3. RABADILLA V.

CA
FACTS: In a codicil appended to the last will and testament of testatrix Alleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was instituted as a devisee of a
parcel of land. The codicil provides that Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give Maria marlena of piculs of
sugar until she dies. Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and
Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla. Private respondent Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint to enforce the
provisions of subject codicil. The Complaint alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil, in that Defendant-heirs
failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one hundred (100) piculs of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs domestic sugar) to
plaintiff Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint as mandated by the Codicil, despite
repeated demands for compliance.
The RTC dismissed the complaint. the Court finds that the action is prematurely filed as no cause of action against the defendants has as yet
arose in favor of plaintiff. While there maybe the non-performance of the command as mandated exaction from them simply because they are
the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in question, does not warrant the filing of the present complaint. The remedy at
bar must fall. Incidentally, being in the category as creditor of the left estate, it is opined that plaintiff may initiate the intestate proceedings, if
only to establish the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in order to give full meaning and semblance to her claim under the Codicil. On appeal by
plaintiff, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court; ratiocinating and ordering the reconveyance of title from the estates of Jorge Rabadilla
to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
ISSUE: Whether or not the obligations of Jorge Rabadilla under the codicil are inherited by the heirs?
RULING: YES. It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their
legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the
instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of further proceedings, and the successional rights
were transmitted to them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death.
Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death.
And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil
on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a
modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left
by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does
not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen
or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate; and the mode obligates
but does not suspend. To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition.

Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person disposes of his property, to take effect after his
death. Since the Will expresses the manner in which a person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator
must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of
making a Will.
4. Ferrer vs. Diaz
FACTS: Petitioner Atty. Ferrer represented Comandante, daughter of spouses Diazes obtain loan to petitioner. The loan was secured by a Real
Estate Mortgage Contract. Petitioner further claimed that prior to said loan, Comandante, for a valuable consideration of P600,000.00, which
amount formed part of the abovementioned secured loan, executed in his favor an instrument entitled Waiver of Hereditary Rights and
Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided). The Diazes, however, reneged on their obligation as the checks issued by Comandante were
dishonored upon presentment. Despite repeated demands, said respondents still failed and refused to settle the loan. Thus, petitioner filed a
Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money Secured by Real Estate Mortgage Contract against the Diazes and Comandante.
ISSUE: Is a waiver of hereditary rights in favor of another executed by a future heir while the parents are still living valid?
HELD: No. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance
except in cases expressly authorized by law. For the inheritance to be considered future, the succession must not have been opened at the
time of the contract. A contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Article
1347, where the following requisites concur: (1) That the succession has not yet been opened. (2) That the object of the contract forms part of
the inheritance; and, (3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature. In
this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of Comandantes Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property
(Still Undivided), succession to either of her parents properties has not yet been opened since both of them are still living. With respect to the
other two requisites, both are likewise present considering that the property subject matter of Comandantes waiver concededly forms part of
the properties that she expect to inherit from her parents upon their death and, such expectancy of a right, as shown by the facts, is
undoubtedly purely hereditary in nature. From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner entered into a contract involving the
formers future inheritance as embodied in the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by her
in petitioners favor.
4. Atty. Pedro Ferrer vs sps. Alfredo and imelda Diaz, reina comandante, sos bienvenido and elizabeth pangan
Facts: 1. The diazes, as represented by Comandante, obtained a loan from P. This load was secured by a REM and a PN. 2. Comandante, for a
valuable consideration of 600k , which amount formed part of the abovementioned secured loan, executed in P's favor, an instrument entitled
waiver of hereditary rights and interests as a legitimate daughter of Sps. Diaz over a real property. 3. on the basis of said waiver, p caused to
be annotated an adverse claim in the TCT. 4.For failure of the diazes to comply with their obligations, P filed an action for collection of sum of
money.
Issue: WON the waiver of hereditary rights and interest over a real property (still undivided) executed by Comandante is void.
Ruling: Yes. Pursuant to the 2nd paragraph of art. 1347 of the Civil Code no contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in
cases expressly authorized by law. For the future inheritance to be considered "future", the succession must not have been opened at the time

of the contract. A contract may be classified as a contract upon futute inheritance, prohibited under the 2nd paragraph of Article 1347, where
the following requisites concur: (1) that the succession has not yet been opened. (2) that the object of the contract forms part of the
inheritance; and (3) that the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature. In this
case, there is no question that at the time of execution of Comandante'swaiver of hereditary rights and interest over a real property (still
undivided), succession to either of her parent's properties has not yet been opened since both of them are still living. With respect to the other
two requisites, both are likewise present considering that the property subject matter of Comandante's waiver concededly forms part of the
properties that she expect to inherit from her parents upon their death and, such expectancy of a right, as shown by the facts, is undoubtedly
purely hereditary in nature.
From the foregoing, it is clear that cmandante and p entered into a contract involving a former's future inheritance as embodied in the waiver
of hereditary rights and interest over a real property ( still univided) executed by her in petitioner's favor.
8. NEPOMUCENO VS CA
FACTS: Martin Jugo left a last Will and Testament duly signed by him at the end of the Wil in the presence of Celestina Alejandro, Myrna C.
Cortez, and Leandro Leano, who in turn, affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of pages of the Will in the
presence of the testator and of each other and the Notary Public. The Will was acknowledged before the Notary Public Romeo Escareal by the
testator and his three attesting witnesses. The testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only
executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two
legitimate children and on December 5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were married in Victoria,
Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and
Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner.
The petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
the legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging inter alia that the execution of the Will was procured
by undue and improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick
and that petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage with the testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus, letters testamentary
should not be issued to her. The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting
with the petitionerl . The Will's admission to probate will be an idle exercise because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic
provisions is evident. The respondent court declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void
pursuant to Article 739 in relation with Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and Testament of the
deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner.
RULING: Respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic
validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity
of the Will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what
the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.

Article 739 of the Civil Code provides that donations made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the
donation shall be void. Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides that prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall
apply to testamentary provisions. Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation between
persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the
recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a
person with whom he had been living in concubinage.
9. In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA. SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., petitionersappellees, vs. MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
FACTS : On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a document purporting to be his Last Will and
Testament. Resident of the City of Cebu, he died on January 14, 1943, in the municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an evacuee. He
left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees, filed a petition for its probate in
the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed opposition.
The learned trial court found and declared it to be a holographic will; that it was in the handwriting of the testator and that although at the
time it was executed and at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law still, because at the time of the
hearing and when the case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic
wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may
override any defect in form, said trial court by order dated January 24, 1952, admitted to probate as the Last Will and Testament of Father
Sancho Abadia. The oppositors are appealing from that decision; and because only questions of law are involved in the appeal, the case was
certified to us by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE : What is the law to apply to the probate? May we apply the provisions of the new Civil Code which not allows holographic wills, which
provisions were invoked by the appellee-petitioner and applied by the lower court? But article 795 of this same new Civil Code expressly
provides: "The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made."
RULING: There is the view that the intention of the testator should be the ruling and controlling factor and that all adequate remedies and
interpretations should be resorted to in order to carry out said intention, and that when statutes passed after the execution of the will and
after the death of the testator lessen the formalities required by law for the execution of wills, said subsequent statutes should be applied so
as to validate wills defectively executed according to the law in force at the time of execution. However, we should not forget that from the
day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it becomes a vested right, protected under the
due process clause of the constitution against a subsequent change in the statute adding new legal requirements of execution of wills which
would invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning, when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal
requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he should be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will
then inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to
execution should be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate
succession. The general rule is that the Legislature cannot validate void wills. The order appealed from is reversed, is denied probate.
10. Jimenez vs. Fernandez
Facts: The case involved the residential land (the Eastern portion with an area of 436 sqm situated in Barrio Dulig (now Magsaysay),

Pangasinan under the name of Sulpicia Jimenez. Fermin Jimenez own said whole parcel of land. Sulpicia is the only child of Fortunato son of
Fermin. Upon death of Fermin, the land was registered under Sulpicia and Carlos Jimenez (also son of Fermin) in equal pro indiviso.
Upon death of Carlos, his illegitimate daughter, Melicia Jimenez possessed the eastern portion of the land and later sold the same to Edilberto
Cagampan and Teodora Grado. However, Sulpicia executed an affidavit adjudicating that she is the only heir of his uncle Carlos; hence a TCT
under her name was issued.
On April 1, 1970, Sulpicia Jimenez, joined by her husband, seeks to recover the eastern portion of the property occupied by defendant Teodora
Grado and her son. RTC ruled in favor of Grado as the absolute owner of the land. CA affirmed the same.
Issue: WON Melecia Jimenez is not the daughter of Carlos Jimenez. WON Melecia has the right to sell the land.
Ruling: RTC erred in not declaring that Melecia Jimenez Cayabyab also known as Melecia Jimenez, is not the daughter of Carlos Jimenez and
therefore, had no right over the property in question. Respondents failed to present concrete evidence to prove that Melecia Cayabyab was
really the daughter of Carlos Jimenez. Nonetheless, assuming for the sake of argument that Melecia Cayabyab was the illegitimate daughter of
Carlos Jimenez there can be no question that Melecia Cayabyab had no right to succeed to the estate of Carlos Jimenez and could not have
validly acquired, nor legally transferred to Edilberto Cagampan that portion of the property subject of this petition.
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 777,
Civil Code). Moreover, Art. 2263 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
Rights to the inheritance of a person who died with or without a will, before the effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil
Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of Court . . . (Rollo, p. 17)
Thus, since Carlos Jimenez, died on July 9, 1936 way before the effectivity of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the successional rights
pertaining to his estate must be determined in accordance with the Civil Code of 1889.
Citing the case of Cid v. Burnaman (24 SCRA 434) wherein this Court categorically held that:
To be an heir under the rules of Civil Code of 1889 (which was the law in force when Carlos Jimenez died and which should be the governing
law in so far as the right to inherit from his estate was concerned), a child must be either a child legitimate, legitimated, or adopted, or else an
acknowledged natural child for illegitimate not natural are disqualified to inherit. (Civil Code of 1889, Art. 807, 935)
Even assuming that Melecia Cayabyab was born out of the common-law-relationship between her mother (Maria Cayabyab) and Carlos
Jimenez, she could not even be considered an acknowledged natural child because Carlos Jimenez was then legally married to Susana Abalos
and therefore not qualified to marry Maria Cayabyab and consequently Melecia Cayabyab was an illegitimate spurious child and not entitled to
any successional rights in so far as the estate of Carlos Jimenez was concerned.
Melecia Cayabyab in the absence of any voluntary conveyance to her by Carlos Jimenez or Sulpicia Jimenez of the litigated portion of the land
could not even legally transfer the parcel of land to Edilberto Cagampan who accordingly, could not also legally transfer the same to herein
private respondents.
Petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez is entitled to the relief prayed for, declaring her to be the sole and absolute owner of the land in question with right
to its possession and enjoyment. Since her uncle Carlos Jimenez died in 1936, his pro-indiviso share in the properties then owned in co-

ownership with his niece Sulpicia descended by intestacy to Sulpicia Jimenez alone because Carlos died without any issue or other heirs.
Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED.
13. LLORENTE V. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: In 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente got married. Lorenzo left for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in
Camarines Sur. Thereafter, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization was issued in his favor. When
Lorenzo visited the Philippines, he discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and having an adulterous relationship with
his brother, Ceferino. Paula gave birth to a boy and named as "Crisologo Llorente".
In 1951, Lorenzo returned to the United States and filed for a divorce. Paula was represented by counsel, and actively participated in the
proceedings. 1952, the divorce decree was issued and became final.
In 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife. Their twenty-five (25) year union
produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.
1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses. In the will, Lorenzo
bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children. 1983, Lorenzo filed with the RTC Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and
allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate. In 1985, before
the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzos
estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their
marriage, (3) that Lorenzos will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the
conjugal property. Alicia filed in the testate proceeding, a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary.
In 1987, the RTC ruled in favor of petitioner Paula. IIMAlicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied and
only modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children "legitimate or otherwise" of Lorenzo since they were not
legally adopted by him. The trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the
estate
and
one-third
(1/3)
of
the
free
portion
of
the
estate.
Respondent appealed to the CA. The court affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court that Alicia is declared as co-owner of
whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation. Petitioner filed with the Court
of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision the Court of Appeals, denied the motion for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Will executed by Lorenzo is Valid?
Ruling: YES. The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula;
(2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed. Thus, as a rule, issues arising from
these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
"ARTICLE 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad.

"ARTICLE 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to
the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found."
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other
fact, they must be alleged and proved. While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was "referred back" to the law of the decedents
domicile, in this case, Philippine law. We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the same
breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that "American law follows the domiciliary theory hence, Philippine law
applies when determining the validity of Lorenzos will.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial courts opinion was a
mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during
their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law. Citing this landmark case, the
Court held that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van
Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to inherit" from him. For failing to apply these doctrines, the
decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid
and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent)
are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.
The Civil Code provides: "ARTICLE 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the
laws of the country in which they are executed. "When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the
Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution."
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do
not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family rights and duties, status, condition and legal
capacity."
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and
proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will
was duly probated.
14. LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as Attorney-in-Fact of VICENTE
DOROTHEO and JOSE DOROTHEO
Facts: Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her estate
being settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after Alejandros death, petitioner, who claims to have taken care of Alejandro
before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latters last will and testament. In 1981, the court issued an order admitting
Alejandros will to probate. Private respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically
Void.

The trial court granted the motion and issued an order, declaring Lourdes Legaspi not the wife of the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of
the last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and declaring the oppositors as the only heirs of the late spouses
Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes, whose respective estates shall be liquidated and distributed according to the laws on intestacy upon
payment of estate and other taxes due to the government. Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some
compensation since she took care of Alejandro prior to his death although she admitted that they were not married to each other, which was
denied. On appeal, the same was dismissed for failure to file appellants brief within the extended period granted. This dismissal became final
and executory on February 3, 1989.
An Order was issued by Judge Zain B. Angas setting aside the final and executory Order on the ground that the order was merely
interlocutory, hence not final in character. The court added that the dispositive portion of the said Order even directs the distribution of the
estate of the deceased spouses. Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied private respondents filed a petition
before the Court of Appeals, which nullified the two assailed Orders. Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the case
filed by private respondents before the Court of Appeals was a petition under Rule 65 on the ground of grave abuse of discretion or lack of
jurisdiction.
Issue: May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order that has become final and executory still
be given effect?
Held: It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated, particularly on
three aspects: whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedents last will and testament; compliance with the prescribed formalities for the
execution of wills; the testamentary capacity of the testator; and the due execution of the last will and testament.
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of its
execution, that he had freely executed the will and was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will is genuine
and not a forgery, that he was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a person not expressly prohibited by law from making a will.
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the will has been authenticated. Thus,
it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed,
if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on
succession, the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially so when the courts had already determined in
a final and executory decision that the will is intrinsically void. Such determination having attained that character of finality is binding on this
Court which will no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but that a final and executory decision of
which the party had the opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunals must stand and should no longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail
of the remedies provided by law constitutes waiver. And if the party does not avail of other remedies despite its belief that it was aggrieved by
a decision or court action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed and is satisfied with the decision or order. As early as 1918, it has been
declared that public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts must at some point of time
fixed by law become final otherwise there will be no end to litigation. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium - the very object of which the courts
were constituted was to put an end to controversies. To fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary,
have to be set up to spur on the slothful. The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set
aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence,
which circumstances do not concur herein.

It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of successional rights that testacy is preferred to intestacy. But before
there could be testate distribution, the will must pass the scrutinizing test and safeguards provided by law considering that the deceased
testator is no longer available to prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside from the fact that the transfer of the estate is usually onerous in
nature and that no one is presumed to give - Nemo praesumitur donare. No intestate distribution of the estate can be done until and unless
the will had failed to pass both its extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply regardless of the
intrinsic validity thereof. If it is extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine its intrinsic validity that is whether the provisions of the will
are valid according to the laws of succession. In this case, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic
provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial court.
Furthermore, Alejandros disposition in his will of the alleged share in the conjugal properties of his late spouse, whom he described as his
only beloved wife, is not a valid reason to reverse a final and executory order. Testamentary dispositions of properties not belonging
exclusively to the testator or properties which are part of the conjugal regime cannot be given effect. Matters with respect to who owns the
properties that were disposed of by Alejandro in the void will may still be properly ventilated and determined in the intestate proceedings for
the settlement of his and that of his late spouses estate. Petitioners motion for appointment as administratrix is rendered moot considering
that she was not married to the late Alejandro and, therefore, is not an heir.

16. ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR vs. LORENZO LAXA

FACTS: Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia
Regala (Will) in the Pampango dialect onSeptember 13, 1981. The Will, executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin
(JudgeLimpin), was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of theinstrumental witnesses that the document
is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document on pages] and then on the left margin of
pages 1, 2 and 4thereof.The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra. Limpin), Francisco Garcia(Francisco) and Faustino R.
Mercado (Faustino).
The three attested to the Wills due execution by affixing their signatures below its attestation clause and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and
4thereof, in the presence of Paciencia and of one another and of Judge Limpin who acted as notarypublic.Childless and without any brothers or
sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties torespondent Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children
LunaLorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa,The filial relationship of Lorenzo with Paciencia remains undisputed.
Lorenzo is Paciencias nephew whom she treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treatedPaciencia as his own mother.
Paciencia lived with Lorenzos family in Sasmuan, Pampanga and it was she who raised and cared for Lorenzo since his birth. Six days after the
execution of the Will or on September 19, 1981, Paciencia left for the United States of America (USA). There, she residedwith Lorenzo and his
family until her death on January 4, 1996.In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin. More than four years after the death
of Paciencia or on April 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition ] with the RTC of Guagua,Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for
the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favour.Petitioners filed an Amended Opposition asking the RTC to deny the probate of
Paciencias Will on the following grounds: the Will was not executed and attested to in accordance with the requirements of the law; that
Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of itsexecution; that she was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence
of fear or threats; thatthe execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other
persons for his benefit; that the signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged; that assuming the signature to be genuine, it was obtained
through fraud or trickery; and,that Paciencia did not intend the document to be her Will. Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Opposition and

Recommendation reiterating their opposition to the appointment of Lorenzo as administrator of the properties and requesting for the
appointment of Antonio in his stead.
ISSUE: Whether Paciencia was not of sound mind at the time the will was allegedly executed.
RULING: The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsoundso as to render him unfit to execute a Will.
Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Article 799 of the New Civil Code states: To be of sound mind, it is not
necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered
by disease, injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate
to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of thetestamentary act. Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear or
threats, undue andimproper influence and pressure, fraud and trickery cannot be used as basis to deny theprobate of a will.Here, there was no
showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one month or less before the making of the Will. Clearly, thus, the burden to prove
that Paciencia was of unsoundmind lies upon the shoulders of petitioners. However and as earlier mentioned, no substantial evidence was
presented by them to prove the same, thereby warranting the CAs finding that petitioners failed to discharge such burden.Furthermore, the
Court is convinced that Paciencia was aware of the nature of her estate tobe disposed of, the proper objects of her bounty and the character of
the testamentary act.

18. Ortega v. Valmonte

FACTS: Two years after the arrival of Placido from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old. But in a
little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died. Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of
2 pages, and dated 15 June 1983 but acknowledged only on 9 August 1983. The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia,
Placidos sister. According to the notary public who notarized the testators will, after the testator instructed him on the terms and dispositions
he wanted on the will, the notary public told them to come back on 15 August 1983 to give him time to prepare. The testator and his
witnesses returned on the appointed date but the notary public was out of town so they were instructed by His wife to come back on 9 August
1983. The formal execution was actually on 9 August 1983. He reasoned he no longer changed the typewritten date of 15 June 1983 because
he did not like the document to appear dirty.
Petitioners argument:
1.At the time of the execution of the notarial will Placido was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind.
2. Josefina conspired with the notary public and the 3 attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly reflected in the
varying dates of the execution and the attestation of the will.
ISSUE:W/N Placido has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly executed the will. W/N the signature of Placido in the will was procured
by fraud or trickery.
HELD: 1.YES. Despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in
them and even their location. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. The

omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its
disposition becomes irrelevant.
2.NO. Fraud is a trick, secret devise, false statement, or pretense, by which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the
testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in
consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for fraud, he would not have made.
The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its execution. The burden to show otherwise
shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud.
Omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will. Moreover, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not
invalidate the document, because the law does not even require that a notarial will be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion.
The variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary
public and instrumental witnesses.
19. JABONETA VS.GUSTILO
FACTS: Being in the house of Arcadio Jarandilla, in Jaro, in this province, Jaboneta ordered that the document in question be written, and
calling Julio Javellana, Aniceto Jalbuena, and Isabelo Jena as witnesses, executed the said document as his will. They were all together, and
were in the room where Jaboneta was, and were present when he signed the document, Isabelo Jena signing afterwards as a witness, at his
request, and in his presence and in the presence of the other two witnesses. Aniceto Jalbuena then signed as a witness in the presence of the
testator, and in the presence of the other two persons who signed as witnesses. At that moment Isabelo Jena, being in a hurry to leave, took
his hat and left the room. As he was leaving the house Julio Javellana took the pen in his hand and put himself in position to sign the will as a
witness, but did not sign in the presence of Isabelo Jena; but nevertheless, after Jena had left the room the said Julio Javellana signed as a
witness in the presence of the testator and of the witness Aniceto Jalbuena. Probate was denied the last will and testament of Macario
Jaboneta, deceased, because the lower court was of the opinion from the evidence adduced at the hearing that Julio Javellana, one of the
witnesses, did not attach his signature thereto in the presence of Isabelo Jena, another of the witnesses, as required by the provisions of
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
ISSUE: Whether or not the signature of Javellana did not comply with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
RULING: He, with the other witnesses and the testator, had assembled for the purpose of executing the testament, and were together in the
same room for that purpose, and at the moment when the witness Javellana signed the document he was actually and physically present and
in such position with relation to Javellana that he could see everything which took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction, and
without any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so, therefore we are of opinion that the document was in fact signed before he finally left
the room.
It is sufficient if the witnesses are together for the purpose of witnessing the execution of the will, and in a position to actually see the testator
write, if they choose to do so; and there are many cases which lay down the rule that the true test of vision is not whether the testator actually
saw the witness sign, but whether he might have seen him sign, considering his mental and physical condition and position at the time of the
subscription.

20. CANEDA vs. CA and WILLIAM CABRERA, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Mateo Caballero
FACTS: On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children and already in the twilight years of his life, executed a last
will and testament at his residence in Talisay, Cebu before three attesting witnesses, namely, Cipriano Labuca, Gregorio Cabando and Flaviano
Toregosa. The said testator was duly assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad, and a notary public, Atty. Filoteo Manigos, in the
preparation of that last will. It was declared therein, among other things, that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real
and personal properties to Presentacion Gaviola, Angel Abatayo, Rogelio Abatayo, Isabelito Abatayo, Benoni G. Cabrera and Marcosa
Alcantara, all of whom do not appear to be related to the testator.
Four months later, or on April 4, 1979, Mateo Caballero himself filed a petition docketed as Special Proceeding No. 3899-R before Branch II of
the then Court of First Instance of Cebu seeking the probate of his last will and testament. On May 29, 1980, the testator passed away before
his petition could finally be heard by the probate court. On February 25, 1981, Benoni Cabrera, on of the legatees named in the will, sough his
appointment as special administrator of the testator's estate, the estimated value of which was P24,000.00, and he was so appointed by the
probate court in its order of March 6, 1981.
The petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of the testator, instituted a second petition, entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate
of Mateo Caballero" and be consolidated with Special Proceeding No. 3899-R in Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Cebu and opposed the
probate of the Testator's will and the appointment of a special administrator for his estate.
Benoni Cabrera died on February 8, 1982 hence the probate court, appointed William Cabrera as special administrator on June 21, 1983.
In the course of the hearing in Special Proceeding No. 3899-R, herein petitioners appeared as oppositors and objected to the allowance of the
testator's will on the ground that on the alleged date of its execution, the testator was already in the poor state of health such that he could
not have possibly executed the same. Petitioners likewise reiterated the issue as to the genuineness of the signature of the testator therein.
On the other hand, one of the attesting witnesses, Cipriano Labuca, and the notary public Atty. Filoteo Manigos, testified that the testator
executed the will in question in their presence while he was of sound and disposing mind and that, contrary to the assertions of the oppositors,
Mateo Caballero was in good health and was not unduly influenced in any way in the execution of his will. Labuca also testified that he and the
other witnesses attested and signed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The other two attesting witnesses were not
presented in the probate hearing as the had died by then.
On April 5, 1988, the probate court rendered a decision declaring the will in question as the last will and testament of the late Mateo Caballero
to be his Last will and Testament and that it was executed in accordance with all the requisites of the law.
Petitioners elevated the case in the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19669. They asserted therein that the will in question is null and void
for the reason that its attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails to specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will
witnessed the testator signing the will in their presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
On October 15, 1991, respondent court promulgated its decision affirming that of the trial court, and ruling that the attestation clause in the
last will of Mateo Caballero substantially complies with Article 805 of the Civil Code,

ISSUE : Whether or not the attestation clause contained in the last will and testament of the late Mateo Caballero complies with the
requirements of Article 805, in relation to Article 809, of the Civil Code.
RULING : An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses certify that the instrument has been
executed before them and to the manner of the execution the same.
In the case at bar where the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the
presence of the testator and of each other, the defect is not only in the form or language of the attestation clause but the total absence of a
specific element required by Article 805 to be specifically stated in the attestation clause of a will. That is precisely the defect complained of in
the present case since there is no plausible way by which we can read into the questioned attestation clause statement, or an implication
thereof, that the attesting witness did actually bear witness to the signing by the testator of the will and all of its pages and that said
instrumental witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The rule on substantial compliance in Article 809 cannot be invoked or relied on by respondents since it presupposes that the defects in the
attestation clause can be cured or supplied by the text of the will or a consideration of matters apparent therefrom which would provide the
data not expressed in the attestation clause or from which it may necessarily be gleaned or clearly inferred that the acts
not stated in the omitted textual requirements were actually complied within the execution of the will. In other words, defects must be
remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by the will itself.
The court directed to forthwith DISMISS its Special Proceeding No. 3899-R (Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Mateo
Caballero) and to REVIVE Special Proceeding No. 3965-R (In the matter of the Intestate Estate of Mateo Caballero) as an active case and
thereafter duly proceed with the settlement of the estate of the said decedent.
21. Echavez vs. Dozen Construction
Facts: Vicente Echavez was the absolute owner of several lots in Cebu City, which includes Lot No. 1956-A and Lot No. 1959 . On September
7, 1985, Vicente donated the subject lots to petitioner Manuel Echavez through a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa. Manuel accepted the
donation. In March 1986, Vicente executed a Contract to Sell over the same lots in favor of Dozen Corporation. In October 1986, they executed
two Deeds of Absolute Sale over the same properties covered by the previous Contract to Sell.
When Vicente died. Emiliano Cabanig, Vicentes nephew, filed a petition for the settlement of Vicentes intestate estate. On the other hand,
Manuel filed a petition to approve Vicentes donation mortis causa in his favor and an action to annul the contracts of sale Vicente executed in
favor of Dozen Corporation. These cases were jointly heard.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed Manuels petition to approve the donation and his action for annulment of the contracts of sale. The
RTC found that the execution of a Contract to Sell in favor of Dozen Corporation, after Vicente had donated the lots to Manuel, was an
equivocal act that revoked the donation. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTCs decision. The CA held that since the donation in favor of
Manuel was a donation mortis causa, compliance with the formalities for the validity of wills should have been observed. The CA found that the
deed of donation did not contain an attestation clause and was therefore void.

Manuel claims that the CA should have applied the rule on substantial compliance in the construction of a will to Vicentes donation mortis
causa. He insists that the strict construction of a will was not warranted in the absence of any indication of bad faith, fraud, or substitution in
the execution of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa. He argues that the CA ignored the Acknowledgment portion of the deed of donation,
which contains the "import and purpose" of the attestation clause required in the execution of wills.
Issue: WON CA applied the rule on substantial compliance in the construction of a will to Vicentes donation mortis causa.
Ruling: The CA correctly declared that a donation mortis causa must comply with the formalities prescribed by law for the validity of wills,
"otherwise, the donation is void and would produce no effect." Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code should have been applied.
As the CA correctly found, the purported attestation clause embodied in the Acknowledgment portion does not contain the number of pages
on which the deed was written. The exception to this rule is when although the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages upon
which the will was written, the number of pages was stated in one portion of the will.
Even granting that the Acknowledgment embodies what the attestation clause requires, we are not prepared to hold that an attestation clause
and an acknowledgment can be merged in one statement.
That the requirements of attestation and acknowledgment are embodied in two separate provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 805 and 806,
respectively) indicates that the law contemplates two distinct acts that serve different purposes. An acknowledgment is made by one
executing a deed, declaring before a competent officer or court that the deed or act is his own. On the other hand, the attestation of a will
refers to the act of the instrumental witnesses themselves who certify to the execution of the instrument before them and to the manner of its
execution.
Although the witnesses in the present case acknowledged the execution of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa before the notary public, this is
not the avowal the law requires from the instrumental witnesses to the execution of a decedents will. An attestation must state all the details
the third paragraph of Article 805 requires. In the absence of the required avowal by the witnesses themselves, no attestation clause can be
deemed embodied in the Acknowledgement of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.
25. In the matter of the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased brigido alvarado, cesar alvarado vs gaviola jr.
and bayani ma. rino
Facts: 1. Brigido executed a will wherein he disinherited his illegitimate son and expressly revoked a previously executed holographic will. 2.
The testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead R, as the lawyer who drafted the 8 page document, read the same aloud in
the presence of the testator, 3 instrumental witnesses and the notary public. 3. Thereafter, a codicil was executed to change some dispositions
in the will to generate cash for the testator's eye operation as he was suffering glaucoma. As in this case, the testator did not personally read
the final draft of the codicil. instead, it was R who read it aloud in his presence and in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses (same
as those of the notarial will) and the notary public who followed the reading using their own copies. 4. Testator is not totally blind at the time
the will and the codicil were executed. However, his vision on both eyes was only of "counting fingers at 3 feet" by reason of the glaucoma
which he hd been suffering from for several years and even prior to his first consultation with an eye specialist 5. A petition for probate of the
will and the codicil was filed. P opposed on the ground that at the time of the execution of the will and the codicil, the testator was blind. Issue:
(1) WON the testator was blind for the purpose of Art. 808 (2) WON the double-reading requirement was complied with Ruling: Regardless of
R's staunch contention that the testator was still capable of reading at the time his will and codicil were prepared, the fact remains and this
was testified to by his witnesses, that the testator did not do so becuase of his "poor", "defective" or "blurred" vision making it necessary for

private respondent to do the actual reading for him. The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or
incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object
if they are not in accordance with his wishes.
Clear form the foregoing is that art 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who, for some reason or another, are "incapable of
reading the(ir) will(s)". Sinc Brigido alvarado was incapable of reading the final drafts of his will and codicil on the separate occasions of their
execution due to his "poor" "defective" or "blurred" vision, there can be no other course but to cnclude that Brigido alvarado comes within the
scope of the term "blind" vision, there can be no oother course for us but to conculde that BRigido ALvarado falls under the scope of the term
"blind" as it is used in art 808. Unless the contents were read to him, he had no way of ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who drafted the
will and the codicil did so conforming with his instructions. Hence, to consider his will as validly executed and entitled to probate, it is essential
that we ascertain whether art 808 had been complied with. Article 808 requires that in case of testators like Brigido Alvarado, the will shall be
read twice; once by one of the instrumental witnesses and again by the notary public before whom the will was acknowledged. The purpose is
to make known to the incapacitated testator the contents of the document before signeingand to give him an opportunity to object if anything
is contrary to his instructions. In the case at bar, art 808 was not followed stricty. instead of the notary public and an instrumental witness, it
was the lawyer who drafted the 8 page will and 5 page codicil who read the same aloud to the testator, and read them only once not twice as
art 808 requires.
24. GARCIA V. VASQUEZ
FACTS: In 1965, Gliceria Avelino del Rosario died unmarried in Manila, leaving no descendents, ascendants, brother or sister. At the time of
her death, she was said to be 90 years old more or less, and possessed of an estate consisting mostly of real properties. Consuelo S. Gonzales
Vda. de Precilla, a niece of the deceased, petitioned the CFI Manila for probate of the alleged last will and testament of Gliceria A. del Rosario,
executed on 29 December 1960, and for her appointment as special administratrix of the latters estate, pending the appointment of a regular
administrator thereof.
The petition was opposed separately by several groups of alleged heirs: (1) Rev. Fr. Lucio V. Garcia, a legatee named in an earlier will executed
by Gliceria A. del Rosario on 9 June 1956; (2) Jaime Rosario and children, relatives and legatees in both the 1956 and 1960 wills; Antonio Jesus
de Praga and Marta Natividad de Jesus, wards of the deceased and legatees in the 1956 and 1960 wills; (3) Remedios, Encarnacion, and
Eduardo, all surnamed Narciso; (4) Natividad del Rosario-Sarmiento; (5) Maria Narciso; (6) Pascuala Narciso de Manahan; (7) Severina, Rosa
and Josefa, surnamed Narciso, and Vicente and Delfin, surnamed Mauricio, the latter five groups of persons all claiming to be relatives of
Doa Gliceria within the fifth civil degree. The oppositions invariably charged that the instrument executed in 1960 was not intended by the
deceased to be her true will; that the signatures of the deceased appearing in the will was procured through undue and improper pressure and
influence the part of the beneficiaries and/or other persons; that the testatrix did not know the object of her bounty; that the instrument itself
reveals irregularities in its execution, and that the formalities required by law for such execution have not been complied with. Oppositor Lucio
V. Garcia, who also presented for probate the 1956 will of the deceased, joined the group of Dr. Jaime Rosario in registering opposition to the
appointment of petitioner Consuelo S. Gonzales Vda. de Precilla as special administratrix, on the ground that the latter possesses interest
adverse to the estate.
The probate court, in its order, granted petitioners prayer and appointed her special administratrix of the estate. The order was premised on
the fact the petitioner was managing the properties belonging to the estate even during the lifetime of the deceased, and to appoint another
person as administrator or co administrator at that stage of the proceeding would only result in further confusion and difficulties.

1966, the Court issued an order admitting to probate the 1960 will of Gliceria A. del Rosario. In declaring the due execution of the will, the
probate court took note that no evidence had been presented to establish that the testatrix was not of sound mind when the will was
executed; that the fact that she had prepared an earlier will did not, prevent her from executing another one thereafter; that the fact that the
1956 will consisted of 12 pages whereas the 1960 testament was contained in one page does not render the latter invalid; that, the erasures
and alterations in the instrument were insignificant to warrant rejection; that the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the instrumental
witnesses which were noted by the oppositors are even indicative of their truthfulness. The probate court, also considering that petitioner had
already shown capacity to administer the properties of the estate and that from the provisions of the will she stands as the person most
concerned and interested therein, appointed said petitioner regular administratrix with a bond. From this order all the oppositors appealed.
The probate court denied the oppositors motion. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether the Will executed is valid?
Ruling: NO. For all intents and purpose of the rules on probate, the deceased Gliceria del Rosario was, as appellant oppositors contend, not
unlike a blind testator, and the due execution of her will would have required observance of the provisions of Article 808 of the Civil Code.
"ART. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by one of the subscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary public
before whom the will is acknowledged."
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is
illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes. That
the aim of the law is to insure that the dispositions of the will are properly communicated to and understood by the handicapped testator, thus
making them truly reflective of his desire, is evidenced by the requirement that the will should be read to the latter, not only once but twice,
by two different persons, and that the witnesses have to act within the range of his (the testators) other senses.
The order of the court allowing to probate the alleged 1960 will of Gliceria A. del Rosario is hereby reversed and set aside. The petition, being
meritorious, the appealed order is set aside and the court below is ordered to remove the administratrix, Consuelo Gonzales Vda. de Precilla,
and appoint one of the heirs intestate of the deceased Doa Gliceria Avelino del Rosario as special administrator for the purpose of instituting
action on behalf of her estate to recover the properties allegedly sold by her to the late Alfonso D. Precilla.
25. IN A MATTER OF THE PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF THE DECEASED BRIGIDOALVARADO, CESAR
ALVARADO VSRAMON G. GAVIOLA, JR., ET.AL
Facts: Brigido Alvarado executed a will, HulingHabilin, disinheriting Cesar Alvarado, an illegitimateson. This will revoked previously executed
holographic will awaiting probate. On December 29, 1977, a codicil entitled Kasalatan ng Pagbabago sa Ilang Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa
Huling Habilin was executed changing some dispositions to generate cash for the testatorsglaucoma.Both the will and the codicil was not
read by the testator but instead read to him aloud by Bayani Ma. Rino, who drafted the will. Upon probate, it was contested by the herein
petitioner on the ground that it was not executed and attested as required by law for he is not blind at the time it was executed.
Issue: 1. Whether or not Brigido was blind for the purpose of Art. 808. 2. If so, was the double-reading requirement was complied with.
Ruling: Brigido was not totally blind at the time the will and codicil were executed. His vision on botheyes was only of counting finger at 3
feet. He could no longer read either printed or handwrittenmatters as of December 14, 1977 had poor eyesight.The Supreme Court declared
that the rationale behind Article 808 is the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may able to object if they are not in accordance with

his wishes. Clear that Article 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who are incapable of reading the will. This includes the
illiterate. Moreover, since Brigido was incapable of reading the final draft he comes to the scope of the term blind. On the second issue,
Article 808 was not strictly complied. Instead by the notary public and the instrumental witnesses, it was the respondent lawyer who read once
not twice followed by the notary public and witnesses, albeit silently. Supreme Court ruled that with four persons following the reading word for
word with their owncopies, it can be safely concluded that the testator was reasonably assured that what was read to himwere the terms
actually appearing on the type written documents.
29. Roxas v. De Jesus
FACTS: Bibiane Roxas died. Her brother, Simeon Roxas, filed a spec. pro. for partition of the estate of the deceased and also delivered the
holographic will of the deceased. Simeon stated that he found a notebook belonging to deceased, which contained a letter-will entirely
written and signed in deceaseds handwriting. The will is dated "FEB./61 " and states: "This is my will which I want to be respected although it
is not written by a lawyer. Roxas relatives corroborated the fact that the same is a holographic will of deceased, identifying her handwriting
and signature. Respondent opposed probate on the ground that it such does not comply with Article 810 of the CC because the date contained
in a holographic will must signify the year, month, and day.
ISSUE: W/N the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with the
Article 810 of the Civil Code.
HELD: Valid date. This will not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the statutory requirements
regarding the due execution of Wills. The underlying and fundamental objectives permeating the provisions of the law wills consists in the
liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes, but with
sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon
the testator. If a Will has been executed in substantial compliance with the formalities of the law, and the possibility of bad faith and fraud in
the exercise thereof is obviated, said Will should be admitted to probate (Rey v. Cartagena 56 Phil. 282).
If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply with all the requisites, although compliance is not literal, it is sufficient if the objective
or purpose sought to be accomplished by such requisite is actually attained by the form followed by the testator. In Abangan v. Abanga 40 Phil.
476, we ruled that: The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. ...
In particular, a complete date is required to provide against such contingencies as that of two competing Wills executed on the same day, or of
a testator becoming insane on the day on which a Will was executed (Velasco v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720). There is no such contingency in this case.
We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found no evidence of bad faith and fraud in its execution nor was there any
substitution of Wins and Testaments. There is no question that the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was entirely
written, dated, and signed by the testatrix herself and in a language known to her. There is also no question as to its genuineness and due
execution. All the children of the testatrix agree on the genuineness of the holographic Will of their mother and that she had the testamentary
capacity at the time of the execution of said Will. The objection interposed by the oppositor- respondent Luz Henson is that the holographic
Will is fatally defective because the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will is not sufficient compliance with Article 810 of the Civil
Code. This objection is too technical to be entertained. As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and
year of its execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the

authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61" appearing on the holographic Will is a valid
compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.
30. UY KIAO ENG VS. NIXON LEE
FACTS: Respondent Nixon Lee filed, on May 28, 2001, a petition for mandamus with damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 01100939, before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, to compel petitioner to produce the will so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be
instituted. Allegedly, respondent had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarchs estate and to deliver to the legal
heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason. Petitioner denied that she was in custody of
the original holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts. After the presentation and formal offer of respondents evidence, petitioner
demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her custody the original holographic will. The RTC granted the demurrer on
petitioners motion for reconsideration. The CA issued the writ, and ordered the production of the will and the payment of attorneys fees. It
ruled that respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her possession the holographic will.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for mandamus is the proper remedy for the case.
RULING: The Court cannot sustain the CAs issuance of the writ.
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some
inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty
results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes the public
character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in
which the public has no interest. The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of
a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution.Mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation,
board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists. Mandamus will not lie to
enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty
is imposed. The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual. Mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs,
but only in matters relating to the public. An important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked. The remedy of mandamus cannot be
availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Respondent has a
photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent
him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not.
31. EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY, and MANUEL RAMONAL, petitioners, vs. EVANGELINE R. CALUGAY, JOSEPHINE SALCEDO, and
UEFEMIA PATIGAS, respondents.
FACTS : On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the
deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, a petition for probate of the
holographic will of the deceased, who died on January 16, 1990.

On June 28, 1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition to the petition for probate, alleging that the holographic
will was a forgery and that the same is even illegible. This gives an impression that a "third hand" of an interested party other than the "true
hand" of Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal executed the holographic will.
Petitioners argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing on will after every disposition is out of the ordinary. If the deceased was
the one who executed the will, and was not forced, the dates and the signature should appear at the bottom after the dispositions, as regularly
done and not after every disposition. And assuming that the holographic will is in the handwriting of the deceased, it was procured by undue
and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries, or through fraud and trickery.
On December 12, 1990, respondents filed a notice of appeal, and in support of their appeal, the respondents once again reiterated the
testimony of the following witnesses, namely: (1) Augusto Neri; (2) Generosa Senon; (3) Matilde Ramonal Binanay; (4) Teresita Vedad; (5) Fiscal
Rodolfo Waga; and (6) Evangeline Calugay.
From the testimonies of these witnesses, the Court of Appeals allowed the will to probate and disregard the requirement of three witnesses in
case of contested holographic will, citing the decision in Azaola vs. Singson, ruling that the requirement is merely directory and not mandatory.
ISSUE: The possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, that law
requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.
RULING: The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the respondents, who kept it even before the
death of the deceased. In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, she revealed that the will was in her possession as early as 1985, or five years before
the death of the deceased.
There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of the deceased with other documents signed and
executed by her during her lifetime. The only chance at comparison was during the cross-examination of Ms. Binanay when the lawyer of
petitioners asked Ms. Binanay to compare the documents which contained the signature of the deceased with that of the holographic will and
she is not a handwriting expert. Even the former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the
holographic will.
A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are different when compared with other documents written by the
testator. The signature of the testator in some of the disposition is not readable. There were uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the will.
Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30, 1978, and the signatures in several documents such as the application letter
for pasture permit dated December 30, 1980, and a letter dated June 16, 1978, the strokes are different. In the letters, there are continuous
flows of the strokes, evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of the holographic will. We, therefore, cannot be certain that
ruling holographic will was in the handwriting by the deceased.
The decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The records are ordered remanded to the court of origin with instructions to allow petitioners to
adduce evidence in support of their opposition to the probate of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo vda. de Ramonal.
32. Dela Cerna vs. Potot

Facts: Spouses, Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will and testament in the local dialect whereby they willed
that their two parcels of land shall be given to Manuela Rebaca their niece, who is married to Nicolas Potot. Bernabe dela Serna died on
August 30, 1939, and the will was submitted to probate by said Gervasia and Manuela before CFI Cebu. Upon the death of Gervasia Rebaca
another petition for the probate of the same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed, but for failure of the petitioner, Manuela R. Potot
and her attorney, Manuel Potot to appear, for the hearing of said petition, the case was dismissed.
The Court of First Instance ordered the petition heard and declared the testament null and void, for being executed contrary to the prohibition
of joint wills in the Civil Code. On appeal by the testamentary heir, the Court of Appeals reversed, on the ground that the decree of probate in
1939 was issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive on the due execution of the testament.
Further, the Court of Appeals declared that:
... . It is true the law (Art. 669, old Civil Code; Art. 818, new Civil Code). prohibits the making of a will jointly by two or more persons either for
their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person. However, this form of will has long been sanctioned by use, and the same has
continued to be used; and when, as in the present case, one such joint last will and testament has been admitted to probate by final order of a
Court of competent jurisdiction, there seems to be no alternative except to give effect to the provisions thereof that are not contrary to law, as
was done in the case of Macrohon vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267, wherein our Supreme Court gave effect to the provisions of the joint will therein
mentioned, saying, "assuming that the joint will in question is valid."
Issue: WON the will is valid.
Ruling: The appealed decision correctly held that the final decree of probate, entered in 1939 by the Court of First Instance of Cebu (when the
testator, Bernabe de la Cerna, died), has conclusive effect as to his last will and testament despite the fact that even then the Civil Code
already decreed the invalidity of joint wills, whether in favor of the joint testators, reciprocally, or in favor of a third party (Art. 669, old Civil
Code). The error thus committed by the probate court was an error of law, that should have been corrected by appeal, but which did not affect
the jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final decision, however erroneous. A final judgment rendered on a petition
for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world; and public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors
judgment of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law.
Petitioners, as heirs and successors of the late Bernabe de la Cerna, are concluded by the 1939 decree admitting his will to probate. The
contention that being void the will cannot be validated, overlooks that the ultimate decision on Whether an act is valid or void rests with the
courts, and here they have spoken with finality when the will was probated in 1939. On this court, the dismissal of their action for partition was
correct.
But the Court of Appeals should have taken into account also, to avoid future misunderstanding, that the probate decree in 1989 could only
affect the share of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna. It could not include the disposition of the share of the wife, Gervasia Rebaca,
who was then still alive, and over whose interest in the conjugal properties the probate court acquired no jurisdiction, precisely because her
estate could not then be in issue. Be it remembered that prior to the new Civil Code, a will could not be probated during the testator's lifetime.
It follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife was concerned, must be, on her death, reexamined and
adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is considered a separate will of each testator. Thus regarded, the holding of the court of First Instance of
Cebu that the joint will is one prohibited by law was correct as to the participation of the deceased Gervasia Rebaca in the properties in
question.

Therefore, the undivided interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass upon her death to her heirs intestate, and not exclusively to the
testamentary heir, unless some other valid will in her favor is shown to exist, or unless she be the only heir intestate of said Gervasia.
It is unnecessary to emphasize that the fact that joint wills should be in common usage could not make them valid when our Civil Codes
consistently invalidated them, because laws are only repealed by other subsequent laws, and no usage to the contrary may prevail against
their observance.
33. Gonzales v. CA
Facts: Petitioner Rizalina Gonzales and Lutgarda Santiago (Private respondent) are the nieces of the deceased Isabel Gabriel who died a
widow. A will was thereafter submitted to probate. The said will was typewritten, in Tagalog and appeared to have been executed in April 1961
or two months prior to the death of Isabel. It consisted of 5 pages including the attestation and acknowledgment, with the signature of
testatrix on page 4 and the left margin of all the pages.
Lutgarda was named as the universal heir and executor. The petitioner opposed the probate. The lower court denied the probate on the
ground that the will was not executed and attested in accordance with law on the issue of the competency and credibility of the witnesses.
The Court of Appeals, upon consideration of the evidence adduced by both parties, rendered the decision now under review, holding that the
will in question was signed and executed by the deceased Isabel Gabriel on April 15, 1961 in the presence of the three attesting witnesses,
Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, signing and witnessing the document in the presence of the deceased and of each other
as required by law, hence allowed probate.
The oppositor-appellee contends that the preponderance of evidence shows that the supposed last wig and testament of Isabel Gabriel was
not executed in accordance with law because the same was signed on several occasions, that the testatrix did not sign the will in the presence
of all the instrumental witnesses did not sign the will in the presence of each other.
Issue: Whether or not the credibility of the subscribing witnesses is material to the validity of a will
RULING: No. The law requires only that witnesses posses the qualifications under Art. 820 (NCC) and none of the disqualifications of Art. 802.
There is no requirement that they are of good standing or reputation in the community, for trustworthiness, honesty and
uprightness in order that his testimony is believed and accepted in court. For the testimony to be credible, it is not mandatory that evidence
be established on record that the witnesses have good standing in the the community. Competency is distinguished from credibility, the
former being determined by Art. 820 while the latter does not require evidence of such good standing. Credibility depends on the convincing
weight of his testimony in court.
Article 820 of the Civil Code provides the qualifications of a witness to the execution of wills while Article 821 sets forth the disqualification
from being a witness to a win.
The following are disqualified from being witnesses to a will:
(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines,
(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony.

Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time during the trial as to his good standing in the
community, his reputation for trustworthythiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony may be believed
and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such that the
soundness of his mind can be shown by or deduced from his answers to the questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more) is
shown from his appearance, testimony , or competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is
able to read and write to the satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code. We
reject petitioner's contention that it must first be established in the record the good standing of the witness in the community, his reputation
for trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness, because such attributes are presumed of the witness unless the contrary is
proved otherwise by the opposing party.
In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses for they merely attest the execution of a will or testament and
affirm the formalities attendant to said execution. In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three instrumental witnesses,
namely, Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, are competent and credible is satisfactorily supported by the evidence as found
by the respondent Court of Appeals, which findings of fact this Tribunal is bound to accept and rely upon. Moreover, petitioner has not pointed
to any disqualification of any of the said witnesses, much less has it been shown that anyone of them is below 18 years of age, of unsound
mind, deaf or dumb, or cannot read or write.
It is true that under Article 805 of the New Civil Code, every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the
testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another, While the petitioner submits that Article
820 and 821 of the New Civil Code speak of the competency of a witness due to his qualifications under the first Article and none of the
disqualifications under the second Article, whereas Article 805 requires the attestation of three or more credible witnesses, petitioner
concludes that the term credible requires something more than just being competent and, therefore, a witness in addition to
being competent under Articles 820 and 821 must also be a credible witness under Article 805.
35. Maloto v. CA
Facts: Petitioners and respondents are the nieces/nephews or Adriana Maloto who died in 1963. The four heirs believed that the deceased did
not leave a will, hence they filed an intestate proceeding. However, the parties executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate dividing it
into four equal parts. In 1967, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, ex-associate of the deceased's counsel allegedly discovered her last will which was
purportedly dated 1940, inside a cabinet. Hence the annulment of the proceedings and a probate petition was filed by the devisees and
legatees. The said will was allegedly burned by the house help under the instruction of the deceased . The lower court denied the probate on
the ground that the animus revocandi in the burning of the will was sufficiently proven.
Issue: Whether or not there was valid revocation of the will.
Ruling: No, there was no revocation. For a valid revocation to occur,the 'corpus'and 'animus' must concur, one without the other will not
produce a valid revocation. The physical act of destruction of a will must come with an intention to revoke (animus revocandi). In this case,
there's paucity of evidence to comply with the said requirement. The paper burned was not established to be the will and the burning though
done under her express direction was not done in her presence.

Under Art. 830, the physical act of destruction, in this case the burning of the will, does not constitute an effective revocation, unless it is
coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. Since animus is a state of mind, it has to be accompanied by an overt physical act
of burning, tearing, obliterating or cancelling done by the testator himself or by another under his express direction and presence.
36. De Molo vs. Molo
Facts: Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The latter will contained a revocation clause which
expressly revoked the will in 1918. He died without any forced heirs but he was survived by his wife, herein petitioner Juana. The oppositors to
the probate were his nephews and nieces. Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for the probate of the
1939 will. It was admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the petitioner failed to prove its due execution. As a result, the
petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time. Again the oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked
under the 1939 will. They contended that despite the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and thus effectively nullified
the 1918 will.
Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in the subsequent disallowed 1939 will.
Ruling: Yes. The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will,
having been disallowed for the reason that it was not executed in accordance with law cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will,
inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is void.
There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will because of
his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will executed in 1939.The earlier will can still be probated under the principle of
dependent relative revocation. The doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a
will with the intention to make a new testamentary disposition as substitute for the old, and the new disposition fails of effect for some reason.
39. IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF DECEASED ISMAEL REYES, THE HEIRS OF OSCAR R. REYES vs. CESAR R.
REYES
FACTS : Spouses Ismael Reyes and Felisa Revita Reyes are the registered owners of parcels of land situated in Arayat Street, Cubao, Quezon
City covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 4983 and 3598 (39303). The spouses have seven children, namely: Oscar, Araceli, Herminia,
Aurora, Emmanuel, Cesar and Rodrigo, all surnamed Reyes.
On April 18, 1973, Ismael Reyes died intestate. Prior to his death, Ismael Reyes was notified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) of his
income tax deficiency which arose out of his sale of a parcel land located in Tandang Sora, Quezon City. For failure to settle his tax liability, the
amount increased to about P172,724.40 and since no payment was made by the heirs of deceased Ismael Reyes, the property covered by TCT
No. 4983 was levied4 sold and eventually forfeited by the Bureau of Internal Revenue in favor of the government.5
Sometime in 1976, petitioners predecessor Oscar Reyes availed of the BIRs tax amnesty and he was able to redeem the property covered by
TCT No. 49836 upon payment of the reduced tax liability in the amount of about P18,000.7

On May 10, 1989, private respondent Cesar Reyes, brother of Oscar Reyes, filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City praying for his appointment as administrator of the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes which estate
included 50% of the Arayat properties covered by TCT Nos. 4983 and 3598.10 Oscar Reyes filed his conditional opposition thereto on the
ground that the Arayat properties do not form part of the estate of the deceased as he (Oscar) had acquired the properties by redemption and
or purchase.11
The probate court subsequently issued letters of administration in favor of Cesar Reyes where the latter was ordered to submit a true and
complete inventory of properties pertaining to the estate of the deceased and the special powers of attorney executed by the other heirs who
reside in the USA and that of Aurora Reyes-Dayot conforming to his appointment as administrator.12 Cesar Reyes filed an inventory of real and
personal properties of the deceased which included the Arayat properties with a total area of 1,009 sq. meters.13 On the other hand, Oscar
Reyes filed his objection to the inventory reiterating that the Arayat properties had been forfeited in favor of the government and he was the
one who subsequently redeemed the same from the BIR using his own funds.14
"WHEREFORE, pursuant to the foregoing findings, the Court hereby modifies the inventory submitted by the administrator and declares to
belong to the estate of the late Ismael Reyes the following properties, to wit:
1. One half (1/2) of the agricultural land located in Montalban, Rizal containing an area of 31,054 square meters, covered by TCT 72730 with
an approximate value of P405,270.00;
2. One half (1/2) of two (2) adjoining residential lots located on Arayat Street, Cubao, Quezon City, with total area of 1,009 square meters,
more or less, covered by TCTs No. 4983 AND 3598 (39303), with an approximate value of P3,027,000.00; but this determination is provisional
in character and shall be without prejudice to the outcome of any action to be brought hereafter in the proper Court on the issue of ownership
of the properties; and,
3. The building constructed by and leased to Sonny Bernardo and all its rental income from the inception of the lease, whether such income be
in the possession of oppositor, in which case he is hereby directed to account therefor, or if such income be still unpaid by Bernardo, in which
case the administrator should move to collect the same.
Consistent with the foregoing things, either of the administrator oppositor, or heir Felisa R. Reyes, in her personal capacity as apparent coowner of the Arayat Street properties, may commence the necessary proper action for settling the issue of ownership of such properties in the
Regional Trial Court in Quezon City and to inform the Court of the commencement thereof by any of them as soon as possible.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Oscar Reyes which was denied in an Order dated May 30, 1994.17 He then filed his appeal with the
respondent Court of Appeals. While the appeal was pending, Oscar died and he was substituted by his heirs, herein petitioners.
On May 6, 1999, the respondent Court issued its assailed decision which affirmed the probate courts order. It ruled that the probate courts
order categorically stated that the inclusion of the subject properties in the inventory of the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes "is
provisional in character and shall be without prejudice to the outcome of any action to be brought hereafter in the proper court on the issue of
ownership of the properties"; that the provisional character of the inclusion of the contested properties in the inventory as stressed in the
order is within the jurisdiction of intestate court.

ISSUE : Whether or not the Court a quo committed a reversible error when it included the Arayat properties in the inventory of the estate of
Ismael Reyes .
RULING: The respondent Court did not err in affirming the provisional inclusion of the subject properties to the estate of the deceased Ismael
Reyes without prejudice to the outcome of any action to be brought thereafter in the proper court on the issue of ownership considering that
the subject properties are still titled under the torrens system in the names of spouses Ismael and Felisa Revita Reyes which under the law is
endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law.21 The declaration of the provisional
character of the inclusion of the subject properties in the inventory as stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction of the Probate Court.
Notably, the Probate Court stated, from the start of the hearing, that the hearing was for the merits of accounting and inventory, thus it had
jurisdiction to hear the opposition of Oscar Reyes to the inventory as well as the respective evidence of the parties to determine for purposes
of inventory alone if they should be included therein or excluded therefrom.
In fact, the probate court, aware of its limited jurisdiction declared that its determination of the ownership was merely provisional and
suggested that either the administrator or the widow Felisa Reyes may commence the proper action in the Regional Trial Court. Moreover, the
court admitted that it was not competent to pass upon the ownership of the subject properties.
Another obtrusive reality stands out to invite notice: the BIR levy was only made on the property covered in TCT 4983 and did not include the
property covered in TCT 3598 (39303). This somehow detracts from the logic of the oppositors assertion of ownership of the entire Arayat
Street properties; even if his assertion is valid and true, it can encompass, at most, only the property subject of the BIRs levy and declaration
of forfeiture (i.e., TCT 4983), not the property covered by TCT 3598 (39303).1vvph!1
40. LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA vs. JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE
FACTS: Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the United States until he finally reached retirement. In 1980, Placido finally came home to
stay in the Philippines, and he lived in the house and lot located at #9200 Catmon St., San Antonio Village, Makati, which he owned in
common with his sister Ciriaca Valmonte and titled in their names in TCT 123468. Two years after his arrival from the United States and at the
age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old, in a ceremony solemnized by Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr. on February 5, 1982. But in a
little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died on October 8, 1984 of a cause written down as COR PULMONALE.
"Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but
acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation clause, and
was signed at the end or bottom of that page by the testator and on the left hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second
page contains the continuation of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment, and was signed by the witnesses at the end of the
attestation clause and again on the left hand margin.
"The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia on the grounds that:
1. Petitioner failed to allege all assets of the testator, especially those found in the USA;
2. Petitioner failed to state the names, ages, and residences of the heirs of the testator; or to give them proper notice pursuant to law;

3. Will was not executed and attested as required by law and legal solemnities and formalities were not complied with;
4. Testator was mentally incapable to make a will at the time of the alleged execution he being in an advance sate of senility;
5. Will was executed under duress, or the influence of fear or threats;
6. Will was procured by undue and improper influence and pressure on the part of the petitioner and/or her agents and/or assistants; and/or
7. Signature of testator was procured by fraud, or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of affixing his
signature thereto;and she also opposed the appointment as Executrix of Josefina alleging her want of understanding and integrity.
"Notary Public Floro Sarmiento, the notary public who notarized the testators will, testified that it was in the first week of June 1983 when the
testator together with the three witnesses of the will went to his house cum law office and requested him to prepare his last will and
testament. After the testator instructed him on the terms and dispositions he wanted on the will, the notary public told them to come back on
June 15, 1983 to give him time to prepare it. After he had prepared the will the notary public kept it safely hidden and locked in his drawer. The
testator and his witnesses returned on the appointed date but the notary public was out of town so they were instructed by his wife to come
back on August 9, 1983, and which they did. Before the testator and his witnesses signed the prepared will, the notary public explained to
them each and every term thereof in Ilocano, a dialect which the testator spoke and understood. He likewise explained that though it appears
that the will was signed by the testator and his witnesses on June 15, 1983, the day when it should have been executed had he not gone out of
town, the formal execution was actually on August 9, 1983. He reasoned that he no longer changed the typewritten date of June 15, 1983
because he did not like the document to appear dirty. The notary public also testified that to his observation the testator was physically and
mentally capable at the time he affixed his signature on the will.
"The attesting witnesses to the will corroborated the testimony of the notary public.
ISSUES :
1. Non-compliance with the legal solemnities and formalities in the execution and attestation of the will; and
2. Mental incapacity of the testator at the time of the execution of the will as he was then in an advanced state of senility
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the trial court, the appellate court admitted the will of Placido Valmonte to probate. The CA upheld the credibility of the notary
public and the subscribing witnesses who had acknowledged the due execution of the will. Moreover, it held that the testator had
testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will. It added that his "sexual exhibitionism and unhygienic, crude and impolite
ways"6 did not make him a person of unsound mind.
This Courts Ruling

At the outset, we stress that only questions of law may be raised in a Petition for Review under Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As an
exception, however, the evidence presented during the trial may be examined and the factual matters resolved by this Court when, as in the
instant case, the findings of fact of the appellate court differ from those of the trial court.9
Existence of Fraud in the Execution of a Will
Fraud "is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense, by which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator
is misled or deceived as to the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence
of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for the fraud, he would not have made."13
We stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its execution.14 The burden to
show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud.15 Unfortunately in this case, other than
the self-serving allegations of petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever presented.
Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the document,
"because the law does not even require that a [notarial] will x x x be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion."18 More important,
the will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by three or more credible witnesses who must also attest to it in the presence of the
testator and of one another.19 Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must acknowledge the will before a notary public.20 In any event,
we agree with the CA that "the variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively
explained by the notary public and the instrumental witnesses."21
Capacity to Make a Will
In determining the capacity of the testator to make a will, the Civil Code gives the following guidelines:
"Article 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the testator be of sound mind at the time of its execution.
"Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be
wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or shattered by disease, injury or other cause.
"It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper
objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.
"Article 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
"The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate
of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the
validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval."

According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the
nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testators bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying
this test to the present case, we find that the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of the
execution of his will.
It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares
in them and even their locations. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As
we have stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its
execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant. Reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v. CA,25 which held thus:
"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that
degrees of mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and while
on one hand it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not render a person
incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to
enable him to know what he is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property.
43. Pecson vs. Coronel
Facts: On November 28, 1922, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga probated as the last will and testament of Dolores Coronel. Having no
forced heirs, she left all her properties to her nephew Lorenzo Pecson and likewise executed him as the executor. She requested Vicente J.
Francisco to write her name under her express direction in our presence, at the foot, and on the left margin of each and every sheet, hereof as
she does not know how to write.
The petitioner for the probate of the will is Lorenzo Pecson, husband of Angela Coronel, who is a niece of the deceased Dolores Coronel. The
opponents opposed the probate on the following grounds: (a) That the proof does not contain the last will of Dolores Coronel, and (b) that the
attestation clause is not in accordance with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645.
Issues: WON the document contains the will of Dolores Coronel. WON the attestation clause is in conformity with the Code of Civil Procedure.
Ruling: As to preference given to Lorenzo Pecson, it is not purely arbitrary, nor a caprice or a whim of the moment. The proof adduced by this
appelle, although contradicted, shows by a preponderance of evidence that besides the services which the opponents admit had been
rendered by him to Dolores Coronel since the year 1914, he had also rendered services prior to that time and was the administrator and
manager of the affairs of said Dolores in the last years of her life.
Although such administration and confidence were enjoyed by Pecson always jointly with others and never exclusively, this fact does not show
that the will of the testatrix was to appoint Pecson only as executor and distributor of her estate among the heirs, nor does it prevent her, the
testatrix, from instituting him in 1912 or 1918 as sole beneficiary; nor does it constitute, lastly, a test for determining whether or not such
institution in favor of Pecson was the true will of the testatrix.
In the absence of any statutory restriction every person possesses absolute dominion over his property, and may bestow it upon whomsoever
he pleases without regard to natural or legal claim upon his bounty. If the testator possesses the requisite capacity to make a will, and the

disposition of his property is not affected by fraud of undue influence, the will is not rendered invalid by the fact that it is unnatural,
unreasonable, or unjust. Nothing can prevent the testator from making a will as eccentric, as injudicious, or as unjust as caprice, frivolity, or
revenge can dictate. However, as has already been shown, the unreasonable or unjustice of a will may be considered on the question of
testamentary capacity. The testamentary capacity of Dolores Coronel is not disputed in this case.
As to the alleged insufficiency of the evidence to show that the attesting witnesses Damian Crisostomo and Sotero Dumaual were present at
the execution of the will in controversy. Although this point is raised in the first assignment of error made by the appellants, and not in the
second, it is discussed in this place because it refers to the very fact of attestation. However, we do not believe it necessary to analyze in
detail the evidence of both parties on this particular point. The evidence leads us to the conclusion that the two witnesses aforementioned
were present at the execution and signing of the will. It is neither probable nor likely that a man versed in the law, such as Attorney Francisco,
who was present at the execution of the will in question, and to whose conscientiousness in the matter of compliance with all the extrinsic
formalities of the execution of a will, and to nothing else, was due the fact that the testatrix had cancelled her former will (Exhibit B) and had
new one (Exhibit A) prepared and executed, should have consented the omission of formality compliance with which would have required little
or no effort; namely, that of seeing to it that the testatrix and the attesting witnesses were all present when their respective signatures were
affixed to the will." And the record does not furnish us sufficient ground for deviating from the line reasoning and findings of the trial judge.
44. Estate Of The Late Reverend Father Pascual Rigor vs. Belina Rigor, Nestora Rigor, Francisca Escobar De Rigor And Jovita
Escobar De Fausto,
Facts: Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on August 9, 1935, leaving a will executed on October 29, 1933 which was
probated by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935. Named as devisees in the will were the testators nearest
relatives, namely, his three sisters: Florencia Rigor-Escobar, Belina Rigor-Manaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The testator gave a devise to
his cousin, Fortunato Gamalinda.
In addition, the will contained the following controversial bequest:
5. LEGACY OF THE CHURCH
That it be adjudicated in favor of the legacy purported to be given to the nearest male relative who shall take the priesthood, and in
the interim to be administered by the actual Catholic Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac, Philippines, or his
successors.
RTC approved the project partition. About thirteen years after the approval of the project of partition, or on February 19, 1954, the parish priest
of Victoria filed in the pending testate proceeding a petition praying for the appointment of a new administrator, who should deliver to the
church the said ricelands, and further praying that the possessors thereof be ordered to render an accounting of the fruits. The probate court
granted the petition. A new administrator was appointed. On January 31, 1957 the parish priest filed another petition for the delivery of the
ricelands to the church as trustee. Lower Court declared the bequest inoperative.
The legal heirs appealed to the Court of Appeals. It reversed that order. It held that Father Rigor had created a testamentary trust for his
nearest male relative who would take the holy orders but that such trust could exist only for twenty years because to enforce it beyond that

period would violate "the rule against perpetuities. It ruled that since no legatee claimed the ricelands within twenty years after the testator's
death, the same should pass to his legal heirs, citing articles 888 and 912(2) of the old Civil Code and article 870 of the new Civil Code.
Ruling: In this case, as in cases involving the law of contracts and statutory construction, where the intention of the contracting parties or of
the lawmaking body is to be ascertained, the primary issue is the determination of the testator's intention which is the law of the case.
The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments. When his intention is clearly and precisely expressed, any
interpretation must be in accord with the plain and literal meaning of his words, except when it may certainly appear that his intention was
different from that literally expressed.
In 1935, when the testator died, his nearest leagal heirs were his three sisters or second-degree relatives, Mrs. Escobar, Mrs. Manaloto and
Mrs. Quiambao. Obviously, when the testator specified his nearest male relative, he must have had in mind his nephew or a son of his sister,
who would be his third-degree relative, or possibly a grandnephew. But since he could not prognosticate the exact date of his death or state
with certitude what category of nearest male relative would be living at the time of his death, he could not specify that his nearest male
relative would be his nephew or grandnephews (the son of his nephew or niece) and so he had to use the term "nearest male relative".
It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee only when the testator's nephew living at the time of his
death, who desired to become a priest, had not yet entered the seminary or, having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated. Those
two contingencies did not arise, and could not have arisen in this case because no nephew of the testator manifested any intention to enter
the seminary or ever became a priest.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the old Civil Code, now article 956, which provides that if "the
bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those in which the right of
accretion exists".
This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960 (2), which provides that legal succession takes place when the
will "does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator." There being no substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands the same should be
distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no disposition as to the said ricelands.
The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate, or that there may be mixed succession. The old rule as to
the indivisibility of the testator's win is no longer valid. Thus, if a conditional legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate succession as
to the property recovered by the said legacy .
The Appellate Court's decision is affirmed.
SO ORDERED
45. Austria v. Reyes

Facts: Basilia Austria executed a will wherein the bulk of her estate was given to the respondents, alll have been declared by the former as
her legally adopted children.During her lifetime, Basilia filed a petition for the probate of her will. It was opposed by the petitioners who are
the nephews and nieces. The opposition was dismissed and the will was allowed.
In 1954, the petitioners filed a petition for intervention for partition alleging that they were the nearest kin of Basilia and that the respondent
had not been in fact adopted by the decedent in accordance with law, hence the latter were strangers with no right to succeed as heirs.
The lower court held that the validity or invalidity is not material to the institution of heirs. It held that the testator was possessed of
testamentary capacity and her last will was executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence.
Issue: Whether or not the institution of the heir is valid
RULING: Yes. The general rule is that the falsity of the stated cause for the testamentary institution does not affect the validity or efficacy of
the institution. An exception to the rule is that the falsity will set aide the institution if certain factors are present. Before the institution of the
heirs will be annulled under Art. 850 the following requisites must concur; 1) the cause must be stated in the will, 2) the cause is shown to be
false, and 3) it must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity.
Moreover, testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side especially when the will shows a clear intention on the part of the testator to
dispose of practically his whole estate as in this case.
46. NUGUID, petitioner and appellant, vs. NUGUID and Paz Salonga NUGUID
FACTS: Rosario Nuguid, testator in the holographic will, died single and without descendants,legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her
legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz SalongaNuguid, and six brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado,
Lourdesand Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, Remedios Nuguid, sister of Rosario, filed in the Court of First Instance ofRizal a holographic will allegedly executed by
Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11years before her death. Remedios prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters
of administrationwith the will annexed be issued to her. This was opposed by the parents of Rosario, Felix andPaz. The parents opposed on the
ground of preterition. The CFI of Rizal decided in favor of theparents and declared that there was indeed preterition of compulsory heirs.
Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs were simply ineffectively disinherited and thatthey are entitled to receive their legitimes, but that
the institution of heir "is not invalidated,"although the inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said
legitimes.
ISSUE: May a part of the will, when preterition has been declared, be considered to still be valid with respect to the free portion of the will.
RULING: No, preterition has an effect of completely nullifying the will. Article 854 of the Civil Code states that (T)he preterition or omission of
one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the directline, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator,shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they arenot inofficious.

The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she leftforced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents.
The will completely omits both of them. They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither
werethey expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition.
It cannot be gleaned in the will that any specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for.It is in this posture that the Supreme Court held
that the nullity is complete. Perforce, RosarioNuguid died intestate.
Remedios claim that the will should only be nullified as to the part of the legitime and that sheshould thus be considered a devisee or legatee
is without merit. The law requires that theinstitution of devisees and legatees must be expressly stated in the will. Such was not present.
Also, the omission of the parents in the will cannot be interpreted as a form of disinheritanceas the law also requires that, for disinheritance to
be proper, the disinheritance should be clearlyand expressly stated in the will. Absent that, no inference of disinheritance may be had.
47. CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON
FACTS: On May 1984 petitioner Acain filed with the RTC of Cebu City, a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for
the issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamntary on the premise that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which petitioner and his
siblings were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly executed by Nemesio Acain on February 17, 1960 was written in Bisaya with a translation in
English submitted by petitioner without objection raised by private respondents. The will contained provisions on burial rites, payment of
debts, and the appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of the testament. The will also states: the will provided:
THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties. house, lands and money which I earned jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall
all be given by me to my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino, widower, of legal age and presently residing at 357-C Sanciangko Street, Cebu City.
In case my brother Segundo Acain pre-deceased me, all the money properties, lands, houses there in Bantayan and here in Cebu City which
constitute my share shall be given to me to his children, namely: Anita, Constantino, Concepcion, Quirina, laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all
surnamed Acain.
Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of Segundo who are claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner.
After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court on June 1984 the oppositors filed a motion to dismiss. Said motion was denied by the
trial judge.
After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the lower court, respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court by Resolution of the
Court.Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for the
probate of the will of Nemesio Acain. Petitioner filed this present petition for the review of respondent Court's decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents have been pretirited.
HELD: Yes. Article 854 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the

devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not; inofficious. If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the
institution shall he effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein,
or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the
Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the
surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line.
However, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been
questioned by petitioner. Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person
the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot
be denied that she has totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at
least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally
adopted child.
48. Administration of the estate of Agripino Neri y Chavez. ELEUTERIO NERI vs. IGNACIA AKUTIN AND HER CHILDREN
FACTS: This is a case where the testator in his will left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage, the herein
respondents, with preterition of the children by his first marriage, the herein petitioner. This Court annulled the institution of heirs and declared
a total intestacy.
A motion for reconsideration has been filed by the respondents on the ground (1) that there is no preterition as to the children of the first
marriage who have received their shares in the property left by the testator, and (2) that, even assuming that there has been a preterition, the
effect would not be the annulment of the institution of heirs but simply the reduction of the bequest made to them.
ISSUE: Whether or not preterition is present in the case at bar.
HELD: Yes. According to the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals, the testator left all his property by universal title to the children by
his second marriage, and that without expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage, he left all his property by universal title to the
children by his second marriage, he left nothing to them or, at least, some of them. This is, accordingly, a case of preterition governed by the
Civil Code, which provides that the institution of heirs shall be annulled and intestate succession should be declared open.
49. VIADO NON VS CA
FACTS: Spouses Julian C. Viado and Virginia P. Viado owned several pieces of property, among them a house and lot. Virginia P. Viado died on
20 October 1982. Julian C. Viado died three years later. Surviving them were their children, Nilo Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs, and herein
petitioners Rebecca Viado, married to Jose Non, and Delia Viado. Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs both died on 22 April 1987. Nilo Viado left
behind as his own sole heirs herein respondents, his wife Alicia Viado and their two children Cherri Viado and Fe Fides Viado.
Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977, a common residence at the Isarog property. Rebecca Viado had asked that the property be
equally divided between the two families to make room for the growing children. Respondents, forthwith, claimed absolute ownership over the
entire property and demanded that petitioners vacate the portion occupied by the latter. Respondents predicated their claim of absolute
ownership over the subject property on two documents, a deed of donation executed by the late Julian Viado covering his one-half conjugal
share of the Isarog property in favor of Nilo Viado and a deed of extrajudicial settlement in which Julian Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs (through a

power of attorney in favor of Nilo Viado) and petitioner Rebecca Viado waived in favor of Nilo Viado their rights and interests over their share
of the property inherited from Virginia Viado.
Petitioners attacked the validity of the foregoing instruments, contending that the late Nilo Viado employed forgery and undue influence to
coerce Julian Viado to execute the deed of donation. Petitioner averred that her brother Nilo Viado employed fraud to procure her signature to
the deed of extrajudicial settlement. She added that the exclusion of her retardate sister, Delia Viado, in the extrajudicial settlement, resulted
in the latter's preterition that should warrant its annulment. The trial court found for respondents and adjudged Alicia Viado and her children
as being the true owners of the disputed property. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties were correctly adjudged to respondents.
RULING: The inheritance, which vested from the moment of death of the decedent, remained under a co-ownership regime among the heirs
until partition. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees would be a partition although it would
purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, a donation or an extrajudicial settlement.
In debunking the continued existence of a co-ownership among the parties hereto, respondents rely on the deed of donation and deed of
extrajudicial settlement which consolidated the title solely to Nilo Viado. While asserting that Nilo Viado employed fraud, forgery and undue
influence in procuring the signatures of the parties to the deeds of donation and of extrajudicial settlement, petitioners are vague, however, on
how and in what manner those supposed vices occurred. Neither have petitioners shown proof why Julian Viado should be held incapable of
exercising sufficient judgment in ceding his rights and interest over the property to Nilo Viado. The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged
to be a retardate, from the deed of extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This kind of preterition, however, in the
absence of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on TCT. The relief, as so correctly pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the
partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her. Again, the appellate court has
thus acted properly in ordering the remand of the case for further proceedings to make the proper valuation of the isarog property and
ascertainment of the amount due petitioner Delia Viado.

50. DE PEREZ VS. MARIANO GARCHITORENA

FACTS: The amount of P21,428.58 is on deposit in the plaintiff's name with the association known as La Urbana in Manila, as the final
payment of the liquidated credit of Ana Maria Alcantara, deceased, whose heiress is said plaintiff, against Andres Garchitorena, also deceased,
represented by his son, the defendant Mariano Garchitorena. Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment for P7,872.23 against Joaquin Perez
Alcantara, husband of the plaintiff, Carmen G. de Perez, the sheriff pursuant to the writ of execution issued in said judgment, levied an
attachment on said amount deposited with La Urbana.
Plaintiff, alleging that said deposit belongs to the fideicommissary heirs of the decedent Ana Maria Alcantara, secured a preliminary injunction
restraining the execution of said judgment on the sum so attached. The defendants contend that the plaintiff is the decedent's universal

heiress, and pray for the dissolution of the injunction.The court held that said La Urbana deposit belongs to the plaintiff's children as
fideicommissary heirs of Ana Maria Alcantara, and granted a final writ of injunction.
ISSUE: Whether or not substitution was simple?or fideicommissary substitution.
RULING: The substitution is ordered where the heiress instituted dies after the testatrix, this cannot be a case of simple substitution.The
fideicommissary substitution, requires three things: 1. A first heir called primarily to the enjoyment of the estate. 2. An obligation clearly
imposed upon him to preserve and transmit to a third person the whole or a part of the estate. 3. A second heir.
Clause IX vests in the heiress only the right to enjoy but not the right to dispose of the estate. It says, she may enjoy it, but does not say she
may dispose of it. This is an indication of the usufruct inherent in fideicommissary substitution. From the whole context it appears that in
making the provisions contained in this clause X, the testatrix had in mind a fideicommissary substitution, since she limits the transmission of
her estate to the children of the heiress by this provision, "in such wise that my estate shall never pass out of the hands of my heiress or her
children in so far as it is legally possible.Another indication of fideicommissary substitution in clause X is the provision that the whole estate
shall pass unimpaired to the heiress's children, that is to say the heiress is required to preserve the whole estate, without diminution, in order
to pass it on in due time to the fideicommissary heirs. This provision complies with another of the requisites of fideicommissary substitution.
Clause XI more clearly indicates the idea of fideicommissary substitution, when a provision is therein made in the event the heiress should die
after the testatrix. That is, said clause anticipates the case where the instituted heiress should die after the testatrix and after receiving and
enjoying the inheritance.
All the requisites of a fideicommissary substitution, are present in the case of substitution:
1. At first heir primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate. In this case the plaintiff was instituted an heiress, called to the enjoyment of the
estate, according to clause IX of the will.
2. An obligation clearly imposed upon the heir to preserve and transmit to a third person the whole or a part of the estate. Such an obligation
is imposed in clause X which provides that the "whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her (heiress's) surviving children;" thus, instead of
leaving the heiress at liberty to dispose of the estate by will, or of leaving the law to take its course in case she dies intestate, said clause not
only disposes of the estate in favor of the heiress instituted, but also provides for the disposition thereof in case she should die after the
testatrix.
3. A second heir. Such are the children of the heiress instituted, who are referred to as such second heirs both in clause X and in clause XI.
The inheritance in question does not belong to the heiress instituted, the plaintiff herein, as her absolute property, but to her children, from
the moment of the death of the testatrix. Therefore, said inheritance, of which the amount referred to at the beginning, which is on deposit
with the association known as La Urbana in the plaintiff's name, is a part, does not belong to her nor can it be subject to the execution of the
judgment against Joaquin Perez, who is not one of the fideicommissary heirs.
51. Ramirez vs. Vda. Ramirez G.R. No. L-27952, February 15, 1982

The deceased (Jose Eugenio Ramirez) was survived by his spouse (Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez), two grandnephews (Roberto and Jorge
Ramirez), and his companion (Wanda de Wrobleski).
The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris, while the companion Wanda is an Autralian who lives in
Spain. Moreover, the testator provided for substitutions.
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to
probate by the CFI of Manila. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratix of the estate.
The administrator submitted a partition to the court which divided the estate into two: one-half would go to the widow in the satisfaction of her
legitime; the other half, which is the free portion, would go to the grandnephews; however, one-third of the free portion is charged with the
widow's usufruct and the remaining 2/3 with a usufruct in favor of the companion.
The grandnephews opposed the substitution on the ground that the first heirs are not related to the substitutes (Juan Pable Jankowski and
Horace Ramirez) within the first degree.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the fideicommissary substitution is void. The substitutes are not related to the companion within one degree.
In effect, the SC ruled that one degree means one generation and not one designation. So, it follows that the fideicommissary can only
be either a child or a parent of the first heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation or degree from the fiduciary.
SUBSTITUTION- is the appoint-judgment of another heir so that he may enter into the inheritance in default of the heir orifinally instituted (Art.
857, Civil Code)
Kinds of Substitutions: (Art. 858)
1. Simple or common
2. Brief or compendious
3. Reciprocal
4. Fideicommissary
Two principal classes of substitutions
1. Simple or vulgar (Art. 859)

2. Fideicommissary substitution (Art. 863)

53. NIEVA V. ALCALA
FACTS: Juliana Nieva, the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva, married Francisco Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo
Deocampo was born. Julian Nieva died intestate on April 19, 1889, and her said son, Alfeo Deocampo, inherited from her, ab intestate, the
parcels of land. Alfeo Deocampo died intestate and without issue on July 7, 1890. Thereupon the two parcels of land passed to his father,
Francisco Deocampo, by intestate succession. Thereafter Francisco Deocampo married the herein defendant Manuela Alcala, of which
marriage was born Jose Deocampo, the other defendant herein. Francisco Deocampo died on August 15, 1914, whereupon his widow and son,
the defendants herein, took possession of the parcels of land in question, under the claim that the said son, the defendant Jose Deocampoo (a
minor) had inherited the same, ab intestate, from his deceased father. In 1915, the plaintiff herein, claiming to be an acknowledged natural
daughter of the said Juliana Nieva, instituted the present action for the purposes of recovering from the defendants the parcels of land in
question, invoking the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
The lower court held that, even granting, without deciding, that the plaintiff was an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva, she was
not entitled to the property here in question because, in its opinion, an illegitimate relative has no right to the reservatroncal under the
provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code. The first question presented by this appeal is, whether or not the plaintiff is an acknowledged
natural daughter of the deceased Juliana Nieva. It appears from the record that the said Juliana Nieva, while unmarried, gave birth to the
plaintiff on March 29, 1882, and that the plaintiff was duly baptized as her natural daughter, of unknown father; that the said Juliana Nieva
nourished and reared her said child, the plaintiff herein; that the plaintiff lived with her said mother until the latter was married to Francisco
Deocampo; that the said mother treated the plaintiff, and exhibited her publicly, as a legitimate daughter.
ISSUE: Whether or not an illegitimate relative within the third degree is entitled to the reserva troncal provided for by article 811 (Now
Art.891) of the Civil Code.
RULING: NO. Article 811 (Now Art.891) of the Civil Code provides that: "Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
acquired by the latter gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such of the property as he may
have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came."
The property here in question was inherited, by operation by law, by Francisco Deocampo from his son Alfeo Deocampo, who, in turn, had
inherited it, in the same manner, from his mother Juliana Nieva, the natural mother of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is the natural sister of Alfeo
Deocampo, and she belongs to the same line from which the property in question came.
The provision of article 811 (Now.891) of the Civil Code applies only to legitimate relative. Article 943, provides as follows:
"A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother who has
acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives so inherit from the natural or legitimated child."
To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural brother, Alfeo Deocampo, by operation of law, would be a fragrant
violate of the express provision of the foregoing article (943).
54. DE PAPA V. CAMACHO

FACTS: This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal, was submitted for judgment in the lower
court by all the parties on the following "Stipulation of Facts and Partial Compromise" :
"1. They stipulate that the defendant Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs are legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being said defendants grandaunt
and granduncles.
2. that plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongo-Camacho have as a common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the name of
Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of defendant.
3. that Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated four (4) parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs).
4. that Toribia Tioco died intestate in 1915, survived by her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and
Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho) and leaving the afore-mentioned four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of
her said two children in equal pro-indiviso shares.
5. that in 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his legitimate children by his wife Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs) and
legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the partition of his estate, three (3) parcels of land were adjudicated as the
inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, but as she had predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco, the said three (3) parcels of land devolved upon her
two legitimate children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in equal pro-indiviso shares.
6. that in 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of
land to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received the said property subject to a reserva troncal.
7. that in 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her rights and interests in the parcels of land abovementioned were inherited by her
only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho, subject to the usufructuary right of her surviving husband, defendant Primo
Tongko.
8. that on June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived his only legitimate descendant, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho.
9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned
as her inheritance from her mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.
10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice, the other half of the said seven (7) parcels of land by virtue of the
reserva troncal imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino Dizon and under the laws on intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon
legal advice, oppose her said claim because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which
interest was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue of their being also third
degree relatives of Faustino Dizon.
11. The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial determination in this case the legal issue of whether defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho
is entitled to the whole of the seven (7) parcels of land in question, or whether the plaintiffs, as third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon are
reservatarios (together with said defendant) of the one-half pro-indiviso share therein which was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from his son
Faustino Dizon, and entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of said one-half pro-indiviso share, or three-eights (3/8) of said seven (7) parcels of land,
and, therefore, to three eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by defendant Dalisay P. Tongko Camacho from the tenants of
said parcels of land, minus the expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs share in the rentals.
The lower Court ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs. Not satisfied, the defendant appealed to this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiffs (as decedent's uncles and aunts) may succeed ab intestate and be entitled to the reversionary property.

RULING: NO. Art. 891 of the Civil Code provides that: "Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the
latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have
acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property
came. (811)"
The reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives (reservatarios) to whom the property should be returned; but within that group,
the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify
otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance that the reserva being an exceptional case, its application should be limited to
what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the law.
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any
right thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the praepositus), they are excluded from the succession by his
niece, the defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within the same degree as the latter.
The rule, under our laws of succession, a decedents uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the
decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed. The defendant-appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the
reversionary property. The appealed judgment of the lower Court is reversed and set aside and the complaint is dismissed.
55. Mariquita Sumaya and Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative v. IAC et.al GR 68843-44
FACTS: Raul Balantakbo inherited from two different ascendants two sets of parcels of property, one from his father and the other from his
maternal grandmother. Raul died intestate, single and without any issue, leaving Consuelo Balantakbo, his mother as sole heir. Subsequently,
Consuelo adjudicated to herself the property in affidavit stating that she is the sole and lone ascendant heir of Raul who left the properties
inherited from his father and grandmother. Consuelo sold the properties to Mariquita Sumaya, who sold the same to Villa Honorio
Development Corporation which subsequently transferred its right over the property in favor of Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative.
Certificates of title were issuedin Agros name. However, such title do not contain any annotation of the property being reservable in character.
Two years after Consuelos death, Amadeo et al, brothers, sisters, nephew and nieces of Raul filed a civil case for the recovery of the parcels of
land sold to Agro alleging that such is subject of reserva troncal. Court a quo ruled in favor of plaintiffs, finding Agro as not innocent
purchasers for value. The CA affirmed the lower courts decision and ruled that there is no need to annotate the reservable interest of reserves
in property covered by the certificate of title.
ISSUE: Whether there is a need to annotate the reservable character of the property subject of reserva troncal
RULING: Yes. In a ruling decided by the Court, the reservable character of a property may be lost to innocent purchasers for value and hence,
the obligation is imposed on a widowed spouse to annotate the reservable character of a property subject of reserve viudal. Such obligation is
also applicable in reserva troncal. Moreover, the purpose of notation is nothing more than to afford the persons entitled to reservation, if any,
due protection.
56. Mendoza vs Delos Santos
FACTS: The subject properties of this case are three parcels of land. Lot 1646-B is under the name of respondent Julia delos Santos and coowned by Victoria Pantaleon who bought one-half of the property from petitioner Maria Mendoza and her siblings.

Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido) and Dominga Mendoza (Dominga). Placido and Dominga had four children: Antonio,
Exequiel, married to Leonor, Apolonio and Valentin. The petitioners are children of Antonio and Valentin. They alleged that Placido and
Dominga's properties that were subject of an oral partition and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiel's death, it passed on to
his spouse Leonor and only daughter, Gregoria.
After Leonor's death, her share went to Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died intestate and without issue. They claimed that after Gregoria's death,
respondent, who is Leonor's sister, adjudicated unto herself all these properties as the sole surviving heir of Leonor and Gregoria. Hence,
petitioners claim that the properties should have been reserved by respondent in their behalf and must now revert back to them, applying
Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal.
Respondent, however, denies any obligation to reserve the properties as these did not originate from petitioners' familial line and were not
originally owned by Placido and Dominga. According to respondent, the properties were bought by Exequiel and Antonio from a certain Alfonso
Ramos in 1931.
It appears, however, that it was only Exequiel who was in possession of the properties. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 6, found merit in petitioners' claim and granted their action for Recovery of Possession by Reserva Troncal.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint filed by petitioners. In dismissing
the complaint, the CA ruled that petitioners failed to establish that Placido and Dominga owned the properties in dispute. The CA also ruled
that even assuming that Placido and Dominga previously owned the properties, it still cannot be subject to reserva troncal as neither Exequiel
predeceased Placido and Dominga nor did Gregoria predecease Exequiel.
ISSUES: whether the properties in dispute are reservable properties. whether petitioners are entitled to a reservation of these properties.
RULING: Article 891 of the Civil Code on reservatroncal. The principle of reservatroncal is provided in Article 891 of the Civil Code:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives
who are within the third degree and belong to the line from which said property came. (Emphasis ours)
There are three (3) lines of transmission in reserva troncal. The first transmission is by gratuitous title, whether by inheritance or donation,
from an ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant called the prepositus. The second transmission is by operation of law from the prepositus to
the other ascendant or reservor, also called the reservista. The third and last transmission is from the
reservista to the reservees or reservatarios who must be relatives within the third degree from which the property came. The lineal character
of the reservable property is reckoned from the ascendant from whom the prepositus received the property by gratuitous title.
Based on the circumstances of the present case, Article 891 on reservatroncal is not applicable.
The fallacy in the CA's resolution is that it proceeded from the erroneous premise that Placido is the ascendant contemplated in Article 891 of
the Civil Code. From thence, it sought to trace the origin of the subject properties back to Placido and Dominga, determine whether Exequiel
predeceased Placido and whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel.
The persons involved in reservatroncal are: DTcACa
(1) The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title;
(2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the property;
(3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property from the prepositus by operation of law; and

(4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the (linea o tronco) from which the
property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.
It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be reckoned only from Exequiel's as he is the ascendant from where the
first transmission occurred, or from whom Gregoria inherited the properties in dispute. The law does not go farther than such
ascendant/brother/sister in determining the lineal character of the property.
It was also immaterial for the CA to determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga or whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel.
What is pertinent is that Exequiel owned the properties and he is the ascendant from whom the properties in dispute originally came. Gregoria,
on the other hand, is the descendant who received the properties from Exequiel by gratuitous title.
Moreover, Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been acquired by the descendant or prepositus from an ascendant by
gratuitous or lucrative title. A transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return. At risk of
being repetitious, what was clearly established in this case is that the properties in dispute were owned by Exequiel (ascendant). After his
death, Gregoria (descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as inheritance.
Ascendants, descendants and collateral relatives under Article 964 of the Civil Code Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the
property should be an ascendant (also known as the reservor/reservista) of the descendant/ prepositus. Julia, however, is not Gregoria's
ascendant; rather, she is Gregoria's collateral relative.
Article 964 of the Civil Code provides for the series of degrees among ascendants and descendants, and those who are not ascendants and
descendants but come from a common ancestor
Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or collateral.
A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees among ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons who are not ascendants and descendants, but who come from a
common ancestor.
Gregoria's ascendants are her parents, Exequiel and Leonor, her grandparents, great-grandparents and so on. On the other hand, Gregoria's
descendants, if she had one, would be her children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren. Not being Gregoria's ascendants, both petitioners
and Julia, therefore, are her collateral relatives. In determining the collateral line of relationship, ascent is made to the common ancestor and
then descent to the relative from whom the computation is made. In the case of Julia's collateral relationship with Gregoria, ascent is to be
made from Gregoria to her mother Leonor (one line/degree), then to the common ancestor, that is, Julia and Leonor's parents (second
line/degree), and then descent to Julia, her aunt (third line/degree). Thus, Julia is Gregoria's collateral relative within the third degree and not
her ascendant.
First cousins of the descendant/ prepositus are fourth degree relatives and cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios
Moreover, petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they are not relatives within the third degree of Gregoria from whom
the properties came. The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant/ prepositus the one at the end of the line
from which the property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. It is Gregoria in this case. Petitioners are Gregoria's
fourth degree relatives, being her first cousins. First cousins of the prepositus are fourth degree relatives and are not reservees or

reservatarios.
They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio and Valentin as Article 891 grants a personal right of reservation only to
the relatives up to the third degree from whom the reservable properties came. The only recognized exemption is in the case of nephews and
nieces of the prepositus, who have the right to represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the brothers/sisters of the prepositus
and relatives within the third degree. In Florentino v. Florentino, the Court stated:
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of
the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him,
excludes that of the one more remote.
The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the
relatives within the third degree belong to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in [A]rticle
811 [now Article 891] is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of the designated persons who are the relatives, within
the third degree, of the person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can
never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.
. . . [N]evertheless there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case
of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came. . . . . 23
The conclusion, therefore, is that while it may appear that the properties are reservable in character, petitioners cannot benefit from reserva
troncal. First, because Julia, who now holds the properties in dispute, is not the other ascendant within the purview of Article 891 of the Civil
Code and second, because petitioners are not Gregoria's relatives within the third degree. Hence, the CA's disposition that the complaint filed
with the RTC should be dismissed, only on this point, is correct. If at all, what should apply in the distribution of Gregoria's estate are Articles
1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 1003.
If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
Art. 1009.
Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to
the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood.
Nevertheless, the Court is not in the proper position to determine the proper distribution of Gregoria's estate at this point as the cause of
action relied upon by petitioners in their complaint filed with the RTC is based solely on reserva troncal. Further, any determination would
necessarily entail reception of evidence on Gregoria's entire estate and the heirs entitled thereto, which is best accomplished in an action filed
specifically for that purpose.
A reservista acquires ownership of the reservable property until the reservation takes place or is extinguished
Before concluding, the Court takes note of a palpable error in the RTC's disposition of the case. In upholding the right of petitioners over the
properties, the RTC ordered the reconveyance of the properties to petitioners and the transfer of the titles in their names. What the RTC should
have done, assuming for argument's sake that reserva troncal is applicable, is have the reservable nature of the property registered on
respondent's titles. In fact, respondent, as reservista, has the duty to reserve and to annotate the reservable character of the property on the
title. 24 In reserva troncal, the reservista who inherits from a prepositus, whether by the latter's wish or by operation of law, acquires the
inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of ownership belong to him exclusively.

The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if
the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation.
The transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferee's rights are revoked upon the survival of the
reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the reservees predecease the reservor.
It is when the reservation takes place or is extinguished, 27 that a reservatario becomes, by operation of law, the owner of the reservable
property. 28 In any event, the foregoing discussion does not detract from the fact that petitioners are not entitled to a reservation of the
properties in dispute.
56. Mendoza v Delos Santos
FACTS:
The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of land located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan are presently in the name of respondent Julia
Delos Santos (respondent). Lot No. 1646-B, on the other hand, is also in the name of respondent but co- owned by Victoria Pantaleon, who
bought one-half of the property from petitioner Maria Mendoza and her siblings.
Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido) and Dominga Mendoza (Dominga). Petitioners alleged that the properties were part
of Placido and Domingas properties that were subject of an oral partition and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiels death, it
passed on to his spouse Leonor and only daughter, Gregoria. After Leonors death, her share went to Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died intestate
and without issue. They claimed that after Gregorias death, respondent, who is Leonors sister, adjudicated unto herself all these properties as
the sole surviving heir of Leonor and Gregoria. Hence, petitioners claim that the properties should have been reserved by respondent in their
behalf and must now revert back to them, applying Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC: granted their action for Recovery of Possession by Reserva Troncal, Cancellation of TCT and Reconveyance.
(2) CA: reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint filed by petitioners. CA also denied their motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUES:
A. THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES ARE NOT RESERVABLE PROPERTIES, COMING AS
THEY DO FROM THE FAMILY LINE OF THE PETITIONERS MENDOZAS.
B. THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS MENDOZAS DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES BY VIRTUE OF THE LAW ON RESERVA TRONCAL.
APPLICABLE LAW:
The principle of reserva troncal is provided in Article 891 of the Civil Code:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives
who are within the third degree and belong to the line from which said property came. (Emphasis ours)
RULING:
No, CA is correct.

I. Reserva troncal is not applicable.

Julia, who now holds the properties in dispute, is not the other ascendant within the purview of Article 891 of the Civil Code
Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the
line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant.
Screenshot+2014-10-29+17.56.03.png
It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be reckoned only from Exequiels as he is the ascendant from where the
first transmission occurred, or from whom Gregoria inherited the properties in dispute. The law does not go farther than such
ascendant/brother/sister in determining the lineal character of the property. It was also immaterial for the CA to determine whether Exequiel
predeceased Placido and Dominga or whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel. What is pertinent is that Exequiel owned the properties and he
is the ascendant from whom the properties in dispute originally came. Gregoria, on the other hand, is the descendant who received the
properties from Exequiel by gratuitous title.
Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been acquired by the descendant or prepositus from an ascendant by gratuitous or
lucrative title. A transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return.18 At risk of being
repetitious, what was clearly established in this case is that the properties in dispute were owned by Exequiel (ascendant). After his death,
Gregoria (descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as inheritance.
Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the property should be an ascendant (also known as the reservor/reservista) of the
descendant/prepositus. Julia, however, is not Gregorias ascendant; rather, she is Gregorias collateral relative.
II. Petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they are not relatives within the third degree of Gregoria from whom the
properties came. The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant/prepositusthe one at the end of the line from
which the property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. It is Gregoria in this case. Petitioners are Gregorias fourth
degree relatives, being her first cousins. First cousins of the prepositus are fourth degree relatives and are not reservees or reservatarios. They
cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio and Valentin as Article 891 grants a personal right of reservation only to the
relatives up to the third degree from whom the reservable properties came. The only recognized exemption is in the case of nephews and
nieces of the prepositus, who have the right to represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the brothers/sisters of the prepositus
and relatives within the third degree.

57. Rabadilla vs CA
Facts: Alleja Belleza is the testatrix. She owns a parcel of land which is the subject of this case. She named Dr. Rabadilla was named in the will
of Alleja Belleza to receive the subject property. Along with the instrument was a codicil attached. It provides that Dr. Rabadilla shall provide
Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza 100 piculs of sugar every year until her death.
The codicil provides that the property may be sold but the obligation to deliver sugar to Maria shall not ceased and such obligation shall be
transferred to the owner of the property.
Uopn the death of Dr. Rabadilla, he was succeeded by his heirs, his wife and children.
In 1989 herein complainant Maria filed suit against the heirs of Dr. Rabadilla for failing to perform their obligation to deliver the 100 piculs of
sugar every year, for the past four years. Also, the property was accordingly mortgaged to banks.

Initially being declared in default, the son of Dr. Rabadilla filed an answer that they executed an agreement with complainant that they would
just provide the equivalent monetary value of 100 piculs of sugar, but this was not followed. 50 piculs of sugar was only received by the
complainant. The Trial Court dismissed the complaint.
On appeal before the CA, it reversed the ruling of the Trial Court and ruled in favor of complainant having found the respondents to have failed
in their obligation in pursuant of the codicil executed by Alleja Belleza.
ISSUE: Whether or not Complainant has a cause of action in this case and the right to demand her right pursuant to the codicil.
Held: The Court held to affirm the ruling of the CA.
The complainant had a legally demandable right against the petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil; on which issue the Court of Appeals ruled in
accordance with law.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and
compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.
Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of
law, without need of further proceedings, and the successional rights albeit the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar were transmitted to
them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
The Court further held that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person disposes of his property, to take effect after
his death. Since the Will expresses the manner in which a person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the
testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose
of making a Will.
58. Natividad vs Gabino
Facts: Testator Tiburcio Salvador named Basilia Gabino as testate to receive a property as expressed in his will and have ownership or
dominion over the same. The executor of the will of Tiburcio is herein petitioner Emilio Natividad, grandson and also an heir of Tiburcio. The
will of Tiburcio provided that Basilia Gabino shall have dominion of the property until her death. Upon the death of Basilia the property is to be
delivered to Emilio Natividad being an heir of Tiburcio. Emilio Natividad however is supposed to give compensation of 4,000 pesos upon the
delivery of the property to him.
During the lifetime of Basilia Gabino, Emilio Natividad proposed for the partition of the property, as Basilia was allegedly only a usufruct and
general legacy belongs to Emilio Natividad. Such partition was opposed by Gabino.
ISSUE: Whether or not the partition may be made
What construction must be made regarding the will of Tiburcio bestowing upon Basilia ownership and dominion over the property

HELD: The Court Held to rule in favor of Gabino. The Court Held that the partition may not be made.
The will is clear that during her lifetime, Basilia Gabino shall have ownership and dominion over the property. It is only upon the condition of
her death that Emilio Natividad obtain a right to demand for the possession of the property.
The condition imposed by the testator in the double legacy mentioned depends upon the happening of the event constituting the condition, to
wit, the death of the legatee Basilia Gabino, a perfectly legal condition according to article 1114 of the Civil code, as it is not impossible of
performance and is not contrary to law or public morals, as provided in article 1116 of said code.
If the Basilia Gabino should die, this property instead of passing to the successor, would revert to the testator's grandson and heir, provided
that he in turn would pay to Lorenzo Salvador, successor of Basilia Gabino, the sum of P4,000.