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ARCABA VS.. VDA.

DE BATOCAEL
G.R. No. 146683. November 22, 2001
FACTS:
On January 16, 1956, Francisco Comille and his wife Zozima Montallana are owners of several
pieces of land. However, when Zosima died Francisco and his mother-in-law executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights. On June 27, 1961, Francisco registered those said lots in his
name. Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia and His
cousin Luzveminda and Cirila Abarca to take care of his house and the store as well. There are however
conflicting testimonies as to the relationship of Francisco and Cirila. Niece of Francisco, Leticia said that
her uncle and Cirila were lovers and they slept in the same room. Another niece of Fernando said that
Francisco himself told her that Cirila is her mistress. Cirila on the other hand claimed that they are not
lovers nor she is a mistress of Francisco. She is just a mere helper of Francisco.
Few months before the death of Francisco, he executed an instrument dominated Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos in favor of Cirila. Cirila on the other hand accepted the said donation. A complaint was
filed by the heirs of Francisco for the declaration of nullity of the deed of donation inter vivos basing it on
Article 87 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation is valid.
RULING:
It was held by the Court that, Francisco and Cirila as proved by evidences and testimonies, they
actually lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. Thus, the said donation is invalid or
void basing it on Article 87 of the Family Code which provides: Every donation or grant of gratuitous
advantage, direct or indirect between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts
which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also
apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.

MATABUENA VS. CERVANTES


No. L-28771. March 31, 1971
FACTS:
Felix Matabuena donated a parcel of land to Petronila Cervantes while living martially without the benefit of
marriage. The Deed of Donation was executed by Felix in Favor of Cervantes on February 20, 1956, which
same donation was accepted by Cervantes. After six years, they got married on March 28, 1962. Felix died
on September 13, 1962. after the death of Felix, Cornelia Matabuana, sister of Felix being the sole heir
claimed that the donation made by his brother is void for it was executed while her brother and Cervantes
were living together as husband and wife without the benefit of valid marriage.

The RTC decided in favor of Cervantes on the ground that the said prohibition is applied only for couples
living together with the benefit of a valid marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation is valid.
RULING:
The Court held that, while Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses
during marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality
requires that the same prohibition should be applied to a common-law relationship,
However, the lack of validity of the donation to Cervantes does not necessarily result in Cornelias exclusive
right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix, the relationship between him and Cervantes was
legitimated by their marriage. Cervantes is therefore his widow. Thus she is entitled to one-half of
inheritance and Cornelia as the surviving sister, to the other half.

HILARIO GRECIO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SUN LIFE CO. OF CANADA, defendant-appellant


No. 23703. September 28, 1925
FACTS:
Andrea Zialcita was the lawful wife of Hilario Gercio. Towards the end of the year 1919, she was
convicted of the crime of adultery. On September 4, 1920, a decree of divorce was issued which had the
effect of completely dissolving the bonds of matrimony contracted by Hilario Gercio and Andrea Zialcita.
On march 4, 1922, Gercio notified the Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada that he had revoked his
donation in favor of Zialcita, and he had designated in her stead his present wife, as the beneficiary of the
policy. Gercio requested the company to eliminate Zialcita as beneficiary, however, the company refused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gercio can change the beneficiary of the policy.
RULING:
It was held by the Court that, the insured-the husband- has no power to change the beneficiary- the
former wife- and to name the stead his actual wife, where the policy of the insurance does not expressly
reserve to the insured the right to change the beneficiary.

HARDING VS COMMERCIAL UNION


No. 12707. August 10, 1918

FACTS:
A husband donated an automobile to his wife, who subsequently insured it for P 3,000. When the car was
later completely destroyed, the wife sought to recover the insurance indemnity, but the insurance pleaded
in defense that the wife had no insurable interest in the car, the donation by the husband being void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the insurance can raise the validity of the donation as a defense.
RULING:
It was held by the Court that, the insurance company failed to show that the gift was not a moderate one,
considering the circumstances of the parties. Furthermore, even if the gift had not been a moderate one,
the company cannot assail the validity of the donation, because at the time of the transfer, it was not a
creditor.

IMANI VS. METROBANK


G.R. No. 187023; November 17, 2010
FACTS:
On August 28, 1981, Evangeline D. Imani (petitioner) signed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favor of
respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank), with Cesar P. Dazo, Nieves Dazo, Benedicto
C. Dazo, Cynthia C. Dazo, Doroteo Fundales, Jr., and Nicolas Ponce as her co-sureties. As sureties, they
bound themselves to pay Metrobank whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but
not exceeding Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00).
Later, CPDTI obtained loans of P100,000.00 and P63,825.45, respectively. The loans were evidenced by
promissory notes signed by Cesar and Nieves Dazo. CPDTI defaulted in the payment of its loans.
Metrobank made several demands for payment upon CPDTI, but to no avail. This prompted Metrobank to
file a collection suit against CPDTI and its sureties, including herein petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property is not conjugal is not and the suggestion to vindicate the rights of Sina Imani
and the conjugal partnerhip action under sec. 16 rule 39 encourage multiplicity of suits and violate the
policy of the rules for expedient and inexpensive disposition of actions.
RULING:
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the

operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. The party who asserts this presumption
must first prove said time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the property acquired
during the marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be
conjugal was acquired.

Navarro v. Judge Escobido and Go


27 November 2009
FACTS:
On September 12, 1998, respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 98-599
(first complaint)6 and 98-598 (second complaint),7 before the RTC for replevin and/or sum of money with
damages against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed that the RTC issue writs of replevin for
the seizure of two (2) motor vehicles in Navarros possession.
Navarro alleges that even if the lease agreements were in the name of Kargo Enterprises, since it did not
have the requisite juridical personality to sue, the actual parties to the agreement are himself and Glenn
Go. Since it was Karen Go who filed the complaints and not Glenn Go, she was not a real party-in-interest
and the complaints failed to state a cause of action.
Karen Go, on the other hand, claims that it is misleading for Navarro to state that she has no real interest in
the subject of the complaint, even if the lease agreements were signed only by her husband, Glenn Go; she
is the owner of Kargo Enterprises and Glenn Go signed the lease agreements merely as the manager of
Kargo Enterprises. Moreover, Karen Go maintains that Navarros insistence that Kargo Enterprises is
Karen Gos paraphernal property is without basis. Based on the law and jurisprudence on the matter, all
property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be conjugal property. Finally, Karen Go insists that
her complaints sufficiently established a cause of action against Navarro. Thus, when the RTC ordered her
to include her husband as co-plaintiff, this was merely to comply with the rule that spouses should sue
jointly, and was not meant to cure the complaints lack of cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Karen Go is a real party in interest.
RULING:
A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
As the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit from or be
injured by a judgment in this case. Thus, contrary to Navarros contention, Karen Go is the real party-ininterest, and it is legally incorrect to say that her Complaint does not state a cause of action because her
name did not appear in the Lease Agreement that her husband signed in behalf of Kargo Enterprises.
Whether Glenn Go can legally sign the Lease Agreement in his capacity as a manager of Kargo
Enterprises, a sole proprietorship, is a question we do not decide, as this is a matter for the trial court to
consider in a trial on the merits.

VILLANUEVA VS. CA
G.R. No. 143286. April 14, 2004
FACTS:
Eusebia Napisa and Nicolas Retuya were married on October 7, 1926. out of the marriage, they begotten
five children. During their marriage, they acquired real properties. In 1936, Nicolas started to cohabit with
Pacita Villanueva and out of wedlock they had an illegitimate child, Procopio Villanueva.
Eusebia sought the reconveyance from Nicolas and Pacita of several properties, claiming the subject
properties are her conjugal properties with Nicolas. On November 23, 1996, Eusebia died. The RTC ruled
in favor of Eusebia represented by her son. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the said decision of
the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Eusebia has the right for the reconveyance of the said properties.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that in the affirmative. Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the
Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code to vest rights already
acquired under the Civil Code. Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the
marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. This is counter balanced by the requirement that
properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the marriage before it is presumed to be
conjugal.
Eusebia was able to prove that those properties were acquired during their marriage. Though Nicolas and
Pacita cohabited, Nicolas and Eusebia were still married. Thus, any property acquired during the period is
considered conjugal, unless it is proven that Pacita contributed in the acquisition of said property. However,
Pacita failed to prove the exception.

CHING VS. CA
G.R. No. 124642. February 23, 2004

FACTS:
On September 26, 1978, PBMCI obtained a loan of P9,000,000 from Allied Banking Corporation. On
December 28, 1978, ABC extended another loan to the PBMCI through its Executive Vice President
Alfredo Ching. However, PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans.
PBMCI and Alfredo Ching jointly filed a petition for suspension of payments with the Securities and
Exchange Commission and at the same time seeking the PBMCIs rehabilitation. On July 9, 1982, the SEC
issued an order placing PBMCIs business, including its assets and liabilities under rehabilitation. In the
mean time, on July 21, 1983, the deputy sheriff of the trial court levied on attachment the 100,000 common
shares of stocks in the name of Ching. On November 16, 1993, Encarnacion Ching, wife of Alfredo Ching
filed a motion to set aside the levy on attachment. She alleged that the 100,000 shares of stock levied on
by the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds.
Encarnacion showed to the court copy of her marriage contract with Alfredo as an evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said 100,000 shares of stock be excluded from the case.
RULING:
It was held by the court that, for conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability, that should appertain to the
husband alone, there must be showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses. Certainly, to make
conjugal partnership responsible for a liability that should appertain alone to one of the spouses is to
frustrate the objective of the New Civil Code to show the utmost concern for solidarity and well-being of the
family as a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the power to assume unnecessary and unwarranted
risks to the financial stability of the conjugal partnership. ABC failed to prove that the conjugal partnership
of Encarnacion and Alfredo was benefited by Alfredos act of executing a continuing guaranty and
suretyship agreement with the respondents for and in behalf of PBMCI.

TAN VS. CA
G.R. No. 120594. June 10, 1997
FACTS:
On April 17,1989, a case for partition and accounting was instituted by the spouses Alfonso and Eteria Tan
against Alfonsos brothers, Celestino and Maximo Tan. Spouses claimed that 1/3 of the 906 square meter
residential lot was brought to their conjugal property during their marriage. However, brothers of Alfonso
objected the claim. They claimed that the subject property was inherited by them from their mother and was
divided among them, Alfonso, Celestino and Maximo.
Eteria, admitted that she is legally married to Alfonso but they were now living separately by virtue of a
decree of legal separation. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Alfonso and Eteria, however, the
Court of Appeals decided otherwise.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said 1/3 of the subject property is a conjugal property of Eteria and Alfonso.

RULING:
It was held by the Court that, the Husbands acquisition by succession of a parcel of land during his
marriage to his wife simply means that the lot is his exclusive property because it was acquired by him
during the marriage by lucrative title.

ROS AND AGUETE V PNB LAOAG


G.R. No. 170166; April 6, 2011
FACTS:
On January 13, 1983, spouses Jose A. Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a complaint for the annulment of the
Real Estate Mortgage and all legal proceedings taken thereunder against PNB, Laoag Branch before the
Court of First Instance, Ilocos Norte docketed as Civil Case No. 7803.
The complaint was later amended and was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Laoag City. The
averments in the complaint disclosed that plaintiff-appellee Joe A. Ros obtained a loan of P115,000.00 from
PNB Laoag Branch on October 14, 1974 and as security for the loan, plaintiff-appellee Ros executed a real
estate mortgage involving a parcel of land Lot No. 9161 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag, with all the
improvements thereon described under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9646.
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued
in favor of PNB, Laoag as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one (1) year without the property being
redeemed, the property was consolidated and registered in the name of PNB, Laoag Branch on August 10,
1978. Claiming that she (plaintiff-appellee Estrella Aguete) has no knowledge of the loan obtained by her
husband nor she consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal property a complaint was filed to
annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and consolidation of the property interposing the
defense that her signatures affixed on the documents were forged and that the loan did not redound to the
benefit of the family.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the loan contracted by husband Joe A. Ros with respondent Philippine National Bank Laoag redounded to the benefit of his family, aside from the fact that such had not been raised by
respondent in its appeal.
RULING:
The application for loan shows that the loan would be used exclusively "for additional working [capital] of
buy & sell of garlic & virginia tobacco. In her testimony, Aguete confirmed that Ros engaged in such
business, but claimed to be unaware whether it prospered. Aguete was also aware of loans contracted by
Ros, but did not know where he "wasted the money. Debts contracted by the husband for and in the
exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes to the support of the family cannot be
deemed to be his exclusive and private debts.

If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and
services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term "x x x
x obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is
enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the
contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to
the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or
does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business,
the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

GO VS. CA
G.R. No. 114791. May 29, 1997
FACTS:
Hermogenes and Jane Ong were married on June 7, 1987. The video coverage of the wedding
was provided by the petitioner spouses Nancy and Alex Go. Spouses Ong claimed the video of their
wedding three times but they failed to have it. Because the newlywed couple will be having their
honeymoon in US, they agreed to have the video tape upon their return.
When the couple came home, they found out that the said tape had been erased by spouses Go.
Furious at the lost of the tape which suppose to be the only record of their wedding. Thus, they
filed a complaint. The RTC rendered its decision making spouses Go liable to the said erased tape. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:

Whether or not spouses Go be jointly held liable.

RULING:
The Court held that, since the wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in business
without the consent of the husband, the husband may not be held jointly and severally liable with his wife
for breach of a contract that the latter had entered into.

SIOCHI V. GOZON
18 March 2010
FACTS:
This case involves a 30,000 SQ.M. parcel of land (property)registered in the name of the Spouses Gozon.
Elvira filed with Cavite RTC a petition for legal separation against her husband Alfredo. Elvira filed a notice
of lis pendens, while the legal separation case was still pending. Meanwhile, Alfredo and Mario Siochi
(Mario) entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell involving the property for the price of P18 million. They
stipulated that Alfredo was to remove the notice of lis pendens on the title, to have the land excluded from
the legal separation case and to secure an affidavit from the wife Elvira that the property was the exclusive
property of Alfredo.
However, despite repeated demands from Mario, Alfredo failed to comply with these stipulations. After
paying the P5 million earnest money as partial payment of the purchase price, Mario took possession of the
property in September 1993. Meanwhile, the courts declared the Gozon spouses legally separated. As
regards the property, the RTC declared it conjugal. Alfredo also executed a deed of donation over the said
property in favour of their daughter Winifred without annotating the notice of lis pendens. Alfredo, by virtue
of a Special Power of Attorney executed in his favor by Winifred, sold the property to Inter-Dimensional
Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for P18 million.
Mario then filed with the Malabon RTC a complaint for Specific Performance and Damages, Annulment of
Donation and Sale, with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order. RTC ruled in favour of Mario. CA affirmed. Mario appealed, contending that the Agreement should
be treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the acceptance of the other spouse before the
offer is withdrawn. Since Elviras conduct signified her acquiescence to the sale, Mario prays for the Court
to direct Alfredo and Elvira to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property upon his payment of P9
million to Elvira.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Alfredos share in the conjugal property already forfeited in favour of their daughter by virtue
of the decree of legal separation.
HELD:
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance
shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance
by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because Elvira, with whom Alfredo was
separated in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property. However, as sole

administrator of the property, Alfredo still cannot sell the property without the written consent of Elvira or the
authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the sale is void. The absence of the consent of
one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to
the spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the
sale of the property, that other spouses written consent to the sale is still required by law for its validity.
The Agreement entered into by Alfredo and Mario was without the written consent of Elvira. Thus, the
Agreement is entirely void.

CHEESMAN V IAC
G.R. No. 74833 January 21, 1991
FACTS:
This appeal concerns the attempt by an American citizen (petitioner Thomas Cheesman) to annul, for lack
of consent on his part, the sale by his Filipino wife (Criselda) of a residential lot and building to Estelita
Padilla. On December 4, 1970, Thomas Cheesman and Criselda Cheesman were married but have been
separated since February 15, 1981
On June 4, 1974, a Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights was executed by Armando Altares,
conveying a parcel of land in favor of Criselda Cheesman, married to Thomas Cheesman. Thomas,
although aware of the deed, did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife. Tax declarations for
the said property were issued in the name of Criselda Cheesman alone and she assumed exclusive
management and administration of the property.
On July 1, 1981, Criselda sold the property to Estelita Padilla without knowledge and consent of Thomas.
On July 31, 1981, Thomas filed a suit for the annulment of the sale on the ground that the transaction had
been executed without his knowledge and consent. Criselda filed an answer alleging that the property
soldwas paraphernal, having purchased the property from her own money; that Thomas, an American was
disqualified to have any interest or right of ownership in the land and; that Estelita was a buyer in good
faith. During the trial, it was found out that the transfer of property took place during the existence of
theirmarriage as it was acquired on June 4, 1974.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the wife can dispose of the property in question; Whether or not Cheesman, beingan
American citizen, can question the sale
HELD:
Section 14, Art. XIV of 1973 Constitution provides that: save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question
be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatsoever over the property by virtue of that
purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, he was knowingly violating the
Constitution. As such, the sale to him was null and void.

If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not in substantial
interest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This isa
right that the Constitution does not permit him to have. Even if the wife did use conjugal funds to make the
acquisition, his recovering and holding the property cannot be warranted as it is against the constitution.
Consequently, Estelita is a purchaser in good faith since she knew that Thomas cannot intervene in the
sale or disposition of the said property.

MATTHEWS VS TAYLOR
G.R. No. 164584; June 22, 2009
FACTS:
On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor
(Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina. On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from
Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot (Boracay property) situated at Manoc-Manoc, Boracay Island,
Malay, Aklan, for and in consideration of P129,000.00. The sale was allegedly financed by
Benjamin. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latters funds, constructed improvements thereon and
eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn. All
required permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino,
Joselyns sister.
However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen. On June 8,
1992, Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to
maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their
Boracay property. On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered
into an Agreement of Lease (Agreement) involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with an
annual rental ofP12,000.00. The agreement was signed by the parties and executed before a Notary
Public. Petitioner thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the resort as Music Garden
Resort.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the agreement of Lease of a parcel of land entered into by a Filipino wife without the
consent of her British husband valid.
RULING:
In light of the foregoing jurisprudence, the court find and so hold that Benjamin has no right to nullify the
Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited
from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the
designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true
even if we sustain Benjamins claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such
contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his

expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the
conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to
question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was
merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory
would countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be
declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he
would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not
permit him to have.
In fine, the Agreement of Lease entered into between Joselyn and petitioner cannot be nullified on the
grounds advanced by Benjamin. Thus, the court uphold its validity.

AGGABAO V. PARULAN
1 September 2010
FACTS:
In January 1991, real estate broker Marta K. Atanacio (Atanacio) offered the property to the petitioners,
who initially did not show interest due to the rundown condition of the improvements. But Atanacios
persistence prevailed upon them, so that onFebruary 2, 1991, they and Atanacio met with Ma. Elena at the
site of the property. During their meeting, Ma. Elena showed to them the following documents, namely: (a)
the owners original copy of TCT No. 63376; (b) a certified true copy of TCT No. 63377; (c) three tax
declarations; and (d) a copy of the special power of attorney (SPA) dated January 7, 1991 executed
by Dionisio authorizing Ma. Elena to sell the property. Before the meeting ended, they paid P20,000.00 as
earnest money, for which Ma. Elena executed a handwritten Receipt of Earnest Money, whereby the
parties stipulated that: (a) they would pay an additional payment of P130,000.00 on February 4, 1991; (b)
they would pay the balance of the bank loan of the respondents amounting to P650,000.00 on or before
February 15, 1991; and (c) they would make the final payment of P700,000.00 once Ma. Elena turned over
the property on March 31, 1991.
On February 4, 1991, the petitioners went to the Office of the Register of Deeds and the Assessors Office
of Paraaque City to verify the TCTs shown by Ma. Elena in the company of Atanacio and her husband
(also a licensed broker). There, they discovered that the lot under TCT No. 63376 had been encumbered to
Banco Filipino in 1983 or 1984, but that the encumbrance had already been cancelled due to the full
payment of the obligation. They noticed that the Banco Filipino loan had been effected through an SPA
executed by Dionisio in favor of Ma. Elena. They found on TCT No. 63377 the annotation of an existing
mortgage in favor of the Los Baos Rural Bank, also effected through an SPA executed by Dionisio in favor
of Ma. Elena, coupled with a copy of a court order authorizing Ma. Elena to mortgage the lot to secure a
loan of P500,000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale between Mrs. Elena and the petitioners had been a nullity under Article 124 of
the Family Code.

HELD:
To start with, Article 254 the Family Code has expressly repealed several titles under the Civil Code,
among them theentire Title VI in which the provisions on the property relations between husband and wife,
Article 173 included, are found.
The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family Code. The
proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that any alienation or
encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the Family Code is governed by Article 124
of the Family Code.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected
as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before
the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

Fuentes, et al v. Roca, et al
21 April, 2010
FACTS:
Sabina Tarroza owned a titled 358-square meter lot in Canelar, ZamboangaCity. In 1982, she sold it to her
son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale. But Tarciano did not for the meantime
have the registered title transferred to his name. In 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners
Manuel and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses). They later signed an agreement to sell prepared by
one Atty. Plagata dated April 29, 1988, which agreement expressly stated that it was to take effect in six
months.
The agreement required the Fuentes spouses to pay Tarciano a down payment of P60,000.00 for the
transfer of the lots title to him. And, within six months, Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and
occupants and secure the consent of his estranged wife, Rosario Gabriel Roca (Rosario), to the sale. Upon
Tarcianos compliance with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses were to take possession of the lot and
pay him an additional P140,000.00 orP160,000.00, depending on whether or not he succeeded in
demolishing the house standing on it. If Tarciano was unable to comply with these conditions, the Fuentes
spouses would become owners of the lot without any further formality and payment.

As soon as Tarciano met the other conditions, Atty. Plagata notarized Rosarios affidavit
in Zamboanga City. On January 11, 1989 Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the
Fuentes spouses. They then paid him the additional P140,000.00 mentioned in their agreement. A new
title was issued in the name of the spouses who immediately constructed a building on the lot. On January
28, 1990 Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife Rosario who died nine months afterwards.
Eight years later, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed an action for annulment of sale and
reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses with the RTC- Zamboanga City. The Rocas claimed
that the sale to the spouses was void since Tarcianos wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her
signature on the affidavit of consent had been forged. They thus prayed that the property be reconveyed to
them upon reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already prescribed
HELD:
The action has not yet prescribed. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this
case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano
sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family
Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may
assail her husbands sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouses written
consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void. Under the provisions of the Civil Code
governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very beginning. And this
rule applies to contracts that are declared void by positive provision of law, as in the case of a sale of
conjugal property without the other spouses written consent. A void contract is equivalent to nothing and is
absolutely wanting in civil effects. It cannot be validated either by ratification or prescription. Here, the
Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the
real property that Tarciano sold without their mothers (his wifes) written consent. The passage of time did
not erode the right to bring such an action.

SPOUSES BAUTISTA VS. SILVA


G. R. No. 157434. September 19, 2006.
FACTS:
On August 14, 1980, a Transfer Certificate of Title No. B- 37189 over a parcel of land was registered in the
names of Spouses Berlinda F. Silva and Pedro M. Silva. On March 3, 1988, Pedro M. Silva, for himself and
as attorney-in-fact of his wife, Berlinda, thru a Special Power of Attorney purportedly executed on
November 18, 1987 by Berlinda in his favor, signed and executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the said
parcel of land covered by TCT No. B-37189 in favor of spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista.
As a consequence, TCT No. B-37189 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. V-2765 of the Registry of
Deeds for the Valenzuela Branch was issued in the names of spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista on
March 4, 1988. Evidence shows that the signature appearing on the Special Power of Attorney as that of
Berlinda is a forgery, and that consequently, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Pedro in favor of
spouses Bautista is not authorized by Berlinda.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale made by Pedro is null and void.
RULING:
The sale of conjugal property by the husband without marital consent of the wife affects the entire property,
not just the share of the wife and it is considered a nullity. Petitioners are not buyers of good faith since
they were dealing with a seller (Pedro) who had title to and possession of the land but whose capacity to
sell was restricted, in that marital consent of respondent is required before he could convey the property.

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS AND LOAN v. DAILO


453 SCRA 283
FACTS:
Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. During their
marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot located at San Pablo City.The Deed of Absolute Sale,
however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee.Without the knowledge and
consent of respondent, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one
Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan
Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailo's house and lot in San Pablo City. As security therefor,

Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor
of petitioner. Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding; thus, prompting petitioner to institute an
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property, the latter as the highest bidder.
On December 20, 1995, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died.Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage
constituted on the subject property, which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the RTC of
San Pablo for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against
petitioner.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in question was the
exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conjugal partnership is liable for the payment of the loan obtained by the late Marcelino
Dailo Jr. the same having redounded the benefit of the family.
HELD:
In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed the property relations between respondent and her late husband.
Under Article 121 of the Family Code, The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . . (3) Debts and
obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may
have been benefited; . . . . The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Petitioner's sweeping conclusion
that the loan obtained was used to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to
the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Other than
petitioner's bare allegation, there is nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding that, indeed,
the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of the family. Consequently, the
conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation.

ABALOS v. MACATANGAY
439 SCRA 649
FACTS:
Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the registered owners of a parcel of land located at Azucena
St.,Makati City. With a Special Power of Attorney dated June 2, 1988, purportedly issued by his wife, Arturo
executed a Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement , in favor of respondent, Dr. Galicano S. Macatangay
,binding himself to sell to respondent the subject property.
On November 16, 1989, respondent sent a letter the spouses informing them of his willingness to pay the
full amount of the purchase price. On the same date, Esther, through her attorney-in-fact, executed in favor
of respondent, a Contract to Sell the property to the extent of her conjugal interest.
Respondent reiterated his demand upon the spouses to comply with their obligation to turn over possession
of the property, as he already set aside a full payment purchase price of the said property. However, the
spouses failed to deliver the property which prompted respondent to file a complaint for specific
performance with damages against petitioners. The RTC dismissed the complaint, ruling that the SPA
ostensibly issued by Esther in favor of Arturo was void as it was falsified. Hence, the SPA could not have
authorized Arturo to sell the property to respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may be compelled to convey the property to respondent under the terms of the
RMOA and the Contract to Sell.
RULING:
True, in the Contract to Sell, Esther made reference to the earlier RMOA executed by Arturo in favor of
respondent. However, the RMOA which Arturo signed is different from the deed which Esther executed
through her attorney-in-fact. For one, the first is sought to be enforced as a contract of sale while the

second is purportedly a contract to sell only. For another, the terms and conditions as to the issuance of
title and delivery of possession are divergent.
Arturo and Esther appear to have been married before the effectivity of the Family Code. There being no
indication that they have adopted a different property regime, their property relations would automatically
be governed by the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. Hence,the congruence of the wills of the
spouses is essential for the valid disposition of conjugal property. When there are two (2) documents on
which the signatures of the spouses separately appear, textual concordance of the documents is
indispensable. Hence, in this case where the wifes putative consent to the sale of conjugal property
appears in a separate document which does not, however, contain the same terms and conditions as in the
first document signed by the husband, a valid transaction could not have arisen.

ROXAS v. COURT OF APPEALS


198 SCRA 541
FACTS:
Melania Roxas, plaintiff-petitioner, is married but living separately from her husband, Antonio Roxas.
Plaintiif discovered that that her estranged husband had entered into a contract with herein defendant,
Antonio Cayetano, which covers a portion of their conjugal lot located at Novaliches, Quezon City.
On the same lot, Melania had planned to put up her flea market with at least 20 stalls and mini-mart for
which she applied an application for the Mayors permit and municipal license, which was approved;
however, when she attempted to renew such, it was disapproved due to the complaint alleged by defendant
Cayetano whose application for renewal of Mayors permit and license for the same business permit had
been allegedly earlier approved.
Hence, plaintiff Melania filed a complaint in the court due to the illegal lease contract executed by his
husband and respondent, arguing that it was an unlawful deprivation of her right to put up her own business
on the subject lot, she being a conjugal owner. However, the complaint is dismissed for failure to state a
sufficient cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint has a sufficient cause of action.
HELD:
Under Art. 165, New Civil Code, The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership,". However,
administration does not include acts of ownership. For while the husband can administer the conjugal
assets unhampered, but he cannot alienate or encumber the conjugal realty without the consent of his wife.
Thus, under Art. 166 of NCC "unless the wife has been declared a non-compos mentis or a spendthrift, or
is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership the wife's consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the
court may compel her to grant the same."
Thus, the joinder of the wife, although unnecessary for an oral lease of conjugal realty which does not
exceed one year in duration, is required in a lease of conjugal realty for a period of more than one year,
such a lease being considered a conveyance and encumbrance within the provisions of the Civil Code
requiring the joinder of the wife in the instrument by which real property is conveyed or encumbered. In
case the wife's consent is not secured by the husband as required by law, the wife has the remedy of filing
an action for the annulment of the contract. Art. 173 of the Civil Code states "the wife may, during the
marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any
contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required.
In the case at bar, petitioner's estranged husband, defendant Antonio S. Roxas had entered into a contract
of lease with defendant Antonio M. Cayetano without her marital consent being secured as required by law
under Art. 166 of the Civil Code. Petitioner, therefore, has a cause of action under Art. 173 to file a case for
annulment of the contract of lease entered into without her consent.

NICOLAS v. CA
154 SCRA 635
FACTS:
In 1951, respondent Anastacio Madlangsakay [a.k.a. Anastacio M. Sakay] rice dealer, married to Lourdes
Manuel bought from Felipe Garcia three parcels of land situated in Barrio Matungao, Bulacan and known
as Lot Nos. 6, 7 and 8 of Plan PSU 28714. TCT No. T-8012 was issued on October 19, 1951 in the name
of respondent. At the time of the purchase, petitioners were occupying Lot No. 8 as tenants. Negotiations
begun for the sale of Lot No. 8 to petitioner- tenants and in an affidavit dated August 26, 1958,
Madlangsakay promised to subdivide the land among them at P0.70 per square meter; however; nothing
came out of the negotiations
On April 26, 1961, petitioners filed an amended complaint in the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan
against respondent Madlangsakay to quiet title over Lot. No. 8.In his amended answer, Madlangsakay
averred that the deeds of sale and the affidavits of November 21, 1960 which he purportedly executed were
all forgeries and that the land in question, being conjugal property, registered under the Torrens system
and mortgaged with the Philippine National Bank, could not be alienated without his wife's consent.
The trial court upheld Madlangsakay. It dismissed the complaint, nullified the deeds of sale and the affidavit
of November 21, 1960 for being spurious and ordered the cancellation of their registration in the Registry of
Deeds, which was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a conjugal property may be sold without the consent of the other spouse.
RULING:
It is clear that there can be no legal transfer of ownership in favor of petitioners. One point alone the very
conspicuous absence of the wife's conforme to such disposition of the ganancial property, there being no
showing that Lourdes Manuel, whom respondent Madlangsakay married in 1927, is legally incapacitated
renders the alleged sale void ab initio because it is in contravention of the mandatory requirement in Article
166 of the Civil Code. The Court likewise agreed with the findings of the CA that the evidences presented
that the signatures on the affidavits were forgeries.