Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) 349359

www.elsevier.com/locate/pragma

Is semantics still possible?

Jonathan Berg
Department of Philosophy, University of Haifa, Haifa 31-905 Israel

Abstract
The standard view of semanticsthat every disambiguated sentence has a determinate
semantic content, relative to an assignment of contents to its indexical expressions, and not
necessarily identical to what may be conveyed (pragmatically) by its utteranceis defended
against standard objections and is also argued for on independent grounds, which suggest that
resistance to the view comes from a failure to distinguish between strict semantics and
loose semantics. # 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Semantics; Pragmatics; Context; Meaning; What is said; Literal; Nonliteral

1. The question
In the last decade enormous progress seems to have been made in the syntactic
theory of natural languages . . . Comparable progress seems not to have been made
in the semantic theory of natural languages, and perhaps it is time to ask why this
should be the case. Why is the theory of meaning so hard ? (Putnam, 1970: 139).
When Hilary Putnam posed this question, over 30 years ago, he was concerned in
particular with the semantics of natural kind termswhich he showed to be not
nearly as simple as previously supposed. Nevertheless, he eventually answered the
question with guarded optimism:
Why, then, is semantics so hard? In terms of the foregoing, I want to suggest that
semantics is a typical social science. The sloppiness, the lack of precise theories and
laws, the lack of mathematical rigor, are all characteristic of the social sciences
today. A general and precise theory. . .is still a long way o. But the fact that Utopia
is a long way o does not mean that daily life should come to a screeching halt.
There is plenty for us to investigate, in our sloppy and impressionistic fashion, and
there are plenty of real results to be obtained. The rst step is to free ourselves from

E-mail address: jonathan@research.haifa.ac.il

0378-2166/02/$ - see front matter # 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
PII: S0378-2166(01)00044-3

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J. Berg / Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) 349359

the oversimplications foisted upon us by the tradition, and to see where the real
problems lie. I hope this paper has been a contribution to that rst step (1970: 142).
Despite this optimism, Putnam (1997) has more recently joined those (such as
Searle, 1978 and Travis, 1989, 1991, 1997) who point to a dierent source of diculty in semantics: a sentence, simply as a sentence, Putnam (1997:167)
declares, doesnt have a determinate content apart from particular speakings. So if
a semantic theory is supposed to determine for each sentence what its content is in
general, it would seem that semantics is not possible after all.
I believe that, once again, doubts about the possibility of semantics (at least as
standardly construed) may be assuaged by taking the rst step of freeing ourselves
from some common oversimplicationsthis time not of the relation between natural kind terms and stereotypical characteristics, but of the relation between the
semantic contents of words and our understandings of particular speakings. And so,
following Putnams example, I hope to contribute to that rst step.

2. Clarifying the question

The question at hand is not simply whether or not semantic content is contextdependent.1 It is well-known that the semantic content of at least some sentences
does depend on the context in which the sentence is usedin the sense that the same
sentence can be used to say dierent things in dierent contextsand the standard
view of semantics allows for this.
Consider, for instance, the sentence
(1) Noam likes ying bats.
In one context this sentence might be used to say something about a certain kind of
animal, and in another context it might used to say something about a certain kind
of sports equipment. The standard view of semantics accommodates this contextdependence by treating the word bat as lexically ambiguousthat is, by ascribing
to the word dierent senses, so that the semantic content of the sentence varies in
accordance with the sense in which the word is being used.
Even relative to a single sense of the word batthe animal, say sentence (1) can
be used in one context to say something about what kind of bats Noam likesthose
that are yingand in another context to say something about what Noam likes to do
with batsto y them. The standard view of semantics accommodates this kind of
context-dependence too, by treating sentences such as (1) as syntactically ambiguous

I take the semantic content of a sentence to be what Grice (1975) called what is said by uttering
the sentence, or what in the general tradition of Frege (1892) and Carnap (1956) has also been called the
proposition (or propositional component) expressed by the sentence. This is intended as nothing more
than a pre-theoretical gloss, without any serious commitment to theoretical claims associated with such
manners of speech. It follows that context-dependence is to be construed as including those cases where
contextual information is required for disambiguation.

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351

that is, by ascribing to (1) dierent syntactic structures, so that the semantic content
of the sentence varies in accordance with how it is parsed.2
Another source of context-dependence in (1) is its present-tense verb, by virtue of
which the sentence can be used on dierent occasions with regard to dierent times.
This is accommodated by the standard view of semantics by treating the word likes
as indexical, referring to dierent times in accordance with when it is used.3
And of course, the name Noam can be used on dierent occasions to refer to
dierent people. On some accounts this is a matter of lexical ambiguity, on others a
matter of indexicality. Either way, the standard view of semantics can handle this
kind of context-dependence as well.
Moreover, apart from these ways in which the semantic content of a sentence
might be context-dependent, the standard view of semantics allows that what one
conveys by uttering a particular sentencean utterances pragmatic contentmay
well depend on the context in indenitely many other ways. Even relative to a particular sense of bats, a particular parsing of (1), a particular time of utterance, and
a particular individual named Noamthe sentence (1) could be used to convey
pragmatically indenitely many messages. In one context, one might utter it sarcastically, to indicate that Noam dislikes ying bats. In another context, one might use
it metaphorically, to convey the message that Noam likes watching athletes ght.
And in yet another context, one might use it to imply that Noam would oppose
disqualifying baseball players who let their bats y. All such context-dependence is
compatible with the standard view of semantics (which thereby incorporates a standard view of pragmatics).
So the real question is not whether semantic content is context-dependent, but
whether it is more context-dependent than the standard view allows for. The claim
at issue may be formulated thus:
Standard View of Semantics (SV):
Every disambiguated sentence has a determinate semantic content, relative to an
assignment of contents to its indexical expressions, and not necessarily identical to
what may be conveyed (pragmatically) by its utterance.
A few caveats are in order. First, not every variation of content across contexts
can properly be construed as a case of ambiguity or indexicality. Ascriptions of
ambiguity or indexicality in any particular case must be compatible with our general
2

Arguably there are also cases of logical ambiguity, distinct from lexical or syntactic ambiguity, as in
the sentence Everybody loves somebody.
3
The standard view of semantics need not restrict indexicality to only the more familiar parameters,
such as speaker, time, and place. Perhaps there are many more exotic parametersperhaps expressions
regarding the time of day are indexical with regard to time zone; perhaps expressions of temporal relations
such as simultaneity are indexical with regard to frames of reference. As Kaplan (1989: 591) explains, If
we think of the formal role played by context within the model-theoretic semantics, then we should say
that context provides whatever parameters are needed. From this point of view, context is a package of
whatever parameters are needed to determine the referent, and thus the content, of the directly referential
expressions of the language.

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J. Berg / Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) 349359

theories of these notions. Secondly, not too much metaphysical weight should be put
on the phrase has a determinate semantic content. This means only that the sentence expresses a unique proposition (or propositional part)that there is something, and only one such thing, which is what is said by uttering the sentence.4 In
particular, determinate is used here only in the sense of xednot in the sense of
exact or precise. Semantic contents may well be messy and vague; whether a particular expression has a particular semantic content may be a matter of degree; the
semantics of natural language may be in a constant state of ux. It is, after all, only by
virtue of complex patterns of human behavior that expressions of natural language
mean what they mean. (Recall Putnams characterization of the social sciences.)
Thirdly, a crucial (though somewhat neglected) part of the standard view of semantics
is that semantic theories are to be complemented by pragmatic theories addressing the
relation between what is said in an utterance and what is thereby conveyed.

3. The standard argument against the standard view

The standard way to argue against the standard view of semantics is by appeal to
problem cases. The argument has this form:
Standard Argument against SV:
(i) An utterance of sentence S is true in one context but not in another.5
(ii) The dierence noted in (i) is not due to ambiguity or indexicality.
::
SV must be wrong.
For example, here is one of Traviss (1989: 18-19) examples:
(2) Theres milk in the refrigerator.
Suppose there is only a puddle of milk at the bottom of the refrigerator. (To avoid
questions about improper denite descriptions we may suppose as well that there is
only one refrigerator.) Now consider an utterance of (2) in the course of a discussion
of how well someone cleaned the refrigerator. In this context, says Travis, the
speaker would be saying something true. On the other hand, consider an utterance
of the same sentence in the same state of aairs, but in a context where the hearer
has indicated that he would like some milk for his coee. In this context, says Travis,

See note 1. I am assuming that a proposition has a unique truth value with respect to any given state
of aairs, but I am not assuming anything about what truth values there aremaybe there are three,
maybe there are a whole range, maybe they consist of intervals on a range. What is important for this
formulation of SV is that the truth value of a proposition depends only on the state of aairs, not on
context.
5
Although in keeping with Travis (1989) I have formulated the claim in terms of utterances as bearers
of truth, the discussion could just as well be formulated in terms of sentences, propositions, or whatever
else one might prefer as the fundamental bearers of truth.

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353

the speaker would be saying something false.6 Assuming that this context-dependence
of (2) is not due to ambiguity or indexicality and is not to be accounted for pragmatically, one may conclude that SV is wrong.
The standard response to such an argument is to reject one of the premises. In the
case at hand, for instance, I would say that the sentence is true in both of the given
contexts. Although (2) might seem false in the context where the hearer is interested
in getting milk for his coee, that is only because uttering the sentence in that
context is likely to be misleading, given the speakers presumed knowledge of
the hearers interests. That is, the hearer is likely to infer from the speakers true
utterance something false, viz., that the speaker believes the refrigerator contains
milk that would be suitable for use in the hearers coee (since that, after all, is what
the conversation is presumably about).7
This is the point where the discussion typically evolves into a slugfest of intuitions.
Where the advocate of SV thinks it is more natural to treat an alleged counterexample to SV as a matter of ambiguity, indexicality, or pragmatics, the opponent
of SV insists that it is not. Though each side may nd reassurance in its own intuitions, neither side convinces the other (Searle, 1978; Travis, 1989, 1991, 1997; Berg,
1993). And so, rather than pursue that discussion here, I wish merely to note that
the Standard Argument against SV relies on intuitions which are, at best, highly
controversial and, hence, ill suited to support controversial conclusions.
One might put the Standard Argument against SV on rmer ground by formulating the premises more charitably, with suitable hedges:
Revised Standard Argument against SV:
(i) An utterance of sentence S seems true in one context but not in another.
(ii) The dierence noted in (i) does not seem to be due to ambiguity, indexicality,
or pragmatic phenomena.
::
SV must be wrong.
Although the argument is not generally put this way, these formulations of the
premises are better supported by the relevant data and might be closer to what the
opponent of SV is actually relying on. However, this version of the Standard Argument
against SV is not valid. For even if SV seems incompatible with a particular case,
it does not follow that it actually is; the semantic facts might be other than they
seem.8
6

Note that Travis is talking about the truth of what is said, not about the felicity of the saying of it. In
terms of propositions (although he does not put it this way) his position is that utterances of the sentence
in each of the two contexts express dierent propositions, one true and one false.
7
Cf. Grices (1975/1989:32) classic example of conversational implicature: A is standing by an
obviously immobilized car and is approached by B; the following exchange takes place: (1)A: I am out of
petrol. B: There is a garage around the corner. (Gloss: B would be infringing the maxim Be relevant
unless he thinks, or thinks it possible, that the garage is open, and has petrol to sell; so he implicates that
the garage is, or at least may be open, etc.)
8
Recognizing its patent invalidity, Travis explicitly rejects the revised formulation (personal communication).

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J. Berg / Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) 349359

The invalidity of the Revised Standard Argument against SV reects two related
problems with the argument. First, putting the argument this way amounts to
shifting the burden of proof; the arguer raises hard cases, and then in the absence of
a ready, convincing account in accordance with SV, it is concluded that SV has been
refuted.9 However, the advocate of SV need not accept thishard cases might just
be hard cases, not counterexamples. This is not to say, of course, that hard cases
never warrant discarding a theory; but for that there must be too many cases that are
too hard. In this regard, theories must be assessed holistically, relative to alternatives.10 And despite the many hard cases facing SV, there is no alternative
(including Traviss (1991) speaking-sensitive semantics) facing fewer hard cases.
Secondly, the invalidity of the Revised Standard Argument suggests that the case
against SV relies on an implicit premise to the eect that semantics must be obvious,
in the sense that competent speakers of a natural language always know what they
are saying. Travis (1997), for instance, reasons that if the rst premise of the Standard Argument against SV is false, then either the sentence in question is true in
both contexts or it is false in both contexts. Which disjunct is right? he asks. One
must choose in a principled way. What the words mean must make one or the other
disjunct plainly, or at least demonstrably, true (1997: 90, emphasis added). If so,
then whatever merely seems to competent speakers to be a counterexample to SV
would indeed be a counterexample.
The problem here is that semantics is not so simple. Competent speakers do not
always know what they are saying. What competent speakers do know by virtue of
their competence is how to use expressions of the language; they know the eects
that various utterances are likely to have in various circumstances. But it does not
follow that they always know what isstrictly speakingsaid. Startling as this
claim might seem, its proof lies in the well-known fact that competent speakers
sometimes disagree about semantic content. Russell (1905) and Strawson (1950), for
instance, were preeminently competent speakers of English, yet they disagreed about
the semantic content of sentences such as The present king of France is bald. Since
they could not both be right, at least one of them was wrong. Hence, competence in
a language does not guarantee explicit knowledge of its semantics.11
Another way to assess the Standard Argument against SV is by a method made
famous by Kripke (1977: 16):

9
The point here is based on the dierence between the two formulations of the rst premise. To
establish the rst premise of the Standard Argument, one must show that an utterance of S is indeed true
in one context but not in another; whereas to establish the rst premise of the Revised Standard Argument, one merely needs to show that this seems to be the case, at least prima facie.
10
Cf. Quine (1951/1961:41): our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense
experience not individually but only as a corporate body
11
This is not to say that there is no sense at all in which linguistic competence requires, or is a sign of,
semantic knowledge. It is only explicitarticulablesemantic knowledge that I am claiming competent
speakers may lack. Linguistic competence is surely no less a sign of semantic knowledge than it is of
syntactic knowledge. But just as we do not expect competent speakers to be able to articulate their syntactic knowledge, so too it should not be surprising that they cannot always correctly articulate their
semantic knowledge.

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355

If someone alleges that a certain phenomenon in English is a counterexample to

a given analysis, consider a hypothetical language which (as much as possible) is like
English except that the analysis is stipulated to be correct. Imagine such a hypothetical language introduced into a community and spoken by it. If the phenomenon in
question would still arise in a community that spoke such a hypothetical language
(which may not be English), then the fact that it arises in English cannot disprove the
hypothesis that the analysis is correct for English.12
The phenomenon alleged to be a counterexample to SV is the inclination among
English speakers to use (for example) the sentence
(2) Theres milk in the refrigerator.
sometimes to convey the message that the refrigerator contains milk that should
have been cleaned up, and sometimes to convey the message that the refrigerator
contains milk suitable for putting in ones coee. Now consider a hypothetical language, Shmenglish, for which SV is stipulated to be correct, and which is (otherwise)
like English as much as possible. For SV to be true of Shmenglish, (2) must have the
same semantic content, and hence the same truth value, in both of the imagined
contexts (both in a discussion of how well the refrigerator has been cleaned and also
in an exchange where the hearer has a salient interest in obtaining milk for his or her
coee). To satisfy this condition, suppose that the semantic content of (2) in
Shmenglish is simply that the refrigerator contains some milk, no matter how little
or in what formso that (2) is true in both contexts. Then the question is whether
Shmenglish speakers would be inclined to use (2) sometimes to convey the message
that the refrigerator contains milk that should have been cleaned up, and sometimes
to convey the message that the refrigerator contains milk suitable for putting in
ones coee. And the answer is yes.
One way to see why Shmenglish speakers would use (2) the same as English
speakers do is in light of the empirical fact that speakers of any language tend not to
bother articulating information that they believe is already apparent to their audience (Greeneld and Dents, 1979). This is especially familiar in our use of improper
denite descriptions (denite descriptions not uniquely satised). In the course of
giving a recipe, for instance, I would say
(3a) Knead the dough for ve minutes, rather than
(3b) Knead the dough that you just made for ve minutes,
12
The reasoning behind this test may be put as follows: if someone points to phenomenon P in language L as a counterexample to analysis A of L, he is apparently relying on the implicit premise that P
would not occur in any language satisfying A. His argument can be put thus:

P occurs in L.
[In any language of which A is true, P would not occur.]
Therefore, A is not true of L.
So if we can imagine a language satisfying A (ex hypothesis) in which P does occur, we have thereby
arrived at a counterexample to the arguments implicit premise.

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J. Berg / Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) 349359

as long as I thought it would be clear which dough I was talking about. Likewise,
instead of saying
(2a) Theres milk in the refrigerator that should have been cleaned up,
Shmenglish speakers would be inclined to use (2), as long as they thought it was
clear that they were talking about milk that should have been cleaned up; and
instead of
(2b) Theres milk in the refrigerator that would be suitable for putting in your coee,
they would again be inclined to use (2), as long as they thought it was clear that they
were talking about milk that would be suitable for putting in ones coee.
Another way to see why Shmenglish speakers would use (2) the same as English
speakers do is by considering how Shmenglish speakers are likely to expect their
utterances to be interpreted. If a Shmenglish speaker uttered (2) in the context of a
discussion of how well the refrigerator has been cleaned, it would be most reasonable for her to expect to be understood as having meant what is said in (2a) rather than
what is said in (2b); whereas if she uttered (2) in the context of an exchange where the
hearer has a salient interest in obtaining milk for coee, it would be most reasonable
for her to expect to be understood as having meant what is said in (2b) rather than
what is said in (2a). And so, she would most likely use (2) the same as we do.

4. A transcendental argument for the standard view

Having shown why the Standard Argument against SV is not sound, I would now
like to oer a transcendental argument for SV.
Even the opponents of SV agree that there must at least be constraints on the
semantic content of a given expression (e.g., Putnam, 1997:17). That is, words have
context-independent properties which limit what can be said with them (literally) in
particular contexts. Adapting an example of Wittgensteins, one cannot say literally,
in English, that it is hot, by uttering the words Its cold. Of course, one could say that
it is hot by uttering the words Its cold, if one were speaking some other language
possibly even a future variant of English. Or, one could do so by speaking nonliterally,
perhaps ironically. But in a given language, as it is spoken at a given time, what can be
said literally with a given expression is bounded by context-independent constraints.
This is not to say that such constraints are easy to specify; they may be vague, hard to
formulate, not expressible in terms of necessary and sucient conditions; moreover,
they may be in a constant state of ux, gradually evolving over time. (Recall Putnams, 1970:142 conclusion that semantics is a typical social sciencesloppy,
imprecise, unrigorous.) Nevertheless, for a given language (at a given time), some
such constraints must exist.
Now, for a given sentence, fully disambiguated, with an assignment of referents to
all its indexical expressions, let the general content of that sentence (relative to the

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357

given disambiguation and assignment of indexical referents) be the proposition that the
constraints on its semantic content are satised.13 The general content of a sentence is
thus to be contrasted with any of its contextually enriched contentsthe particular
context-dependent content it might acquire in a particular context (and which opponents of SV take as its semantic content).14 Thus, although SV is clearly false of contextually enriched content, it is just as clearly true of general content. Then the question
is, which is semantics aboutgeneral content or contextually enriched content?
If semantics is about what is said, then the question becomes this: which is,
what is saidgeneral content or contextually enriched content? Here are three
answers:
(i) what is said is general content;
(ii) what is said is contextually enriched content;
(iii) the expression what is said is ambiguouswhat is said is general content
in one sense and contextually enriched content in another sense.
The rst answer supports SV, the second answer supports the rejection of SV, and the
third (suggested by Francois Recanati, in conversation) oers a compromise. Although
I think that considerations of the dierence between, say, what was really said and
what was conveyed without explicitly being said show that the rst answer is the
most plausible, I will not argue the point here. For now it is enough to note that as long
as we can identify these two kinds or layers of content, it is somewhat arbitrary how we
label them. We can, in any case, distinguish between two theoretical enterprises, one
concerning the relation between expressions and their general contents, the other concerning the relation between expressions and their contextually enriched contents. We
may call these strict semantics and loose semantics, respectively. (I prefer calling
them semantics and pragmatics, respectivelybut I will not use this terminology
here, so as not to appear to be begging the question.) Although the Standard View of
semantics is not true of loose semantics, it is clearly true of strict semantics.15
13
Or, the general content could be characterized as the innite disjunction of the sentences semantic
contents (relative to the given disambiguation and assignment of indexical referents) in every possible
context. One might object that this characterization is not coherent, on the grounds that even in particular
contexts there is no determinate content, nothing in particular that is to be taken as what is said (what
may be a consequence of some of the metaphysical positions that Travis (1989, 1997) considers); but such
a view is so radically counterintuitive that I take it to be a nonstarter.
14
This is not to say, of course, that context has no role at all in determining general content, as the
latter is explicitly dened as relative to a given disambiguation and a given assignment of indexical referents. Contextually enriched contents are contextually enriched in that they depend on context for more
than just disambiguation and assignment of indexical referents.
15
One might object that even if there is such a notion of strict semantic content, for which SV holds, no
such notion plays a signicant role in how utterances actually get interpreted. This amounts to changing
the subject, shifting from the current question of whether semantics is possible to the separate question of
whether it is useful. Although the latter question is beyond the scope of this paper, I believe that an armative answer is born out by considerations of (a) our ability to learn new words, (b) our ability to produce and comprehend new sentences, and (c) our success in communicating our beliefs about the world
(this last point brought to my attention by Michael Devitt, in conversation).

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5. Oversimplications and where the real problems lie

So, is semantics still possible? Recall Putnams (1970:142) cautious optimism:
There is plenty for us to investigate, in our sloppy and impressionistic fashion,
and there are plenty of real results to be obtained. The rst step is to free ourselves
from ... oversimplications ... and to see where the real problems lie.
What are the oversimplications from which we must free ourselves? The main
oversimplication regarding the role of context in semantics is the assumption that
the semantic content of a sentence is simply what is correctly understood from an
utterance of the sentence. Though this may be true of loose semantics (depending on
just how loose it is), it is not true of strict semantics. A related oversimplication is
that what really counts in an utterance is semantic content. In fact, usually what
really counts is loose semantic content, not strict semantic content. This is why the
intuitions of competent speakers with regard to what is said are primarily indicative
of loose semantic content, rather than strict semantic content; and so, it would be an
oversimplication to identify semantic content with what competent speakers would
typically say has been said.16
Where, then, do the real problems lie? The real problem lies in simultaneously
working out both a theory of what words meanindependent of any particular contextas well as a theory of what we can thereby convey by them in a particular
context.

Acknowledgements
I am grateful for helpful comments from Mira Ariel, Steven Davis, Paul Horwich,
Peter Pagin, Charles Travis, and others who heard earlier versions of this paper at
the Karlovy Vary Symposium, Swimming in XYZ, September 1998; the University of Bristol, March 1999; and PRAGMA99, Tel-Aviv University, June 1999.

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16
This last oversimplication is closely related to Searles (1969:141) Assertion Fallacythe fallacy
of confusing the conditions for the performance of the speech act of assertion with the analysis of the
meaning of particular words occurring in certain assertionsas well as Barwise and Perrys (1983: 38,
164-6, 264, as cited by Perry 1988: 6) fallacy of misplaced informationthe idea that all the information in an utterance must come from [the proposition it expresses]. For an extended discussion of the
relation between semantic content and what competent speakers would typically say has been said, see the
section on Recanatis Availability Principle in Berg 1998.

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Jonathan Berg is in the philosophy department of the University of Haifa. He is the author of Applied
Logic: Principles of Argument (in Hebrew) and numerous articles on topics in the philosophy of language,
philosophical logic, and the philosophy of mind.