Battle of Caishi

The Battle of Caishi (Battle of Ts'ai-shih; Chinese: 1 Background

) was a major naval engagement of the JinSong
Wars of China that took place on November 2627, Main articles: JinSong Wars and Timeline
1161. Soldiers under the command of Prince Hailing, The Song (9601276) was a Chinese dynasty.* [2] To
the Jurchen emperor of the Jin dynasty, tried to cross
the Yangtze River to attack Song China. Yu Yunwen,
a civil ocial, commanded the defending Song army.
The paddle-wheel warships of the Song eet, equipped
with trebuchets that launched incendiary bombs made of
gunpowder and lime, decisively defeated the light ships
of the Jin navy.
Starting in 1125 the Jin had conquered all Song territories north of the Huai River. In 1142, a peace treaty settled the border between the two states, putting the Jin in
control of northern China and the Song in control of the
south. Prince Hailing was enthroned in 1150, and was intent on uniting northern and southern China under a single
emperor. In 1158, he asserted that the Song had violated
the 1142 treaty, a pretext for declaring war on the Song.
He began preparations for the war in the following year.
He instituted a draft in which all able-bodied men were
required to enlist. The draft was unpopular, precipitating revolts that were later suppressed. The Jin army left
the capital of Kaifeng on October 15, 1161, and pushed The Song dynasty after the Jin conquest of northern China
through from the Huai to the Yangtze River without much
their north were the Jurchens, a confederation of semiresistance from the Song.
agrarian tribes from Manchuria in northeast Asia.* [3]
The Song were fortied along the Yangtze front. Hailing The Song and Jin had once been military allies. The Juplanned to cross the river at Caishi, south of modern-day rchen tribes, unied under the rule of Wanyan Aguda,
Nanjing. He embarked from the shore of the Yangtze on plotted a revolt in 1114 to end their vassalage under the
November 26, and clashed with Song forces led by Yu Khitan-led Liao dynasty.* [3] Aguda established the Jin
Yunwen in a naval engagement. Hailing lost the battle dynasty in 1115 and adopted the title of emperor.* [4]
and retreated to Yangzhou. Hailing was assassinated in The Jin negotiated a joint attack with the Song against
a military camp by his own men shortly after the Caishi the Khitans. They planned the attack for 1121 and then
battle. A military coup had taken place in the Jin court rescheduled to 1122.* [5] In 1122, the Jurchens captured
while Hailing was absent, enthroning Emperor Shizong the Liao Supreme and Western Capitals. The Song tried
as the new emperor. A peace treaty signed in 1165 ended yet failed to capture the Liao Southern Capital of Yan
the conict between Song and Jin.
(modern Beijing), which fell later that year to the Jin.* [6]
Song sources likely inated the number of Jin soldiers and The military weakness of the Song gave the Jin more
*
casualties at Caishi, but the 18,000 gure for the Song diplomatic leverage over the Song. [6] Negotiations bearmy is plausible. Modern studies suggest that the battle tween the Song and Jin produced a treaty in 1123, but
was smaller and that both sides were more evenly matched bilateral relations deteriorated because of territorial dis*
*
than traditional accounts suggest. Nonetheless, the vic- putes over the Sixteen Prefectures. [7] [6] In 1125, the
*
*
tory boosted the morale of the Song infantry and halted Jurchens invaded the Song. [8] [3]
the southern advance of the Jin army. Emperor Gaozong By 1127, Jin had conquered most of northern China and
abdicated nine months after the battle ended.
besieged the Song capital of Kaifeng twice.* [3]* [9] In
the second siege of Kaifeng, Emperor Qinzong of the
Song was captured. The Jurchens took him and the Song
royal family to Manchuria as hostages.* [10] Members
of the Song court who had evaded capture ed south,
1

BACKGROUND

where they established a temporary capital, rst in the

Song southern capital (modern Shangqiu),* [6]* [11] and
then in Hangzhou in 1129.* [12] The move of the Song
capital south to Hangzhou signals the transition from
the Northern Song era to the Southern Song.* [3] Qinzong's younger brother, Prince Zhao Gou, was enthroned
as Qinzong's successor in the southern capital in 1127;
he is known posthumously as Emperor Gaozong.* [13]
The Jurchen general Wanyan Wuzhu crossed the Yangtze
River in 1130 and tried to capture Gaozong, but the emperor escaped.* [14]* [15] Wuzhu retreated north across
the Yangtze, where he fought o a stronger Song eet
commanded by Han Shizhong.* [16]
The Jin persisted with their advance into the remaining
Song territories south of the Yangtze.* [17] They faced
an insurgency of Song loyalists in the north, the deaths of
some important leaders, and military oensives by Song
generals like Yue Fei. The Jurchens created the puppet government of Da Qi to serve as a buer state between Song and Jin, but Qi failed to defeat the Song.* [18]
The Jin abolished Qi in 1137. As the Jin gave up on
conquering the Southern Song, diplomatic talks for a
peace treaty resumed.* [19] Signed in 1142, the Treaty
of Shaoxing established the boundary between the two
states along the Huai River, which runs north of the
Yangtze.* [20]* [3] The treaty forbade the Song from purchasing horses from the Jin, but smuggling continued in
the border markets.* [21] The relations between the two Early 17th-century woodblock print of a Jurchen warrior with a
states were mostly peaceful from 1142 to 1161, the year bow
Prince Hailing went to war.* [22]

1.1

Preparation for war

That year, Hailing claimed that the Song had broken the
1142 treaty that banned them from acquiring horses. In
1159, he began building up his army in preparation for an
invasion. He acquired weapons, which he stored in Beijing, as well as horses allegedly numbering 560,000.* [26]
Hailing understood that an invasion of the Song would
require a lot of men. He ensured that Han Chinese soldiers were drafted into the war eort alongside Jurchen
soldiers. The recruitment drive lasted until 1161.* [26]
Naval confrontations were likely because the Jin planned
on traveling by river. Ships were seized for the war and
30,000 of the recruits were assigned to the Jin eet.* [28]
Hailing authorized the building of ships for the war in
March 1159, under the auspices of the Ministry of War.
Construction began in the Tong () prefecture near Beijing.* [29] Hailing appointed himself head of the army
and took personal command of the Jurchen forces.* [30]
The draft was unpopular. Several revolts erupted against
it, many of them in the Jin provinces neighboring the
Song.* [26] But Hailing allowed no dissent. He had his
stepmother executed after hearing that she was critical of
the war eort.* [30]

Main article: Prince Hailing of Jin

Prince Hailing was crowned Jin emperor in 1150 after killing his cousin and predecessor, Emperor Xizong,
in a palace coup.* [23] Hailing considered himself more
of a Chinese authoritarian ruler than a Jurchen leader
who ruled through a tribal council.* [24] The History of
Jin contends that Hailing told his ocials that the three
desires of his life were conquest, absolute power, and
women.* [25] His ultimate ambition was to rule over all
of China, not just the north.* [26] In his childhood, Hailing adopted Song practices like drinking tea by learning from Song emissaries, and once he had become emperor, he pursued a policy of sinicizing the state. His
anity for the culture of the Song earned him the Jurchen nickname ofaping the Chinese. He moved the
Supreme Capital of the Jin from Huining in Manchuria
to Beijing and promoted Kaifeng to his Southern Capital
in 1157. He also moved government institutions south,
tore down palaces of Jurchen chieftains in Manchuria,
and constructed new palaces in Beijing and Kaifeng.* [26]
He made plans to move the Jin capital further south to In order to eliminate any challenge to his legitimacy as
the center of China.* [27] Hailing's construction projects emperor of a united China, Hailing ordered the execudrained the Jin treasury.* [27]* [26]
tion of all male members of the Song and Liao royal
Plans for a war against the Southern Song began in 1158. families residing in Jin territory.* [30] The execution of

3
130 members of the two royal clans in the span of a
few months proved unpopular, and the Khitans soon revolted in Manchuria.* [30] They refused to be drafted into
the army, maintaining that conscription would leave the
homeland of the Khitans unprotected from rival tribes on
the steppes. Prince Hailing rebued their demands. The
Khitan rebels killed several Jurchen ocials. The rebellion was fragmented, and there were separate plans either
to spread the revolt further by operating from Shangjing,
the former Liao capital, or to move the Khitan people
from Manchuria to Central Asia, where the Kara-Khitan
Khanate had formed after the demise of Liao.* [27] Hailing was forced to divert resources and men away from the
war eort to suppress the rebellion.* [30]
Diplomatic exchanges between the Song and Jin did not
stop during the period preceding the war. The History
of Song claims that the Song realized that the Jin were
planning for an invasion when they noticed the discourtesy of one of the Jin diplomats.* [30] Some Song ocials foresaw the impending war,* [30] but Emperor Gaozong hoped to maintain peaceful relations with the Song's
northern neighbor. His reluctance to antagonize the Jin
delayed the fortication of the Song border defenses.
The Song quickly built just three military garrisons in
1161.* [31] Hailing departed from Kaifeng on October
15, 1161.* [30] The oensive comprised four armies, and
Hailing personally led the army that entered Anhui.* [31]
The Jin passed the Huai River boundary on October 28,
advancing into Song territory.* [30] The Song resistance
was minimal because they had fortied the southern shore
of the Yangtze River and not the Huai.* [30]

Naval battle

Hailing's army built its encampment near Yangzhou on

the northern side of the Yangtze River.* [1] The Jin advance had been slowed by Song victories in the west,
where the Song captured several prefectures from the Jin.
Hailing commanded his forces to cross the Yangtze at
Caishi,* [30] south of modern Nanjing.* [32] A naval battle between Jin and Song took place on November 26 and
27, 1161.* [30] The Song troops were led by Yu Yunwen a scholar-ocial and his lieutenants Dai Gao,
Jian Kang, Shi Zhun, and others.* [32] Yu, who was a
Drafting Ocial of the Secretariat (zhongshu sheren
), was at Caishi to distribute awards to Song soldiers who had been selected for their outstanding service;
it was by chance that his visit coincided with Hailing's
campaign.* [33] When he rst arrived, the Song forces at
Caishi were scattered and lacked a central leader. Yu took
command and built a cohesive army.* [34] The Jin performed a ritual sacrice of horses a day before the battle.
On November 26, Jin troops embarked from the shore
of the Yangtze and engaged the Song eet.* [32] Some
of the ships they boarded were shoddily built.* [35] The
Jin had lost several ships in Liangshan, where they were

bogged down by the shallow depths of Liangshan Lake

as they were being transported to the Grand Canal.* [29]
Hailing had urgently requested the construction of more
ships in 1161 to compensate for those still stuck in Liangshan.* [36] One account of the war contends that the Jin
ships were constructed in a week with materials recycled
from destroyed buildings. The shortage of vessels and the
poor quality of those available prevented the Jin from ferrying more soldiers needed for ghting a naval battle with
the Song.* [35]
The Song military response was likely stronger than Hailing had anticipated.* [34] The paddle-wheel ships of the
Song navy could move more rapidly and outmaneuver
the slower Jin ships.* [37] The Song kept their eet hidden behind the island of Qibao Shan. The ships were to
depart the island once a scout on horseback announced
the approach of the Jin ships by signalling a concealed
ag atop the island's peak. Once the ag became visible, the Song eet commenced their attack from both
sides of the island. Song soldiers operated traction trebuchets that launched incendiary thunderclap bombs
and other soft-cased explosives containing lime and sulphur, which created a noxious explosion when the casing
broke.* [38] The Jin soldiers who managed to cross the
river and reach the shore were assaulted by Song troops
waiting on the other side.* [33] The Song won a decisive
victory.* [1] Hailing was defeated again in a second engagement the next day.* [33] After burning his remaining
ships,* [33] he retreated to Yangzhou, where he was assassinated before he could nish preparations for another
crossing.* [39]
Estimates for the number of soldiers and casualties at the
battle vary widely. A Song source reports that there were
18,000 Song soldiers stationed in Caishi, a number that
historian Herbert Franke considers plausible. However,
Song estimates for the number of Jin troops are likely inated. One document claims that 400,000 Jin soldiers
were present at the battle. This number is doubtful, bearing in mind that the Song had only 120,000 soldiers ghting on the entire front. Song historians may have confused the total number of Jin personnel deployed on the
front with the number of Jin combatants at Caishi.* [1]
The inated gure could have referred to the number
of soldiers that the Jin army had before crossing the
Huai River toward the Yangtze. The desertions and casualties from suppressing revolts while advancing southward would have shrunk that number by the time the Jin
reached the Yangtze.* [33] The History of Jin, a document
written from the perspective of the Jin, reports Jin casualties between one meng'an (a Jurchen unit of a thousand
soldiers) and a hundred men, and two meng'an and two
hundred men. The History of Song reports Jin casualties
numbering four thousand soldiers and two commanders
of wanhu (ten thousand men) rank.* [33] An account of
the battle by a dierent Song source holds that 24,000
Jin soldiers died and that 500 combatants and ve mengan were taken as prisoners. A more conservative Song

4
source estimates that the Jin only had 500 soldiers and
20 ships at Caishi.* [34] It is not certain which of these
gures is more accurate; Franke believes that the safest
conclusion that can be drawn is that the number of Jin
casualties was not greater than four thousand.* [1]

4 AFTERMATH
could see nothing. Our ships then went forward to attack theirs, and their men and horses
were all drowned, so that they were utterly defeated.* [38]

There were up to 340 ships in the Song eet during the

battle of Caishi in 1161.* [40] The Song eet used trebuchets to bombard the Jin ships with incendiary bombs
3 Military and naval technology
(pili huoqiu or huopao ; thunderclap re balls) that contained a mixture of gunpowMain article: Science and technology of the Song dynasty
der, lime, scraps of iron, and a poison that was likely
An account of the Song's technological capabilities is
arsenic.* [38] Reports that the bomb produced a loud
sound suggests that the nitrate content of the gunpowder
mixture was high enough to create an explosion.* [41] The
powdered lime in the bombs at Caishi generated a cloud
of blinding smoke similar to tear gas.* [42] The huoqiu released the smoke once the casing of the bomb shattered.
Fuses activated the bombs after launching.* [37]
The Jin conscripted thousands of blacksmiths to build the
armor and weaponry of the eet, and workers to dig out
the canal necessary for transporting the ships from Tong
to the Grand Canal through the northern port of Zhigu
(), modern Tianjin.* [29] The Jin armored their light
ships with thick rhinoceros hides. The ships had two stories; on the lower deck were the oarsmen responsible for
rowing the ship, while soldiers on the upper deck could
re missile weapons.* [37] Three dierent variations of
the warships were constructed. Several of the ships became bogged down in Liangshan, and the ships built to replace them were of an inferior quality.* [36] The Jin eet
were unable to defeat the larger and faster warships of the
Song.* [43]
The battle is signicant in the technological history of
the Song navy. The technological advances of the Song
navy ensured its access to the East China Sea, where they
competed with the military forces of Jin and Mongol riThe pili huoqiu incendiary bombs at Caishi contained mixtures vals. Although huopao launched by the ship-mounted
of lime and gunpowder. This huoqiu is from the earlier Wujing trebuchets had been invented decades earlier, the bombs
did not become mandatory on Song warships until 1129.
Zongyao (1044).
Paddle-wheel ships operated with treadmills were congiven in the Hai Qiu Fu (Rhapsodic Ode on the Sea- structed continuously in various sizes between 1132 and
1183. The engineer Gao Xuan devised a ship outtted
eel Paddle Wheel Warships):
with up to eleven paddle wheels on each side, and Qin
Shifu, another engineer, designed the iron plating for arThe men inside them paddled fast on the
moring the ships in 1203. All these advances supported
treadmills, and the ships glided forwards as
a rapid increase in the size of the force; according to the
though they were ying, yet no one was visible
20th-century historian Joseph Needham, From a total
on board. The enemy thought that they were
of 11 squadrons and 3,000 men [the Song navy] rose in
made of paper. Then all of a sudden a thunone century to 20 squadrons totalling 52,000 men.* [40]
derclap bomb was let o. It was made with paper (carton) and lled with lime and sulphur.
(Launched from trebuchets) these thunderclap
4 Aftermath
bombs came dropping down from the air, and
upon meeting the water exploded with a noise
Traditional Chinese historiography celebrated the battle
like thunder, the sulphur bursting into ames.
of Caishi as an important victory for China. Caishi was
The carton case rebounded and broke, scatheld in the same esteem as the Battle of Fei River in 383,
tering the lime to form a smoky fog, which
when the Eastern Jin defeated the northern invaders of the
blinded the eyes of men and horses so that they

5
reign in the empire, and Hailing's policies had alienated
the Jurchens, the Khitans, and the Han Chinese. Disaffected ocers conspired to kill him, and he was assassinated on December 15, 1161. Emperor Shizong succeeded Hailing as ruler of the Jin. He had been enthroned
weeks before the assassination, in a military coup that installed him as emperor while Hailing was absent from the
court.* [44] Shizong eventually rescinded many of Hailing's sinication policies.* [45]
The victory boosted the morale of the Song soldiers and
increased dissatisfaction among the Jin army. News of
the victory improved condence in the government and
bolstered the stability of the Song.* [30]* [46] The Jurchens gave up their ambitions of conquering the Southern Song and reunifying China.* [46] The Jin army withdrew in 1162, and diplomatic relations between the
two states resumed.* [44] Emperor Gaozong retired nine
months after the conclusion of the battle.* [35] The reasons for his abdication are complicated,* [47] but Gaozong's handling of the war with Hailing may have had a
part in his decision to resign.* [48] He had ignored the
warnings of a Jin attack* [49] and his hopes for conciliation held back plans for strengthening the Song defenses.* [31]

Emperor Gaozong of Song abdicated the throne nine months after

the conclusion of the battle

Former Qin. However, its portrayal as a victory against

overwhelming odds, in which 18,000 Song soldiers overcame an army of nearly half a million men, is likely an
exaggeration. Modern historians believe that the number
of Jin soldiers was far lower. The Song possessed multiple advantages, and the battle was more evenly matched
than contemporaneous historians suggest. The Song had
larger ships and ample time to prepare while the Jin army
gathered supplies and ships for the crossing. It was also
impossible for the Jin to use cavalry, the most important asset of the Jurchen military, during a naval engagement.* [1]
A modern analysis of the background of the conict and
the battleeld has also shown that it was a smaller engagement than traditionally believed. Its eects were
more psychological than material.* [30] The battle was
not solely responsible for dooming Hailing's military
campaign; his own failings also led to his downfall.* [1]
Hailing's generals detested him, and his relationship with
his men had deteriorated over the course of the war. His
authoritarianism made him equally unpopular among his
own people. There was a widespread disapproval of his

Military clashes continued in Huainan and Sichuan, but

Jin incursions after Caishi had no intent of reaching the
Yangtze. The Jin had discovered that southern China's
many lakes and river impeded their cavalry.* [35] They
signed a peace treaty with the Song in 1165, ending hostilities. The Huai River border remained the same and
the Song continued to pay annual indemnities to the Jin,
but the Song no longer recognized their state as a Jin vassal.* [45]

5 See also
History of China
Emperor Shizong
Battle of Tangdao
Gunpowder warfare
History of the Song dynasty
Jiao Yu
Military history of China (pre-1911)
Naval history of China
Naval warfare

6 Notes
[1] Franke 1994, p. 242.

[2] Ebrey 2010, p. 136.

[40] Needham 1971, p. 476.

[3] Holcombe 2011, p. 129.

[41] Needham 1987, pp. 166167.

[4] Franke 1994, p. 221.

[42] Needham 1987, p. 165.

[5] Mote 1999, p. 209.

[43] Chan 1992, p. 658.

[6] Franke 1994, p. 225.

[7] Mote 1999, pp. 209210.
[8] Mote 1999, p. 196.
[9] Franke 1994, pp. 227229.

REFERENCES

[44] Franke 1994, p. 243.

[45] Franke 1994, p. 244.
[46] Tao 2002, p. 155.
[47] Tao 2009, pp. 707709.

[10] Franke 1994, p. 229.

[48] Tao 2009, pp. 708709.
[11] Mote 1999, p. 292.
[12] Mote 1999, p. 293.
[13] Mote 1999, pp. 289293.
[14] Tao 2009, p. 654.
[15] Mote 1999, p. 298.
[16] Tao 2009, p. 655.
[17] Franke 1994, p. 230.
[18] Franke 1994, pp. 230232.
[19] Franke 1994, p. 232.
[20] Franke 1994, p. 233.
[21] Tao 2009, p. 684.
[22] Franke 1994, p. 235.
[23] Franke 1994, p. 239.
[24] Franke 1994, pp. 239240.
[25] Tao 2002, p. 150.
[26] Franke 1994, p. 240.
[27] Mote 1999, p. 235.
[28] Franke 1994, pp. 240241.
[29] Chan 1992, p. 657.
[30] Franke 1994, p. 241.
[31] Tao 2009, p. 704.
[32] Tao 2002, p. 151.
[33] Tao 2002, p. 152.
[34] Tao 2009, p. 706.
[35] Tao 2009, p. 707.
[36] Chan 1992, pp. 657658.
[37] Turnbull 2002, p. 46.
[38] Needham 1987, p. 166.
[39] Mote 1999, p. 233.

[49] Tao 2009, p. 709.

7 References
Chan, Hok-Lam (1992). The Organization and
Utilization of Labor Service Under The Jurchen
Chin Dynasty. Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies
52 (2): 613664. doi:10.2307/2719174.
Ebrey, Patricia Buckley (2010) [1996]. The Cambridge Illustrated History of China (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-12433-1.
Franke, Herbert (1994). Denis C. Twitchett; Herbert Franke; John King Fairbank, eds. The Cambridge History of China: Volume 6, Alien Regimes
and Border States, 7101368. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-24331-5.
Holcombe, Charles (2011). A History of East Asia:
From the Origins of Civilization to the Twenty-First
Century. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0521-51595-5.
Mote, Frederick W. (1999). Imperial China: 900
1800. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-67401212-7.
Needham, Joseph (1971). Science and Civilisation
in China: Civil Engineering and Nautics, Volume 4
Part 3. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0521-07060-7.
Needham, Joseph (1987). Science and Civilisation
in China: Military technology: The Gunpowder Epic,
Volume 5, Part 7. Cambridge University Press.
ISBN 978-0-521-30358-3.
Tao, Jing-shen (2002). A Tyrant on the Yangtze:
The Battle of Ts'ai-shih in 1161. In Marie Chan;
Chia-lin Pao Tao; Jing-shen Tao, eds. Excursions in
Chinese Culture: Festschrift in Honor of William R.
Schultz. Chinese University Press. pp. 149158.
ISBN 978-962-201-915-7.

7
Tao, Jing-shen (2009).The Move to the South and
the Reign of Kao-tsung. In Paul Jakov Smith; Denis C. Twitchett. The Cambridge History of China:
Volume 5, The Sung Dynasty and Its Precursors,
907-1279. Cambridge University Press. pp. 556
643. ISBN 978-0-521-81248-1. (hardcover)
Turnbull, Stephen (2002). Fighting Ships of the Far
East: China and Southeast Asia 202 BC AD 1419.
Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-78200-017-4.

Further reading
Partington, J. R. (1960). A History of Greek Fire
and Gunpowder. Johns Hopkins University Press.
ISBN 978-0-8018-5954-0.

9 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

9.1

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Battle of Caishi Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle%20of%20Caishi?oldid=630169729 Contributors: Timrollpickering, Varlaam, Confuzion, SpookyMulder, CanisRufus, LordAmeth, Rjwilmsi, Tim!, Naraht, Jaraalbe, Bgwhite, Ksyrie, Rsrikanth05, Nikkimaria,
Fram, Ian Rose, Durova, Cattus, Afasmit, Cplakidas, Underbar dk, Neddyseagoon, Cydebot, Wandalstouring, Magioladitis, The Anomebot2, STBot, Kevinsam, R'n'B, KylieTastic, PericlesofAthens, WereSpielChequers, Rosiestep, Lorddrink, Piledhigheranddeeper, Dank,
Addbot, LaaknorBot, Materialscientist, Madalibi, Aa77zz, LucienBOT, Jesse V., Sarastro1, EmausBot, Faolin42, Italia2006, ZroBot,
Tomobe03, ClueBot NG, BG19bot, Nowhere14, Cold Season, Cnbhkine, 23 editor, Hmainsbot1, Zziccardi, ArmbrustBot, TFA Protector
Bot, Khanate General, Aogiapvang, Vctrbarbieri, Krishnachaitan, Lizabiggers, Ewan12301, Jewseatbabies, Classicmania, Hallo19899 and
Anonymous: 12

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