Ca
CaO
1270
Mg
MgO
1240
Al
Al2O3
1100
Si
SiO2
830
Cr
Cr2O3
750
Zn
ZnO
700
Fe
Fe2O3
530
Cu
CuO
300
Sucrose
470
Starch
470
390
Carbon
CO2
400
Coal
400
Sulphur
SO2
300
The higher the heat of combustion, the more likely it is to be able to sustain a
dust explosion. You can see from the above table, that metals are the most
dangerous dusts from a purely energetic viewpoint.
For ideal gases we can relate the heat release to the pressure increase quite
easily using this equation:
P = TnR / V
Where P is the gas pressure, T is the temperature, n is the number of moles
present, R is the universal gas constant (8.3145 Joules per mole Kelvin at STP)
and V is the gas volume. At constant volume the pressure is proportional to n and
T. Hence by finding the temperature rise from the combustion of the dust you can
estimate the pressure rise due to the explosion (assuming a constant volume).
The temperature change affects the pressure rise the most, as the number of
moles present is dependant on the chemistry of the reaction.
For example, if metal dusts are combusted all of the oxygen will be converted to
oxides reducing n as no gases are produced to replace the oxygen. However in a
combustion reaction with an organic dust (composed of carbon and hydrogen)
the volume increase will be large. For every oxygen molecule consumed two
molecules of water (as a gas) will be formed or one carbon dioxide molecule will
be formed. However this is assuming complete combustion of all the oxygen
rather than any generation of carbon monoxide or other products. Therefore the
most important factor in deciding whether a material can cause a dust explosion
is the heat of combustion.
Explosible Concentrations
Dust cloud explosions can only occur if the dust concentration is within certain
limits. This is analogous with the concept of upper and lower flammable limits of
mixtures of gas (or vapours) and air. In general the lowest concentration of dust
that can give a dust explosion is around 50-100g/m 3 and the maximum is 23kg/m3. These limits are dependent on the particular chemical in question and on
the particle size distribution; however they are included here to give an idea of
the orders of magnitude involved.
It is usually easy to see if a cloud is explosible, as visibility through a dust cloudeven at the lowest concentrations-is impaired. However these concentrations are
far below those recommended by industrial hygiene standards, therefore they
shouldn't occur in a working environment anyway.
As a general rule of thumb it is said that if a 25W bulb can be seen through 2m of
the dust cloud then the dust concentration is below 40g/m 3. A cloud of this
concentration is unlikely to be in the workplace, and should only be found in
process vessels.
Ignition
A cloud of dust, within its flammable concentration limits, will not burn unless
sufficient energy is provided to ignite it. Possible ignition sources include:
Open flames (welding, cutting, matches, etc)
Hot surfaces (dryers, bearings, heaters, etc)
Heat from mechanical impacts
Electrical discharges
Electrostatic discharges
Smouldering or burning dust
A brief analysis of each of these ignition sources follows, techniques for avoiding
them are covered in the Prevention section of the site.
Open Flames
Flames from welding or cutting operations are easily sufficient to trigger a dust
explosion. Oxy-acetylene torches are particularly dangerous as they supply
oxygen to the area, and the more oxygen present, the less heat is required to
trigger an explosion. Therefore there should be no use of cutting or welding
torches on working dust processing units. Smoking should be prohibited
anywhere in the plant as a match flame generates 100W of heat energy, which is
more than sufficient to ignite a dust cloud.
Hot Surfaces
Hot surfaces can ignite dust explosions in two ways, the first by causing lying
dust to burn, and the second by direct contact with the dust cloud. The chances
of igniting a dust cloud are less as this requires a surface temperature of over
400C to supply enough heat for ignition.
Electric sparks
Sparks given off from faulty electrical equipment are sometimes the causes of
dust explosions, especially if a high voltage device fails, or a cable is severed. A
spark of anything over 1mJ can ignite a dust cloud, and this is easily produced if
a piece of plant equipment, such as a motor, fails.
Electrostatic Discharges
These kind of static sparks were long thought to be incapable of igniting a dust
cloud, although today they are known to have been the cause of dust explosions
where equipment has not been earthed properly. The static electricity build-up in
dust processing can be large as charge is transferred from particles to the
vessel. There are several different types of electrostatic discharges (Spark,
Brush, Corona, Propagating Brush, Surface, and Lightning-like discharge). The
most dangerous type are spark discharges, which occur when charge builds up
Dust Concentration
Dust cloud explosions can only occur if the dust concentration is within certain
limits. This is analogous with the concept of upper and lower flammable limits of
mixtures of gas (or vapours) and air. In general the lowest concentration of dust
that can give a dust explosion is around 50-100g/m3 and the maximum is 2-
3kg/m3. These limits are dependent on the particular chemical in question and
on the particle size distribution. The worst cases are usually when the dust
concentration is slightly above the stoichiometric concentration. Upper
concentration limits are dictated by the minimum amount of oxygen needed for
explosion, lower limits by the minimum quantity of particles needed to sustain a
combustion.
Turbulence
A more turbulent cloud will result in a more severe explosion as, due to the more
homogenous concentrations and lower degree of dispersion, the flame front will
move more quickly through the dust cloud. However a less turbulent cloud is
more easily ignited, as heat dissipation is at a lower rate so the initial heat
release is more locally concentrated, leading to a higher probability of ignition
from an input of energy.
Mitigation
Preventing Explosible
Dust Clouds
Smouldering combustion
in dust
Intrinsic Inerting
Isolation
Hot Surfaces
Venting
Electric/Electrostatic
Sparks
Pressure Resistant
construction
Automatic Suppression
Good Housekeeping (cleaning
& dust removal)
Prevention falls into two categories, preventing ignition and preventing the
formation of a dust cloud. Mitigation can be achieved in several ways which
either stop the explosion or relieve the pressure it causes before it can do too
much damage.
]
Open Flames
Open flames are most easily avoided by rigorously enforcing a no smoking policy
within the process area. Hot work must not be carried out in an area unless it,
and any area that could be directly or indirectly affected, is entirely free from
dust. Gas cutting torches that use excess oxygen should be avoided as they can
cause ignition to be easier than it would be in air.
Hot Surfaces
Hot surfaces occur on items of process equipment that use heat, such as
heaters, dryers, steam pipes, electrical equipment, etc. They also occur in less
obvious process equipment too, such as engines, blowers, mechanical
conveyors, mills, mixers, bearings and unprotected light bulbs. Further hot
surfaces can be created during hot work which can provide enough heat for
ignition.
Dust lying on hot surfaces can be ignited, as can dust clouds, thus leading to
dust explosions. Lying dust on hot surfaces also acts as a layer of insulation
which can cause equipment failure.
Following these measures can help minimise the chance of ignition from hot
surfaces:
Removal of all dust before performing hot work
Prevent/Remove dust on hot surfaces
Shield or isolate hot surfaces
Only use electrical equipment approved for use in the presence of
combustible dust
Use equipment with low chance of overheating
Regular and thorough inspection and maintenance procedures
Mechanical Impacts
Mechanical impacts can produce either glowing sparks or hot spots where the
impact occurs. Usually these sparks are not sufficiently energetic to provide
ignition, but in the case of repeated impact or when exotic metals are used there
is a risk of igniting a dust cloud. To best avoid these sparks occurring it is
recommended that you:
Remove foreign objects from process streams as soon a possible
Avoid any construction materials that could give incendiary sparks or thermite
flashes
Inspect odd noises to see if they are caused by impacts, and if so remedy the
situation in a safe manner
Electrical/electrostatic sparks
Electrical sparks are best minimised by observing the regulations for electrical
equipment in dusty areas and ensuring that any installed electrical items comply.
Making sure that workers are aware of the electrical items and how to use them
safely is also wise.
Electrostatic sparks are less well understood and there are many ways to try to
minimise their formation. It has been recommended that:
Use conducting materials for plant items to avoid charge buildup
Earth any equipment that may become charged
Earth workers is the dust is easily ignitable
Earth coarse non-conducting powders via an earth rod through their storage
vessel
If in doubt, earth it.
Explosion Isolation
Isolating an explosion can restrict the amount of damage caused in several ways.
Primarily it stops the explosion from reaching other areas of the plant through the
process ducts or pipes, but also it stops the possibility of flame jets that can
occur at the end of long pipes and stops the pressure from the primary explosion
making secondary explosions in further vessels even more violent.
Isolation can be achieved in two different ways, either passive (activated by the
explosion itself) or active (requiring tripping by a sensor for activation). Passive
systems are favoured as they are simpler and more reliable, as long as they
function as intended. Usually these systems will, upon triggering, spray the dust
ahead of the flame front with extinguishing agent stopping further propagation,
alternatively they may simply close a valve ahead of the flame front (although this
can cause pressure problems).
There are a number of plant items that will avoid the propagation of flame
throughout the system. These include choked screw conveyers, rotary airlocks,
and special bursting disk systems that involve flow reversal.
A screw conveyor with choke can stop the flame front passing
A Bursting disk installed on a pipeline to stop flame propagation by reversing flow direction
Explosion Venting
Venting is the one of the cheapest, most effective ways to relieve pressure in an
explosion situation; however it is difficult to size the vent correctly to allow
sufficient pressure relief, as it must allow sufficient outflow of burnt dust and air
out to relieve the pressure being generated by the heat of the explosion. Usually
venting will be designed such that the pressure can be kept below some upper
value (that is lower than the strength of the vessel or building). If the powder in
the process is toxic venting to atmosphere is not possible, however venting to a
sealed area may be possible. Many different designs of venting are available for
all kinds of processes, including hinged doors that can withstand many
explosions, simple panels that are ejected, vent covers are usually attached to
the process vessel with clips or rubber seals which are known to fail under the
load of the explosion.
Here you can see the pressures in unvented, insufficiently vented, and correctly vented vessels
There are some rules of thumb for sizing vents, you can use a vent ratio from this
table:
Max Rate of Pressure Rise (bar/s) Vent Ratio (m-1)
< 345
1 / 6.1
345 - 690
1 / 4.6
> 690
1 / 3.1
The vent ratio is the ratio of vent area to vessel volume. You can also use the
graph below to get an approximate size for your vents:
For large vessels, greater than 30m 3, the ratio for vent sizing can be reduced, the
reason being that it is unlikely that a vessel that large would be full of an
explosive mixture, hence the pressure will not rise linearly with volume.
There are more accurate and complicated methods of vent sizing which can be
found in most of the better books on dust explosions (both "Dust Explosions" by
The agent used for suppression is typically a powder based one such as
NH4H2PO4, although for some powders superheated steam is quite good too.
Good Housekeeping
Good housekeeping in this context refers to the removal of dust accumulations
within the plant. Careful removal of lying dust can eliminate the possibility of
secondary dust explosions occurring, and also help to prevent some ignition
sources.
This should be done by installing good dust extraction systems wherever there is
a particularly dusty area of the plant. Spilt dust should be removed immediately
using either a high power explosion proof vacuum cleaner or an internal
vacuuming system which removes dust and sends it to a central filtration system.
Minor but steady leaks must be looked out for, as these can cause large amounts
of dust to accumulate over a period of time, this is more likely to be a problem if
the process runs at a slightly elevated pressure. The best way to avoid dust
Plant Layout
Buildings used in dust processing plants that could be in danger of dust
explosions must be designed along the same lines as any plant which has the
danger of explosion. Generally they should be away from other buildings, and the
actual parts of the plant should be as far apart from each other as is possible on
the site (without creating transport problems). Buildings should be as low as
possible, preferably of one storey, or if this is not possible, the most explosion
prone part of the process should be as high as possible (preferably on the roof)
to minimise the chance of building collapse in an explosion. If the hazardous part
of the plant is located indoors then the area must be reinforced and there must
be protection for the rest of the areas of the plant (a blast wall is needed) and
sufficient venting to avoid structural damage from overpressure. Other features
that must be included are safe escape routes in case of an explosion and fire, fire
resistant materials of construction, fire-resistant doors and high quality electrical
insulation.
Human Factors
There will be many different people working in any plant, ranging from engineers
and technicians to management and sales, above all it is important that
communication between everyone in the plant is meaningful and conveys
information properly. Workers must have knowledge, motivation and the
confidence to make decisions when needed. There must be training and
instruction for all workers that enables them to develop and be able to deal with
the actuality of a dust explosion.
Having seen in the previous section the many ways of avoiding and minimising
the dust explosion hazard, engineers need to identify what is needed for their
plant. There are several ways of doing this which usually come down to a cost
versus safety analysis, to see whether a solution is practicable.
It has been suggested that the problem should be broken down into fundamental
parts thus:
The effectiveness of the protection system
The technical feasibility
The environmental acceptability
The financial acceptability
The effectiveness of a system will always basically come down to how well the
system is understood and how well the safety systems have been designed, and
should allow them to be technically feasible. Environmental considerations must
also be at the forefront of the designers mind as it's not worth risking an
environmental disaster for the saving of a few thousand pounds. Really the
design and choice of system is dependant on what has been specified as the
most important condition of the plant design, this should always be the
effectiveness of the system but is too often the financial acceptability.
The diagram below shows a way of working from the process dust to consider all
the possibilities.
Hazard analysis always takes a large part in the choosing of the correct safety
system for a plant:
Hazard surveys
These should be run to see how much dangerous material is on site before
startup and to see what inventories of them will be used in the process
HAZOP
A HAZOP analysis should be performed to identify any areas where dangerous
situations can occur long before the plant is even built.
To Conclude...
This is the end of the website, I hope that you have reached here after reading
the whole of the page and I hope that this website has provided you with a useful
learning experience, and has extended your knowledge of dust explosions. I feel
glad that I have as it is now one of the few free sites that has any useful
information about dust explosions on the internet.
If you wish to pursue the subject of dust explosions further I recommend these
books:
Dust Explosions in the Process Industries - R. K. Eckhoff - 1997
This book is the most comprehensive book on dust explosions, published in 1997
it collects a great deal of the work by Field and Palmer, is very readable and yet
covers all aspects of dust explosions in great depth.
Butterworth-Heinemann; ISBN: 0750632704
Dust Explosions - P. Field - 1982
Part of the Handbook of Powder Technology this book is also a very
comprehensive guide to the phenomenon of dust explosions, and includes large
tables of useful data about many different chemicals and the likelyhood of them
being involved in dust explosions.
Elsevier; ISSN: 0167-3785
Industrial Dust Explosions - Cashdollar-Herzberg - 1986
A collection of papers from the 1986 symposium on industrial dust explosions,
this book has a great deal of technical data on specific aspects of dust
explosions.
ASTM 04-958000-31
Dust Explosions and Fires - K.N.Palmer - 1973
Another good book that seeks to explain the phenomenon of dust explosions
from the ground up, comprehensive and comprehendible, this book is a good
place to start, although some of the information may be slightly redundant due to
recent advances in the field it is one of the most cited books in the others.
ISBN 412 09430 4
Explosibility assessment of industrial powders and dusts - P. Field - 1983
This book is a useful and practical guide to the basics of dust explosions as it