FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 151908. August 12, 2003]

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (SMART) and PILIPINO TELEPHONE CORPORATION (PILTEL), petitioners, vs.
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC), respondent.
[G.R. No. 152063. August 12, 2003]
GLOBE TELECOM, INC. (GLOBE) and ISLA COMMUNICATIONS CO., INC. (ISLACOM), petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
(The Former 6th Division) and the NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued on June 16, 2000
Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, promulgating rules and regulations on the billing of telecommunications services. Among its
pertinent provisions are the following:
(1)
The billing statements shall be received by the subscriber of the telephone service not later than 30 days from the end of each
billing cycle. In case the statement is received beyond this period, the subscriber shall have a specified grace period within which to
pay the bill and the public telecommunications entity (PTEs) shall not be allowed to disconnect the service within the grace period.
(2)
There shall be no charge for calls that are diverted to a voice mailbox, voice prompt, recorded message or similar facility
excluding the customers own equipment.
(3)
PTEs shall verify the identification and address of each purchaser of prepaid SIM cards. Prepaid call cards and SIM cards shall
be valid for at least 2 years from the date of first use. Holders of prepaid SIM cards shall be given 45 days from the date the prepaid
SIM card is fully consumed but not beyond 2 years and 45 days from date of first use to replenish the SIM card, otherwise the SIM
card shall be rendered invalid. The validity of an invalid SIM card, however, shall be installed upon request of the customer at no
additional charge except the presentation of a valid prepaid call card.
(4)

Subscribers shall be updated of the remaining value of their cards before the start of every call using the cards.

(5)
The unit of billing for the cellular mobile telephone service whether postpaid or prepaid shall be reduced from 1 minute per
pulse to 6 seconds per pulse. The authorized rates per minute shall thus be divided by 10.[1]
The Memorandum Circular provided that it shall take effect 15 days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation and
three certified true copies thereof furnished the UP Law Center. It was published in the newspaper, The Philippine Star, on June 22,
2000.[2] Meanwhile, the provisions of the Memorandum Circular pertaining to the sale and use of prepaid cards and the unit of
billing for cellular mobile telephone service took effect 90 days from the effectivity of the Memorandum Circular.
On August 30, 2000, the NTC issued a Memorandum to all cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS) operators which contained
measures to minimize if not totally eliminate the incidence of stealing of cellular phone units. The Memorandum directed CMTS
operators to:
a. strictly comply with Section B(1) of MC 13-6-2000 requiring the presentation and verification of the identity and addresses of
prepaid SIM card customers;
b. require all your respective prepaid SIM cards dealers to comply with Section B(1) of MC 13-6-2000;
c. deny acceptance to your respective networks prepaid and/or postpaid customers using stolen cellphone units or cellphone units
registered to somebody other than the applicant when properly informed of all information relative to the stolen cellphone units;
d. share all necessary information of stolen cellphone units to all other CMTS operators in order to prevent the use of stolen
cellphone units; and
e. require all your existing prepaid SIM card customers to register and present valid identification cards.[3]
This was followed by another Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 addressed to all public telecommunications entities, which reads:
This is to remind you that the validity of all prepaid cards sold on 07 October 2000 and beyond shall be valid for at least two (2)
years from date of first use pursuant to MC 13-6-2000.
In addition, all CMTS operators are reminded that all SIM packs used by subscribers of prepaid cards sold on 07 October 2000 and
beyond shall be valid for at least two (2) years from date of first use. Also, the billing unit shall be on a six (6) seconds pulse
effective 07 October 2000.
For strict compliance.[4]
On October 20, 2000, petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed against the National
Telecommunications Commission, Commissioner Joseph A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy
Commissioner Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing
Circular) and the NTC Memorandum dated October 6, 2000, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-42221 at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 77.[5]

Petitioners Islacom and Piltel alleged, inter alia, that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the
prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the
Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of
property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by
unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid
card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void
ab initio.
Soon thereafter, petitioners Globe Telecom, Inc and Smart Communications, Inc. filed a joint Motion for Leave to Intervene and to
Admit Complaint-in-Intervention.[6] This was granted by the trial court.
On October 27, 2000, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the NTC from implementing Memorandum
Circular No. 13-6-2000 and the Memorandum dated October 6, 2000.[7]
In the meantime, respondent NTC and its co-defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of petitioners failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.
Subsequently, after hearing petitioners application for preliminary injunction as well as respondents motion to dismiss, the trial
court issued on November 20, 2000 an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the defendants motion to dismiss is hereby denied for lack of merit. The plaintiffs application
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is hereby granted. Accordingly, the defendants are hereby enjoined from
implementing NTC Memorandum Circular 13-6-2000 and the NTC Memorandum, dated October 6, 2000, pending the issuance and
finality of the decision in this case. The plaintiffs and intervenors are, however, required to file a bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00), Philippine currency.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in an Order dated February 1, 2001.[9]
Respondent NTC thus filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CAG.R. SP. No. 64274. On October 9, 2001, a decision was rendered, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED, in that, the order of the court a quo
denying the petitioners motion to dismiss as well as the order of the court a quo granting the private respondents prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction, and the writ of preliminary injunction issued thereby, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The private
respondents complaint and complaint-in-intervention below are hereby DISMISSED, without prejudice to the referral of the private
respondents grievances and disputes on the assailed issuances of the NTC with the said agency.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Petitioners motions for reconsideration were denied in a Resolution dated January 10, 2002 for lack of merit.[11]
Hence, the instant petition for review filed by Smart and Piltel, which was docketed as G.R. No. 151908, anchored on the following
grounds:
A.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
(NTC) AND NOT THE REGULAR COURTS HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
B.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ALSO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO EXHAUST
AN AVAILABLE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY.
C.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE BILLING CIRCULAR ISSUED BY THE RESPONDENT NTC IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND CONTRARY TO LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY.
D.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO SHOW THEIR CLEAR
POSITIVE RIGHT TO WARRANT THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.[12]
Likewise, Globe and Islacom filed a petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 152063, assigning the following errors:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SO GRAVELY ERRED BECAUSE THE DOCTRINES OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION AND
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES DO NOT APPLY SINCE THE INSTANT CASE IS FOR LEGAL NULLIFICATION (BECAUSE
OF LEGAL INFIRMITIES AND VIOLATIONS OF LAW) OF A PURELY ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION PROMULGATED BY AN AGENCY IN
THE EXERCISE OF ITS RULE MAKING POWERS AND INVOLVES ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW.

2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SO GRAVELY ERRED BECAUSE THE DOCTRINE ON EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES DOES NOT APPLY WHEN THE QUESTIONS RAISED ARE PURELY LEGAL QUESTIONS.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SO GRAVELY ERRED BECAUSE THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION IS COMPLETE AND EFFECTIVE, WHEN THERE IS NO OTHER
REMEDY, AND THE PETITIONER STANDS TO SUFFER GRAVE AND IRREPARABLE INJURY.
4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SO GRAVELY ERRED BECAUSE PETITIONERS IN FACT EXHAUSTED ALL ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO THEM.
5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SO GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING ITS QUESTIONED RULINGS IN THIS CASE BECAUSE
GLOBE AND ISLA HAVE A CLEAR RIGHT TO AN INJUNCTION.[13]
The two petitions were consolidated in a Resolution dated February 17, 2003.[14]
On March 24, 2003, the petitions were given due course and the parties were required to submit their respective memoranda.[15]
We find merit in the petitions.
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers.
Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within
the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.[16]
The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of a delegated legislative power to create
new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the
legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and
be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.[17] They must conform to and be consistent with
the provisions of the enabling statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid. Constitutional and statutory provisions control
with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by an administrative body, as well as with respect to what fields are
subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a
statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a
statute. In case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the former must prevail.[18]
Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative
adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to
decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative
body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or
administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the
executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies
are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them
as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.[19]
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust
administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was
performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative
power. In Association of Philippine Coconut Dessicators v. Philippine Coconut Authority,[20] it was held:
The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party may seek judicial review, so strenuously urged by the
Solicitor General on behalf of respondent, has obviously no application here. The resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the
exercise of its rule- making or legislative power. However, only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the
exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine.
Even assuming arguendo that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies apply in this case, the records reveal that
petitioners sufficiently complied with this requirement. Even during the drafting and deliberation stages leading to the issuance of
Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, petitioners were able to register their protests to the proposed billing guidelines. They
submitted their respective position papers setting forth their objections and submitting proposed schemes for the billing circular.[21]
After the same was issued, petitioners wrote successive letters dated July 3, 2000[22] and July 5, 2000,[23] asking for the
suspension and reconsideration of the so-called Billing Circular. These letters were not acted upon until October 6, 2000, when
respondent NTC issued the second assailed Memorandum implementing certain provisions of the Billing Circular. This was taken by
petitioners as a clear denial of the requests contained in their previous letters, thus prompting them to seek judicial relief.
In like manner, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or
adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to an administrative
agency of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts will not determine a controversy involving
a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative
tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience
and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential
to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute administered. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a
court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined
some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. It applies where the claim is originally
cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is
suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.[24]

However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the
performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of
whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the
regional trial courts.[25] This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an
appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments.[26] Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.[27]
In the case at bar, the issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000
was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power. As such, petitioners were justified in invoking the judicial power of the
Regional Trial Court to assail the constitutionality and validity of the said issuances. In Drilon v. Lim,[28] it was held:
We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being
embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their
conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically, B.P. 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the
subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, even as the accused in a criminal action has the right to question in his
defense the constitutionality of a law he is charged with violating and of the proceedings taken against him, particularly as they
contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction
over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.[29]
In their complaint before the Regional Trial Court, petitioners averred that the Circular contravened Civil Code provisions on sales
and violated the constitutional prohibition against the deprivation of property without due process of law. These are within the
competence of the trial judge. Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, the issues raised in the complaint do not entail highly
technical matters. Rather, what is required of the judge who will resolve this issue is a basic familiarity with the workings of the
cellular telephone service, including prepaid SIM and call cards and this is judicially known to be within the knowledge of a good
percentage of our population and expertise in fundamental principles of civil law and the Constitution.
Hence, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide Civil Case No. Q-00-42221. The Court of Appeals erred in setting
aside the orders of the trial court and in dismissing the case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the consolidated petitions are GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 64274 dated October 9, 2001 and its Resolution dated January 10, 2002 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated
November 20, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, in Civil Case No. Q-00-42221 is REINSTATED. This case is
REMANDED to the court a quo for continuation of the proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 124360. November 5, 1997.]
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, Petitioner, v. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF FINANCE, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 127867. November 5, 1997.]
EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOKER P. ARROYO, ENRIQUE GARCIA, WIGBERTO TAADA, FLAG HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION, INC., FREEDOM
FROM DEBT COALITION (FDC), SANLAKAS, Petitioners, v. HON. RUBEN TORRES in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, HON.
FRANCISCO VIRAY, in his capacity as the Secretary of Energy, CALTEX Philippines, Inc., PETRON Corporation and PILIPINAS SHELL
Corporation, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
The petitions at bar challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil
Industry and For Other Purposes." 1 R.A. No. 8180 ends twenty six (26) years of government regulation of the downstream oil
industry. Few cases carry a surpassing importance on the life of every Filipino as these petitions for the upswing and downswing of
our economy materially depend on the oscillation of oil.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
First, the facts without the fat. Prior to 1971, there was no government agency regulating the oil industry other than those dealing
with ordinary commodities. Oil companies were free to enter and exit the market without any government interference There were
four (4) refining companies (Shell, Caltex, Bataan Refining Company and Filoil Refining) and six (6) petroleum marketing companies
(Esso, Filoil, Caltex, Getty, Mobil and Shell), then operating in the country. 2
In 1971, the country was driven to its knees by a crippling oil crisis. The government, realizing that petroleum and its products are
vital to national security and that their continued supply at reasonable prices is essential to the general welfare, enacted the Oil
Industry Commission Act. 3 It created the Oil Industry Commission (OIC) to regulate the business of importing, exporting, reexporting, shipping, transporting, processing, refining, storing, distributing, marketing and selling crude oil, gasoline, kerosene, gas
and other refined petroleum products. The OIC was vested with the power to fix the market prices of petroleum products, to regulate
the capacities of refineries, to license new refineries and to regulate the operations and trade practices of the industry. 4
In addition to the creation of the OIC, the government saw the imperious need for a more active role of Filipinos in the oil industry.
Until the early seventies, the downstream oil industry was controlled by multinational companies. All the oil refineries and marketing
companies were owned by foreigners whose economic interests did not always coincide with the interest of the Filipino. Crude oil was
transported to the country by foreign-controlled tankers. Crude processing was done locally by foreign-owned refineries and
petroleum products were marketed through foreign-owned retail outlets. On November 9, 1973, President Ferdinand B. Marcos
boldly created the Philippine National Oil Corporation (PNOC) to break the control by foreigners of our oil industry. 5 PNOC engaged
in the business of refining, marketing, shipping, transporting, and storing petroleum. It acquired ownership of ESSO Philippines and
Filoil to serve as its marketing arm. It bought the controlling shares of Bataan Refining Corporation, the largest refinery in the
country. 6 PNOC later put up its own marketing subsidiary Petrophil. PNOC operated under the business name PETRON
Corporation. For the first time, there was a Filipino presence in the Philippine oil market.
In 1984, President Marcos through Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1956, created the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) to
cushion the effects of frequent changes in the price of oil caused by exchange rate adjustments or increase in the world market
prices of crude oil and imported petroleum products. The fund is used (1) to reimburse the oil companies for cost increases in crude
oil and imported petroleum products resulting from exchange rate adjustment and/or increase in world market prices of crude oil,
and (2) to reimburse oil companies for cost underrecovery incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum
products. Under the law, the OPSF may be sourced from:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1.
any increase in the tax collection from ad valorem tax or customs duty imposed on petroleum products subject to tax under
P.D. No. 1956 arising from exchange rate adjustment,
2.
any increase in the tax collection as a result of the lifting of tax exemptions of government corporations, as may be
determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the Board of Energy,
3.
any additional amount to be imposed on petroleum products to augment the resources of the fund through an appropriate
order that may be issued by the Board of Energy requiring payment of persons or companies engaged in the business of importing,
manufacturing and/or marketing petroleum products, or
4.
any resulting peso costs differentials in case the actual peso costs paid by oil companies in the importation of crude oil and
petroleum products is less than the peso costs computed using the reference foreign exchange rate as fixed by the Board of Energy.
7
By 1985, only three (3) oil companies were operating in the country Caltex, Shell and the government-owned PNOC.

In May, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed Executive Order No. 172 creating the Energy Regulatory Board to regulate the
business of importing, exporting, re-exporting, shipping, transporting, processing, refining, marketing and distributing energy
resources "when warranted and only when public necessity requires." The Board had the following powers and functions:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
1.

Fix and regulate the prices of petroleum products;

2.
Fix and regulate the rate schedule or prices of piped gas to be charged by duly franchised gas companies which distribute
gas by means of underground pipe system;
3.

Fix and regulate the rates of pipeline concessionaries under the provisions of R.A. No. 387, as amended . . .;

4.
Regulate the capacities of new refineries or additional capacities of existing refineries and license refineries that may be
organized after the issuance of (E.O. No. 172) under such terms and conditions as are consistent with the national interest; and
5.
Whenever the Board has determined that there is a shortage of any petroleum product, or when public interest so requires,
it may take such steps as it may consider necessary, including the temporary adjustment of the levels of prices of petroleum
products and the payment to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund . . . by persons or entities engaged in the petroleum industry of such
amounts as may be determined by the Board, which may enable the importer to recover its cost of importation. 8
On December 9, 1992, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7638 which created the Department of Energy to prepare, integrate, coordinate,
supervise and control all plans, programs, projects, and activities of the government in relation to energy exploration, development,
utilization, distribution and conservation. 9 The thrust of the Philippine energy program under the law was toward privatization of
government agencies related to energy, deregulation of the power and energy industry and reduction of dependency on oil-fired
plants. 10 The law also aimed to encourage free and active participation and investment by the private sector in all energy activities.
Section 5(e) of the law states that "at the end of four (4) years from the effectivity of this Act, the Department shall, upon approval
of the President, institute the programs and timetable of deregulation of appropriate energy projects and activities of the energy
industry."cralaw virtua1aw library
Pursuant to the policies enunciated in R.A. No. 7638, the government approved the privatization of Petron Corporation in 1993. On
December 16, 1993, PNOC sold 40% of its equity in Petron Corporation to the Aramco Overseas Company.cralawnad
In March 1996, Congress took the audacious step of deregulating the downstream oil industry. It enacted R.A. No. 8180, entitled the
"Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996." Under the deregulated environment, "any person or entity may import or
purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries
and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement," subject only to monitoring
by the Department of Energy. 11
The deregulation process has two phases: the transition phase and the full deregulation phase. During the transition phase, controls
of the non-pricing aspects of the oil industry were to be lifted. The following were to be accomplished: (1) liberalization of oil
importation, exportation, manufacturing, marketing and distribution, (2) implementation of an automatic pricing mechanism, (3)
implementation of an automatic formula to set margins of dealers and rates of haulers, water transport operators and pipeline
concessionaires, and (4) restructuring of oil taxes. Upon full deregulation, controls on the price of oil and the foreign exchange cover
were to be lifted and the OPSF was to be abolished.
The first phase of deregulation commenced on August 12, 1996.
On February 8, 1997, the President implemented the full deregulation of the Downstream Oil Industry through E.O. No. 372.
The petitions at bar assail the constitutionality of various provisions of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 372.
In G.R. No. 124360, petitioner Francisco S. Tatad seeks the annulment of section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 8180. Section 5 (b)
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"b)
Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this Act, tariff duty shall be imposed and
collected on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven
percent (7%), except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be the same as that for imported crude oil: Provided, That beginning
on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the same: Provided, further, That
this provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress."cralaw virtua1aw library
The petition is anchored on three arguments:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
First, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products violates the equal
protection clause. Petitioner contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and
discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to
source refined petroleum products from abroad.
Second, that the imposition of different tariff rates does not deregulate the downstream oil industry but instead controls the oil
industry, contrary to the avowed policy of the law. Petitioner avers that the tariff differential between imported crude oil and
imported refined petroleum products bars the entry of other players in the oil industry because it effectively protects the interest of
oil companies with existing refineries. Thus, it runs counter to the objective of the law "to foster a truly competitive market."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Third, that the inclusion of the tariff provision in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 violates Section 26(1) Article VI of the Constitution
requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in its title. Petitioner contends that the imposition of tariff
rates in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is foreign to the subject of the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
In G.R. No. 127867, petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Joker P. Arroyo, Enrique Garcia, Wigberto Taada, Flag Human Rights Foundation,
Inc., Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) and Sanlakas contest the constitutionality of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392.
Section 15 provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 15.
Implementation of Full Deregulation. Pursuant to Section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 7638, the DOE shall, upon
approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As far as
practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are
declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Upon the implementation of the full
deregulation as provided herein, the transition phase is deemed terminated and the following laws are deemed repealed:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
x

E.O. No. 372 states in full, viz.:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7638, otherwise known as the "Department of Energy Act of 1992," provides that, at the end of four
years from its effectivity last December 1992, "the Department (of Energy) shall, upon approval of the President, institute the
programs and time table of deregulation of appropriate energy projects and activities of the energy sector;
"WHEREAS, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8180, otherwise known as the "Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996,"
provides that "the DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later
than March, 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products
in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable;
"WHEREAS, pursuant to the recommendation of the Department of Energy, there is an imperative need to implement the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry because of the following recent developments: (i) depletion of the buffer fund on or
about 7 February 1997 pursuant to the Energy Regulatory Boards Order dated 16 January 1997; (ii) the prices of crude oil had been
stable at $21-$23 per barrel since October 1996 while prices of petroleum products in the world market had been stable since midDecember of last year. Moreover, crude oil prices are beginning to soften for the last few days while prices of some petroleum
products had already declined; and (iii) the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar has been stable for the past twelve
(12) months, averaging at around P26.20 to one US dollar;
"WHEREAS, Executive Order No. 377 dated 31 October 1996 provides for an institutional framework for the administration of the
deregulated industry by defining the functions and responsibilities of various government agencies;
"WHEREAS, pursuant to Republic Act No. 8180, the deregulation of the industry will foster a truly competitive market which can
better achieve the social policy objectives of fair prices and adequate, continuous supply of environmentally-clean and high quality
petroleum products;
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by the powers vested in me by law, do hereby
declare the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry."cralaw virtua1aw library
In assailing section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392, petitioners offer the following submissions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
First, section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Secretary of Energy
because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to
implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry. Petitioners contend that the law does not define when it is
practicable for the Secretary of Energy to recommend to the President the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry or when
the President may consider it practicable to declare full deregulation. Also, the law does not provide any specific standard to
determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to be declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso to
the US dollar is considered stable.
Second, petitioners aver that E.O. No. 392 implementing the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry is arbitrary and
unreasonable because it was enacted due to the alleged depletion of the OPSF fund a condition not found in R.A. No. 8180.
Third, section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392 allow the formation of a de facto cartel among the three existing oil companies
Petron, Caltex and Shell in violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and
unfair competition.
Respondents, on the other hand, fervently defend the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392. In addition, respondents
contend that the issues raised by the petitions are not justiciable as they pertain to the wisdom of the law. Respondents further aver
that petitioners have no locus standi as they did not sustain nor will they sustain direct injury as a result of the implementation of
R.A. No. 8180.
The petitions were heard by the Court on September 30, 1997. On October 7, 1997, the Court ordered the private respondents oil
companies "to maintain the status quo and to cease and desist from increasing the prices of gasoline and other petroleum fuel
products for a period of thirty (30) days . . . subject to further orders as conditions may warrant."cralaw virtua1aw library

We shall now resolve the petitions on the merit. The petitions raise procedural and substantive issues bearing on the constitutionality
of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392. The procedural issues are: (1) whether or not the petitions raise a justiciable controversy, and
(2) whether or not the petitioners have the standing to assail the validity of the subject law and executive order. The substantive
issues are: (1) whether or not section 5(b) violates the one title one subject requirement of the Constitution; (2) whether or not
the same section violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution; (3) whether or not section 15 violates the constitutional
prohibition on undue delegation of power; (4) whether or not E.O. No. 392 is arbitrary and unreasonable; and (5) whether or not
R.A. No. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.
We shall first tackle the procedural issues. Respondents claim that the avalanche of arguments of the petitioners assail the wisdom of
R.A. No. 8180. They aver that deregulation of the downstream oil industry is a policy decision made by Congress and it cannot be
reviewed, much less be reversed by this Court. In constitutional parlance, respondents contend that the petitions failed to raise a
justiciable controversy.
Respondents joint stance is unnoteworthy. Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. 12
The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature
transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where a statute violates the Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty
of the judiciary to declare such act as unconstitutional and void. 13 We held in the recent case of Taada v. Angara: 14
"x

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a
justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes
not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political.
The duty to adjudicate remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the application
or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court, it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by
constitutional mandate to decide."cralaw virtua1aw library
Even a sideglance at the petitions will reveal that petitioners have raised constitutional issues which deserve the resolution of this
Court in view of their seriousness and their value as precedents. Our statement of facts and definition of issues clearly show that
petitioners are assailing R.A. No. 8180 because its provisions infringe the Constitution and not because the law lacks wisdom. The
principle of separation of power mandates that challenges on the constitutionality of a law should be resolved in our courts of justice
while doubts on the wisdom of a law should be debated in the halls of Congress. Every now and then, a law may be denounced in
court both as bereft of wisdom and constitutionally infirmed. Such denunciation will not deny this Court of its jurisdiction to resolve
the constitutionality of the said law while prudentially refusing to pass on its wisdom.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The effort of respondents to question the locus standi of petitioners must also fall on barren ground. In language too lucid to be
misunderstood, this Court has brightlined its liberal stance on a petitioners locus standi where the petitioner is able to craft an issue
of transcendental significance to the people. 15 In Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 16 we
stressed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x

Objections to taxpayers suit for lack of sufficient personality, standing or interest are, however, in the main procedural matters.
Considering the importance to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Courts duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to
determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws
and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken
cognizance of these petitions."cralaw virtua1aw library
There is not a dot of disagreement between the petitioners and the respondents on the far reaching importance of the validity of RA
No. 8180 deregulating our downstream oil industry. Thus, there is no good sense in being hypertechnical on the standing of
petitioners for they pose issues which are significant to our people and which deserve our forthright resolution.
We shall now track down the substantive issues. In G.R. No. 124360 where petitioner is Senator Tatad, it is contended that section
5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 on tariff differential violates the provision 17 of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject
which should be expressed in its title. We do not concur with this contention. As a policy, this Court has adopted a liberal
construction of the one title - one subject rule. We have consistently ruled 18 that the title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue
all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may
be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. 19 We hold
that section 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the
downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway prospective investors to put up refineries in our country and make them
rely less on imported petroleum. 20 We shall, however, return to the validity of this provision when we examine its blocking effect on
new entrants to the oil market.
We shall now slide to the substantive issues in G.R. No. 127867. Petitioners assail section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 which fixes the time
frame for the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry. We restate its pertinent portion for emphasis,
viz.:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 15.
Implementation of Full Deregulation. Pursuant to section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 7638, the DOE shall, upon
approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As far as
practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are
declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

Petitioners urge that the phrases "as far as practicable," "decline of crude oil prices in the world market" and "stability of the peso
exchange rate to the US dollar" are ambivalent, unclear and inconcrete in meaning. They submit that they do not provide the
"determinate or determinable standards" which can guide the President in his decision to fully deregulate the downstream oil
industry. In addition, they contend that E.O. No. 392 which advanced the date of full deregulation is void for it illegally considered
the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor.
The power of Congress to delegate the execution of laws has long been settled by this Court. As early as 1916 in Compaia General
de Tabacos de Filipinas v. The Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 21 this Court thru, Mr. Justice Moreland, held that "the true
distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to
the latter no valid objection can be made." Over the years, as the legal engineering of mens relationship became more difficult,
Congress has to rely more on the practice of delegating the execution of laws to the executive and other administrative agencies.
Two tests have been developed to determine whether the delegation of the power to execute laws does not involve the abdication of
the power to make law itself. We delineated the metes and bounds of these tests in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. POEA, 22
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz.: the completeness
test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test,
there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is
not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative."cralaw virtua1aw library
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in our constitutional landscape. As sagely observed, delegation of
legislative power has become an inevitability in light of the increasing complexity of the task of government. Thus, courts bend as far
back as possible to sustain the constitutionality of laws which are assailed as unduly delegating legislative powers. Citing Hirabayashi
v. United States 23 as authority, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz states "that even if the law does not expressly pinpoint the standard,
the courts will bend over backward to locate the same elsewhere in order to spare the statute, if it can, from constitutional infirmity."
24
Given the groove of the Courts rulings, the attempt of petitioners to strike down section 15 on the ground of undue delegation of
legislative power cannot prosper. Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted
that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the
occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it
for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the
President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the
judgment of the President he is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world
market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.
Petitioners contend that the words "as far as practicable," "declining" and "stable" should have been defined in R.A. No. 8180 as they
do not set determinate or determinable standards. The stubborn submission deserves scant consideration. The dictionary meanings
of these words are well settled and cannot confuse men of reasonable intelligence. Webster defines "practicable" as meaning possible
to practice or perform, "decline" as meaning to take a downward direction, and "stable" as meaning firmly established. 25 The fear of
petitioners that these words will result in the exercise of executive discretion that will run riot is thus groundless. To be sure, the
Court has sustained the validity of similar, if not more general standards in other cases. 26
It ought to follow that the argument that E.O. No. 392 is null and void as it was based on indeterminate standards set by R.A. 8180
must likewise fail. If that were all to the attack against the validity of E.O. No. 392, the issue need not further detain our discourse.
But petitioners further posit the thesis that the Executive misapplied R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the depletion of the OPSF
fund as a factor in fully deregulating the downstream oil industry in February 1997. A perusal of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 will
readily reveal that it only enumerated two factors to be considered by the Department of Energy and the Office of the President, viz.:
(1) the time when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining, and (2) the time when the
exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Section 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor
to be given weight by the Executive before ordering full deregulation. On the contrary, the debates in Congress will show that some
of our legislators wanted to impose as a pre-condition to deregulation a showing that the OPSF fund must not be in deficit. 27 We
therefore hold that the Executive department failed to follow faithfully the standards set by R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the
extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund. The misappreciation of this extra factor cannot be justified on the ground that the
Executive department considered anyway the stability of the prices of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the exchange
rate of the peso to the dollar. By considering another factor to hasten full deregulation, the Executive department rewrote the
standards set forth in R.A. 8180. The Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by subtraction or addition the standards set in
R.A. No. 8180 for it has no power to make laws. To cede to the Executive the power to make law is to invite tyranny, indeed, to
transgress the principle of separation of powers. The exercise of delegated power is given a strict scrutiny by courts for the delegate
is a mere agent whose action cannot infringe the terms of agency. In the cases at bar, the Executive co-mingled the factor of
depletion of the OPSF fund with the factors of decline of the price of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the peso to the
US dollar. On the basis of the text of E.O. No. 392, it is impossible to determine the weight given by the Executive department to the
depletion of the OPSF fund. It could well be the principal consideration for the early deregulation. It could have been accorded an
equal significance. Or its importance could be nil. In light of this uncertainty, we rule that the early deregulation under E.O. No. 392
constitutes a misapplication of R.A. No. 8180.
We now come to grips with the contention that some provisions of R.A. No. 8180 violate section 19 of Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. These provisions are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1)
Section 5 (b) which states "Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this Act, tariff duty
shall be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at
the rate of seven percent (7%) except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be the same as that for imported crude oil. Provided,
that beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the same. Provided,
further, that this provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress."cralaw virtua1aw library
(2)
Section 6 which states "To ensure the security and continuity of petroleum crude and products supply, the DOE shall
require the refiners and importers to maintain a minimum inventory equivalent to ten percent (10%) of their respective annual sales
volume or forty (40) days of supply, whichever is lower," andchanrobles virtual lawlibrary
(3)
Section 9 (b) which states "To ensure fair competition and prevent cartels and monopolies in the downstream oil
industry, the following acts shall be prohibited:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x

(b)
Predatory pricing which means selling or offering to sell any product at a price unreasonably below the industry average
cost so as to attract customers to the detriment of competitors."cralaw virtua1aw library
On the other hand, section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution allegedly violated by the aforestated provisions of R.A. No. 8180
mandates: "The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of
trade or unfair competition shall be allowed."cralaw virtua1aw library
A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more persons or companies, consisting in the exclusive right or
power to carry on a particular business or trade, manufacture a particular article, or control the sale or the whole supply of a
particular commodity. It is a form of market structure in which one or only a few firms dominate the total sales of a product or
service. 28 On the other hand, a combination in restraint of trade is an agreement or understanding between two or more persons,
in the form of a contract, trust, pool, holding company, or other form of association, for the purpose of unduly restricting
competition, monopolizing trade and commerce in a certain commodity, controlling its production, distribution and price, or
otherwise interfering with freedom of trade without statutory authority. 29 Combination in restraint of trade refers to the means
while monopoly refers to the end. 30
Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code and Article 28 of the New Civil Code breathe life to this constitutional policy. Article 186 of the
Revised Penal Code penalizes monopolization and creation of combinations in restraint of trade, 31 while Article 28 of the New Civil
Code makes any person who shall engage in unfair competition liable for damages. 32
Respondents aver that sections 5(b), 6 and 9(b) implement the policies and objectives of R.A. No. 8180. They explain that the 4%
tariff differential is designed to encourage new entrants to invest in refineries. They stress that the inventory requirement is meant
to guaranty continuous domestic supply of petroleum and to discourage fly-by-night operators. They also submit that the prohibition
against predatory pricing is intended to protect prospective entrants. Respondents manifested to the Court that new players have
entered the Philippines after deregulation and have now captured 3%-5% of the oil market.
The validity of the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 8180 has to be decided in light of the letter and spirit of our Constitution, especially
section 19, Article XII. Beyond doubt, the Constitution committed us to the free enterprise system but it is a system impressed with
its own distinctness. Thus, while the Constitution embraced free enterprise as an economic creed, it did not prohibit per se the
operation of monopolies which can, however be regulated in the public interest. 33 Thus too, our free enterprise system is not based
on a market of pure and unadulterated competition where the State pursues a strict hands-off policy and follows the let-the-devil
devour the hindmost rule. Combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competitions are absolutely proscribed and the proscription is
directed both against the State as well as the private sector. 34 This distinct free enterprise system is dictated by the need to
achieve the goals of our national economy as defined by section 1, Article XII of the Constitution which are: more equitable
distribution of opportunities, income and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation
for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the
underprivileged. It also calls for the State to protect Filipino enterprises against unfair competition and trade practices.
Section 19, Article XII of our Constitution is anti-trust in history and in spirit. It espouses competition. The desirability of competition
is the reason for the prohibition against restraint of trade, the reason for the interdiction of unfair competition, and the reason for
regulation of unmitigated monopolies. Competition is thus the underlying principle of section 19, Article XII of our Constitution which
cannot be violated by R.A. No. 8180. We subscribe to the observation of Prof. Gellhorn that the objective of anti-trust law is "to
assure a competitive economy, based upon the belief that through competition producers will strive to satisfy consumer wants at the
lowest price with the sacrifice of the fewest resources. Competition among producers allows consumers to bid for goods and services,
and thus matches their desires with societys opportunity costs." 35 He adds with appropriateness that there is a reliance upon "the
operation of the market system (free enterprise) to decide what shall be produced, how resources shall be allocated in the
production process, and to whom the various products will be distributed. The market system relies on the consumer to decide what
and how much shall be produced, and on competition, among producers to determine who will manufacture it."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Again, we underline in scarlet that the fundamental principle espoused by section 19, Article XII of the Constitution is competition for
it alone can release the creative forces of the market. But the competition that can unleash these creative forces is competition that
is fighting yet is fair. Ideally, this kind of competition requires the presence of not one, not just a few but several players. A market
controlled by one player (monopoly) or dominated by a handful of players (oligopoly) is hardly the market where honest-to-goodness
competition will prevail. Monopolistic or oligopolistic markets deserve our careful scrutiny and laws which barricade the entry points
of new players in the market should be viewed with suspicion.

Prescinding from these baseline propositions, we shall proceed to examine whether the provisions of R.A. No. 8180 on tariff
differential, inventory reserves, and predatory prices imposed substantial barriers to the entry and exit of new players in our
downstream oil industry. If they do, they have to be struck down for they will necessarily inhibit the formation of a truly competitive
market. Contrariwise, if they are insignificant impediments, they need not be stricken down.
In the cases at bar, it cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign
oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All other players belong to the
lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff
differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts
and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend to
equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those
who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They
will be competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective
players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by
burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in
our downstream oil industry is an idle dream.
The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of Petron, Shell and Caltex against prospective new players. Petron,
Shell and Caltex can easily comply with the inventory requirement of R.A. No. 8180 in view of their existing storage facilities.
Prospective competitors again will find compliance with this requirement difficult as it will entail a prohibitive cost. The construction
cost of storage facilities and the cost of inventory can thus scare prospective players. Their net effect is to further occlude the entry
points of new players, dampen competition and enhance the control of the market by the three (3) existing oil companies.
Finally, we come to the provision on predatory pricing which is defined as." . . selling or offering to sell any product at a price
unreasonably below the industry average cost so as to attract customers to the detriment of competitors." Respondents contend that
this provision works against Petron, Shell and Caltex and protects new entrants. The ban on predatory pricing cannot be analyzed in
isolation. Its validity is interlocked with the barriers imposed by R.A. No. 8180 on the entry of new players. The inquiry should be to
determine whether predatory pricing on the part of the dominant oil companies is encouraged by the provisions in the law blocking
the entry of new players. Text-writer Hovenkamp, 36 gives the authoritative answer and we quote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x

"The rationale for predatory pricing is the sustaining of losses today that will give a firm monopoly profits in the future. The
monopoly profits will never materialize, however, if the market is flooded with new entrants as soon as the successful predator
attempts to raise its price. Predatory pricing will be profitable only if the market contains significant barriers to new entry."cralaw
virtua1aw library
As aforediscussed, the 4% tariff differential and the inventory requirement are significant barriers which discourage new players to
enter the market. Considering these significant barriers established by R.A. No. 8180 and the lack of players with the comparable
clout of PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX, the temptation for a dominant player to engage in predatory pricing and succeed is a chilling
reality. Petitioners charge that this provision on predatory pricing is anti-competitive is not without reason.
Respondents belittle these barriers with the allegation that new players have entered the market since deregulation. A scrutiny of the
list of the alleged new players will, however, reveal that not one belongs to the class and category of PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX.
Indeed, there is no showing that any of these new players intends to install any refinery and effectively compete with these
dominant oil companies. In any event, it cannot be gainsaid that the new players could have been more in number and more
impressive in might if the illegal entry barriers in R.A. No. 8180 were not erected.
We come to the final point. We now resolve the total effect of the untimely deregulation, the imposition of 4% tariff differential on
imported crude oil and refined petroleum products, the requirement of inventory and the prohibition on predatory pricing on the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180. The question is whether these offending provisions can be individually struck down without
invalidating the entire R.A. No. 8180. The ruling case law is well stated by author Agpalo, 37 viz.:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x

The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion,
if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a separability clause in a statute creates the presumption
that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be
so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had
supposed that it could not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible and valid statute,
which carries out the legislative intent. . .
The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions,
considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole,
the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the statute dependent, conditional, or connected with one another,
the legislature intended the statute to be carried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if one part is void, in which case if
some parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with them." cdtech
R.A. No. 8180 contains a separability clause. Section 23 provides that "if for any reason, any section or provision of this Act is
declared unconstitutional or invalid, such parts not affected thereby shall remain in full force and effect." This separability clause
notwithstanding, we hold that the offending provisions of R.A. No. 8180 so permeate its essence that the entire law has to be struck
down. The provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing are among the principal props of R.A. No. 8180. Congress
could not have deregulated the downstream oil industry without these provisions. Unfortunately, contrary to their intent, these
provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing inhibit fair competition, encourage monopolistic power and interfere

with the free interaction of market forces. R.A. No. 8180 needs provisions to vouchsafe free and fair competition. The need for these
vouchsafing provisions cannot be overstated. Before deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX had no real competitors but did not
have a free run of the market because government controls both the pricing and non-pricing aspects of the oil industry. After
deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX remain unthreatened by real competition yet are no longer subject to control by
government with respect to their pricing and non-pricing decisions. The aftermath of R.A. No. 8180 is a deregulated market where
competition can be corrupted and where market forces can be manipulated by oligopolies.
The fall out effects of the defects of R.A. No. 8180 on our people have not escaped Congress. A lot of our leading legislators have
come out openly with bills seeking the repeal of these odious and offensive provisions in R.A. No. 8180. In the Senate, Senator
Freddie Webb has filed S.B. No. 2133 which is the result of the hearings conducted by the Senate Committee on Energy. The
hearings revealed that (1) there was a need to level the playing field for the new entrants in the downstream oil industry, and (2)
there was no law punishing a person for selling petroleum products at unreasonable prices. Senator Alberto G. Romulo also filed S.B.
No. 2209 abolishing the tariff differential beginning January 1, 1998. He declared that the amendment." . . would mean that instead
of just three (3) big oil companies there will be other major oil companies to provide more competitive prices for the market and the
consuming public." Senator Heherson T . Alvarez, one of the principal proponents of R.A. No. 8180, also filed S.B. No. 2290
increasing the penalty for violation of its section 9. It is his opinion as expressed in the explanatory note of the bill that the present
oil companies are engaged in cartelization despite R.A. No. 8180, viz.:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x

"Since the downstream oil industry was fully deregulated in February 1997, there have been eight (8) fuel price adjustments made
by the three oil majors, namely: Caltex Philippines, Inc.; Petron Corporation; and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. Very
noticeable in the price adjustments made, however, is the uniformity in the pump prices of practically all petroleum products of the
three oil companies. This, despite the fact, that their selling rates should be determined by a combination of any of the following
factors: the prevailing peso-dollar exchange rate at the time payment is made for crude purchases, sources of crude, and inventory
levels of both crude and refined petroleum products. The abovestated factors should have resulted in different, rather than identical
prices.
The fact that the three (3) oil companies petroleum products are uniformly priced suggests collusion, amounting to cartelization,
among Caltex Philippines, Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation to fix the prices of petroleum products
in violation of paragraph (a), Section 9 of R.A. No. 8180.
To deter this pernicious practice and to assure that present and prospective players in the downstream oil industry conduct their
business with conscience and propriety, cartel-like activities ought to be severely penalized."cralaw virtua1aw library
Senator Francisco S. Tatad also filed S.B. No. 2307 providing for a uniform tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum
products. In the explanatory note of the bill, he declared in no uncertain terms that." . . the present set-up has raised serious public
concern over the way the three oil companies have uniformly adjusted the prices of oil in the country, an indication of a possible
existence of a cartel or a cartel-like situation within the downstream oil industry. This situation is mostly attributed to the foregoing
provision on tariff differential, which has effectively discouraged the entry of new players in the downstream oil industry."cralaw
virtua1aw library
In the House of Representatives, the moves to rehabilitate R.A. No. 8180 are equally feverish. Representative Leopoldo E. San
Buenaventura has filed H.B. No. 9826 removing the tariff differential for imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products.
In the explanatory note of the bill, Rep. Buenaventura explained:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x

As we now experience, this difference in tariff rates between imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products, unwittingly
provided a built-in-advantage for the three existing oil refineries in the country and eliminating competition which is a must in a free
enterprise economy. Moreover, it created a disincentive for other players to engage even initially in the importation and distribution
of refined petroleum products and ultimately in the putting up of refineries. This tariff differential virtually created a monopoly of the
downstream oil industry by the existing three oil companies as shown by their uniform and capricious pricing of their products since
this law took effect, to the great disadvantage of the consuming public.
Thus, instead of achieving the desired effects of deregulation, that of free enterprise and a level playing field in the downstream oil
industry, R.A. 8180 has created an environment conducive to cartelization, unfavorable, increased, unrealistic prices of petroleum
products in the country by the three existing refineries."cralaw virtua1aw library
Representative Marcial C. Punzalan, Jr., filed H.B. No. 9981 to prevent collusion among the present oil companies by strengthening
the oversight function of the government particularly its ability to subject to a review any adjustment in the prices of gasoline and
other petroleum products. In the explanatory note of the bill, Rep. Punzalan, Jr., said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x

To avoid this, the proposed bill seeks to strengthen the oversight function of government, particularly its ability to review the prices
set for gasoline and other petroleum products. It grants the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) the authority to review prices of oil and
other petroleum products, as may be petitioned by a person, group or any entity, and to subsequently compel any entity in the
industry to submit any and all documents relevant to the imposition of new prices. In cases where the Board determines that there
exist collusion, economic conspiracy, unfair trade practice, profiteering and/or overpricing, it may take any step necessary to protect
the public, including the readjustment of the prices of petroleum products. Further, the Board may also impose the fine and penalty
of imprisonment, as prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. 8180, on any person or entity from the oil industry who is found guilty of such
prohibited acts.

By doing all of the above, the measure will effectivity provide Filipino consumers with a venue where their grievances can be heard
and immediately acted upon by government.
Thus, this bill stands to benefit the Filipino consumer by making the price-setting process more transparent and making it easier to
prosecute those who perpetrate such prohibited acts as collusion, overpricing, economic conspiracy and unfair trade."
chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
Representative Sergio A.F. Apostol filed H.B. No. 10039 to remedy an omission in R.A. No. 8180 where there is no agency in
government that determines what is "reasonable" increase in the prices of oil products. Representative Dante O. Tinga, one of the
principal sponsors of R.A. No. 8180, filed H.B. No. 10057 to strengthen its anti-trust provisions. He elucidated in its explanatory
note:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x

The definition of predatory pricing, however, needs to be tightened up particularly with respect to the definitive benchmark price and
the specific anti-competitive intent. The definition in the bill at hand which was taken from the Areeda-Turner test in the United
States on predatory pricing resolves the questions. The definition reads, Predatory pricing means selling or offering to sell any oil
product at a price below the average variable cost for the purpose of destroying competition, eliminating a competitor or
discouraging a competitor from entering the market.
The appropriate actions which may be resorted to under the Rules of Court in conjunction with the oil deregulation law are adequate.
But to stress their availability and dynamism, it is a good move to incorporate all the remedies in the law itself. Thus, the present bill
formalizes the concept of government intervention and private suits to address the problem of antitrust violations. Specifically, the
government may file an action to prevent or restrain any act of cartelization or predatory pricing, and if it has suffered any loss or
damage by reason of the antitrust violation it may recover damages. Likewise, a private person or entity may sue to prevent or
restrain any such violation which will result in damage to his business or property, and if he has already suffered damage he shall
recover treble damages. A class suit may also be allowed.
To make the DOE Secretary more effective in the enforcement of the law, he shall be given additional powers to gather information
and to require reports."cralaw virtua1aw library
Representative Erasmo B. Damasing filed H.B. No. 7885 and has a more unforgiving view of R.A. No. 8180. He wants it completely
repealed. He explained:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x

Contrary to the projections at the time the bill on the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation was discussed and debated upon in the
plenary session prior to its approval into law, there arent any new players or investors in the oil industry. Thus, resulting in
practically a cartel or monopoly in the oil industry by the three (3) big oil companies, Caltex, Shell and Petron. So much so, that with
the deregulation now being partially implemented, the said oil companies have succeeded in increasing the prices of most of their
petroleum products with little or no interference at all from the government. In the month of August, there was an increase of Fifty
centavos (50) per liter by subsidizing the same with the OPSF, this is only temporary as in March 1997, or a few months from now,
there will be full deregulation (Phase II) whereby the increase in the prices of petroleum products will be fully absorbed by the
consumers since OPSF will already be abolished by then. Certainly, this would make the lives of our people, especially the
unemployed ones, doubly difficult and unbearable.
The much ballyhooed coming in of new players in the oil industry is quite remote considering that these prospective investors cannot
fight the existing and well established oil companies in the country today, namely, Caltex, Shell and Petron. Even if these new
players will come in, they will still have no chance to compete with the said three (3) existing big oil companies considering that
there is an imposition of oil tariff differential of 4% between importation of crude oil by the said oil refineries paying only 3% tariff
rate for the said importation and 7% tariff rate to be paid by businessmen who have no oil refineries in the Philippines but will import
finished petroleum/oil products which is being taxed with 7% tariff rates.
So, if only to help the many who are poor from further suffering as a result of unmitigated increase in oil products due to
deregulation, it is a must that the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996, or R.A. 8180 be repealed completely."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Various resolutions have also been filed in the Senate calling for an immediate and comprehensive review of R.A. No. 8180 to
prevent the downpour of its ill effects on the people. Thus, S. Res. No. 574 was filed by Senator Gloria M. Macapagal entitled
Resolution "Directing the Committee on Energy to Inquire Into The Proper Implementation of the Deregulation of the Downstream Oil
Industry and Oil Tax Restructuring As Mandated Under R.A. Nos. 8180 and 8184, In Order to Make The Necessary Corrections In the
Apparent Misinterpretation Of The Intent And Provision Of The Laws And Curb The Rising Tide Of Disenchantment Among The Filipino
Consumers And Bring About The Real Intentions And Benefits Of The Said Law." Senator Blas P. Ople filed S. Res. No. 664 entitled
resolution "Directing the Committee on Energy To Conduct An Inquiry In Aid Of Legislation To Review The Governments Oil
Deregulation Policy In Light Of The Successive Increases In Transportation, Electricity And Power Rates, As Well As Of Food And
Other Prime Commodities And Recommend Appropriate Amendments To Protect The Consuming Public." Senator Ople
observed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x

WHEREAS, since the passage of R.A. No. 8180, the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) has imposed successive increases in oil prices
which has triggered increases in electricity and power rates, transportation fares, as well as in prices of food and other prime
commodities to the detriment of our people, particularly the poor;

WHEREAS, the new players that were expected to compete with the oil cartel-Shell, Caltex and Petron-have not come in;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that a review of the oil deregulation policy be made to consider appropriate amendments to the existing
law such as an extension of the transition phase before full deregulation in order to give the competitive market enough time to
develop;
WHEREAS, the review can include the advisability of providing some incentives in order to attract the entry of new oil companies to
effect a dynamic competitive market;
WHEREAS, it may also be necessary to defer the setting up of the institutional framework for full deregulation of the oil industry as
mandated under Executive Order No. 377 issued by President Ramos last October 31, 1996. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Senator Alberto G. Romulo filed S. Res. No. 769 entitled resolution "Directing the Committees on Energy and Public Services In Aid
of Legislation To Assess The Immediate Medium And Long Term Impact of Oil Deregulation On Oil Prices And The Economy." Among
the reasons for the resolution is the finding that "the requirement of a 40-day stock inventory effectively limits the entry of other oil
firms in the market with the consequence that instead of going down oil prices will rise."cralaw virtua1aw library
Parallel resolutions have been filed in the House of Representatives. Representative Dante O. Tinga filed H. Res. No. 1311 "Directing
The Committee on Energy To Conduct An Inquiry, In Aid of Legislation, Into The Pricing Policies And Decisions Of The Oil Companies
Since The Implementation of Full Deregulation Under The Oil Deregulation Act (R.A. No. 8180) For the Purpose of Determining In
The Context Of The Oversight Functions Of Congress Whether The Conduct Of The Oil Companies, Whether Singly Or Collectively,
Constitutes Cartelization Which Is A Prohibited Act Under R.A. No. 8180, And What Measures Should Be Taken To Help Ensure The
Successful Implementation Of The Law In Accordance With Its Letter And Spirit, Including Recommending Criminal Prosecution Of
the Officers Concerned Of the Oil Companies If Warranted By The Evidence, And For Other Purposes." Representatives Marcial C .
Punzalan, Jr., Dante O. Tinga and Antonio E. Bengzon III filed H.R. No. 894 directing the House Committee on Energy to inquire into
the proper implementation of the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. House Resolution No. 1013 was also filed by
Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. and Joker P. Arroyo urging the President to immediately suspend the
implementation of E.O. No. 392.
In recent memory there is no law enacted by the legislature afflicted with so much constitutional deformities as R.A. No. 8180. Yet,
R.A. No. 8180 deals with oil, a commodity whose supply and price affect the ebb and flow of the lifeblood of the nation. Its shortage
of supply or a slight, upward spiral in its price shakes our economic foundation. Studies show that the areas most impacted by the
movement of oil are food manufacture, land transport, trade, electricity and water. 38 At a time when our economy is in a dangerous
downspin, the perpetuation of R.A. No. 8180 threatens to multiply the number of our people with bent backs and begging bowls. R.A.
No. 8180 with its anti-competition provisions cannot be allowed by this Court to stand even while Congress is working to remedy its
defects.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
The Court, however, takes note of the plea of PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX to lift our restraining order to enable them to adjust
upward the price of petroleum and petroleum products in view of the plummeting value of the peso. Their plea, however, will now
have to be addressed to the Energy Regulatory Board as the effect of the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 is to
revive the former laws it repealed. 39 The length of our return to the regime of regulation depends on Congress which can fasttrack
the writing of a new law on oil deregulation in accord with the Constitution.
With this Decision, some circles will chide the Court for interfering with an economic decision of Congress. Such criticism is charmless
for the Court is annulling R.A. No. 8180 not because it disagrees with deregulation as an economic policy but because as cobbled by
Congress in its present form, the law violates the Constitution. The right call therefor should be for Congress to write a new oil
deregulation law that conforms with the Constitution and not for this Court to shirk its duty of striking down a law that offends the
Constitution. Striking down R.A. No. 8180 may cost losses in quantifiable terms to the oil oligopolists. But the loss in tolerating the
tampering of our Constitution is not quantifiable in pesos and centavos. More worthy of protection than the supra-normal profits of
private corporations is the sanctity of the fundamental principles of the Constitution. Indeed when confronted by a law violating the
Constitution, the Court has no option but to strike it down dead. Lest it is missed, the Constitution is a covenant that grants and
guarantees both the political and economic rights of the people. The Constitution mandates this Court to be the guardian not only of
the peoples political rights but their economic rights as well. The protection of the economic rights of the poor and the powerless is
of greater importance to them for they are concerned more with the esoterics of living and less with the esoterics of liberty. Hence,
for as long as the Constitution reigns supreme so long will this Court be vigilant in upholding the economic rights of our people
especially from the onslaught of the powerful. Our defense of the peoples economic rights may appear heartless because it cannot
be half-hearted.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are granted. R.A. No. 8180 is declared unconstitutional and E.O. No. 372 void.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo and Vitug, JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J., concurs in the result.
Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-25024. March 30, 1970.]
TEODORO C. SANTIAGO, JR. Minor, Represented by his Mother, Mrs. Angelita C. Santiago, Petitioner-Appellant, v. MISS
JUANITA BAUTISTA, ROSALINDA ALPAS, REBECCA MATUGAS, MILKITA INAMAC, ROMEO AGUSTIN, AIDA CAMINO,
LUNA SARMAGO, AURORA LORENA, SOLEDAD FRANCISCO and MR. FLOR MARCELO, Respondents-Appellees.
Teodoro M. Santiago for Petitioner-Appellant.
Ramon C. Carag for Respondents-Appellees.
SYLLABUS
I. POLITICAL LAW; JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES; REQUIREMENT. Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise
judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under
which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board
or officer clothed with power and authority to determine what the law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of the
contending parties.
2. ID.; ID.; COMMITTEE OF TEACHERS ON THE RATING OF STUDENTS FOR HONOR IS NEITHER JUDICIAL NOR QUASI-JUDICIAL.
The committee on rating of students for honor whose actions are questioned in this case exercised neither judicial nor quasi-judicial
functions in the performance of its assigned task. There is nothing on record about any rule of law that provides that when teachers
sit down to assess the individual merits of their pupils for purpose of rating them for honors, such-function involves the
determination of what the law is and that they are therefore automatically vested with judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
3. ID.; ID.; THE BOARD OF JUDGES OF AN ORATORICAL CONTEST; AWARD NOT SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW. The issue of
whether courts have authority to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical contest was resolved in the case of Felipe
v. Leuterio, etc., et al, wherein the Court declared that the judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges of that
contest and, for that matter it would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests and similar competitions.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; PLEADING AND PROCEDURE; PETITION FOR CERTIORARI; FAILURE TO ATTACH COPY OF JUDGMENT OR ORDER
SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED FATAL. We are inclined to sustain the order of dismissal appealed from for failure on the part of
appellant to comply with the requirement of Section I of Rule 65 that "the petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of
the judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto."
DECISION
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato dismissing, on a motion to dismiss, its Civil Case No. 2012 for
certiorari, injunction and damages on the ground that the complaint therein states no cause of action, and from the subsequent
order of the court a quo denying the motion for the reconsideration of the said order of dismissal.
The record shows that at the time Civil Case No. 2012 was commenced in the court below, appellant Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a
pupil in Grade Six at the public school named Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City. As the school year 1964-1965 was then
about to end, the "Committee On The Rating Of Students For Honor" was constituted by the teachers concerned at said school for
the purpose of selecting the "honor students" of its graduating class. With the school Principal, Mrs. Aurora Lorena, as chairman, and
Juanita Bautista, Rosalinda Alpas, Rebecca Matugas, Milkita Inamac, Romeo Agustin, Aida Camino and Luna Sarmago, as members,
the above-named committee deliberated and finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Ligat and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as first,
second and third honors, respectively. The schools graduation exercises were thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but three days before
that date, the "third placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother, and with his father as counsel, sought the invalidation
of the "ranking of honor students" thus made, by instituting the above-mentioned civil case in the Court of First Instance of
Cotabato, against the above-named committee members along with the District Supervisor and the Academic Supervisor of the
place.
The corresponding complaint filed alleged, inter alia: that plaintiff-petitioner Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. is a sixth grader at the Sero
Elementary School in Cotabato City scheduled to be graduated on May 21st, 1965 with the honor rank of third place, which is
disputed; that the teachers of the school had been made respondents as they compose the "Committee on the Rating of Students for
Honor", whose grave abuse of official discretion is the subject of suit, while the other defendants were included as Principal, District
Supervisor and Academic Supervisor of the school; that Teodoro Santiago, Jr. had been a consistent honor pupil from Grade I to
Grade V of the Sero Elementary School, while Patricia Ligat (second placer in the disputed ranking in Grade VI) had never been a
close rival of petitioner before, except in Grade V wherein she ranked third; that Santiago, Jr. had been prejudiced, while his closest
rival had been so much benefited, by the circumstance that the latter, Socorro Medina, was coached and tutored during the summer
vacation of 1964 by Mrs. Alpas who became the teacher of both pupils in English in Grade VI, resulting in the far lead Medina
obtained over the other pupil; that the committee referred to in this case had been illegally constituted as the same was composed
of all the Grade VI teachers only, in violation of the Service Manual for Teachers of the Bureau of Public Schools which provides that
the committee to select the honor students should be composed of all teachers in Grades V and VI; that there are direct and
circumstantial matters, which shall be proven during the trial, wherein respondents have exercised grave abuse of discretion and

irregularities, such as the changing of the final ratings on the grading sheets of Socorro Medina and Patricia Ligat from 80% to
85%, and some teachers giving petitioner a starting grade of 75% in Grade VI, which proves that there was already an intention to
pull him to a much lower rank at the end of the school year; that several district examinations outside of teachers daily units and
other than periodical tests were given, ratings in which were heavily considered in the determination of periodical ratings, whereas
according to the Academic Supervisor and Acting Division Superintendent of schools of the place such district examinations were not
advisable; that there was a unanimous agreement and understanding among the respondent teachers to insult and prejudice the
second and third honors by rating Socorro Medina with a perfect score, which is very unnatural; that the words "first place" in
petitioners certificate in Grade I was erased and replaced with: the words "second place", which is an instance of the unjust and
discriminating abuses committed by the respondent teachers in the disputed selection of honor pupils they made; that petitioner
personally appealed the matter to the School Principal, to the District Supervisor, and to the Academic Supervisor, but said officials
"passed the buck to each other" to delay his grievances, and as to appeal to higher authorities will be too late, there is no other
speedy and adequate remedy under the circumstances; and, that petitioner and his parents suffered mental and moral damages in
the amount of P10,000.00. They prayed the court, among others, to set aside the final list of honor students in Grade VI of the Sero
Elementary School for that school year 1964-1965, and, during the pendency of the suit, to enjoin the respondent teachers from
officially and formally publishing and proclaiming the said honor pupils in Grade VI in the graduation exercises the school was
scheduled to hold on the 21st of May of that year 1965. The injunction prayed for was denied by the lower court in its order of May
20, 1965, the said court reasoning out that the graduation exercises were then already set on the following day, May 21, 1965. and
the restraining of the same would be shocking to the school authorities, parents. and the community who had eagerly looked forward
to the coming of that yearly happy event. As scheduled, the graduation exercises of the Sero Elementary School for the school year
1964-1965 was held on May 21, with the same protested list of honor students.
Having been required by the above mentioned order to answer the petition within ten (10) days, respondents moved for the
dismissal of the case instead. Under date of May 24, 1965, they filed a motion to dismiss, on the grounds (1) that the action for
certiorari was improper, and (2) that even assuming the propriety of the action, the question brought before the court had already
become academic. This was opposed by petitioner.
In an order dated June 4, 1965, the motion to dismiss of respondents was granted, the court reasoning thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The respondents now move to dismiss the petition for being improper and for being academic. In order to resolve the motion to
dismiss, the Court has carefully examined the petition to determine the sufficiency of the alleged cause of action constituting the
special civil action of certiorari.
"The pertinent portions of the petition alleging grave abuse of discretion are found in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. These
allegations may be substantially summarised as follows: Paragraph 3 alleges that since grades one to six, the students closely
contending for class honors were Socorro Medina, Teodoro Santiago, Jr., Dolores Dalican and Patricia Ligat.
"Socorro Medina obtained first honor thrice (grades I, V and VI); once second honor (grade IV, and twice third place (grades II and
III).
"Teodoro Santiago, Jr. obtained first place once (grade IV); four times second place (grades I, II, III, and V) and once third place
(grade VI).
"Dolores Dalican obtained twice first place (grades II, III); once third place (grade I).
Patricia Ligat once third place (grade V); and once second place (grade VI).
"That as now ranked in the graduation Ligat is given second place while Teodoro Santiago, Jr., is given the third place only. This is
the ranking now disputed by petitioner, Teodoro Santiago, Jr.
"Paragraph 4 alleges that Socorro Medina was tutored in the summer of 1964 by Mrs. Rosalinda Alpas who became her English
teacher in the sixth grade; that as such, Mrs. Alpas unjustly favored Socorro against her rivals.
"Paragraph 5 alleges that the teachers who composed the committee on honor students are all grade six teachers while the Service
Manual For Teachers provides that the committee shall be composed of the teachers from the fifth and sixth grades.
"Paragraph 6 alleges that there are direct and circumstantial evidence showing the change of ratings of Socorro Medina and Patricia
Ligat from 80% to 85% and the intention to junk petitioner to a lower rank.
"Paragraph 7 alleges that the giving of district examinations upon which ratings were partly based were not advisable.
"Paragraph 8 alleges that the teachers rated Socorro Medina a perfect pupil which is unnatural.
"Paragraph 9 alleges that on the first grade certificate of the petitioner the word First Place was erased and changed to Second
Place.
"Paragraph 10 alleges that petitioner personally appealed to the school authorities but they only passed the buck to each other.
"SECOND PARAGRAPH VIOLATED
"Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions, has acted without or in excess
of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty

and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings, as the law requires, of such tribunal, board or
officer.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto.
It is striking, indeed, that this petition has not been accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order complained of,
together with all pleadings and documents which are relevant thereto, as required by the second paragraph of the aforequoted rule.
This violation renders the petition extremely indefinite and uncertain. There is no written formal judgment or order of respondents
that is submitted for revision or correction of this Court. This violation is fatal to the petition.
"ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES NEGLECTED
"All that the petition alleges is that the petitioner personally appealed to the school authorities who only passed the buck to each
other. This allegation does not show that petitioner formally availed of and exhausted the administrative remedies of the
Department of Education. The petition implies that this is the first formal complaint of petitioner against his teachers. The
administrative agencies of the Department of Education could have investigated the grievances of the petitioner with dispatch and
give effective remedies, but petitioner negligently abandoned them. Petitioner cannot now claim that he lacked any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy.
"NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
"Allegations relating to the alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of teachers refer to errors, mistakes, or irregularities rather
than to real grave abuse of discretion that would amount to lack of jurisdiction. Mere commission of errors in the exercise of
jurisdiction may not be corrected by means of certiorari.
"In view of the foregoing, the Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the petition states no cause of action and should be, as it is
hereby dismissed."cralaw virtua1aw library
Upon receipt of a copy of the above-quoted order, the petitioner moved for the reconsideration thereof, but the same proved to be
futile, hence, this appeal.
Appellant here assails the holding of the lower court that his petition states no cause of action on the grounds discussed by the
court a quo in the appealed order abovequoted (1) that the petition does not comply with the second paragraph of Sec. 1 of Rule
65 because it has not been accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto; (2) that administrative remedies were not first exhausted; and (3) that
there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the teachers who constituted the committee referred to. On the other hand,
appellees maintain that the court below did not err in dismissing the case on said grounds. Further, they argue in favor of the
questioned order of dismissal upon the additional ground that the "committee on the ratings of students for honor" whose actions are
here condemned by appellant is not the "tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions" against which an action for certiorari
may lie under Section 1 of Rule 65.
The last point raised by appellees deserves first consideration, for if really the said committee of teachers does not fall within the
category of the tribunal board, or officer exercising judicial functions contemplated by Rule 65, further discussion of the issues raised
by appellant may no longer be necessary. To resolve this problem the following tests may be employed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In this jurisdiction certiorari is a special civil action instituted against any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions.
(Section 1, Rule 67.) A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers; the exercise of a judicial function is the
doing of something in the nature of the action of the court (34 C.J. 1182). In order that a special civil action of certiorari may be
invoked in this jurisdiction the following circumstances must exist: (1) that there must be a specific controversy involving rights of
persons or property and said controversy is brought before a tribunal, board or officer for hearing and determination of their
respective rights and obligations.
Judicial action is an adjudication upon the rights of parties who in general appear or are brought before the tribunal by notice or
process, and upon whose claims some decision or judgment is rendered. It implies impartiality, disinterestedness, a weighing of
adverse claims, and is inconsistent with discretion on the one hand for the tribunal must decide according to law and the rights of
the parties or with dictation on the other; for in the first instance it must exercise its own judgment under the laws and not act
under a mandate from another power . . . The character of its action in a given case must decide whether that action is judicial,
ministerial, or legislative, or whether it be simply that of a public agent of the country or State, as in its varied jurisdictions it may by
turns be each. (In Re Saline County Subscription, 100 Am. Dec. 337, 338, cited in Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Georgia Public
Service Commission, 181 S. E. 836-837.)
It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties
are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine
those questions, he acts judicially. (State ex rel. Board of Commissioners of St. Louis County, Et. Al. v. Dunn, 90 N. W. 772-773.)
(2)
the tribunal, board or officer before whom the controversy is brought must have the power and authority to pronounce
judgment and render a decision on the controversy construing and applying the laws to that end.
The phrase "judicial power" is not capable of a precise definition which would be applicable to all cases. The term has been variously
defined as the authority to determine the rights of persons or property by arbitrating between adversaries in specific controversies at
the instance of a party thereto; the authority exercised by that department of government which is charged with the declaration of
what the law is and its construction so far as it is written law; the authority or power vested in the judges or in the courts; the
authority vested in some court, officer, or persons to hear and determine when the rights of persons or property or the propriety of

doing an act is the subject matter of adjudication; the power belonging to or emanating from a judge as such; the power conferred
upon a public officer, involving the exercise of judgment and discretion in the determination of questions of right in specific cases
affecting the interest of persons or property, as distinguished from ministerial power or authority to carry out the mandates of
judicial power or the law; the power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before them, or some matter incidental
thereto, and of which they have jurisdiction; the power of a court to decide and pronounce a judgment; the power which adjudicates
upon and protects the right and interests of individual citizens, and to that end construes and applies the law. "Judicial power"
implies the construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights. It includes the power to hear and determine but not everyone
who may hear and determine has judicial power. The term "judicial power" does not necessarily include the power to hear and
determine a matter that is not in the nature of a suit or action between the parties. (34 C.J. 1183-1184.)
(3)
the tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that branch of the sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or at least,
which does not belong to the legislative or executive department.
". . . the distinction between legislative or ministerial functions and judicial functions is difficult to point out What is a judicial function
does not depend solely upon the mental operation by which it is performed or the importance of the act. In solving this question, due
regard must be had to the organic law of the state and the division of power of government. In the discharge of executive and
legislative duties, the exercise of discretion and judgment of the highest order is necessary, and matters of the greatest weight and
importance are dealt with. It is not enough to make a function judicial that it requires discretion, deliberation, thought, and
judgment. It must be the exercise of discretion and judgment within the subdivision of the sovereign power which belongs to the
judiciary, or, at least, which does not belong to the legislative or executive department. If the matter, in respect to which it is
exercised, belongs to either of the two last-named departments of government, it is not judicial. As to what is judicial and what is
not seems to be better indicated by the nature of a thing, than its definition. (Whealing & Elm Grove Railroad Co. Appt. v. Town of
Philadelphia, Et Al., 4 L.R.A. (N. S.), pp. 321, 328-329.) [Emphasis supplied] 1
"WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI JUDICIAL ACTS. It is difficult, if not impossible, precisely to define what are judicial or quasi judicial
acts, and there is considerable conflict in the decisions in regard thereto, in connection with the law as to the right to a writ of
certiorari. It is clear, however, that it is the nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the office, board, or body which
performs it, that determines whether or not it is the discharge of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. It is not essential that the
proceedings should be strictly and technically judicial, in the sense in which that word is used when applied to courts of justice, but it
is sufficient if they are quasi judicial. It is enough if the officers act judicially in making their decision, whatever may be their public
character . . .
"In State ex rel. Board of Commrs. v. Dunn (86 Minn. 301, 304), the following statements were made:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The precise line of demarcation between what are judicial and what are administrative or ministerial functions is often difficult to
determine. The exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative or administrative duties, and the
performance of administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be said
generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect
to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he
acts judicially." 2
It is evident, upon the foregoing authorities, that the so called committee on the rating of students for honor whose actions are
questioned in this case exercised neither judicial nor quasi judicial functions in the performance of its assigned task. From the abovequoted portions of the decisions cited, it will be gleaned that before a tribunal board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi judicial
acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to
such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board or officer clothed With
power and authority to determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties. As
pointed out by appellees, 3 however, there is nothing on record about any rule of law that provides that when teachers sit down to
assess the individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors, such function involves the determination of what
the law is and that they are therefore automatically vested with judicial or quasi judicial functions. Worse still, this Court has not
even been appraised by appellant of the pertinent provisions of the Service Manual of Teachers for Public Schools appellees allegedly
violated in the composition of the committee they constituted thereunder, and, in the performance of that committees duties.
At any rate, the situation brought before Us in this case, the seemingly one of first impression, is not with out substantial parallel. In
the case of Felipe v. Leuterio, etc., Et Al., 4 the issue presented for determination was whether or not the courts have the authority
to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical contest, and this Court declared that the judiciary has no power to
reverse the award of the board of judges of that contest and, for that matter, it would not interfere in literary contests, beauty
contests and similar competitions. It was reasoned out thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"For more than thirty years oratorical tilts have been held periodically by schools and colleges in this islands. Intercollegiate
oratorical competitions are of more recent origin. Members of this court have taken part in them either as contestants in their school
days (In the College of Law, U.P. annual oratorical contest, first prize was awarded to Justice Montemayor in 1914 and to Justice
Labrador in 1916), or as members of the board of judges afterwards. They know some few verdicts did not reflect the audiences
preference and that errors have sometimes been ascribed to the award of the judges. Yet no party ever presumed to invoke judicial
intervention; for it is unwritten law in such contests that the boards decision is final and unappealable.
"Like the ancient tournaments of the Sword, these tournaments of the Word apply the highest tenets of sportsmanship: finality of
referees verdict. No alibis, no murmurs of protest. The participants are supposed to join the competition to contribute to its success
by striving their utmost: the prizes are secondary.
"No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the contestants, because theirs was merely the privilege to compete for the prize, and
that privilege did not ripen into a demandable right unless and until they were proclaimed winners of the competition by the
appointed arbiters or referees or judges.

"Incidentally, these school activities have been imported from the United States. We found in American jurisprudence no litigation
questioning the determination of the board of judges.
"Now, the fact that a particular action has had no precedent during a long period affords some reason for doubting the existence of
the right sought to be enforced, especially where occasion for its assertion must have often arisen; and courts are cautious before
allowing it, being loath to establish a new legal principle not in harmony with the generally accepted views thereon. (See C.J.S. Vol.
1, p. 1012.)
"We observe that in assuming jurisdiction over the matter, the respondent judge reasoned out that where there is a wrong there is a
remedy and that courts of first instance are courts of general jurisdiction.
"The flaw in his reasoning lies in the assumption that Imperial suffered some wrong at the hands of the board of judges. If at all,
there was error on the part of one judge, at most. Error and wrong do net mean the same thing.Wrong as used in the aforesaid
principle is the deprivation or violation of a right. As stated before, a contestant has no right to the prize unless and until he or she is
declared winner by the board of referees or judges.
"Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in law there are instances of damnum absque injuria. This is one of them.
If fraud or malice had been proven, it would be a different proposition. But then her action should be directed against the individual
judge or judges who fraudulently or maliciously injured her. Not against the other judges."cralaw virtua1aw library
But even were We to assume for .the moment, as the court below apparently did, that judicial intervention might be sought in cases
of this nature, still, We are inclined to sustain the order of dismissal appealed from for failure on the part of appellant to comply with
the requirements of Section 1 of Rule 65. To be sure, the lower courts holding that appellants failure to accompany his petition with
a copy of the judgment or order subject thereof together with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto
"is fatal to his cause" is supported not only by the provision of that Rule but by precedents as well. In the case of Alajar, Et. Al. v.
Court of Industrial Relations, 5 where it was claimed by therein petitioners that the respondent court had acted with grave abuse of
discretion in estimating certain rice harvests involved in the case in terms of cavans instead of cans, allegedly in complete disregard
of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in Expropriation Proceedings No. 84 and of this Court in G.R. No. L-6191, 6
and in ordering thereafter the division of the said rice harvests on the ratio of 70-30 in favor of the tenants, this Court denied the
petition for certiorari on the ground, among others, of failure on the part of said petitioners to attach to their petition copies of the
decisions allegedly violated. Speaking thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes then, this Court held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The petition is patently without merit. In the first place, it is not even sufficient in form and substance to justify the issuance of the
writ of certiorari prayed for. It charges that the Court of Industrial Relations abused its discretion in disregarding the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Batangas in Expropriation Proceedings No. 84 and of this Court in G. R. No L-6191; yet it does not attach
to the petition the decisions allegedly violated by the Court below and point out which particular portion or portions thereof have
been disregarded by the respondent Court."cralaw virtua1aw library
The same principle was applied in the more recent case of NAWASA v. Municipality of Libmanan, Et Al., 7 wherein this Court
dismissed (by Resolution) the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority against
the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, and the municipality of Libmanan. In the following language, this Court emphasized the
importance of complying with the said requirement of Rule 65:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"While paragraph 3 of the petition speaks of the complaint filed by the respondent municipality with the respondent court for
recovery of property with damages (Civil Case No. L-161) no copy thereof is attached to the petition.
"Similarly, paragraph 4 of the petition mentions the decision rendered by the respondent court on December 10, 1965, but no copy
thereof is attached to the petition.
"Again, paragraph 5 of the petition speaks of the order of default entered by the respondent court and of the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner in the case above-mentioned, but no copy of the order of default is attached to the petition.
"Bearing in mind that the petition under consideration was filed for the purpose of enjoining the respondent court from executing the
decision rendered in Civil Case No. L-161, the importance of the missing pleadings is obvious.
"Moreover, the petition is also for the purpose of securing an order commanding the respondent court to approve either the original
or the amended record on appeal filed by petitioner, but no copy of either is attached to its petition.
"In view of the foregoing, the petition under consideration is dismissed."cralaw virtua1aw library
It might be true, as pointed out by appellant, that he received a copy of the programme of the graduation exercises held by the Sero
Elementary School in the morning of the very day of that graduation exercises, implying that he could not have attached then a copy
thereof (to show the decision of the committee of teachers in the ranking of students complained of) to his petition. The stubborn
fact remains, however, that appellant had known of such decision of the said committee of teachers much earlier, as shown by the
circumstance that according to him, even before the filing of his petition with the lower court on the 19th of May, 1965, he had
personally appealed the said committees decision with various higher authorities of the above-named school, who merely passed the
buck to each other. Moreover, appellant mentions in his petition various other documents or papers as the Service Manual for
Teachers allegedly violated by appellees in the constitution of their committee; altered grading sheets; and erasures in his Grade I
certificate which appellant never bothered to attach to his petition. There could be no doubt then that he miserably failed to
comply with the requirement of Rule 65 above-mentioned. With this conclusion, it is no longer necessary to pass upon the other two
errors assigned by Appellant.
FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against Appellant.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 46496. February 27, 1940.]
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and proprietor, and NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD,
Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., Respondents.
Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court of Industrial Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia; for National Labor Union.
Claro M. Recto; for petitioner "Ang Tibay."
Jose M. Casal; for National Workers Brotherhood.
SYLLABUS
1. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; POWER. The nature of the Court of Industrial Relations and of its power is extensively
discussed in the decision.
2. ID.; ID.; TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE; DUE PROCESS OF LAW. The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly
constrained by technical rules of procedure, and Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may
deem just and equitable (Goseco v. Court of Industrial Relations Et. Al., G. R. No. 46673). The fact, however, that the Court of
Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in
justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials
and investigations of an administrative character.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings
of this character. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case
and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While
the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely,
that of having something to support its decision. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the
evidence must be substantial. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his
own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving
at a decision. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controvercial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR; NEW TRIAL GRANTED. In the light of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient
to observe here that, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Workers Brotherhood (appendix
A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a rational way, a conclusion of
law. This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for by the respondent National Labor Union,
Inc. The interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents
referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the
Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely
attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby,
granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it re-open the
case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth in the
decision.
DECISION
LAUREL, J.:
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled case has filed a motion for
reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, we reconsider the following legal conclusions of the majority
opinion of this Court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin termino fijo de duracion o que no sea para una determinada,
termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que llega el plazo fijado para el pago de los salarios segun
costumbre en la localidad o cuando se termine la obra;
"2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya individual ya colectivamente, con ella, sin tiempo fijo, y
que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus trabajos por haberse declarado paro forzoso en la fabrica en la cual trabajan, dejan de ser
empleados u obreros de la misma;

"3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus obreros sin tiempo fijo de duracion y sin ser
para una obra determinada y que se niega a readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron como consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es
culpable de practica injusta ni incurre en la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a
readmitir se deba a que dichos obreros pertenecen a un determinado organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado de ser
empleados suyos por terminacion del contrato en virtud del paro."cralaw virtua1aw library
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgment rendered by the majority of
this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. That Toribio Teodoros claim that on September 26,1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary
for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the
Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.
"2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all
the members of the National Labor Union, Inc., from work.
"3. That Toribio Teodoros letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of leather soles from the
States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the
Philippine Army.
"4. That the National Workers Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the
existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U. S., 548, petitioners printed memorandum, p. 25.)
"5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and elective representation are highly
essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
"6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of dissensions and continuous civil war in
Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of
American origin where industrial peace has always been the rule.
"7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc.,
and unjustly favoring the National Workers Brotherhood.
"8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence they could
not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
"9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily
mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein."cralaw virtua1aw library
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations and to the motion for new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein- after stated with reference to the motion for a new trial of the respondent
National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the SolicitorGeneral. We shall proceed to dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent labor union. Before doing this, however, we deem
it necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, to make several observations regarding the nature of the
powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding principles which should be observed in the trial of cases
brought before it. We have re-examined the entire record of the proceedings had before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case,
and we have found no substantial evidence to indicate that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or
activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during the hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and
conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit their own views. It is evident that these
statements and expressions of views of counsel have no evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth
Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a
mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is
invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as
will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasijudicial
functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and
extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy
or dispute arising between, and/or affecting, employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and
regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It
shall take cognizance for purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute
causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wageshares or compensation, hours of labor or
conditions of tenancy or employment, between employers and employees or laborers and between landlords and tenants or farmlaborers, provided that the number of employees, laborers or tenants or farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or
agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and
certified by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be death with by the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section A,
ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to
settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall
investigate and study all pertinent facts related to the industry concerned or to the industries established in a designated locality,
with a view to determining the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of
laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or lessees to landowners. (Section 5,

ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for
that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific
controversies between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial
functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.
In the case of Goseco v. Court of Industrial Relations Et. Al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to
point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to
"act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be
bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section
20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the
industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed
necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (Section 13,
ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated
by this Court to carry into effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be
said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it,
entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due Process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this
character:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1)
The first of these rights is the right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his
own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan v. U. S., 304 U. S. 1, 58 S. Ct.
773, 999, 82 Law. ed 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair
play."cralaw virtua1aw library
(2)
Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights
which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U. S. 298 U. S. 468, 56
S. Ct. 906, 80 Law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this Court in Edwards v. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence,
without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or
persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration."cralaw virtua1aw library
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a
place when directly attached." (Edwards v. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more fundamental principle that the
genius of constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation
upon power.
(4)
Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila v. Agustin, G. R. No. 45844,
promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia & Maryland
Coach Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U. S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law ed 965.) Substantial evidence is more
than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."cralaw virtua1aw library
(Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v.
Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758,
760.) . . . The statute provides that the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling. The obvious
purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere
admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order.
(Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 93, 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene &
Southern Ry. Co., 265 U. S. 274, 288, 44 S. Ct. 565, 569, 68 Law. ed. lola; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420,
442, 50 S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far
as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not
constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv.
Op., p. 131.)"
(5)
The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission v. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431. )Only by
confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and
meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that
purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the
controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but
their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any
industrial or agricultural dispute of any matter under its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal, a
justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may
delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but
such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers (Section 10, ibid.)
(6)
The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the
law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the
volume of work is such that it is literally impossible for the titular heads of the Court of Industrial Relations personally to decide all
controversies coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory authority authorizing
examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no
such statutory authority.

(7)
The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties
to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
In the light of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged agreement between
the Ang Tibay and the National Workers Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual
basis upon which to predicate, in a rational way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for by the respondent National Labor Union, Inc. In
the portion of the petition hereinabove quoted of the National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of leather
material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the National Labor
Union, Inc., from work" and this averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and
the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather" ; that "the National Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or
employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further alleges under oath
that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his substantial averments "are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with
the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial
Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are of such far reaching importance and effect that their admission
would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered therein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay
and its arguments against the petition. By and large, after considerable discussion, we have come to the conclusion that the interest
of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion
and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial
Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties
adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire
record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such
evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 129958. November 25, 1999]
MIGUEL MELENDRES, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RUPERTO P. CONCEPCION, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari is the Resolution[1] of the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated July 17,
1997, in SPR No. 16-97 entitled Ruperto P. Concepcion, Petitioner v. Hon. Maria Cristina Cornejo, Presiding Judge, Branch 66, MTC,
Pasig City and Miguel Melendres, Jr., Respondents the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the questioned Orders of public respondent are hereby set aside for being NULL and VOID. The public respondent is
hereby ordered to cease and desist from further acting on Election Case No. 083-97 entitled Miguel Melendres, Jr. v. Ruperto
Concepcion.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing and promulgating ex parte the assailed resolution
without complying with the provisions of Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 28, Section 1 of Rule 10, Sections 1 to 6 of Rule 14, Sections 1 to
4 of Rule 17 and Section 9 of Rule 18, all of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
The factual antecedents of the controversy which are matters of record have been summed thus by the COMELEC:
Petitioner (herein private respondent Ruperto P. Concepcion) and private respondent (herein petitioner Miguel Melendres, Jr.) were
candidates for the position of Barangay Chairman of Barangay Caniogan, Pasig City, in the May 12, 1997 barangay elections. After
the counting of the votes, petitioner (Concepcion) was proclaimed as the duly elected Barangay Chairman. On May 21, 1997, private
respondent (Melendres) filed an election protest against petitioner (Concepcion) with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
contesting therein the results of the election in all forty-seven (47) precincts of said barangay. The case was assigned to Branch 68.
On June 4, 1997, after the preliminary hearing of the election case, it was shown that no filing or docket fee was paid by the
protestant therein, which payment is required in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 37, Sec. 6. Petitioner Concepcion moved to
dismiss the case on the ground of failure to comply with this requirement. In the contested Order, public respondent denied the
motion to dismiss on the ground that the requirement of payment of filing or docket fee is merely an administrative procedural
matter and [is] not jurisdictional. Petitioner presented an oral motion for reconsideration of the Order, which oral motion was
promptly denied by public respondent. Consequently, the contested ballots were scheduled for review.
On June 16, 1997, Concepcion filed this instant case for Certiorari and Prohibition, with a prayer for a Temporary Restraining order
and/or Preliminary Injunction. On June 25, 1997, he filed an Urgent Motion for Immediate Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order to temporarily restrained (sic) public respondent from commencing with the revision [of the ballots], pending the hearing of
the petition, in order to maintain the status quo and in order that the issues raised and the prayer stated in the petition may not
become moot and academic; xxx The move was prompted by the Order issued by the public respondent on June 6, 1997, which
deferred the revision of ballots to give way to the petition for certiorari brought to this Commission, as it involves a question of the
courts jurisdiction. The order also stated that, as agreed upon by both parties, if no injunction is issued by the end of June, 1997,
the revision of ballots would proceed.
On July 1, 1997, public respondent issued another Order scheduling the revision of ballots on July 9, considering that no injunctive
writ was issued by the Commission. Consequently, on July 7, 1997, the latter filed a Second Urgent Motion for Immediate Issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order with this Commission.
On the same day, respondent Melendres filed with the Commission a Manifestation wherein he claimed that the contested issue of
non-payment of filing fee was now moot and academic as the same had been paid on June 6, 1997, ten days before this petition was
filed.
On the basis of the foregoing factual recital, respondent COMELEC rendered the challenged Order nullifying the orders of the public
respondent in SPR No. 16-97.
Asserting that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, petitioner contends that
public respondent erred
14.1 in disregarding and violating its own rules, specifically Section 5, Rule 28 of the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, in not
issuing and serving an order requiring the Respondents to answer the petition filed before it;
14.2 in disregarding and violating its own rules, specifically Section 1, Rule 10 of the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, in not
issuing and serving the Summons and COPY OF THE PETITION to the Respondents, both private and public, in SPR 16-97;
14.3 in disregarding and violating its own rules, specifically the provisions of Sections 2 to 6, Rule 14 of the COMELEC RULES OF
PROCEDURE requiring the issuance, service and proof of service of summons to the respondents in SPR 16-97;
14.4 In disregarding and violating its own rules, specifically Section 6, Rule 28 and Sections 1 to 4, Rule 17, when it did not set or
conduct any hearing in SPR 16-97;
14.5 in disregarding and violating its own rules when it promulgated the questioned Resolution despite the clear provision of Section
6, Rule 28, that it shall render judgment only AFTER SUCH HEARING;

14.6 in disregarding and violating its own rules, specifically Section 9 (a), Rule 18 of the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, when it
issued the questioned Resolution even though SPR 16-97 is not yet DEEMED SUBMITTED FOR DECISION;
14.7 in resolving the Petition (SPR 16-97) without a hearing, when Respondent Concepcion himself requests for a decision on his
petition AFTER HEARING;
14.8 in acting on the Petition for Certiorari raised by Respondent Concepcion even though it involves the denial of his Motion to
Dismiss by the lower Court, a PROHIBITED PLEADING under Section 1, Rule 13 of the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE;
14.9 in ruling on the issue of non-payment of filing fee, when said issue was never raised as a Special or Affirmative Defense in the
Answer of Respondent Concepcion;
14.10 in circumventing its own rules when it allowed the issue of non-payment of filing fee to be discussed even if the same was not
raised in the Answer, but only in a Motion to Dismiss, a prohibited pleading under the RULES;
14.11 in applying the case of Gatchalian v. Court of Appeals[2] even if the Gatchalian case involves the NON-PAYMENT of filing fee,
whereas SPR 16-97 involves the WILLFUL REFUSAL of the Clerk of Court to accept the payment of filing fee;
14.12 in applying the Gatchalian case notwithstanding FULL PAYMENT made by the Petitioner following a lawful order of the Court;
14.13 in ignoring the real issue in SPR 16-97, which is the right and the authority of the lower court to order the Clerk of Court to
accept the payment of the filing fee in protest cases;
14.14 in overturning the doctrine consistently laid down by the Supreme Court in a long line of decisions that election cases must
be construed liberally to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical
objections; and
14.15 in not applying the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rodillas v. Commission on Elections[3] consistent with the
provisions of Section 18 of Rule 42 of the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURES.
The Court issued a Resolution dated September 14, 1999 which, among others, gave due course to the petition and required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice. However, in view of petitioners Urgent Motion for
Early Resolution[4] and private respondents Comment[5] thereon, echoing petitioners desire that the petition be immediately
resolved in order that the issues raised may be finally put to rest, the Court deemed it to the best interest of justice to dispense
with the filing of the said memoranda and to forthwith decide the questions raised on the basis of the parties pleadings.
The issues raised here boils down to whether or not: 1.] the payment of the filing fee in an election protest is a jurisdictional
requirement and non-compliance can be a valid basis for the dismissal of the protest; 2.] subsequent full payment of the filing fee
after the lapse of the reglementary period will cure the jurisdictional defect; and, 3.] public respondent observed due process prior to
the promulgation of the questioned resolution in SPR No. 16-97.
With regard to the first issue, it appears from the record that private respondent was proclaimed as the duly elected Punong
Barangay of Barangay Caniogan, Pasig City on May 12, 1997.[6] On May 21, 1997, petitioner filed an election protest challenging the
results of the barangay elections with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City where the same was docketed as Election Protest
Case No. 083-97 and raffled to Branch 68 of said court.
On June 4, 1997, after the preliminary hearing of the case, it was shown that no filing or docket fee was paid by
petitioner/protestant,[7] prompting private respondent/protestee to move for the dismissal of the election protest on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction for failure to comply with the jurisdictional requirement of payment of filing fee as required under Section 6, Rule
37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that
SEC. 6. Filing fee. No protest shall be given due course without the payment of a filing fee of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00) and
the legal research fee as required by law. (Emphasis supplied).
On June 5, 1997, the Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 68, issued an Order which reads:
Upon verification with the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, it was found out that indeed, no filing fee was paid
for this petition, as none was collected by the Clerk of Court from all those who filed election protests.
Be that as it may, the question raised in this case is whether or not compliance with Sec. 6, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure is jurisdictional.
In ordinary civil actions to which the Revised Rules of Court and other related doctrines apply, the court acquires jurisdiction over the
case only upon payment of the filing fee. It should be noted, however, that the instant case is not an ordinary action but an election
case. By express provision of Rule 143, the Revised Rules of Court shall not apply to election cases except by analogy or in a
suppletory character whenever practicable and convenient. Suffice it to say that the suppletory character is applied only when a law
or Rule in question is silent on the matter in contention. The COMELEC Rule in question is, however, explicit. Under the
circumstances, the Revised Rules of Court and its related doctrines do not apply to this case.
As afore-cited, the COMELEC Rule in question (Sec. 6, Rule 37) is explicit. The Rule does not speak of conferment of jurisdiction
upon the Court or the acquisition by the Court of jurisdiction upon payment of the filing fee. Nothing extant in the COMELEC Rules
either expressly or by implication requires the payment of the filing fee for purposes of conferment upon or acquisition by the Court
of jurisdiction over the case. The Rule speaks only of giving due course to the protest upon the payment of the filing fee.

Undeniably therefore, the payment of the filing fee is an administrative procedural matter, proceeding as it does from an
administrative body.
Due course has been given to this protest when it was accepted for filing by the Clerk of Court without payment of the filing fee.
There was an honest error of omission on the part of the Clerk of Court as evidenced by the fact that all the other election protests
were accepted for filing by the Clerk of Court without the payment of filing fee. This petition was no exception. There simply was an
administrative procedural lapse but which does not detract from the fact that the Court has jurisdiction over this case as conferred
upon it by substantive law, the Omnibus Election Code.
The Court had acquired jurisdiction over the case. The jurisdiction of the Court over a contest attaches when motion containing the
proper jurisdictional averments is filed within the time prescribed by law; the jurisdiction of the Court cannot thereafter be
determined by law; what the law itself may do or may not do (Lucero vs. De Guzman, 46 Phil. 852). The payment of the filing fee is
not one of the jurisdictional facts required to be alleged in the petition. At any rate, the sufficiency of the allegations in the petition
is not essential for the acquisition of jurisdiction (which had already been acquired by the filing of the petition, as afore-cited), but
only to continue in its exercise, once it has been acquired (Santiago vs. Ignacio, 52 Phil. 376).
It is axiomatic that an election contest, involving as it does not only the adjudication and settlement of private interests of the rival
candidates but also the paramount need of dispelling once and for all the uncertainty that beclouds the real choice of the electorate
with respect to who shall discharge the prerogative of the officers within their girt, is a proceeding imbued with public interest which
raises it onto a plane over and above ordinary civil actions. For this reason, broad perspective[s] of public policy impose upon the
Courts the imperative duty to ascertain by all means within their command who is the real candidate elected in an expeditious
manner as possible, without being fettered in technicalities and procedural barriers to the end that the will of the people may not be
frustrated (Sibulo vda. de Mesa, et al. vs. Hon. Eulogio Mencias, et al. Oct. 29, 1966, citing Ibasco vs. Ilao, et al., Dec. 20, 1960.)
On the basis of all the foregoing considerations, it is resolved that the payment of the filing of fee for purposes of an election protest
and counter-protest is not jurisdictional and, hence, non-compliance therewith at the outset will not operate to deprive the Court of
jurisdiction conferred upon it by law and acquired pursuant to the Rules. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss the instant petition is
hereby denied.
The herein protestant is hereby directed to pay the filing fee of P100.00 with respect to his protest, and the protestee is directed to
pay the filing fee with respect to his counter-protest.[8]
Aggrieved, private respondent filed on June 16, 1997 a petition for certiorari and prohibition with respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), docketed as SPR No. 16-97 entitled Ruperto P. Concepcion, Petitioner v. Hon. Maria Cristina Cornejo and
Miguel Melendres, Jr., Respondents.
The COMELEC overruled the assailed Order of the Metropolitan Trial Court reasoning as follows:
Petitioner contends that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in not dismissing
the election protest for failing to comply with the required payment of filing and legal research fees as prescribed in the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, such requirement being jurisdictional, as opposed to the contention of public respondent. The COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, Rule 37, Sec. 6, states:
Sec. 6. Filing fee. No protest shall be given due course without the payment of a filing fee of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00) and
the legal research fee as required by law. (Emphasis supplied).
There is no denying private respondents failure to comply with this requirement, given the certification of the Clerk of Court of
Branch 68. Melendres failure to pay said fee at the time the election protest was filed is also clear from the questioned Order and in
the July 7, 1997 Manifestation of Concepcion filed with this Commission. Hence, the contested Orders must be reversed.
In Gatchalian v. Court of Appeals,[9] the Supreme Court has stated clearly that [i]t is the payment of the filing fee that vests
jurisdiction of the court over the election protest xxx. In the case of Pahilan v. Tabalba,[10] the Court recognized a distinction
between the partial payment of filing fees and the complete absence of such payment. If there is complete absence of payment, the
case is not given due course. The court entertained the case because there was, at least incomplete payment of the filing fees.
The Court compared this to the case of Malimit v. Degamo[11] wherein there was no payment of the fees at all. The Supreme Court
stated therein that [b]efore the payment of the docket fees, the case is not deemed duly registered and docketed.[12]
The ruling in Sun Insurance Office Ltd. v. Asuncion[13] is a prelude to the Pahilan ruling. There was likewise an incomplete payment
of the said fees in Sun Insurance, and the
subsequent payment of the correct [amount was allowed] provided it is within the reglementary period or before prescription has
set in xxx [and that] there was no intent on the part of the petitioners therein to defraud the government xxx[14]
The requirement of payment of filing fees is not, therefore, a mere procedural matter but is, rather, jurisdictional. The Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 68 could not be said to have acquired jurisdiction despite the complete failure of the private
respondent to pay the said fees.
Private respondent claims that the payment of the filing fee ten (10) days before this petition was filed, rendered the same moot and
academic. This is untenable. The Rules of Procedure of the Commission, in Sec. 6 of Rule 37 requires the payment of the filing fee
of one hundred pesos for the proper court to acquire jurisdiction. However, this has to be read in conjunction with Sec. 4 of the
same rule:
Sec. 4. Period within which to file petition. The petition shall be filed within ten (10) days after the proclamation.

Given the cited rulings of the Supreme Court above, especially those in the Malimit and Gatchalian cases, such late payment does
not vest any jurisdiction upon the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 68, said payment having been made beyond the
period prescribed.
It needs be stressed that the power of administrative agencies to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily
limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment.[15] However, [A] long line of cases establish the basic rule that the
courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation
of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.[16] More explicitly
Generally, the interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement a statute, is accorded great
respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts.[17] The reason behind this rule was explained in Nestle Philippines,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,[18] in this wise:
The rationale for this rule relates not only to the emergence of the multifarious needs of a modern or modernizing society and the
establishment of diverse administrative agencies for addressing and satisfying those needs; it also relates to the accumulation of
experience and growth of specialized capabilities by the administrative agency charged with implementing a particular statute. In
Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs[19] the Court stressed that executive officials are presumed to have
familiarized themselves with all the considerations pertinent to the meaning and purpose of the law, and to have formed an
independent, conscientious and competent expert opinion thereon. The courts give much weight to the government agency or
officials charged with the implementation of the law, their competence, expertness, experience and informed judgment, and the fact
that they frequently are drafters of the law they interpret.
As a general rule, contemporaneous construction is resorted to for certainty and predictability in the laws,[20] especially those
involving specific terms having technical meanings.
However, courts will not hesitate to set aside such executive interpretation when it is clearly erroneous, or when there is no
ambiguity in the rule,[21] or when the language or words used are clear and plain or readily understandable to any ordinary
reader.[22]
Stated differently, when an administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a preexisting law and the administrative interpretation is at best advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what the law
means.[23] Thus an action by an administrative agency may be set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, abuse
of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law.[24]
However, there is no cogent reason to depart from the general rule because the findings of the COMELEC conforms to rather than
conflicts with the governing statute and controlling case law on the matter.
It will be observed that the order of the Metropolitan Trial Court was challenged on certiorari before respondent COMELEC because
private respondents motion to dismiss was denied on the basis of the trial courts observation that the non-payment of filing fees is
not jurisdictional but is merely an administrative matter which did not affect its jurisdiction.
This ruling of the trial court directly contravenes this Courts explicit pronouncement in Gatchalian v. Court of Appeals[25] declaring
in no uncertain terms that
It is the payment of the filing fee that vests jurisdiction of the court over the election protest, not the payment of the docket fees for
the claim of damages and attorneys fees. For failure to pay the filing fee prescribed under Section 9, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure, [n]o protest xxx shall be given due course without the payment of a filing fee in the amount of Three Hundred Pesos
(P300.00) for each interest. (Emphasis and italics supplied.)
Apropos the second issue, the subsequent payment of the filing fee on June 6, 1997 will not extricate petitioner from his predicament
considering that before the payment of the filing fee, a case is not deemed duly registered and docketed.[26] In other words, the
date of the payment of the filing fee is deemed the actual date of the filing of the election protest and, viewed vis--vis Section 3,
Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that
SEC. 3. Period to file petition. The petition shall be filed within ten (10) days following the date of proclamation of the results of
the election.
the subsequent payment of the filing fee on June 6, 1997 did not cure the jurisdictional defect because the said date which is
deemed the actual date of filing the election protest is twenty-five (25) days after the proclamation of the results of the election on
May 12, 1997 and, needless to state, way beyond the ten-day reglementary period to file the same. In this regard, it bears stressing
that
The rule prescribing the ten-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional and the filing of an election protest beyond the period
deprives the court of jurisdiction over the protest.[27] Violation of this rule should not be taken lightly nor should it be brushed aside
as a mere procedural lapse that can be overlooked. The rule is not a mere technicality but an essential requirement, the noncompliance of which would oust the court of jurisdiction over the case.
In Lim vs.COMELEC,[28] citing Kho vs. COMELEC,[29] this court reiterated the long standing rule that a counterprotest must be filed
within the period provided by law, otherwise, the court acquires no jurisdiction to entertain it.[30]
Relatedly, if the docket fees are not fully paid on time, even if the election protest is timely filed, the court is deprived of jurisdiction
over the case.[31] (Emphasis and italics supplied).

Neither can petitioner seek refuge behind his argument that the motion to dismiss filed by private respondent is a prohibited
pleading under Section 1, Rule 13 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure because the said provision refers to proceedings filed before
the COMELEC. The applicable provisions on the matter are found in Part VI of the Rules of Procedure titled PROVISIONS
GOVERNING ELECTION CONTESTS BEFORE TRIAL COURT and as this Court pointedly stated in Aruelo v. Court of Appeals:[32]
It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that motions to dismiss and bill of
particulars are not allowed in election protests or quo warranto cases pending before regular courts.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The
power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court.[33]
(Emphasis and italics supplied)
The grounds relied upon to support his position in the third issue is, likewise, no refuge for petitioner who insists that public
respondent denied him his right to due process by violating its own rules. More specifically, petitioner contends that the COMELEC
did not comply with the requirements regarding the issuance and service of summons and conducting hearings for the purpose of
receiving evidence under Rule 14 of the COMELEC Rules. Petitioners arguments along this line fails to persuade. It must be borne
in mind that the assailed order of the Metropolitan Trial Court was elevated to the COMELEC by way of certiorari. Section 1, Rule 14
does not require the issuance and service of summons in cases involving appeals from the decisions of the courts in election
protests, special actions, special cases, special reliefs and special proceedings, viz:
SEC. 1. Clerk to issue summons. Unless otherwise provided herein, the Clerk of Court concerned shall issue the corresponding
summons to the protestee or repondent within three (3) days following the filing of a protest or petition in ordinary actions except
appeals from decisions of courts in election protest cases, in special actions, special cases, special reliefs and in special proceedings.
In relation to the foregoing, Section 4, Rule 28 of the COMELEC Rules provides that:
SEC. 4. Duty of Clerk of Court of the Commission. Upon the filing of the petition, the Clerk of Court shall calendar the case for an
en banc ex parte hearing of the Commission to determine if it is sufficient in form and substance. (Emphasis and italics supplied).
It can be clearly gleaned from these complementing provisions of Section 4, Rule 28 that the petitioner has no right to require the
COMELEC to first hear and receive evidence before deciding the merits of the petition for certiorari.
At any rate, petitioner can hardly feign denial of due process given the prevailing facts of this case. It appears from the record that
on June 16, 1997, before filing with the COMELEC the petition for certiorari challenging the validity of the Metropolitan Trial Courts
order, petitioner was furnished a copy of the said petition by registered mail. In fact, no less than petitioner himself expressly
admits in the petition[34] that he received a copy of the petition for certiorari and prohibition on June 19, 1997 or three (3) days
after the filing thereof with respondent COMELEC. It must be remembered that a formal notice would have been an idle ceremony
where an adverse party, as in this case, had actual knowledge of the proceedings.[35]
What, however, spells finis to any further pretensions of petitioner that he was neither afforded an opportunity to be heard nor was
jurisdiction acquired over his person is his filing on June 23, 1997 of an exhaustive Comment[36] to the petition. Petitioner, in filing
the said pleading, submitted himself to the jurisdiction of respondent COMELEC because as has been consistently held in a litany of
cases, jurisdiction over a party is acquired either by coercive process, generally by service of summons, or by voluntary
appearance.[37] In other words, the filing of the Comment as well as a Manifestation subsequently filed on July 7, 1997[38] cured
the lack of summons considering that [V]oluntary appearance is equivalent to service of summons, in fact it even cures the defect
of summons.[39]
Finally, with regard to the requisite of hearing, suffice it to state that
A formal trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process. It is enough that the parties are given a
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present evidence on which a fair decision
can be based xxx.
xxx xxx

xxx

Commenting on the same topic, we said earlier in Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan[40]

Due process as a constitutional precept does not, always and in all situations, require a trial-type proceedings. The essence of due
process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of ones
defense. To be heard does not only mean verbal arguments in court. One may also be heard through pleadings where opportunity
to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of due process.[41]
All told, the issue of jurisdiction was rendered moot by petitioners active participation in the proceedings below[42] and such active
participation of the petitioner against whom the action was brought is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a
willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or bodys jurisdiction.[43]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 63915. April 24, 1985.]
LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], Petitioners, v. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the
President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA
CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacaang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director,
Bureau of Printing, Respondents.
Lorenzo M. Taada, Abraham F. Sarmiento, Mabini Legal Aid Committee for petitioners
Solicitor General for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTES; PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE; LEGAL PERSONALITY OF PETITIONERS TO
FILE MANDAMUS TO COMPEL PUBLICATION, RECOGNIZED. The subject of the petition is to compel the performance of a public
duty and petitioners maintain they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course. The right sought to
be enforced by petitioners is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not
allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that
the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for
respondents in this case.
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ARTICLE 2 CIVIL CODE DOES NOT PRECLUDE PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE EVEN IF THE LAW
ITSELF PROVIDES FOR DATE OF ITS EFFECTIVITY. That publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for
the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates is correct only insofar as it equates the
effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion
is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. The clear object of Article 2 of the Civil Code is to give the general public adequate notice of
the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
4.
ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLICATION OF PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES "OF A PUBLIC NATURE" OR "OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY," A
REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS; UNPUBLISHED PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES WITHOUT FORCE AND EFFECT. The publication of all
presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that
provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as tax and revenue
measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons such as administrative and
executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. (People v. Que Po Lay,
94 Phil. 640; Balbuena, Et. Al. v. Secretary of Education, Et Al., 110 Phil. 150) It is needless to add that the publication of
presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before
a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court therefore declares that
presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.
5.
ID.; ID.; ID.; DECLARATION OF INVALIDITY OF UNPUBLISHED PRESIDENTIAL DECREES DOES NOT AFFECT THOSE WHICH
HAVE BEEN ENFORCED OR IMPLEMENTED PRIOR TO THEIR PUBLICATION. The implementation/enforcement of presidential
decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration . . .that an all inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."cralaw virtua1aw library
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring with qualification:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTES; PUBLICATION REQUIREMENT NEED NOT BE CONFINED TO THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE.
It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party
who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. But such publication
required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It
conduces to certainty. That is to be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all
circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree, or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding
force and effect. To so hold would raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that
such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such
requirement in the Constitution.
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT IN ART. 2 CIVIL CODE DOES NOT HAVE THE JUDICIAL FORCE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMAND. The Chief Justices qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of
a legislative or executive act of a general application. He is not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the
Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided."
Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of

a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different
rule.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; TO DECLARE UNPUBLISHED PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT WOULD RESULT
IN UNDESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES. Nor does the Chief Justice agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice
Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal
character. That would be, in his opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. He finds
himself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTES, PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE; NECESSARY PURSUANT TO THE BASIC
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and
ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstanced and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set
procedure. The Court had consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to
be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation," (People v. de
Dios, G.R. No. L-11003, August 31, 1959, per the late Chief Justice Paras) citing the settled principle based on due process
enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents. especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or
circular must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties." Without official
publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis
nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are
ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith."cralaw virtua1aw library
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPONDENTS CONTENTION THAT "ONLY LAWS WHICH ARE SILENT AS TO THEIR EFFECTIVITY DATE NEED
TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY," UNTENABLE. The plain text and meaning of the Civil
Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided," i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that had been
duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the
same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect (only) one year (not 15 days) after such publication." To sustain
respondents misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official
Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity" would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Codes indispensable and essential
requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier
effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the
Civil Code for its proper dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTES; PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE; RETROACTIVITY IN EFFECTIVITY DATE NOT
ALLOWED WHERE IT WILL RUN COUNTER TO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OR DESTROY VESTED RIGHTS. There cannot be any
question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be published. When a date effectivity is mentioned in
the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that
the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the
retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.
PLANA, J., separate opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTES; PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE NOT ESSENTIAL FOR EFFECTIVITY FOR
EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS. The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity,
unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected
parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process
clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.
2.
ID.; ID.; PUBLICATION MAY BE MADE ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides
that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided." Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it
will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date
but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
3.
ID.; ID.; COMMONWEALTH ACT 638 CANNOT NULLIFY OR RESTRICT OPERATION OF A STATUTE WITH A PROVISION AS TO
ITS EFFECTIVITY. Not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public
nature." Moreover, Commonwealth Act No. 638 does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity
of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general
application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision
of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume the role.
DECISION
ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973
Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or
otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and or cause
the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive
orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a]
Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325,
326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573,
574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143,
1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b]
Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192,
193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248-251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283,
285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397,
405, 438-440, 444-445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642,
665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964, 997, 1149-1178, 1180-1278.
c]

General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d]
Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 15501558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734,
1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816,
1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 18761889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 21632244.
e]
Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457-471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536,
538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611-647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712786, 788-852, 854-857.
f]

Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.

g]

Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360-378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal
personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are
personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said
petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties"
within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act
required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
wrongful acts of the defendant."cralaw virtua1aw library
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the
performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino v. Governor General, 3 this Court held that
while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some
private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the
public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell v.
Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the
proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a
citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431]."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus
proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in the town of
Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party to
proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think
that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular
case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not
exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error.

"No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the Respondent. The circumstances
which surround this case are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these
proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and
represent the people in cases of this character."cralaw virtua1aw library
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizens legal personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the
present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the
fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of
any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to
represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws
where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in
question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for
their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided, . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Courts construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this
Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its
effectivity date for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day
following its publication but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication.
Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not
preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus,
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Section 1.
There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of
the Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts
of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by
law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have
general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The clear object of the above quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate
their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
"ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at
this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people
are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa and for the diligent ones, ready
access to the legislative records no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication,
the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of
informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion
genrica de leyes, se comprenden tambin los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de
conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad." 5
The very first clause of Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette . . ." The word
"shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of
the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what
should be published in the official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what
must be included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously,
presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the people,
such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or
class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of
due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta v. COMELEC 7 :jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the requirement of
due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the
texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific
contents."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force
and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts
done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put

the question as to whether the Courts declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their
publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set
forth in Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
"The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law;
that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton
v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such
broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of
a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered
in various aspects with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of
status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of
the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have
engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."cralaw virtua1aw library
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter v. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law,
albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative
fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration .
. . that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."cralaw virtua1aw library
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be
published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not
been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are
available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented
or enforced by the government. In Pesigan v. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is
necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected
thereby." The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment
that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been
published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect
immediately."cralaw virtua1aw library
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are
of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concur.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the
Official Gazette.
De la Fuente, J., Insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general applicability
ineffective, until due publication thereof.