophisticated atmospheric chemical calculations needed to delineate detailed ozone-depletion mechanisms.
Indeed, simulations of ozone loss following a SORT conflict have not yet been conducted.
Policy implications
Scientific debate and analysis of the issues discussed in this article are essential not only to ascertain the science behind the results but also to
create political action. Gorbachev, who together with Reagan had the courage to initiate the builddown of nuclear weapons in 1986, said in an
interview at the 2000 State of the World Forum, Models made by Russian and American scientists showed that a nuclear war would result in a
nuclear winter that would be extremely destructive to all life on Earth; the knowledge of that was a great stimulus to us, to people of honor and
morality, to act in that situation. Former vice president Al Gore noted in his 2007 Nobel Prize acceptance speech, More than two decades
ago, scientists calculated that nuclear war could throw so much debris and soot into the air that it would block life-giving sunlight from our
atmosphere, causing a nuclear winter. Their eloquent warnings here in Oslo helped galvanize the worlds resolve to halt the nuclear arms
race.
Many researchers have evaluated the consequences of single nuclear explosions, and a few groups have considered the results of a small
number of explosions. But
our work represents the only unclassified study of the consequences of a regional
nuclear conflict and the only one to consider the consequences of a nuclear exchange involving the
SORT arsenal. Neither the US Department of Homeland Security nor any other governmental agency in the world currently has an
unclassified program to evaluate the impact of nuclear conflict. Neither the US National Academy of Sciences, nor any other scientific
body in the world, has conducted a study of the issue in the past 20 years.
That said, the science community has long recognized the importance of nuclear winter. It was investigated by numerous organizations during
the 1980s, all of which found the basic science to be sound. Our
most recent calculations also support the nuclearwinter concept and show that the effects would be more long lasting and therefore worse than
thought in the 1980s.
Nevertheless, a
misperception that the nuclear-winter idea has been discredited has permeated the
nuclear policy community. That error has resulted in many misleading policy conclusions. For instance, one
research group recently concluded that the US could successfully destroy Russia in a surprise first-strike nuclear attack.10 However, because of
nuclear winter, such an action might be suicidal. To recall some specifics, an attack by the US on Russia and China with 2200 weapons could
produce 86.4 Tg of soot, enough to create Ice Age conditions, affect agriculture worldwide, and possibly lead to mass starvation.
Lynn Eden of the Center for International Security and Cooperation explores the military view of nuclear damage in her book Whole World on
Fire.11 Blast is a sure result of a nuclear explosion. And military planners know how to consider blast effects when they evaluate whether a
nuclear force is capable of destroying a target. Fires
are collateral damage that may not be planned or accounted

for. Unfortunately, that collateral damage may be capable of killing most of Earths population.
Climate and chemistry models have greatly advanced since the 1980s, and the ability to compute the
environmental changes after a nuclear conflict has been much improved. Our climate and atmospheric
chemistry work is based on standard global models from NASA Goddards Institute for Space Studies
and from the US National Center for Atmospheric Research. Many scientists have used those models
to investigate climate change and volcanic eruptions, both of which are relevant to considerations of
the environmental effects of nuclear war. In the past two decades, researchers have extensively studied other bodies whose
atmospheres exhibit behaviors corresponding to nuclear winter; included in such studies are the thermal structure of Titans ambient
atmospheres and the thermal structure of Marss atmosphere during global dust storms. Like volcanoes, large
forest fires
regularly produce phenomena similar to those associated with the injection of soot into the upper
atmosphere following a nuclear attack. Although plenty remains to be done, over the past 20 years scientists have gained a
much greater understanding of natural analogues to nuclear-weapons explosions.
Substantial uncertainties attend the analysis presented in this article; references 5 and 8 discuss many of them in detail. Some uncertainties
may be reduced relatively easily. To give a few examples: Surveys of fuel loading would reduce the uncertainty in fuel consumption in urban
firestorms. Numerical modeling of large urban fires would reduce the uncertainty in smoke plume heights. Investigations of smoke removal in
pyrocumulus clouds associated with fires would reduce the uncertainty in how much soot is actually injected into the upper atmosphere.
Particularly valuable would be analyses of agricultural impacts associated with the climate changes following regional conflicts.
For any nuclear conflict, nuclear winter would seriously affect noncombatant countries.12 In
a hypothetical SORT war, for example,

we estimate that most of the worlds population, including that of the Southern Hemisphere, would
be threatened by the indirect effects on global climate. Even a regional war between India and
Pakistan, for instance, has the potential to dramatically damage Europe, the US, and other regions
through global ozone loss and climate change. The current nuclear buildups in an increasing number
of countries point to conflicts in the next few decades that would be more extreme than a war today
between India and Pakistan. The growing number of countries with weapons also makes nuclear
conflict more likely.
The environmental threat posed by nuclear weapons demands serious attention. It should be carefully
analyzed by governments worldwideadvised by a broad section of the scientific communityand widely debated by the public.
Independently China-US clean tech cooperation solves warming
Lieberthal and Sandalow 9
(Kenneth, Visiting Fellow Brookings Institution, Professor

University of Michigan, and David, Senior Fellow The Brookings Institution, January,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/1/climate%20change%20lieberthal%2
0sandalow/01_climate_change_lieberthal_sandalow)
Climate change is an epic threat. Concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere are higher than at
any time in human history and rising sharply. Predicted consequences include sea-level rise, more severe storms,
more intense droughts and floods, forest loss and the spread of tropical disease. Each of these phenomena is
already occurring. Every year of delay in reducing greenhouse gas emissions puts the planet at greater risk. The
United States and China play central roles in global warming. During the past century, the United States emitted
more greenhouse gases than any other countrya fact often noted, since carbon dioxide, the leading greenhouse gas,
remains in the atmosphere for roughly 100 years. However, in 2007, China may have surpassed the United States as the
worlds top annual emitter of carbon dioxide. 1 Together, the two countries are responsible for over 40% of the
greenhouse gases released into the atmosphere each year. For the world to meet the challenge of global
warming, the United States and China must each make the transition to a low-carbon economy. Farreaching changes will be needed. To date, however, each nation has used the other as one reason not do to more.
Enormous benefits would be possible if this dynamic were replaced with mutual understanding and joint efforts
on a large scale. Yet cooperation will not be easy. The U.S. and China are separated by different histories, different
cultures, and different perspectives. Opportunities for collaboration in fighting climate change and promoting clean energy are
plentiful, but moving forward at the scale needed will require high-level political support in two very different societies and systems that have
The time
for large-scale U.S.-China cooperation on climate change and clean energy is now. Unless both countries
change course soon, ongoing investments in 20th century technologies will commit the world as a whole
to dangerous levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere in the decades ahead. Recent political and
technological developments make the benefits of such cooperation especially compelling. Furthermore, thirty
years after normalization and with the start of a new administration in the United States, the U.S. China relationship is ready to
move to a new stage. This new stage will initiate full bilateral consultation and cooperation where possible on
the most critical global issues of the era. Climate change and clean energy are at the top of the list. This new stage does
considerable suspicion of the other. This report identifies major barriers to cooperation and recommends ways to overcome them.
not envision a U.S.-China condominium or alliance. Any U.S.-China agreements must be supplements tonot substitutes forother
relationships and obligations. If handled properly, such agreements will increase bilateral and global capacities to manage critical world
challenges. The
major failing in U.S.-China relations to date is that, despite much progress over the past 30 years, mutual
distrust over each others long-term intentions remains deepand perhaps has even grown in recent years. By
making active cooperation on critical global issues a centerpiece of the relationship, both countries
governments can increase trust over long-term intentions and thereby reduce the chances of slipping
into mutual antagonism over the coming 10-20 years. In particular, U.S.-China cooperation can make each side less
inclined to point to the other as a reason to do less at home to fight global warming. It can also
contribute to the success of multilateral climate change negotiations. Having the U.S. and China
successfully manage issues that have divided industrialized and developing countries in the global climate change negotiations can
help shape acceptable multilateral climate change agreements for the post-Kyoto period. Finally, U.S.-China
cooperation on climate change and clean energy can also help each country enhance its energy security
and pursue a sustainable economic path that will create jobs and promote economic recovery.
Warming leads to extinction.
Mazo 10 (Jeffrey Mazo
PhD in Paleoclimatology from UCLA, Managing Editor, Survival and Research

Fellow for Environmental Security and Science Policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies
in London, 3-2010, Climate Conflict: How global warming threatens security and what to do about it,
pg. 122)
The best estimates for global warming to the end of the century range from 2.5-4.~C above pre-industrial levels,
depending on the scenario. Even in the best-case scenario, the low end of the likely range is 1.goC, and in the worst 'business
as usual' projections, which actual emissions have been matching, the range of likely warming runs from 3.1--7.1C. Even keeping
emissions at constant 2000 levels (which have already been exceeded), global temperature would still be expected to reach 1.2C
(O'9""1.5C)above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century."
Without early and severe reductions in emissions , the
effects of climate change in the second half of the twenty-first century are likely to be catastrophic for the stability
and security of countries in the developing world - not to mention the associated human tragedy. Climate change could even
undermine the strength and stability of emerging and advanced economies, beyond the knock-on effects on
security of widespread state failure and collapse in developing countries.' And although they have been condemned as
melodramatic and alarmist, many informed observers believe that unmitigated climate change beyond the end of the
century could pose an existential threat to civilisation ." What is certain is that there is no precedent in human experience
for such rapid change or such climatic conditions, and even in the best case adaptation to these extremes would mean profound social, cultural
and political changes.
And, technological development is key to sustainable transition.

Rasmus KARLSSON Poli Sci @ Lund 9 A global Fordian compromise?And what it would mean for the transition to sustainability
Envtl Science and Policy 12 p. 190-191
Though these caricatures may still hold true to a certain extent, I would argue that the last years have challenged this impasse. On one hand,
the general public has grown increasingly aware of how serious our current predicament has become. On the other hand, a string of
promising academic work, both in the sciences (Hoffert et al., 2002) and in green political theory (Nordhaus and Shellenberger,
2007), has finally taken up what otherwise has been a dormant position ever since the 1970s. I am referring to
those who accept the gravity of the present environmental crisis yet believe that the solution can
never be found in the traditional green mantra of reduction , conservation and self-denial . Instead
these authors have attempted to reconcile the politics of scarcity with technological optimism , to tap
into the spirit that once made grand projects like the Apollo program possible and, on this basis, move towards a politics of radical
engagement. Nowhere does the need for such new politics appear more urgent than on the global level. With parts of the world
(mostly in Asia) rapidly industrializing while others remaining trapped in the direst poverty, the planetary perspective
goes to the heart of the sustainable transition. Not only does it show the terrible human cost of the present status-quo but
also the irreversibility in the move towards modernization. Billions are now impatiently aspiring for the material living
standard of the West, and given the limited ecological space of the planet (Andreasson, 2005; Rist, 1997, pp. 4445), it is hard to
see how these needs can be met without radical technological innovation. However, there are reasons to doubt
the feasibility of any advanced technological paths to sustainability. Only in a climate of high and sustained economic
growth would it be possible for states to set aside the vast resources necessary to bring success to
long-term projects on nuclear fusion, nanotechnology and other converging technologies (Malsch, 2008). Such benign
economic conditions are, just as the prospects of sustainable development more generally (Blinc et al., 2007), unlikely to come
about in times of international tension, unplanned mass-migration and growing resource scarcity. This
should warrant a new kind of sobering realism, an acceptance that the future of modernity is now a planetary enterprise and that we are all
into this as one common human civilization.
LNG exports are good for the environment and key to transitioning to renewables.
Odano 10 (Dr. Sumimaru Odano is Professor and Director, Center for Risk Research, Shiga University, Japan. The
authors gratefully acknowledge the data and information that were provided by Alidi Mahmud (Head of Energy
Division at the Prime Ministers Office), Sofian Kipli (External Affairs Adviser, Brunei LNG Company), and Jill Heys
(BP Distribution Services, United Kingdom "LNG EXPORTS FROM BRUNEI TO JAPAN" http://www.econ.shigau.ac.jp/10/2/3/res.3/A20SaifulOdano201003.pdf) SM
LNG has also environmental advantages compared with oil or coal. LNG is typically made up mostly of methane (over
90 percent). Methane is composed of one carbon and four hydrogen atoms, CH4 [Foss 2007, p. 7]. Because LNG contains the least
amount of carbon, when burned it produces less carbon dioxide
(CO2) than oil or coal, which are considered the
main contributors to the greenhouse effect. LNG also produces fewer nitrogen oxides (NOx) and sulfur oxides (SOx), both of which cause air
pollution.
Because of its
relatively
lower impact on the environment, there is growing worldwide demand
for LNG as an environmentally friendly source of energy.
Natural gas seepage damages the environment, drilling reduces it

Allen, Bruce 11/30/2009 (Bruce Allen is co-founder of SOS California, an environmental and energy nonprofit based in Santa Barbara, California. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/11/howoffshore-oil-and-gas-production-benefits-the-economy-and-the-environment)
Abstract: Conventional wisdom holds that offshore oil and gas production harms the surrounding
environment. This blanket "wisdom" ignores the fact that the largest source of marine hydrocarbon
pollution is offshore natural oil seepage. It also ignores the fact that offshore oil production has
lowered the amount of oil released into the ocean by reducing natural oil seepage, especially in areas
with active offshore oil seeps, such as California's Santa Barbara coast. This Heritage Foundation
analysis cites studies, developments, and biological facts that demonstrate often-overlooked benefits of
offshore oil and gas production. The oceans surrounding the United States hold tremendous oil and
natural gas potential, but much of that potential is not being realized. Nearly 85 percent of these
waters -- the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the eastern Gulf of Mexico -- are off-limits to exploration and
drilling. Government studies estimate that these restricted areas hold at least 19 billion barrels of oil - nearly 30 years' worth of current imports from Saudi Arabia -- and oil estimates are known to increase
as exploration occurs. The greatest untapped potential lies in the Pacific. Producing this oil would
increase oil supplies, lower prices, and generate large tax revenues -- while creating thousands of jobs
in the domestic energy industry. Drilling restrictions in general are imposed due to environmental
concerns, despite the fact that offshore environmental damage has been greatly reduced by
technologies that minimize the risk of oil spills and other hazards to the environment.
In fact, offshore oil production has lowered the amount of oil released into the ocean by reducing
natural seepage of oil, especially in areas with active offshore oil seeps, such as California's Santa
Barbara coast. Natural hydrocarbon seeps have historically been used to locate the world's usable
sources of oil and tar. Papers published by British Petroleum in the early 1990s[1] show that over 75
percent of the world's oil basins contain surface oil seeps. Most seeps emit small volumes of oil and gas
that do not significantly deplete hydrocarbon reservoirs over the short term, but can add up to
significant depletion of oil and gas over the longer term. The knowledge that surface seepage has a
direct link to subsurface oil and gas accumulations is not new and has been the impetus for many of the
world's early major oil and gas discoveries by pioneers of oil production -- as far back as ancient China,
and more recently the 1860s in Pennsylvania and the 1890s in Azerbaijan. Natural seeps were the
impetus for early exploration of oil in Iran and Iraq in the early 1900s. Natural hydrocarbon seeps
continue to be an important indicator of economic oil and gas resources. The high cost of deep-water
offshore oil and gas exploration has made the identification of hydrocarbon seeps an important
consideration in oil-exploration risk-reduction methods.[2] Natural Seeps: The Largest Source of U.S.
Marine Hydrocarbon Pollution Natural hydrocarbon seeps generally result from pressurized
hydrocarbon reservoirs that force oil and gas up through fissures to the earth's surface either on land
or the seabed floor where the hydrocarbons escape in the form of oil, tar, and methane-rich gases. It
is a widely overlooked fact that natural hydrocarbon seeps generally have a larger impact on the
marine environment than do oil and gas exploration and production. According to the National
Academy of Sciences, 63 percent of hydrocarbon pollution in U.S. waters stems from natural seeps,
while only 1 percent is due to offshore drilling and extraction
.[3] Geologists believe that over the course of millions of years, more oil has seeped naturally into the
earth's environment than currently exists in all conventional oil reservoirs combined. The Gulf of
Mexico, for instance, is a major U.S. offshore oil and gas producing region where the environmental
impact of natural hydrocarbon seepage appears to far exceed the environmental impact of accidental
oil releases due to commercial extraction and transportation.[4] Onshore hydrocarbon seeps are also
pervasive in many areas of the world, and are a source of contamination for many streambeds and
rivers. The Santa Susanna Mountains in California are estimated to contain 22,000 active oil seeps that
are associated with significant streambed contamination.[5] One of the most studied offshore oil and
gas seep regions over the last 40 years is the Santa Barbara coast of California, which has the world's
second most prolific oil seepage areas, extending for about 80 miles along the coastline.[6] The offshore
Santa Barbara oil seepage zones result in about 70,000 barrels per year of oil and tar seepage into the
Pacific, much of which washes up on California beaches.[7] Every four years, the amount of offshore
Santa Barbara oil seepage exceeds the 240,000 barrels that spilled from the Exxon Valdez in 1989. By
comparison, according to the U.S. Minerals and Management Service, the total amount of oil spilled in
California coastal waters due to offshore oil production since 1970 has been less than 870 barrels.[8] Far
more birds and wildlife have been killed in the last 40 years by California's offshore oil seepage than
by all previous California offshore oil production spills combined, including the 1969 spill.[9] Seeps are
also one of t he world's largest methane gas emission sources,[ 10] and are a major source of air
pollution in Santa Barbara County.[11] These coastal California seeps release oil and tar that washes
ashore along nearly half the coastline of California, with the highest concentrations in Santa Barbara
County. In the winter, the Davidson current washes seep oil and tar ashore as far north as the beaches
of Santa Cruz and San Francisco.[12] The California Department of Fish Game often receives public calls
reporting a possible oil spill on California central coast beaches, which is invariably determined to be
natural seepage. The California Department of Fish Game requires that seep oil and tar collected on
California beaches be treated as hazardous waste, the same as for industrial oil spills. Offshore
Production: Significant Reductions in Oil Pollution on California Beaches One of the side affects of
offshore oil production has been the reduction of oil and gas seepage due to decreases in subsea oilreservoir pressure. Seep oil is chemically the same as commercially extracted oil, although the seep oil
and tar have often undergone partial oxidation by the time they move into the water or onshore. The
seepage reductions due to offshore oil and gas extraction have, in some cases, resulted in significant
reductions in natural oil and gas seep pollution over the last 40 years.[13] There are also anecdotal
observations and research indicating that oil production around the world is responsible for ongoing
reductions in hydrocarbon seepage pollution.[14] Ironically, the decreased oil and gas reservoir
pressure due to ongoing "legacy" offshore oil and gas production (which continued even after the
state-wide offshore moratorium was imposed) near the site of the famous 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill is
resulting in reductions in California's coastal seepage pollution. California beaches have become
significantly cleaner over the last 50 years due to offshore oil and gas production. Modern slant and
horizontal drilling is extending these benefits into seep zones located further into the ocean than the
areas immediately surrounding existing offshore production platforms. Central and southern California
beaches have been polluted by this natural seep oil for well over 100,000 years. A 22-year study of the
offshore oil platform "Holly" off the Californian coast concluded that,"Oil production here has resulted
in an unexpected benefit to the atmosphere and marine environment."[15]According to peer-reviewed
University of California research, if offshore production were expanded in the seep zone areas studied,
there would be further reductions in seepage pollution and the associated methane gas and ozoneforming reactive organic compounds (ROCs).[16] Long-time Santa Barbara residents have also observed
for the last 50 years that their beaches have seen significant reductions in seepage oil and tar beach
pollution. The simple fact is that California offshore oil and gas production has been the reason why
California's prolific natural oil and gas seepage pollution has been declining for decades. California
beaches are becoming cleaner thanks to existing legacy offshore oil and gas production. Geologists
believe these reductions in seepage pollution will last for thousands of years. Offshore hydrocarbon
seeps are also a naturally dynamic process. In addition to reduced seepage due to reservoir pressure
reductions from commercial extraction, seeps can also become active in new areas due to earthquakes
and other natural events. In 2007, an earthquake in New Zealand resulted in a new offshore seepage
area that led to exploration activity to determine the underlying reservoir's production potential. This
seep zone off the New Zealand coast had previously not been explored for the presence of economically
recoverable hydrocarbons.[17] In Santa Barbara, a 6.8 magnitude earthquake in 1925 resulted in a large
spontaneous release of undersea reservoir oil off the coast that boiled up from the seafloor and
inundated the coastline and beaches with extensive oil slicks.[18] The southern California 1971 Sylmar
earthquake also resulted in new offshore seep areas observed in previously unrecorded areas. In
January 2005, an increase in natural seepage off the California coast resulted in oil slicks that covered
more than 20 square miles. The increased seepage subsided over the following weeks. Since Californian
offshore production began in the late 1950s, far more wildlife has been killed (using bird death
estimates as a surrogate) by California's offshore natural oil seeps than by all of California offshore oil
production spills combined. It is an interesting artifact of the offshore oil debate that large numbers of
bird deaths due to natural oil seepage garners no media attention, whereas small numbers of bird
deaths due to a small oil spill causes extensive national attention and outrage by opponents of offshore
oil production -- even in areas where offshore production has been consistently reducing pollution
caused by natural seepage. A new study estimates that oil seepage off the Santa Barbara coast from
one seep area alone (Coal Oil Point) has resulted in current oil sediment deposits between 8 and 80
times the amount of oil released from the Exxon Valdez spill.[19] There are also concerns about air
pollution resulting from seepage. Gas emissions from hydrocarbon seeps are estimated to be one of
the largest sources of methane released annually into the earth's atmosphere, and studies indicate
that existing oil and gas production may be causing ongoing reductions in methane emissions
worldwide.[20] Methane is a potent greenhouse gas. Natural offshore seep emissions are one of the
largest sources of air pollution in Santa Barbara County. Oil Seeps: Indicators of Oil and Gas Reserves
The presence of natural oil seeps has led to the discovery of some of the world's largest oil fields. The
second-largest oil field ever discovered, the Cantarell "supergiant" field, was discovered after a
fisherman, Rudesindo Cantarell, repeatedly complained to the Mexican national oil company PEMEX
that his fishing nets were being covered with oil in the Gulf of Mexico. PEMEX had no oil operations in
Mr. Cantarell's fishing area. The company investigated the source of the offshore oil and subsequently
discovered an offshore oil field in 1976 which had produced more than 12 billion barrels of oil by 2007.
Although being depleted rapidly, the Cantarell field is still one of Mexico's largest single sources of oil
production.[21] At current rates of oil seepage off the Santa Barbara coast, about 7 billion barrels of oil
may already have seeped into the California coastal marine environment over the last 100,000 years.
The lifespan of the Santa Barbara offshore oil seeps is estimated to exceed 400,000 years. Seven billion
barrels of oil represents approximately 25 percent of all current U.S. oil reserves. Seven billion barrels of
new Santa Barbara offshore oil production would supply all of California's current imported oil needs for
the next 25 years. National Offshore Energy Policy Should Consider Natural Oil and Gas Seepage Natural
oil and gas seeps are by far the largest sources of hydrocarbon pollution released into U.S. coastal
waters and are a major source of offshore oil pollution and atmospheric methane emissions
worldwide. Oil and gas seeps are also one of the most important indicators for locating recoverable
hydrocarbon resources. California's central and south coast has seen significant environmental
benefits from the reductions in coastal seepage pollution due to offshore oil and gas production.
California's coastal environment would benefit from offshore oil and gas expansion in active seep
areas that are currently off-limits in California waters, as well as in federal seep zone waters in the
Santa Maria basin in the Outer Continental Shelf. Thus offshore oil and gas production represents both
an effective means of addressing the problems of seepage pollution as well as an economic
opportunity. Continued research may also show that the long-term environmental benefits that coastal
California has experienced due to offshore oil and gas extraction may be occurring in other regions as
well -- albeit probably to a lesser degree. The economic benefits from increased domestic hydrocarbon
production are well known, but many erroneously assume they come at an environmental cost. In
truth, there are opportunities, off Santa Barbara and elsewhere, to achieve substantial
environmental benefits from drilling as a consequence of reduced seepage of oil and natural gas into
the air and water . Expanded offshore oil and gas production can genuinely be a win-win
proposition.
We are necessary for clean technology.

Mol 2k Arthur Environmental Sociology @ Wageningen
The Environmental Movement in an Era of Ecological
Modernisation Geoforum 31 p. EBSCO

In the 1980s increasing numbers of environmental sociologists, and other social scientists who had environmental deterioration and reform as
their central object of study, started to observe that some significant changes were taking place in both the environmental discourse and the
social practices and institutions that actually dealt with environmental problems. Out of the sometimes vigorous debates concerning the
interpretation of these transformations, their structural or incidental character, their geographical reach and their normative valuation, the
theory of ecological modernisation emerged. For example, some empirical studies showed that from the mid to
late 1980s onwards, in countries such as Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the USA, Sweden and
Denmark, a discontinuity could be identified in the tendency of enhanced economic growth to be
paralleled by increased environmental disruption a process referred to as the decoupling or delinking of material
flows from economic flows. In a number of cases (countries and/or specific industrial sectors and/or specific environmental
issues) it was actually claimed that environmental
reform resulted in an absolute decline of emissions and use of

natural resources, regardless of growth in financial or material terms (cf. recently for the Netherlands RIVM, 1998).
However, although these sometimes controversial empirical studies lie behind the idea of ecological modernisation, they do not form the
core. Central stage in ecological modernisation is given to the associated social practices and institutional transformations, which are often
believed to be at the foundations of these physical changes. In the debate on the changing character of the social practices and institutions
since the 1980s, adherents to the theory of ecological modernisation positioned themselves by claiming that these
transformations in
not be explained away as mere window-dressing or rhetoric, but should
indeed be seen as structural transformations in industrial societys institutional order, as far as these
concerned the preservation of its sustenance base.
institutions and social practices could

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Navy

Mason 11 (Joseph Senior Fellow, The Wharton School, Louisiana State

OCS is already the most important

benefits of utilizing OCS reserves accrue from three

likely value of state recoverable oil and gas reserves are

permanent relaxation of all federal OCS production moratoria would unlock

ancillary industries that support the offshore industry

would produce thousands of new jobs in stable and valuable

jobs pay wages. OCS development is estimated to yield approximately

output, more jobs, and higher

of initial annual exploration and refining investments

The industry is key to naval power

Asia. On the other hand, U.S.

Naval power solves multiple scenarios of extinction

key component of deterring major power war .

No sales were scheduled for the

groups wasted no time in offering their

offshore exploration had helped to fuel the U.S. energy

Perception of inadequate supply causes domestic infighting over LNG exports

of the discussion over potential exports hinges on

LNG exports, a major concern among opponents is that such exports

of LNG export under consideration would not materially

gas reserves are

Offshore terminals solve these issues

Renegotiations create a unique window of opportunity

Scenario 1 is Japan LNG exports will go to East Asia

LNG exports solidify US-Japan relations

disturbances in the global energy

a nation that already relies heavily on imported energy,

advances have increased the projected amounts of recoverable oil and

Thats key to solve terror, cyberattacks, and nuclear proliferation.

U.S.-Japan alliance has succeeded at its original core purpose to deter

must use the strong U.S.-Japanese partnership as a platform to do

Koreas pursuit of nuclear weapons and

Cyberterror attacks lead to extinction.

grid is also vulnerable to purposive attacks. A report sponsored by the Department

Specifically that removes Chinese fears of US encirclement solves US-China conflict

In the space of just a couple of years, natural

transportation sector that could rely jointly on

aware of its negotiating

look at Chinas alternative sources of supply, particularly domestic

should provide greater stability in an important and strategic part of the

of Chinas naval build-up and assertive

a 5-Tg soot injection reduces

are collateral damage that may not be planned or accounted

a hypothetical SORT war, for example,

Independently China-US clean tech cooperation solves warming

Lieberthal and Sandalow 9

(Kenneth, Visiting Fellow Brookings Institution, Professor

Warming leads to extinction.

Mazo 10 (Jeffrey Mazo

PhD in Paleoclimatology from UCLA, Managing Editor, Survival and Research

Without early and severe reductions in emissions , the

And, technological development is key to sustainable transition.

(CO2) than oil or coal, which are considered the

lower impact on the environment, there is growing worldwide demand

for LNG as an environmentally friendly source of energy.

Natural gas seepage damages the environment, drilling reduces it

We are necessary for clean technology.

The Environmental Movement in an Era of Ecological

Modernisation Geoforum 31 p. EBSCO

issues) it was actually claimed that environmental

reform resulted in an absolute decline of emissions and use of

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