Respondents make such a plea in line with their return that they had released the desaparecidos
after nine days. But their return begs the question. If the release of the detainees is an established
fact and not in dispute, they do not continue to be missing persons or desaparecidos. Where,
however, there are grounds for grave doubts about the alleged release of the detainees, where the
standard and prescribed procedure in effecting the release has not been followed, then the burden
of proving by clear and convincing evidence the alleged release is shifted to the respondents.
Release is an affirmative defense and "each party must prove his own affirmative
allegations," just as the burden of proof of self-defense in a killing rests on the accused.
Moreover, evidence of release lies particularly within respondents' power.
2. Diokno claimed that signatures of the detainees on their release papers were falsified. He
submitted specimens of Dizons signatures and compared it to signatures on documents that
respondents themselves submitted. He concluded that they were markedly different from the
signatures on their supposed release certificates. With respect to Eduardo Dizon, Diokno noted
particularly the very poor line quality of Dizon's signature on the release certificate when
compared to the speed and freedom of his signature on his voter's application form.
The Solicitor General, in turn, disputed Diokno's conclusions about the falsity of the detainees'
signatures on the release certificates and questions the reliability of the specimen signatures used,
adding that "it is not possible to make any comparison of signatures for the purpose of
determining genuineness on the basis of xerox copies.
The Court also noted that the respondents did not follow the prescribed standard procedure for
releasing detainees.
1. The respondents did not release the detainees to their parents though the latter had been
visiting them and, in fact Dizon's father was in the camp on the very day he was supposedly
released.
2. Respondent Carian did not report the supposed releases to the Ministry of Defense or General
Eduardo
3. Respondent Carian's command could not readily furnish copies of the detainees' release
certificates to their parents when the latter asked for them.
4. Respondent Col. Carian had no authority, inherent or delegated, to release the detainees.
Carian also claimed to release them under the pretext that they would act as spies for the military.
He knew that the probability of the detainees' keeping their supposed bargain was remote. Yet, he
took no precautions to insure compliance. Worse, when they broke the supposed bargain by
failing to report as he says they agreed to, he took no steps to look for them.
3. Court cant grant petitioners relief. Petitioners' charges of falsification of the detainees'
alleged signatures on the certificates of release, compounded by the irregularities and failure of
respondents to follow the prescribed procedure in effecting the release for purposes of
authentication and to produce and furnish the parents upon request copies of the release
certificates need thorough investigation.
It is not a trier of facts, nor does it have the means and facilities to conduct such investigation of
the grave charges at bar as well as of the whereabouts and fate of the desaparecidos.
More, the 1987 Constitution which was overwhelmingly ratified on February 2,1987 expressly
mandated the creation of the Commission on Human Rights. The Constitution vested the
Commission on Human Rights with broader powers than its predecessor committee, such as to
investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. Hence the case was referred here.
In Hon. Isidro Cario, et al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al., we held that the CHR is
not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official.
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying
the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may
not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of
injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so.
"Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication.
The "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR
may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a
court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary
injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within
his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. It may also be
granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in any action
pending in an inferior court within his district." (Sec. 2, Rule 58, Rules of Court). A writ of
preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action,
for the preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no other
purpose.
Topic: Personal Dignity and Human Rights (Sec. 11, 1987 Constitution)
SIMON, JR. vs COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994
FACTS:
On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and order, directing the
petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending the
resolution of the vendors/squatters complaint before the Commission" and ordering said
petitioners to appear before the CHR.
On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss questioning CHR's jurisdiction and
supplemental motion to dismiss was filed on September 18, 1990 stating that Commissioners'
authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil
and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case were not civil and political