Vita vs. Montanano GR No.

L-50553, February 19, 1991

Facts: A complaint was filed before the Court of First Instance of Laguna by plaintiff-appellant Nazario
Vita, as judicial administrator of the estate of deceased Edilberto Vita, seeking to recover from
defendants-appellants Soledad Montanano, Estanislao Jovellano and Estebana Jovellano the possession
of three (3) parcels of land located in Barrio Talangan, Nagcarlan, Laguna and their annual yield since
January, 1962 in the amount of P1,100.00 a year. Plaintiff-appellant claims that during the lifetime of
Edilberto Vita, he was the owner and possessor of these three (3) parcels of land and he was enjoying
the fruits therefrom. When he died on January 23, 1962, defendants-appellants, through stealth and
strategy, took possession of the above-stated parcels of land and gathered the fruits therefrom.
Respondents instead claim that the two parcels of lands belong to Soledad Montanano as these were
conveyed to her by Isidra Montanano (her aunt and wife of Edilberto Vita) and Edilberto Vita in a
document signed and executed by them on November 22, 1938 and ratified by one Mr. Matienzo, a
Notary Public from Nagcarlan, Laguna. However, all copies of said document were lost during the last
war.
They alleged therein that they acquired ownership of the three (3) parcels of land mentioned in the
complaint, which are in the possession of Soledad Montanano, and the other parcels of land mentioned
in their counterclaim, which are in the possession of plaintiff-appellant, by virtue of a donation mortis
causa executed by Isidra Montanano on November 22, 1938 or by a donation executed by her on
December 20, 1940 which was confirmed by Edilberto Vita. They pray that these parcels of land be
adjudicated to them in the manner set forth in their counterclaim; that plaintiff-appellant be ordered to
account for the harvests from these parcels of land from the time he took possession; and that they be
awarded damages corresponding to their litigation expenses.
The trial court rendered judgment adverse to all parties. CA certified it to the SC for pure questions of
law.
Issue: WON the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa.

Held: Inter vivos. Thus, based on the first part of the paragraph which states " '[n]a bagaman at sa
kasulatang ito ay lubusan ng ibinibigay at ipinagkakaloob sa bawat isa . . . na iyon ay patuluyan nang
ngayo'y iginagawad sa kanila ng walang pasubali, na magagawa na nila ang buong karapatan ngayon
bilang tunay na may-ari . . . " , it was obviously the intention of Isidra Montanano to grant a donation
inter vivos to defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants.
It is true that the last paragraph in each donation contains the phrase "that after the death of the donor
the aforesaid donation shall become effective." . . . However, said expression must be construed
together with the rest of the paragraph, and thus taken, its meaning clearly appears to be that after the
donor's death, the donation will take effect so as to make the donees the absolute owners of the
donated property, free from all liens and encumbrances; for it must be remembered that the donor
reserved for himself a share of the fruits of the land donated. Such reservation constituted a charge or

encumbrance that would disappear upon the donor's death, when full title would become vested in the
donees. The donor only reserved for Himself, during his lifetime, the owner's share of the fruits or
produce . . . a reservation that would be unnecessary if the ownership of the donated property
remained with the donor. Most significant is the absence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the
donations. Furthermore, mention must be made of the fact that the consideration of the second deed of
donation is love and services rendered by defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants to Isidra
Montanano.

G.R. No. 46706, Cario v. Ma. Abaya, 70 Phil. 182

Facts: The root cause of the present legal controversy is a document on April 11, 1921 by Petrona Gray
and Dorotea Gray, sisters that has a stipulation to the effect as: Seventh, we the sisters do hereby order
that all these properties shall be given to those to whom they have been assigned by virtue of this
instrument at the expiration of thirty days after the death of the last one to die between us... To deliver
the aforesaid properties to the donees as set forth in this instrument so that no controversy may arise
among themselves in connection therewith. And that Miguel Cario shall likewise take charge of all
funds, if any left, belonging to us and use the same to pay whatever expenses might be incurred during
our sickness including our funeral expenses and also to pay debts if any may appear to be due after our
death.
Jose Cario, son of Miguel Cario and petitioner herein, commenced intestate proceedings in the Court
of First Instance of Ilocos Sur in which he prayed that he be appointed administrator of the estate left by
the Gray sisters. Subsequently, on June 5, 1935, the said Jose Cario filed an amended petition praying
that the properties described in paragraph III thereof be declared trust properties and that he be
appointed trustee of the same. On July 12, 1935, Father Fernando Ma. Abaya, respondent herein and
first cousin of Petrona and Dorotea Gray, interposed an opposition to the amended petition alleging that
the document executed on April 11, 1921, by the Gray sisters (Exhibit C-1) is null and void and praying
that the court make an adjudication to that effect. While on the one hand, Jose Cario contended that
Exhibit C-1 is a donation inter vivos creating at the time a trust, Father Fernando Abaya, on the other,
alleged that said document is a will.
TC declares the properties trust properties, and, for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions
contained in said trust. Court of Appeals \held that Exhibit C-1 was neither a donation inter vivos as
contended by the petitioner herein nor a will as alleged by the respondent, but a void donation mortis
causa, void because it was not executed with the formalities of a will.

Issue: Whether Exhibit C-1 is a donation inter vivos as claimed by the petitioner, or a will as insisted by
the respondent.
Held: We concur in the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the document in dispute is a donation
mortis causa. The seventh clause of the document considered in conjunction with the fact that the
grantors employed the terms "there shall given to," "shall administer," and "shall be administered,"
which have reference to the future, clearly brings forth the intention on the part of the Gray sisters to
make the distribution of their estate effective after their death. Also, that in the ninth clause of Exhibit
C-1 the phrase "together with those who had been mentioned to inherit from us" supplies a cogent
reason for concluding that the grant therein made was meant to take effect the death of the grantors
for the word "inherit," as used here, implies the acquisition of property by the heirs after the death of
the Gray sisters. Donations which are to become effective upon the death of the donor partake of the
nature of disposals of property by will shall be governed by the rules established for testamentary
successions. (Art, Civil Code.) Accordingly, said donations can only be made with the formalities of a will.

Howard vs. Padilla

FACTS:
Marie Howard is the widow of the donor. The donated propert was conjugal in nature. Iit was stated in
the deed of donation that the donor wanted to give the donee something "to take effect after his
death" and that "this donation shall produce effect only by and because of the death of the donor. The
CA ruled that the donation was inter vivos, not mortis causa. As such it is valid and irrevocable. It is valid,
however, only up to the extent of the share of the donor in the property.

ISSUE:
Is the donation mortis causa or inter vivos?

HELD:
The donation is mortis causa which takes effect upon the death of the donor. The property herein
donated to pass title after the donor's death". In this case the donation was regarded as mortis causa
although the donated property was delivered to the donee upon the execution of the deed and
although the donation was accepted in the same deed. Moreover, the donation not having conformed
with the formalities of the law, the same is void.