As the devastation of the Second World War and Holocaust casted a lingering shadow over

the international community, nations sought the prevention of similar atrocities through
constraining national sovereignty and the establishment of a global order based on human rights.
(Silverburg Sept 24) Nations placed their ideological differences aside and an unprecedented
global alignment to create a universal legally binding bill of rights with enforcement and
implementation mechanisms emerged. (Normand and Zaidi 143) However, this unique consensus
quickly disintegrated as the interests of the global hegemons, the United States, Britain and the
Soviet Union took precedence over this initial shared desire. As the victors of the Second World
War, the founders of this global organization, international power was firmly concentrated in their
hands. Under no circumstances would they sacrifice national powers and interest on the altar of
human rights and ultimately they never had to. (Normand and Zaidi 143)
The human rights system that emerged was fragmented; comprising of two edifices: the
Declaration of Human Rights and two separate covenants for social and economic rights and civil
and political rights. It is important to note that the implementation mechanism, the final and most
essential part of the human rights edifices, was never established. This essay will examine three
instances of political bargaining and maneuvering in the creation of the two human rights
covenants: specifically the hierarchy of social and economic rights and civil and political rights,
the right to reservations and the absence of an enforcement mechanism. It will argue that
universality of the covenants was greatly diminished by the United States and Western Blocs
domination of the drafting process but will assert that the content and character of the individual
rights and norms presented in covenants were and continue to be universal.
The secondary position of social and economic rights was a direct result of the United
States and Britains human rights vision, which excluded these rights on the basis that they were

not justiciable. To appease the US and ensure their participation in the new human rights regime-the covenants were separated and significantly more forceful rhetoric was used in the civil and
political rights covenant. For example, it was framed in traditional human rights language,
positing the individual as the primary actor and compelling immediate action by States. In
contrast, the economic and social covenant provided for the progressive realization of the rights
enshrined in the covenant. (Normand Zaidi 99). Likewise, the civil and political rights covenant
produced a monitoring body upon the completion of the covenant but the social and economic
monitoring body was only established in 1986.
While the Western Bloc appealed to the international community to reject social and
economic covenant on legal grounds, their true motivations were self-interested. They rejected
social and political rights because of the rampant racial inequality present in the US during 1940s
and the lower costs associated with upholding civil and political rights. For example, privileging
and supporting social and economic rights would draw international attention to grave domestic
human rights abuses against African Americans, implicating the US in issues of race and
economic equality. Additionally, the Western Bloc was supportive of civil and political rights as
achieving them is virtually cost free whereas social and economic rights required the provision of
expensive public goods.
In opposition to the United States and the rest of the Western bloc was the Soviet Union
and several Third World Nations. They acceded to the idea that these sets of two rights were
implicitly unequal but privileged social and economic rights, criticizing the Western blocs
support for the highly individualistic nature of civil and political rights. (Normand and Zaidi 107)
This prioritization was motivated by the Soviet Unions sovereign interests: civil and political
rights would conflict with their communist principles and draw unnecessary international attention

to their infamous gulags. (Silverburg Sept 24) Communist ideology emphasized social and
economic equality but did not recognize even freedom of choice, thought, speech or choice, thus
civil and political rights were completely incompatible with Soviet Unions political system.
In a similar vein of selecting particular human rights that would not conflict with domestic
affairs and laws was the issue of reservations, which allowed states to impose reservations on
articles they did not want to implement. Despite the majoritys stance against reservations as they
conflicted with the universality of the covenants and defeated their most central premise of a
single human rights document that applied to all people, reservations were still integrated into the
covenants .(Normand Zaidi 107)
While Third World and some European states were united in their stance against
reservations, the unlikely pairing of the United States and Russia emerged, with Britain eventually
joining this union. (Normand and Zaidi 107) The United States and Russia were motivated by the
fact it would allow the maximum number of state ratifications of the covenant, but truly wanted to
further their national interests in eliminating any potential international interference in domestic
affairs and conflict with domestic law. Although the United States desperately wanted the
reservations, they let the Soviet Union take the emboldened stance which was what ultimately
tipped the balance of forces in this debate (Normand and Zaidi 107).
Even after debates on the issue of reservations in the General Assembly and advisory
opinion from the International Court of Justice, there was still no consensus. The majority of states
continued to believe that reservations were inappropriate in human rights treaties, a smaller group
of states supported the ICJ precedent, seeking the limited applicability of reservations and the
Soviet Union demanded their applicability in all cases. 12 years of debate on this issue produced a
compromise more consistent with the Western Bloc and Soviet vision of human rights. This is

because even if there was no particular clause addressing reservations, following the Vienna
Convention on Multilateral treaties, countries were able to implement reservations as long as they
did not go against the object and purpose of the treaties. (Normand and Zaidi 108).
The United States, Britain, and Soviet Unions shared position extended to the issue of
enforcement. The US and Soviet Union were engaging in horrific human rights violations towards
their own citizens and thus could not be open to international involvement and enforcement
mechanisms. In opposition were most countries from Asia, Africa and Latin America. These
nations desperately wanted to protect individuals from the abuses of state power through a human
rights committee with fact-finding powers that could review complaints from states, individuals,
and civil organizations. (Normand and Zaidi 108) While the first meeting of the CHR and several
General Assembly resolutions urged the inclusion of implementation measures, these steps were
not strong enough to confront the Western bloc and Soviet Union. (Normand and Zaidi 108)
Similar to their unequivocal stance on the issue of reservations, the Soviet Union flatly rejected
enforcement measures as conceiving them as a threat against national sovereignty. The US based
their concerns on legal and technical grounds, utilizing a non-confrontational approach, while the
UK seriously considered reservations but found that it would conflict with its colonial policies.
Although the majority desired the right to petition in at least some shape or form, it was ostensibly
eliminated. The CHR reached the weak compromise of an optional protocol that would grant the
privilege of petitions for citizens only in the case of civil and political rights. (Normand and Zaidi
111), further exemplifying the hierarchy between civil and political and economic rights.
Similarly, a Human Rights Committee was established to oversee the submission of periodic
reports of the state of human rights in their respective nations. Ultimately, as a result of the

Western Blocs and Soviet Unions interests, the most basic enforcement tools required to accord
a legal status to the rights mentioned in the covenants were not produced.
The sovereign state interests of the global super powers dominated the drafting process of
the human rights covenants -- diminishing the universality of the covenants. The unparalleled
power of the Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States ensured that covenants reflected their
western conceptions of human rights and more importantly their own state interests. The fact that
there was no eastern power or Latin nation in this hegemonic trifecta prevented the inclusion of
both eastern and Latin cultural ideals regarding human rights. Likewise, the drafting of these
covenants occurred prior to the wave of decolonization, had this not been the case perhaps there
may have been a more obvious reflection of their cultural ideals. On a similar note if the global
hegemons did not play such a decisive role in the drafting of these conventions, it is likely that an
enforcement mechanism would have been developed and that reservations would be eliminated. In
this case, the covenants would be more universal as nations would not impose reservations on
particular articles but accept the covenant in its entirety and with enforcement mechanisms,
nations would be held liable to same international human rights standard.
However, it is important to separate the highly politicized drafting process from the
content and character of the rights the covenants put forward. It seems remarkable that despite
these political machinations that covenants were extremely comprehensive and reflected all four
sets of rights and thus were universal. Despite the greater influence of the United States, Russia
and Soviet Union, we cannot discount the value of such covenants and the ideas they promoted in
the wake of the Second World War and the recent establishment of the United Nations.

Works Cited
Normand, Roger, and Sarah Zaidi. "Chapter 5-7" Human Rights at the UN: The Political History
of Universal Justice. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2008. N. pag. Print.

Silverburg, Helene. "Political Science 123s." Cory, Berkeley. Sept. 2013. Lecture.

Wagner, Rosemarie. "Political Science 123s." Dwinelle, Berkeley. Sept. 2013. Lecture.

Ayesha Dayaram
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September 30, 2013