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G.R. Nos.

74387-90 November 14, 1988


BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY & ARMANDO PON, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE HEIRS OF PAZ VDA. DE PAMFILO, THE HEIRS OF
NORMA NERI, and BAYLON SALES and NENA VDA. DE ROSALES, respondents.
Sibal, Custodia, Santos & Nofuente for petitioners.
Restituto L. Opis for respondents Pamfilos and Rosaleses.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for N. Neri and Baylon Sales.

PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a Petition to Review by Certiorari, the decision 1 of the respondent appellate court which
affirmed with modification the joint decision of the trial court in four (4) cases involving similar facts and
issues, finding favorably for the plaintiffs (private respondents herein), the dispositive portion of said
appellate judgment reading as follows:
WHEREFORE, with the modification that the death indemnity is raised to P30,000.00
to each set of the victims' heirs, the rest of the judgment appealed from is hereby
affirmed in toto. Costs against the defendants-appellants.
SO ORDERED. (p. 20, Rollo)
From the records of the case We have gathered the following antecedent facts:
The collision between Bus No. 1046 of the Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company (BLTB, for
brevity) driven by Armando Pon and Bus No. 404 of Superlines Transportation Company
(Superlines, for brevity) driven by Ruben Dasco took place at the highway traversing Barangay
Isabong, Tayabas, Quezon in the afternoon of August 11, 1978, which collision resulted in the death
of Aniceto Rosales, Francisco Pamfilo and Romeo Neri and in several injuries to Nena Rosales (wife
of Anecito) and Baylon Sales, all passengers of the BLTB Bus No. 1046. The evidence shows that as
BLTB Bus No. 1046 was negotiating the bend of the highway, it tried to overtake a Ford Fiera car just
as Bus No. 404 of Superlines was coming from the opposite direction. Seeing thus, Armando Pon
(driver of the BLTB Bus) made a belated attempt to slacken the speed of his bus and tried to return
to his proper lane. It was an unsuccessful try as the two (2) buses collided with each other.
Nena Vda. de Rosales and Baylon Sales and the surviving heirs of the deceased Francisco Pamfilo,
Aniceto Rosales and Romeo Neri instituted separate cases in the Court of First Instance of
Marinduque against BLTB and Superlines together with their respective drivers praying for damages,
attorney's fees and litigation expenses plus costs. Criminal cases against the drivers of the two
buses were filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon.
Defendants BLTB and Superlines, together with their drivers Pon and Dasco, denied liability by
claiming that they exercised due care and diligence and shifted the fault, against each other. They all
interposed counterclaims against the plaintiffs and crossclaims against each other.

After trial on the merits, the lower court exonerated defendants Superlines and its driver Dasco from
liability and attributed sole responsibility to defendants BLTB and its driver Pon, and ordered them
jointly and severally to pay damages to the plaintiffs. Defendants BLTB and Armando Pon appealed
from the decision of the lower court to respondent appellate court which affirmed with modification
the judgment of the lower court as earlier stated.
Hence, this petition to review by certiorari of defendant BLTB assigning a lone error, to wit:
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN ADJUDGING THAT THE
ACTIONS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE BASED ON CULPA CONTRACTUAL.
(p. 12, Rollo)
It is argued by petitioners that if the intention of private respondents were to file an action based
on culpa contractual or breach of contract of carriage, they could have done so by merely impleading
BLTB and its driver Pon. As it was in the trial court, private respondents filed an action against all the
defendants basing their action on culpa aquiliana or tort.
Petitioners' contentions deserve no merit. A reading of the respondent court's decision shows that it
anchored petitioners' liability both on culpa contractual and culpa aquiliana, to wit:
The proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of three and injuries to two
of the passengers of BLTB was the negligence of the driver of the BLTB bus, who
recklessly operated and drove said bus by overtaking a Ford Fiera car as he was
negotiating the ascending bend of the highway (tsn, October 4, 1979, pp. 9-10, 35,
36, 61; Exhibit 6 Superlines, p. 47) which was divided into two lanes by a continuous
yellow strip (tsn, October 4, 1979, p. 36). The driver of the BLTB bus admitted in his
cross-examination that the continuous yellow line on the ascending bend of the
highway signifies a no-overtaking zone (tsn, October 4, 1979, p. 36). It is no surprise
then that the driver of the Superlines bus was exonerated by the lower court. He had
a valid reason to presuppose that no one would overtake in such a dangerous
situation. These facts show that patient imprudence of the BLTB driver.
It is well settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of
overtaking another vehicle in ordinary situation has the duty to see that the road is
clear and not to proceed if he can not do so in safety (People v. Enriquez, 40 O.G.
No. 5, 984).
... Before attempting to pass the vehicle ahead, the rear driver must see that the road
is clear and if there is no sufficient room for a safe passage, or the driver ahead does
not turn out so as to afford opportunity to pass, or if, after attempting to pass, the
driver of the overtaking vehicle finds that he cannot make the passage in safety, the
latter must slacken his speed so as to avoid the danger of a collision, even bringing
his car to a stop if necessary. (3-4 Huddy Encyclopedia of Automobile Law, Sec. 212,
p. 195).
The above rule becomes more particularly applicable in this case when the
overtaking took place on an ascending curved highway divided into two lanes by a
continuous yellow line. Appellant Pon should have remembered that:
When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve there is special necessity
for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver has not the right to drive on the

left hand side relying upon having time to turn to the right if a car is approaching from
the opposite direction comes into view. (42 C.J. 42 906).
Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic
regulation. (Art. 2165, Civil Code).
In failing to observe these simple precautions, BLTB's driver undoubtedly failed to act
with the diligence demanded by the circumstances.
We now come to the subject of liability of the appellants.
For his own negligence in recklessly driving the truck owned by his employer,
appellant Armando Pon is primarily liable (Article 2176, Civil Code).
<re||an1w>

On the other hand the liability of Pon's employer, appellant BLTB, is also primary,
direct and immediate in view of the fact that the death of or injuries to its passengers
was through the negligence of its employee (Marahan v. Mendoza, 24 SCRA 888,
894), and such liability does not cease even upon proof that BLTB had exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees (Article 1759, Civil Code).
The common carrier's liability for the death of or injuries to its passengers is based
on its contractual obligation to carry its passengers safely to their destination. That
obligation is so serious that the Civil Code requires "utmost diligence of very cautious
person (Article 1755, Civil Code). They are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently unless they prove that they have observed extraordinary diligence"
(Article 1756, Civil Code). In the present case, the appellants have failed to prove
extraordinary diligence. Indeed, this legal presumption was confirmed by the fact that
the bus driver of BLTB was negligent. It must follow that both the driver and the
owner must answer for injuries or death to its passengers.
The liability of BLTB is also solidarily with its driver (Viluan v. Court of Appeals, 16
SCRA 742, 747) even though the liability of the driver springs from quasi delict while
that of the bus company from contract. (pp. 17-19, Rollo)
Conclusively therefore in consideration of the foregoing findings of the respondent appellate court it
is settled that the proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of three and injuries to two of
the passengers of BLTB was the sole negligence of the driver of the BLTB Bus, who recklessly
operated and drove said bus in a lane where overtaking is not allowed by Traffic Rules and
Regulations. Such negligence and recklessness is binding against petitioner BLTB, more so when
We consider the fact that in an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an
express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible for the
payment of the damages sought by the passenger. By the contract of carriage, the carrier BLTB
assumed the express obligation to transport the passengers to their destination safely and to
observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might
be suffered by its passengers is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier (Art.
1756, New Civil Code).
Petitioners also contend that "a common carrier is not an absolute insurer against all risks of travel
and are not liable for acts or accidents which cannot be foreseen or inevitable and that responsibility
of a common carrier for the safety of its passenger prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the New

Civil Code is not susceptible of a precise and definite formulation." (p. 13, Rollo) Petitioners'
contention holds no water because they had totally failed to point out any factual basis for their
defense of force majeure in the light of the undisputed fact that the cause of the collision was
the sole negligence and recklessness of petitioner Armando Pon. For the defense offorce majeure or
act of God to prosper the accident must be due to natural causes and exclusively without human
intervention.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 84458 November 6, 1989


ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DIVISION, LUCILA C. VIANA, SPS. ANTONIO VIANA
and GORGONIA VIANA, and PIONEER STEVEDORING CORPORATION, respondents.
Herenio E. Martinez for petitioner.
M.R. Villaluz Law Office for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:
In this appeal by certiorari, petitioner Aboitiz Shipping Corporation seeks a review of the decision 1 of
respondent Court of Appeals, dated July 29, 1988, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from as modified by the order of October 27,
1982, is hereby affirmed with the modification that appellant Aboitiz Shipping is
hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-appellees the amount of P30,000.00 for the death of
Anacleto Viana; actual damages of P9,800.00; P150,000.00 for unearned income;
P7,200.00 as support for deceased's parents; P20,000.00 as moral damages;
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and to pay the costs.
The undisputed facts of the case, as found by the court a quo and adopted by respondent court, are
as follows: .
The evidence disclosed that on May 11, 1975, Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel
M/V Antonia, owned by defendant, at the port at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro,
bound for Manila, having purchased a ticket (No. 117392) in the sum of P23.10 (Exh.
'B'). On May 12, 1975, said vessel arrived at Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila, and the
passengers therein disembarked, a gangplank having been provided connecting the
side of the vessel to the pier. Instead of using said gangplank Anacleto Viana
disembarked on the third deck which was on the level with the pier. After said vessel
had landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation took over the exclusive control of
the cargoes loaded on said vessel pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement dated

July 26, 1975 (Exh. '2') between the third party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring
Corporation and defendant Aboitiz Shipping Corporation.
The crane owned by the third party defendant and operated by its crane operator
Alejo Figueroa was placed alongside the vessel and one (1) hour after the
passengers of said vessel had disembarked, it started operation by unloading the
cargoes from said vessel. While the crane was being operated, Anacleto Viana who
had already disembarked from said vessel obviously remembering that some of his
cargoes were still loaded in the vessel, went back to the vessel, and it was while he
was pointing to the crew of the said vessel to the place where his cargoes were
loaded that the crane hit him, pinning him between the side of the vessel and the
crane. He was thereafter brought to the hospital where he later expired three (3)
days thereafter, on May 15, 1975, the cause of his death according to the Death
Certificate (Exh. "C") being "hypostatic pneumonia secondary to traumatic fracture of
the pubic bone lacerating the urinary bladder" (See also Exh. "B"). For his
hospitalization, medical, burial and other miscellaneous expenses, Anacleto's wife,
herein plaintiff, spent a total of P9,800.00 (Exhibits "E", "E-1", to "E-5"). Anacleto
Viana who was only forty (40) years old when he met said fateful accident (Exh. 'E')
was in good health. His average annual income as a farmer or a farm supervisor was
400 cavans of palay annually. His parents, herein plaintiffs Antonio and Gorgonia
Viana, prior to his death had been recipient of twenty (20) cavans of palay as support
or P120.00 monthly. Because of Anacleto's death, plaintiffs suffered mental anguish
and extreme worry or moral damages. For the filing of the instant case, they had to
hire a lawyer for an agreed fee of ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos. 2
Private respondents Vianas filed a complaint 3 for damages against petitioner corporation (Aboitiz, for
brevity) for breach of contract of carriage.
In its answer. 4 Aboitiz denied responsibility contending that at the time of the accident, the vessel was
completely under the control of respondent Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation (Pioneer, for short) as the
exclusive stevedoring contractor of Aboitiz, which handled the unloading of cargoes from the vessel of
Aboitiz. It is also averred that since the crane operator was not an employee of Aboitiz, the latter cannot
be held liable under the fellow-servant rule.
Thereafter, Aboitiz, as third-party plaintiff, filed a third-party complaint 5 against Pioneer imputing
liability thereto for Anacleto Viana's death as having been allegedly caused by the negligence of the crane
operator who was an employee of Pioneer under its exclusive control and supervision.
Pioneer, in its answer to the third-party complaint, 6 raised the defenses that Aboitiz had no cause of
action against Pioneer considering that Aboitiz is being sued by the Vianas for breach of contract of
carriage to which Pioneer is not a party; that Pioneer had observed the diligence of a good father of a
family both in the selection and supervision of its employees as well as in the prevention of damage or
injury to anyone including the victim Anacleto Viana; that Anacleto Viana's gross negligence was the
direct and proximate cause of his death; and that the filing of the third-party complaint was premature by
reason of the pendency of the criminal case for homicide through reckless imprudence filed against the
crane operator, Alejo Figueroa.
In a decision rendered on April 17, 1980 by the trial court, 7 Aboitiz was ordered to pay the Vianas for
damages incurred, and Pioneer was ordered to reimburse Aboitiz for whatever amount the latter paid the
Vianas. The dispositive portion of said decision provides:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plantiffs:

(1) ordering defendant Aboitiz Shipping Corporation to pay to plaintiffs the sum of
P12,000.00 for the death of Anacleto Viana P9,800.00 as actual damages;
P533,200.00 value of the 10,664 cavans of palay computed at P50.00 per cavan;
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; F 5,000.00, value of the 100 cavans of palay as
support for five (5) years for deceased (sic) parents, herein plaintiffs Antonio and
Gorgonia Viana computed at P50.00 per cavan; P7,200.00 as support for deceased's
parents computed at P120.00 a month for five years pursuant to Art. 2206, Par. 2, of
the Civil Code; P20,000.00 as moral damages, and costs; and
(2) ordering the third party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation to reimburse
defendant and third party plaintiff Aboitiz Shipping Corporation the said amounts that
it is ordered to pay to herein plaintiffs.
Both Aboitiz and Pioneer filed separate motions for reconsideration wherein they similarly raised the
trial court's failure to declare that Anacleto Viana acted with gross negligence despite the
overwhelming evidence presented in support thereof. In addition, Aboitiz alleged, in opposition to
Pioneer's motion, that under the memorandum of agreement the liability of Pioneer as contractor is
automatic for any damages or losses whatsoever occasioned by and arising from the operation of its
arrastre and stevedoring service.
In an order dated October 27, 1982, 8 the trial court absolved Pioneer from liability for failure of the
Vianas and Aboitiz to preponderantly establish a case of negligence against the crane operator which the
court a quo ruled is never presumed, aside from the fact that the memorandum of agreement supposedly
refers only to Pioneer's liability in case of loss or damage to goods handled by it but not in the case of
personal injuries, and, finally that Aboitiz cannot properly invoke the fellow-servant rule simply because its
liability stems from a breach of contract of carriage. The dispositive portion of said order reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby modified insofar as third party defendant Pioneer
Stevedoring Corporation is concerned rendered in favor of the plaintiffs-,:
(1) Ordering defendant Aboitiz Shipping Corporation to pay the plaintiffs the sum of
P12,000.00 for the death of Anacleto Viana; P9,000.00 (sic) as actual damages;
P533,200.00 value of the 10,664 cavans of palay computed at P50.00 per cavan;
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; P5,000.00 value of the 100 cavans of palay as
support for five (5) years for deceased's parents, herein plaintiffs Antonio and
Gorgonia Viana,computed at P50.00 per cavan; P7,200.00 as support for deceased's
parents computed at P120.00 a month for five years pursuant to Art. 2206, Par. 2, of
the Civil Code; P20,000.00 as moral damages, and costs; and
(2) Absolving third-party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation for (sic) any
liability for the death of Anacleto Viana the passenger of M/V Antonia owned by
defendant third party plaintiff Aboitiz Shipping Corporation it appearing that the
negligence of its crane operator has not been established therein.
Not satisfied with the modified judgment of the trial court, Aboitiz appealed the same to respondent
Court of Appeals which affirmed the findings of of the trial court except as to the amount of damages
awarded to the Vianas.
Hence, this petition wherein petitioner Aboitiz postulates that respondent court erred:
(A) In holding that the doctrine laid down by this honorable Court in La Mallorca vs.
Court of Appeals, et al. (17 SCRA 739, July 27, 1966) is applicable to the case in the

face of the undisputable fact that the factual situation under the La Mallorca case is
radically different from the facts obtaining in this case;
(B) In holding petitioner liable for damages in the face of the finding of the court a
quo and confirmed by the Honorable respondent court of Appeals that the deceased,
Anacleto Viana was guilty of contributory negligence, which, We respectfully submit
contributory negligence was the proximate cause of his death; specifically the
honorable respondent Court of Appeals failed to apply Art. 1762 of the New Civil
Code;
(C) In the alternative assuming the holding of the Honorable respondent Court of
Appears that petitioner may be legally condemned to pay damages to the private
respondents we respectfully submit that it committed a reversible error when it
dismissed petitioner's third party complaint against private respondent Pioneer
Stevedoring Corporation instead of compelling the latter to reimburse the petitioner
for whatever damages it may be compelled to pay to the private respondents
Vianas. 9
At threshold, it is to be observed that both the trial court and respondent Court of Appeals found the
victim Anacleto Viana guilty of contributory negligence, but holding that it was the negligence of
Aboitiz in prematurely turning over the vessel to the arrastre operator for the unloading of cargoes
which was the direct, immediate and proximate cause of the victim's death.
I. Petitioner contends that since one (1) hour had already elapsed from the time Anacleto Viana
disembarked from the vessel and that he was given more than ample opportunity to unload his
cargoes prior to the operation of the crane, his presence on the vessel was no longer reasonable e
and he consequently ceased to be a passenger. Corollarily, it insists that the doctrine in La Mallorca
vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 10 is not applicable to the case at bar.
The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed
at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises. 11 Once created, the
relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely
alighted from the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. All
persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed
passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from
all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his
departure. 12 The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person
transported has been carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains in the carrier's
premises to claim his baggage. 13
It was in accordance with this rationale that the doctrine in the aforesaid case of La Mallorca was
enunciated, to wit:
It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not
cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place
selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the passenger
has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's
premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to
be determined from all the circumstances. Thus, a person who, after alighting from a
train, walks along the station platform is considered still a passenger. So also, where
a passenger has alighted at his destination and is proceeding by the usual way to
leave the company's premises, but before actually doing so is halted by the report

that his brother, a fellow passenger, has been shot, and he in good faith and without
intent of engaging in the difficulty, returns to relieve his brother, he is deemed
reasonably and necessarily delayed and thus continues to be a passenger entitled as
such to the protection of the railroad company and its agents.
In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which
was not unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Racquel, the child that she was,
must have followed the father. However, although the father was still on the running
board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus
started to run, so that even he (the father) had to jump down from the moving
vehicle. It was at this instance that the child, who must be near the bus, was run over
and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had
exercised the 'utmost diligence' of a 'very cautious person' required by Article 1755 of
the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation
to transport safely its passengers. ... The presence of said passengers near the bus
was not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers
of the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage. 14
It is apparent from the foregoing that what prompted the Court to rule as it did in said case is the fact
of the passenger's reasonable presence within the carrier's premises. That reasonableness of time
should be made to depend on the attending circumstances of the case, such as the kind of common
carrier, the nature of its business, the customs of the place, and so forth, and therefore precludes a
consideration of the time element per se without taking into account such other factors. It is thus of
no moment whether in the cited case of La Mallorcathere was no appreciable interregnum for the
passenger therein to leave the carrier's premises whereas in the case at bar, an interval of one (1)
hour had elapsed before the victim met the accident. The primary factor to be considered is the
existence of a reasonable cause as will justify the presence of the victim on or near the petitioner's
vessel. We believe there exists such a justifiable cause.
It is of common knowledge that, by the very nature of petitioner's business as a shipper, the
passengers of vessels are allotted a longer period of time to disembark from the ship than other
common carriers such as a passenger bus. With respect to the bulk of cargoes and the number of
passengers it can load, such vessels are capable of accommodating a bigger volume of both as
compared to the capacity of a regular commuter bus. Consequently, a ship passenger will need at
least an hour as is the usual practice, to disembark from the vessel and claim his baggage whereas
a bus passenger can easily get off the bus and retrieve his luggage in a very short period of time.
Verily, petitioner cannot categorically claim, through the bare expedient of comparing the period of
time entailed in getting the passenger's cargoes, that the ruling in La Mallorca is inapplicable to the
case at bar. On the contrary, if we are to apply the doctrine enunciated therein to the instant petition,
we cannot in reason doubt that the victim Anacleto Viana was still a passenger at the time of the
incident. When the accident occurred, the victim was in the act of unloading his cargoes, which he
had every right to do, from petitioner's vessel. As earlier stated, a carrier is duty bound not only to
bring its passengers safely to their destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to claim
their baggage.
It is not definitely shown that one (1) hour prior to the incident, the victim had already disembarked
from the vessel. Petitioner failed to prove this. What is clear to us is that at the time the victim was
taking his cargoes, the vessel had already docked an hour earlier. In consonance with common
shipping procedure as to the minimum time of one (1) hour allowed for the passengers to disembark,
it may be presumed that the victim had just gotten off the vessel when he went to retrieve his
baggage. Yet, even if he had already disembarked an hour earlier, his presence in petitioner's
premises was not without cause. The victim had to claim his baggage which was possible only one

(1) hour after the vessel arrived since it was admittedly standard procedure in the case of petitioner's
vessels that the unloading operations shall start only after that time. Consequently, under the
foregoing circumstances, the victim Anacleto Viana is still deemed a passenger of said carrier at the
time of his tragic death.
II. Under the law, common carriers are, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of
the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. 15 More
particularly, a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances. 16 Thus, where a passenger dies or is injured, the common carrier is presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently. 17 This gives rise to an action for breach of contract of carriage
where all that is required of plaintiff is to prove the existence of the contract of carriage and its nonperformance by the carrier, that is, the failure of the carrier to carry the passenger safely to his
destination, 18 which, in the instant case, necessarily includes its failure to safeguard its passenger with
extraordinary diligence while such relation subsists.
The presumption is, therefore, established by law that in case of a passenger's death or injury the
operator of the vessel was at fault or negligent, having failed to exercise extraordinary diligence, and
it is incumbent upon it to rebut the same. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State
to afford full protection to the passengers of common carriers which can be carried out only by
imposing a stringent statutory obligation upon the latter. Concomitantly, this Court has likewise
adopted a rigid posture in the application of the law by exacting the highest degree of care and
diligence from common carriers, bearing utmost in mind the welfare of the passengers who often
become hapless victims of indifferent and profit-oriented carriers. We cannot in reason deny that
petitioner failed to rebut the presumption against it. Under the facts obtaining in the present case, it
cannot be gainsaid that petitioner had inadequately complied with the required degree of diligence to
prevent the accident from happening.
As found by the Court of Appeals, the evidence does not show that there was a cordon of drums
around the perimeter of the crane, as claimed by petitioner. It also adverted to the fact that the
alleged presence of visible warning signs in the vicinity was disputable and not indubitably
established. Thus, we are not inclined to accept petitioner's explanation that the victim and other
passengers were sufficiently warned that merely venturing into the area in question was fraught with
serious peril. Definitely, even assuming the existence of the supposed cordon of drums loosely
placed around the unloading area and the guard's admonitions against entry therein, these were at
most insufficient precautions which pale into insignificance if considered vis-a-vis the gravity of the
danger to which the deceased was exposed. There is no showing that petitioner was extraordinarily
diligent in requiring or seeing to it that said precautionary measures were strictly and actually
enforced to subserve their purpose of preventing entry into the forbidden area. By no stretch of
liberal evaluation can such perfunctory acts approximate the "utmost diligence of very cautious
persons" to be exercised "as far as human care and foresight can provide" which is required by law
of common carriers with respect to their passengers.
While the victim was admittedly contributorily negligent, still petitioner's aforesaid failure to exercise
extraordinary diligence was the proximate and direct cause of, because it could definitely have
prevented, the former's death. Moreover, in paragraph 5.6 of its petition, at bar, 19 petitioner has
expressly conceded the factual finding of respondent Court of Appeals that petitioner did not present
sufficient evidence in support of its submission that the deceased Anacleto Viana was guilty of gross
negligence. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim otherwise.

No excepting circumstance being present, we are likewise bound by respondent court's declaration
that there was no negligence on the part of Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation, a confirmation of the
trial court's finding to that effect, hence our conformity to Pioneer's being absolved of any liability.
As correctly observed by both courts, Aboitiz joined Pioneer in proving the alleged gross negligence
of the victim, hence its present contention that the death of the passenger was due to the negligence
of the crane operator cannot be sustained both on grounds, of estoppel and for lack of evidence on
its present theory. Even in its answer filed in the court below it readily alleged that Pioneer had taken
the necessary safeguards insofar as its unloading operations were concerned, a fact which appears
to have been accepted by the plaintiff therein by not impleading Pioneer as a defendant, and
likewise inceptively by Aboitiz by filing its third-party complaint only after ten (10) months from the
institution of the suit against it. Parenthetically, Pioneer is not within the ambit of the rule on
extraordinary diligence required of, and the corresponding presumption of negligence foisted on,
common carriers like Aboitiz. This, of course, does not detract from what we have said that no
negligence can be imputed to Pioneer but, that on the contrary, the failure of Aboitiz to exercise
extraordinary diligence for the safety of its passenger is the rationale for our finding on its liability.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 95582 October 7, 1991


DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. and THEODORE LARDIZABAL y
MALECDAN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, INOCENCIA CUDIAMAT, EMILIA CUDIAMAT BANDOY, FERNANDO
CUDLAMAT, MARRIETA CUDIAMAT, NORMA CUDIAMAT, DANTE CUDIAMAT, SAMUEL
CUDIAMAT and LIGAYA CUDIAMAT, all Heirs of the late Pedrito Cudiamat represented by
Inocencia Cudiamat, respondents.
Francisco S. Reyes Law Office for petitioners.
Antonio C. de Guzman for private respondents.

REGALADO, J.:p
On May 13, 1985, private respondents filed a complaint

1 for damages against petitioners for the death of Pedrito


Cudiamat as a result of a vehicular accident which occurred on March 25, 1985 at Marivic, Sapid, Mankayan, Benguet. Among others, it was
alleged that on said date, while petitioner Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to petitioner corporation in a
reckless and imprudent manner and without due regard to traffic rules and regulations and safety to persons and property, it ran over its
passenger, Pedrito Cudiamat. However, instead of bringing Pedrito immediately to the nearest hospital, the said driver, in utter bad faith and
without regard to the welfare of the victim, first brought his other passengers and cargo to their respective destinations before banging said
victim to the Lepanto Hospital where he expired.

On the other hand, petitioners alleged that they had observed and continued to observe the
extraordinary diligence required in the operation of the transportation company and the supervision
of the employees, even as they add that they are not absolute insurers of the safety of the public at
large. Further, it was alleged that it was the victim's own carelessness and negligence which gave
rise to the subject incident, hence they prayed for the dismissal of the complaint plus an award of
damages in their favor by way of a counterclaim.
On July 29, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision, effectively in favor of petitioners, with this
decretal portion:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby pronounced that Pedrito
Cudiamat was negligent, which negligence was the proximate cause of his death.
Nonetheless, defendants in equity, are hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Pedrito
Cudiamat the sum of P10,000.00 which approximates the amount defendants initially
offered said heirs for the amicable settlement of the case. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 2
Not satisfied therewith, private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which, in a decision

3 in

CA-G.R. CV No. 19504 promulgated on August 14, 1990, set aside the decision of the lower court, and ordered petitioners to pay private
respondents:

1. The sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos by way of indemnity for death of
the victim Pedrito Cudiamat;
2. The sum of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) by way of moral damages;
3. The sum of Two Hundred Eighty Eight Thousand (P288,000.00) Pesos as actual
and compensatory damages;
4. The costs of this suit. 4
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated
October 4, 1990,5 hence this petition with the central issue herein being whether respondent court erred in reversing the decision of
the trial court and in finding petitioners negligent and liable for the damages claimed.

It is an established principle that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals as a rule are final and
may not be reviewed by this Court on appeal. However, this is subject to settled exceptions, one of
which is when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court, in which case
a reexamination of the facts and evidence may be undertaken. 6
In the case at bar, the trial court and the Court of Appeal have discordant positions as to who
between the petitioners an the victim is guilty of negligence. Perforce, we have had to conduct an
evaluation of the evidence in this case for the prope calibration of their conflicting factual findings
and legal conclusions.
The lower court, in declaring that the victim was negligent, made the following findings:
This Court is satisfied that Pedrito Cudiamat was negligent in trying to board a
moving vehicle, especially with one of his hands holding an umbrella. And, without
having given the driver or the conductor any indication that he wishes to board the
bus. But defendants can also be found wanting of the necessary diligence. In this

connection, it is safe to assume that when the deceased Cudiamat attempted to


board defendants' bus, the vehicle's door was open instead of being closed. This
should be so, for it is hard to believe that one would even attempt to board a vehicle
(i)n motion if the door of said vehicle is closed. Here lies the defendant's lack of
diligence. Under such circumstances, equity demands that there must be something
given to the heirs of the victim to assuage their feelings. This, also considering that
initially, defendant common carrier had made overtures to amicably settle the case. It
did offer a certain monetary consideration to the victim's heirs. 7
However, respondent court, in arriving at a different opinion, declares that:
From the testimony of appellees'own witness in the person of Vitaliano Safarita, it is
evident that the subject bus was at full stop when the victim Pedrito Cudiamat
boarded the same as it was precisely on this instance where a certain Miss Abenoja
alighted from the bus. Moreover, contrary to the assertion of the appellees, the victim
did indicate his intention to board the bus as can be seen from the testimony of the
said witness when he declared that Pedrito Cudiamat was no longer walking and
made a sign to board the bus when the latter was still at a distance from him. It was
at the instance when Pedrito Cudiamat was closing his umbrella at the platform of
the bus when the latter made a sudden jerk movement (as) the driver commenced to
accelerate the bus.
Evidently, the incident took place due to the gross negligence of the appellee-driver
in prematurely stepping on the accelerator and in not waiting for the passenger to
first secure his seat especially so when we take into account that the platform of the
bus was at the time slippery and wet because of a drizzle. The defendants-appellees
utterly failed to observe their duty and obligation as common carrier to the end that
they should observe extra-ordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for
the safety of the passengers transported by them according to the circumstances of
each case (Article 1733, New Civil Code). 8
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no reason to disturb the above holding of
the Court of Appeals. Its aforesaid findings are supported by the testimony of petitioners' own
witnesses. One of them, Virginia Abalos, testified on cross-examination as follows:
Q It is not a fact Madam witness, that at bunkhouse 54, that is before
the place of the incident, there is a crossing?
A The way going to the mines but it is not being pass(ed) by the bus.
Q And the incident happened before bunkhouse 56, is that not
correct?
A It happened between 54 and 53 bunkhouses. 9
The bus conductor, Martin Anglog, also declared:
Q When you arrived at Lepanto on March 25, 1985, will you please
inform this Honorable Court if there was anv unusual incident that
occurred?

A When we delivered a baggage at Marivic because a person


alighted there between Bunkhouse 53 and 54.
Q What happened when you delivered this passenger at this
particular place in Lepanto?
A When we reached the place, a passenger alighted and I signalled
my driver. When we stopped we went out because I saw an umbrella
about a split second and I signalled again the driver, so the driver
stopped and we went down and we saw Pedrito Cudiamat asking for
help because he was lying down.
Q How far away was this certain person, Pedrito Cudiamat, when you
saw him lying down from the bus how far was he?
A It is about two to three meters.
Q On what direction of the bus was he found about three meters from
the bus, was it at the front or at the back?
A At the back, sir. 10 (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing testimonies show that the place of the accident and the place where one of the
passengers alighted were both between Bunkhouses 53 and 54, hence the finding of the Court of
Appeals that the bus was at full stop when the victim boarded the same is correct. They further
confirm the conclusion that the victim fell from the platform of the bus when it suddenly accelerated
forward and was run over by the rear right tires of the vehicle, as shown by the physical evidence on
where he was thereafter found in relation to the bus when it stopped. Under such circumstances, it
cannot be said that the deceased was guilty of negligence.
The contention of petitioners that the driver and the conductor had no knowledge that the victim
would ride on the bus, since the latter had supposedly not manifested his intention to board the
same, does not merit consideration. When the bus is not in motion there is no necessity for a person
who wants to ride the same to signal his intention to board. A public utility bus, once it stops, is in
effect making a continuous offer to bus riders. Hence, it becomes the duty of the driver and the
conductor, every time the bus stops, to do no act that would have the effect of increasing the peril to
a passenger while he was attempting to board the same. The premature acceleration of the bus in
this case was a breach of such duty. 11
It is the duty of common carriers of passengers, including common carriers by railroad train,
streetcar, or motorbus, to stop their conveyances a reasonable length of time in order to afford
passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered by boarding
passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances while they are
doing so. 12
Further, even assuming that the bus was moving, the act of the victim in boarding the same cannot
be considered negligent under the circumstances. As clearly explained in the testimony of the
aforestated witness for petitioners, Virginia Abalos, th bus had "just started" and "was still in slow
motion" at the point where the victim had boarded and was on its platform. 13

It is not negligence per se, or as a matter of law, for one attempt to board a train or streetcar which is
moving slowly. 14 An ordinarily prudent person would have made the attempt board the moving conveyance under the same or similar
circumstances. The fact that passengers board and alight from slowly moving vehicle is a matter of common experience both the driver and
conductor in this case could not have been unaware of such an ordinary practice.

The victim herein, by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already considered a
passenger and is entitled all the rights and protection pertaining to such a contractual relation.
Hence, it has been held that the duty which the carrier passengers owes to its patrons extends to
persons boarding cars as well as to those alighting therefrom. 15
Common carriers, from the nature of their business and reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordina diligence for the safety of the passengers transported by the according to all the
circumstances of each case. 16 A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. 17

It has also been repeatedly held that in an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not
make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible
to pay the damages sought by the passenger. By contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the
express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and observe extraordinary
diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the
passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier. This is an exception to
the general rule that negligence must be proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the carrier to
prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the
Civil Code. 18
Moreover, the circumstances under which the driver and the conductor failed to bring the gravely
injured victim immediately to the hospital for medical treatment is a patent and incontrovertible proof
of their negligence. It defies understanding and can even be stigmatized as callous indifference. The
evidence shows that after the accident the bus could have forthwith turned at Bunk 56 and thence to
the hospital, but its driver instead opted to first proceed to Bunk 70 to allow a passenger to alight and
to deliver a refrigerator, despite the serious condition of the victim. The vacuous reason given by
petitioners that it was the wife of the deceased who caused the delay was tersely and correctly
confuted by respondent court:
... The pretension of the appellees that the delay was due to the fact that they had to
wait for about twenty minutes for Inocencia Cudiamat to get dressed deserves scant
consideration. It is rather scandalous and deplorable for a wife whose husband is at
the verge of dying to have the luxury of dressing herself up for about twenty minutes
before attending to help her distressed and helpless husband. 19
Further, it cannot be said that the main intention of petitioner Lardizabal in going to Bunk 70 was to
inform the victim's family of the mishap, since it was not said bus driver nor the conductor but the
companion of the victim who informed his family thereof. 20 In fact, it was only after the refrigerator was unloaded that
one of the passengers thought of sending somebody to the house of the victim, as shown by the testimony of Virginia Abalos again, to wit:

Q Why, what happened to your refrigerator at that particular time?


A I asked them to bring it down because that is the nearest place to
our house and when I went down and asked somebody to bring down
the refrigerator, I also asked somebody to call the family of Mr.
Cudiamat.
COURT:

Q Why did you ask somebody to call the family of Mr. Cudiamat?
A Because Mr. Cudiamat met an accident, so I ask somebody to call
for the family of Mr. Cudiamat.
Q But nobody ask(ed) you to call for the family of Mr. Cudiamat?
A No sir. 21
With respect to the award of damages, an oversight was, however, committed by respondent Court
of Appeals in computing the actual damages based on the gross income of the victim. The rule is
that the amount recoverable by the heirs of a victim of a tort is not the loss of the entire earnings, but
rather the loss of that portion of the earnings which the beneficiary would have received. In other
words, only net earnings, not gross earnings, are to be considered, that is, the total of the earnings
less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and minus living and other
incidental expenses. 22
We are of the opinion that the deductible living and other expense of the deceased may fairly and
reasonably be fixed at P500.00 a month or P6,000.00 a year. In adjudicating the actual or
compensatory damages, respondent court found that the deceased was 48 years old, in good health
with a remaining productive life expectancy of 12 years, and then earning P24,000.00 a year. Using
the gross annual income as the basis, and multiplying the same by 12 years, it accordingly awarded
P288,000. Applying the aforestated rule on computation based on the net earnings, said award must
be, as it hereby is, rectified and reduced to P216,000.00. However, in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence, the death indemnity is hereby increased to P50,000.00. 23
WHEREFORE, subject to the above modifications, the challenged judgment and resolution of
respondent Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.

LOU A. ATIENZA, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON


ELECTIONS AND ANTONIO G. SIA, RESPONDENTS.
EN BANC
KAPUNAN, J.:
Private respondent Antonio G. Sia was elected mayor of the Municipality of Madrilejos,
Cebu in the 1988 local elections obtaining a plurality of 126 votes over his nearest rival,
herein petitioner Lou A. Atienza. 1 Following Sias proclamation by the Municipal Board
of Canvassers, petitioner filed an election protest docketed as Election Case No. EC-5
with the Regional Trial Court questioning the results of the elections in a number of
precincts in the municipality. 2 Consequently, in the revision ordered by the lower court,
petitioner obtained a total of 2,826 votes, a plurality of 12 votes over the private

respondent. On April 12, 1989 the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision declaring
petitioner the winner of the municipal elections and ordering the private respondent to
reimburse petitioner the amount of P300,856.19 representing petitioners expenses in
the election protest. Private respondent appealed the trial courts decision to the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) raising as errors 1) the computation of the number
of votes received by the candidates; and 2) the alleged award of excessive damages
in favor of the petitioner. 3 The case was docketed as EAC No. 20-89 and assigned to
the COMELECs Second Division.
Meanwhile, the Regional Trial Court granted petitioners motion for execution pending
appeal. However, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus,
docketed as SPC No. 19-91 questioning the order of execution pending appeal. Acting
thereon, the COMELEC issued a preliminary injunction stopping the enforcement of the
order of execution.
The COMELEC, en banc, on April 7, 1992 issued an Order setting aside the preliminary
injunction and thereby allowing petitioner to assume as mayor of the Municipality of
Madrilejos pending resolution of his appeal. 4 However, following the synchronized
elections of May 11, 1992, the Presiding Commissioner of the COMELECs Second
Division issued an Order dated July 18, 1992 dismissing petitioners appeal for being
moot and academic pursuant to the Commissions decision in Resolution No. 2494
declaring the election protest and appeal cases as well as petitions for special relief
arising out of the January 18, 1988 elections dismissed and terminated as of June 30,
1992. 5 Thereupon, private respondent sought clarification of the order of dismissal of
EAC No. 20-89 referred to the protest case in the Regional Trial Court or to the appeal
case in COMELEC. In response, the Second Division of COMELEC stated in its Order
dated September 16, 1992 that (t)he election protest cases mentioned in the
aforecited order are those protest cases over which the Commission has original
jurisdiction. Hence, it is only the appeal case that was dismissed for being moot and
academic. On the private respondents Motion for Reconsideration and/or Appeal to the
Commission En banc, wherein he pointed out that the appeal could not be simply
dismissed because it would result to the affirmance of the monetary judgment of the
trial court without considering its merits on appeal, respondent COMELEC issued an
Order, dated 15 October 1992, certifying the case to the Commission en banc pursuant
to Section 5, Rule 19 of the COMELECs Rules of Procedure.
On January 28, 1993, respondent Commission en banc released its questioned
resolution, the dispositive portion of which states:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that the


dismissal of the appeal by the Commission (Second Division) for being moot and
academic because of the expiration of the term of office of the contested position did
not thereby revive the vacated judgment of the Regional Trial Court, said appealed
judgment to remain vacated, not having been resolved on the merits by the
Commission for or against any of the parties; and the judgment directing the
protestee-appellant to reimburse the protestant-appellee the amount of P300,856.19
representing his expenses in the election protest, is hereby REVERSED, said judgment
not being in accordance with law in the absence of any evidence of any wrongful, or
negligent act or omission on the part of the protestee appellant to justify the award.
Since the principal issue elevated to the Commission on Elections by the private
respondent has been rendered moot and academic by the election of new municipal
officials in the May 11, 1992 elections, the sole question for our determination is
whether or not the Commission on Elections acted with grave abuse of discretion when
it issued its Resolution of January 28, 1993 reversing the lower courts judgment
awarding damages to herein petitioner after it had earlier dismissed EAC No. 20-89 for
being moot and academic. Petitioner argues that when the appeal from the trial courts
decision was dismissed for being moot and academic, it was as if no appeal had ever
been taken and that the trial courts decision thereby remained untouched, valid and
subsisting. 6
We disagree.
Immediately after the Commission on Elections issued its July 18, 1992 Order dismissing
EAC No. 20-89, the private respondent filed a Motion for Clarification asking whether
what

was

dismissed

by

the

COMELEC

in

EAC

No. 20-89 was the Election Protest Case No. EC-5 or just the appeal. In clarification, the
COMELECs Second Division immediately issued an order stating that the protest cases
mentioned in its earlier order only included those cases in which the body possessed
original jurisdiction, and hence it was only the appeal case which was dismissed for
being moot and academic. 7 Moreover, in its assailed decision, the Commission stressed
that its dismissal of the appeal obviously referred only to that part of the appealed
judgment which was affected by the elections of May 11, 1992, i.e., the portion which
adjudged petitioner as the winner in the election protest. Since the question relating to
the lower courts award of P300,856.19 could not have been rendered moot and
academic by the May 11, 1992 elections, the COMELEC pointed out that the second part

of the lower courts decision was a matter which had nothing to do with the expiration
of the term of office and could not have been dismissed by the said body. 8
In support of his averments, however, petitioner cites Yorac vs. Magalona 9 as authority
for his claim that when the appeal is dismissed, the decision of the lower court shall
stand,' 10 and further contends that the following provision of the Rules of Court
should be given suppletory effect, the Omnibus Election Code and the Comelec Rules of
Procedure being bereft of any provision defining the effect of dismissal of cases before
the said body. Section 2, Rule 50 of the said Rules states:
Sec. 2. Effect of Dismissal. Fifteen days after the dismissal of an appeal, the clerk shall
return to the court below the record on appeal with a certificate under the seal of the
Court showing that the appeal had been dismissed. Upon receipt of such certificate in
the lower court the case shall stand there as though no appeal had been taken, and the
judgment of the said court may be enforced with additional costs allowed by the court
upon dismissal of the appeal.
We cannot accept the petitioners theory. First, because the term of the disputed office
had expired, there was virtually nothing to enforce except the monetary judgment
awarded by the trial court. The COMELEC immediately clarified that said monetary
judgment, not having been mooted by the May, 1992 elections, was not and could not
have been part of its earlier order. Under the circumstances, therefore, it would have
been absolutely illogical to assume that the case stood originally as though no appeal
had been taken to the Commission plainly because the decision on the main issue the
electoral protest could not be enforced. On the other hand, had the case been
dismissed for lack of merit, the lower court would have been duty-bound, at the very
least, to enforce its original decision finding herein petitioner winner of the mayoralty
post in the 1988 municipal elections in Madrilejos, Cebu.
Second, petitioners citation of Yorac vs. Magalona 11 as authority for his main
proposition is grossly inappropriate and misses the point in issue. The sole question in
that case centered on an election protest involving the mayoralty post in Saravia,
Negros Occidental in the general elections of 1955, which was rendered moot and
academic by the expiration of the term of office in December, 1959. 12 It did not involve
a monetary award for damages and other expenses incurred as a result of the election
protest. In responding to the petitioners contention that the issues presented before
the court were novel and important and that the appeal should not be dismissed, the
Court held citing the same provision of the Rules of Court upon which petitioner

staunchly places reliance that a decision on the merits in the case would have no
practical value at all, and forthwith dismissed the case for being moot. That is not the
case here. In contradistinction to Yorac, a decision on the merits in the case at bench
would clearly have the practical value of either sustaining the monetary award for
damages or relieving the private respondent from having to pay the amount thus
awarded.
This brings us to the substantive issue: Did the COMELEC abuse its discretion in
reversing that portion of the trial courts decision awarding election expenses in the
amount of P300,856.19?
The Omnibus Election Code provides:
Actual or compensatory damages may be granted in all election contests or in quo
warranto proceedings in accordance with law. 13
Provisions for actual or compensatory damages under the law are embodied in various
Civil Code articles allowing claims for damages under specific circumstances. Thus,
Article 2176 provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi delict, and is governed
by the provisions of this chapter.
Specifically, Article 2199 of the Civil Code mandates that:
Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
Thus, in addition to specific provisions of law allowing actual or compensatory damages
in certain situations, the Civil Code elaborates that the proper setting for allowance of
actual or compensatory damages occurs in breaches of obligations, i.e., in cases of
contracts and quasi-contracts, 14 and in crimes and quasi-delicts, where the defendant
may be held liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of
the act or omission complained of. 15 Given this setting, it would appear virtually
impossible for a party in an election protest case to recover actual or compensatory
damages in the absence of the conditions specified under Articles 2201 and 2202 of the

Civil Code, or in the absence of a law expressly providing for situations allowing for the
recovery of the same. It follows, naturally, that in most election protest cases where the
monetary claim does not hinge on either a contract or quasi-contract or a tortious act or
omission, the claimant must be able to point out to a specific provision of law
authorizing a money claim for election protest expenses against the losing party. This,
petitioner has been unable to do.
The countrys early election laws contained provisions requiring the furnishing of a bond
or cash deposit for purposes of payment of expenses and costs incidental to election
contests and appeals. 16 The Administrative Code of 1917 for instance provides:
Sec. 482. Bond or Cash Deposit Required of Contestants. Before the Court shall
entertain any such contest or counter-contest or admit an appeal, the party filing the
contest, counter-contest or appeal shall give bond in an amount fixed by the court with
two sureties satisfactory to it, conditioned that he will pay all expenses and costs
incident to such motion or appeal, or shall deposit cash in court in lieu of such bond. If
the party paying such expenses and costs shall be successful, they shall be taxed by the
court and entered and be collectible as a judgment against the defeated party.
The Election Law of 1938 (Commonwealth Act No. 357) contained the same provision
with a minor modification providing for increasing or decreasing the bond or cash
deposit as the course of the contest may require. This provision was repeated in toto
in the Revised Election Code of 1947. 17 Republic Act No. 6388, and the Election Code
of 1971, 18 P.D. No. 1296, and the 1978 Election Code contained provisions allowing
awards for moral and exemplary damages as the Commission may deem just if the
aggrieved party has included (such) in his pleadings, 19 but left out the provision for
bond and cash deposits found in the earlier election codes. The provisions for moral and
exemplary damages as well as the early provisions requiring the furnishing of a bond to
cover expenses related to election contests have all but disappeared in the current
Omnibus Election Code.
It may be argued that the provisions for the furnishing of a bond or cash deposit which
were deleted from the 1981 Omnibus Election Code, nonetheless, appear in the
Comelec Rules of Procedure. Section 1 of Rule 42 of the said rules for instance provides:
Sec. 1. Filing fees for election contests, quo warranto, and petitions for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus.
xxx xxx xxx

(b) Cash Deposits. In any protest or counter protest or protest-in-intervention not


requiring ballot revision the following cash deposits shall be paid by the interested
party:
(1)

For

(2)

each

election

For

contest

each

P1,000.00;

counter

protest

or protest-in-intervention P1,000.00
(c) In any protest, counter-protest or protest-in-intervention requiring ballot revision the
following cash deposits shall be paid by the interested party:
(1)

For

(2)

each

election

For

contest

each

P5,000.00;

counter

protest

or protest-in-intervention P5,000.00
The cash deposits prescribed above shall be applied to the payment of all expenses
incidental

to

such

protest,

counter-protest

or

protest-in-intervention.

When

circumstances so demand, additional cash deposits may be required. Any unused


balance thereof shall be returned to the protestant, counter-protestant or protestant-inintervention, as the case may be.
(d) In case of revision of ballots, there shall be deposited the sum of P350.00 for every
ballot box for the compensation of the revisors at the rate of P100.00 each and as
reserve for expenses.
(e) If a claim for damages and attorneys fees are set forth in a protest, counter-protest
or protest-in-intervention, an additional filing fee shall be paid at the rate of P300.00 for
the first one hundred fifty thousand pesos and P4.00 for every one thousand pesos over
the first P150,000.00.
An examination of the above quoted provision, however, reveals that the bonds or cash
deposits required by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are in the nature of filing fees, not
damages. These filing fees obviously refer to the expenses incurred by the COMELEC in
the course of administering election cases and are species different from the bond or
cash deposit required by previous election laws which are clearly in the nature of actual
and compensatory damages. 20 Plainly then, the deposit requirements under previous
election laws which were obviously compensatory damages, were repealed or abrogated
as a result of their non-inclusion both in the Election Code of 1978 and the Omnibus
Election Code of 1981. If their non-inclusion in the 1978 statute was a mere legislative

lapse, then the previous provisions on bonds or cash deposits would have been included
in the Omnibus Election Code. Their non-inclusion, and the omission of provisions
allowing for moral and exemplary damages in the Omnibus Election Code, furthermore
clearly underscores the legislative intent to do away with provisions for damages other
than those specified in Section 259 of the Omnibus Election Code. In fact, the COMELEC,
in justifying its deletion of actual damages in its assailed en banc resolution, ignored the
fees provision of its Comelec Rules of Procedure and explained that the bond or cash
deposit provisions of previous election laws were abrogated by their non-inclusion in the
current law.
In fine, Section 259 of the Omnibus Election Code merely provides for the granting of
actual and compensatory damages in accordance with law. That it was the intent of the
legislature to do away with provisions indemnifying the victorious party for expenses
incurred in an election contest in the absence of a wrongful act or omission clearly
attributable to the losing party cannot be gainsaid. The intent, moreover, to do away
with such provisions merely recognizes the maxim, settled in law that a wrong without
damage or damage without wrong neither constitutes a cause of action nor creates a
civil obligation.
Finding no reversible error in the assailed resolution, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977

Elcano v Hill July 17, 2011 77 SCRA 100 May 26, 1977
Torts and Damages Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from Crimes
Facts:
Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a
criminal case against Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for lack of intent
coupled with mistake. Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald and his dad
(Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that
the civil action is barred by his sons acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever,
his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is already
an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.

Held:
Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a
separate civil action. A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the
two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of
Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a
quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not

DMPI Employees vs. Velez Metal-NAFLU G.R. No.129282, November 29, 2001
Facts:An information for estafa was filed against Carmen Mandawe for alleged
failure to account to respondent Eriberta Villegas the amount of
P608,532.46.Respondent Villegas entrusted this amount to Carmen Mandawe, an
employee of petitioner DMPI-ECCI, for deposit with the teller of petitioner.
Subsequently, on March 29, 1994, respondent Eriberta Villegas filed with the
Regional Trial Court, a complaint against Carmen Mandawe and petitioner DMPIECCI for a sum of money and damages with preliminary attachment arising out of
the same transaction. In time, petitioner sought the dismissal of the civil case on
the ground that there is a pending criminal case in RTC Branch 37, arising from the
same facts, Trial court issued an order dismissing the case. However upon
respondents motion for reconsideration, the order of dismissal was recalled On Feb.
211997
Issue: Whether or not the civil case could proceed independently of the criminal
case for Estafa without the necessary reservation exercised by the party
Held: Yes. As a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first is
the social injury produced by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired thru the
imposition of the corresponding penalty, and the second is the personal injury
caused to the victim of the crime which injury is sought to be compensated through
indemnity which is civil in nature. Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony
is also civilly liable."This is the law governing the recovery of civil liability arising
from the commission of an offense. Civil liability includes restitution, reparation for
damage caused, and indemnification of consequential damages. The offended party
may prove the civil liability of an accused arisingfrom thecommission of the offense
in the criminal case since the civil actionis either deemed instituted with the
criminal action or is separatelyinstituted.Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure,which became effective on December 1, 2000, provides that:

"(a) When acriminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liabilityarising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with thecriminal
action.
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action."
Rule 111, Section 2 further provides that "After the criminal action has been
commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until
final judgment has been entered in the criminal action
."
However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under Articles
32,33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission, the rule
has been changed. Under the present rule, only the civil liability arising from the
offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.
There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil
actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. "The
reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of
the civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does not include recovery of
civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission which may be prosecuted separately even
without a reservation.
The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent
civil actions which became effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to this
case.
Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of
procedure. Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-214, an independent civil action for damages
on account of the fraud committed against respondent Villegas under Article 33 of
the Civil Code, may proceed independently even if there was no reservation as to its
filing.

G.R. No. L-39999

May 31, 1984

ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY


BEDENIA, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

Sisenando Villaluz, Sr. for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals' decision which


reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction and acquitted the petitioners of the
crime of grave coercion on the ground of reasonable doubt but inspite of the
acquittal ordered them to pay jointly and severally the amount of P9,000.00 to the
complainants as actual damages.

The petitioners were charged under the following information:

The undersigned Fiscal accused ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, PEPITO


BEDENIA, YOLLY RICO, DAVID BERMUNDO, VILLANOAC, ROBERTO ROSALES,
VILLANIA, ROMEO GARRIDO, JOSE ORTEGA, JR., RICARDO CELESTINO, REALINGO
alias "KAMLON", JOHN DOE alias TATO, and FOURTEEN (14) RICARDO DOES of the
crime of GRAVE COERCION, committed as follows:

That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, in the
municipality of Jose Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, Roy
Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedenia, Yolly Rico, David Bermundo, Villanoac,
Roberto Rosales, Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo Celestino,
Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does, by
confederating and mutually helping one another, and acting without any authority

of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of threats,
force and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to close their stall located
at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by
subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally
demolishing and destroying said stall and the furnitures therein by axes and other
massive instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise, to the
damage and prejudice of the said Antonio Vergara and his family in the amount of
P30,000.00 in concept of actual or compensatory and moral damages, and further
the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.

That in committing the offense, the accused took advantage of their public
positions: Roy Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the
accused being policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with evident
premeditation.

The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Tenth Judicial District rendered a
decision, the dispositive portion of which states that:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Roy Padilla, Filomeno
Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of grave coercion, and hereby imposes upon them to suffer an
imprisonment of FIVE (5) months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to
pay actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P10,000.00; moral
damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary
damages, jointly and severally, and all the accessory penalties provided for by law;
and to pay the proportionate costs of this proceedings.

The accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon', David Bermundo, Christopher


Villanoac, Godofredo Villania, Romeo Garrido, Roberto Rosales, Ricardo Celestino
and Jose Ortega, are hereby ordered acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt for
their criminal participation in the crime charged.

The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. They
contended that the trial court's finding of grave coercion was not supported by the
evidence. According to the petitioners, the town mayor had the power to order the
clearance of market premises and the removal of the complainants' stall because

the municipality had enacted municipal ordinances pursuant to which the market
stall was a nuisance per se. The petitioners stated that the lower court erred in
finding that the demolition of the complainants' stall was a violation of the very
directive of the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy two (72) hours
to vacate the market premises. The petitioners questioned the imposition of prison
terms of five months and one day and of accessory penalties provided by law. They
also challenged the order to pay fines of P500.00 each, P10,000.00 actual and
compensatory damages, P30,000.00 moral damages, P10,000.00 exemplary
damages, and the costs of the suit.

The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals states:

WHEREFORE, we hereby modify the judgment appealed from in the sense that the
appellants are acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt. but they are ordered to pay
jointly and severally to complainants the amount of P9,600.00, as actual damages.

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of
the defendants-appellants as to criminal liability results in the extinction of their
civil liability. The Court of Appeals denied the motion holding that:

xxx

xxx

xxx

... appellants' acquittal was based on reasonable doubt whether the crime of
coercion was committed, not on facts that no unlawful act was committed; as their
taking the law into their hands, destructing (sic) complainants' properties is
unlawful, and, as evidence on record established that complainants suffered actual
damages, the imposition of actual damages is correct.

Consequently, the petitioners filed this special civil action, contending that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW OR GRAVELY ABUSED


ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING UPON PETITIONERS PAYMENT OF DAMAGES TO
COMPLAINANTS AFTER ACQUITTING PETITIONERS OF THE CRIME CHARGED FROM
WHICH SAID LIABILITY AROSE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED DECEMBER


26, 1974 THAT SINCE APPELLANTS' ACQUITTAL WAS BASED ON REASONABLE
DOUBT, NOT ON FACTS THAT NO UNLAWFUL ACT WAS COMMITTED, THE IMPOSITION
OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IS CORRECT.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL INCONSISTENCY, IF NOT PLAIN


JUDICIAL ERROR, IN HOLDING IN ITS APPEALED RESOLUTION THAT PETITIONERS
COMMITTED AN UNLAWFUL ACT, THAT IS TAKING THE LAW INTO THEIR HANDS,
DESTRUCTING (sic) 'COMPLAINANTS' PROPERTIES', AFTER HOLDING IN ITS MAIN
DECISION OF NOVEMBER 6,1974 THAT THE ACTS FOR WHICH THEY WERE CHARGED
DID NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE COERCION AND THEY WERE NOT CHARGED OF ANY
OTHER CRIME.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS HEREIN,


APPELLANTS IN CA-G.R. NO. 13456CR, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, TO PAY
COMPLAINANTS P9,600.00 IN SUPPOSED ACTUAL DAMAGES.

The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or not the respondent court
committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the
complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge.

Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability which is included in the
criminal action is that arising from and as a consequence of the criminal act, and
the defendant was acquitted in the criminal case, (no civil liability arising from the
criminal case), no civil liability arising from the criminal charge could be imposed
upon him. They cite precedents to the effect that the liability of the defendant for
the return of the amount received by him may not be enforced in the criminal case
but must be raised in a separate civil action for the recovery of the said amount
(People v. Pantig, 97 Phil. 748; following the doctrine laid down in Manila Railroad
Co. v. Honorable Rodolfo Baltazar, 49 O.G. 3874; Pueblo contra Abellera, 69 Phil.
623; People v. Maniago 69 Phil. 496; People v. Miranda, 5 SCRA 1067; Aldaba v.
Elepafio 116 Phil. 457). In the case before us, the petitioners were acquitted not
because they did not commit the acts stated in the charge against them. There is
no dispute over the forcible opening of the market stall, its demolition with axes and
other instruments, and the carting away of the merchandize. The petitioners were
acquitted because these acts were denominated coercion when they properly
constituted some other offense such as threat or malicious mischief.

The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision:

For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing provision, the violence must be
employed against the person, not against property as what happened in the case at
bar. ...

xxx

xxx

xxx

The next problem is: May the accused be convicted of an offense other than
coercion?

From all appearances, they should have been prosecuted either for threats or
malicious mischief. But the law does not allow us to render judgment of conviction
for either of these offenses for the reason that they were not indicted for, these
offenses. The information under which they were prosecuted does not allege the
elements of either threats or malicious mischief. Although the information mentions
that the act was by means of threats', it does not allege the particular threat made.
An accused person is entitled to be informed of the nature of the acts imputed to
him before he can be made to enter into trial upon a valid information.

We rule that the crime of grave coercion has not been proved in accordance with
law.

While appellants are entitled to acquittal they nevertheless are liable for the actual
damages suffered by the complainants by reason of the demolition of the stall and
loss of some of their properties. The extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it that of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. (Rule 111, Sec.
3 (c), Rev. Rules of Court; Laperal v. Aliza, 51 OG.R. 1311, People v. Velez, 44 OG.
1811). In the instant case, the fact from which the civil might arise, namely, the
demolition of the stall and loss of the properties contained therein; exists, and this
is not denied by the accused. And since there is no showing that the complainants
have reserved or waived their right to institute a separate civil action, the civil
aspect therein is deemed instituted with the criminal action. (Rule 111, Sec. 1, Rev.
Rules of Court).

xxx

xxx

xxx

Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that
when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with it. There is no implied
institution when the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his
right to institute it separately. (Morte Sr. v. Alvizo, Jr., 101 SCRA 221).

The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers
exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other words, the
civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil
liability arising from the act as a crime.

As easily as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Jorge Bocobo in
Barredo v. Garcia, et at. 73 Phil. 607 laid down the rule that the same punishable act
or omission can create two kinds of civil liabilities against the accused and, where
provided by law, his employer. 'There is the civil liability arising from the act as a
crime and the liability arising from the same act as a quasi-delict. Either one of

these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the accused, However, the
offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability. For instance, in
cases of criminal negligence or crimes due to reckless imprudence, Article 2177 of
the Civil Code provides:

Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But
the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.

Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that:

Sec. 3.
Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included in
the preceding section the following rules shall be observed:

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

(c)
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil,
unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to
the civil action may institute it in the Jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law
against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or
indemnity for the damage suffered.

The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only
when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not
exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of
evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the
liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia,
96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft,
and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil

liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does not
arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted
(Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623). Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that:

When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the
same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance
of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file
a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be
malicious.

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the
court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be
inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
ground.

More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case
would not constitute an obstacle to the filing of a civil case based on the same acts
which led to the criminal prosecution:

... The finding by the respondent court that he spent said sum for and in the interest
of the Capiz Agricultural and Fishery School and for his personal benefit is not a
declaration that the fact upon which Civil Case No. V-3339 is based does not exist.
The civil action barred by such a declaration is the civil liability arising from the
offense charged, which is the one impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
(Section 1, Rule III, Rules of Court.) Such a declaration would not bar a civil action
filed against an accused who had been acquitted in the criminal case if the criminal
action is predicated on factual or legal considerations other than the commission of
the offense charged. A person may be acquitted of malversation where, as in the
case at bar, he could show that he did not misappropriate the public funds in his
possession, but he could be rendered liable to restore said funds or at least to make
a proper accounting thereof if he shall spend the same for purposes which are not
authorized nor intended, and in a manner not permitted by applicable rules and
regulations. (Republic v. Bello, 120 SCRA 203)

There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be


filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been
established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due
process has been accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal
charged. The constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts
on the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all
witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration
by the judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To
require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would
mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation
with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.

The trial court found the following facts clearly established by the evidence adduced
by both the prosecution and the defense:

xxx

xxx

xxx

(9)
In the morning of February 8, 1964, then Chief Galdones, complying with the
instructions contained in said Memorandum No. 32 of the Mayor, and upon seeing
that Antonio Vergara had not vacated the premises in question, with the aid of his
policemen, forced upon the store or stall and ordered the removal of the goods
inside the store of Vergara, at the same time taking inventory of the goods taken
out, piled them outside in front of the store and had it cordoned with a rope, and
after all the goods were taken out from the store, ordered the demolition of said
stall of Antonio Vergara. Since then up to the trial of this case, the whereabouts of
the goods taken out from the store nor the materials of the demolished stall have
not been made known.

The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar finding that:

On the morning of February 8th, because the said Vergaras had not up to that time
complied with the order to vacate, the co-accused Chief of Police Galdones and
some members of his police force, went to the market and, using ax, crowbars and
hammers, demolished the stall of the Vergaras who were not present or around, and
after having first inventoried the goods and merchandise found therein, they had
them brought to the municipal building for safekeeping. Inspite of notice served

upon the Vergaras to take possession of the goods and merchandise thus taken
away, the latter refused to do so.

The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they evaluated them were:

Cost of stall construction P1,300.00

Value of furniture and equipment


judgment destroyed

300.00

Value of goods and equipment taken

8,000.00

P9,600.00

It is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall of the complainants
Vergaras and carted away its contents. The defense that they did so in order to
abate what they considered a nuisance per se is untenable, This finds no support in
law and in fact. The couple has been paying rentals for the premises to the
government which allowed them to lease the stall. It is, therefore, farfetched to say
that the stall was a nuisance per se which could be summarily abated.

The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact that they caused the destruction
of the complainant's market stall and had its contents carted away. They state:

On February 8, 1964, despite personal pleas on Vergaras by the Mayor to vacate the
passageways of Market Building No. 3, the Vergaras were still in the premises, so
the petitioners Chief of Police and members of the Police Force of Jose Panganiban,
pursuant to the Mayor' 6 directives, demolished the store of the Vergaras, made an
inventory of the goods found in said store, and brought these goods to the
municipal building under the custody of the Municipal Treasurer, ...

The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier
cited, that "when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground
that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages for the same act or omission may be instituted." According to some
scholars, this provision of substantive law calls for a separate civil action and cannot
be modified by a rule of remedial law even in the interests of economy and
simplicity and following the dictates of logic and common sense.

As stated by retired Judge J. Cezar Sangco:

... if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the civil action but inadequate
to justify a conviction in the criminal action, may it render judgment acquitting the
accused on reasonable doubt, but hold him civilly liable nonetheless? An affirmative
answer to this question would be consistent with the doctrine that the two are
distinct and separate actions, and win (a) dispense with the reinstituting of the
same civil action, or one based on quasi-delict or other independent civil action, and
of presenting the same evidence: (b) save the injured party unnecessary expenses
in the prosecution of the civil action or enable him to take advantage of the free
services of the fiscal; and (c) otherwise resolve the unsettling implications of
permitting the reinstitution of a separate civil action whether based on delict, or
quasi-delict, or other independent civil actions.

... But for the court to be able to adjudicate in the manner here suggested, Art. 29
of the Civil Code should be amended because it clearly and expressly provides that
the civil action based on the same act or omission may only be instituted in a
separate action, and therefore, may not inferentially be resolved in the same
criminal action. To dismiss the civil action upon acquittal of the accused and
disallow the reinstitution of any other civil action, would likewise render,
unjustifiably, the acquittal on reasonable doubt without any significance, and would
violate the doctrine that the two actions are distinct and separate.

In the light of the foregoing exposition, it seems evident that there is much
sophistry and no pragmatism in the doctrine that it is inconsistent to award in the
same proceedings damages against the accused after acquitting him on reasonable
doubt. Such doctrine must recognize the distinct and separate character of the two
actions, the nature of an acquittal on reasonable doubt, the vexatious and
oppressive effects of a reservation or institution of a separate civil action, and that
the injured party is entitled to damages not because the act or omission is

punishable but because he was damaged or injured thereby (Sangco, Philippine Law
on Torts and Damages, pp. 288-289).

We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court to
grant damages despite a judgment of acquittal based on reasonable doubt. What
Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the
defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil
action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or
omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of
only in a separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no
statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of
recovering damages.

There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment
of acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two
can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal
liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear
showing that the act from which civil liability might arise did not exist.

A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil Code a trivial requirement, a


provision which imposes an uncalled for burden before one who has already been
the victim of a condemnable, yet non-criminal, act may be accorded the justice
which he seeks.

We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at the
intent of the legislator that they could not possibly have intended to make it more
difficult for the aggrieved party to recover just compensation by making a separate
civil action mandatory and exclusive:

The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him
from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It
has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal
was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the
accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is
derived from the the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability
cannot be demanded.

This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and
deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation
between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result
of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or
correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by
the aggrieved party... it is just and proper that, for the purposes of the
imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why
should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or
violation of every private right to be proved only by preponderance of evidence? Is
the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also
punishable by the criminal law? (Code Commission, pp. 45-46).

A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be


established or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been
fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more
expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was
decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The offended party
may, of course, choose to file a separate action. These do not exist in this case.
Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and
review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this
time a separate civil action to be filed.

With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court of Appeals did not err
in awarding damages despite a judgment of acquittal.

WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals


and dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE


PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted


out becomes final and executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of
the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of
asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil liability
of the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are
carried in one single decision that has become final and executory.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the March 29, 2000 and the March 27, 2001 Resolutions of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 59390. Petitioners appeal from
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union in
Criminal Case No. 2535 was dismissed in the first Resolution as follows:
[1]

[2]

[3]

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the
appeal is ordered DISMISSED.
[4]

The second Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

[5]

The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:
On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was found guilty and
convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple
physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and to pay
damages as follows:
a.

to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sum of P50,000.00 as


indemnity for his death, plus the sum of P25,383.00, for funeral
expenses, his unearned income for one year at P2,500.00 a
month, P50,000.00 as indemnity for the support of Renato Torres, and
the further sum of P300,000.00 as moral damages;

b.

to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum of P50,000.00 as


indemnity for her death, the sum of P237,323.75 for funeral expenses,
her unearned income for three years at P45,000.00 per annum, and the
further sum of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages and P200,000.00 as
attorneys fees[;]

c.

to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum of P50,000.00 as


indemnity for her death, the sum of P22,838.00 as funeral expenses, the
sum of P20,544.94 as medical expenses and her loss of income for 30
years at P1,000.00 per month, and the further sum of P100,000.00 for
moral damages;

d.

to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of P229,654.00 as hospital


expenses, doctors fees of P170,000.00 for the orthopedic
surgeon, P22,500.00 for the [n]eurologist, an additional indemnity [of] at
least P150,000.00 to cover future correction of deformity of her limbs,
and moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00;

e.

to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of P3,561.46 as medical


expenses, P2,000.00 as loss of income, and P25,000.00 as moral
damages;

f.

to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of P19,800.47 as medical


expenses, P800.00 for loss of income, and P25,000.00 as moral
damages;

g.

to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of P580.81 as medical


expenses, P4,600.00 as actual damages and her loss earnings
of P1,400.00 as well as moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00;

h.

to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of P12,473.82 as hospital


expenses, P14,530.00 as doctors fees, P1,000.00 for medicines
and P50,000.00 as moral damages;

i.

to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of P155.00 for medical


expenses, P87.00 for medicines, P1,710.00 as actual damages
and P5,000.00 as moral damages;

j.

to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of P1,395.00 for hospital


bills, P500.00 for medicine, P2,100.00 as actual damages, P1,200.00 for
loss of income and P5,000.00 as moral damages;

k.

to La Union Electric Company as the registered owner of the Toyota


Hi-Ace Van, the amount of P250,000.00 as actual damages for the cost
of the totally wrecked vehicle; to the owner of the jeepney, the amount
of P22,698.38 as actual damages;

The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the insolvency of accused,
shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against
accused had become final and executory.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mention[ing]
that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when
appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by
[petitioner], filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court. We affirmed
the denial of the notice of appeal filed in behalf of accused.
Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of appeal from the
judgment of the trial court. On April 29, 1997, the trial court gave due course to
[petitioners] notice of appeal. OnDecember 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its
brief. On December 9, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General received [a] copy of
[petitioners] brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG moved to be excused from filing
[respondents] brief on the ground that the OSGs authority to represent People is
confined to criminal cases on appeal. The motion was however denied per Our
resolution of May 31, 1999. On March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor filed
the instant motion to dismiss. (Citations omitted)
[6]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals


The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution
also of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the
criminal case against the accused-employee, the employers subsidiary civil
liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes
conclusive and enforceable.
The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute
independently the civil liability fixed in the criminal case against the accusedemployee would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment. Since the
notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been dismissed by the CA,
then the judgment of conviction and the award of civil liability became final
and executory. Included in the civil liability of the accused was the employers
subsidiary liability.

Hence, this Petition.

[7]

The Issues
Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:
A.
Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of
its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the
accused.
B.
Whether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of Appeals (158 SCRA 57)
and Yusay v. Adil (164 SCRA 494) apply to the instant case.
[8]

There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an adjunct to Item
A.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Propriety of Appeal by the Employer
Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC
Decision, petitioner contends that the judgment of conviction against the
accused-employee has not attained finality. The former insists that its appeal
stayed the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had jumped bail. In
effect, petitioner argues that its appeal takes the place of that of the accusedemployee.
We are not persuaded.
Appeals in Criminal Cases
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
states thus:

Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be
placed in double jeopardy.
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case,
but the government may do so only if the accused would not thereby be
placed in double jeopardy. Furthermore, the prosecution cannot appeal on the
ground that the accused should have been given a more severe penalty. On
the other hand, the offended parties may also appeal the judgment with
respect to their right to civil liability. If the accused has the right to appeal the
judgment of conviction, the offended parties should have the same right to
appeal as much of the judgment as is prejudicial to them.
[9]

[10]

[11]

Appeal by the Accused


Who Jumps Bail
Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court
may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if
the accused jumps bail. The second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio,
dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or
flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.
[12]

This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in
court when they abscond. Unless they surrender or submit to the courts
jurisdiction, they are deemed to have waived their right to seek judicial relief.
[13]

Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail
during the appeal, but also to one who does so during the trial. Justice
Florenz D. Regalado succinctly explains the principle in this wise:
x x x. When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his arraignment and during the
trial, but the trial in absentia proceeded resulting in the promulgation of a judgment
against him and his counsel appealed, since he nonetheless remained at large his
appeal must be dismissed by analogy with the aforesaid provision of this Rule [Rule
124, 8 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure]. x x x
[14]

The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they


voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested
within 15 days from notice of the judgment against them. While at large, they
[15]

cannot seek relief from the court, as they are deemed to have waived the
appeal.
[16]

Finality of a Decision
in a Criminal Case
As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section
7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote:
A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside
before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty
is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an
appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when
the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to
surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his
appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has become final and
executory.
[17]

Liability of an Employer
in a Finding of Guilt
Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities
of innkeepers, as follows:
In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other
persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their
establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general
or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft
within their houses from gue88qsts lodging therein, or for payment of the value
thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper
himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn;
and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his
representative may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such
goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeepers employees.

Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according


to Article 103 which reads:
The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to
employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for
felonies committed by their serv
ants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or
employees in the discharge of their duties.
Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now address the main
issue raised by petitioner.
Civil Liability Deemed Instituted
in the Criminal Prosecution
At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure
has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
x x x

xxx

x x x

Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is
deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action, that is, unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or
institutes it prior to the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of
the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced
by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the
employee.
[18]

[19]

It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving


independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately from
criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code shall remain separate, distinct and independent of
any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here are some direct
consequences of such revision and omission:
[20]

[23]

[21]

[22]

1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need
not be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed
included therein.
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action
arising from the crime charged does not extinguish the right to bring such
action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than
once for the same act or omission.
[24]

What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability


arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those
liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even
if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal
prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control of
the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the
remaining civil interest therein.
[25]

This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code,


which states that [e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.
[26]

Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the


criminal
case
and
is
conclusively
bound
by
the
outcome
thereof. Consequently, petitioner must be accorded the right to pursue the
case to its logical conclusion -- including the appeal.
The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to
the criminal case, which was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its
employee.
In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive list of cases dealing
with the subsidiary liability of employers. Thereafter, it noted that none can be
applied to it, because in all th[o]se cases, the accuseds employer did not
interpose an appeal. Indeed, petitioner cannot cite any single case in which
the employer appealed, precisely because an appeal in such circumstances is
not possible.
[27]

The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly


declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases
instituted against their employees. Although in substance and in effect, they
have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their
subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of
[28]

supplying the latters lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act
independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.
Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard
Against Double Jeopardy
Petitioners appeal obviously aims to have the accused-employee
absolved of his criminal responsibility and the judgment reviewed as a
whole. These intentions are apparent from its Appellants Brief filed with the
CA and from its Petition before us, both of which claim that the trial courts
finding of guilt is not supported by competent evidence.
[29]

[30]

[31]

An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case
open to a review by the appellate court. The latter is then called upon to
render judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable
to the appellant. This is the risk involved when the accused decides to
appeal a sentence of conviction. Indeed, appellate courts have the power to
reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the lower court and to increase or
reduce the penalty it imposed.
[32]

[33]

[34]

If the present appeal is given course, the whole case against the accusedemployee becomes open to review. It thus follows that a penalty higher than
that which has already been imposed by the trial court may be meted out to
him. Petitioners appeal would thus violate his right against double jeopardy,
since the judgment against him could become subject to modification without
his consent.
We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why the accused
effectively waived his right to appeal by jumping bail. It is clear, though, that
petitioner may not appeal without violating his right against double jeopardy.
Effect of Absconding
on the Appeal Process
Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing
criminal procedure, the accused impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail
and thereby made the judgment of the court below final. Having been a
fugitive from justice for a long period of time, he is deemed to have waived his
[35]

right to appeal. Thus, his conviction is now final and executory. The Court
in People v. Ang Gioc ruled:
[36]

There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused
himself, but the right of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the
benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it
either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the case has been
submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to
appeal from the judgment rendered against him. x x x.
[37]

By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the


court and placed himself in a position to speculate on his chances for a
reversal. In the process, he kept himself out of the reach of justice, but hoped
to render the judgment nugatory at his option. Such conduct is intolerable
and does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate court.
[38]

[39]

Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who escapes and who


refuses to surrender to the proper authorities becomes final and executory.
[40]

Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the
criminal case against the accused-employee; that by jumping bail, he has
waived his right to appeal; and that the judgment in the criminal case against
him is now final.
Subsidiary Liability
Upon Finality of Judgment
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now
accrues. Petitioner argues that the rulings of this Court in Miranda v. Malate
Garage & Taxicab, Inc., Alvarez v. CA andYusay v. Adil do not apply to the
present case, because it has followed the Courts directive to the employers in
these cases to take part in the criminal cases against their employees. By
participating in the defense of its employee, herein petitioner tries to shield
itself from the undisputed rulings laid down in these leading cases.
[41]

[42]

[43]

Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on subsidiary


liability, petitioner lost track of the most basic tenet they have laid down -- that
an employers liability in a finding of guilt against its accused-employee is
subsidiary.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily
liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the

latters insolvency. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary


liability -- Articles 102 and 103 -- are deemed written into the judgments in the
cases to which they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its
decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of
the employer.
[44]

[45]

In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the


offended party, the judgment of conviction should bind the person who is
subsidiarily liable. In effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal
conviction surpasses mere civil liability.
[46]

[47]

To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case


would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a
competent court. By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final
criminal conviction of their employees without the latters consent would also
result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.
[48]

The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and


conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the formers civil liability,
but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be
separated from that of the employee.
[49]

Before the employers subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must


be adequate evidence establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of
the convicted employees; (2) that the former are engaged in some kind of
industry; (3) that the crime was committed by the employees in the discharge
of their duties; and (4) that the execution against the latter has not been
satisfied due to insolvency.
[50]

The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil


action. But the determination must be based on the evidence that the
offended party and the employer may fully and freely present. Such
determination may be done in the same criminal action in which the
employees liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced; and in a hearing
set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the
proceedings for the execution of the judgment.
[51]

Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its


accused-employee does not mean that its liability has transformed its nature;
its liability remains subsidiary. Neither will its participation erase its subsidiary
liability. The fact remains that since the accused-employees conviction has
attained finality, then the subsidiary liability of the employer ipso factoattaches.
According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the
finality of conviction could be the proper sanction to be imposed upon the

accused for jumping bail, the same sanction should not affect it. In effect,
petitioner-employer splits this case into two: first, for itself; and second, for its
accused-employee.
The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one
criminal case against the accused-employee. A finding of guilt has both
criminal and civil aspects. It is the height of absurdity for this single case to be
final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity whose liability
is dependent upon the conviction of the former.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the
pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the
latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the
formers subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately
enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary
liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.
No Deprivation
of Due Process
As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process, we
reiterate that what is sought to be enforced is the subsidiary civil liability
incident to and dependent upon the employees criminal negligence. In other
words, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the conviction
of the employee and upon proof of the latters insolvency, in the same way
that acquittal wipes out not only his primary civil liability, but also his
employers subsidiary liability for his criminal negligence.
[52]

It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a
part of due process. It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin, a
remedy that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions
of law authorizing such exercise. Hence, the legal requirements must be
strictly complied with.
[53]

[54]

[55]

It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the rules on appeal


as merely harmless and trivial technicalities that can be discarded. Indeed,
deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated. In these times when court
dockets are clogged with numerous litigations, such rules have to be followed
by parties with greater fidelity, so as to facilitate the orderly disposition of
those cases.
[56]

[57]

[58]

After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the
winning party. If the proper losing party has the right to file an appeal within

the prescribed period, then the former has the correlative right to enjoy the
finality of the resolution of the case.
[59]

In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it


participated in the proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the
employer was deprived of due process. It might have lost its right to appeal,
but it was not denied its day in court. In fact, it can be said that by jumping
bail, the accused-employee, not the court, deprived petitioner of the right to
appeal.
[60]

All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against the
accused. It should be clear that only after proof of his insolvency may the
subsidiary liability of petitioner be enforced. It has been sufficiently proven
that there exists an employer-employee relationship; that the employer is
engaged in some kind of industry; and that the employee has been adjudged
guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the
discharge of his duties. The proof is clear from the admissions of petitioner
that [o]n 26 August 1990,while on its regular trip from Laoag to Manila,
a passenger bus owned by petitioner, being then operated by petitioners
driver, Napoleon Roman, figured in an accident in San Juan, La Union x x
x. Neither does petitioner dispute that there was already a finding of guilt
against the accused while he was in the discharge of his duties.
[61]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and


Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

the

assailed

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150157

January 25, 2007

MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., Petitioners,


vs.
MODESTO CALAUNAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed before Us is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 which affirmed
in toto the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 42, in Civil Case No.
D-10086, finding petitioners Mauricio Manliclic and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI)
solidarily liable to pay damages and attorneys fees to respondent Modesto Calaunan.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate number CVD478, owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeep

with plate number PER-290, owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo
Mendoza.
At around 6:00 to 7:00 oclock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent Calaunan, together with
Marcelo Mendoza, was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his owner-type jeep. The
Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise bound for Manila from Concepcion, Tarlac. At approximately
Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the two
vehicles collided. The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep
causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to
further extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of
collision.
Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. He was first brought for treatment to
the Manila Central University Hospital in Kalookan City by Oscar Buan, the conductor of the
Philippine Rabbit Bus, and was later transferred to the Veterans Memorial Medical Center.
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, charging
petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical
Injuries, docketed as Crim. Case No. 684-M-89. Subsequently on 2 December 1991, respondent
filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI before the RTC of Dagupan
City, docketed as Civil Case No. D-10086. The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case.
Among those who testified in the criminal case were respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and
Fernando Ramos.
In the civil case (now before this Court), the parties admitted the following:
1. The parties agreed on the capacity of the parties to sue and be sued as well as the venue
and the identities of the vehicles involved;
2. The identity of the drivers and the fact that they are duly licensed;
3. The date and place of the vehicular collision;
4. The extent of the injuries suffered by plaintiff Modesto Calaunan and the existence of the
medical certificate;
5. That both vehicles were going towards the south; the private jeep being ahead of the bus;
6. That the weather was fair and the road was well paved and straight, although there was a
ditch on the right side where the jeep fell into. 3
When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographic
notes (TSNs)4of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in
the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case in as much as these witnesses are not
available to testify in the civil case.
Francisco Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law, respondent Calaunan, left for abroad sometime in
November, 1989 and has not returned since then. Rogelio Ramos took the stand and said that his
brother, Fernando Ramos, left for Amman, Jordan, to work. Rosalia Mendoza testified that her
husband, Marcelo Mendoza, left their residence to look for a job. She narrated that she thought her

husband went to his hometown in Panique, Tarlac, when he did not return after one month. She went
to her husbands hometown to look for him but she was informed that he did not go there.
1awphil.net

The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Branch 8, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, the court where
Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was tried, to bring the TSNs of the testimonies of respondent
Calaunan,5 Marcelo Mendoza6 and Fernando Ramos7 in said case, together with other documentary
evidence marked therein. Instead of the Branch Clerk of Court, it was Enrique Santos Guevara,
Court Interpreter, who appeared before the court and identified the TSNs of the three afore-named
witnesses and other pertinent documents he had brought. 8 Counsel for respondent wanted to mark
other TSNs and documents from the said criminal case to be adopted in the instant case, but since
the same were not brought to the trial court, counsel for petitioners compromised that said TSNs and
documents could be offered by counsel for respondent as rebuttal evidence.
For the defendants, petitioner Manliclic and bus conductor Oscar Buan testified. The TSN 9 of the
testimony of Donato Ganiban, investigator of the PRBLI, in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was marked
and allowed to be adopted in the civil case on the ground that he was already dead.
Respondent further marked, among other documents, as rebuttal evidence, the TSNs 10 of the
testimonies of Donato Ganiban, Oscar Buan and petitioner Manliclic in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89.
The disagreement arises from the question: Who is to be held liable for the collision?
Respondent insists it was petitioner Manliclic who should be liable while the latter is resolute in
saying it was the former who caused the smash up.
The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows:
The parties differed only on the manner the collision between the two (2) vehicles took place.
According to the plaintiff and his driver, the jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per
hour on the slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in
the process of overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side.
At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In other words,
the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit. Fernando Ramos
corroborated the testimony of the plaintiff and Marcelo Mendoza. He said that he was on another
jeep following the Philippine Rabbit Bus and the jeep of plaintiff when the incident took place. He
said, the jeep of the plaintiff overtook them and the said jeep of the plaintiff was followed by the
Philippine Rabbit Bus which was running very fast. The bus also overtook the jeep in which he was
riding. After that, he heard a loud sound. He saw the jeep of the plaintiff swerved to the right on a
grassy portion of the road. The Philippine Rabbit Bus stopped and they overtook the Philippine
Rabbit Bus so that it could not moved (sic), meaning they stopped in front of the Philippine Rabbit
Bus. He testified that the jeep of plaintiff swerved to the right because it was bumped by the
Philippine Rabbit bus from behind.
Both Mauricio Manliclic and his driver, Oscar Buan admitted that the Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped
the jeep in question. However, they explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to
the left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because it was to overtake
another jeep in front of it. Such was their testimony before the RTC in Malolos in the criminal case
and before this Court in the instant case. [Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the
collision took place was correct, would be determinative of who between the two drivers was
negligent in the operation of their respective vehicles.] 11

Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of its employee, specifically petitioner Manliclic.
On 22 July 1996, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent Calaunan and against
petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the
said defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and solidarily the amount of P40,838.00 as actual damages for
the towing as well as the repair and the materials used for the repair of the jeep in
question; P100,000.00 as moral damages and another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages
and P15,000.00 as attorneys fees, including appearance fees of the lawyer. In addition, the
defendants are also to pay costs.12
Petitioners appealed the decision via Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals. 13
In a decision dated 28 September 2001, the Court of Appeals, finding no reversible error in the
decision of the trial court, affirmed it in all respects. 14
Petitioners are now before us by way of petition for review assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals. They assign as errors the following:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS QUESTIONABLE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF THE TSNs AND OTHER
DOCUMENTS PRESENTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS RELIANCE ON THE VERSION OF THE RESPONDENT ON HOW THE ACCIDENT
SUPPOSEDLY OCCURRED.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS UNFAIR DISREGARD OF HEREIN PETITIONER PRBLs DEFENSE OF EXERCISE OF
DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS EMPLOYEES.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS QUESTIONABLE AWARD OF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEE.
With the passing away of respondent Calaunan during the pendency of this appeal with this Court,
we granted the Motion for the Substitution of Respondent filed by his wife, Mrs. Precila Zarate Vda.
De Calaunan, and children, Virgilio Calaunan, Carmelita Honeycomb, Evelyn Calaunan, Marko
Calaunan and Liwayway Calaunan. 15

In their Reply to respondents Comment, petitioners informed this Court of a Decision 16 of the Court
of Appeals acquitting petitioner Manliclic of the charge 17 of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property with Physical Injuries attaching thereto a photocopy thereof.
On the first assigned error, petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent
Calaunan,18Marcelo Mendoza19 and Fernando Ramos20 should not be admitted in evidence for failure
of respondent to comply with the requisites of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
For Section 47, Rule 13021 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead
or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial
or administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the former
case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different causes of action;
(d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present
case; and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former
case.22
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth by the Rules for
a testimony given in a former case or proceeding to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay
rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89, had no opportunity to
cross-examine the three witnesses in said case. The criminal case was filed exclusively against
petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLIs employee. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of
employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases
instituted against their employees.23
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case, the testimonies
of the three witnesses are still admissible on the ground that petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their
admissibility.
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document
is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is
merely a privilege which the party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it
does not conform to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. Even assuming ex gratia
argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of failure to
object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein
asserted.24 Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but, when no
objection is made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the importance it
deserves.25
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the testimonies of
respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case when the same
were offered in evidence in the trial court. In fact, the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan and
Mendoza were admitted by both petitioners.26Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even offered in evidence
the TSN containing the testimony of Donato Ganiban in the criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI argues
that the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiffs witnesses in the criminal case should not be admitted in
the instant case, why then did it offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban which was given in the
criminal case? It appears that petitioner PRBLI wants to have its cake and eat it too. It cannot argue
that the TSNs of the testimonies of the witnesses of the adverse party in the criminal case should not
be admitted and at the same time insist that the TSN of the testimony of the witness for the accused
be admitted in its favor. To disallow admission in evidence of the TSNs of the testimonies of
Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case and to admit the TSN of the
testimony of Ganiban would be unfair.

We do not subscribe to petitioner PRBLIs argument that it will be denied due process when the
TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case
are to be admitted in the civil case. It is too late for petitioner PRBLI to raise denial of due process in
relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to the admissibility of
the TSNs. For failure to object at the proper time, it waived its right to object that the TSNs did not
comply with Section 47.
In Mangio v. Court of Appeals,27 this Court, through Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, 28 admitted in
evidence a TSN of the testimony of a witness in another case despite therein petitioners assertion
that he would be denied due process. In admitting the TSN, the Court ruled that the raising of denial
of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to
the admissibility of the TSN was belatedly done. In so doing, therein petitioner waived his right to
object based on said ground.
Petitioners contend that the documents in the criminal case should not have been admitted in the
instant civil case because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to "testimony or deposition." We find
such contention to be untenable. Though said section speaks only of testimony and deposition, it
does not mean that documents from a former case or proceeding cannot be admitted. Said
documents can be admitted they being part of the testimonies of witnesses that have been admitted.
Accordingly, they shall be given the same weight as that to which the testimony may be entitled. 29
On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that the version of petitioner Manliclic as to how
the accident occurred is more credible than respondents version. They anchor their contention on
the fact that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted by the Court of Appeals of the charge of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.
To be resolved by the Court is the effect of petitioner Manliclics acquittal in the civil case.
From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one arising from, or
based on, quasi-delict.30 Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his negligence or reckless imprudence in
causing the collision, while petitioner PRBLI was sued for its failure to exercise the diligence of a
good father in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. The
allegations read:
"4. That sometime on July 12, 1988 at around 6:20 A.M. plaintiff was on board the abovedescribed motor vehicle travelling at a moderate speed along the North Luzon Expressway
heading South towards Manila together with MARCELO MENDOZA, who was then driving
the same;
"5. That approximately at kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Express Way, the above-described
motor vehicle was suddenly bumped from behind by a Philippine Rabbit Bus with Body No.
353 and with plate No. CVD 478 then being driven by one Mauricio Manliclic of San Jose,
Concepcion, Tarlac, who was then travelling recklessly at a very fast speed and had
apparently lost control of his vehicle;
"6. That as a result of the impact of the collision the above-described motor vehicle was
forced off the North Luzon Express Way towards the rightside where it fell on its drivers side
on a ditch, and that as a consequence, the above-described motor vehicle which maybe
valued at EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS (P80,000) was rendered a total wreck as shown by
pictures to be presented during the pre-trial and trial of this case;

"7. That also as a result of said incident, plaintiff sustained bodily injuries which compounded
plaintiffs frail physical condition and required his hospitalization from July 12, 1988 up to and
until July 22, 1988, copy of the medical certificate is hereto attached as Annex "A" and made
an integral part hereof;
"8. That the vehicular collision resulting in the total wreckage of the above-described motor
vehicle as well as bodily (sic) sustained by plaintiff, was solely due to the reckless
imprudence of the defendant driver Mauricio Manliclic who drove his Philippine Rabbit Bus
No. 353 at a fast speed without due regard or observance of existing traffic rules and
regulations;
"9. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Line Corporation failed to exercise the diligence of
a good father of (sic) family in the selection and supervision of its drivers; x x x" 31
Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be found negligent notwithstanding the
declaration of the Court of Appeals that there was an absence of negligence on his part?
In exonerating petitioner Manliclic in the criminal case, the Court of Appeals said:
To the following findings of the court a quo, to wit: that accused-appellant was negligent "when the
bus he was driving bumped the jeep from behind"; that "the proximate cause of the accident was his
having driven the bus at a great speed while closely following the jeep"; x x x
We do not agree.
The swerving of Calaunans jeep when it tried to overtake the vehicle in front of it was beyond the
control of accused-appellant.
xxxx
Absent evidence of negligence, therefore, accused-appellant cannot be held liable for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries as defined in Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code.32
From the foregoing declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner Manliclic was
acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground that he is not the author of the act complained
of which is based on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist.
In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The afore-quoted
section applies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action arising
from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3,
Rule 111 [now Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only
and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. 33

A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime
a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasidelicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability
arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extracontractual under the Civil Code.34 It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a
finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi
delict.35
In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability
arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is
acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there
is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist), said
acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance,
there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In
this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of.
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by
an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the
act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in
a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code.36 An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil
case37 based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
Petitioners ask us to give credence to their version of how the collision occurred and to disregard
that of respondents. Petitioners insist that while the PRBLI bus was in the process of overtaking
respondents jeep, the latter, without warning, suddenly swerved to the left (fast) lane in order to
overtake another jeep ahead of it, thus causing the collision.
As a general rule, questions of fact may not be raised in a petition for review. The factual findings of
the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding and conclusive on the
Supreme Court.38 Not being a trier of facts, this Court will not allow a review thereof unless:
(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals
went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 39
After going over the evidence on record, we do not find any of the exceptions that would warrant our
departure from the general rule. We fully agree in the finding of the trial court, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, that it was petitioner Manliclic who was negligent in driving the PRBLI bus which
was the cause of the collision. In giving credence to the version of the respondent, the trial court has
this say:

x x x Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took place was correct, would
be determinative of who between the two drivers was negligent in the operation of their respective
vehicle.
In this regard, it should be noted that in the statement of Mauricio Manliclic (Exh. 15) given to the
Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading no mention was made by him about the fact that the
driver of the jeep was overtaking another jeep when the collision took place. The allegation that
another jeep was being overtaken by the jeep of Calaunan was testified to by him only in Crim. Case
No. 684-M-89 before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan and before this Court. Evidently, it
was a product of an afterthought on the part of Mauricio Manliclic so that he could explain why he
should not be held responsible for the incident. His attempt to veer away from the truth was also
apparent when it would be considered that in his statement given to the Philippine Rabbit
Investigator CV Cabading (Exh. 15), he alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the jeep of
Calaunan while the Philippine Rabbit Bus was behind the said jeep. In his testimony before the
Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan as well as in this Court, he alleged that the Philippine
Rabbit Bus was already on the left side of the jeep when the collision took place. For this
inconsistency between his statement and testimony, his explanation regarding the manner of how
the collision between the jeep and the bus took place should be taken with caution. It might be true
that in the statement of Oscar Buan given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading, it was
mentioned by the former that the jeep of plaintiff was in the act of overtaking another jeep when the
collision between the latter jeep and the Philippine Rabbit Bus took place. But the fact, however, that
his statement was given on July 15, 1988, one day after Mauricio Manliclic gave his statement
should not escape attention. The one-day difference between the giving of the two statements would
be significant enough to entertain the possibility of Oscar Buan having received legal advise before
giving his statement. Apart from that, as between his statement and the statement of Manliclic
himself, the statement of the latter should prevail. Besides, in his Affidavit of March 10, 1989, (Exh.
14), the unreliability of the statement of Oscar Buan (Exh. 13) given to CV Cabading rear its "ugly
head" when he did not mention in said affidavit that the jeep of Calaunan was trying to overtake
another jeep when the collision between the jeep in question and the Philippine Rabbit bus took
place.
xxxx
If one would believe the testimony of the defendant, Mauricio Manliclic, and his conductor, Oscar
Buan, that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already somewhat parallel to the jeep when the collision
took place, the point of collision on the jeep should have been somewhat on the left side thereof
rather than on its rear. Furthermore, the jeep should have fallen on the road itself rather than having
been forced off the road. Useless, likewise to emphasize that the Philippine Rabbit was running very
fast as testified to by Ramos which was not controverted by the defendants. 40
Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclics negligence that caused the smash up, there arises the
juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of
the diligence of a good father of a family.41 Under Article 218042 of the New Civil Code, when an injury
is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there
was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under
Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent
employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon
the private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their employee. 43

In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the required
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. In the
matter of selection, it showed the screening process that petitioner Manliclic underwent before he
became a regular driver. As to the exercise of due diligence in the supervision of its employees, it
argues that presence of ready investigators (Ganiban and Cabading) is sufficient proof that it
exercised the required due diligence in the supervision of its employees.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of employees, the employer must
formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary
measures for the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete
proof, including documentary evidence, that they complied with everything that was incumbent on
them.44
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,45 it was explained that:
Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes the formulation of suitable
rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended
for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its
employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of
breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of
and beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of
consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting
through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory functions.
In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be
deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company
guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to
the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it
has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their
work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without
anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption.
We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that "the formulation of various
company policies on safety without showing that they were being complied with is not sufficient to
exempt petitioner from liability arising from negligence of its employees. It is incumbent upon
petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing the erring driver the recruitment procedures and
company policies on efficiency and safety were followed." x x x.
The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection but not in the supervision of its employees. It expounded as follows:
From the evidence of the defendants, it seems that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines has a very good
procedure of recruiting its driver as well as in the maintenance of its vehicles. There is no evidence
though that it is as good in the supervision of its personnel. There has been no iota of evidence
introduced by it that there are rules promulgated by the bus company regarding the safe operation of
its vehicle and in the way its driver should manage and operate the vehicles assigned to them. There
is no showing that somebody in the bus company has been employed to oversee how its driver
should behave while operating their vehicles without courting incidents similar to the herein case. In
regard to supervision, it is not difficult to observe that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. has been
negligent as an employer and it should be made responsible for the acts of its employees,
particularly the driver involved in this case.

We agree. The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident is not enough to
exempt petitioner PRBLI from liability arising from the negligence of petitioner Manliclic. Same does
not comply with the guidelines set forth in the cases above-mentioned. The presence of the
investigators after the accident is not enough supervision. Regular supervision of employees, that is,
prior to any accident, should have been shown and established. This, petitioner failed to do. The lack
of supervision can further be seen by the fact that there is only one set of manual containing the
rules and regulations for all the drivers of PRBLI. 46 How then can all the drivers of petitioner PRBLI
know and be continually informed of the rules and regulations when only one manual is being lent to
all the drivers?
For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily responsible for the damages
caused by petitioner Manliclics negligence.
We now go to the award of damages. The trial court correctly awarded the amount of P40,838.00 as
actual damages representing the amount paid by respondent for the towing and repair of his
jeep.47 As regards the awards for moral and exemplary damages, same, under the circumstances,
must be modified. The P100,000.00 awarded by the trial court as moral damages must be reduced
to P50,000.00.48 Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public
good.49 The amount awarded by the trial court must, likewise, be lowered to P50,000.00.50 The award
of P15,000.00 for attorneys fees and expenses of litigation is in order and authorized by law.51
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1) the
award of moral damages shall be reduced to P50,000.00; and (2) the award of exemplary damages
shall be lowered to P50,000.00. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-21438

September 28, 1966

AIR FRANCE, petitioner,


vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for petitioner.
Bengzon Villegas and Zarraga for respondent R. Carrascoso.

SANCHEZ, J.:
The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso
P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing
the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome,
these various amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until
paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket
from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs
against petitioner.

The case is now before us for review on certiorari.


The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully supported by the evidence of record", are:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for
Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air
Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome.
From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the
defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying
because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the
Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat,
the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat
would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G.
Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found
out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they
came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white
man" (Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May 26, 1959); and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first
class" seat in the plane.3
1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all the findings" 4 of respondent Court
of Appeals. Petitioner charges that respondent court failed to make complete findings of fact on all
the issues properly laid before it. We are asked to consider facts favorable to petitioner, and then, to
overturn the appellate court's decision.
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall be rendered by any court of
record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based". 5 This is echoed in the statutory demand that a judgment determining the merits of the case
shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based"; 6 and that "Every
decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised
before it". 7
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct attack. 8 The law,
however, solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's
conclusion is drawn. 9 A court of justice is not hidebound to write in its decision every bit and piece of
evidence 10 presented by one party and the other upon the issues raised. Neither is it to be burdened
with the obligation "to specify in the sentence the facts"which a party "considered as proved". 11 This
is but a part of the mental process from which the Court draws the essential ultimate facts. A
decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So long
as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it is
no error for said court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence
for the defense". Because as this Court well observed, "There is no law that so requires". 12 Indeed,
"the mere failure to specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for
refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the
provisions of law and the Constitution". It is in this setting that in Manigque, it was held that the mere
fact that the findings "were based entirely on the evidence for the prosecution without taking into
consideration or even mentioning the appellant's side in the controversy as shown by his own
testimony", would not vitiate the judgment. 13 If the court did not recite in the decision the testimony of
each witness for, or each item of evidence presented by, the defeated party, it does not mean that
the court has overlooked such testimony or such item of evidence. 14 At any rate, the legal

presumptions are that official duty has been regularly performed, and that all the matters within an
issue in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it. 15
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe defined as "the written
statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court ... and essential to support the decision and
judgment rendered thereon". 16They consist of the court's "conclusions" with respect to the
determinative facts in issue". 17 A question of law, upon the other hand, has been declared as "one
which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
parties." 18
2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the
Court of Appeals. 19 That judgment is conclusive as to the facts. It is not appropriately the business of
this Court to alter the facts or to review the questions of fact. 20
With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals support its judgment.
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a first
class ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and
agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for
first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the
issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such
would depend upon the availability of first class seats.
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and discussed in its brief before the
Court of Appeals under its third assignment of error, which reads: "The trial court erred in finding that
plaintiff had confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first class seats on the "definite" segments of
his journey, particularly that from Saigon to Beirut". 21
And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:
Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first-class ticket was
no guarantee that the passenger to whom the same had been issued, would be
accommodated in the first-class compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to
make arrangements upon arrival at every station for the necessary first-class reservation.
We are not impressed by such a reasoning. We cannot understand how a reputable firm like
defendant airplane company could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to
honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of first-class tickets and yet it
allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the
ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or riot the tickets it
issues are to be honored or not.22
Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly disposed of petitioner's contention,
thus:
On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "First class" ticket, there can be no question.
Apart from his testimony, see plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-1", "B", "B-1," "B-2", "C" and "C-1", and
defendant's own witness, Rafael Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff's testimony and testified as follows:

Q. In these tickets there are marks "O.K." From what you know, what does this OK mean?
A. That the space is confirmed.
Q. Confirmed for first class?
A. Yes, "first class". (Transcript, p. 169)
xxx

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Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that
although plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to
confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the testimony of said witnesses. Oral
evidence cannot prevail over written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-l", "B", "B-l", "C" and "C1" belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for,
a first class ticket without any reservation whatever.
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga testified that the
reservation for a "first class" accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court cannot believe
that after such confirmation defendant had a verbal understanding with plaintiff that the "first class"
ticket issued to him by defendant would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong. 23
We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight difference of a few pesos in the
amount refunded on Carrascoso's ticket, the decision of the Court of First Instance was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals in all other respects. We hold the view that such a judgment of affirmance has
merged the judgment of the lower court. 24Implicit in that affirmance is a determination by the Court of
Appeals that the proceeding in the Court of First Instance was free from prejudicial error and "all
questions raised by the assignments of error and all questions that might have been raised are to be
regarded as finally adjudicated against the appellant". So also, the judgment affirmed "must be
regarded as free from all error". 25 We reached this policy construction because nothing in the
decision of the Court of Appeals on this point would suggest that its findings of fact are in any way at
war with those of the trial court. Nor was said affirmance by the Court of Appeals upon a ground or
grounds different from those which were made the basis of the conclusions of the trial court. 26
If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat,
notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air
passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. What security then can a passenger
have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very
stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the
passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a rule, a written document speaks
a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in
the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such
is the case here. The lower courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the
covenants in the ticket.
The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that there are facts upon which
the Court of Appeals predicated the finding that respondent Carrascoso had a first class ticket and
was entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok, which is a stopover in the Saigon to Beirut leg of the
flight. 27 We perceive no "welter of distortions by the Court of Appeals of petitioner's statement of its
position", as charged by petitioner. 28 Nor do we subscribe to petitioner's accusation that respondent
Carrascoso "surreptitiously took a first class seat to provoke an issue". 29 And this because, as
petitioner states, Carrascoso went to see the Manager at his office in Bangkok "to confirm my seat

and because from Saigon I was told again to see the Manager". 30 Why, then, was he allowed to take
a first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat? Or, if another had a better right to the
seat?
4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages. Petitioner's trenchant claim is that
Carrascoso's action is planted upon breach of contract; that to authorize an award for moral
damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith; 31 and that the decision of the Court of
Appeals fails to make a finding of bad faith. The pivotal allegations in the complaint bearing on this
issue are:
3. That ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the Philippine Air Lines for a
valuable consideration, the latter acting as general agents for and in behalf of the defendant,
under which said contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as defendant agreed to furnish plaintiff,
First Class passage on defendant's plane during the entire duration of plaintiff's tour of
Europe with Hongkong as starting point up to and until plaintiff's return trip to Manila, ... .
4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to Saigon and from Saigon to
Bangkok, defendant furnished to the plaintiff First Class accommodation but only after
protestations, arguments and/or insistence were made by the plaintiff with defendant's
employees.
5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage, but instead furnished plaintiff
only TouristClass accommodations from Bangkok to Teheran and/or Casablanca, ... the
plaintiff has been compelledby defendant's employees to leave the First Class
accommodation berths at Bangkok after he was already seated.
6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the inconvenience and
embarrassments brought by defendant's breach of contract was forced to take a Pan
American World Airways plane on his return trip from Madrid to Manila. 32
xxx

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xxx

2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First Class accommodations aforesaid,
plaintiff suffered inconveniences, embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby causing plaintiff mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like injury, resulting in moral
damages in the amount of P30,000.00. 33
xxx

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xxx

The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a
first class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract
was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that
there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class
accommodation berth "after he was already, seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason
of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is
true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad
faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. 34 The contract was
averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of the action is put on wrongful
expulsion.

Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial, respondent's counsel placed
petitioner on guard on what Carrascoso intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in Bangkok,
Carrascoso was oustedby petitioner's manager who gave his seat to a white man; 35 and (b)
evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was presented without objection on the part of
the petitioner. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment
in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured
by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required. 36 On the
question of bad faith, the Court of Appeals declared:
That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the plane
belonging to the defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist
class not only without his consent but against his will, has been sufficiently established by
plaintiff in his testimony before the court, corroborated by the corresponding entry made by
the purser of the plane in his notebook which notation reads as follows:
"First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that
the captain refused to intervene",
and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who was a co-passenger. The
captain of the plane who was asked by the manager of defendant company at Bangkok to
intervene even refused to do so. It is noteworthy that no one on behalf of defendant ever
contradicted or denied this evidence for the plaintiff. It could have been easy for defendant to
present its manager at Bangkok to testify at the trial of the case, or yet to secure his
disposition; but defendant did neither. 37
The Court of appeals further stated
Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white
man. Hence, if the employees of the defendant at Bangkok sold a first-class ticket to him
when all the seats had already been taken, surely the plaintiff should not have been picked
out as the one to suffer the consequences and to be subjected to the humiliation and
indignity of being ejected from his seat in the presence of others. Instead of explaining to the
white man the improvidence committed by defendant's employees, the manager adopted the
more drastic step of ousting the plaintiff who was then safely ensconsced in his rightful seat.
We are strengthened in our belief that this probably was what happened there, by the
testimony of defendant's witness Rafael Altonaga who, when asked to explain the meaning
of the letters "O.K." appearing on the tickets of plaintiff, said "that the space is confirmed for
first class. Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another witness for defendant, who was the chief of
the Reservation Office of defendant, testified as follows:
"Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know what reservation the
passenger has arranged with you?
A They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation." (t.s.n., p. 247, June 19,
1959)
In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge has said on this point:
Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, "white man" have a
"better right" to the seat occupied by Mr. Carrascoso? The record is silent. The
defendant airline did not prove "any better", nay, any right on the part of the "white

man" to the "First class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying and for which he paid
and was issued a corresponding "first class" ticket.
If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendant's Manager in Bangkok,
the defendant could have easily proven it by having taken the testimony of the said
Manager by deposition, but defendant did not do so; the presumption is that
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par (e), Rules
of Court]; and, under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to find, as it does
find, that the Manager of the defendant airline in Bangkok not merely asked but
threatened the plaintiff to throw him out of the plane if he did not give up his "first
class" seat because the said Manager wanted to accommodate, using the words of
the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, the "white man".38
It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted portion first transcribed did
not use the term "bad faith". But can it be doubted that the recital of facts therein points to
bad faith? The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class
seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him
suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to
another passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith.
Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in
law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design
or with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose." 39
And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express finding of bad faith in the
judgment of the Court of First Instance, thus:
The evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of transportation with
plaintiff in bad faith, with the aggravating circumstances that defendant's Manager in
Bangkok went to the extent of threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many
passengers to have him thrown out of the airplane to give the "first class" seat that
he was occupying to, again using the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a
"white man" whom he (defendant's Manager) wished to accommodate, and the
defendant has not proven that this "white man" had any "better right" to occupy the
"first class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and for which the
corresponding "first class" ticket was issued by the defendant to him. 40
5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It is
well settled in law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer,
must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the
provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable. 42
6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual
relation. 43And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business
is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers.
The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.

Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected
against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it
is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the
latter an action for damages against the carrier. 44
Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger's check, it was a breach of
contract and a tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely
notify her that the check was worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection, though the
language used was not insulting and she was not ejected." 46 And this, because, although the
relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that
breaks the contract may be also a tort". 47 And in another case, "Where a passenger on a railroad
train, when the conductor came to collect his fare tendered him the cash fare to a point where the
train was scheduled not to stop, and told him that as soon as the train reached such point he would
pay the cash fare from that point to destination, there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger
which justified the conductor in using insulting language to him, as by calling him a lunatic," 48 and
the Supreme Court of South Carolina there held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said
passenger.
1awphl.nt

Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's
action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by
the petitioner air carrier a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's testimony, thus
Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and purser?
A When we left already that was already in the trip I could not help it. So one of the
flight attendants approached me and requested from me my ticket and I said, What for? and
she said, "We will note that you transferred to the tourist class". I said, "Nothing of that kind.
That is tantamount to accepting my transfer." And I also said, "You are not going to note
anything there because I am protesting to this transfer".
Q Was she able to note it?
A No, because I did not give my ticket.
Q About that purser?
A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and you don't have enough
leg room, I stood up and I went to the pantry that was next to me and the purser was there.
He told me, "I have recorded the incident in my notebook." He read it and translated it to me
because it was recorded in French "First class passenger was forced to go to the
tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene."
Mr. VALTE
I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness because the best evidence
would be the notes. Your Honor.
COURT

I will allow that as part of his testimony. 49


Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in his
notebook reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and
that the captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence [Carrascoso's testimony above]
which is incompetent. We do not think so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster
incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule.
Such testimony is admissible. 49a
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of the
startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died
down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. 50 For, they
grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant". 51 The
utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the
circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the
operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner. It would
have been an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really
true that no such entry was made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant
exemplary damages in contracts and quasi- contracts. The only condition is that defendant should
have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." 53 The manner of
ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in
addition to moral damages.54
9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar
judgment for attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just
and equitable that attorneys' fees be given. 55 We do not intend to break faith with the tradition that
discretion well exercised as it was here should not be disturbed.
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, thus: P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and
P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court. 56 The
Court of Appeals did not interfere with the same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give
our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof. 57
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible error.
We accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Castro, JJ.,
concur.
Bengzon, J.P., J., took no part.

LRTA v Navidad GR 145804, 6 February 2003

Facts:
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past 7:00 p.m., Nicanor Navidad, then
drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing
payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near theLRT
tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached
Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the twoapparently ensued
that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight
started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell
on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by
Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was
killed instantaneously.
On 8 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, Marjorie Navidad, along with her
children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the
LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death
of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counter claim against Navidad and a crossclaim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and
averred that it had exercised due diligence in the election and supervision of its
security guards. The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and
Escartin, instead of presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad
had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task. On 11 August
1998, the trial court rendered its decision, ordering Prudent Security and Escartin to
jointly and severally pay Navidad (a) (1) Actual damages of P44,830.00; (2)
Compensatory damages of P443,520.00; (3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor
Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00; (b) Moral damages of P50,000.00; (c) Attorneys
fees of P20,000; and (d) Costs of suit. The court also dismissed the complaint
against LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit, and the compulsory counter
claimof LRTA and Roman.
Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the appellate court
promulgated its decision exonerating Prudent from any liability for the death of
Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally
liable. The appellate court modified the judgment ordering Roman and the LRTA
solidarily liable to pay Navidad (a) P44,830.00 as actual damages;(b) P50,000.00 as
nominal damages; (c) P50,000.00 as moral damages; (d)P50,000.00 as indemnity
for the death of the deceased; and (e) P20,000.00 a sand for attorneys fees. The
appellate court denied LRTAs and Romans motion for reconsideration in its
resolution of 10 October 2000.
Issue:
Whether LRTA liable for tort arising from contract.
Held:

YES. The premise for employers liability for tort (under the provisions of Article2176
and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180 of the Civil Code) is
negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the
employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juristantum that
the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and
supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can onlybe negated by
showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of theemployee. Herein, such
a factual matter that has not been shown.
The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to
indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure
to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its
commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its
own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm
to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its
responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission
causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa
aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may
arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated
differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself
constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between
the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby
allowing the rules on tort to apply.

Far East Bank and Trust Co. v. CA G.R. No. 108164 February 23, 1995 241 SCRA 671
Facts:
In October 1986 Luis Luna applied for a FAREASTCARD with Fart East Bank. A
supplemental card was also issued to his wife, Clarita. On August 1988, Clarita lost
her card and promptly informed the bank of its loss for which she submitted an
Affidavit of Loss. The bank recorded this loss and gave the credit card account a
status of Hot Card and/or Cancelled Card. Such record holds also for the
principal card holder until such time that the lost card was replaced. On October
1988, Luis Luna used his card to purchase a despidida lunch for his friend in the
Bahia Rooftop Restaurant. His card was dishonored in the restaurant and he was
forced to pay in cash, amounting to almost P600.00. He felt embarrassed by this
incident. He then complained to Far East Bank and he found out that his account
has been cancelled without informing him. Bank security policy is to tag the card as
hostile when it is reported lost, however, the bank failed to inform him and an
overzealous employee failed to consider that it was the cardholder himself
presenting the credit card. The bank sent an apology letter to Mr. Luna and to the

Manager of the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant to assure that Mr Luna was a very
valuable client. Spouses Luna still felt aggrieved and thus filed this case for
damages against Far East Bank. Far East Bank was adjudged to pay the following:
(a) P300,000.00 moral damages;(b) P50,000.00 exemplary damages; and (c)
P20,000.00 attorney's fees.
Issue:
Whether Far East Bank is liable for damages to the Spouses Luna amounting the
above-mentioned figures?
Held:
Spouses Luna are entitled only to nominal damages but not moral and exemplary
damages. Moral damages are awarded if the defendant is to be shown to have
acted in bad faith. Article 2219 states that, Moral damages may be recovered in
the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical
injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; It is true that the bank was
remiss in indeed neglecting to personally inform Luis of his own card's cancellation.
Nothing however, can sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part of the
Bank to cause harm to private respondents. Neither could the banks negligence in
failing to give personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to malice
or bad faith. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a
wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the
negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. Nominal damages were
awarded because of the simple fact that the bank failed to notify Mr. Luna, thus
entitle him to recover a measure of damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of the
Civil Code providing thusly: "Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order
that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant,
may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him."

Andamo v IAC G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990


Facts:
Spouses Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land which is adjacent to that of
private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious
corporation. Within the land of respondent corporation, water paths and
contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly
inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged
petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of
petitioner sand their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants

and other improvements to destruction. Petitioners filed a criminal and a separate


civil action for damages against the respondent.
Issue:
Whether he IAC erred in affirming the trial courts order dismissing the civil case as
the criminal case was still unresolved.
Held:
Yes. A careful examination of the afore quoted complaint shows that the civil
actionis one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the
elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff,
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he
must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Clearly, from
petitioner's complaint, the water paths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore,
an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these water paths
and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or
negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages. petitioners'
complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to
sustain damage due to the water paths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage
to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly
constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between the act and the
damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties make a
clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana. Article 2176, whenever it refers to
"fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently,
a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he
is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended
party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.

Castro v Pp G.R. No. 180832, July 23, 2008


Facts:
Justin Albert was the son of Mr. Tan. Justin was a Grade 12 student of Reedley
International School (RIS). He was dismissed for violating the rules of his probation.
Tan requested for a reconsideration and RIS imposed non-appealable conditions
such as not allowing Albert to participate in the graduation ceremonies. Tan filed a

complaint in the DepEd, claiming malice and bad faith. DepEd nullified RIS sanctions
as unreasonable and a denial of due process. DepEd orders readmission of Albert
without any conditions. Albert finally participated in the graduation ceremonies.
After the graduation ceremonies, Tan talked to a fellow parent Ching, intimating his
contemplating suit against officers of RIS in their personal capacities, including Asst.
Headmaster Castro. Ching relayed the information to Castro. At the end of the
conversation, Castro said be careful talking to Tan, thats dangerous Ching then
relayed the information to Tan, and Tan filed a grave oral defamation suit against
Castro.
Issue:
Whether petitioner can still be held liable, or has double jeopardy set in?
Held:
No. Petitioner cannot be held liable as double jeopardy has set in. Double jeopardy
occurs upon (1) a valid indictment (2) before a competent court (3)after
arraignment (4) when a valid plea has been entered and (5) when the accused was
acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused. Thus, an acquittal, whether ordered by the trial
or appellate court, is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy. The
only exception is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion or, as we
held in Galman v. Sandiganbayan, when there was mistrial. In such instances, the
OSG can assail the said judgment in a petition for certiorari establishing that the
State was deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case. He
rationale behind this exception is that a judgment rendered by the trial court with
grave abuse of discretion was issued without jurisdiction. It is, for this reason, void.
Consequently, there is no double jeopardy.

MR.

&
MRS.
ENGRACIO
FABRE,
JR. * and
PORFIRIO
CABIL, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE WORD FOR
THE WORLD CHRISTIAN FELLOWSHIP, INC., AMYLINE
ANTONIO, JOHN RICHARDS, GONZALO GONZALES, VICENTE
V. QUE, JR., ICLI CORDOVA, ARLENE GOJOCCO, ALBERTO
ROXAS CORDERO, RICHARD BAUTISTA, JOCELYN GARCIA,
YOLANDA CORDOVA, NOEL ROQUE, EDWARD TAN, ERNESTO
NARCISO, ENRIQUETA LOCSIN, FRANCIS NORMAN O. LOPEZ,
JULIUS CAESAR GARCIA, ROSARIO MA. V. ORTIZ, MARIETTA
C. CLAVO, ELVIE SENIEL, ROSARIO MARA-MARA, TERESITA
REGALA, MELINDA TORRES, MARELLA MIJARES, JOSEFA
CABATINGAN, MARA NADOC, DIANE MAYO, TESS PLATA,

MAYETTE JOCSON, ARLENE Y. MORTIZ, LIZA MAYO, CARLOS


RANARIO, ROSAMARIA T. RADOC and BERNADETTE
FERRER, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of


Appeals[1] in CA-GR No. 28245, dated September 30, 1992, which affirmed
with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58,
ordering petitioners jointly and severally to pay damages to private respondent
Amyline Antonio, and its resolution which denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a 1982 model
Mazda minibus. They used the bus principally in connection with a bus
service for school children which they operated in Manila. The couple had a
driver, Porfirio J. Cabil, whom they hired in 1981, after trying him out for two
weeks. His job was to take school children to and from the St. Scholasticas
College in Malate, Manila.
On November 2, 1984 private respondent Word for the World Christian
Fellowship Inc. (WWCF) arranged with petitioners for the transportation of 33
members of its Young Adults Ministry from Manila to La Union and back in
consideration of which private respondent paid petitioners the amount of
P3,000.00.
The group was scheduled to leave on November 2, 1984, at 5:00 oclock
in the afternoon. However, as several members of the party were late, the bus
did not leave the Tropical Hut at the corner of Ortigas Avenue and EDSA until
8:00 oclock in the evening. Petitioner Porfirio Cabil drove the minibus.
The usual route to Caba, La Union was through Carmen,
Pangasinan. However, the bridge at Carmen was under repair, so that
petitioner Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area (it being his first trip to La
Union), was forced to take a detour through the town of Ba-ay in Lingayen,
Pangasinan. At 11:30 that night, petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp curve on
the highway, running on a south to east direction, which he described as
siete. The road was slippery because it was raining, causing the bus, which
was running at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road
shoulder. The bus hit the left traffic steel brace and sign along the road and
rammed the fence of one Jesus Escano, then turned over and landed on its
left side, coming to a full stop only after a series of impacts. The bus came to

rest off the road. A coconut tree which it had hit fell on it and smashed its front
portion.
Several passengers were injured. Private respondent Amyline Antonio
was thrown on the floor of the bus and pinned down by a wooden seat which
came off after being unscrewed. It took three persons to safely remove her
from this position. She was in great pain and could not move.
The driver, petitioner Cabil, claimed he did not see the curve until it was
too late. He said he was not familiar with the area and he could not have seen
the curve despite the care he took in driving the bus, because it was dark and
there was no sign on the road. He said that he saw the curve when he was
already within 15 to 30 meters of it. He allegedly slowed down to 30
kilometers per hour, but it was too late.
The Lingayen police investigated the incident the next day, November 3,
1984. On the basis of their finding they filed a criminal complaint against the
driver, Porfirio Cabil. The case was later filed with the Lingayen Regional Trial
Court. Petitioners Fabre paid Jesus Escano P1,500.00 for the damage to the
latters fence. On the basis of Escanos affidavit of desistance the case
against petitioners Fabre was dismissed.
Amyline Antonio, who was seriously injured, brought this case in the RTC
of Makati, Metro Manila. As a result of the accident, she is now suffering from
paraplegia and is permanently paralyzed from the waist down. During the trial
she described the operations she underwent and adduced evidence regarding
the cost of her treatment and therapy. Immediately after the accident, she
was taken to the Nazareth Hospital in Ba-ay, Lingayen. As this hospital was
not adequately equipped, she was transferred to the Sto. Nio Hospital, also
in the town of Ba-ay, where she was given sedatives. An x-ray was taken and
the damage to her spine was determined to be too severe to be treated
there. She was therefore brought to Manila, first to the Philippine General
Hospital and later to the Makati Medical Center where she underwent an
operation to correct the dislocation of her spine.
In its decision dated April 17, 1989, the trial court found that:
No convincing evidence was shown that the minibus was properly checked for travel
to a long distance trip and that the driver was properly screened and tested before
being admitted for employment. Indeed, all the evidence presented have shown the
negligent act of the defendants which ultimately resulted to the accident subject of this
case.
Accordingly, it gave judgment for private respondents holding:

Considering that plaintiffs Word for the World Christian Fellowship, Inc. and Ms.
Amyline Antonio were the only ones who adduced evidence in support of their claim
for damages, the Court is therefore not in a position to award damages to the other
plaintiffs.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment against
defendants Mr. & Mrs. Engracio Fabre, Jr. and Porfirio Cabil y Jamil pursuant to
articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and said defendants are
ordered to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs the following amount:
1) P93,657.11 as compensatory and actual damages;
2) P500,000.00 as the reasonable amount of loss of earning capacity of plaintiff
Amyline Antonio;
3) P20,000.00 as moral damages;
4) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
5) 25% of the recoverable amount as attorneys fees;
6) Costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with respect to
Amyline Antonio but dismissed it with respect to the other plaintiffs on the
ground that they failed to prove their respective claims. The Court of Appeals
modified the award of damages as follows:
1) P93,657.11 as actual damages;
2) P600,000.00 as compensatory damages;
3) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
4) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
5) P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
6) Costs of suit.

The Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts finding that petitioner Cabil
failed to exercise due care and precaution in the operation of his vehicle
considering the time and the place of the accident. The Court of Appeals held
that the Fabres were themselves presumptively negligent. Hence, this
petition. Petitioners raise the following issues:
I.

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS WERE NEGLIGENT.

II. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS WERE LIABLE FOR THE INJURIES


SUFFERED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.

III. WHETHER OR NOT DAMAGES CAN BE AWARDED AND IN THE POSITIVE, UP


TO WHAT EXTENT.

Petitioners challenge the propriety of the award of compensatory damages


in the amount of P600,000.00. It is insisted that, on the assumption that
petitioners are liable, an award of P600,000.00 is unconscionable and highly
speculative. Amyline Antonio testified that she was a casual employee of a
company called Suaco, earning P1,650.00 a month, and a dealer of Avon
products, earning an average of P1,000.00 monthly. Petitioners contend that
as casual employees do not have security of tenure, the award of
P600,000.00, considering Amyline Antonios earnings, is without factual basis
as there is no assurance that she would be regularly earning these amounts.
With the exception of the award of damages, the petition is devoid of
merit.
First, it is unnecessary for our purpose to determine whether to decide this
case on the theory that petitioners are liable for breach of contract of carriage
or culpa contractual or on the theory of quasi delict or culpa aquiliana as both
the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals held, for although the
relation of passenger and carrier is contractual both in origin and nature,
nevertheless the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. [2] In either
case, the question is whether the bus driver, petitioner Porfirio Cabil, was
negligent.
The finding that Cabil drove his bus negligently, while his employer, the
Fabres, who owned the bus, failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of
the family in the selection and supervision of their employee is fully supported
by the evidence on record. These factual findings of the two courts we regard
as final and conclusive, supported as they are by the evidence. Indeed, it was
admitted by Cabil that on the night in question, it was raining, and, as a
consequence, the road was slippery, and it was dark. He averred these facts
to justify his failure to see that there lay a sharp curve ahead. However, it is
undisputed that Cabil drove his bus at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour
and only slowed down when he noticed the curve some 15 to 30 meters
ahead.[3] By then it was too late for him to avoid falling off the road. Given the
conditions of the road and considering that the trip was Cabils first one
outside of Manila, Cabil should have driven his vehicle at a moderate
speed. There is testimony[4] that the vehicles passing on that portion of the
road should only be running 20 kilometers per hour, so that at 50 kilometers
per hour, Cabil was running at a very high speed.
Considering the foregoing the fact that it was raining and the road was
slippery, that it was dark, that he drove his bus at 50 kilometers an hour when

even on a good day the normal speed was only 20 kilometers an hour, and
that he was unfamiliar with the terrain, Cabil was grossly negligent and should
be held liable for the injuries suffered by private respondent Amyline Antonio.
Pursuant to Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code his negligence gave rise
to the presumption that his employers, the Fabres, were themselves negligent
in the selection and supervision of their employee.
Due diligence in selection of employees is not satisfied by finding that the
applicant possessed a professional drivers license. The employer should
also examine the applicant for his qualifications, experience and record of
service.[5] Due diligence in supervision, on the other hand, requires the
formulation of rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the
issuance of proper instructions as well as actual implementation and
monitoring of consistent compliance with the rules.[6]
In the case at bar, the Fabres, in allowing Cabil to drive the bus to La
Union, apparently did not consider the fact that Cabil had been driving for
school children only, from their homes to the St. Scholasticas College in
Metro Manila.[7] They had hired him only after a two-week
apprenticeship. They had tested him for certain matters, such as whether he
could remember the names of the children he would be taking to school,
which were irrelevant to his qualification to drive on a long distance travel,
especially considering that the trip to La Union was his first. The existence of
hiring procedures and supervisory policies cannot be casually invoked to
overturn the presumption of negligence on the part of an employer.[8]
Petitioners argue that they are not liable because (1) an earlier departure
(made impossible by the congregations delayed meeting) could have averted
the mishap and (2) under the contract, the WWCF was directly responsible for
the conduct of the trip. Neither of these contentions hold water. The hour of
departure had not been fixed. Even if it had been, the delay did not bear
directly on the cause of the accident. With respect to the second contention, it
was held in an early case that:
[A] person who hires a public automobile and gives the driver directions as to the
place to which he wishes to be conveyed, but exercises no other control over the
conduct of the driver, is not responsible for acts of negligence of the latter or
prevented from recovering for injuries suffered from a collision between the
automobile and a train, caused by the negligence either of the locomotive engineer or
the automobile driver.[9]
As already stated, this case actually involves a contract of
carriage. Petitioners, the Fabres, did not have to be engaged in the business

of public transportation for the provisions of the Civil Code on common


carriers to apply to them. As this Court has held:[10]
Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged
in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water,
or air for compensation, offering their services to the public.
The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal
business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who
does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as a
sideline). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a
person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled
basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or
unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier
offering its services to the general public, i.e., the general community or
population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a
narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article 1732
deliberately refrained from making such distinctions.
As common carriers, the Fabres were bound to exercise extraordinary
diligence for the safe transportation of the passengers to their
destination. This duty of care is not excused by proof that they exercised the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their
employee. As Art. 1759 of the Code provides:
Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers
through the negligence or wilful acts of the formers employees, although such
employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation
of the orders of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employees.
The same circumstances detailed above, supporting the finding of the trial
court and of the appellate court that petitioners are liable under Arts. 2176 and
2180 for quasi delict, fully justify finding them guilty of breach of contract of
carriage under Arts. 1733, 1755 and 1759 of the Civil Code.
Secondly, we sustain the award of damages in favor of Amyline
Antonio. However, we think the Court of Appeals erred in increasing the
amount of compensatory damages because private respondents did not
question this award as inadequate.[11] To the contrary, the award of
P500,000.00 for compensatory damages which the Regional Trial Court made

is reasonable considering the contingent nature of her income as a casual


employee of a company and as distributor of beauty products and the fact that
the possibility that she might be able to work again has not been
foreclosed. In fact she testified that one of her previous employers had
expressed willingness to employ her again.
With respect to the other awards, while the decisions of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals do not sufficiently indicate the factual and legal basis for
them, we find that they are nevertheless supported by evidence in the records
of this case. Viewed as an action for quasi delict, this case falls squarely
within the purview of Art. 2219(2) providing for the payment of moral damages
in cases of quasi delict. On the theory that petitioners are liable for breach of
contract of carriage, the award of moral damages is authorized by Art. 1764,
in relation to Art. 2220, since Cabils gross negligence amounted to bad faith.
[12]
Amyline Antonios testimony, as well as the testimonies of her father and
co-passengers, fully establish the physical suffering and mental anguish she
endured as a result of the injuries caused by petitioners negligence.
The award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees was also properly
made. However, for the same reason that it was error for the appellate court
to increase the award of compensatory damages, we hold that it was also
error for it to increase the award of moral damages and reduce the award of
attorneys fees, inasmuch as private respondents, in whose favor the awards
were made, have not appealed.[13]
As above stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals can be sustained
either on the theory of quasi delict or on that of breach of contract. The
question is whether, as the two courts below held, petitioners, who are the
owners and driver of the bus, may be made to respond jointly and severally to
private respondent. We hold that they may be. In Dangwa Trans. Co. Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,[14] on facts similar to those in this case, this Court held the
bus company and the driver jointly and severally liable for damages for
injuries suffered by a passenger. Again, in Bachelor Express, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals[15] a driver found negligent in failing to stop the bus in order to let off
passengers when a fellow passenger ran amuck, as a result of which the
passengers jumped out of the speeding bus and suffered injuries, was held
also jointly and severally liable with the bus company to the injured
passengers.
The same rule of liability was applied in situations where the negligence of
the driver of the bus on which plaintiff was riding concurred with the
negligence of a third party who was the driver of another vehicle, thus causing
an accident. In Anuran v. Buo,[16] Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v.

Intermediate Appellate Court,[17] and Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court


of Appeals,[18] the bus company, its driver, the operator of the other vehicle and
the driver of the vehicle were jointly and severally held liable to the injured
passenger or the latters heirs. The basis of this allocation of liability was
explained in Viluan v. Court of Appeals,[19] thus:
Nor should it make any difference that the liability of petitioner [bus owner] springs
from contract while that of respondents [owner and driver of other vehicle] arises
from quasi-delict. As early as 1913, we already ruled in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56
Phil. 177, that in case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of
the bus on which he was riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well
as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages. Some
members of the Court, though, are of the view that under the circumstances they are
liable on quasi-delict.[20]
It is true that in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals [21] this
Court exonerated the jeepney driver from liability to the injured passengers
and their families while holding the owners of the jeepney jointly and severally
liable, but that is because that case was expressly tried and decided
exclusively on the theory of culpa contractual. As this Court there explained:
The trial court was therefore right in finding that Manalo [the driver] and spouses
Mangune and Carreon [the jeepney owners] were negligent. However, its ruling that
spouses Mangune and Carreon are jointly and severally liable with Manalo is
erroneous. The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in
case of breach of the contract of carriage. The rationale behind this is readily
discernible. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger,
and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore
to the passenger, even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver (see
Viluan v. The Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. L-21477-81, April 29, 1966, 16
SCRA 742) . . .[22]
As in the case of BLTB, private respondents in this case and her coplaintiffs did not stake out their claim against the carrier and the driver
exclusively on one theory, much less on that of breach of contract alone. After
all, it was permitted for them to allege alternative causes of action and join as
many parties as may be liable on such causes of action[23] so long as private
respondent and her co-plaintiffs do not recover twice for the same
injury. What is clear from the cases is the intent of the plaintiff there to recover
from both the carrier and the driver, thus justifying the holding that the carrier
and the driver were jointly and severally liable because their separate and
distinct acts concurred to produce the same injury.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with


MODIFICATION as to the award of damages. Petitioners are ORDERED to
PAY jointly and severally the private respondent Amyline Antonio the following
amounts:
1) P93,657.11 as actual damages;
2) P500,000.00 as the reasonable amount of loss of earning capacity of plaintiff
Amyline Antonio;
3) P20,000.00 as moral damages;
4) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
5) 25% of the recoverable amount as attorneys fees; and
6) costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA


JUJEURCHE SUNGA and FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents.
D E C I S I ON
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated March 31, 1991, reversing the contrary decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Dumaguete City, and awarding damages
instead to private respondent Eliza Jujeurche Sunga as plaintiff in an action
for breach of contract of carriage.
[1]

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:


At 10 oclock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza
Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in Physical Education
at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by
petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24
passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat," a
wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. Sclaw
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to
let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave

way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck
driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left
rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She sustained a
fracture of the "distal third of the left tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the
underlying skin." Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg circular casting,
and case wedging were done under sedation. Her confinement in the hospital
lasted from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her attending physician, Dr.
Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a
cast for a period of three months and would have to ambulate in crutches
during said period.
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas,
alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise
the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand,
filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu
truck. Korte
The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and
absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck
who was responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of another case
(Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasidelict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena
jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney. Rtcspped
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was reversed
on the ground that Sungas cause of action was based on a contract of
carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the
diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed the
third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages
to Sunga. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and another one is entered ordering defendantappellee Vicente Calalas to pay plaintiff-appellant:
(1) P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
(4) P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and

(5) to pay the costs.


SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490
that the negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident
negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the common
carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers. He contends that the
bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva was a caso fortuito.
Petitioner further assails the award of moral damages to Sunga on the ground
that it is not supported by evidence. Sdaadsc
The petition has no merit.
The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding
the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that
she was never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle of res
judicata does not apply. Missdaa
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same.
The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena
were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioners jeepney. On
the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his
contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa
aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the
tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised
upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly
established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of
contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the
contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to
transport his passenger safely to his destination. In case of death or injuries
to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove
that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755
of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the
burden of proof. Slxmis
[2]

There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No.
3490, finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioners
jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause

of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the
truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for
quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a
device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him
and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But,
where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the
parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is
merely to regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage
are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those
respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard to the safety
of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or
injury to passengers. It provides: Slxsc
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and
for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is
further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5,6, and
7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the
passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all
the circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of
negligence at once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he
had to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. Scslx
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human care and
foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with due regard for all the circumstances" as required by Art. 1755? We do not
think so. Several factors militate against petitioners contention. Slx

First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly parked,
its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of
the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is
a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as amended, or the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code, which provides:
Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. - No person shall drive his motor
vehicle in such a manner as to obstruct or impede the passage of
any vehicle, nor, while discharging or taking on passengers or
loading or unloading freight, obstruct the free passage of other
vehicles on the highway.
Second, it is undisputed that petitioners driver took in more passengers than
the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of 32(a) of the same
law. It provides: Mesm
Exceeding registered capacity. - No person operating any motor
vehicle shall allow more passengers or more freight or cargo in
his vehicle than its registered capacity.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril
greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not
only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of negligence
imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence
shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers. Calrky
We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioners contention that Sungas
taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is
akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our
seas should not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed
a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of
petitioners contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly
parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which could not be
foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. This requires that the
following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent
of the debtors will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the
event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in
a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to
the creditor. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his
jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway. Kycalr
[3]

[4]

Finally, petitioner challenges the award of moral damages alleging that it is


excessive and without basis in law. We find this contention well taken.
In awarding moral damages, the Court of Appeals stated: Kyle
Plaintiff-appellant at the time of the accident was a first-year
college student in that school year 1989-1990 at the Silliman
University, majoring in Physical Education. Because of the injury,
she was not able to enroll in the second semester of that school
year. She testified that she had no more intention of continuing
with her schooling, because she could not walk and decided not
to pursue her degree, major in Physical Education "because of my
leg which has a defect already."
Plaintiff-appellant likewise testified that even while she was under
confinement, she cried in pain because of her injured left foot. As
a result of her injury, the Orthopedic Surgeon also certified that
she has "residual bowing of the fracture side." She likewise
decided not to further pursue Physical Education as her major
subject, because "my left leg x x x has a defect already."
Those are her physical pains and moral sufferings, the inevitable
bedfellows of the injuries that she suffered. Under Article 2219 of
the Civil Code, she is entitled to recover moral damages in the
sum of P50,000.00, which is fair, just and reasonable.
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages
predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated
under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. As an exception, such damages are
recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a
passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil
Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as
provided in Art. 2220.
[5]

[6]

In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there
was no factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith
in the performance of the contract of carriage. Sungas contention that
petitioners admission in open court that the driver of the jeepney failed to
assist her in going to a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission
of bad faith. The fact that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to
the hospital does not imply that petitioner was utterly indifferent to the plight of

his injured passenger. If at all, it is merely implied recognition by Verena that


he was the one at fault for the accident. Exsm
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 1995,
and its resolution, dated September 11, 1995, are AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.

PADUA, ET AL. vs. ROBLES


G.R. No. L-40486, 29 August 1975, 66 SCRA 485
CASTRO, J p:
Resolving this appeal by the spouses Paulino and
Lucena Bebin Padua, we set aside the order dated
October 25, 1972 of the Court of First Instance of
Zambales dismissing their complaint in civil case 10790, and remand this case for further proceedings.
In the early morning of New Year's Day of 1969 a
taxicab (bearing 1968 plate no. TX-9395 and driven by
Romeo N. Punzalan but operated by the Bay Taxi Cab
owned by Gregorio N. Robles) struck ten-year old
Normandy Padua on the national road in barrio
Barretto, Olongapo City. The impact hurled Normandy
about forty meters away from the point where the
taxicab struck him, as a result of which he died.

Subsequently, Normandy's parents (Paulino and


Lucena Bebin Padua), by complaint filed with the Court
of First Instance of Zambales (civil case 427-0), sought
damages from Punzalan and the Bay Taxi Cab;
likewise, the city Fiscal of Olongapo, by information
filed with the same court (criminal case 1158-0),
charged Punzalan with homicide through reckless
imprudence.
On October 27, 1969 the court a quo, in civil case 427-0,
adjudged for the Paduas as follows:
"WHEREFORE judgment is hereby
rendered ordering the defendant
Romeo Punzalan to pay the plaintiffs
the sums of P12,000.00 as actual
damages, P5,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages, and P10,000.00
as attorney's fees; and dismissing the
complaint insofar as the Bay Taxicab
Company is concerned. With costs
against the defendant Romeo
Punzalan." (emphasis supplied)
Almost a year later, on October 5, 1970, the court a quo,

in criminal case 1158-0, convicted Punzalan, as follows:


"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Romeo
Punzalan y Narciso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence, as
defined and penalized under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code, attended by the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, and hereby sentences him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS,
FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
correccional, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE
(1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the
cost. The civil liability of the accused has already been
determined and assessed in Civil Case No. 427-0,

ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY OF


MANILA, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. 114841-42, 20 October 1995, 247 SCRA 606
REGALADO, J p:
Petitioner moves for the reconsideration of our
judgment promulgated in this case on August 23, 1995
contending that (1) private respondents are permitted
thereunder to recover damages twice for the same act

or omission, and (2) the interests adjudged on the


awarded damages should be reckoned from the date of
finality of our aforesaid judgment rendered herein.
We reject the first submission. It is theorized by
petitioner that our affirmance of the judgment of the
trial court, which granted damages for both the
"damage proper to the land" and "rentals for the same
property," runs afoul of the proscription in Article 2177
of the Civil Code against double recovery of damages
for the same act.
Petitioner overlooks the fact that private respondents,
as plaintiffs in the actions filed in the court below,
specifically alleged that as a result of petitioner's
dredging operations the soil of the former's property
"became infertile, salty, unproductive and unsuitable
for agriculture." They further averred that petitioner's
heavy equipment "used to utilize (private respondents')
land as a depot or parking lot of these equipment(t)
without paying any rent therefor."
Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the factual
findings and conclusions of the trial court on the nature
and cause of the twin items of damages sustained by

private respondents, thus:


The main reason why (private respondents') properties
were damaged, as found by the trial court, was due to
the dredging operations undertaken by (petitioner) on
the area, which findings are supported by the testimony
of Carlito Castillo, testifying in Civil Case No. 10276,
and Teodora Dimaculangan, in Civil Case No. 10696. . .
. Neither has (petitioner) asseverated against (private
respondents') submission that their properties were
used by (petitioner) as a dump site for its equipment
and trucks, and proof are the photographs of their
properties showing tracks left by truck tires on their
properties. (Parenthetical indication of the parties
concerned are made for easy reference.)
It is, therefore, clearly apparent that petitioner was
guilty of two culpable transgressions on the property
rights of private respondents, that is, for the ruination
of the agricultural fertility or utility of the soil of their
property and, further, for the unauthorized use of said
property as a dump site or depot for petitioner's heavy
equipment and trucks. Consequently, albeit with
differing amounts, both courts correctly awarded

damages both for the destruction of the land and for the
unpaid rentals, or more correctly denominated, for the
reasonable value of its use and occupation of the
premises. There is consequently no merit in said
objection of petitioner.
The second proposition of petitioner is better taken, in
light of the reconciliation and clarification undertaken
by the Court of the heretofore imprecise and varying
pronouncements on the imposition of interest in
judgments for a sum of money.
In the recent case of Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court
of Appeals, et al., the Court adopted interpretative rules
on the matter of the imposable interest and the accrual
thereof. The rules pertinent to the interest involved in
the case at bar are hereunder briefed as applied to the
controversy on the computation and the reckoning date
thereof.

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