PresentedatCSD&M,1214December,2012

FrameworkforEnsuringNuclearSafety:
BeingPreparedforNuclearRisk
AkiraYamaguchi
DepartmentofEnergyandEnvironment
OsakaUniversity,Osaka,Japan

SummaryofFukushimaDaiichi Accident
RadiationExposureofFukushimaResidents (for4months
aftertheaccident)
99outof25,520exceed10mSv(public),maximum25.1mSv
48outof147exceed10mSv(workersinnuclearfacilities)

Confusioninevacuation,foodandwatercontrol
Contaminationoflandissignificant
Ifemergencypreparednessworks,theyshouldhavebeen
mitigated
Exposurelimitationinemergencysituation
Radioactivitycontrolinfoodanddrinks
Mitigationmeasureofsignificantradioactiverelease

TheTsunamiCausedStationBlackout(SBO)and
LossofUltimateHeatSink
Unit1

Unit2

Unit 3

Unit4

Unit5

Unit6

Offsitepower

X(0/6/7)

X(0/6/7)

X(0/6/7)

X(0/6/7)

X(0/6/7)

X(0/6/7)

EmergencyDG

(X)

(X)

(X)

(X)

(X)

O
(X)

Metal clad(6.9kV)

(X)

X
Power center
(480V)

X
DCbattery
Ultimate heatsink

(X)

CrossroadinFukushimaDaiichi Accident

Earthquake Practicallynodamageonsafetyfunctions at14:46,March11

Tsunami Lossofmultifunctions(notonlysafetybutlogistics)at15:42
Stationblackout(SBO)
Lossofultimateheatsink(LUHS)
Lossofinstrumentationandcontrol
Lossofcommunicationandinformation(lighting,computer,mobilephone,
paging)
Lossofoffsiteexternalassistance
Fearonaftershockandanothertsunami

HydrogenExplosiononUnit1at15:36,March12

Lossofaccidentmanagement
Lossofaccessibility
Lossofhabitability
Fearonthenextexplosion
4

RecoveryfromDisaster
Thestaffalwaysconsideredpriority;toselectthebestaction
ontheworstunit
Knowledgebasemanagement
Mobileequipment
Carbatteries

Informationishelpfulforgooddecisionmaking
HelicopterflightconfirmedwaterinthespentfuelpoolonMarch16

Externalsupportstarted(SelfDefenseForce,Fire
ManagementAgency,etc)
Corecoolingusingfireengines
Spentfuelpoolcooling usingconcretepumpvehicles
5

LessonsLearned

Always,wecanmanage
Flexibility,knowledgeandimagination
Agreementwithsocietybeforepreparation
Justificationofnucleartechnology
Riskisuncertainty

Scrutinyofwhatwentwellandworseandpreparation
ofallpossibilitiesofSevereAccidentManagement
6

HowtoEnsureSafety
RiskModel inMathematicalForm
Risk

Frequency

Consequence

Toensuresafety,suppresstherisktolowlevel
ReduceFrequency
MitigateConsequence

ItworksonlyIfweknowthefrequencypreciselyand
wecontroltheconsequence
7

FrequencyandConsequence;
WhichIsMoreImportant?
Frequency

LowConsequence

Large Risk

Lackofknowledge
andrecognition

Small Risk
Consequence

Low
Frequency

Large risk means large uncertainty

LowFrequency:WhatDoesItMean?

Likeliness

Frequency

LowConsequence

Large Risk

Small Risk
Consequence

LowFrequency
Lowlevelof
knowledge/
recognition

Low frequency means less information (ignorance)

ApproachtoEnsureSafety LimittheRisk
Riskisnotfrequencytimesconsequence
Riskcomesfromuncertaintywhichwecannotbefreefrom
Wemustbepreparedforuncertaintyandovercomeignorance

Approachtoprepareforuncertaintyandtolimit
theriskis: DefenseinDepth
Whatcausestherisk?
Sourcetermorradioactivematerial:fissionproductcausestherisk

Whosustainstherisk?
Publichealthandsafetyandenvironmentsustaintherisk

10

WhatIsHazard?WhoShouldbe
Protected?
IdentifyHazardSource
Radioactivematerials

DefineSafetyObjective
Healthandpropertyofpublicandenvironment

KeepHazardandPublicSeparate

Hazardous
Material

Management

Publichealth
andproperty,
environment
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rd
3

Defense:ObjectiveIstheGoal

Toprotectpublicismost
important
Emergencyresponseis
scenarioless
Scenarioisunpredictable
1st defensedependson
scenario

Flexibilityandknowledge
baseactionworks
Managementsystem
Drillandeducation
Safetyculture

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nd
2

DefenseIsFlexibleandBroad

1st Defence
Prevention

2nd Defence
Mitigation

Hazard
(Fission
Product)

Management

NoSevereAccident

ContainFissionProduct

3rd Defence
Emergency
preparedness

Healthand
safety,and
propertyof
public

RespondtoEmergency
Barrier/Distance/Time

Purposeofthe2nd defenseisambiguous
Boundariesareoverlapped

13

AbsolutelyUnlikelyIsImpossible
BlackSwan/WhiteRaven

BlackSwan (N.Taleb,2007)

WhiteRavens(Hempel's Ravens)

14

Knowledge

FourCategoriesofUndesirableEvent

Knownunknown

Unlikely

Knownknown

Unknown

Unknownknown

Unknownunknown

Rare

Recognition
TwoBeyondDesignBasisType:UnlikelyEventandRareEvent

15

PrecursorisMessengerofSafety
WhiteSnake(Iwakuni City,Yamaguchi,Japan)

Appearanceofunknownsismessengerofsafety

16

KnownUnknownBecomesReality
EarthquakeandtsunamiintheIndian
OceanoffSumatra:Kalpakkam NPP

Flooding:LeBlayais NPP,France

FortCalhounNPP:Missouri
RiverFloodingin2011,USA

17

IdentificationandPreparationfor
Unknowns
KnownKnownisalreadyconsidered
Designbasis

UnknownUnknownbecomesKnowns
PRAfindoutsequences(UnknownKnown)
BWRcontainmentvesselfailure(SBOscenario):hardenedvent

Unexpectedeventbecomesreality(KnownUnknown)
SmallLOCAandhumanerror(TMI)
SBO+LUHS(FukushimaDaiichi)bytsunami

Unknownknownisinvestigatedindetail(stresstest)
Knownunknownisprotected(provisions)

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RoleofStressTest,PRAandProvisions
The1st Defense
Knowledgelevel

Knownunknown
Beyondrecognition
UrgentProvisions

PRA

ResidualRisk

Unknownunknown

The3rd Defense

Knownknown
DesignBasis

Stresstest

Beyondknowledge

The2nd Defense

Unknownknown

Recognitionlevel

HowtoDealwiththeResidual?
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DoWeAcceptResidualRisk?
IAEAFundamentalSafetyPrinciples
Facilitiesandactivitiesthatgiverisetoradiationrisksmustyield
anoverallbenefit.
Justificationistheactionofdeclaringor
makingrighteousinthesightofGod
(OxfordDictionaryofEnglish)
Bereadytoacceptriskunderjustification
Butcontinuetoreduce/optimizerisk
Justitia

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Conclusions
Goodmanagementandknowledgeleadustotheright
wayatcrossroads
PreparationforUncertainty(Unpostulated scenario)
DefenseinDepth
UnlikelyEventandRareEvent

BeingPreparedforThreeTypesofUnknowns
Stresstestcoversrareevent:Unknownknown
Appropriatebackfitpreparesfor:Knownunknown
PRAdealwithunlikelyevent:UnknownUnknown

Thereexistcluetosurvivalanywhere;Trytofindit
alwaysandcontinually
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