Moral relativism is the position that moral propositions do not reflect objective

and/or universal moral truths, but instead make claims relative to social,
cultural, historical or personal circumstances.
There are two major types of moral relativism. Descriptive Moral Relativism and
Metaethical Moral Relativism. (Descriptive moral relativism emphasizes on the
empirical evidence that the disagreements among social groups on moral issues
are more significant than the agreements. Thus, it lends support to the
relativistic saying that there is no universal moral truth.) (However, this view
may be too weak to imply that there is no objective moral standard) because (it
is hard to fully verify the non-existence of absolute morals with empirical
evidence.) (The Metaethical Moral Relativists direct the attention to the truth or
justification of moral values, and claim that all moral values are relative to the
tradition, convictions or practices of a group of persons.)
Is it the case that there are no objective moral standards? In answering this
question, we should analyze if there is a set of objective moral rules, where could
they possibly lie in. I propose that this set of moral standard is inherent or
manifested either (in the order of God), in human nature, or in social norm. I
think the manifestation of some relatively more objective morals in social norm
gives the best explanation and support to the existence of objective moral
standard.
It can be clear that there is moral absoluteness if we are sure about the existence
of an Omni-benevolence being because we can simply take the moral orders
from him as the objective moral standards. However, it is hard to justify the
existence of such a being with any rational means, so the claim that there are
absolute moral standards under this inference remains weak.
It would be easier to take an objectivists stance in the dualist view by claiming
that objective moral standards are inherent in our mind or soul. But it would be
hard when we attempt to hold objectivist claims in physicalists perspective.
According to physicalism, our nature that forms all our beliefs and actions are
only physical and chemical states and phenomenon. To claim there is any moral
objectivity or unity of moral standard that is inherent in our nature is to claim
that there are uniformities or similarities in the physical or chemical
phenomenon prescribed in every human body which we perceive as human
nature. That means moral objectivity comes from materials and natural laws,
which is a possible case. But it also means that these perceived moral standards
are just metaphysical rules produced by physical rules. These moral standards
are absolute only if those physical or chemical phenomenon and rules they rely
on are absolute. So it seems one might believe moral absoluteness upon physical
absoluteness. However it would be a bit problematic when we try to argue that
these physical or chemical phenomenon and rules are so absolute that no other
factor can triumph or alter them such that they always results in a set of moral
standard as the single outcome. Also, this kind of moral standard as a product of
physical materials and laws is in nature different from what we usually regard as
objective truth. The truth that fire cannot burn without fuel, heat or an oxidizing
agent is objective and absolute even there is no fire. In comparison, if there is no

living agent, no body will generate the metaphysical moral rules, and these
moral rules will not exist. It seems far for such moral standard uniformly
inherent to human being to be crowned as objective truth.
In arguing for moral objectivism, we could have more clues from examining the
perseverance of some moral standards with respect to social changes. History
tells us that some moral standards shift according to how the society changes.
For example, it used to be moral to sacrifice human in rituals but this is
unacceptable in modern society. However, we can still find a number of moral
standards that has never changed in human history, such as (the condemnation
on killing innocents or holocaust). These moral standards are persistent, though
they are not necessarily the permanent moral truths because we do not know if
they will be viewed as morally wrong in the future. But we have a good reason to
think that moral beliefs less vulnerable to social changes are more objective
morals. I think this is the best support to our intuitive faith on moral objectivism.