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GALANG V CA

**facts of this case is in alien language


(Espaol)
Facts: Tee Hook Chun was charged with an
administrative case for violating the Phil
Immigration Act Sec 29 (a).
He was also charged with a criminal case for
violating Sec 45(e).

Issue:
WON Tee Hook Chun, for being charged with a
criminal case, may no longer be punished with
exclusion which is the necessary penalty of the
first case since he has to wait for the rendition of
a judgment in the first case and completion of
the service of penalty imposed on him if found
guilty of the criminal charge.

Held: NO. The two proceedings do not nullify


one another since their conflict is only physical.
If he is convicted in both cases, the penalties
will be served successively and there will be no
renunciation of either of the penalties. This
means that if he is guilty of the criminal case,
but the penalty does not include exclusion, he
may still be penalized with exclusion if found
guilty in the first case. The power of exclusion
under section 29(a) (17) is not set aside, waived
or lost upon institution of the criminal case. The
administrative proceeding for deportation shall
be "independent of the criminal action" for
violation of said section 45. The acquittal of the
accused in said criminal action would not bar his
deportation under the same provision, by the
Commissioner of Immigration.

In October 1951, Premiere Productions, Inc.


(PPI) filed a petition with the Court of Industrial
relations (CIR) seeking authority to lay-off 44
workers on the ground of financial losses. The
union therein (Philippine Movie Pictures
Workers Association) opposed the petition as it
averred that PPI is merely retaliating against
employees who joined a previous strike.
Judge Arsenio Roldan of the CIR then
conducted an ocular inspection. The inspection
was attended by counsels for both parties. The
judge inspected some records and interrogated
some witnesses. The counsels for both parties
were granted opportunities to cross examine in
said ocular inspection. Thereafter, Judge Roldan
granted PPI the authority to lay-off the 44
workers.
ISSUE: Whether or not an ocular inspection
may be the basis, without receiving full
evidence, of determining the cause or motive of
laying off employees.
HELD: No. An ocular inspection does not
satisfy the procedural requirement. The petition
for lay-off was predicated on the lack of work
and of the further fact that the company was
incurring financial losses these allegations
cannot be proven simply by an ocular
inspection. The parties, especially the workers
in this case, should not be deprived of their
opportunity to present evidence they may deem
necessary to establish their case in the main trial.
Here, the main trial is absent because all that
was conducted was an ocular inspection such
is tantamount to a deprivation of their right to be
heard. It is recognized that ones employment,
profession, or trade, or calling, is a property
right and the wrongful interference therewith is
an actionable wrong. Therefore, the dismissal of
the 44 workers without opportunity to be heard
is a violation of their property right.

Philippine Movie v Premier Production


Facts:

Antique Sawmill, Inc, v, Zayco


Facts:

A public bidding was conducted for the award of


a forest area which was divided equally between
Zayco and Antique Sawmills, Inc. Zayco filed
MR outside the 30-day reglementary period.
Despite this, Zayco still appealed this to OP and
OP still issued a decision that the forest area be
awarded only to Zayco. Antique Sawmill claims
that the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources has become final and the
OP had no jurisdiction to issue that decision
after the 30-day reglementary period had lapsed.

Held:
NO. Compliance with the period provided by
law for the perfection of an appeal is not merely
mandatory by also a jurisdictional requirement.
Such failure has the effect of rendering final the
judgment of the court, and the certification of
the record on appeal thereafter cannot restore the
jurisdiction which has been lost. A regulation
adopted pursuant to law has the force and effect
of law. Administrative regulations be given the
same force as rules of court in order to maintain
the regularity of administrative proceedings.
Proceedings already terminated should not be
altered at every step. Judgment of courts should
become final at some definite date fixed by law.
The very object for which courts were instituted
was to put an end to controversy.
FACTOR AFFECTING FINALITY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS: If an
administrative decision has already becomes
final and executory, judicial review is
impossible no longer available

Corpuz v Cuaderno
Facts:
Petitioner was holding the position of Special
Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank of
the Philippines and was charged with an
administrative case, for alleged dishonesty,
incompetence, neglect of duty and/or abuse of
authority, oppression, misconduct, etc. preferred

against him by employees of the Bank, resulting


in his suspension by the Monetary Board of the
Bank. Upon the committee report submitted, it
finds that there is no basis upon which to
recommend disciplinary action against him.
Unable to agree with the committee report, the
Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. 957
which considered "the respondent, R. Marino
Corpus, resigned as of the date of his
suspension." Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari, mandamus and quo warranto, with
preliminary mandatory injunction and damages,
against the herein respondents but the same was
dismissed on the ground that petitioner did not
exhaust all administrative remedies available to
him in law. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether exhaustion of admin remedies
should be sought first by the petitioner.
Ruling: No. This is under an exception.
XPN: When the administrative remedy available
is merely permissive, then the party can seek
judicial relief right away (also apply generalia
specialibus non derogate). In this case, the
permissive remedy is an appeal to the Civil
Service Commission from the Monetary Board.

Smart Communications v NTC


Facts:
FACTS: Pursuant to its rule-making and
regulatory powers, the National
Telecommunications Commission issued a
Memorandum Circulars on the billing of
telecommunications services and on measures in
minimizing, if not eliminating, the incidence of
stealing of cellular phone unit. Isla
Communications Co., Inc. (IslaCom) and
Pilipino Telephone Corporation (PilTel) filed an
action for the declaration of nullity of the
memorandum circulars, alleging that NTC has

no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer


goods as stated in the subject memorandum
circulars. Such jurisdiction belongs to the DTI
under the Consumer Acts of the Philippines.
Soon thereafter, Globe Telecom, Inc. and Smart
Communications, Inc. filed a joint motion for
leave to intervene and to admit complaint-inintervention. This was granted by the trial court.

The trial court issued a TRO enjoining NTC


from implementing the MCs. NTC filed a
Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that
petitioners failed to exhaust administrative
remedies. The defendant's MD is denied for
lack of merit. NTC filed a MR but was later on
denied by the trial court. The CA, upon NTC's
filing of a special action for certiorari and
prohibition, reversed the decision of the lower
court. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the rule in exhaustion of admin


remedies should be applied.

smart, doctrine of exhaustion is applicable only


in quasi-judicial proceedings. The proper
objection in rate fixing is the doctrine of
"ripeness."
Conrad and Co v CA
Facts:
The respondents Fitrite, Inc. and its sister
company, Victoria Biscuit Co., Inc. are domestic
corporations engaged in the business of
manufacturing, selling and distributing biscuits
and cookies. Their products bear the trademark
"SUNSHINE" in the Philippines which was
awarded by the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks
and Technology Transfer (BPTTT) listing Fitrite
as principal registrant.
Since May 20, 1983 when Fitrite was issued the
Certificate of Registration for its trademark to
the filing of its complaint against Conrad
Company Inc., Fitrite and Victoria Biscuit have
been manufacturing, selling and distributing on a
massive scale biscuits and cookies bearing the
"Sunshine" trademark making it popular in
Metro Manila and in the provinces.

Ruling:
The rule was not applied.
XPN: In cases involving rule-making or quasilegislative powers of an administrative agency
- In questioning the validity or constitutionality
of a rule or regulation issued by an
administrative agency, a party need not exhaust
administrative remedies before going to court.
This principle applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed
pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not
when the assailed act pertained to its rulemaking or quasi-legislative power.

- But see Paredes v. CA (which involved ratefixing subject to approval of the Cabinet or
quasi-legislative power), where the doctrine was
applied. But Sir said the settled rule is here in

On May 30, 1990, Conrad's own Import


Manager and Executive Assistant, Raul Olaya,
executed an affidavit stating that Conrad had
also been importing, selling and distributing
biscuits and cookies, and other items bearing the
same trademark as Fitrite and Victoria's. It was
traced by the mentioned domestic corporations
that on April 18, 1988, Conrad was designated
as an exclusive importer and dealer of the
products of "Sunshine Biscuits, Inc." for sale in
the Philippine market.
A few days later, Conrad started its first
importation and continuously did so. Through
their counsel, Fitrite and Victoria addressed a
letter to Conrad demanding that it cease and
desist from continuing its operation and use of
the subject trademark, but was ignored. This led

Fitrite and Victoria to file a complaint against


Conrad for infringement and unfair competition.
Conrad sought to dismiss the complaint by
invoking litis pendentia, the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, and failure to state a cause of
action. Conrad argued that it has been granted
distributorship by Sunshine Biscuits USA over
the Philippine territory, and so, it follows that
the basis of Fitrite and Victoria's claim is lodged
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the BPTTT.
The trial court found merit on the motion to
dismiss the complaint.

Fitrite and Victoria filed a motion for


reconsideration, but was denied by the lower
court. The Court of Appeals, however, found
merit on their claims and reinstated the
complaint. Hence, this petition by Conrad
praying that the Civil Case for "Injunction with
Damages with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction" based on infringement and unfair
competition filed by Fitrite and Victoria be
dismissed.
Issue: Whether or not Fitrite and Victorias civil
action against Conrad which was based on
infringement and unfair competition be
dismissed because of the doctrine of litis
pendentia.
Held: No, the petition is without merit.
An application for administrative cancellation of
a registered trademark on any of the grounds
enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No. 166 or the
Trade-Mark Law, as amended, falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of BPTTT. But, for
infringement or unfair competition, as well as
the remedy of injunction and relief for damages,
it is explicitly and unquestionably within the
competence and jurisdiction of ordinary courts.
As held in an earlier decision by the Supreme
Court, that the registration in the Principal
Register gives rise to a presumption of validity

of the registration and of the registrant's


ownership and right to the exclusive use of the
mark. Such registration can serve as the basis for
an action of infringement which entitles the
registrant whose right was invaded for court
protection and relief.
Section 23 and Section 27 of Chapter V, of the
Trade-Mark Law provides:
Sec. 23. Actions, and damages and injunction
for infringement. Any person entitled to the
exclusive use of a registered mark or trade-name
may recover damages in a civil action from any
person who infringes his rights, and the measure
of the damages suffered shall be either the
reasonable profit which the complaining party
would have made, had the defendant not infringe
his said rights, or the profit which the defendant
actually made out of the infringement, or in the
event such measure of damages cannot be
readily ascertained with reasonable certainty,
then the court may award as damages a
reasonable percentage based upon the amount of
gross sales of the defendant or the value of the
services in connection with which the mark or
trade-name was used in the infringement of the
rights of the complaining party. In cases where
actual intent to mislead the public or to defraud
the complaining party shall be shown, in the
discretion of the court, the damages may be
doubled.
The complaining party, upon proper showing,
may also be granted injunction.
**In DOPJ, it is a condition sine qua non for the
operation of the doctrine that there be concurrent
jurisdiction between a court and an
administrative agency. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction which, simply expressed, merely
behooves regular courts, in controversies
involving specialized disputes, to defer to the
findings of resolutions of administrative

tribunals on certain technical matters. It is


unlabeled the act of suspending the judicial
proceeding pending admin act, for good cause
shown. What is that good cause? Equitable
considerations that the result of admin case may
affect the civil case or the parties may kiss and
make up. But the court should not have used
the term doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

Kilosbayan v Guingona
Facts:

1.

2.

3.

4.

In 1993, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes


Office decided to put up an on-line lottery
system which will establish a national network
system that will in turn expand PCSOs source
of income.
A bidding was made. Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation (PGMC) won it. A
contract of lease was awarded in favor of
PGMC.
Kilosbayan opposed the said agreement between
PCSO and PGMC as it alleged that:
PGMC does not meet the nationality
requirement because it is 75% foreign owned
(owned by a Malaysian firm Berjaya Group
Berhad);
PCSO, under Section 1 of its charter (RA 1169),
is prohibited from holding and conducting
lotteries in collaboration, association or joint
venture with any person, association, company
or entity;
The network system sought to be built by
PGMC for PCSO is a telecommunications
network. Under the law (Act No. 3846), a
franchise is needed to be granted by the
Congress before any person may be allowed to
set up such;
PGMCs articles of incorporation, as well as the
Foreign Investments Act (R.A. No. 7042) does
not allow it to install, establish and operate the
on-line lotto and telecommunications systems.
PGMC and PCSO, through Teofisto Guingona,
Jr. and Renato Corona, Executive Secretary and

Asst. Executive Secretary respectively, alleged


that PGMC is not a collaborator but merely a
contractor for a piece of work, i.e., the building
of the network; that PGMC is a mere lessor of
the network it will build as evidenced by the
nature of the contract agreed upon, i.e., Contract
of Lease.
ISSUE: Whether or not Kilosbayan is correct.
HELD: Yes, but only on issues 2, 3, and 4.
1. On the issue of nationality, it seems that
PGMCs foreign ownership was reduced to 40%
though.
2. On issues 2, 3, and 4, Section 1 of R.A. No.
1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the
PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries in
collaboration, association or joint venture with
any person, association, company or entity,
whether domestic or foreign. There is
undoubtedly a collaboration between PCSO and
PGMC and not merely a contract of lease. The
relations between PCSO and PGMC cannot be
defined simply by the designation they used,
i.e., a contract of lease. Pursuant to the wordings
of their agreement, PGMC at its own expense
shall build, operate, and manage the network
system including its facilities needed to operate
a nationwide online lottery system. PCSO bears
no risk and all it does is to provide its franchise
in violation of its charter. Necessarily, the use
of such franchise by PGMC is a violation of Act
No. 3846.
**Following the ruling in De Guia, legal
standing is equated to a procedural rule. Hence,
transcendental importance was sufficient to
confer standing.
Note Felicianos dissent: The issue on locus
standi should not be dismissed using merely
transcendental importance. Determination of
standing must be based on a standard:
a. The character of funds/ assets is of major
importance
b. This is a clear case of constitutional/statutory
prohibition

c. Lack of any other party with more specific or


direct interest
d. Wide range of impact of the issue