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From colonial policing to community

policing in Bahrain: The historical
persistence of sectarianism
Staci Strobl

John Jay College of Criminal Justice , New York, USA

Published online: 17 Jan 2011.

To cite this article: Staci Strobl (2011) From colonial policing to community policing in Bahrain:
The historical persistence of sectarianism, International Journal of Comparative and Applied
Criminal Justice, 35:1, 19-37, DOI: 10.1080/01924036.2011.535687
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01924036.2011.535687

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International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice

Vol. 35, No. 1, February 2011, 1937

From colonial policing to community policing in Bahrain: The

historical persistence of sectarianism
Staci Strobl*

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John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New York, USA

This paper focuses on the history of policing in the Kingdom of Bahrain, a small
Arab, Muslim country. The historical discourse about Bahraini policing, though scant,
has not adequately confronted the role the police have had in protecting Sunni hegemony in a majority Sh majority nation, a residual feature of colonialism. Through
colonial records, press accounts, and Bahraini historical sources, the importance of sectarian politics in the development of Bahraini policing emerges. By drawing on conflict
criminology and paying attention to the relevant cultural processes, a new approach to
understanding policing in Bahrain, and the Gulf region, emerges. The analysis suggests
that although the Bahraini police force has liberalized in recent years by developing a
community policing unit, disapproval and unrest by Bahraini Sh remains a significant
social and political problem.
Keywords: policing; Bahrain; Sh; post-colonial
Bayn quwah al-akhdar wa latafah al-azraq . . .1
Advertisement for series of articles on Bahraini policing in al-Waqt
newspaper, March 27, 2006

In an age of the global police professional networks spreading ideas about community
policing, and the influence of human rights standards, national police forces are increasingly turning from being the heavy-handed strong arm of government to exhibiting concern
about their legitimacy in the eyes of the community. This public relations approach, through
community-oriented policing, is touted as a historical sea-change compared to previous
police practices in colonial and postcolonial settings; however, care must be taken to
evaluate whether these developments are substantive or merely cosmetic.
As Bayley (1977) opined, policing is affected by the historical context in which it
operates, yet such a notion is often substantively disregarded in police studies. This paper
focuses on the history of policing in the Kingdom of Bahrain from the colonial era to
todays community policing, suggesting that understanding and confronting ShSunni
sectarianism is fundamental to the development of community policing in the country.
The distrust of police in the Sh community potentially undermines the new community
police forces. Without acknowledgement of past sectarian-motivated police violence, and
active engagement in improving sectarian relations, community policing is likely to fail.
Bahrain is a small archipelago nation located off the Eastern shore of Saudi Arabia in
the Arabian Gulf. Bahrain is a Muslim country and has a population of slightly more than
700,000 (Central Intelligence Agency, 2009). The country is a constitutional monarchy

*Email: stacistrobl@gmail.com
ISSN 0192-4036 print/ISSN 2157-6475 online
2011 School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University
DOI: 10.1080/01924036.2011.535687
http://www.informaworld.com

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20

S. Strobl

headed by King Hamid bin Isa Al-Khalifah. It has a modern police force numbering
approximately 3000 officers, 5% of whom are policewomen (Strobl, 2008). This historical
account uses a broadly defined critical criminological perspective and emphasizes the role
of ethnic identity in struggles for power and authority in criminal justice (Chambliss, 1999;
Messerschmidt, 1997; Sellin, 1938; Young, 1988). Conflict criminology can help explain
policeSh tension, palpable today even in the midst of recent police reforms and a move
toward community policing strategies. Previous historical accounts mentioning Bahraini
policing have failed to emphasize the role that police force has had in shoring up Sunni
leadership in a Sh majority country (approximately 70% of the population), a legacy
of the colonial approach to administering Bahrain. As Anderson and Killingray (1991)
observed, many of the archival information on policing in British protectorates and colonies
is fragmented, necessitating a careful reconstruction from a wide range of sources. By
consulting colonial records, and underutilized Bahraini historical sources, the role of sectarian identity in the history of Bahraini policing emerges. The researcher also conducted
fieldwork and interviews with Bahraini police personnel in the years 2004 to 2006.
Hills Policing Africa (2000) correctly identifies the need for a place-based empiricism
in postcolonial police studies which is not stagnant, but sensitive to the cycles of progress
and regression, with progress or modernization usually understood as moving toward
Western models of capitalist and democratic societies (p. 5). Although Hills critiqued this
notion of modernization, it was adopted for utilitarian purposes as a means of linking
Western conceptual models to non-Western ones. Any linking of these divergent conceptual
models requires a recognition of the inherent power imbalance in the discourse of social
science as it has been historically construed, with the Western social scientist propped up
as a neutral observer of the subjugated colonial subject (Said, 1993).
The promise of community policing in contemporary times
Community policing, as an organizational mission adopted by many forces throughout
the world, emerged in the United States in the 1980s and involves strengthening the ties
between citizen and state via police services, taking a holistic approach to crime and
disorder which surpasses crime control functions (Goldstein, 1990) and has the potential to change police occupational culture into being more accepting of social work as
real police work. It was designed to bring officers back into the community context and
out of their detachment, a by-product of the professional, patrol-car dominated model
of policing which emerged in the 1960s. It was also a response to increasing criticisms
by critical criminologists, citing the history of race riots (Chambliss, 1999; Jones-Brown,
2000) and the unjustified shootings of minorities (Tennessee v. Garner, 1985). Historically
in the United States, police forces were largely white, male institutions enforcing laws
differentially against poor, minority communities (Chambliss, 1999; Jones-Brown, 2000;
Russell, 1998). Although no single model characterizes community policing, it is generally a decentralized approach designed to decrease crime, disorder and fear by designating
particular officers to work in the community on long-term problem-solving goals. It also
involves a commitment to develop new problem-solving skills through training on communication processes, conflict management, and community relations in the context of
multiculturalism, and increased recruitment of minorities and women (Haberfeld, 2002).
The community policing model has taken root in forces around the world as a
consequence of the globalization of professional police networks. The Internet and other
mass communication technology bring the worlds police departments together in various
global forums pursuant to international policing conferences and cross-national training.

International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice

21

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As a result, police policies and procedures developed in one country are being implemented
in others. In addition, variables external to policing, such as a shift in public management
techniques brought on by global deregulation, have led to a general trend toward downsizing government services to encompass corporate-style efficiency and to view the public
as clients like the private sector does (Clarke, 2002). According to Manning (2002, p. 12),
the global, national and international context of economics, politics and globalization of
life-styles seem to come in and out of the analyses of policing. As Finnemore and Sikkink
(1998) found in their analysis of the debate surrounding global norms in human rights
development:
Professions often serve as powerful and pervasive agents working to internalize norms among
their members. Professional training does more than simply transfer technological knowledge;
it actively socializes people to value certain things about others . . . As state bureaucracies
and international organizations have become more and more professionalized over the twentieth century, we should expect to see policy increasingly reflecting the normative basis of the
profession that staff the decision-making agencies. (p. 905)

This suggests that police departments not only influence each other, but may also be
conduits for increasingly similar policy development which in turn generates global norms
within policing across cultures.
For example, human rights-related concerns over policing in diverse societies has characterized recent literature in policing across countries (Shusta, Levine, Harris, & Wong,
2002). Representation within policing of the diversity within modern, globalized societies
has been suggested as necessary for the police to maintain their legitimacy and to protect
the basic rights of individuals, the impetus behind community-oriented policing methods.
The assumption is that, if the police resemble those they are policing, there will be better community relations and less police abuse of power and authority (Jackson, 2001).
Increasingly, police executives must encourage diversity in their workforce and understand
diversity in their changing communities if they hope to be effective. A professional police
force is characterized by a willingness to engage all groups in the community, and improve
communication with community leaders of diverse groups (Shusta et al., 2002).
As the first Arab country to adopt a community policing model, Bahrain offers a
glimpse into the historical movement from colonial to community policing and, as such,
becomes an experimental model for the development of such policing styles in the Gulf
states and other Middle Eastern countries. To understand what community policing means
for Bahrain, and perhaps nearby countries, it is important to explore the historical context
which preceded its implementation.

Precolonial influences on Bahraini policing

Academic sources about precolonial policing in the Gulf region are scant. As such, a
description of the history emerges from piecemeal sources. Early Islamic empires devel
who policed
oped the shurtah,2 who handled criminal investigations, and the muhtasib,
the marketplace (Crystal, 2001). For example, the first caliph of the Abbassid Empire
(7501258 CE), Abul-Abbas (720755 CE), ruling from Baghdad, appointed a minister
to control a police system which transcended tribal affiliations and featured a chief of
police. Duties of the force included civil and moral policing (Haberfeld, 2002). In the Gulf
in particular, order maintenance occurred in the context of tribal and kinship networks.
Arabian Gulf tribes were united by honor (sharaf ) and the loyalty of parts (shaff min dun)3

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S. Strobl

in a patriarchal, hereditary social structure (Lienhardt, 2001). Disputes were policed by

the council (majlis) of the tribal leaders (shaykhs) who would convene session to hear the
grievances of people wronged and to provide community solutions (Khuri, 1980).
Shaykhs exercised authority in order maintenance as the chief protectors and
justice-seekers, careful to maintain their authority through consultations with other males
in the kinship unit (Onley & Khalaf, 2007). In the event that the dispute involved Muslim
law (shariah) conflicts were brought before a local qadi (customary judge). However,
according to Onley and Khalaf (2007), the Muslim learned elite, or ulema, exercised little
political influence over rulers at this time, acting primarily as consultants. According to
the ethnographic writing of Peter Lienhardt on the Arabian Gulf during the 1950s, before
bringing cases to a qadi, parties sought out a third-party mediator to hear their complaint
and offer a judgment. These decisions were largely treated as binding. In addition, there was
reportedly a cultural preference for nonviolent solutions to conflicts, including crime. Two
of the main crimes in early Gulf society were piracy (by sea) and Bedouin raiding (by land)
as well as evasion of the tolls collected by shaykhs. In cases of murder, restoration for the
murder of their kin was sought from the kin of the murderer. Tribal members followed the
d, daynna wa daynhum wah
d (our blood is their blood, our
rule of damna wa damhum wah
debt is their debt). Blood money (diyah) was the most prevalent form of restoration; however, blood feuds sometimes developed between tribes when blood money failed to satisfy
the victims family. Murders within the same clan were a particular problem because blood
money customs could not be applied in the same way. Violent retribution often ensued
in these cases, though shaykhs did not usually advocate this approach. Another exception
to the customs on murder involved honor killings; killing a woman who had sullied the
familys honor was not subject to restorative or monetary responses (Lienhardt, 2001).

Colonial policing in the Arabian Gulf

Colonialism was the vehicle that brought modern policing. The British brought new
administrative structures and bureaucracies to the Gulf protectorates as part of securing
the region for capitalist development. What was once the duty of a local decentralized
confederation of tribes, or small scale societies, became the job of more centralized
municipalities under colonial influence (Hammouche, 2004; Onley & Khalaf, 2007, p.
191). At the same time, the precolonial customary order maintenance survived the colonial
era, albeit in a reduced way, through a variety of practices interwoven into contemporary policing, such as the use of traditional mediation practices to solve conflicts and the
periodic political calls to formalize diyah (blood money) into law as it is occasionally
informally practiced (Strobl, 2007).
The development of modern policing in the colonial period occurred in the context
of modernization instigated by colonists; policing was a by-product of the expansion of
capitalism and often developed in an ad hoc fashion, in reaction to particular needs but
more importantly in reaction to the nature of the local acceptance or resistance to colonial rule (Cole, 1999, p. 89). Under the British colonial system, coercive force was used
against locals to perpetuate imperialism, and the police played a central role in the delivery
of that force. There was little separation between police and military. Police continued to
rely on military personnel for internal order. Colonial policing was often more centralized
as the role of the police involved not just maintaining law and order but also defending a
colony. The forces were then accountable to London on matters of intelligence, security
and training (Sinclair & Williams, 2007).

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23

Local recruits were added to colonial forces, relying on an ethnic policing model in
which a minority within a colony was utilized as police against the majority. The British
disseminated an ideology of martial races and criminal tribes in order to maintain the
minoritys sense of superiority over the majority. Colonial policing was also centralized,
unlike what the British implemented at home. The centralization and militarization of the
Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC), who were effective in situations where opposition was
strong and the government weak, inspired colonial leaders as a model to be used in more
distant British possessions (Crystal, 2001). However, compared to other British colonies
like Nigeria or India, the Gulf state occupants did not agitate for change in the form of
protracted violent struggle, although some clashes occurred (Fakhro, 1990). By the 1920s,
British-style municipal policing in urban centers was initiated (Hammouche, 2004). By the
1930s, the British had usurped political control from monarchs and shaykhs in the Gulf,
while simultaneously supporting the maintenance of the tribal social structure (Seikaly,
1994).
In the early postcolonial period many newly independent Middle Eastern nations
retained the colonial policing systems in an effort to maintain control. The existing police were intentionally chosen and absorbed into the new government primarily
because the new regimes political legitimacy and social bases were fragile, and in
some cases, there were no funds to build a force from the ground up (Crystal, 2001;
Hills 2000). In addition, many nations still depended on the former colonial powers
for technical and administrative support. This was particularly palpable in the oilproducing Gulf states, where old colonial forces remained focused on squashing political
dissent.
The Arab awakening (nahdah) in the twentieth century, at the time nations gained
independence from colonial powers, represented modernism in the form of political participation and technological infrastructure, including the development of national police
forces. The nahdah may be seen as a cultural and social struggle between the two fundamental standpoints of secularism and Islam (Sharabi, 1988, p. 10). Similarly, Seikaly
(1994) describes an ambivalence among political leaders in the Gulf toward modern
development and as such their policies have attempted to find a balance between commitments to modernization and economic development and commitment to the internal
traditional sociocultural forces (p. 416).
Postcolonial policing in Bahrain
Blalocks power-threat hypothesis (1967) can be applied to policing when a culturally
cohesive police force is oppressively employed against a designated class of people who
are considered politically threatening to the existing regime. Blalock originally developed
the power threat hypothesis to explain lynchings in the southern region of the United States.
He proposed that lynching expressed dominant group political fear and argued that whites
used that fear to control the black population through terror and intimidation. He successfully predicted that lynching rates would be higher in counties with a larger percentage of
black residents. Such power struggles are palpable across nations, though the groups in
power and the groups the powerful fear are variable and based on differing constructions of
ethnicity, race, class and political ideology. Similarly, Sellin (1938) posited that laws represent the norms, values, and interests of the dominant ethnic group and thereby produce
conflict with those in subordinate groups because the behavior of the subordinate group
is defined as deviant. Those defined as deviant take a protective stance in order to maintain their identities and social and cultural integrity. Under Sellins conflict theory, local

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S. Strobl

cultural and political specifics are important in how the threats and violence are perceived
and framed.
In the Bahraini context, the government has relied on its police force to control the
an) or
disenfranchised majority Sh population. Sh in Bahrain are of either Arab (Bahr
Persian (Ajam) ethnic descent. The Bahraini government does not release statistics as to the
percentage of each group of the total Sh population. Arab Sh primarily migrated from
the eastern province of Southern Iraq. Many ajam, though second and third generation residents of Bahrain, are not issued passports and do not have full citizenship. These noncitizen
Bahrainis are referred to as the bidun (without [citizenship]) (International Crisis Group
[ICG], 2005). Other Bahrainis of Persian descent, however, have ancestors who have occupied the island for hundreds, if not thousands, of years. Many primarily Sh villages have
Persian names such as Janussan, Kharbabad, Diraz, and Sharakhan. Sunnis (aside from
the ruling family, who arrived from Kuwait via Qatar), are composed of tribal Arabs from

the Arabian peninsula, the hawalah

(location shifters) who came from the coasts of Iran
and Oman in the eighteenth century and more recent migrants from Africa and Pakistan
(Fakhro, 1997; Mansfield, 1991).
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the police routinely rounded up members of the
primarily Sh political opposition and subjected them to detainment without trial and
torture (ICG, 2005). As such, the country has been described as a divided nation (p.
1) and the police a repressive and largely foreign-staffed security apparatus (p. 2). This
differs greatly from the other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, which do not
have Sh majority populations, but much smaller Sh minorities; however, most GCC
countries employ a large percentage of foreign, Arab police personnel. Furthermore, the
Sh in the other countries are not as politically organized, nor as targeted by police (save
for the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia, which does experience Sh unrest). As such,
the history of policeSh relations in other GCC countries is not as violent or volatile.
Based on fieldwork and interviews in Bahrain, Sh speak of a hidden history
of government detainment and violence against their people. The role of the Bahraini
police as the strong arm of a nonrepresentative government against political and sectarian opposition is inadequately discussed in many historical accounts of Bahrain (Bahrain
Government, 1987; Belgrave, 1954; Cordesman, 1997; Joyce, 2003; Khuri, 1980; Lawson
1989; Zahlan, 1998).
Sectarianism and policing in Bahrain
Islam split into two major sects in the seventh century after disagreement over who should
succeed the prophet Muhammad in leadership of the ummah (Muslim people). Those who
became Sunnis supported Abu Bakr, but those who became Shia felt that Ali was the correct ruler. From this point, although the two groups share the Quran and many theological
beliefs, their social and political history diverged (Esposito, 1998). The problem of Sh
Sunni sectarianism in Bahrain in particular can be traced to the British support of the ruling
Sunni al-Khalifa family through treaties signed in 1861, 1880, and 1882.
In 1861, Bahrain became a part of the British colonial Trucial System in which the
Gulf countries each signed separate treaties with Britain to abstain from piracy in exchange
for British protection (Zahlan, 1998). An additional benefit came in the form of external
recognition of certain ruling families as the legitimate rulers (Onley & Khalaf, 2007). Part
of the agreement included the British establishment of a land base in Bahrain (Mansfield,
1991). The country became the Gulf headquarters of the British colonial endeavor and,
as a result, the country had the most militarized colonial police force in the region.

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By 1902, a Bahrain Political Agent was posted from Britain (Belgrave, 1954) and by cooperating with him rulers kept competing shaykhs out of power (Onley & Khalaf, 2007).
As colonial administration took root, police and military forces were built up primarily to
protect the economic and political interests of the British rather than to catch criminals
(Crystal, 2001). Armed retainers from other parts of the Arab world and Baluchistan were
also invited by the local sheikhs and, in 1905, Bahrain had approximately 200 such troops
(Onley & Khalaf, 2007).
Although local courts existed in previous centuries, in 1926, the first modern court, the
Bahrain Court, opened in central Manama by decree of the emir, Sheikh Hamid bin Isa
bin Ali Al-Khalifa. Its first judges were Charles Belgrave, British advisor to the emir, and
Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdul Raman. The court followed the Indian Code of Criminal
Procedure, which the British established in India (Bahrain Government, 1987). This was a
common practice as English law was often transplanted to colonies and protectorates via
hybrid treatments developed in other parts of the empire (Anderson & Killingray, 1991).
In 1927, the British opened a small court in order to take less serious cases and
relieve the Bahrain Court of some of its caseload. In addition, there were two shariah
courts opened in the 1920s, one for Sunni and the other for Sh, and a majlis tijara, which
heard commercial disputes (Bahrain Government, 1987). In 1936, another court opened,
which specialized in cases related to commercial disputes within the fishing and pearl
diving industries, the most important industries before the development of oil extraction
and refining. In addition, the building housed the Ministry of Informations reviewers of
printed materials (Makan a min, 2006).
The first modern police force in Bahrain was established in 1920 in the capital city of
Manama. Modeled after the Royal Irish Constabulary and in accordance with the British
policy of ethnic policing, the police were recruited from the Persian, Sh community.
However, in a turn of events whose legacy is felt today, Bahrainis of Persian, Sh descent
were dropped after disturbances in the early 1920s, propelled by British control over the
ruling family, which exacerbated conflict between Sunni and Sh (Zahlan, 1998). This
made it imperative that the . . . regime establish a police force that had no social links
with any of the conflicting parties (Khuri, 1980, p. 114). The British then began recruiting police from the Indian subcontinent, first Baluchis and then Punjabis, nonpartisan
groups traditionally used by emirs in the Gulf as bodyguards. At this time, the force had
approximately 300 uniformed officers and 200 armed watchmen (Lawson, 1989).
In 1936, the British formally established the Colonial Police Service, which recruited
from Britain to provide officers to the many territories in its possession (Jeffries, 1952).
Although the number of British police in the protectorate of Bahrain at the time is not
known, Jeffries explains of the colonies:
Because of the relatively uneducated state of the bulk of the Colonial populations, nearly all
posts calling for special skills or training had to be filled by recruitment from Britain. (p. 43)

According to British annual reports, there were 50 policemen of Indian origin in 1932
(Abahussein, 1996). In the 1930s and 1940s, the police policy of favoring outsiders continued and many Africans were added to the force. As a result of discriminatory hiring,
indigenous Bahrainis avoided seeking employment in policing. Only about 20% of the
1000 strong force were Bahraini at that time (Khuri, 1980). Popular demonstrations for
reform began as early as 1938 when Bahrainis called for a legislative body which better
represented the Sh population. At this time, they were estimated to be half the population and so requested this ratio of Sh in governing bodies (Fakhro, 1997). Reforms of the

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S. Strobl

police were also called for to include more Bahrainis in the force. Concurrently, the government clamped down on the printing of the first local newspaper, Al-Bahrain, in 1944,
when publisher Abdullah al-Zayed called for uniting Bahrain into one Gulf Arab principality with other emirates (Hanna, 1991), a Pan-Arab call to transcend sectarianism and to
usurp the heavy-handed control of the royal family.
In the 1950s, the police were headquartered at Riffa Fort, southwest of Manama. At
that time, additional Iraqi troops were added to shore up the ruling family against sectarian, opposition demonstrations and violence by locals. In 1953 a state of emergency was
declared (Fakhro, 1997) and a special branch of the police was established to handle political affairs and internal unrest. Second-in-charge of the political unit was a British officer.
Additionally, tribal militias, primarily from the village of al-Hasa, who were loyal to the
emir, suppressed local disorder. These 200 volunteers were later recruited into an antiriot
team (Lawson, 1989). In 1965 a strike at Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) involved
demonstrators calling for the right to organize labor unions, a lifting of the state of emergency and freedom of the press (Fakhro, 1997). By the 1960s, given the sectarian unrest
and the growing opposition to the ruling family, the emir preferred to have British officers
in positions of trust in policing rather than Bahrainis or other foreigners (Joyce, 2003).
The 1960s were characterized by a lack of trust between the police and the community.
In al-Hoora, a Sunni community, a Pan-Arab movement surfaced at a local community
center, the Arabian Club.
Al-Hoora [in the 1960s and 1970s], used to swarm with a leftist political activity and tidal
wave which irritated the security authorities. This has led to the deployment of Secret Police
like domestic flies throughout the quarters of Al-Hoora. (Sulaibekh, 2004, p. 57)

Because the men who belonged to the Arabian Club solved local disputes between
community members and otherwise exhibited informal authority in the neighborhood, this:
made the Secret Police, whenever they have arrested a young man, ask him the following
questions: Is the Club run and supported from abroad? If you do not admit so, we will close it
down. These questions and threats used to be directed to all prison inmates . . . The Club used
to be a school on its own right. It was a police station. It was a ministry of foreign affairs. And
it was a ministry of information. When the Club gives orders, everybody will obey in respect
for its orders. (p. 82)

Leftist Bahrainis, both Sunni and Sh, who were alive at the time recall that secret police
and other undercover operatives were often deployed by the state in order to maintain the
royal familys control over the island.
Policing after independence
The Bahrain State Police under the Department of General Security was first established
in 1962. During the 1960s, the British were actively decolonizing its protectorates and
pursued a policy of further importing British-style policing to cement the colonial legacy
(Sinclair & Williams, 2007). Local officers were promoted into positions that were previously filled by British officers (Tobias, 1977). A female police unit, whose role was
to work on cases involving women or children, was started in 1970 with three Bahraini
women trained in Bahrain by a British policewoman and then sent to England for
additional training (Strobl, 2007). In addition, the transition to independence involved
bolstering police technology around responsiveness, mobility and communications

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(Sinclair & Williams, 2007). According to Tobias (1977), the police forces in the former
British protectorates and colonies can fairly claim to be one of the proudest and most
enduring legacies of Britains erstwhile role as ruler of much of the worlds surfaces
(p. 242).
Upon independence, the police force was renamed Bahrain Public Security in 1971
and placed within the Ministry of the Interior after independence of the country from
Britain (Strobl & Alizadeh, 2005). Defense and internal security expenditures have historically been high in Bahrain, forming approximately 2028% of Bahrains total government
expenditures in the years between 1974 and 1983 (Lawson, 1989).
After independence, the police continued to suppress opposition to the ruling family,
a political deployment of police that was common in postcolonial countries throughout
the Middle East and Africa (Crystal, 2001). In 1975, the State Security Measures Law was
decreed by the Emir and granted power of arrest and detention for up to three years without
interrogation or trial for anyone accused of threatening the state (Crystal, 2001; Fakhro,
1997; ICG, 2005). The elected assembly, created under the 1973 constitution, was opposed
to this measure, which was never subjected to their approval. In August 1975, the Emir
dissolved the assembly, contrary to the constitution and decreed that all land in the country
was at his disposal (Fakhro, 1997). According to several Sh interviewed, many people
in their community had their land taken away by the emir; Sunni-owned lands, however,
seemed to evade confiscation. These and other discriminatory measures concentrated the
political and economic power into the hands of the Sunni elite. The maintenance of the
political and economic power was solidified by police control of any opposition.
Sectarian strife reached a critical point after the 1979 Iranian revolution. The Bahraini
police reported that coup dtat attempts, by Sh allegedly loyal to Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini, had been broken up. In 1984, the police arrest 30 Sh who had arms caches
for this purpose. They made 60 to 80 arrests in 1988 of members of the Islamic Front for
al-Bahrain), headed by Hadi
the Liberation of Bahrain (al-Jabhah al-Islamyah li-tahrir
al-Mudarrisi, which the police claimed conducted sabotage operations from cells in Sh
dominated rural villages (Cordesman, 1997).
The sectarian divide reached crisis proportions in 1994 when Sh gatherings at AlMumin mosque in Manama, memorializing the death of Grand Ayatollah Golpayegani of
Iran, morphed into a protest against the government suppression of Sh political and economic interests. Police dispersed the demonstration which only led to mounting tension in
the Sh community. The following month, 14 Sh students were arrested and detained
without trial after a sectarian argument with other students. In September of the same year
police used tear gas to break up a Sh protest against job discrimination and unemployment in front of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs building. In November of that
year, the police arrest of Sheikh Ali Salman, a Sh cleric trained in Iran, and a dozen of
his followers for inciting violence. Reportedly, they encouraged a previous incident during the Bahrain marathon in which villagers protested and threw rocks at runners who they
felt were inappropriately attired in running shorts. December 1994 brought more protests in
the Sh neighborhoods within Manama when the largely Pakistani and Baluchi force fired
rubber bullets at protestors using Molotov cocktails and stones against them (Cordesman,
1997). Thousands of Bahrainis were arrested and tortured by police during this and subsequent periods of unrest (personal communication with two torture victims, March 1, 2006;
Human Rights Watch, 2002; ICG, 2005).
In January of 1995, several hundred demonstrators were arrested and several civilians and two policemen were killed in protest violence. Two months later there were Sh
attacks on power stations and transformers as well as burning tires and petrol-bombing

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S. Strobl

of Western expatriate homes. On April 1, 1995, Sheikh Abdul Amir al-Jamri, a Sh

cleric educated in Iran, sparked police confrontation. Eighteen members of his family
were arrested within a melee of several hundred demonstrators. Fifty civilians were injured
and a policeman was killed. As many as 5000 men, mostly in their teens and early twenties, were arrested during unrest in May. The following month extra security forces were
deployed during ashura, a holiday commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Hussein in
the seventh-century CE and memoralizing the moment at which the Sh split from the
Sunni. The heavy police presence sparked riots and protests during which several people
were killed and hundreds arrested. In July 1995, the death of a 15-year-old Sh youth
after being beaten during interrogation led to more protests and demonstrations, including
the arrests of three men for unleashing percussion bombs. The United States Department
of State estimated that throughout 1995, at least 2700 people were arrested for demonstrating, and were not afforded procedural rights such as knowing the charges against them,
attorney representation, and trials (Cordesman, 1997).
In January 1996, there were four protests over the course of two weeks in which police
used tear gas to control crowds. On January 17, a bomb exploded in a toilet at the Meridian
Hotel (now the Ritz Carlton). The following month, protestors set fire to the Karzakhan
branch of the National Bank of Bahrain, seven Bangladeshi workers were killed in the
firebombing of a restaurant, and a bomb exploded in the car of a top newspaper editor. The
police responded by conducting major security sweeps through the Sh areas of Sitra,
Sanabis, and Diah (Cordesman, 1997).
According to the Ministry of the Interior, the Islamic Movement for the Liberation of
Bahrain, operating out of London, and Hezbollah Bahrain, which were receiving funding
and material support from Lebanon and Iran, actively worked to overthrow the government.
The police believed that Hezbollah Bahrain had been directed by the Iranian government
during the 1990s to collect data on US military forces in Bahrain. Members of this group
were reportedly trained in heavy weapons and explosives by Hezbollah in Lebanon. The
Ministry of the Interior broadcasted the confession of arrested group members on television, where they admitted planning acts of terrorism in Bahrain at the direct request of
Ayatollah Ali Khamanei.
However, the Bahraini government exaggerated Irans role in stoking Bahrains sectarian policies (Cordesman, 1997; ICG, 2005). Recent scholarship has made a compelling
argument that the widespread fear surrounding Sh militancy was wholly disproportionate to its actual power and appeal, and outside political influence was far less significant
than alleged (ICG, 2005, p. 11). Instead, the Ministry of the Interior and the government
in general has played the sectarian card in order to call into question the loyalty of the
Sh, as well as some Sunnis who were critical of the government, and justify the ruling
familys agenda to concentrate economic and political power in the ruling elite (ICG, 2005,
p. 12). Foreign observers often accepted Sunni paranoia about Shia due to a misperception of the religious symbols used to express Shia frustration. For example, imagery of the
martyrdom of Hussein, celebrated during ashura is often used as a metaphor for current
Bahraini Sh frustrations, but it is not necessarily a call for a pan-Sh state or a joining
up with Iran as Sunnis and the government fear. For example, one large sign draped over
a building in central Manama during the February 2006 ashura celebrations stated in
Arabic [authors translation]: We learned from Hussein how to stand by the oppressed and
oppose the oppressor. Sunnis often misunderstand Sh marj al-taqld, the obligation to
seek guidance from leading Sh clergy. Bahrain does not have religious authority figures
(marjiiyah) high enough to emulate on this level; thus, Shia turn to marj outside Bahrain
for guidance and to answer their spiritual and practical questions (ICG, 2005).

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By placing blame on external threats and religious sectarianism, the government has
attempted to neutralize the actual focus of Sh activism, which has long been focused
on solving domestic challenges like poverty, discrimination in employment, and lack of
political participation in the life of the country. Sh are more likely to be poor. Young
Sh families are unable to afford to buy houses, a situation that is exacerbated by an
overall sense of relative deprivation. As MacFarquhar (2006) reported in the New York
Times:
The poverty suffered by many Shiites seems particularly galling to them given the real estate
boom. [Manamas] skyline is dominated by gargantuan luxury office blocs under construction,
which Bahrainis contend are all owned by the royal family. The capital is plastered with ads
for housing developments like Riffa Heights, an upscale community with sea views and a
golf course in a plush neighborhood already dominated by royal palaces where Shiites [are
not permitted] to buy land. (p. 1)

In addition, there is visible segregation of poor Sh communities from surrounding

wealthier areas. Entire Sh villages are tucked away, off the main roads, with only one
or two points of access to them. The containment of these pockets of squalor, notably the
outskirts of Manama, Sitra, and Sanabis, has come in handy during demonstrations against
the detainment of Sh activists and leaders. According to reporting by al-Wasat newspaper, riot police use the villages to dead-end protest marches and contain demonstrators
(Mahdi, 2006a, 2006b).
Particularly problematic in the eyes of human rights workers and Sh activists is the
importing of Sunnis from other countries, such as Yemen, Jordan, Syria, and Pakistan,
to fill police officer positions. In what has been called political naturalization, the government sought to influence the demographics of the country by granting citizenship to
non-Bahrain Sunni Arabs working for the defense and security forces as a means of countering the Sh majority. Human rights workers believe that as many as 60,000 have been
granted citizenship in this way. The ease that these people were granted citizenship contrasts greatly with non-Muslim South Asian expatriate workers who after years of working
in the country, sometimes over generations, do not have access to citizenship (ICG, 2005,
p. 8). Reports that the government was naturalizing several hundred Sunni South Asians
in anticipation of the 2006 elections were published in local papers (Asian Citizenship,
2006). Several political groups filed suit, including the National Democratic Action Society
(NADS), al-Wefaq National Islamic Society and Bahrain Centre for Human Rights, among
others, alleging that the naturalization was illegal (Bahraini Groups, 2006). As a result
of the political naturalization of many police personnel, many locals refer to the police
as foreign mercenaries (ICG, 2005). Bahraini Sh are grossly underrepresented in
the Bahraini police force, as well as government ministries in general (Bahry, 2000;
Cordesman, 1997). The government refused to provide information on the number of Sh
currently serving in the police force pursuant to this research. A survey of policewomen in
2005 found that only three out of a sample of 112 who returned questionnaires (out of a
total population of 241), identified themselves as Sh when asked their sectarian identity
(Strobl & Sung, 2009).
According to a report by the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights, anti-Sh discrimination is particularly pronounced at the heights of power, which are dominated by the
ruling family, and in [the] most sensitive sectors, like the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF)
and the Ministry of the Interior (ICG, 2005, p. 8). Of police occupying the top 30 positions of the Ministry of the Interior, all are Sunni and 15 of them hail from the ruling

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S. Strobl

family (IGC, 2005). As recently as the 1990s, the Bahraini government discouraged Sh
from applying to positions in the Bahrain Defense Force and the Ministry of the Interior by

requiring them to show a certificate of good behavior and conduct (shihadah husin
al-suluk
wa al-srah) issued by the police to those without a police record or any arrests for political
demonstrations (Bahry, 2000).
Recently, the move toward Bahrainization of human resources has included initiatives
to increase the number of Bahrainis, including Sh, in the police force, while slowly
phasing out existing foreigners from Yemen, Jordan, Syria, and Pakistan (Bahry, 2000). In
February 2006, 2200 non-Bahraini Ministry of the Interior personnel were fired as part
of the plan to Bahrainize the national forces; 252 of the fired employees were policemen. According to the Ministry of the Interior, 48% of their personnel are Bahraini.
However, this number was not broken down into the percentage of those Bahrainis
who were Sh versus Sunni (Al-dakhalya, 2006). According to the Ministry of the
Interior, 14% of the police force are Arab expatriates, and 38% are of other nationalities
(Ministry Jobs, 2005).
Political change at the turn of the millennium in Bahrain, ushered in by the then-new
King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa, changed the country from an emirate to a constitutional
monarchy, suggesting greater freedom and a constraint on royal power. Political prisoners
were released, parliamentary elections held and exiled opposition members welcomed back
to the country in a move toward a democracy that the King said would be arqah (deeply
rooted) (MacFarquhar, 2006). The King also fired the British director of internal security
(Higgins, 2005). In fact, the permission to conduct this research in consultation with police
officers reflected the Ministry of Interiors new public-friendly orientation, which includes
releasing more information to the public about its operations than ever before.
However, in evidence of a backsliding of the liberalization promised by the King,
in 2005, political prisoners were once again detained by the police. For example, Ali
Abdulrahman, founder of Bahrain Online, an immensely popular interactive Internet
site devoted to discussions of the Bahraini politics of opposition, was put in prison for
fomenting hatred of the government in February 2006 (Higgins, 2005). In late 2004, Abd
al-Hadi al-Khawaja, a prominent human rights leader, was arrested after giving a speech
that was critical of Prime Minister Shaikh Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa. No newspaper printed the contents of the speech, though it was reported about on Bahrain Online
(MacFarquhar, 2006).
In the autumn of 2006 clashes between police and the Sh opposition occurred at
least twice in response to a report issued by the London-based Gulf Centre for Democratic
Development (GCDD) in September. Protestors hurled stones at police in a September
2006 incident in which police responded with tear gas. In November, rioters blocked access
to Sanabis, a suburb of Manama, and set trash bins on fire. Both demonstrations began with
marches calling for an investigation into the allegations of the GCDD report. It claimed that
a secret group from within the Sunni government, including members of the royal family,
had conspired to stoke sectarian flare-ups and rig the poll results of the November 25, 2006
municipal and parliamentary elections. The scandal was uncovered by Salah al-Bandar,
a Sudanese-Brit, who was expelled from Bahrain on September 13, 2006. The incident
is popularly referred to as Bandargate; the government has banned Bahraini newspapers
from mentioning it (Bahraini Police, 2006; Bahraini Police, Protestors, 2006; Bahraini
Protestors, 2006; Fattah, 2006a, 2006b). Despite the alleged attempt to foment sectarian
unrest and politically naturalize Sunnis to create votes for Sunni candidates, Sh candidates won 16 out of the 17 seats they contested in parliament, representing 40% of the
legislative body.

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31

More recently, in January 2009, police used tear gas to quell Sh demonstrations
involving burning tires and trashcans in Diraz and Jidhafs. The unrest erupted in protest to
the detention of two clerics and a human rights leader on terrorism charges and the failure
to report to the public prosecutor as witnesses in a case in which it is alleged 14 Sh
individuals attempted to overthrow the government (Agence France Press, 2009; Second
day, 2009). According to the New York Times, the rioters insist that they are protesting
an apartheid system that denies them opportunities equal to those of their Sunni neighbors,
and they say that their government has cracked down in response to the perceived threat
of the rising Shiite power in Iraq and the rising influence of Iran (Bahrain, 2009). In
March of the same year, tensions arose after an Iranian official stated that Iran maintain
its claims on Bahrain as one of its provinces. Sunni Bahrainis, sensitive to the influence of
Iran in the region given the Sh majority in their midst, reacted with anger, tamped down
only by regional diplomacy involving the president of Egypt and the king of Jordan. Sunni
overtures that Bahraini Sh want to unite with Iran resurfaced at that time, whereas most
Sh groups indicate that, like in the 1990s, such accusations are an excuse to maintain
Sh marginalization (Slackman & Worth, 2009).
Community policing in Bahrain
Upon the ascendancy of the current king and his liberalization strategy, the need to alter
the image of the police and to make the force more legitimate in the eyes of Bahrainis
became a priority. As has occurred in many countries, the police have become conscious of
the need for its officers to reflect the ethnic, religious and gender diversity within modern,
globalized societies (Shusta et al., 2002) in order to win over foreign investment and maintain the appearance of meeting international human rights standards. As such, in 2003, the
government turned toward the darling of Western police strategies community policing
as a model. The new Bahraini community police officers hit the streets in 2005.
One aim of the unit, like community policing throughout the world, is to increase the
ties between the public and the community through measures that focus holistically on
crime prevention and problem solving (Radi, 2005), including informal dispute resolution
(Sharp and Smart, 2005). Each community police officer serves in the same governate
in which they live in order to further ground the unit in the local culture and conditions.
In addition, they initiate public awareness campaigns, educational programs such as anger
management classes, and participate in national celebrations (Abdulrahman, 2004). For
example, during the Sh celebration of Ashura, which involves processions by thousands
of people throughout the alleys and lanes of central Manama, community police officers
engaged in foot patrols and assisted in crowd control and on-site dispute resolution while
also mingling with the public socially and listening to the concerns of community members
(Muhammad, 2006). Although the community police officers do not carry firearms, they
have batons, and have been granted the power of arrest. They regularly participate in foot
patrols in places like suqs, malls, and city centers (Radi, 2005).
The move toward community policing in Bahrain was first felt in 1999. The Ministry of
the Interior initiated the training of community policing officers after top officials attended
international police conferences and were impressed by the community policing in countries like Australia and Japan. The ministry sent 18 officers to the United Kingdom to
learn from community police officers and subsequently added community policing to
the curriculum at the Royal Police College in Jaw (Four Years, 2003). In 2003, the
Ministry of the Interior hosted an International Police Executive Forum conference entitled Community and the Police in order to elicit information and ideas, following a royal

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decree that charged the ministry with developing a public service orientation. Local police
representatives, as well as police from Finland, Japan, and the United States, participated
(Dr. Michael Palmietto, conference participant, personal communication, March 23, 2006).
More recently, the Minister of the Interior, Shaikh Rashid bin Abdullah al Khalifa cited
the United Kingdom and Singapore as ideal community policing models (Fakhri, 2005a).
Contemporaneous with the new focus on developing community policing, the Gulf Daily
News published a story on Yusuf Dashti, a Bahraini who had returned home after working
with a US community relations department in Texas and earning his undergraduate degree
in criminal justice. He told the press:
The police in Bahrain need to stop touring around in their jeeps and glaring at people and start
getting out and shaking hands. If police are closer to the community then they can remove the
fear barrier between them. They will know more about peoples problems and be able to gather
intelligence to prevent crime. (Horton, 2003)

In addition, Dashti expressed concern that policemen (unlike policewomen) are largely
non-Bahraini, further alienating them from the community. He called for more recruitment
of locals to the force.
Indeed, there is some speculation that the community police force is a means to
increase the numbers of local Bahrainis and Sh into the foreign, Sunni-dominated force.
According to community policewomen interviewed, they estimate that approximately 10
(one-quarter) of the 39 community policewomen are Sh.
The introduction of a more representative force inclusive of Sh and women has been
framed by the Kingdom as part of a general move toward increased modernization and
liberalization of the country. The Minister of the Interior, Shaikh Rashid bin Abdullah al
Khalifa, has labeled the community policing initiative as part of the ministrys modernization phase to ensure better services (Hamada, 2005, p. 3) and a qualitative change
to keep pace with developments in security measures in the developed world (Fakhri,
2005a, p. 4). According to Brigadier Abdulatif Al-Zayani, human rights, transparency, and
accountability all characterize the new unit (Fakhri, 2005b). As such, women and Sh
are markers in the governments drive toward impressing outsiders with a modern, friendly
face. One policewoman echoed this notion when she explained the benefits of working
in Bahrains international airport. She believes that policewomen are promoted to higher
ranks much earlier than women in other sections, such as traffic, child protection, or immigration. She explained, It is because the government wants foreigners coming in on flights
to see high-ranking policewomen. It projects an image of modernization. The importance
of appearing modern was further evidenced by the number of police who touted the new,
blue uniforms as a sign of change (as opposed to the green, military-like uniforms that noncommunity police wear). In an advertisement on March 27, 2006, for a series in al-Waqt
newspaper about the history of the Bahraini police (which subsequently was not printed),
the advertising slogan stated that the police are between green strength and blue charm
(bayn quwah al-akhdar wa latafah al-azraq).
According to a police colonel, the long-term goal of community policing is for the
entire force to be community-oriented and preventive, emphasizing the blue charm in
their approach (personal communication, November 14, 2005). A police major said that
wearing blue will soften the image of the police and help the public to understand the
change the police are undergoing to better serve them (personal communication, May 2,
2005). As a director of a Bahraini Governate stated, regarding community policing:

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The train has left the station and we are on board. We havent reached all our goals, it is still too
early. But were moving forward toward service-oriented approaches . . . security is a service
and we need to be in the business of quality-management . . . What I hope to see is tough
police for criminals and soft police for victims and the community. (Personal communication,
December 6, 2005)

Though the strategizing about and implementation of community policing has largely
occurred among male police leaders, policewomen are seen as playing a crucial role in
the transformation, or at least the appearance of transformation, of policing from colonial
to community-oriented in Bahrain.
Finally, trends in Bahrain seem to reflect a regional move toward community policing.
Algerias police have indicated that they would like to explore more community-oriented
approaches (Algeria, 2001). And, the Sharjah Police, in the United Arab Emirates
(UAE), has recently adopted what is called anjad (friendly or helpful) patrols consisting
of policemen who greet and meet community members and inquire about their concerns
(Al-Jandaly, 2003).

Conclusion
Historical trends in the development of Bahraini police are fundamental in understanding
the current trends in community policing in Bahrain, as well as the ongoing Sh opposition to the police. Unlike most historical accounts of the Bahraini police, their colonial
and postcolonial development is highly influenced by the political power struggle between
a Sunni government ruling a Sh majority population. It is important to recognize the
nature of postcolonial police forces as legacies of colonial subjugation. In this case, the
Bahraini ruling family was from a minority Sunni group shored up by the British and then
maintained through a heavy-handed policing style, which lurks in the recent past. More
broadly, the Bahraini police are influenced by a variety of identifiable and overlapping
influences: kinship networks, colonial administration, global capitalism, and international
police professionalism, to name a few. This reflects the postcolonial milieu as a hybrid
with a variety of important nuances, which must be disaggregated in order to understand
a social phenomenon operating in a particular context (Abu-Lughod, 1998; Said, 1993;
Spivak, 1999).
Although the implementation of community policing is one step toward acknowledging
the hybridity of influences, the diversity of the countrys citizens, and including Sh community in matters related policing, further research is needed into the implementation
strategies and effectiveness of this recent initiative. Bahrains form of community policing has become a model of the region, according to the countrys Ministry of the Interior.
For example, its website boasts about a Qatari delegation visiting the community policing unit in Bahrain to learn about [the] experience of Bahrain in the field of community
policing, which has been considered [a] successful experience applied in the GCC member countries (Ministry of the Interior, 2009). As such, Bahrain has received community
policing practices from Japan, Singapore, and the West, as well as passing them along to
their regional neighbors.
Despite community policing efforts, sectarian unrest in Bahrain shows no signs of abating, suggesting that further reforms are likely needed to maintain order in the country.
Bahraini policing maintains its modus operandi as a protection of the Sunni government
even as it tries to soften its image after contact with a global police culture of community
policing. This softening may primarily serve as a means of measuring up to the global

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S. Strobl

standards of policing and being perceived as one of the worlds developed, industrialized
countries rather than being a substantive movement toward a new era. Based on fieldwork
in the country, it appears that merely changing uniforms, patrolling more on foot in the
community, and publicizing a friendlier orientation may not be enough for the police to
overcome Sh dissatisfaction and trauma stemming from historical and contemporary
experiences with police oppression.
The lack of trust evident in the Sh community toward the police will inevitably
hinder any chance of the new community police force to truly repair the relationship. With
thousands of Bahrainis having experienced torture and other human rights violations at
the hands of police, the expectation that citizens will suddenly forgive and forget, without
a reconciliation process in which the government takes responsibility, seems misguided.
The lack of trust in Bahrain is further exacerbated by high-ranking police and government
officials refusal to speak candidly about their past and present policies regarding Sh.
Two high-ranking police officers asked this researcher to avoid any mention of sectarian
problems in any study of Bahraini policing. One explained:
It would not be good for the county to talk about Sh and Sunni. We have to see ourselves
as one people and [academic] work that focus on sectarian problems just makes everything
worse for us.

The best hope, however, for meaningful change in policeSh relations is more, not less
dialogue. A mediated dialogue process has been routinely called for by the Bahrain Centre
for Human Rights, but the Bahraini government has never indicated any willingness to
initiate one.
Truth and reconciliation committees, like those in South Africa that confronted
apartheid, are one way to confront a violent past with an eye toward the future. Such a
committee has been previously initiated in the Arab world when Morocco established the
Moroccan Equity and Reconciliation Committee, administered by the International Center
for Transitional Justice (ICTJ). Moroccos truth-seeking process centered on the arbitrary
detentions perpetrated against members of the opposition movement from 1956 to 1999
(ICTJ, 2004), bringing to light 20,000 cases of suspected disappearances, rape, torture, and
murder (Harter, 2004; Slyomovics, 2005). Morocco chose not to punish named offenders
in order to concentrate on identifying, verifying, and reporting stories of suspicious disappearances. The hearings were televised live in 2004 over a period of several weeks and
Moroccans reported to local newspapers that viewing the testimony had a profound emotional effect on them (Slyomovics, 2005). The use of public hearings has been touted as:
one important step in restoring dignity to citizens who have suffered state-sponsored human
rights violations and who have been forced to remain silent about their experiences for fear of
reprisal and societal exclusion. (ICTJ, 2004, n.p.)

Similarly, by giving Bahraini Sh victims a voice in a similar process, it is possible to

grow a new relationship between the Bahraini government, the police, and its citizens that
can blunt the historical persistence of sectarian strife.
Notes
1.
2.
3.

Between green strength and blue charm . . . [authors translation].

This evolved into the modern Arabic word for police.
Colloquial Arabic as transliterated by Lienhardt (2001).

International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice

35

Notes on contributor
Staci Strobl is an assistant professor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice. She is also the recipient
of the 2009 Radzinowicz Memorial Prize from the British Journal of Criminal Justice. The research
reported in this article was partially supported by a US Department of State Fulbright grant to Bahrain
in 2005 and 2006.

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